Sn.

Sntttfinymt{,rwtnffuF itl Fw

Eti Archer Blackholrse,Fetitionen

v.

n amrie Connenny,

Respondent.

$rprmiru fur!rt*$*wru$trfnprrur?nrnat $t*t

fltrcnlrrt!**$arfiffii

*

Eli A. Blackhouse,Plaintiff (pro se)

35 Bridge Street, Suite 1

Gardiner, ME 04345 -2121

-\-

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

L Whether the Maine Supreme Judicial Court erred in upholding the lower court'sdismissal of a kidnapping victim's protection from harassment ("PFH") complaint byciting the entbezzlement and extortion activity holding said plaintiff in debt bondage

- and in the thrall of his captors - as not remediable by the Maine statute prohibitingharassment activity.

il. Whether the Maine Supreme Judicial Court erred in failing to issue or in failing tocause a court of appropriate jurisdiction to issue a writ of habeas corpus to resolve

the plaintiffs wrongfi.rl confinement to Central Maine and to the premises of 235

Water Street in the City of Gardiner (upon its discovery thatthe Plaintiffwas held so

bound).

-2-

LIST OF PARTIES

The name of the Petitioner is:

Eli Archer Blackhouse

The name of the Respondent is:

Laurie Connelly

-3-

TABLE OF CONTENTS

QUESTTONS PRESENTED. .............2

LIST OF PARTIES. ......3

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES. ...........5

OPINIONS BELOW. .......6

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION .. .. ...6

STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED..... ....,.7

STATEMENT OF THE CASE. .....I0

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT .......13

THE MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT ERRED IN UPHOLDING THEDISMISSAL OF THE HARASSMENT COMPLAINT AS THE ACTIONS OF THEDEFENDANT DID,IN FACT, VIOLATE 5 MRSA $ 4651.

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO PROVIDE IMMEDIATEINJTINCTIVE REMEDY UPON ITS DISCOVERY THAT THE PLAINTIFF WASA VICTIM OF KIDNAPPING AND WRONGFUL CONFINEMENT ANDSHOULD HAVE ARRANGED FOR REMEDY PURSUANT TO THE RELIEFENABLED BY, AMONG OTHER LAWS, 28 USC 5 2241AND THE MAINESTATUTE (ls MRS $ s501) PROVIDING HABEAS CORPUS RELIEF FORVICTIMS OF SAID CRIMES.

CONCLUSION.

APPENDIX

August 12,2010 Memorandum of Decision of the Maine Supreme Judicial Court (sitting as theLaw Court)...... ......App. 1 (p. 21)

January 26,2010) Denial of Request for Protection of Harassment: Temporary Order and

Dismissal of the Augusta (Maine) District Court. ....App. 2 (p.22)

I.

II.

-4-

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

FEDERAL STATUTE28 USC 5224t (3) (c). .7,16

STATE STATUTES5 MRSA $ 4532.. ...7,15

'.'5 MRSA $ 45S2-A (2).... --7,t1

5 MRSA $ 4633 (1).... ..7,r2

5 MRSA $ 4633 (2).... ..........7,12

5 MRSA $ 4651 (2)...... ....7,14,17

5 MRS $ 4681 ........8, 14

5 MRS S 4682 (reallocated)......... '.....8

14 MRSA $ 5501 ....8, 16

14 MRSA $ 600r (3).... ...9,12

14 MRSA $ 6016. .......9,12

14 MRSA $ 6021 (2).... .....-..9, l0

14 MRSA 5 6022 (1).... .9,l2

REGULATIONS

24 CFR 882.4s (1xb)(4xiii)...... ......e,12

24 CFR 982.310 (bX2).. ......9, 12

24 CFR 982.456 (bxl). ..9,12

-5-

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIOARI

Petitioner Eli Archer Blackhouse petitions the Court for a Writ of Certioari to review afinal judgment of the Maine Supreme Judicial Court (sitting as the Law Court) affirming theMaine District Court's dismissal of his Complaint.

$

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the Maine Supreme Judicial (Law) Court is not reported and is included inthe Appendix (App., infra, at p. 2l).The final judgment of the Maine District Court (at Augusta)is not reported and is reproduced in the Appendix (App., infra, atp.22).

$

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

The judgment of the Maine Supreme Judicial (Law) Court was entered on August 12,2010. See App., infra, at 1. The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked pursuant to 28 USC S 1257(a) and 28 USC 5 2241 (3) (c).

