Blind Company Order

8/10/2019 Blind Company Order

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UNITEDSTATESDISTRICTCOURT

SOUTHERNDISTRICTOFFLORIDA

MIAMIDIVISION

CASENO.1422011CIVMARTINEZ/GOODMAN

JASONM.WANDNER,

Plaintiff,

v.

AMERICANAIRLINES,etal.,

Defendants.

_____________________________/

ORDERONPLAINTIFFSREQUESTFORSPOLIATIONSANCTIONS

If thewellknown, vinyl era rockbands Bad Company and Blind Faith had

mergedtoformasupergroup,thenthehypotheticalnewbandmighthavebeencalled

BadFaith,whichwouldsatisfyPlaintiffsburdentoobtainthespoliationsanctionshe

seeks.Or

the

imagined

musical

group

could

have

chosen

to

combine

the

precursor

bandsnamesandcalleditselfBlindCompany.Thatcouldbeacolorful,hyperbolicyet

somewhat accurate description of how Plaintiff portrays Defendant MiamiDade

Countys(theCounty)handlingofhiswrittenrequesttopreservevideosurveillance

footageofhisarrest thefocalpointofthiscase andthecircumstancesleadingupto

hisdetention.

PlaintiffsrequestthattheCountybetakenonaninvoluntarytriptothelandof

sanctions for itsmishandling of his request to preserve video evidencebegins, like

Case 1:14-cv-22011-JEM Document 119 Entered on FLSD Docket 01/12/2015 Page 1 of 40


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manytrips,attheairport,whereJasonWandner acriminaldefenseattorney went

tomeethisclient.

Specifically, on January 15, 2014, Wandner went to the Miami International

Airport(theAirport)tomeethisclientatagateontheconcourseforabusinesstripto

Jacksonville.Wandnerparkedhiscarandenteredtheterminal,buthenevermadehis

scheduled flight.What happened toWandner at and around theAmericanAirlines

ticketcounterandwhyhenevermadeittothegateisverymuchindispute.Whatisnot

in dispute, however, is thatWandnerwas arrested for disorderly conduct andwas

transported tojail,wherehebondedout approximately sevenhours later.The State

AttorneysOfficenolleprossedthecasethesameday.

Five days later, on January 20, 2014, Wandner sent a letter to Miami

DadeCounty(theCounty),addressedtotheairport,askingthatallvideosurveillance

of the ticket counter and adjacent selfcheckin areasbepreserved for the twohour

windowof6:00 to8:00a.m.onJanuary15.TheCountyreceived theJanuary20,2014

letterandultimatelyarrangedforamaintenanceemployeetoprocessWandnersvideo

preservation request.No one at theCounty took note ofwhen the videowouldbe

destroyedthroughthestandardprotocolofrecordingovervideoafterapproximately30

days.Essentially,despiteWandnerswrittenrequest,theCountyallowedthevideoto

be destroyed.Wandner claims that this failure has unduly prejudiced his ability to

prosecute his laterfiled civil lawsuit against theCounty (and other defendants) for,



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amongotherthings,maliciousprosecution,negligenceandafederalcivilrightsclaims

under42U.S.C.1983.

Wandnerbrands theCountysmishandlingofhiswritten requestas spoliation

andasks for severe sanctions includingajury instruction foramandatoryadverse

inference.TheCounty,ofcourse,opposesWandnersrequest.Itarguesthatitsconduct

fallsfarshortofthebadfaithnecessaryinthisCircuitfortheimpositionofspoliation

related sanctions. And it contends that Wandners request for spoliation sanctions

suffers from other fatal flaws, including the failure to demonstrate that any actual

evidenceexistedonthevideosinthefirstplace.

TheUndersigned concludes, after amultihour evidentiary hearing [ECFNo.

106]andsupplementalbriefing, that theCountybadlybungledWandnersrequest to

preserve the surveillancevideosand issurely responsible for thevideosdestruction.

Nevertheless,therequestedsanctionscannotbeawardedbecauseWandnerhasnotmet

hisburden of proving that the County acted inbad faith. In addition, he has not

sufficientlydemonstratedthatthevideoscontainedanyrelevantevidence.

ButWandnerwillnotbeleftwithoutanypotentialtoolstoaddressthissituation.

Subject to a final rulingbyUnited StatesDistrictJudgeJoseA.Martinez,whowill

preside at the trial andmake the final evidentiary rulings,Wandnermay introduce

evidenceofhiswrittenrequestsforvideo(thereweretwo)andoftheCountysfailure

to preserve the videos, and he may also argue that the destruction of evidence



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hampered his ability to present his case. He may also argue about the Countys

motivationtonotpreservethetapeswhenitknewoflikelylitigation.Tobesure,thisis

lesspowerful than amandatory inference instruction,or even apermissible adverse

inferenceinstruction.Butthosetworesultsareforspoliation,andtheUndersignedfinds

thatspoliationsanctionsarenotwarrantedhereundercurrentEleventhCircuitlaw.

Thefactualbackgroundandlegalanalysisareoutlinedbelow.

I. RelevantFactualBackground

a.

WandnersVersion

According toWandnersAmendedComplaint [ECFNo. 32],1he arrived at an

airportparkinggarageapproximatelyanhourbeforethescheduled7:10a.m.departure

time for the American Airlines flight. Wandner contends that the parking ticket

machinemalfunctionedanddidnotissuehimaticket.Therefore,Wandnerclaims,he

was forced toback up and enter through another parking garage lane and finally

obtainedanentranceticketat6:28a.m.

Wandnerparked,enteredtheterminal,andproceededtothenearestAmerican

Airlines automatic check in kioskmachine to obtain aboarding pass. Themachine

wouldnotprintone,andWandnerclaimshe soughthelp fromDeryaUysal,a ticket

agent technically employedby Codefendant Swissport,USAwhowas acting as an

1 AftertheevidentiaryhearingonWandnersrequestforspoliationsanctions,the

subject of thisOrder,he filed [ECFNo. 111] amotion to amendhis FirstAmended

Complaint.All fourDefendants filedajointopposition to themotion [ECFNo.114].

Theyopposethemotiononbothproceduralandsubstantivegrounds.



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AmericanAirlinesagent.TheAmendedComplaintalleges thatUysal refused togive

Wandneraboardingpass.Wandner saysUysalclaimed the flightwasclosedeven

thoughitwasatleast30minutesuntilthescheduleddeparturetime.

Wandner thenphonedhis client,whowas at the gate.His client spoke to an

AmericanAirlinesgateagent,who advisedthattheflightwasnotclosed,hadnoteven

beguntoboardandthatWandnerhadsufficienttimetoreachthegate.Wandnerthen

askedUysal tocontactasupervisor,andUysalsaidshewouldcallbothasupervisor

and the MiamiDade police. The supervisor, another Swissport employee, arrived,

refusedtotakeanyactionandthenwalkedaway.Atsomepoint,WandnercalledUysal

incompetent,andheclaimsthatUysalcalledpolicetoretaliateforthiscomment.

