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Bangladesh Institute of Peace and Security StudiesHouse 405, Road 6, DOHS, Baridhara, Dhaka-1206, Bangladesh

Telephone: 88 02 88414283-5Fax: 88 02 8411309E-mail: [email protected]

Website: www.bipss.org.bd

Copyright C Bangladesh Institute of Peace and Security Studies (BIPSS), 2011

No part of this publication may be reproduced or stored, in a retrieval system, or transmitted in an from, or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopy, or otherwise, without permission of the Eof the Publication.

ISBN 978 984 33 3534 0

Subscription Rates(including air mail charge)Single Copy: Tk. 500.00 / US$ 20.00

First published May 2011 by Major General Muniruzzaman (Retd), President, theBangladesh Institute of Peace and Security Studies (BIPSS), Dhaka, Bangladesh. Designand produced by Abarton and printed at the Akota Offset Press, 119 Fakirapool, Dhaka,Bangladesh.


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Contents

Foreword 5 Abstract 9

Introduction 11Chapter 1 8

The Death of Osama bin Laden 15Chapter 2 8

Structure and Organization 35Chapter 3 8

Capability and Intent 47Chapter 4 8

The Impact of Current Middle Eastern 8Democracy Movements 55

Chapter 5 8Conclusions 59


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Foreword 5

The death of Osama bin-Laden, founder, spiritual ideologue and, as fresh documentary evidence now suggests, the chief executive of al-Qaeda, may not be as seminal an eventin the contemporary international security firmament as were his group's unprecedentedaerial assault in symbols of American wealth and power in New York and Washingtonon 11th September 2001. Nearly a decade on, though, the covert, Hollywood - stylemission by SEAL Team-6, the elite of the US Special Forces elite, in Abbottabad, innorthern Pakistan, not too far from the capital, Islamabad, was a remarkable event for a

variety of reasons. Some of these have already been analysed in excruciating detail by theinternational, especially Western, counter-terrorism commentariat; others are being examined with greater deliberation. A semi-mystical figure whose own life was as full of contradictions and irony as are some of the activities of the al-Qaeda franchise

worldwide, Osama bin-Laden died as he had lived since the early 1980s, in a milieucombining clandestine operations by small groups of armed men working in greatsecrecy, seeking objectives whose ramifications reverberated well beyond the immediate,occasionally even impinging on the systemic framework, with mortal danger and bloody death never too far away.

Bin-Laden's death, confirmed by his acolytes on Jihadi websites only a few days afterPresident Barrack Obama proclaimed it in a late night announcement, having firstadvised former Presidents Bush and Clinton- two predecessors who had mounted futileoperations to the same end - raised almost as many questions as it answered, althoughthe haul of electronic and paper documents the SEAL team retrieved from the million-dollar villa in Abbottabad should be offering answers to a few. Some questions will notbe answered by the analysts poring over this treasure trove of al-Qaeda gold dust. Forinstance, will bin-Laden's death rob his campaign against what he saw and described asan arrogant and corrupt infidel global dispensation of its prime drive and motive force?

Will bin-Laden's successor command the respect and loyalty of the field troops,especially among the non-Arab franchises, which bin-Laden himself commanded? Inshort, is America's Long War against global terrorism finally approaching the beginning of its end? While we cannot by definition know the future, experience can help us to

Foreword


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surmise key trends and tendencies. Using the recent past as the palimpsest on which the Jihadi combatants and their adversaries have drawn and redrawn countervailing narratives, it is possible to suggest that Osama bin-Laden had attained a semi-mythical

stature among those who either shared or sympathised with his views; his ability to eludecapture or death at the hands of the agencies of the greatest military and intelligencepower the world has ever known for over a decade since the embassy bombings in 1998created a mystique, an image of invincibility, almost immortality, perhaps. No successorcould hope to attain that aura anytime soon.

However, although the ideological and operational chief executive of al-Qaeda, bin-Laden never commanded the near-total authority of, say, Hitler, or Stalin when thesemen ruled Germany and the Soviet Union respectively. A terrorist franchise, howeverpassionate the motivation and beliefs of its activists and ideologues, can never quite

attain the substance of a Westphalian state, however frail the latter paradigm might begetting to be. The former is by nature a diffuse group held together by the perceptionof shared grievances, unable to function openly or organise, recruit and propagate its

views publicly. This enforced clandestine nature reduces the group's capacity to eitherperform with proficiency matching its full potential or claim popular legitimacy without

which it cannot secure its locus within the public political space. Even without the US-led Long War against global Jihad sustaining counter-terrorist operations, it is difficult tosee terrorist organisations garnering sufficient voluntary approbation for taking over all thefunctions of an organised state by popular acclaim. Nonetheless, Afghanistanand Somaliaoffer instances of great-power competition deepening domestic divisions, powering forces of polarisation and finally overwhelming societal cohesion- fragile to start with- with the result that these countries became agglomerations of ungoverned spaces into

which crevices grew the potted plants of terrorist verdure that vigorous efforts by the world's greatest military power have failed to eradicate.

Eradication, of course, assumes that the distillation of experience and its integration with modern innovations in C4SIR, liberally laced with kinetic power and surges in'boots on the ground' with some 'nation-building' efforts mixed in can address the lethalmix of terrorist insurgency. Generals David Petraeus and James Amos built theirreputations, indeed, recent careers, on the strength of the US Army/Marine Corps Field

Manual 3-24 on Counterinsurgency which has assumed the stature of the professionalbible for US and other combatants engaged in such operations. While the two Generalsstressed the very substantial differences between waging war against conventionaladversaries and fighting COIN campaigns and emphasised the need for winning heartsand minds in the latter with very precise and discriminate application of force, military and political realities stood in the way of execution. General Stanley McChrystal, theaustere Commander International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan (COMISAF)

who was cashiered for making disrespectful comments about his civilian 'superiors,' hadordered restrained use of force, especially airpower, against targetsand objectives where

civilian casualties-often inappropriately described as collateraldamage-

were likely,especially while engaging fleeting 'targets of opportunity' identified by small bands of CIA and military Special Forces operatives in south-eastern Afghanistan. McChrystal'sefforts to reduce inadvertent attacks on civilians and emphasis on protecting the


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Foreword 7

population were beginning to pay off when on issues of grand-strategic concern andcivil-military relations, he had to abandon the uniform and don the academic's garb.General Petraeus, his successor as COMISAF, notwithstanding his own now-famous

dicta in FM 3-24, reversed McChrystal's restrictions on the use of force, especially airpower, and escalated the kinetic approach to COIN in Afghanistan, while taking advantage of the 'surge' urged by his predecessor. Politics back in the USA, rather thanmilitary doctrine, is shaping the US-NATO-ISAF endgame in Afghanistan. Osama bin-Laden's dramatic demise could sweeten the broth of defeat and withdrawal, but couldnot retrieve victory from the jaws of failure. The complexities of the terrorist reality demand investment in serious intellectual resources as well as muscular efforts to revealthe nature of the threat and design effective countermeasures which should make alasting impression on the environment.