-6-

STATUTORY AND REGULATORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED

28 USC 52241(3) (c)

The writ of habeas corpus shall. . . extend to a prisoner. . . .in custody in violation of the

Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.. ..

s MRS $ 4s82

It is unlawful housing discrimination...for any owner...to discriminate against any...(disabled person)... in the price, terms, conditions or privileges of the sale, rental or lease

of any housing accommodations...or to.. .attempt to evict any tenant of any housingaccommodation because of the disability....

It is unlawful housing discrimination. ...for any real estate broker...to accept for listingany housing accommodation when the person having the right to sell or lease the same

has directly or indirectly indicated an intention of discriminating among prospectivetenants or purchasers on the ground of their...disability...or when the broker knows orhas reason to know that the person having the right to sell or lease the housingaccommodation has made a practice of discrimination. . ..

s MRS $ 4s82-A (2).

It is unlawful housing discrimination...for any owner...to refuse to make reasonableaccommodations in rules, policies, practices or services when those accommodations are

necessary to give a person with...disability equal opportunity to use and enjoy thehousing....

s MRS $ 4633 (1)

A person may not discriminate against any individual because that individual has

opposed any act or practice that is unlawful under [the Maine Human Rights Act]because that individual made a charge...under this Act.

s MRS $ 4633 (2)

It is unlawful for a person to coerce, intimidate, threaten, or interfere with any individualin the exercise or enjoyment of...rights...

s MRS S46sl (2).

"Harassment" means:

A. Three or more acts of intimidation, confrontation, physical force or the threat ofphysical force directed against any person...that are made with the intention ofcausing fear, intimidation or damage to property and that do in fact cause fear,

-7 -

B.

intimidation or damage to property;

Three or more acts that are made to deter the free exercise or enjoyment of anyrights or privileges secured by the Constitution of Maine or the United States

Constitution; or

A single act or course of conduct constituting a violation of section 4681 ; Title17, section 2931; or Title 17-A, sections 201,202,203,204,207,208,209,210,210-A, 271, 253, 301, 302,303, 506-4, 51 1, 556, 802,805 0r 806.1

C.

s MRS S 4681

INOTE THAT this statute refers only to the Attorney General's ability to bring an actionon behalf of an individual aggrieved by the civil rights violations listed therein; however,same statute is listed in 5 MRS $ 4651 (2) (c) as bearing a description of proscribedactivity identifiable as remediable harassment. Also note that 5 MRS $ 4682 (following)permits the filing of a "restraining order" by individuals aggrieved by the same actionsdelineated in 5 MRS $ 4681 but is not listed among the definitions of harassment in 5

MRS $ 4651 (2) (c). One presumes that in referring to 5 MRS $ 4681 as bearing a list ofviolations consisting of "harassment," that lawmakers intended 5 MRS S 4682 - whichrepeats the list of (civil rights) violations enumerated in 5 MRS $ 4681 but states thatsuch violations are remediable by way of "civil action" (i.e., by individuals so aggrieved)

- that they also intended the prohibited actions listed in 5 MRS $ 4682 to be remediableby way of a "protection from harassment" order.]

5 MRS $ 4682 (1-A - REALLOCATED FROM T. 5, $4682, sub-$l)

Whenever any person, whether or not acting under color of law, intentionally interferesor attempts to intentionally interfere by physical force or violence against a person,

damage or destruction of property or trespass on property or by the threat of physicalforce or violence against a person, damage or destruction of property or trespass onproperty with the exercise or enjoyment by any other person of rights secured by theUnited States Constitution or the laws of the United States or of rights secured...theperson whose exercise or enjoyment of these rights has been interfered with, or attemptedto be interfered with, may institute and prosecute in that person's own name and on thatperson's own behalf a civil action for legal or equitable relief.

14 MRS $ ss01

Every person unlawfully deprived of his personal liberty by the act of another. . . shall ofright have a writ of habeas corpus...

Title 17 violations constitute criminal activity according to Maine law.

-B-

14 MRS $ 6001 (3)

In any action of forcible entry and detainer there is a rebuttable presumption that theaction was commenced in retaliation against the tenant if, within 6 months prior to thecommencement of the action, the tenant has:

A. Asserted ...rights pursuant to section 6021;

B. Complained as an individual...of conditions affecting that individual'sdwelling unit. ...

E. Filed, in good faith, a fair housing complaint with the Maine HumanRights Commission or...

14 MRS 56016

Rent charged for residential estates may not be increased if the dwelling unit is inviolation of the wamanty of habitability.

