GLOBAL ALERT

BOAZ GANOR

and the Challenge to the

The Rationality of Modern Islamist Terrorism

Liberal Democratic World

G LOBAL ALERT WAS written in an effort to elaborate a broader

understanding of the rationale behind modern Islamist terror-

ism. It has striven to do so by combining an analysis of mod-

ern terrorism strategy with an analysis of the doctrines of fundamentalist

Islam, and by revealing how the two are embodied in Middle Eastern

Islamist-jihadist terrorist organizations. The test cases chosen to illus-

trate this—Hamas and Hezbollah—present a distinct model of Islamist

hybrid terrorism (one Sunni and the other Shi’ite). The book has also shed

light on two fundamental misconceptions of the rationale behind modern

Islamist terrorism. The first conceives of Islamist terrorist organizations as

irrational actors and views suicide attacks, the hallmark of many funda-

mentalist Islamist terrorist organizations, as evidence of the irrationality of

these organizations’ leaders and activists. The second conceives of Islamist

terrorist organizations as rational actors, but holds that their cost-benefit

considerations, motivations, incentives, and behavior have a Western ratio-

nale. Those who hold this misconception believe that the cost-benefit

calculations of the leaders and activists of Islamist-jihadist terrorist orga-

nizations are similar to their own; they therefore assume that these ter-

rorist organizations will not perpetrate a given act because (under similar

circumstances) neither would they.

11CONCLUSION

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To redress these misconceptions, Global Alert proposes acknowledging

that Islamist-jihadist terrorist organizations are rational actors, while real-

izing that their rational judgments are subjective—that is, the rationality

of their policies and behavior is in the eye of the beholder. In other words,

terrorist organizations and their leaders use a system of rational concerns to

analyze the costs and benefits of alternative modi operandi; ultimately, they

choose the alternative most beneficial to them, based on their subjective

worldview. Understanding the calculus of these terrorist organizations is

the key to formulating an effective policy for confronting Islamist-jihadist

terrorism as a whole, and hybrid terrorism in particular. The book proposes

a classification of the considerations and goals underlying the actions of

modern terrorist organizations in general, and Islamist-jihadist organiza-

tions in particular, which distinguishes root motives from instrumental

motives, and these from strategic and concrete operational interests. In this

way, it explains the tension between the ideological and religious aspira-

tions and the immediate and longer-term operational considerations that

inform a terrorist organization’s decision-making processes. An analysis of

the variety and hierarchy of a terrorist organization’s goals, and recogni-

tion of the harmony and tension among them, is essential to understanding

that organization’s modus operandi, to assessing its expected behavior in

light of internal and external changes and developments, and to formulat-

ing an effective strategy for confronting it. Counter-terrorism experts and

states that confront terrorism must understand the generic rationale behind

modern terrorism, as well as the subjective rationale of each and every one

of their specific terrorist rivals; they must also be able to parse their rivals’

decision-making processes, so as to understand the leverage that may be

brought to bear on them. Counter-terrorism experts must classify the goals

and motives of terrorist organizations, and avoid confusing ideological and

religious root motivations with the instrumental motivations derived from

momentary needs and mutable constraints—even when the latter are por-

trayed by a terrorist organization as being its fundamental motivations. It

is the practice of terrorist organizations to deliberately misrepresent their

motives, with the intention of deceiving local and international public

opinion and appropriating a moderate mien. Such a classification should

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be used in devising a strategy for coping with terrorism, which will simul-

taneously reduce terrorists’ operational capability and neutralize the factors

that motivate their attacks. In this context, the book elucidates the funda-

mental principles underlying modern terrorist strategies, while exposing the

interconnectedness among terrorist organizations, the media, and public

opinion. It is this that determines a terrorist organization’s weaknesses and

strengths and governs its decision to deploy a given type of terrorist attack,

be it conventional, suicidal, or unconventional (CBRN).

Global Alert challenges the belief of many Western researchers and deci-

sion makers that democracy is a panacea, a magic solution to the problems

of fundamentalism, extremism, and terrorism. It explains that the spiritual,

military, and administrative leaders of Islamist-jihadist terrorist organi-

zations see democracy as a means of promoting their own interests. For

them, liberal democratic values are a state’s “soft underbelly,” which they

exploit to the detriment of the state. The vulnerability of liberal democ-

racy does not warrant its abandonment in the struggle to stem terrorism;

neither should that struggle dictate the adoption of an alternative form of

government. However, one of the keys to resolving the “liberal-democratic

dilemma” of fighting terrorism is to first recognize that liberal democracy

is vulnerable to exploitation by Islamist-jihadist terrorist organizations,

and to use this recognition to create a complex system of checks and bal-

ances that will obviate such exploitation. Awareness of the tension between

effective counter-terrorism strategies and liberal democratic values is the

first step toward finding a golden mean that will enable liberal democracies

to preserve their fundamental values while successfully fighting terrorism.