Wandnercontendsthatthegateagent,throughaconversationwithhisclientat

thegate,advisedthatWandnershouldaskforaticketingchangetoalaterflight,which

would thenpermithim to standby for the7:10a.m. flight.WandneraskedUysal to

issue him a ticket for the later flight. She took his drivers license, supposedly to

facilitatehisrequest,butthengavehislicensetoCodefendantLindsayDiaz,aCounty

policeofficerwhohadbythenarrivedwiththreeorfourotherofficers.Uysalprocessed

theticketchangeandgaveWandneraboardingpassforthelaterflight.

Atthatpoint,Wandnersays,heaskedOfficerDiaztoreturnhisdriverslicense

so thathe couldproceed to the gate,butOfficerDiaz refused and toldWandner to

standoff to theside.Wandnersayshecompliedbut toldOfficerDiaz thathehadno



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legalrighttoarrestordetainhimandthathisactionsviolatedWandnersconstitutional

rights.Wandner claims that Officer Diaz then immediately took him into custody,

withoutconductinganyinvestigationorobservinganycrime.HealsoclaimsthatDiaz

didnotatthetimeadvisehimofthechargeswhichsupposedlyjustifiedthearrest.

OfficerDiazhandcuffedWandnerand forcedhim togoonaperp rideona

golfcarttoanofficewherehewashandcuffedfortwohourswhilepolicereportswere

drafted.Wandnersayshemadeseveralrequeststo telephonehisclient,hisoffice,his

wifeandtheJacksonvillefederalcourt(wherehewastoappearthatday),butOfficer

Diaz and theotherofficers refused.Wandner claims thatOfficerDiaz and theother

officersalsorefusedhisrequests toremove thehandcuffsandrejectedhisarguments

that handcuffswere unnecessarybecause he is amember in good standing of the

FloridaBar,hadneverbeenarrestedbeforeandwasnotaflightrisk.

WandneralsocontendsthatheaskedOfficerDiaztoissueanoticetoappear,in

lieuofanarrestandajailbooking,butOfficerDiazrefused.Moreover,Wandnersays,

OfficerDiazadvisedhim thathewantedWandner to suffer the fullconsequencesof

beingdetained,includingbeingbookedintojailandbeingforcedtobondout.Officer

DiaztookhimtotheTurnerGilfordKnightCorrectionalCenter,wherehewasbooked

and where he remained for seven hours before bonding out. After dropping off

Wandnerat thejail,OfficerDiazgaveWandnera copyof thearrestaffidavit,which

statedthatdisorderlyconductwasthechargeforthearrest.



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Wandnerhadalreadybondedoutbythetimeajudgebegantheafternoonsfirst

appearancesthroughthejailsvideofeedandtheStateAttorneysOfficeannounceda

nolleprosewhenhiscasewascalled.

InaletterdatedJanuary20,2014,WandneraskedtheCountytopreserveany

and all video evidence taken at the Miami International Airport, at the American

AirlinesticketcounterandselfcheckinonJanuary15,2014between6:00a.m.through

8:00a.m.,andatthegatewhereAmericanAirlinesflightnumber3639boardedbetween

6:00 a.m. through 8:00 a.m.This evidence is relevant for an impendingcivil

matter

relating toJasonM.Wandners false arreston thatdateunder the abovepolice case

number. SeeJointCompositeExhibitBinder submitted atDec. 23, 2014Evidentiary

Hearing, p. MDC 36 (emphasis added). The letter also advised, if you have any

questionsregardingtheforegoing,pleasecontactouroffice.Id.Acountystampinthe

lowerrightcorneroftheletterreflectsaJanuary27,2014receiptdate.

InaFebruary5,2014followupletter(stampedreceivedonFebruary11,2014),

Wandner expanded his video preservation request to include any and all video

evidencefromtheAirportparkinggarageentrance. Id.atp.MDC83.

Wandner ultimately received video showing the parking garagebut did not

receive any for the ticket counter, selfcheckin areaor thegatewherehis clientwas

waitingforhim.HelaterlearnedthattheCountyfailedtopreservethosevideos.



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Aswillbeoutlined shortly, theCountysviewof the facts is fardifferent than

Wandners. Itdescribeshim asa rude, loud, angry and confrontational travelerwho

createdascene.Wandnerdeniesthis.

But, given the significant discrepancybetween the competing versions of the

facts leadingup to the arrest,Wandner contends thatvideo surveillance showingan

absenceofactivitywouldhavebeencriticaltohiscase becauseitwouldsupporthis

versionandundermineDefendantsrendition.

b.

TheDefendants

Version

TheCountyandOfficerDiazjointly fileda summaryjudgmentmotionwitha

separatestatementofundisputedmaterialfacts.[ECFNos.96,97].

AccordingtotheseDefendants,Wandnerdidnotknowwhattimehisflightwas

scheduledtoboardandarrivedattheAmericanAirlinesselfservicekioskat6:31a.m.

However,by this time, the flightwasfinal meaningnoadditionalpersonscould

checkinbecause the flightwas scheduled to depart in less than fortyfiveminutes.

AccordingtoOfficerDiazandtheCounty,thefinalcountercheckinwas6:25a.m.,six

minutesbeforeWandnerfirsttriedtocheckinatthekiosk.

Theyalsoexplainthatboardingpassesarenotissuedafteraflightisconsidered

final andnote thatWandners 7:10 a.m. flight toJacksonvillebeganboarding at 6:42

a.m.,boardedthelasttwostandbypassengersat6:57a.m.andthendepartedthegate

sevenminutesearly,at7:03a.m.



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OfficerDiazandtheCountysayWandnerbecamefrustratedwhenthemachine

advisedhimthataboardingpasscouldnotbeissuedtohim.HeranuptoUysal,who

noticedthatheappearedtobesweating,andheaskedforherhelp.Uysaltookhimto

the front of the line (even though other people were in line) but, after using the

computer, determined that he could not get aboarding passbecause the flightwas

closed.

Wandnerdidnotacceptthatexplanation,andhecontactedhisclientbyphoneat

thegate.Afterthatconversation,WandnerrenewedthematterwithUysalbecausehe

believedshegavehimfalseinformation.Uysalrefusedhisrequesttocontactthegate.

He thought thiswasunprofessional,andhe toldUysalshewas incompetent.Hewas

angryandraisedhisvoiceather.

Uysal askedhim to calmdown,advising that shewouldputhimon thenext

flight. Officer Diaz and the County contend that he did not calm down, however.

Wandnerwaswarnedseveraltimesthat thepolicewouldbecalled ifhedidnotstop

yelling,stopcursingandstopslamminghishandsonthecounter.Wandnersaidhedid

notcare if thepolicewerecalled,which,according toDefendants, scaredUysaleven

more.Wandneremphaticallyslammedhishandsonthecounter,leanedtowardUysal,

and toldher, Im going to get on that fucking flight!At thatpoint, another ticket

agentcontactedpolice.