14 MRS S6021 (2).

In any written or oral agreement for rental of a dwelling unit, the landlord shall be

deemed to covenant and warrant that the dwelling unit is fit for human habitation.

14 MRS $6022 (1)

A landlord or his agent shall provide a written receipt, as required...for each rentalpayment and each security deposit payment received...

24 CFR 882.4s1 (b) (4) (iii)

The family is not responsible for payment of the portion of rent to owner covered by thehousing assistance payment under the HAP contract between the owner and the PHA....

24 CFR 982.310 (b) (2)

The PHA failure to pay the housing assistance payment to the owner is not a violation ofthe lease between the tenant and the owner. ...

24 CFR e82.4s6 (b) (1)

The family [HUD's term for "covered tenant"] is not aparty to...the HAP contract."

-9-

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Plaintiff Eli Blackhouse is a housing fraud victim who can neither remain safely within

nor relocate outside of the premises of 235 Water Street - where he currently dwells - because

Ms. Connelly and her property management company, dlbla "TLC Properties," require him to

pay an amount of rent that is illegal according to Federal law.2 Fully disabled with post-traumatic

stress disorder requiring careful management in most public settings, Mr. Blackhouse is

presently imperiled by: a) conditions created by the extortion of excessive rent, which violate the

apartment's warranty of habitability (14 MRSA $ 6021); and, b) his inability to relocate outside

of the thrall of Ms. Connelly, who acquired the building from the previous owner after said

owner had extorted over $8000 from his monthly SSDI disbursement check (in a manner both

identical to and enabling the continuation of the extortion that would - subsequent to the illegal

sale - then go on to be conducted by the Defendant)

Mr. Blackhouse filed the PFH lawsuit against Ms. Connelly when the latter refused to

stop trespassing. She has no right to be on the premises, as her acquisition of the building

occurred during a period of time in which Mr. Blackhouse remained unremunerated and un-

consulted subsequent to the illegally non-forfeited sale; additionally, she further violated the

Plaintiffls rights by refusing a mandatory reasonable accommodation of his disability, his right

under both State tenant law and Federal law (the Americans with Disabilities Act [the "ADA"]).

As the Plaintiffs disability is exacerbated by exposure to landlords - especially those in the

course of committing criminal activity abetted by armed local police - he asked both Ms.

Connelly and her husband to accommodate him by directing all communications to his Catholic

' Mr. Blackhouse's guaranteed Federal Section 8 housing subsidy was retaliatorily terminated bythe AHA - in 2005 - after Mr. Blackhouse attempted to report his 2002 kidnapping and three-weeks ofcaptivity. The termination caused his rent-to-income ratio to exceed 40%o of his income, which isprohibited according to the HUD regulations cited herein.

-10-

Charities of Maine case manager; he also requested that paper notices not be posted to his door.

Ms. Connelly violated the RA request by appearing at his door once again after he instructed her

that on-premises collection of rent exacerbated his disability. During this episode, she demanded

the illegal amount of rent in question, attempting to enact a shakedown that violated both: a) his

right not to be subjected to extortion; and, b) his right to have landlord-tenant communications

reasonably accommodated (see 5 MRS $ 4582-A [2], which prohibits "any owner...(from

refusing) to make reasonable accommodations in rules, policies, practices or services when those

accommodations are necessary to give a person with physical or mental disability equal

opportunity to use and enjoy the housing").

Prior to filing against Ms. Connelly when the RA refusal caused his health to fail, Mr.

Blackhouse filed a formal housing discrimination complaint against the Connellys with the

Maine Human Rights Commission (in October, 2009). This complaint described the illegal

housing activity that causes him to remain largely indoors in a non- HUD-compliant, cell-like

setting, out of reach of the court system, and unable to relocate to a replacement residence; it also

attributed the wrongful confinement to HUD fraud, money-laundering activity, and the transfer

of the building via fraudulent title sale, describing how Auta Main (the previous alleged owner)

had sold the building without remuneration of excessive rent to the Plaintiff, prohibiting the

latter from maintaining a safe standard of living within the apartment and from being able to

relocqte out ofit.