States must identify the mechanisms and behaviors that will enable them

to honor their commitment to defending their citizens without sacrificing

their core values. Ignoring the inherent tension between these two com-

mitments may be damaging, and may even cost human lives. Yet unbridled

counter-terrorism efforts that trammel liberal democratic values threaten to

delegitimize those who employ them.

In this context, Global Alert pinpoints certain anachronisms and lacunae

in international humanitarian law, which hamper its use in fighting terror-

ism. The book illustrates this with an extensive discussion of the dilemma of

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proportionality—a dilemma exacerbated by the tendency of Islamist-jihadist

terrorist organizations to deliberately embed operatives and installations in

a crowded civilian population so as to force the rival state to risk inflicting

extensive human casualties and property damage if it tries to oppose them. The

book proposes a unique conceptual model, which may help to solve the liberal

democratic dilemma of proportionality in counter-terrorism operations.

Another facet of the liberal-democratic dilemma in the war on ter-

rorism is that posed by hybrid terrorist organizations, which simultane-

ously employ pseudo-legitimate social welfare and political mechanisms

and illegitimate and illegal terrorist and military mechanisms. The hybrid

model is not unique to Islamist-jihadist terrorist organizations, however;

it is particularly prevalent among organizations that derive from extremist

Islamic movements, and among Islamist terrorist organizations that estab-

lish welfare and charitable foundations and political parties as a “front”

for their terrorist activity. Global Alert cites Hamas and Hezbollah, which

have become entrenched in the Palestinian and Lebanese political arenas,

respectively, and which have made territorial gains, as distinct exemplars

of the hybrid terrorist organization. Hamas and Hezbollah are likely to

become “role models” for Islamist-jihadist terrorist organizations in the

Middle East and elsewhere—like the Abu Sayyaf Group in the Philip-

pines, Jemaah Islamiyah ( JI) in Indonesia, jihadist groups in Egypt, sepa-

ratist groups in Chechnya, and the local branches of al-Qaeda in North

Africa (al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb), Yemen (al-Qaeda in the Ara-

bian Peninsula), Iraq (the Islamic State of Iraq), and Syria (the al-Nusra

Front)—that aspire to translate their terrorist activity into electoral gains

and augment their internal and international status. Western decision

makers must therefore realize that hybrid terrorist organizations are more

dangerous than terrorist organizations that are not involved in political or

social-welfare activities. Terrorist organizations that operate in pseudo-

legitimate social and political spheres do not warrant any legitimacy; in

fact, operative and ethical guidelines should be developed to prohibit ter-

rorist organizations from infiltrating the political and social-welfare arenas,

unless they renounce and actually desist from terrorist activity themselves,

and cease assisting other terrorist entities.

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On the basis of this analysis, Global Alert determines that Islamist-

jihadist terrorism is a “learning endeavor,” with terrorist organizations ever

on a learning curve. They adapt to the behavior of rival regimes, identify the

vulnerabilities and limitations imposed by those regimes’ values, and adjust

their modus operandi accordingly. Counter-terrorism experts and states

that confront terrorism must therefore win the “learning competition” with

terrorist organizations. Just as terrorist organizations learn the vulnerabilities

of the states they oppose, so must Western states learn the weaknesses and

vulnerabilities of terrorist organizations. At the same time, these states must

learn to recognize their own soft underbelly and weaknesses.

To effectively cope with Islamist-jihadist terrorism, it is first necessary to

understand its fundamentalist underpinnings. Appeasement is no solution to

the problem of Islamist-jihadist terrorism—and in fact may be very danger-

ous. At the same time, however, it is important not to demonize Islam as the

ultimate motivator of radicalization processes that lead to violence and ter-

rorism. Doing so is an oversimplification of the situation, and only alienates

moderate Muslims who should take part in the fight against the extremist

terrorism that threatens the liberal democracy from which they, too, benefit.