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DefendantscontendthatanAmericanAirlinesmechanicworking100feetaway

heardWandner yelling and approached out of concern forUysals safety. Another

ticketagentexplainedthatWandnersbehaviordisruptedalloperationsatthecheckin

counter.

Officer Diaz received a dispatch call to respond to a disturbance. When he

arrived,DiazsawWandnerfacingUysal,whoappearedsomewhatdistraught.Healso

concluded that Wandners hand gestures and mannerisms suggested that he was

arguingwithUysal.UysaladvisedOfficerDiaz thatWandnerwasangrybecause the

flightwasclosed, that shehadputhimon thenext flightasstandbybut thathehad

becomeirateandstartedtoscreamather.

OfficerDiaztookWandnersdriverslicenseandtriedtoconductabackground

searchforoutstandingwarrants.AccordingtoOfficerDiaz,Wandnergotverycloseto

hisfaceanddemandedhis licensebereturned.OfficerDiazadvisedWandnerthathe

wouldreturnitwhenhewasfinishedwithit,andheaskedWandnertomovebacktwo

feet.Wandnercontinuedtomake inflammatoryaccusations inanargumentativeway.

AnotherofficerapproachedandtriedtocalmWandnerdown,butthoseeffortsfailed.

WandnersinterruptionspreventedOfficerDiazfromspeakingfurtherwithUysaland

completinghisinvestigation. Thecommotioncausedallmovementandbusinessatthe

counterstostop,andOfficerDiazarrestedWandnerat6:50a.m.



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c.

TheEvidentiaryHearingAboutTheVideoRequests2

There are fivewitnesseswho testified andwhowere involved in processing

Wandners requests to preserve security surveillance videos at the airport: Jordan

Garber (aCounty clerkwho requestsvideos from thevideo shopwhen a request is

received),VictorAdriazola(aMiamiairportvideoshopsupervisorwhodelegatesvideo

copying to a technician), Janet Hutcheon (a claims adjuster for the Countys risk

management divisionwho sometimes requests evidence in caseswhere there is an

actual or potential claim against the County), Jesus Diaz (a County maintenance

departmentemployeewhoworksforAdriazolainthevideoshop andwhosearched

the videos requested by Wandner), and Milford Cockfield (a risk manager in the

supportservicesdivisionoftheCountysAviationDepartment).

AdriazolaconsideredWandnersinitialwrittenrequesttobeinsufficient,buthe

sent iton toDiaz forprocessing.TheCountynotes, in itsposthearingmemorandum

[ECFNo.115],thatAdriazolaforwardedthelettertoDiazwithinminutesofreceiving

an email about it.Adriazola hasworkedwithGarber to narrow the scope of other

requestsbuthasnorecollectionofdoingsohere.

2 Inadditiontothetestimonyadducedattheevidentiaryhearing,therecordhas

beensupplementedwiththedepositionofVictorAdriazola,aCountyemployeewhois

a supervisor at theAirportsvideo shop. [ECFNo. 104].TheParties agreed that the

Adriazola deposition testimony could be used in lieu of live testimony because

Adriazolacouldnotappearattheevidentiaryhearing.[Id.atp.2].



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departmentforfalsearrest.Wewillgoaheadandgetafilesetuponthisendforthe

falsearrestclaim.SeeJointCompositeExhibitBinder,p.MDC3(emphasissupplied).

Garbersaidhehadno ideaofthebackgroundsurroundingthepoliceinvolved

disturbanceandsaid itwouldhavebeenhelpful ifHutcheonhadcontactedWandner

foradditionalinformation.

According toGarber, thevideo surveillance ispreserved for approximately30

days.Thespecificpreservationtimevariesaccordingtothecameraandserverinvolved.

TheCountydidnothaveasystem topinpointwhen the30day (or similarduration)

period expired.Garberwasunaware of anyone at theCountynotingwhen 30days

(fromJanuary15,thedateoftheincident)wouldexpire.

Underquestioning fromanassistantcountyattorney,Garberexplained thathe

does not know where the cameras are located or where they are focused, what

information thevideo shop employeesneed inorder to locate aparticular video, or

whether thevideo shop technicians think theyhave sufficient information to locatea

requestedvideo.GarberdidnotknowWandnerorOfficerDiazandhadnoreasonto

helporhurteitherof them.Henever lookedatvideo involved in thecaseandnever

triedtopreventtherequestedvideosfrombeingprovidedtoWandner.

HutcheonreceivedacopyofWandnersJanuary20writtenrequestbutdoesnot

recallwhenshefirstsawit.Shehadheardthatvideosarepreservedforbetween20to

30daysbut shenever calendared the expirationof thevideosat issue inWandners



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letter.Hutcheon did not know if there is a video camera for theAmericanAirlines

counterortheselfcheckinatthekiosks.Shenowknowswherethecamerasarelocated

and that theCountyhasvideocameras focusedon thecounterarea.Sheneverasked

GarberwhatadditionalinformationhethoughtshouldbeobtainedfromWandnerand

shesawnoneedtocontacthiminresponsetohisfirstletter.Hutcheondid,however,

contactWandner immediately(i.e.,thesameday)afterreceivinghissecond letter(for

the parking garage video)but never received any additional information from him

abouthis first letter.Sheneverspoke toanyoneat thevideo shop tosee if thevideo

existed.

OnApril14,2014(almostthreemonthsafterWandnersenthisinitialrequestto

preservevideos),HutcheonreceivedanemailfromAdriazola,advisingthattherequest

forvideo footageof the terminalwasmissing theboardinggatenumber.She tracked

downthegatenumberforhim.

HutcheondidnotknowWandnerorOfficerDiazatthetimeshewas involved

with theCountys response toWandners twovideopreservation letters andhadno

reasontocausethevideostobedestroyed.

Diaz, the video shop employee taskedwith thejob of actually locating and

preserving the videos, said he sawWandnersJanuary 20, 2014 letter request.Diaz

explainedthatthevideocameraswereinfactworkingonJanuary15,2014andthatitis

possibletocopytheentirevideofromthetwohourwindowrequested.Diazreviewed



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multiple camera angles and felt confident that he had pinpointed the three specific

camerashethoughtwouldhavecapturedwhathebelievedtobethelocationsatissue.

Diazsometimessimplycopiesallvideoswhenaspecificcamera ismentioned.

ButinsteadofcopyingthevideosfromthethreecameraswhichDiazpinpointedasthe

oneshe thoughtwouldbestcapture theAmerican ticketcounterand thekioskareas,

Diazwatchedandevaluatedthevideoshimself inordertofindanincident.Diazsaid

he searched for an incident, rather thanjust copying everything from the three two

hoursegments,becausethelettermentionedsomethingaboutanarrest.