This activity enabled the Defendant and her husband- dlbla "TLC Properties," and upon

the illegal acquisition of the building from Ms. Main - to keep the Plaintiff a prisoner in his own

apartment and a built-in source of extortion cash, to wit: the excessive rent now keeps him bound

to the premises of 235 Water Street, within harassing reach of the operators of the Mad Dog Pub

-LL-

and the other downtown establishments in which the extorted rent is laundered, and as such,

guarantees that the Defendant is able to extort $475 per month from the Plaintiffs SSDI

disbursement check, in illegal proportion to his income, and at the expense of both: a) the

Plaintiff s right to choose to relocate and not to pay rent to the Connellys at all; and, b) his right

to pay only the rent he was required to pay according to HUD regulations.3 To the contrary of

their demands, it would be the obligation of the Aususta Housins Authorit)' to pay rent to the

Connellys if and only if the Corurellys legally held title to the building, which they do not.a

However, Ms. Connelly's harassment during this time was not limited to refusing to

accommodate his disability or even to her unabashed and deliberately-conceived effort to

continue the wrongful confinement pattern initiated by the seller: she also violated 5 MRSA $

4633, which prohibits both retaliation and coercion against any individual opposing violations of

the Maine Human Rights Act. This violation occurred when she attempted to evict the Plaintiff

on November 3, 2009, during the pendency of the Maine Human Rights Commission decision

and while safe replacement housing was unavailable. It should also be noted that all such

eviction attempts - i.e., those occurring during the pendency of housing discrimination

complaints - are presumed to be retaliatory pursuant to 14 MRSA $ 6001.

t The Defendant also routinely violates State tenant law by not providing rental receipts (14 MRSAS 6022) and in maintaining the rent at an increased amount that both violates Federal regulation and isprohibited by 14 MRSA $ 6016, which forbids landlords from raising rent on dwellings that are notsuitable for habitation. Before the illegal transfer of the building to the Connellys in 2009, the allegedformer "owner" (Ms. Main) raised rent from $450 per month to $475 per month in spite of the presence ofapartment conditions violating the warranty of habitability.o That missing housing authority payments ("FIAPs") are not the tenant's responsibility is stated on

numerous occasions in HUD-promulgated Federal regulations such as 24 CFR 882.451 (b)(4)(iii): "Thefamily is not responsible for payment of the portion of rent to owner covered by the housing assistancepayment under the HAP contract between the owner and the PHA"; 24 CFR 982.310 (b) (2): "The PHAfailure to pay the housing assistance payment to the owner is not a violation of the lease between thetenant and the owner", and 24 CFR 982.456 (b) (1): "The family (HUD's term for 'covered tenant') isnot a parly to...the HAP contract."

-12-

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

I. THE MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT ERRED IN UPHOLDING THEDISMISSAL OF THE HARASSMENT COMPLAINT AS THE ACTIONS OF THEDEFENDANT DTD,IN FACT, VIOLATE 5 MRSA $ 465r.

Excessive rent causes debt bondage - as is the case with Mr. Blackhouse's forced

tenancy at 235 Water Street - and the Defendant's refusal to adhere to Federal housing law by

requiring excessive rent under threat of police-enforced eviction keeps Mr. Blackhouse in an

unlawful state of peonage. HUD prohibits excessive rent for covered Section 8 tenants precisely

because excessively high rent-to-income ratios bind such individuals to and confine them within

properties in which they do not wish to reside, converting said tenants into victims of rent-based

debt bondage: that is, perennial furnishers of unlarvfully excessive rent, a condition rendering

such victims: a) unable to relocate away from the premises (that is, because excessive rent

prevents the saving of first month's rent and security deposit), and - as a consequence of not

being able to re-locate - also, b) unable to escape the thrall (and any other forms of attendant

abuse) of the landlord controlling the requirement to pay the unlawful rent. For the purposes of

evaluating this case for its broader class applications, the Court should note that the successful

execution of such rent-to-income ratio violations - i.e., by ill-intending or profit-driven landlords

- unlawfully enable such violators to circumvent the expenses and market vagaries associated

with having to find replacement tenants: ergo, if - as in the Plaintiff s case - any combination of

HUD or State and Federal law enforcement agencies fail to enforce indispensable rules

protecting the disenfranchised from housing-based fraud and abuse, there likely exists a vast, un-

Constitutional industry based upon the wrongful confinement of HUD-dependent tenants to their

own dwellings by way of such fraud. While the Plaintiff s case is unusual in the scope and range

of organized criminal activity enacted against him during a period in which he is a witness to

-L3-

large-scale Federal crimes, the necessity of rent-to-income ratio enforcement - where crucial to

the maintenance of habeas corpus protections - cannot be understated.