It is also necessary to recognize the dynamic, elusive nature of mod-

ern terrorism, which is simultaneously active in multiple spheres. Only a

complex local, federal, and international network, in which various agen-

cies cooperate to meet the criminal, military, political, economic, and public

relations challenges posed by terrorist organizations, will guarantee effective

multidimensional counter-terrorism policy. Focusing on any one of these

dimensions exclusively will hamper the overall effort to successfully coun-

ter terrorism. Yet to facilitate sophisticated cooperation and establish the

necessary, shared international mechanisms and methods, it is first imper-

ative to arrive at one internationally consensual definition of terrorism. To

date, the lack of such an agreed-upon definition has stymied attempts to

address the multiple facets of modern terrorism and the varied layers of the

hybrid terrorist organization, in particular.

For counter-terrorism efforts to be effective, terrorism must be fought

operationally, in the media, and through legal methods. The military and the

police must wage an operational campaign to diminish, if not utterly defeat,

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the capabilities of terrorist organizations by drying up their monetary

resources, disrupting their recruitment efforts, destroying their weapons,

foiling their training routines, and thwarting their plans and preparations.

At the same time, a media-propaganda campaign must be waged to foil the

efforts of terrorist organizations to win hearts and minds, gain international

legitimacy, and instill fear in target populations. Unlike a terrorist organi-

zation, a state confronting terrorism is at a fundamental disadvantage in

facing the terrorist organization’s population of origin, its own population,

and world public opinion. Usually, it is easier for a terrorist organization to

stir up hatred of an enemy state—through da’wa and by insinuating itself

into its population of origin, effectively forcing the enemy state to harm

that population in its counter-terrorism efforts—than it is for a state to use

the media to lessen hatred and enmity or assuage the fears and anxieties

stirred up in its own population by continuous encounters with terrorism.

Furthermore, it is difficult for a state targeted by terrorism to contradict

the image of the underdog that its terrorist enemy builds for itself in the

international and, particularly, the Western-liberal media, with its impli-

cation of an asymmetrical struggle between David and Goliath. As the

purported Goliath, the state is stymied in its justified need to employ effec-

tive counter-terrorism measures, because these (may) cause collateral dam-

age, even if limited. This difficulty is exacerbated by terrorist organizations’

readiness to create a fictitious but convincing picture of their “plight”: by

inflating the number of civilian victims of counter-terrorism efforts, blam-

ing the besieged state for using forbidden means and methods, and enter-

ing into alliances with human rights and other associations that support

the “underdog.” These actions have the effect of delegitimizing the besieged

state, whose own counter-propaganda campaign must hew to a rigid com-

mitment to proven facts. Clarifying these facts to get at the truth can take

so long that by the time the state’s facts have been assembled, the terror-

ist organization’s message has come to dominate the media, rendering the

state’s message irrelevant and anachronistic.

Lastly, states that battle terrorism must fastidiously preserve the legal

legitimacy of liberal democracy even as they undermine any terror-

ist attempt to exploit it. Decision makers must remember that terrorist

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organizations tether international laws and tribunals to their fight against

the enemy state, portraying any attempt to fight terrorism as illegitimate,

illegal, and based on “war crimes.” Terrorism’s “lawfare” requires the belea-

guered state to exercise extreme caution, and studiously avoid the legal traps

laid for it by its terrorist rivals.

In this context, it is interesting to quote Ismail Hania, the most promi-

nent “internal” leader of Hamas in the Gaza Strip. In a recent statement,

Hania in effect described Hamas’s strategy for fighting Israel:

It is of course well known that experience teaches that to realize the proj-

ect of national liberation, we must combine struggle with political and

diplomatic efforts, such that the political efforts are no less important

than the military efforts, and in fact each complements the other. . . . We

call on all Palestinian forces, organizations and people to join ranks in

confronting the dangers of negotiations with the enemy or any possible

agreement with the enemy, and to formulate a national Palestinian strat-

egy that will include any and all means—including armed struggle, popu-

lar resistance, political and diplomatic opposition, propaganda, a public

and legal fight, and an academic boycott—and will be deployed in all

regional and international arenas. . . . We call on human rights organiza-

tions, on civil society, and international liberal organizations to denounce

the Zionist blockade of Gaza. . . . We call on anyone who can do so to file

a legal suit in international criminal court against the Israeli occupation,

for war crimes against our helpless nation.1

In summary, effectively coping with Islamist-jihadist terrorism in gen-

eral, and hybrid terrorism in particular, requires liberal democratic states to

formulate a doctrine founded on the following eight principles:

1. Gaining thorough familiarity with the rationale of enemy terrorist orga-

nizations: their ideology, motivations (distinguishing between root causes

and instrumental motivations), goals, cost-benefit calculations, and decision-

making processes, including how they address conflicts, rivalries, and competi-

tion within their leadership, and the external and internal influences on them.