Post-US Afghanistan could either transmogrify itself into a haven of liberal-democratic market capitalism, or resume its deep divisions along fissures deepened by three decades of warfare. Because deadly force which takes lives transforms the milieuas human minds at the receiving end respond to violence and coercion in a manner notexistent prior to the introduction and application of that force, the former is unlikely.

The latter would, in many ways, restore the status quo ante, with very little to show forthe death and destruction visited upon this unchanging and almost unchangeable land of mediaeval charms and brutality. Would the Taliban and al-Qaeda be able to regroup inthe space vacated by the foreign forces? Would bin-Laden's sudden death in Abbottabadchange that outcome in any meaningful manner? And what would the consequences forPakistan be? The answers to these questions will have to be awaited.

In the meanwhile, the Bangladesh Institute of Peace and Security Studies (BIPSS) which has, using its specialised Bangladesh Centre for Terrorism Research (BCTR),monitored, recorded, analysed and reported developments in the transnational terroristthreat realm, considers it appropriate, indeed necessary, to draw in all relevant strandsaround Osama bin-Laden's death, to examine current knowledge of al-Qaeda, establish

what is essential and what is changing in the organisation- if that is the way to describethe group, and how the shadowy fountainhead of trans-national Jihadi violence isadapting itself to a dynamic, occasionally fluid, landscape. BIPSS and BCTR have

implemented a number of assignments of this nature over the past few years: withBritish collaboration, they have organised and conducted a series of Counter TerrorismCapacity Building workshops for members of the counter terrorism responders'community in Bangladesh and from across the South Asian Association for RegionalCooperation (SAARC); they have examined the nature of ideational drivers and socio-economic pressures shaping the radicalisation of youths in north-eastern Bangladesh, ahotbed of militancy; they have conducted studies in Britain and in Southeast Asia on theradicalisation of second-generation members of diaspora Bangladeshi communities;andthey have widely disseminated academic tracts containing gleanings from these and

similar exercises. BIPSS and BCTR will continue to pursue these endeavours, reflecting theimportance they attach to seeking an objective appreciation of this particular aspect of the 21st century security dynamics. This particular special monograph is a contributionto that enterprise.


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For those engaged in monitoring, recording, analysing and reporting developmentsin the global Jihadi insurrection primarily but not exclusively against the US-led and Western-dominated international security system, it would be a useful exercise to pull

together the information that the counter-terrorism community does have, extending andupdating the central narrative within a manageable length, linking up the various dotsthat are visible, seeking to address the gaps that still remain in the community'sknowledge and understanding, and take the story forward. This is what James Veitch and

John Martin do here. And with a record of reputable analytical work behind them, they are ideally placed to do so.

Major General Muniruzzaman, ndc, psc (Retd)

PresidentBangladesh Institute of Peace and Security Studies (BIPSS)


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Abstract 9

The death of Osama bin Laden opens up a range of questions-

Who was this man who declared war on America and Israel?

How did it take so long to find him-and what does this say about the effectiveness of many of the world's intelligence services?

Why was he killed in the way that he was when there is so much to yet to ask him about

the events he was involved in over more than twenty years? Reading his diary and hisnotes will not be enough.

What is the connection between bin Laden and those held in Guantanamo Bay charged with the destruction of the Twin Towers in New York?

Who runs Al-Qaeda and how is it organized and where is it to be found today?

Has the size and the modus operandi of this organization be blown out of allproportions?

Is the war against terror-against radical politicized Islam- now over-including theinsurgency in Afghanistan?

What is radical politicized Islam: what is it about and what is driving it?

Not all these questions are answered here, but this monograph begins the re-evaluationof the issues around Al-Qaeda and the war on terror: a re-evaluation made possible by the killing of bin Laden.

Abstract


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1 http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-11751888

It is not possible to defeat Al Qaeda or the Taliban militarily.

"You can't. We've all said this.David Petraeus has said it, I've said it."

General Sir David Richards

UK Chief Of Defence Staff - Nov 20101


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Introduction 11

Introduction

On May 2, 2011 at 11.35pm, in Washington DC, President Obama made a dramaticspeech from the White House: 2

Good evening. Tonight, I can report to the American people and to the world that the United States has conducted an operation that killed Osama bin Laden, the leader of al Qaeda, and a terrorist who's responsible for the murder of thousands of innocent men, women, and children.

In making this striking announcement did the President of the United States finally draw to a close the 'War on Terror'?

Almost ten years earlier, at 9pm on September 20, 2001, in an equally salient address,George W Bush had stood in front of a joint session of Congress and declared 3

On September 11th, enemies of freedom committed an act of war against our country... Tonight,the United States of America makes the following demands on the Taliban: Deliver to United States authorities all the leaders of Al Qaida who hide in your land. Release all foreign nationals, including

American citizens, you have unjustly imprisoned. Protect foreign journalists, diplomats, and aid workers in your country. Close immediately and permanently every terrorist training camp in Afghanistan, and hand over every terrorist and every person in their support structure to appropriate authorities. Give the United States full access to terrorist training camps, so we can make sure they are no longer operating.These demands are not open to negotiation or discussion. The Taliban must act and act immediately. They will hand over the terrorists,or they will share in their fate. Our war on terror begins with Al Qaida...but it does not end there. It will not end until every terrorist group of global reach has been found,stopped, and defeated.

At 1pm on October 7, 2001, when the Taliban did not respond, President Bushannounced, from the White House Treaty Room, the beginning of 'Operation Enduring Freedom'. His speech included the following words:

Now the Taliban will pay a price.... Initially, the terrorists may burrow deeper into caves and other

2 http://swampland.time.com/2011/05/02/full-remarks-president-obama-on-the-death-of-osama-bin-laden/#ixzz1Lnj6982S

3 http://middleeast.about.com/od/usmideastpolicy/a/bush-war-on-terror-speech_2.htm


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entrenched hiding places. Our military action is...designed to clear the way for sustained, comprehenand relentless operations to drive them out and bring them to justice.4

And so began the unconventional 'Global War on Terror' without even objectives,

which were not set until the beginning of 2003.5Osama bin Laden and the leadership of the Taliban managed to avoid capture. In

December of that year, as the conflict escalated, bin Laden narrowly escaped over theborder and into Pakistan. during the battle of Tora Bora.