It is difficult to ascertain the lower court's rationale for dismissing Mr. Blackhouse's

harassment complaint, as said complaint reported multiple, well-documented concems regarding

money-laundering activity, a crime which in itself is both: a) inherently harassing; and, b) in

direct contravention of the harassment statute cited. The judge's statement that "the complaint

fails to state a claim of harassment as defined in 5 MRSA $ 4651, et seq." possibly anticipated

that an affirmative harassment determination would have to arise from three or more acts readily

discernible to the judge. However, Ms. Connelly's forcing Mr. Blackhouse to pay HUD-

prohibited excessive rent under threat of police eviction constitutes a harassing "single act" or

"course of action" in violation of 5 MRS $ a681; both kinds of act are among the definitional

parameters of 5 MRS $ 4651 (2) (c) harassment (the retaliatory and peremptory eviction attempt

also constituted such a violation, her repeated, on-site harassment of the disabled Plaintiff

notwithstandings).

In addition to excessive rent, the Defendant enacts disability-related harassment along

with her husband and the former owner of the property management company (dlbla "Vallee

Property Management"), who co-engineered the human trafficking activity that conveyed the

Plaintiff to the illegal premises of 235 Water Street in February, 2008. This former property

manager now repeatedly demands entry to Mr. Blackhouse's apartment during a period in which

the disabled tenant's health remains jeopardized by indoor confinement and forced interaction

with prospective "buyers" of the building, who are - in the first place - breaking the law in

t Which violated multiple MRS Title 17 prohibitions (not listed or analyzed here but readilymanifest from a juxtaposition of the crimes delineated in said criminal statute: the Defendant's repeated

stalking and terrorizing of the disabled victim constituted sufficient grounds for a restraining order and

the harassment was episodic enough to meet the definition of harassment as "three or more" harassingacts in any event.

-14-

seeking to acquire money-laundered property operating on money extorted from the disable

Plaintiff (Mr. Blackhouse).

Prior to the purchase of the building by the Connellys, Mr. Blackhouse fled town on two

different occasions to avoid such repeated efforts to "sho#' the apartment while he remained

criminally restrained within it. This behavior continued without abatement when the Connellys

took over ownership of the building,6 and Mr. Blackhouse fled for a third time - on this

occasion, for a period of several weeks, in an attempt to escape to a neighboring town - when

Mr. Vallee retook to demanding access to the apartment while refusing Mr. Blackhouse's right

not to be exposed to door postings advertising the former's impending, unwarranted property

inspections. Mr. Vallee also left an additional note even after the Plaintiff s instruction to him -

in person - that such communications were among the specific forms of communication that

trigger the ill effects of his disability. As with Ms. Connelly, he proceeded with full knowledge

that his actions were injuring the Plaintiff.

In addition to these cruel and unusual refusals to accommodate the Plaintiffs post-

traumatic stress disorder ("PTSD"), the aggregate activity described in this brief also violates 5

MRS $ 4582, which prohibits discrimination against a tenant based upon both disability and

status as recipient of public assistance. It should be noted that the monthly shakedown of HUD-

prohibited excessive rent from the Plaintiff s SSDI disbursement check - presently conducted by

the Defendant - violates both of these protected categories at the same time.

u Th" Gardiner Police Department appears to have tipped Auta Main to sell her business - and then

235 Water Street - to evade having to prosecute the money-laundering activity the Plaintiff reported to itschief, who also forced the Plaintiff to submit to an illegal search of the latter's apartment after same

Plaintiff attempted to compel law enforcement intervention in a manifest - and newly-uncovered -conspiracy to have him abducted by a mob-run ooin-home health care" agency and conveyed into tortureand re-confinement - an attempt to prevent him from pressing charges against his 2002 assailants.

-15-

il. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO PROVIDE IMMEDIATEINJUNCTIVE REMEDY UPON ITS DISCOVERY THAT THE PLAINTIFF WASA VICTIM OF KIDNAPPING AND WRONGFUL CONFINEMENT ANDSHOULD HAVE ARRANGED FOR REMEDY PURSUANT TO THE RELIEFENABLED BY, AMONG OTHER LAWS,28 USC 52241AND THE MAINESTATUTE (ls MRS $ 5s01) PROVIDTNG HABEAS CORPUS RELIEF FORVICTIMS OF SAID CRIMES.