Diazsaidhewasnotprovidedwiththespecificcameranumbers.Hedetermined

onhisownthethreecamerascoveringtheareas(attheAmericanAirlinescheckinarea,

butnot at thegate).Hewas looking for an incidentbetween a civilian and apolice

officer.Heneverlookedforanincidentbetweenacivilianandaticketagent.Henever

alertedanyoneaboutwhenthe30dayswouldexpireandneveraskedanyoneformore

informationbefore the30dayspassed.Diaz said thatWandners lettergavehiman

ideaofwhichcamerastosearch.TheCountynotes[ECFNo.115,p.4,n.2]thatnotall

portionsoftheAmericanAirlinesticketcounterarecoveredbyvideosurveillance.

OnJanuary27,2014,AdriazolareceivedanemailfromGarber,attachingacopy

ofWandnersJanuary20writtenrequest.Sentat10:58a.m.,Garbersemailexplained

that the request forpreservation of video records is onewhich involves aPolice

involved incident fromJanuary 15. SeeJointComposite Exhibit Binder, p.MDC 7.



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Adriazola then forwarded this email toDiaz. SeeJointComposite Exhibit Binder,p.

MDC165.

Approximately three hours and fortyfive minutes later, Diaz sent back a

response email, explaining that video footage by the Self Check In area for this

incidentwasnot found. Id. Inhisemail,Diazalsoasked for thespecificgate for the

flight.Id.

Diazsaidhewasabletothoroughlyreviewallsixhoursofvideo(i.e.,twohours

each,forthreecameras)inlessthanfourhoursbecausehewatchedonevideoatnormal

speedbutviewed theother twovideos atfour times thenormal speed.Diaz saidhe

wouldhavebeenabletodiscernanincidentevenwhenviewingthetwovideosatthe

acceleratedspeed.

Diaz said he later saw video of Wandner in the parking garage but never

observedhimonavideointheairportterminal.

Anyvideoshelocatedwouldcontainonlyvideo;audioisnotcaptured.

As explained by Diaz, the videos are stored on hard drives, which are

automatically rewrittenwhen the hard drive is full.Diaz said the cameras capture

imagesofthepassengers,notonlythoseoftheticketagents,atthecounterarea.

AdriazoladoesnotknowwhetherDiaz looked for the requested twohoursof

video or whether he searched for an incident. He does not know whether Diaz

reviewedactualvideofootageandconcludedthattherewasnothingthereorwhether



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completely preclude defenses or generate litigationending consequences. Practice

BeforeFederalMagistrates,16.06A (MathewBender2010) (discovery sanctionsare

generally viewed as nondispositive matters committed to the discretion of the

magistrateunlessapartysentireclaimisbeingdismissed).

Indeterminingbetweendispositiveandnondispositivediscoverysanctions,the

criticalfactoriswhatsanctionthemagistratejudgeactuallyimposes,ratherthantheone

requestedby thepartyseekingsanctions.Gomez v.MartinMariettaCorp.,50F.3d1511,

151920(10thCir.1995)(rejectingargumentthatmagistratejudgeruledondispositive

motionbecauselitigantsoughtentryofadefaultjudgmentandexplainingthat[e]ven

thoughamovantrequestsasanctionthatwouldbedispositive,ifthemagistratejudge

does not impose a dispositive sanction, then the order is treated asnotdispositive

underRule72(a));Wright,Miller&Marcus,FederalPracticeandProcedure:Civil2d

3068.2,at34244(West1997).

FederalmagistratejudgesinthisCircuit3frequentlyenterordersincaseswhere

parties seek sanctions, including defaultjudgments or dismissals, for spoliation. See,

3 Federalmagistratejudgesinothercircuitsroutinelyentersimilartypesoforders

whentheeffectisnotsimilartoadefaultjudgmentordoesnotprecludeadefense.See

Moore

v.

Napolitano,723F.Supp.2d167,18384(D.D.C.2010)(thedistrictjudgerejected

theargumentthatthemagistratejudgeenteredaseveresanctionakintoalitigation

ending defaultjudgment and affirmed themagistratejudges order precluding the

defendant fromofferingany legitimate,nondiscriminatory reason torebutanyprima

facie case of disparate treatment discriminatory nonpromotion of the individually

namedplaintiffsinanemploymentdiscriminationcase);Carmonav.Wright,233F.R.D.

270, 276 (N.D.N.Y. 2006) (magistratejudges permitted to enter sanctions orders for



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e.g.,Calixtov.WatsonBowmanAcmeCorp.,No.0760077CIV,2009WL3823390(S.D.Fla.

Nov.16,2009)(Rosenbaum,J.);AtlanticSeaCo.,S.A.,v.AnaisWorldwideShipping,Inc.,

No.0823079CIV,2010WL2346665 (S.D.Fla.June9,2010) (Brown,J.);ManagedCare

Solutions,

Inc.

v.

Essent

Healthcare,

Inc.,736F.Supp.2d1317(S.D.Fla.2010)(OSullivan,

J.). Indeed,federalmagistratejudgesinFloridahaveenteredordersimposingadverse

inferencesandattorneysfeesassanctionsinspoliationscenarios.OptowaveCo.,Ltd.v.

Nikitin,No.6:05cv1083Orl22DAB,2006WL3231422(M.D.Fla.Nov.7,2006)(Baker,

J.)(imposingadverseinferencejuryinstructionbasedonintentionalfailuretoproduce

highly relevant emails); Preferred Care Partners Holding Corp. v. Humana, Inc.,No. 08

20424CIV,2009WL982460,at*8(S.D.Fla.Apr.9,2009)(Simonton,J.)(awardingcosts

andfeesforgrosslynegligentdiscoveryconductleadingtothedestructionofemails

whenbadjudgment,butnotbadfaith,wasresponsiblefortheerrors).

Becauseanadverseinferenceinstructiondoesnotstrikeaclaimordefenseand,

inanyevent,thisOrderdoesnotgrantthatrelieftoWandner,thisisanondispositive

rulingthatcanbedeterminedbyamagistratejudgethroughanorderunderRule72(a).

discovery violationsbecause they are generally nondispositivematters unless the

order imposes a sanctionwhich disposes of a claim; e.g., striking pleadings with

prejudice or dismissal); Exxon

Corp.

v.

Halcon

Shipping

Co.

Ltd.,

156 F.R.D. 589, 590

(D.N.J.1994) (magistratejudgesorderprecludingexpertwitness from testifyingasa

sanction for violation of a pretrial discovery orderwas reviewed under the clearly

erroneousorcontraryto lawstandardofreview).Cf.SanShiahEnter.Co.,Ltd.v.Pride

Shipping

Corp., 783 F. Supp. 1334 (S.D. Ala. 1992) (magistrate judge authorized to

imposeRule11sanctions).



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b.

Spoliation

In adiversity lawsuit such as this one, federal law governs the imposition of

spoliation sanctionsbecause they constitute an evidentiarymatter. Flury v. Daimler

Chrysler

Corp., 427 F.3d 939, 944 (11thCir. 2005).Although federal law governs, the

Courtmaylooktostatelawforguidancetotheextentthatitisconsistentwithfederal

law.ManagedCareSolutions,736F.Supp.2dat1322.