In 2003, shakily justified by assertions made by the Bush administration that Iraq,had "failed to abandon its nuclear and chemical weapons development program in

violation of the United Nations Resolution"6 and that Iraq had or was developing weapons of mass destruction and he stated a need to remove an oppressor from powerand bring democracy to Iraq. The conflict in the region was extended into the oil rich

nation. The allegations were eventually found wanting- although Saddam Hussein wasstill hanged for "crimes against humanity"7 - and on September 1, 2010, after sevenyears of conflict, the US and allied combat operations in Iraq came to an end. Themilitary action has, however, continued in Afghanistan, spilled over into the FATAHtribal region between Pakistan and Afghanistan and even spread into Pakistan itself.

The justifications for the Bush's original declaration of war can be traced back to acommunication made by Osama bin Laden in a wide ranging outline of grievancesentitled 'Declaration of War against the Americans occupying the the Land of the Holy Places (Expel the infidels from the Arabian Peninsula)', made on 23 August 1996. It wasa directive from Usama bin Muhammad bin Laden to his Muslim Brethren all over the

world and specifically in the Arab Peninsular. The conflict against America and Israel was re-enforced by a fatwa issued on

February 23 1998 which, again, outlines the activities of the United States, bin Laden andhis associates considered amounted to an American led war on the Muslim people of the world.

The critical words in the speech are as follows:8 All these crimes and sins committed by the Americans are a clear declaration of war on Allah, hi

messenger, and Muslims. And ulema have throughout Islamic history unanimously agreed that the jihis an individual duty if the enemy destroys the Muslim countries. This was revealed by Imam Bin-

Qadamah in "Al-Mughni," Imam al-Kisa'i in "Al-Bada'i," al-Qurtubi in his interpretation, and the shaykh of al-Islam in his books, where he said: "As for the fighting to repulse [an enemy], it is aimed adefending sanctity and religion, and it is a duty as agreed [by the ulema]. Nothing is more sacred thanbelief except repulsing an enemy who is attacking religion and life. On that basis, and in compliance w

Allah's order, we issue the following fatwa to all Muslims: The ruling to kill the Americans and their allies - civilians and military - is an individual duty for

every Muslim who can do it in any country in which it is possible to do it, in order to liberate the a

4 http://middleeast.about.com/od/afghanistan/qt/me081007b.htm5

National Strategy for Combating Terrorism.February 2003 https://www.cia.gov/news-information/ cia-the-war-on-terrorism/Counter_Terrorism_Strategy.pdf 6 http://usmilitary.about.com/od/terrorism/a/Iraqwar_2.htm7 http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/6218485.stm8 http://www.fas.org/irp/world/para/docs/980223-fatwa.htm


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Introduction 13

Aqsa Mosque and the holy mosque [Mecca] from their grip, and in order for their armies to move out of all the lands of Islam, defeated and unable to threaten any Muslim. This is in accordance with the words of Almighty Allah Fight the pagans all together as they fight you all together, and "fight them

until there is no more tumult or oppression and there prevails justice and faith in Allah".9 These programmatic words led to a struggle against the United States and its almost

inevitable climax in the 2001 attack on the Twin Towers. The costs have been high, perhaps as much as 1.4 trillion US dollars10 In human

terms, although official American military casualties are put at 5,921 (at May 9, 2011) amuch higher overall figure of 54,800 American- dead and wounded from the war onterror- have been suggested. Exact numbers of civilian casualties are not known butestimates indicate the figures to be much higher. Iraqi civilians killed and woundedmaybe as high as 1.4 million. 34,000 Afghan civilian's may have been killed or wounded.

35,000 may have died in conflicts connected with the war on terror in Pakistan and thetribal areas, with the figure rising by the day.

What role did Osama bin Laden have on the al-Qaeda side of the war on terror?

Over recent months United States intelligence stated that bin Laden no longer hadoperational control of al-Qaeda, but had delegated much of his authority to Ayma al-Zawahiri and the, as yet unknown, Director of International Operations. 11 They believebin Laden's role to have become largely symbolic, his video and audio messages morecommentary than calls to action. 12

Other analysts challenge this view, pointing out that many agencies had declared alQaeda's leadership extinct after the invasion of Afghanistan, only to be proven wrong

within a few short years, during which the network established a new global structureand solidified its manhaj or ideology.

A key to this debate is recognition of the structure of al-Qaeda and the roles of its various constituents.13 Whether al-Qaeda has a centralized command structure, and whether bin Laden still had a commanding role, is secondary to the successfuldevelopment of a manhaj that has led to al-Qaeda being ideologically and operationally stronger than it was in 2001. Osama bin Laden played a key role in driving thedevelopment of that manhaj and in communicating it to al Qaeda's audience world-wide.

He was still fulfilling this role at the time of his death. An analysis by Professor Rohan Gunaratna in a RSIS Commentary on May 3 set outthe importance and the significance of the founder of al-Qaeda: 14

Osama bin Laden influenced the contemporary wave of global terrorism more than any other terrorist figure.While his own group al-Qaeda spearheaded the most devastating attacks, bin Laden built a global terror network by bringing together like-minded groups from conflict

9 http://www.usc.edu/schools/college/crcc/engagement/resources/texts/muslim/quran/009.qmt.html10 See The Congressional Research Service Report: The Cost of Iraq,Afghanistan and other Global War on

Terror Operations since 9/11, March 29,2011 http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL33110.pdf 11

http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/34342417/ns/world_news-south_and_central_asia/12 NATO official: 'Bin Laden hiding in northwest Pakistan' - October 18, 2010 CNN13 See: Peter L. Bergen,The Osama bin Laden I know: An Oral History of the al-Qaeda Leader.2006, Free Fress New

York and: Peter L. Bergin, Holy War, Inc: Inside the Secret World of Osama bin Laden 2001 Free Press New York


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zones in Asia, Africa and the Middle East. Although puritanical in his belief, bin Laden also harnessed modern communications platforms t

politicize, radicalize and mobilize millions of supporters and sympathizers. He could communic

complex messages in simple words. Speaking softly with a Quran in one hand and an AK47 in theother, he built mass appeal across the Muslim world.15

It will take some time before the story of bin Laden will emerge out of the myth andlegend that has built up from the mystique of his personality. This should not, however,prevent an assessment being made of his more recent role and of the more recentactivity of al-Qaeda as a factor in the ongoing events that have spread rapidly across the

Arab world.From the beginning there has been a lack of clarity surrounding the number of

operatives involved in the al-Qaeda movement. In 2001 the number was put at between 500

to a 1,000.16

A more recent estimate of the numbers operating in Afghanistan suggests 50-100.17 In the Western world it is likely no one actually knows the numbers that have beeninvolved in the past and that are now involved. The reality is that al-Qaeda, as anorganization, may well be intact at the centre but its own operatives are a small number andare spread out in strategic areas. The strength of al-Qaeda is in its influence throughout a wide-spread network of organizations and movements that share its ideals and its ideology. This is what makes the core operatives so difficult to identify, even though the leadership indifferent countries may be known by name.