Mr. Blackhouse's PFH complaint - addressed to Augusta District Court - consisted of a

letter, completed court form, and formal victim's statement. Together, these documents amply

described conditions meeting the criterion for enactment of habeas corpus intervention described

in 28 USC $ 2241 (c) (3), which permits court-ordered assistance to and protection of any

individual "in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States."

The wrongful confinement of any individual to physical premises or even to a specific

geographical arca constitutes such a custodial violation, and Mr. Blackhouse is presently being

restrained both to the City of Gardiner and to the premises of 235 Water Street in violation of

rights bestowed upon him - as with every free citizen - by the Constitution of the United States

of America.

Although "the Great Writ" (of habeas corpus) is commonly utilized during the

administration of court proceedings involving citizens incarcerated in the penal system, the basic

protection the Writ extends has also been invoked to defend non-prisoner victims of crimes

involving criminal restraint, such as kidnappingT and wrongful confinement. Indeed, in

circumstances such as those presently confronting the United States Supreme Court in this action

(Docket No. KEN-10-58), comrption has surrounded Mr. Blackhouse since his deliberate

disabling in an un-Constitutional torture and confinement facility located in Portland, Maine:

t According to the recent Maine definition of the crime (presently repealed, but likely to be

reinstated), Mr. Blackhouse is also - at this writing - a victim of kidnapping in the course of beingcommitted. The criminal violations (including kidnapping) of the United States Code comprising hisabduction and post-torture captivity are delineatedin Blackhouse v. TLC Properties, et al.

-1.6-

individuals have organized to enact financial crimes, entitlement program fraud, and police

abuse, and have even conspired to suppress investigation of Mr. Blackhouse's assault by an

Augusta Police Department officer in2002.

Indeed, these outstanding criminal problems not only obstruct Mr. Blackhouse from

escaping rampant housing fraud and organized criminal syndicate activity - presently ongoing

within the State of Maine - they support the perpetrators' agenda of unlawfully managing the

disabled victim's life to keep him continuously susceptible to peril. As offrcials at all level of

government have permitted the abuse and obstruction to continue, it becomes obvious - after

examination of the entire matter - that no Maine-based governmental organization possesses the

authority, motivation, or operational efficacy (and, in most instances, good faith) to protect Mr.

Blackhouse from additional abuse during a period in which he is a victim of - and witness to -

large-scale Federal criminal activity. Indeed, justice has not been delivered with respect to the

multiple violent crimes of which he has already been the victim.

Under such circumstances, it is only the United States Supreme Court that can intervene,

as the Maine Supreme Court refused to fulfill its responsibility (as did the State's district court

upon its discovery of Mr. Blackhouse's status as an unassisted victim of crime) to interpret

victimization-related need - based upon an emergent evaluation of evidence - and then to assist

the Plaintiffs immediate removal out of harm's way, executing said removal in a manner

compliant with the victim's wishes and protective of his human, civil, and Constitutional rights.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, both Maine District Court and Maine Supreme Judicial (Law)

Court erred in finding that Ms. Connelly's actions did not violate 5 MRSA $ 4651. The lower

-t7 -

court's dismissal should have been vacated by the Law Court and a temporary protection from

harassment order granted pending a full, court-initiated criminal investigation of the

longstanding abuse against the Plaintiff. Additionally, other forms of relief normally or

circumstantially granted to plaintiffs during the pendency of court decisions should have been

granted - and should now be granted - to Mr. Blackhouse (e.g., the immediate return of the $450

security deposit Ms. Connelly acquired from Auta Main during the fraudulent purchase of 235

Water Streets). However, irrespective of remedies allegedly available to protection from

harassment complainants in Maine, the activity conducted by the Connellys impedes the

administration ofjustice to the extent that both the State and Federal courts must now intervene,

specific questions of harassment law notwithstanding. At this writing, Eli Blackhouse remains in

peril of the aforementioned kidnapping attempt (see Footnote 4) in large part because the

Defendant's discriminatory and obstructive building management practices keep him at risk of

such abuse, and he cannot temporarily relocate away from dangerous premises - and into fair,

properly-accommodated housing - if the Court permits her to continue to extort excessive rent

forbidden by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development. In determining the final

disposition of Blackhouse v. Connelly, the Court should consider that even the most lenient

assessment of Ms. Connelly's actions - e.9., one emergently conceived exterior to a full analysis

of the criminal activity she commits but featuring an accurate rendering of her part in the

extortion proper - would reveal her behavior to be so profoundly criminally negligent as to

constitute harassment in any event, as she has been charging an amount of rent prohibited by

HUD continuously for the past seven (7) months (since September, 2009), a period in which the

t While not sufficient to compensate theheedlessness - relative to the law - with whichrepeated exchange of money derived from realwrongfu lly confi ned victim.