Spoliationreferstothedestructionofevidenceorthesignificantandmeaningful

alterationofadocumentorinstrument.Green

Leaf

Nursery

v.

E.I.

DuPont

de

Nemours

&

Co., 341 F.3d 1292, 1308 (11th Cir. 2003). But it is also defined as the intentional

destruction,mutilation, alteration or concealment of evidence, usually a document.

Calixto,2009WL3823390,at*13(emphasisadded)(internalcitationomitted);seealsoSe.

Mech.

Servs,

Inc.

v.

Brody,No.8:08CV1151T30EAJ,2009WL2242395,at*2(M.D.Fla.

July24,2009)(theintentionaldestructionorconcealmentofevidence).

The courts in this Circuit have not always been consistent in providing a

definitionofspoliation.Somedefinitionsincludethewordintentional,whileothers

donot.4 BecausetheEleventhCircuitsdecision inGreenLeafNurserydidnot include

4 For example, the intentional component is included in the spoliation

definitionsinOptowaveCo.,Ltd.,2006WL2321422,Se.Mech.Servs., 2009WL2242395,

andCalixto,2009WL3823390.Theintentional factor isnot included inGraffv.Baja

Marine

Corp., 310 F. Appx. 298 (11th Cir. 2009). Graff, however, is a not for

publication opinionbased, inpart, onGeorgia law.On the otherhand, there isno

intentional requirement found in the courts spoliationdefinition in Corporate Fin.,



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Thedistrictcourthasbroaddiscretiontocontroldiscovery,includingtheability

toimposesanctionsonuncooperativelitigants.Phippsv.Blakeney,8F.3d788,790(11th

Cir.1993).

InthisCircuit,sanctionsforspoliationofevidencemayinclude(1)dismissalof

thecase[ordefaultjudgmentagainstdefendant];(2)exclusionofexperttestimony;or

(3)ajury instructiononspoliationwhichraisesapresumptionagainst thespoliator.

Flury, 427 F.3d at 945; see also Walter v. Carnival Corp.,No. 0920962CIV, 2010WL

2927962(S.D.Fla.July23,2010).

Intheinstantcase,Wandnerurgesthethirdtypeofsanction impositionofan

adverse inference. But there are different types of adverse inferences, ranging in

differing and everincreasing levels of harshness. One type results in a jury being

instructed that certain facts are deemed admitted and must be accepted as true.

Anothertyperesultsintheimpositionofamandatory,albeitrebuttable,presumption.

Athirdtypepermitsajurytopresumethatthelostevidenceisrelevantandfavorable

totheinnocentparty.Withthisthirdtypeofadverseinference,thejuryalsoconsiders

thespoliatingpartysrebuttalevidenceand thendecideswhether todrawanadverse

inference.

Stressing that recklessnesswas present and that this is the equivalent ofbad

faith,Wandnersayshispreferenceisforamandatoryinferenceinstruction,buthealso

seeksapermissibleadverseinferenceinstructioniftheUndersignedisnotpreparedto



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instructionbasedonspoliationofevidenceunderFloridalaw.Severalreasonssupport

thisconclusion.

First, Flury construedGeorgia spoliation law (not federalorFlorida spoliation

law).5Second,Flurywasapaneldecisionandassuchdidnotoverrulethepriorpanel

decision in Bashir, requiring a showing ofbad faith.Managed Care Solutions, 736 F.

Supp.2dat1328,n.16(notingthatonlytheSupremeCourtoranenbancdecisionfrom

theEleventhCircuit canjudiciallyoverrule apriorpaneldecision).Third, in several

cases following the 2005 Flury

decision, the Eleventh Circuit specifically and

unequivocallyheldthatbad faith isrequiredforanadverse inference instructionasa

sanction forspoliation.See,e.g.,Mannv.TaserIntl,Inc.,588F.3d1291,1310(11thCir.

2009)(notingthatashowingofmaliceisnotrequiredtofindbadfaithbutemphasizing

that an adverse inference canbe drawn from apartys failure topreserve evidence

onlywhentheabsenceofthatevidenceispredicatedonbadfaith)(emphasisadded)

(internalquotationomitted);Coxv.TargetCorp.,351F.Appx381,383(11thCir.2009)

(a jury instruction on spoliation of evidence is required only when bad faith is

responsible for theabsenceof theevidence);BPProds.N.Am., Inc.v. Se.EnergyGrp.,

Inc., 282 Fed.Appx 776, 780n.3 (11thCir. 2008) (holding that an adverse inference

presumptionwas appropriatewhere thedistrict court implicitlydetermined that the

defendantsactionswerepredicatedonbadfaith).

5 InBrownv.Chertoff,563F.Supp.2d1372,1381(S.D.Ga.2008),thecourtstated

thatsinceFlury,badfaithisonlyonefactortoconsider).



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Phraseddifferently,merenegligenceinlosingordestroyingrecordsorevidence

isinsufficienttojustifyanadverseinferenceinstructionforspoliation.Bashir,119F.3d

at931.TheEleventhCircuitsruleprecludinganadverseinferenceinthefaceofsimple

negligenceisthatitdoesnotsustainaninferenceofconsciousnessofaweakcase. Id.

(internalquotationomitted);seealsoSlatteryv.PrecisionResponseCorp.167F.Appx139,

141(11thCir.2006).

Given this Circuits requirement that an adverse inference flowing from

spoliationrequiresthepresenceofbadfaith,evengrosslynegligent

discoveryconduct

doesnotjustifythattypeofjuryinstruction.PreferredCarePartnersHoldingCorp.,2009

WL982460at*7(decliningtoorderadverseinferenceeventhoughpartysperformance

infulfillingdiscoveryobligationswasclearlyegregiousandeventhoughthepartys

discoveryfailingsresultedfromthegrosslynegligentoversightsofcounsel).

BecausethisCircuit,unlikesomeothers,requiresbadfaithbeforepermittingan

adverseinferencejuryinstructionwhenthereisspoliationofevidence,courtsdenythe

requested instruction when no bad faith is shown. Slattery, 167 F. Appx at 141

(employersfailuretoproducedocumentsdidnotjustifyanadverseinferencebecause

plaintiffhaddemonstratednoevidence[ofwithholding]ortamperingwithanyofthe

documentsinbadfaith);seealsoPenaltyKickMgmt.,318F.3dat129394(noevidenceof

bad faith in losing label at issue in lawsuit alleging improper disclosure of trade

secrets).



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In fact,district courts inourCircuit regularlydeny adverse inference requests

evenwhenthere isan indisputabledestructionofevidence.Socasv.Nw.Mut.LifeIns.

