Blueprint for a Transatlantic Climate Partnership

8/14/2019 Blueprint for a Transatlantic Climate Partnership

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CLIMATE & ENERGY PAPER SERIES 09

Blueprint for a transatlantic

climate partnership

nigel purvis

Senior Transatlantic Fellow, The German Marshall Fund of the United States

President, Climate Advisers


2/21

2009 Te German Marshall Fund o the United States. All rights reserved.

No part o this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any orm or by any means without permission in writing

rom the German Marshall Fund o the United States (GMF). Please direct inquiries to:

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E [email protected]

Tis publication can be downloaded or ree at http://www.gmus.org/publications/index.cm. Limited print

copies are also available. o request a copy, send an e-mail to [email protected].

gmf per serie

Te GMF Paper Series presents research on a variety o transatlantic topics by sta, ellows, and partners o the GermanMarshall Fund o the United States. Te views expressed here are those o the author and do not necessarily represent the

view o GMF. Comments rom readers are welcome; reply to the mailing address above or by e-mail to [email protected].

about gmf

Te German Marshall Fund o the United States (GMF) is a non-partisan American public policy and grant-making institu-

tion dedicated to promoting greater cooperation and understanding between North America and Europe.

GMF does this by supporting individuals and institutions working on transatlantic issues, by convening leaders to discuss

the most pressing transatlantic themes, and by examining ways in which transatlantic cooperation can address a variety o

global policy challenges. In addition, GMF supports a number o initiatives to strengthen democracies.

Founded in 1972 through a gi rom Germany as a permanent memorial to Marshall Plan assistance, GMF maintains astrong presence on both sides o the Atlantic. In addition to its headquarters in Washington, DC, GMF has seven ofces in

Europe: Berlin, Bratislava, Paris, Brussels, Belgrade, Ankara, and Bucharest.

Tis paper would not have been possible without unding rom the ransatlantic Climate Bridge, an initiative jointly launched

by German Foreign Minister Dr. Frank-Walter Steinmeier and German Environment Minister Sigmar Gabriel to connect and

support those working to address the challenges o climate change, energy security, and economic growth at the local, thestate, and the ederal level in the United States and Germany.

Te writing o this report was supported in part by a grant rom the Norwegian Royal Ministry o Foreign Aairs.


3/21

Blueprint or a ransatlantic Climate Partnership

Climate & Energy Paper Series

July 2009

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Blueprint or a ransatlantic Climate Partnership 3

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Introduction1

Past experience

shows that forgin

a durable global

consensus on

a new climate

agreement will

prove difficult,

perhaps impossi

if the United

States and Europ

cannot overcome

their differences.


5/21

he German Marshall Fund o the United States4

Whether Europe

and the United

States like it or not,

the onlyglobal deal

developing nations

are prepared toconsider right

now must include

commitments from

developed nations

to immediate

emissions mitigation,

more financial

assistance, and to

giving developing

nations greater

control of globalclimate institutions.

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The Global Deal2


6/21


The good news is

that most parties

including the

United States an

Europe, agree

on a number of

important points

The bad news is

that developed

and emerging

economies disag

on two really big

questionsthe

level of ambition

of the medium-

term U.S. emissio

target, and the

legal and structu

form of actions

by emerging

economies.

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7/21


Many

knowledgeable

climate experts

in Washington

believe that

Obamas proposedtargeta 14%

cut in U.S.

emissions from

2005 levels by

2020represents

a realistic

scenario for the

United States

one that is both

economically

and politicallyachievable.

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8/21


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Obama and the

international

community

should continue

to push Congress

toward the

most ambitious

emissions

reduction target

possible, but in

the end whateve

target Congress

approves will be

akin to a take it

or leave it offer.

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9/21


The transatlantic

parties are rightly

focused on

getting emerging

economies

committed tolong-term climate-

friendly economic

strategies,

sometimes called

low carbon

growth plans.

The international

superstructure

that surrounds

these, therefore,

must by necessitybe at the heart

of international

negotiations.

Actions by Emerging Economies:

Insist on a Few Common Elements

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10/21


If the actions

of emerging

economies are

not legally bindin

internationally

in the next

international

climate

agreement,

Congress would

be very unlikely

to agree to

legally binding

commitments for

the United States

,

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11/21


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Access to global

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have negotiated

sector- oreconomy-

wide emission

reduction

baselines with

the international

community.


12/21


Nations that are

concerned about

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need to be

prepared to drive

a hard bargain

actually saying

no to an

international

agreement

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contain uniform

mitigation

requirements

for all major

emitters. Without

these elements

a new climate

agreement would

be unlikely to

succeed.

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13/21


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Finance and Institutions3


14/21


Europe and

the United

States should

make a very

generous offer

to substantially

increase financia

assistance to

developing

nations, provided

a small number

of reasonable

conditions are m

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15/21


To deal with

climate change

effectively the

United States

and Europe each

need to comeup with at least

$25 billion a year

for international

climate activities

between now

and 2020 from

public and private

sources. Politically,

mobilizing this

amount of

funding wouldbe a Herculean

effort, particularly

in the United

States and likely

even in Europe.

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16/21


Developing

nations need to

accept that a

large and growin

percentage of ne

climate change

resources will

come from the

private sector,

mainly through

U.S. and Europea

carbon markets.

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Figure 1: Uses and Sources of Public Financing

Capacitybuilding

Verifiedemissionsreductions

Policyimplementation

Capacitybuilding

Verifiedemissionsreductions

Policyimplementation

New global fund(World Bank?)

Other IFIs

GEF

EU bilateral

Existing UN funds

Other developed countrybilateral funds

Japanbilateral

U.S. bilateral

Funding Uses Funding Sources

Multilateral

Decentralized

Source: Nigel Purvis, Climate Advisers (2009)


17/21


So deep is the

suspicion of global

government in

America that

mandatory

contributions tonew centralized

climate finance

institutions could

threaten the

prospects of U.S.

participation in a

new UN climate

agreement.

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18/21


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Figure 2: Financing Emissions Mitigation in Emerging Economies

Market-readiness andcapacity building forforeign assistance

Global emergingeconomy mitigationcost curve

Emergingeconomycontribution

Developed countrycarbon markets

Government-to-governmentpay for performance

$ per ton CO2e

Time/tons

Negative cost opportunities,self-financed sustainabledevelopment projects

$

0

Source: Nigel Purvis and Andrew Stevenson, Climate Advisers (2009)

Note: Some concepts were drawn from McKinsey and Companys global greenhouse gas abatement cost curve work.


19/21


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w .


20/21


Unless the

United States

and Europe find

common ground

on both emission

mitigation and

financing for

developing

nations, China an

other emerging

economies

are unlikely to

make major

compromises.

Upcoming Climate Diplomacy4W MEF b , , b C w

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x v- k .


21/21

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Blueprint for a Transatlantic Climate Partnership