It is not astonishing that such a small organization has made such an impact and costthe United States and its allies so much in terms of financial and human costs. Theleadership and the membership of Al-Qaeda are committed to the cause and are quiteprepared to die in the process of realizing the goals of the organization and movementsassociated with it.

14 See:Rohan Gunaratna, Inside Al-Qaeda Global Net Work of Terror.2002. Scribe publications Melbourne and:http://www.pvtr.org/pdf/CTTA/2011/CTTA-May11.pdf

15 Jason Burke, Al-Qaeda: The True Story of Radical Islam 2004 Penguin Books London.

16 See: Ken Silverstein writing in theHarpers Magazine . July 2006. http://www.harpers.org/archive/ 2006/07/sb-al-qaeda-new-members-badly-needed-17 Bill Roggio, 'How Many al-Qaeda operators are now left in fghanistan'? April 26, 2011.Threat Matrix: A Blog of

the Long War Journal.http://www.longwarjournal.org/threat-matrix/archives/2011/04/how_ many_al_qaeda_operatives_a.php


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18 http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/pakistan/8487355/Osama-bin-Laden-killed-how-the-deadly-US-raid-unfolded.html

19 http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/pakistan/8487374/Osama-bin-Laden-killed-live.html?sms_ss=email&at_xt=4dbf28362197b59e%2C0

20 See for further detail the article in theWashington Post written by Bob Woodward entitled 'Death of Osama bin

Laden: Phone call pointed U.S. to compound-and to 'the pacer', May 11, 2011.The courier's name (it is apseudonym and he was, according to Woodward, known to US intelligence) whose cell phone conversations wereintercepted is, Abu Ahmed al-Kuwaiti. www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/death-of-osama-bin-laden.

21 This detail comes fromThe New Statesman

On May 1 2011,18 bin Laden was killed by a bullet fired by a United States Navy SEALduring a 40-minute helicopter assault on a fortified compound believed to have beenpurpose-built to hide the al-Qaeda leader. AT least two modified Blackhawk helicoptersflew the assault team to Abbottabad a town of around 120,888 citizens (2006) situated71 miles (115 kilometers) from the centreof Islamabad.

According to US officials,19 the path to bin Laden's demise began when KhalidSheikh Mohammed, an al-Qaeda leader captured in 2003, and currently held in detentionat Guantanamo Bay provided the CIA with the name of bin Laden's personal courier.Subsequently, Abu al-Libi, who is also in detention at Guantanamo in Cuba, said he hadbeen appointed a bin Laden messenger in 2003 to be based in Abbottabad sparking theinterest of intelligence agencies in that town. Precisely what led to the discovery thatOsama bin Laden was resident there, in a house built in 2004, is clouded incontradictions but it is clear that by late 2010 planning was underway to eliminate the al-Qaeda leader.20

The three-story compound, pictured above, was located "at the end of a narrow dirt

road",21 2.5 miles (4km) northeast of the city center of Abbott?bad and is about 100miles from the Afghanistan border on the far eastern side of Pakistan (about 20 milesfrom India). The compound is 0.8 miles (1.3km) southwest of the Pakistan Military

Academy (PMA), Pakistan's "West Point".

The Death of Osama bin Laden

Chapter 1


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Surrounded by wallstopped by barbed wire, theonly access was through two

security gates- although this isnot unusual in residences inPakistan or India. Builtaround five years ago, itsaccommodation block is threelevels high. Such is theemphasis on privacy that thethird-floor terrace is shieldedby a seven-foot wall.22

President Barack Obama,occupied the top two spots on YouTube's "most watched" videos on May 2, as he and his team followed the raid and finally the announcement of the death of the al-Qaeda leader23. On May 3 a video of the President's comments onMay 1 immediately following the death of the terrorist leader bin Laden had attractedover two million viewers in 48 hours from users around the world. The video entitled"President Obama on Death of Osama bin Laden," 24 was posted by the White House,between 10:30 p.m. and 11:30 p.m. EST, on May 2, Google saw around that time a one

million percent increase in searches for "bin laden."25 The Secretary of State, Hilary Clinton, also drew world-wide internet audiences

when she spoke. "Part of what we are fighting against right now, the United Statescreated. We created the Mujahidin force against the Soviet Union (in Afghanistan). Wetrained them, we equipped them, we funded them, including somebody named Osamabin Laden. And it didn't work out so well for us."The Secretary of the State also statedthat "Pakistan is paying a "big price" for supporting U.S. war against terror groups intheir own national interest. But I think it is important to note that as they have madethese adjustments in their own assessment of their national interests, they're paying a big price for it,"26

White House Press Secretary Jay Carney gave the official statement on May 5: 27

On orders of the President, a small US team assaulted a secure compound in an affluent suburb o

Source: CIA

22 ws/asia/pakistan/8487374/Osama-bin-Laden-killed-live.html?sms_ss=email&at_xt= 4dbf28362197b59e%2C023 http://www.independent.co.uk/life-style/gadgets-and-tech/obama-dominates-youtube-as-2-million-watch-

news-of-bin-ladenrsquos-death-viral-video-spotlight-2278378.html24 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZNYmK19-d0U25

http://twitter.com/#%21/google/status/65502190315376640 For Obama's own account see the 60 minutesprogram, atwww.cbsnews.com/stories/2011/05/08/60minutes. See also the transcript of a PBS News HourReport for May 2. www.pbs.org.newshour/bb/terrorism/jan-june11/obamaplan.

26 http://www.todaysviews.com/?p=961


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Islamabad to capture or kill Osama bin Laden. The raid was conducted with US military personnel assaulting on two helicopters. The team methodically cleared the compound, moving from room to roomin an operation lasting nearly 40 minutes. They were engaged in a firefight throughout the operation,

and Osama bin Laden was killed by the assaulting force In addition to the bin Laden family, two other families resided in the compound: one family on the

first floor of the bin Laden building, and one family in a second building.One team began the operation on the first floor of the bin Laden house and worked their way to the

third floor. A second team cleared the separate building.On the first floor of bin Laden's building, two al Qaeda couriers were killed, along with a woman

who was killed in crossfire. Bin Laden and his family were found on the second and third floor of the building. There was concern that bin Laden would oppose the capture operation - operation rather, and,indeed, he did resist.