Co.,No.0720336,2010WL3894142(S.D.Fla.Sept.30,2010)(denyingmotiontodismiss

andforadverseinferencejuryinstructionwhendoctornegligentlyfailedtosuspendher

ordinarypolicyofpurginginactivepatientfilesafterlearningtheinformationinthose

fileswas relevant toherdisability claim);Managed Care Solutions, 736F. Supp. 2d at

1332; Walter, 2010 WL 2927962 (missing broken deck chair in lawsuit for injuries

sustainedwhenplaintiffsdeckchaircollapsedwhilehewasacruiseshippassenger);

Atlantic

Sea

Co.,2010WL2346665 (failure topreserve spotlightandelectricalwiring);

Calixto,2009WL3823390(missingemails);seealsoUnitedStatesv.Barlow,576F.Supp.

2d 1375, 1381 (S.D.Fla. 2008) (lossofPVCmarkerused to identify the locationof a

shipsgrounding ina lawsuitbroughtby thegovernment fordamage tounderwater

sanctuaryresourceswhendefendantsboatranaground).

When assessing the bad faith requirement for a sanctions award against an

attorneyunder28U.S.C.1927,anadmittedlydifferentsituation,theEleventhCircuit

emphasized that bad faith is the touchtone, that the statute is not about mere

negligencebut that objectively reckless conduct is sufficient tomeet thebad faith

requirement.Amlong&Amlong,P.A.v.Dennys, Inc.,500F.3d1230,123942 (11thCir.

2007)(notingthatunreasonableandvexatiousconductundersection1927occursonly

whentheattorneysconductissoegregiousthatitistantamounttobadfaith);seealso



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YoungApartments,Inc.v.TownofJupiter,Fla.,503Fed.Appx711,725 (11thCir.2013)

(affirming feesawardagainstplaintiffsattorneysunder section1927andnoting that

bad faith is an objective standard that is satisfiedwhen an attorney knowingly or

recklessly pursues a frivolous claim or engages in litigation tactics that needlessly

obstruct the litigationonnonfrivolousclaims) (emphasisadded) (internalquotation

omitted); Norelus v. Dennys Inc., 628 F.3d 1270 (11thCir. 2010) (bad faithneeded to

prove thatattorneymultiplied courtproceedingsunreasonablyandvexatiously for

purposesofSection1927canbemetbyobjectivelyrecklessconduct);Cf.

Peer

v.

Lewis,

606F.3d1306,1315(11thCir.2010)(explainingthattheCourtsinherentpowerisboth

broaderandnarrowerthanothermeansofimposingsanctions).

Assuming, for thesakeofdiscussiononly, that theEleventhCircuitsstandard

for evaluatingbad faith for a sanctions award against an attorneyunder 28U.S.C.

1927 is the same as the standard for spoliation sanctionsunder theCourts inherent

power (and theUndersigned isnot concluding that this assumption is correctwhen

analyzing a spoliation scenario), thenWandnermust, at a minimum, show that the

Countyacted recklessly inorder toobtain sanctions for spoliationunder theCourts

inherentpower. If the standard isnot identical, thenWandnermustprovebad faith,

whichismorethangrossnegligenceandrecklessbehavior.

TheUndersignedisnotrequiredtowrestlewiththeissueofwhetherthereckless

behavior which is tantamount to bad faith for a Section 1927 sanction against an



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attorneymay alsobe amethod toprove thebad faithneeded to invoke theCourts

inherentpowers foraspoliationsanction.Asexplainedbelow, theUndersignedfinds

thatWandnerdidnotmeethisburdenofestablishingbadfaithspoliationofthevideos

even

if he could have demonstrated it through the lessstringent objectively reckless

approach.

Parties can establish the requisite bad faith through either direct or

circumstantialevidence. Calixto, 2009WL 3823390, at *16. In order todemonstratea

party destroyed evidence inbad faith through circumstantial evidence, themovant

must establishallof the following four factors: (1) evidenceonce existed that could

fairlybesupposed tohavebeenmaterial to theproofordefenseof a claim at issue

in thecase; (2) thespoliatingpartyengagedinanaffirmativeactcausingtheevidence

tobe lost; (3) the spoliatingpartydid sowhile itknewor shouldhaveknownof its

dutytopreserve theevidence;and (4) theaffirmative act causing the loss cannotbe

crediblyexplainedasnot involvingbad faithby thereasonprofferedbythespoliator.

Calixto,2009WL3823390,at*16(emphasisadded);seealsoManagedCareSolutions,736

F. Supp. 2d at 133132 (adopting fourfactor test for circumstantial evidence ofbad

faith).

Whenapartysactionsleadtothedestructionofevidencebutwerenotdonein

badfaith,thensanctionsareinappropriate butthisresultisnotintendedtopreclude

[theprejudicedparty]fromintroducingintoevidencethefactsconcerningthefailureto



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preserverelevant[evidence].Socas,2010WL3894142,at*9(citingManagedCare,2010

WL 3368654, at *13). Thus, an order denying spoliation sanctionswould notbe the

deathknellforWandnerseffortstopresenttheCountysactions(orinactions)toajury.

TheEleventhCircuithasnotdecidedtheappropriateevidentiarystandardtouse

when the requested sanctions are based upon the Courts inherent powers.

Nevertheless, theUndersigned finds persuasive a relatively recent decisionbyU.S.

MagistrateJudgeAndreaSimonton in In re BricanAm. LLC Equip. Lease Litig., 977F.

Supp. 2d 1287, 1293, n.6 (S.D. Fla. 2013). In Brican

America,

the Court adopted two

differentevidentiaryburdens,dependingonthenatureofthesanctionimposed.

For issuerelated sanctions those that are fundamentally remedial rather

than punitive and do not preclude a trial on themerits the proofmustbeby a

preponderanceoftheevidence.Id.(citingComptonv.AlphaKappaAlphaSorority,Inc.,938

F.Supp.2d103,10405(D.D.C.2013)).Incontrast,forfundamentallypenalsanctions

such as dismissals anddefaultjudgments, aswell as contemptorders, awardsof

attorneysfees,andtheimpositionoffines theclearandconvincingstandardisused.

Id.(citingCompton,938F.Supp.2dat10405).JudgeSimontonusedthepreponderance

oftheevidencestandardforthewitnesstamperingallegationsinsofarasthePlaintiffs

soughtnondispositive sanctionsandapplied themoreexactingclearandconvincing

standardtotherequestfordispositivesanctions.



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Wandner requests different types of sanctions, with a mandatory adverse

inferencejury instruction as themost severe and ajury instruction for a permissive

adverse inference (after hearing the Countys rebuttal evidence) as the least severe.

Determining whether some, none or all of these three types of sanctions are

fundamentally penal (as opposed to being remedial) is not one which the parties

briefed.Nevertheless, theCourtneednotengage in thenuancedanalysis required to

classifythesanctions intooneoftwocategoriesbecausetheresultwouldbethesame

undereitherstandardofproof.See

also

Qantum

Commns

Corp.

v.