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2. Identifying possible failures in understanding terrorism as a whole

and Islamist terrorism in particular, which may be the “fault” of deliber-

ate deception by terrorist organizations and their supporters. It is there-

fore necessary to precisely identify and define the enemy, remembering that

although a terrorist organization may be the immediate enemy, it may be

backed by a fundamentalist ideology of violence, which motivates the ter-

rorist activity of multiple activists and organizations worldwide. For exam-

ple, states should guard against failing to understand the enemy’s rationale,

and confusing the enemy’s instrumental motivations with its root causes.

3. Recognizing the strengths and weaknesses of liberal democracy

in confronting the liberal-democratic and the democratic-governance

dilemmas. The liberal-democratic dilemma requires a state to strike a

delicate balance between preserving its fundamental liberal democratic

underpinnings while efficiently confronting terrorism. The democratic-

governance dilemma reflects the tension between a liberal democratic state’s

ability to govern and retain legitimacy in the face of protracted terrorism,

given that the leaders of a Western liberal society can continue to rule only

if they ensure the safety of their citizens—even when this requires using

means that may impede civil rights or contradict liberal democratic values.

4. Striving to achieve the broadest possible consensus, spanning reli-

gions and cultures, regarding the illegitimacy of terrorism. International

consensus must be based on an objective, consensual definition of terror-

ism, which treats its methods as illegitimate under all circumstances—even

when they are meant to achieve goals that its perpetrators and supporters

perceive as justified. The greatest impediment to this principle is political

correctness—that is, the use of lip service and appeasement in an attempt

not to arouse the wrath of states, organizations, and individuals that identify

with the political goals of the terrorist organization.

5. Distinguishing between the gross cynical exploitation that Islamist-

jihadist terrorist organizations and their spiritual leaders make of religious

motivations and extremist interpretations of the necessity of violence

against “heretics,” and a religious radicalism marked by devoutness and pre-

cise adherence to the commandments of Islam, that is divorced from the

use of or incitement to violence. This requires recognizing radicalization

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processes, identifying the stages of escalation, and knowing when the line

has been crossed between legitimate Islamic religious orthodoxy and dan-

gerously violent Islamist-jihadist extremism.

6. Realizing the unique danger posed by hybrid terrorist organizations,

and failing to grant legitimacy to organizations that are involved in pseudo-

legitimate political, religious, educational, or economic activities. No arti-

ficial distinction should be made among the military, political, and da’wa

components of a terrorist organization. Moreover, terrorist organizations

must not be allowed to engage in political, religious, and social welfare

activities unless they cease initiating, planning, perpetrating, or inciting to

terrorism. Similarly, an organization’s right to participate in elections should

be conditional on its proven renunciation of terrorism.

7. Formulating an effective doctrine for fighting terrorism in gen-

eral and Islamist-jihadist terrorism in particular, which simultaneously

addresses terrorist organizations’ underlying motivations and operational

capabilities. States must recognize the tension, and sometimes the contra-

diction, between motivations and capabilities, which can cause a “boomer-

ang effect.” That is, counter-terrorism measures that effectively target an

organization’s capabilities can paradoxically increase its motivation to carry

out terrorist attacks. Effective counter-terrorism doctrine requires finding

an appropriate balance, allowing for proactive military and security activi-

ties to thwart a terrorist organization’s capabilities without fueling its desire

to perpetrate retaliatory or “revenge” attacks.

8. Formulating a counter-terrorism doctrine that encompasses opera-

tive, media-propaganda, and legal efforts. Only if a state is simultaneously

victorious in all three arenas may it effectively stymie, or perhaps even

defeat, terrorist organizations.

In summary, it is not impossible to effectively fight modern terrorism over-

all, and Islamist-jihadist terrorism in particular. However, doing so does

require that Western liberal democracies employ critical self-examination,

precise and unbiased identification of the terrorist enemy, and understand-

ing of that enemy’s subjective rationale.