In the room with bin Laden, a woman -

bin Laden's -

a woman, rather, bin Laden's wife, rushed the US assaulter and was shot in the leg but not killed. Bin Laden was then shot and killed. He was not armed.

Following the firefight, the non-combatants were moved to a safe location as the damaged helicopter was detonated. The team departed the scene via helicopter to the USS Carl Vinson in the North

Arabian Sea.Neither Carney nor any other official has explained how an assault force that arrived

in two helicopters managed to squeeze into just one for the extraction to the USS Carl Vinson. It must be assumed that either support helicopters were available at or near thelocation, or that it was a very small assault force as most Blackhawk helicopters have aload capacity of just crew plus fourteen.

US officials say no prisoners, or bodies- other than that of bin Laden- were flown outof the compound when the SEAL team withdrew.28 It may be that the mechanical failure of one of the helicopters meant that the attack force had limited transport which may havefrustrated any intentions of removing prisoners from Abbottabad.

As can be expected, initial reports, even from the highest level are already being contradicted and it will no doubt be some time before a reliable picture is gained of whatoccurred in Abbottabad. One senior US official has described this as a result of 'the fog of war'.29 This view seems incongruous with the much publicized photograph of

President Obama and others in the White House Situation Room watching 'real time'events occurring in Abbottabad. 30

Reports state there were between seventeen and twenty two people, including numerous children, in the compound when the attack commenced. Depending on whichsource you use, one, two 0r three of bin Laden's wives and 'about eight or nine' childrenare in Pakistani care and four bodies were recovered- one of them being Osama binLaden's son, Khalid.31 Two more of the deaths are reported to be al-Qaeda 'couriers'

27 http:/ /www.3news.co.nz/Bin-Laden-situation-Full-White-House-press-briefing/tabid/417/

articleID/210045/Default.aspx28 http://www.duluthnewstribune.com/event/article/id/197995/29 http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2011/05/the-slippery-story-of-the-bin-laden-kill/238261/30 But see the interview Obama gave to 60 minutes on May 5 2011.The program is entitled "President Obama on

the raid that killed bin Laden." www.cbsnews.com/stories/2011/05/08/60 minutes/


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who lived at the compound. The fourth body is reported to be that of a woman who was used as a shield by one of the al-Qaeda men during the 'firefight.' Two other women were wounded- one of them a wife of bin Laden. It appears that those captured wereleft, tied up, and are now in the care of the Pakistani authorities who arrived at the scene

within an hour.On May 11th it was reported that Hamza bin Laden, the youngest son of Osama bin

Laden disappeared from the Pakistani compound where his father was shot dead. Threeof bin Laden's widows, who are in custody in Pakistan, have told authorities that they cannot account for the whereabouts of the 20-year-old. 32 The United States had initially reported, on May 2, that three adults besides Osama bin Laden were killed in the raidand that one of the dead was Hamza bin Laden. 33 Officials later said his 22 year-oldbrother Khalid had been killed instead. 34 At present, this remains another unexplained

contradiction in the official account.Pakistan's foreign ministry said the bin Laden family was "all in safe hands and being looked after in accordance with law. Some of them needing medical care are undertreatment in the best possible facilities. As per policy, they will be handed over to theircountries of origin."35 The Australian newspaper has reported that Saudi authorities haverefused to accept custody of as many as nine children found in the compound. TheIslamic kingdom rescinded bin Laden's citizenship in 1994 for suspected terroractivities.36 Understandably the US is seeking to interrogate the wives held by thePakistan Government as they seek basic information about the life of the family in

Abbottabad and information about the possible whereabouts of the second incommand Ayman al-Zawahiri.

A Treasure Trove of Intelligence? 37

US Administration officials report that they may have also found communicationsbetween senior al-Qaeda lieutenants and bin Laden which could reveal informationabout potential targets and strategic information on the direction of the organization, as

well as the whereabouts of its operatives. The raiders took away a range of "removablemedia" such as computer disks.

The White House chief of counter-terrorism, John Brennan, said some of the

computer hardware could have been used to ferry messages to and from bin Laden inthe absence of an internet connection or phone link to the hideaway. Messages fromother parts of al-Qaeda would have been ferried in by disk or hard drive and uploadedfor him to read, US officials believe.

Another key question, which the cache of data may help answer, is the whereabouts

31 http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/may/04/osama-bin-laden-killing-us-story-change32 http://www.smh.com.au/world/hunt-on-for-crown-prince-of-terror-20110511-1ehu7.html33 http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/05/02/us-obama-binladen-son-idUSTRE7410T52011050234 http://blogs.forbes.com/afontevecchia/2011/05/10/bin-ladens-son-to-have-escaped-raid-as-new-footage-is-

released/35 http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/may/03/osama-bin-ladens-family 36 http://www.theaustralian.com.au/bali-bomber-umar-patek-helped-lead-world-to-osama-bin-ladens-

hideaway/story-fn8ljzlv-122605011699737 http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/may/03/al-qaida-hard-drives


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of al-Zawahiri and the extent to which bin Laden continued to communicate with theoutside world on both strategy and operations, especially given the widely held belief he

was unlikely to have been recently involved in detailed planning of attacks. The recent

release of videos of bin Laden watching TV and then videos of himself delivering addresses (but without the words) have not added any credibility to the claims that thefinds are significant.

Conflict in Official US and Pakistani Accounts

US Foreign Policy was reporting 38 by May 4 that the White House was retreating from anumber of the most provocative details of its account of the raid. In particular, theearlier claims made by John Brennan that bin Laden had been "engaged in a firefight

with those that entered" and was "hiding behind women who were put in front of him

as a shield" appear to be false. Jay Carney now says that bin Laden's wife "rushed the U.S. assaulter and was shot in

the leg but not killed. Bin Laden was then shot and killed. He was not armed." The woman who was caught in the line of fire and "presumed to be his wife" may haveactually been acting of her own free will.

CIA Director Leon Panetta now says that, while the U.S. would have taken bin Ladeninto custody if he had surrendered, "I don't think he had a lot of time to say anything."Carney attributed the miss-statement to the administration's "great haste" in sharing information on the raid.

Official US sources have also reported (as did the President) that the PakistaniGovernment was not informed of the raid until after it was over. It is worthy of note,however, that US sources reported that the raid was launched from Ghazi airbase in Pakistan.Limited bases were granted to the Americans in Tarbella, Ghazi in 2008 under an agreementfor high-profile operations.39 Ghazi is 20km from Islamabad.

