Black Water, Red Tape: Anatomy of a Border Problem

by Glen Sparrow and Dana Brown*

Mayor Brian Bilbray attacked it with a bulldozer. , . Congressman Dun- can Hunter proposed a 13-acre pond for it . . . U. S. Ambassador John Gavin threatened to halt a $46million international loan because of it , . . San Diego County’s Health Department quarantined beaches, crops and water wells because of it . . . The city of San Diego proposed a $730-million solu- tion and then threatened to cancel the only program that was eliminating it. But it continues to be one of the most signijcant problems facing the San Diego border region.

HE raw sewage from Tijuana continues to flow: down drainage ca- nals into the Tijuana River and, hence, into the United States; escap- ing from breaks and fissures in the pipe and conveyance canal and

running down the drains and canyons from the mesa and into the Tijuana River Valley; flowing through an open ditch to points south of the border and released into the Pacific Ocean to be carried north by the prevailing currents and deposited on the beaches north of the border. This occurs on a daily basis, and during times of heavy rain flood waters laden with the untreated sewage (called black water by the Mexicans) inundate the Tijuana River Valley on the U.S. side of the border.

The sewage causes irreparable damage to the truck farms located in the valley; once the producer of vegetable crops, now approximately one-third of the land is no longer in use. The only crop that has increased in acreage since 1980 is sod; tomato crops, for example, had decreased from 110 acres to 11 acres by 1984. Land values have depreciated 50 percent, and farmers are facing economic disaster.

Leaving the valley, the contaminated river flows through the fragile ecosys- tem of the Tijuana National Estuarine Sanctuary (one of 10 designated na-

*Glen Sparrow is a professor in the School of Public Administration and Urban Studies at San Diego State University. Dana Brown 1s a graduate student in the same program.

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BLACK WATER, RED TAPE I 21 5

tional salt water marshes) and into the ocean. The beach at Border Field State Park has been closed since March 1983, and the beaches north along the coast in Imperial Beach were closed for 303 days in 1983, 365 days in 1984, and throughout 1985.

Imperial Beach, on the ocean immediately north of the border, experienced a nearly 30 percent decline in tourist-related revenue after the 1983 beach closing and, according to a San Diego County study, the city could be facing a loss of nearly $3 million dollars in tourism-related investments. Located just north of Imperial Beach, Coronado fared better since its beaches were closed only occasionally (the transient occupancy tax is the city’s second most im- portant revenue source). Experts feel, however, that an expected increase in sewage flow will pose serious problems for Coronado.

San Diego County continues to monitor water samples from the Tijuana River and along the beaches. In April 1985, it reported the presence of salmo- nella, non-epidemic cholera, yersinia entercolitica bacteria, and entero and ademo viruses, all of which can-and more than likely do-cause human dis- ease. The report also raises the specter of an estimated 60,000 undocumented workers who cross the border each month, usually through the river, coming in contact with the raw sewage. Many of these workers find employment in the food harvesting, processing or preparation industries throughout Califor- nia.

The potential for economic, health and environmental crisis now is signifi- cant, but the potential for disaster in the future is even greater due to the expected increase in Tijuana’s population from one million to 2.5 million by 2000, and the proposed expansion of that city’s water system, which may increase the amount of sewage discharge by five times.

he situation can be traced to the original settlement of Tijuana and the T fact that San Diego is downstream from Tijuana. As population has grown in Tijuana, sewage facilities have not kept pace. After numerous at- tempts at containment or disposal by San Diego, Tijuana, the United States and Mexico, as well as through joint efforts, the problem still exists and compounds.

The eastern section of Tijuana uses the river to deposit untreated sewage. The remainder of the city’s wastewater finds its way to limited sewage collec- tion facilities. These include a series of trunk sewers and septic tanks to col- lect the sewage, two pump stations which force the effluent west along the border and over the mesas to the coast, and an open conveyance canal that transports the effluent to a point approximately five miles south of the border

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where it is released, untreated, into the ocean. This system, operating at full capacity, could accommodate approximately 18 million gallons of effluent per day (mgd). The city, however, produces over 20 mgd. In addition, the Mexi- can facilities, over 20 years old, are obsolete and consistently malfunction. It is estimated that only one-two mgd of raw sewage actually make it through Tijuana’s conveyance system. Approximately 13 mgd enters the San Diego metropolitan system through the “emergency connector” and is treated by the plant at Point Loma. The remainder, about 5 mgd, either escapes the Mexican system or overflows during periods of heavy rainfall. This effluent flows into the river on the U . S . side and eventually is deposited into the ocean.

hile a solution is technically achievable, there have been serious politi- W cal difficulties. Few would dispute the fact that the international boundary has complicated the issue. But the U.S. governmental structure has also thwarted the policy-making process. The constitution precludes state and local governments from negotiations or formal agreements with sovereign nations, thus the solutions must be achieved through formal accords between the U.S. and Mexico. Yet, the immediate crisis threatens local governments, affects state water quality, and is having a severe impact on individuals and local economies. Getting the attention of the federal government and directing its attention to a localized border problem is not easy, for when a local issue becomes an international issue, solutions become more difficult.