Star

Broad.,

Inc.,

473F.

Supp. 2d 1249, 126970 (S.D. Fla. 2007) (using clear and convincing standardwhen

grantinga sanctionsmotionandenteringadefaultjudgmentandattorneys feesand

costs).

ii.

ThePartiesContentions

WandnercontendsthattheCountysfailuretopreservethevideosoftheticket

counter,kioskcheckinandconcoursegateareasisbadfaith.6Hearguesthatthefailure

isattributabletomorethansimplenegligence.Rather,WandnerarguesthattheCounty

turned ablind eye to his request and points toHutcheons failure to follow up on

Garbers suggestion to reach out to Wandner for more information as a prime

illustration of bad faith. He notes that Hutcheon took the position that more

6 Wandnerreceivedacopyofthevideosurveillancefromtheparkinggarage.



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informationwasnotneeded eventhoughshedidnotknowmuchaboutthespecifics

attheAirport.

Wandners theory is that the County acted with callous disregard for the

consequencesofitsactions(orinactions)oranotherpersonsrights.Hefocusesonthe

lackofwrittenproceduresforvideopreservationrequestsand the lackofmeaningful

supervisory oversight.He also emphasizes theCountys complete failure to note or

monitorwhenthe30daysexpiredanditsfailuretofollowupwithrequestsformore

specific information on a request that someof its employeesdeemed insufficient. In

addition,hefocusesonDiazsdecisiontoviewonlythreeofthirtythreevideocameras

coveringtheAmericanAirlinesareaattheAirport.

Concerning the actual logistics of how the video reviewwas done,Wandner

challengesDiazsdecisiontosearchforanincident,ratherthansimplycopythevideos

for thehourshepinpointed inhis letter,andhisrelateddecision towatch twoof the

threevideosatfourtimesnormalspeed.

BecauseDiazreviewed thevideos foran incident involvingapoliceofficer,he

wouldhave ignoredvideoof the exchangesor confrontationsWandnerhadwith the

ticket agentsbeforeOfficerDiaz arrived.Wandner also argues thatDiazs choice to

ignore his request and to instead look only for incidents necessarily means that

substantive,helpfulevidencehas, infact,beendestroyed videofootageshowingno

incidentswiththeticketagents(becausethatwouldsupporthiscontentionthathedid



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not slam his arms on the ticket counter or otherwise create a public disturbance).

Specifically,Wandnerargues thateven the lackofheightenedactivityobservedby

andbrushed off as notworthy of preservingbyMr.Diazwould havebeen critical

evidenceinsupportofPlaintiffsclaims.[ECFNo.113,p.3(emphasisinoriginal)].He

alsostressesthattheotherwitnessestotheseeventsarenotindependentbecausethey

allworkforeithertheCountyorSwissport.

Attheendoftheevidentiaryhearing,whentheUndersignedgavecounseltime

forclosingargument,Wandnersattorneyconceded thathe isnotsuggesting that the

County knew the videoshadharmful evidence and therefore intentionallydestroyed

them.Infact,heagreedthatthevideoscouldcontainevidencewhichhelpstheCountys

defenseinthislawsuit.Likewise,hewasnotsuggestingthattheCountyhadananimus

againstWandneror abias in favorofOfficerDiaz. Instead,hisargument is that the

Countys responsewas so cavalier and so careless that it is tantamount tobad faith

undertherecklessbehaviormethodofestablishingit.

The County contends that its failure to preserve the requested videos of the

counterareaandkioskcheckinareasisanoversightcausedbyamisunderstandingor

misinterpretationoftherequest.ItcontendsthatnoCountyemployeetookaffirmative

stepstodestroythevideosortoensurethattheautomaticwriteoverprocedurewould

causethevideostobeerasedbeforetheywerepreservedandcopied.ItsaystheCounty

hadnomotive tohelpOfficerDiazor tohinderWandnerbeforehe filedhis lawsuit.



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And it argues that the records contain many examples of its good faith, which, it

suggests,isevidencethatitdidnotactinbadfaith.

In addition, the County argues that other, alternative evidence exists the

testimony fromotherwitnesseswhowitnessedWandnersencounterswith the ticket

agentsandOfficerDiaz.And, to theextent thatvideoof thegatewouldberelevant,

Wandnerhasotherwitnessesavailable includinghisownclient.7

TheCounty argues thatWandnerhas comenowhere close to establishing the

necessarybadfaithheneedstoobtainspoliationsanctions.Anditsaysthatnegligence,

evengrossnegligence(whichitdoesnotconcedeispresenthere),isinsufficient.

TheothertwoDefendants,AmericanandSwissport,arguethatsanctionswould

beundulyprejudicial to theirpositionsbecauseallDefendantshavesimilarpositions

7 Wandner contends that video of thegatewouldhavebeenhelpfulbecause it

couldhaveconfirmedthathisclientspoketoanairlineboardingagentatthegateand

then spoke toWandneron the telephone.UnderWandners theory, thevideowould

helpconfirmthattheflighthadnotboardedandthattheagenttoldhisclientthatthe

flight had not closed when he first challenged Uysals comments and called her

incompetent. But the Undersigned is not thoroughly convinced of the potential

relevance.Atmost, the videowould showWandners client speakingon thephone.

Neither the identity of the other speaker or the contents of the conversationwould

appearon thevideo.Moreover, thevideomightalso showhis client speaking to the

boardinggateagent.But,again,thesubjectoftheconversationandthespecificsofwhat

wassaidwouldnotappearonthevideo.Thus,theonlywayforavideo(ifoneshowing

theseconversationsexisted) tobesubstantivelyhelpful is forWandnersclientand/or

the gate agent to testify about what was being said. But that testimony could be

introducedwithout thevideo.Atbest, thevideomightbeofmodestrelevance, to the

extentitshowedtheclientonhiscellphone.



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onthefacts andasaresult,anadverseinferenceinstructionwhichisdetrimentalto

theCountywouldnecessarilyandautomaticallyalsobedetrimentaltothemattrial.

iii. Analysis

ThereisnodoubtthattheCountymishandledWandnersrequesttopreservethe

videos.Theabsenceofwrittenguidelines, thecompletedelegationof theprocesstoa

maintenancedepartmentemployeewhomisinterpretedtherequestbysearchingforan

incident(ratherthanmerelycopyingthevideos),thefailureofanyonetoevennote

(letalonemonitor)whenthe30dayperiodexpired,theconfusionoverthesufficiency

ofWandners initial request, theexpedited review (of sixhoursofvideo in less than

four hours) of three videos (and the possibility that Diaz may have missed an

encounter),Diazs search for only encounterswith police officers (which necessarily

excludedallofWandnersencounterswiththeticketagentsbeforepolicearrived),the

relative ease of simply copying the videos (as requested) and allowingWandner to

search for relevantportions and theCountys failure to followup formoredetailed

informationarehardlythehallmarkofhowtocompetentlyhandlearequesttopreserve

surveillancevideos.