Pakistani authorities subsequently said,40 "Reports about US helicopters taking off from Ghazi Airbase are absolutely false and incorrect. Neither any base or facility insidePakistan was used by the US Forces, nor did the Pakistan Army provide any operationalor logistic assistance to these operations conducted by the US Forces". This report has to be weighed against an earlier statement in

which bin Laden's death was confirmed by Pakistani intelligence and in which LieutenantGeneral Ahmad Shuja Pasha, the director general of Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI),said the ISI had been aware of the operation and was part of the whole process. 41

We must, of course, be cognizant of the many complexities in the Pakistani political/military/intelligence conundrum. The Pakistani Government would have good domesticreason to deny any involvement.

The Asia Times Online 42 points out that United States officials modified their narrativeon Osama bin Laden's killing less than a day after the initial announcement, to "protectPakistan's broader interests against threats from militants," saying that the Pakistanis had

38 http://nz.mg261.mail.yahoo.com/dc/launch?.partner=tnz&.gx=1&.rand=7ltivj8114ftl39 http://atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/ME04Df03.html40 http://www.inewsone.com/2011/05/03/no-pakistani-bases-used-by-us-forces-says-pakistan/47960


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41 http://atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/ME03Df01.html42 http://atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/ME04Df03.html43

http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-503543_162-20059361-503543.html44 http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2011/04/25/national/main20057002.shtml?tag=mncol;lst;1045 http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2011/05/03/politics/main20059255.shtml46 http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2011/05/the-slippery-story-of-the-bin-laden-kill/238261/

little involvement.The Asia Times says that well-placed security sources maintain that the operation in

Abbottabad, just a two-hour drive north of the capital Islamabad, was without a doubt

a joint Pakistan-US effort and that all logistics were arranged inside Pakistan. The ISI's account 43 differs in a number of places from the version offered by U.S.

officials. An ISI official said that there were 17 to 18 people in the compound at the timeof the attack and that the Americans took away one prisoner - possibly a bin Laden son.

The U.S. has said that there were 23 children and nine women in the compound inaddition to those killed in the raid, and all were turned over to Pakistani authorities.

The Pakistani official said the remaining people left in the house were found tied upand suggested that U.S. forces may have been planning to take them away but abandonedthe plan due to the helicopter that malfunctioned.

There are reasons to be skeptical of the anonymous official's version of events.Documents recently released by WikiLeaks show that U.S. officials consider the ISI tobe a terrorist group similar to Hamas or Hezbollah, 44 and the U.S. has been grappling

with ongoing questions about Pakistan's reliability as a partner in fighting terrorism.45Of course, official U.S. accounts of such charged events are not free from

falsehoods. After initially reporting that bin Laden used a woman as a human shield,officials later backtracked from that account.46

The CIA and the ISI have worked closely together since the Sept. 11 terrorist attacksto hunt down al-Qaeda operatives sheltering in Pakistan. U.S. officials have often voicedsuspicions that elements of the ISI were either linked to or supporting militants even asthe two countries publicly talked of their alliance in the campaign against extremism.

CIA chief Leon Panetta told Times Magazine that U.S. officials feared that Pakistancould have undermined the operation by leaking word to its targets. Months prior to theraid, the U.S. had considered expanding the assault to include coordination with othercountries, notably Pakistan. The CIA however ruled out participating with its nominalSouth Asian ally early on because "it was decided that any effort to work with thePakistanis could jeopardize the mission. They might alert the targets."47

The Coincidence of Umar Patek

Some sources suggest that, while the Pakistan's military command was aware that theoperation targeted a high-value suspect, it may have been unaware that it was in fact binLaden until this was announced by the US after the al-Qaeda leader had been killed by the Special Forces.

The operation to find, capture or kill bin Laden was similar to the one that nettedthe Indonesian al-Qaeda operative Umar Patek. The arrest in Abbottabad on January 25of Patek, the last major figure who was still at large for the 2002 Bali attacks, that killed


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47 http://swampland.time.com/2011/05/03/cia-chief-breaks-silence-u-s-ruled-out-involving-pakistan-in-bin-laden-raid-early-on/48 http://www.theaustralian.com.au/bali-bomber-umar-patek-helped-lead-world-to-osama-bin-ladens-

hideaway/story-fn8ljzlv-122605011699749 ibid

202 people, has raises a critical question: did Patek give vital information to his Pakistancaptors about the whereabouts of bin Laden, or did his arrest by Pakistani intelligencerisk upsetting the American operation? Indonesia Defence Minister Purnomo

Yusgiantoro said on May 4, "The information that we have with Umar Patek (and about) why he was in Pakistan . . . is (he was) trying to meet with Osama bin Laden."48

US officials claim, and it is not denied by Pakistan's ISI- that Patek was caught on atip-off from the CIA. It was the ISI, however, who captured and "processed" Patek and

who still holds him incommunicado in Lahore. While US authorities have maintainedthey tracked bin Laden through his courier, Pakistan's highest selling Urdu newspaper,

Jang , reported, without attribution, that the final clues leading to bin Laden's hideout were extracted from Patek under ISI interrogation and handed to the CIA. 49

So, when Pakistani intelligence gave the approval for American gunship helicopters

to fly from Tarbella Ghazi, 20 kilometers from Islamabad and the brigade headquartersof the Pakistan army's elite commando unit, to capture a high-value target in

Abbottabad, is it possible the Pakistanis may have assumed it was for the seizure of Umar Patek's companions?

Add to this the probability that whilst some elements of the Pakistani ISI and /orthe army may indeed have had an awareness of the operation but were forced to distancethemselves from the knowledge in order to minimize any domestic blowback from bothradical Islamists and military and or intelligence staff of questionable loyalty.

"They may argue the Pakistani government collaborated with the US against Islam,"

wrote the Director of the University of Western Australia's Centre for Muslim Statesand Societies, Samina Yasmeen.50 "Others may argue if the Pakistani government wasaware of and co-operated with Americans to kill Osama bin Laden on Pakistani soil,

what does that say about Pakistan's sovereignty of its territory? ... That could feed intothe anti-Americanism that's been coming up in Pakistan in the last 10 years or evenbefore that."

Yasmeen added that if the argument that Pakistan had been protecting bin Ladenturned out to be the case then, it was likely to lead to tougher language (and maybeaction) against Pakistan, which in turn would feed "anti-American circles."

There have been demonstrations in several Pakistani cities condemning theGovernment for allowing the American incursions. But such demonstrations must beunderstood against the number of Pakistanis killed or wounded since the war on terrorbegan. For the last year 2,113 militant, insurgent and sectarian attacks were reportedacross Pakistan, killing 2,913 people.51

Who Was Aware Of bin Laden's Residency?