Plaintiff, the loss is cited here to demonstratethe multi-tiered fraud operation (which featured

estate prohibited from re-sale) served to deprive

18-

thethethe

Plaintiff has also been subjected to inhumane housing conditions and forced to remain within her

sphere of control and under threat ofphysical violence by her husband.e

The Plaintiff also notes that Ms. Connelly and Mr. Vallee are attempting to sell the

building during the pendency of housing discrimination lawsuit proceedings, activity that

constitutes money-laundering and is grounds for enjoinment pursuant to Maine tenant 1aw.10

Additionally, * expedited judgment regarding the freehold rights maintained by the Plaintiff

during these proceedings is now obviously in order.

In closing, the Plaintiff re-asserts that the appropriate court should intervene directly with

injunctive remedies in advance of additional proceedings relative either to the Law Court's

decision regarding the lower court's dismissal or Ms. Connelly's culpability in harassment

activity: neither local nor State law enforcement - in their present configurations - can protect

him from ongoing, longstanding criminal activity, including the current threat of reprisal violent

criminal activity, and no Maine-driven law enforcement mechanism currently protects the

Plaintiffs Constitutional right to liberty and freedom from its unwarranted revocation. Habeas

corpus proceedings - or the administration of equivalent injunctive relief - should occur in

advance of the Court's final judgment regarding the PFH complaint appeal proper, and his only

opportunity to receive restitution - and protection from longstanding abuse - is directly through

certiorari.

o The APD refused to intervene in the threats, shielding Mr. Connelly from intervention andenforcement activity by denying accommodations to the victim during interactions with the police,despite the victim's PTSD and survival of unprosecuted police assault. The threats of physical violencemade against the Plaintiff by Mr. Connelly were reported in the United States District Court action he

attempted to file but that was - for reasons obvious from these proceedings - unable to pursue with effect.l0 The nature of his ongoing wrongful confinement to the State of Maine - during a period in whichhe remains deliberately immobilized by ongoing financial exploitation by the Defendant - has enabled the

Plaintiff to provide some, but not all, of the statutory citations of consequence to the questions articulatedin this petition. Maine's prohibition against the maintenance of "dangerous buildings" (17 MRS $ 2851)is just one example of multiple other statutes presently being violated by the Defendant.

-L9-

For the foregoing reasons, the Petitioner requests that the Petition for Writ of Certioari be

granted.

Dated: April20,2010 (for the Maine Law Court)

Revised: M:ay 17,2010 (typographic/grammatical only)

Revised for USSC: January 9,2011(and submitted)

2nd USSC Revision: March 28, 20ll (non-substantive; revised deadtine) [60 days fromJan.27,20l1l

Signed

Eli Archer Blackhousen Plaintiff

Date

-20-

APPENDIX

MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURTDecisionNo. Mem l0-I02DocketNo. Ken-l0-58

ELI A. BLACKHOUSE

v.

LAURIE CONNELLY

Reporter of Decisions

Submitted on Briefs JuIy 26,2010

Decided August 12,2010

Panel: SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, SILVER, MEAD, GORMAN, and

JABAR, JJ.

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION

Eli A. Blackhouse appeals from the judgment of the District Court (Augusta, Westcott, J.)

dismissing his protection from harassment action, 5 M.R.S. $ 4651-4654 (2009) for failure tostate a claim of harassment. Blackhouse contends that his complaint did sufficiently make out aclaim of harassment because, he alleges, Laurie Connelly requires that he pay an illegal amountof rent that prevents him from leaving or safely remaining within his current residence. TheDistrict Court concluded, correctly, that if there is any remedy for Blackhouse's claims, theremedy is not provided by the protection from harassment statute.

The entry is:Judgment affrrmed.

Eli A. Blackhouse, pro se:Eli A. Blackhouse235 Water Street, Apt. 8

Gardiner, Maine 04345

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