GiventhenumerouswaysinwhichtheCountyfumbledwhatshouldhavebeen

a straightforward request, the Undersigned has little difficulty concluding that the

Countyshandlingofthevideopreservationletterwasnegligent.Inlightofthemyriad

mistakesandmiscalculationsand theundeniableconclusion that theCountys lapses



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35

led to the destruction of many hours of videos, the Undersigned might even be

preparedtoclassifytheCountysactionsasgrosslynegligent.

Butwhat theUndersignedcannotdo isalsoconclude that theCountyacted in

bad faith, even if that term included a recklessness standard (which, once again, the

Court is not concluding is a standard for spoliation sanctions in this Circuit). The

Undersignedsconclusiononthispointisthesameunderbothapreponderanceofthe

evidence standard and a clear and convincing burden. Consequently, spoliation

sanctionsareunwarranted.

Butspoliationsanctions(suchasadverseinferencejuryinstructions)wouldstill

beunavailablehereevenifIweretoconcludethattheCountysconductwentbeyond

multiplegoofsandreached thebad faith level.That isbecauseWandnerhasnotmet

otherprerequisites:

First,Wandnerhasnotproventhatthemissingevidenceactuallyexistedatone

time.Althoughthevideosurveillancefootageexistedatonetimebeforebeingwritten

over,Wandnerhasnotestablishedthatanyofthefootageisofhim.AssumingthatDiaz

thoroughlyandcarefullyreviewedeverysecondofthesixhoursofvideoandengaged

in a meticulous, errorfree review, all he could say was that he did not see any

encountersinvolvingapoliceofficer.Therefore,theconclusionwouldbethatthevideo

ofWandnersactualarrest(orfalsearrest,assuminghisallegationsarecorrect)didnot

existbeforethevideowasoverwritten.ButifDiazdidapoorjobofviewingsixhoursof



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videosandallowedhisconcentrationtolapse,thenWandnerwouldstillnothaveproof

thatanyportionof thevideoswereofhim.Allhewouldhave isapossibility that the

videoscapturedhimdigitallyonfilm.

Moreover, Wandners argument that a video showing no activity would be

helpfulneedstobeanalyzedmorecarefullythansimplyacceptingthenotionthatany

typeofnonactivitywould assistWandner.Theonlynonactivitywhichwouldhelp

WandnerisvideoofWandnerdoingnothing e.g.,notslamminghishandsdownon

thecounter,notwildlygesticulatinginfrontoftheticketagent,etc.Ifthattypeofvideo

evidencehadexisted,then itwouldhavebolsteredWandnersversionthathedidnot

engageinconductconstitutingdisorderlyconduct.

Butmerevideoofothers (e.g.,otherpassengers, ticketagents, securityofficers,

visitors,luggagehandlers,policeofficers,pilotsandflightattendants,etc.)wouldbeof

no help toWandner (or theCounty, for thatmatter) unlessWandner himselfwere

showndoingnothing.Otherwise,anacceptableconclusionwouldbethatthecameras

capturedsomepassengersatthecounteroratthekioskareabutdidnotforsomereason

happen to film Wandner. Therefore, Diazs statement that he saw no incidents

involvingapoliceofficerduringthesixhoursofvideoshewatcheddoesnotmeanthat

thedestroyed, rewrittenvideoswouldhavehelpedWandner. Itmightmerelymean

that Wandner was not captured on the videos at all. Thus, all Wandner can say

persuasively is that thevideos mighthavehelpedhim if theyhad shownhim at the



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counterand if theyestablished thathedidnotslam thecounterorotherwisecreatea

disturbance.Yes,thevideosmighthaveshownhimatthecounterinanonaggressive

way,buttheymighthavealsonotshownhimatall.

This is not a situation where cameras malfunctioned, where there was a

computerglitch,wheretherewasapoweroutageorwherethevideoswereblankfor

thosereasonsorotherreasons.Tobesure,thevideoscontainedsomething.Diazwasnot

watching sixhours ofnothing.But the somethinghewatched (andwhichwas later

deleted)mayhavetheevidentiaryvalueofnothingifthevideosdidnotfilmWandner.

Wandnerhasnotestablishedthattheydid.Hehasnotpinpointedexactlywhereinthe

airporthewasarrested.Hehasnotestablished thatanyvideocamera (including the

threeDiazwatched)wouldnecessarilyhavefilmedhimbeingarrestedorspeakingwith

theticketagents.

Even ifoneormorecameraswouldhavefilmedthearea,thecamerasmaynot

have capturedhim at the relevant times.Otherpassengersor employees couldhave

beenstandingnextto,infrontoforbehindhim,blockingtheviews.Luggage,luggage

carts,boxes, animalsorother things couldhaveobstructed the camerasview at the

criticalmoments.Sothesomethingcapturedinthevideocouldbenothingoritcould

beanythingoritcouldbeeverything.Whoknows?

Tosumupthispoint,Wandnerhasnotmethisburdenofdemonstratingthatthe

videoevidencehesoughtactuallyexistedbeforethevideoswerenotpreservedbecause



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theywere overwritten. Cox, 351 Fed.Appx 381 (affirming denial of requestedjury

instructiononspoliationofevidencewherecustomerwasunable toestablish that the

video footage of her fall existed at allbecause the video cameras did not provide

comprehensivecoverageoftheentirestore).

Second,theCountydoesnotchallengethesecondelement(thatithadadutyto

preserve evidence once it received Wandners written request), but it challenges

Wandners ability tomeet the third requirement: that the evidencewas crucial tohis

abilitytoprovehisprima

facie

case.ThereareseveralwitnessestoWandnersexchanges

withtheticketagentsandOfficerDiaz.Themerefactthattheyhappentobeemployees

ofAmericanAirlines,theairlinesagent(Swissport)ortheCountydoesnotmeanthat

alternative evidence isnot available.Wandnermaynot like their testimony,but this

doesnotequatetoasituationwhereapartydestroyedtheonlyevidenceconcerninga

criticalissue.

Third,theevidencemaynothaveassistedhiminprovinghiscase.Theevidence

mayhavehinderedhisabilitytoprovehiscase.Forexample,ifthevideoshaddepicted

himacting inaconfrontational, belligerent,bellicosemanner,thentheevidencewould

havehelpedtheCountyandtheotherDefendants(andhinderedhisabilitytoprovehis

case).Indeed,thispossiblescenario thatthedestroyedvideowouldhavehampered

WandnerbuthelpedtheCounty ispartofthereasonwhytheUndersignedconcludes



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surroundinghispreservationrequestsandtheCountysfailuretoachievethatresultto

thejury, subject toJudgeMartinezsoversight as thedistrictjudgewhowillpreside

overthetrial.

DONEANDORDEREDinChambers,inMiami,Florida,January12,2015.

Copiesfurnished

to:

HonorableJoseE.Martinez

AllCounselofRecord


Documents

Blind Company Order