Abbottabad residents have commented that despite all attempts to fly under the radar in


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the close, affluent suburb of businessmen and serving and retired army officers,occasional trips by the women outside the compound always sparked curiosity, especially given the fact that they emerged in darkened vehicles and in full burkas. The inevitable

question now is whether bin Laden was able to come and go in one of Pakistan's mostsecure cities, under the noses of senior army officers and police and perhaps under thecover of a burka.52

On May 2, Hillary Clinton moved to quash accusations that Pakistani authoritiesknew of bin Laden's whereabouts, telling reporters that the country's counter-terrorismofficials helped lead the US to his compound. Speaking at the State Department theSecretary of State thanked Pakistan for its cooperation and said that it "has contributedgreatly to our efforts to dismantle al-Qaida." She added, "in fact, cooperation withPakistan helped lead us to bin Laden and the compound in which he was hiding. 53

Somewhat contradicting this, Reuters reports that Clinton said last July that shebelieved that Pakistani officials knew where bin Laden was holed up. On a visit toPakistan just days before the Abbottabad raid, Admiral Mike Mullen, chairman of theU.S. Military's Joint Chiefs of Staff, accused the ISI of maintaining links with the

Taliban.54Clinton's recent, more conciliatory, comments may be driven more by "real politic"

than any genuine belief that no elements of the Pakistani administration were complicitin bin Laden's presence in a city a short distance from the capital.

The Pakistani government admitted that, since 2009, the ISI has shared informationabout the compound with the CIA and other Western intelligence agencies, and that

intelligence indicating foreigners were in the Abbottabad area continued until mid- April.55

Pakistani security forces have killed or captured over 400 al-Qaeda members since2001, and lost over 3,000 of their own soldiers and policemen fighting militant groupsin Pakistan. At times, Pakistan has cooperated closely with US and other Westernintelligence.56 Moreover, al-Qaeda tried to kill former president Pervez Musharraf atleast three times.

Understanding the longstanding contradictions within Pakistan's armed forces andthe security services is an enormous challenge for both Pakistan and the West. It is

summed up in a recent statement by the chairman of Britain's Foreign AffairsCommittee, Richard Ottaway, who said, "Unfortunately, I am not sure that theGovernment of Pakistan speaks for the whole of Pakistan. It is a divided country withlots of tribal loyalties, and there are clearly internal divisions within Pakistan's security services."57

50 http://www.watoday.com.au/wa-news/can-you-really-trust-pakistan-islam-nation-central-to-future-terror-threat-wa-islam-expert-says-20110502-1e56l.html

51 http://www.dawn.com/2011/01/16/urban-terrorism-growing-threat-in-pakistan-report.html52

ibid53 http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/clinton-says-cooperation-with-pakistan-helped-lead-us-to-compound-where-bin-laden-was-killed/2011/05/02/AFfiBjZF_story.html

54 http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/05/05/us-binladen-pakistan-isi idUSTRE74408220110505?feedType=RSS&feedName=topNews


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Pakistan: Al Qaeda's Regional Focus?

Recent events suggest that al-Qaeda has diverted its regional focus from Afghanistan toPakistan. As early as 2007 US reports stated that Pakistan is the base from where al-Qaeda is rebuilding itself.58 In August 2010 a US government report said that Al-Qaeda'sleadership in Pakistan and its affiliates in Africa remain the biggest threats to US and itsinterests abroad.59

The question of how Pakistan and its Western allies will deal with the tribal areas onthe border with Afghanistan which remain largely under the control of a variety of terrorist groups, despite strenuous efforts by the Pakistan army to eliminate them, is now even more pressing. Al-Qaeda and its Pakistani extremist allies will need these areas morethan ever after bin Laden's death and will fight to the death to retain them. Pakistan isnow a much weaker and more vulnerable state than it was when the hunt for bin Laden

began. The Government has multiple political and economic problems that it has failedto deal with. These challenges only make the issue of control over the tribal areas thatmuch more difficult. To be on top of these problems, Pakistan will need internationalhelp and support to achieve this result. 60bin Laden: A Martyr?

Had Osama bin Laden been captured rather than killed, it would have potentially createdserious problems for any country that held him, and for their allies, with terroristfactions and others demanding his release or his detention in international hands.Similarly it can be argued that to provide him with a grave, other than an unidentifiable

place in the Arabian Sea would have provided him a martyr's tomb. These considerationsappear to be the basis for the raid and for the' decision to bury the body at sea. Hindsightmay prove these decisions to be counter-productive.

Legal considerations need to be understood against the background of the Bushadministration determination to bring bin Laden to justice along with the leadership of the Taliban. The emotional reaction was first of anger at the destruction of life andbuildings at the site of the Twin Towers and onboard the aircraft high jacked for thepurpose. Anger gave way to vengeance and the vow to apprehend those responsible andto leave no stone unturned in the search. But vengeance gave way to a determination to

avenge the dead and to stand up to the perpetrators for not only what became knownas 9/11, but also for the damage to American lives and property in the 1990s,for which Al-Qaeda had been blamed. George Bush's speeches in the weeks following 9/11 wereadamant. The following words define the doctrine of preemptive action that undergirded subsequent actions by his administration.61

The security environment confronting the United States today is radically different from what we have faced before. Yet the first duty of the United States Government remains what it always has been:

55 http://www.kentucky.com/2011/05/03/1728283/pakistans-president-denies-harboring.html56

http://www.nybooks.com/blogs/nyrblog/2011/may/03/pakistan-and-al-qaedas-future/57 NZ Dominion Post May 4 2011, Impossible Not To Know Of Urban Hideout58 http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/6257029.stm59 http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-1088816560 http://www.nybooks.com/blogs/nyrblog/2011/may/03/pakistan-and-al-qaedas-future/


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to protect the American people and American interests. It is an enduring American principle that thiduty obligates the government to anticipate and counter threats, using all elements of national powbefore the threats can do grave damage. The greater the threat, the greater is the risk of inaction - a

the more compelling the case for taking anticipatory action to defend ourselves, even if uncertaremains as to the time and place of the enemy's attack. There are few greater threats than a terrorisattack with WMD.

To forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our adversaries, the United States will, if necessary, a pre-emptively in exercising our inherent right of self-defense. The United States will not re-sort to fin all cases to pre-empt emerging threats. Our preference is that non-military ac-tions succeed. Andcountry should ever use pre-emption as a pretext for aggression.

In addressing Congress he had this to say: 62

We will pursue nations that provide aid or safe haven to terrorism. Every nation, in every region, nohas a decision to make. Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists. From this day forwardany nation that continues to harbor or support terrorism will be regarded by the United States as ahostile regime.

And again these words:63

We cannot defend America and our friends by hoping for the best. We cannot put our faith in the worof tyrants, who solemnly sign non-proliferation treaties, and then systemically break them. If we w

for threats to fully materialize, we will have waited too long Our security will require transforming

military you will lead a military that must be ready to strike at a moment's no-tice in any dark cornerof the world. And our security will require all Americans to be forward-looking and resolute, to be rea for preemptive action when necessary to defend our liberty and to defend our lives.