The federal government appears to have two primary concerns about the sewage issue, neither of which is directed at a local solution. First, the view is that this is a Mexican-produced problem that the Mexican government should solve. Second, there is concern that if the federal government assists local and state governments with money to build a binational plant it will set a prece- dent for joint environmental problems all along the 2,000-mile border. For example, in August 1984, President Ronald Reagan was required by Congress to seek assurances from Mexico that an “acceptable” form of reimbursement be determined before federal money would be released for planning and de- sign of a small binational sewage treatment plant in San Diego.

The City of San Diego, prodded by the International Boundary and Water Commission in 1965, signed an agreement permitting Tijuana to use the San Diego sewerage system for 20 years on an as-needed, emergency basis. In return, the Mexican government agreed to reimburse San Diego at a fixed rate based on the number of days the bypass was used, not to exceed $200,000 per year. Tijuana’s use of the bypass was limited to an average of about 10 days per year for the first five years, but that use increased to 365 days per year by

July-August 1986

BLACK WATER, RED TAPE 1 217 1980, placing a significant burden on the city’s primary facility which was reaching its projected capacity. In addition, the cost of treating approximately 13 mgd of sewage daily is costing San Diego about $2 million a year, which is paid by city taxpayers.

In 1983, it appeared that the sewage crisis might have a silver lining for San Diego. Using the threat of the adverse impact on life and property in the Southbay, the city commissioned a study by Lowry and Associates to seek solutions for the problem. The comprehensive solution was a $730-million state-of-the-art binational treatment plant to be built on the U.S. side of the border. The plant would not only treat the expected Tijuana sewage but would also provide adequate capacity for the Southbay population and industrial expansion expected over the next 20 years.

The funding mechanism was to be the clean water act, which provided for 75 percent federal funding and 12.5 percent each from the state and the city. The initial plan did not include Mexico as a contributor. The state quickly allocated a $5-million initial payment, but the federal government, after ap- proval of $32 million, became concerned with the lack of a Mexican contribu- tion and withheld funding until Mexico agreed to pay its “fair share.”

After receiving little response from Mexico, which faces an economic crisis and a $96-billion debt, the U.S. government began to play international hard- ball. In an interview in the Sun Diego Union early in 1985, then Ambassador to Mexico John Gavin warned that the United States might vote against a $46.5-million loan Mexico was requesting from the Inter-American Develop- ment Bank (IDB). Mexico intended to use the loan to upgrade the Tijuana water system, but Gavin contended that U.S. support depended on Mexico’s response to the sewage issue. The U.S. position was predicated on the fact that by upgrading and increasing the flow of water to Tijuana an increase in sewage flow could also be expected. In the U.S. view the issues are interre- lated. In late January 1985, the Mexican government responded with a pro- posal to build a sewage treatment system on its side of the border. After meetings between officials of the two countries in February, it appeared that the Mexican solution was acceptable and the binational plant proposal was dead. In March, after having received assurances from Mexico, the U.S. agreed to support the IDB loan.

skepticism and a lack of iron-clad assurance from Mexico that the UO s proposed system would provide a permanent solution led to dis- cussions among U.S. authorities directed toward developing a “defensive system” on the U.S. side of the border. The federal government proposal

July-August 1986

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involved a series of effluent collectors in the canyons and drains on the north- ern side of the border, plus a pipeline to carry the untreated sewage from the Tijuana River back across the border and into the Mexican system. The fed- eral share of $32 million discussed the previous year in Congress would fi- nally be released for this project. But no provision was made for the raw sewage dumped into the ocean at Rosarita that would be canied back up the coast to the San Diego County beaches.

A proposed state bond issue of $150 million, in addition to $21.5 million to protect the U.S. side of the border and $5.5 million for studies and contingen- cies such as unforeseen public health emergencies, which must be approved by the voters in 1986, would be used to finance construction of a small treat- ment plant.

It appears that the feds will prevail, primarily due to the international nature of the issue. But confusion among the various governments continues. What, for example, is the role of the state, and how will it use the bond money should the voters approve it? How is San Diego to meet its federal mandate for sewage treatment, and who will pay the bill for the city’s treatment of Tijuana’s sewage? Even more importantly, after 50 years of attempts to solve the problem, no government or combination of governments has exhibited the will, money and desire to implement a comprehensive solution. The current schemes lack coordination or an integrated, total solution, and appear des- tined to take their place among the other, short-term, crisis-based, cheap solu- tions that eventually fail. The problem is severe. A solution is technically achievable, but the ability of the governmental system to produce a compre- hensive plan seems to exceed the grasp of policy makers at all levels of gov- ernment.

92ND NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON GOVERNMENT

Westin Crown Center Kansas City, Missouri

November 7-9