An article in the Guardian maintains that there was an agreement between Bush andhis Afghanistan and Pakistan counterparts to allow such an excursion into theirterritories by the US. The key words of the article are these:

US forces were given permission to conduct unilateral raid inside Pakistan if they knew where BLaden was hiding, officials say

The deal was struck between Pervez Musharraf and George Bush in 2001 and renewedduring the 'transition to democracy' - a six-month period from February 2008 whenMusharraf was still president but a civilian government had been elected.

Under its terms, Pakistan would allow US forces to conduct a unilateral raid insidePakistan in search of Bin Laden, his deputy, Ayman al-Zawahiri, and the al-Qaida No3. Afterwards, both sides agreed, Pakistan would vociferously protest the incursion.

"There was an agreement between Bush and Musharraf that if we knew whereOsama was, we were going to come and get him," said a former senior US official withknowledge of counterterrorism operations. "The Pakistanis would put up a hue and cry,but they wouldn't stop us."

61 National Security Council (March 2006). "Summary of National Security Strategy 2002". http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/nsc/nss/2006/print/sectionV.html.62 Bush, George W. (September 20, 2001). "Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People".

TheWhiteHouse. http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/09/ print/20010920-8.html.


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President Obama did not cancel this policy when he took office so presumably theprinciple of preemption as defined in this way still stands thus giving his administrationthe grounds for tak-ing whatever action it deems fit in someone else's territory to take

preemptive action to protect its own American citizens. 64 Within 24 hours of the announcement of bin Laden's death and burial at sea, debate

began around the world about the legality of the former 65 and the religious and moralcorrectness of the latter. 66

Regardless of the outcome of these debates, bin Laden's death, 'fighting for his life anddying for the cause' and 'his body stolen from his people and hidden beneath the ocean'creates a mythology that fits perfectly into the Arab/Jewish/Christian way of thinking aboutthe death of a hero figure. Unless the body is produced or the death can be testified to by areliable witness then myths will be woven and the personality of the deceased will live on in

the life of his community. That the US administration is becoming aware of this may explain why we arealready receiving revised accounts of the way he died: armed and fighting or un-armedand cowering?

"History," wrote Abdullah Azzam, Osama bin Laden's mentor, "does not write itslines except with blood Glory does not build its lofty edifice except with skulls;honour and respect cannot be established except on a foundation of cripples andcorpses." Osama bin Laden has become one of those corpses. Even as Americacelebrates the death of the man who more than any other came to represent evil in ourtime, there is little reason for jubilation.67

bin Laden himself, the scholar Christine Fair has noted, has emerged as a "kind of Che Guevara of the jihadist movement, an inspirational icon who could fire theimagination of young recruits." Bin Laden's death or, to the faithful, his martyrdom -might prove to be his last service for his macabre cause. 68

A tape made by bin Laden was poised to be released Monday May 3 by Al Qaeda. It was unclear whether the tape is audio or video, but a U.S. official said intelligenceindicates bin Laden ordered it to be released in the event of his death. 69

Who Becomes Leader?

It is unclear how leadership change will occur because it is the first time since the 1980sthat Arab extremists will be faced with actually choosing a new leader while the pressureof the US and NATO intelligence will not allow al-Qaeda members to communicate

63 Bush, George W. (June 1, 2002). "President Bush Delivers Graduation Speech at West Point."64 See the document by Thomas Donnelly, "The Underpinning of the Bush Doctrine," American Enterprise

Institute at www.aei.org 65 See for example the following sources: The Guardian May 3, 2011, "Osama bin Laden: US responds to

questions about killing legality." www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/may/o3/osama-bin-laden-killing-legality; Andrew Longstreth, "Analysis: Legal questions remain over bin Laden killing"Reuters ; May 5, 2011 MichaelCohen, "Killing Osama bin Laden was a Legal Act," Atlantic Council May 6, 2011. www.acus.org; DavidBosco, "OBL Killing: Did Pakistan Consent". Foreign Policy May 10, 2011.http://bosco.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/05/10/obl_killing.

66 The rules for burial are: [620]. * It is obligatory to bury a dead body in the ground, so deep that its smelldoes not come out and the beasts of prey do not dig it out, and, if there is a danger of such beasts


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easily with one another. As this struggle plays out, however, there will also be ampleopportunities for Western forces and intelligence agencies to degrade and dismantle al-Qaeda further, for example, by detaining other leaders.70

An Asia Times Online report 71 claims that, following the upheavals in the Middle Eastand North Africa, bin Laden had been spurred into action to create unity within theIslamist cadre of Pakistan and Afghanistan, in the Afghan battle against the Americans.For this reason he recently traveled to Pakistan to meet with Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, thelegendary Afghan mujahid and founder and leader of the Hezb-e-Islami Afghanistanpolitical party and paramilitary group, and many other top jihadi leaders. He is believedto have shifted to Abbottabad about 10 days ago and was about to move again, sourcestold Asia Times Online.

The Asia Times report also noted that al-Qaeda's leadership shura (council), would

run the organization and a new chief would be decided later. A new generation of commanders includes Sirajuddin Haqqani, Qari Ziaur Rahman, Nazir Ahmad and IlyasKashmiri, who have chosen to joine forces with al-Qaeda.

A key player of course is Ayman al-Zawahri, long the second in command in AlQaeda, who is likely to succeed bin Laden as its leader. Zawahiri released five recordingsbetween January and April trying to link the uprisings across the Arab world to thejihadist inspiration behind the Sept. 11 attacks.72 The jihadist battle cry has not beenparticularly relevant to the uprisings, and Zawahri even apologized in his messages foroften being behind the curve on developments in the Arab world, "the result of being on the run", he said. Zawahri's effort to cast al-Qaeda as a central player in militantIslamic politics could become even more difficult with the death of bin Laden.

If bin Laden was al-Qaeda's ideological leader, Zawahri has been considered itsorganizational brains. He is viewed as something of a drudge, more likely to be caughtup in local issues and feuds and lacking the charismatic skill to inspire jihadists of allstripes around the world. Autonomous al-Qaeda franchises in North Africa, the ArabianPeninsula and Iraq are likely to become even more so, government officials and expertsbelieve, as Zawahri struggles to hold the organization together.

"bin Laden represented a movement; he was almost mythic in his appearances and what he said. Zawahri cannot equal that," according to Richard Barrett, the coordinator

for the Qaeda-Taliban monitoring team for the United Nations Security Council. "Hedoes not have the vision that can incorporate the people who take a less violent way to

digging it out then the grave should be made solid with bricks, etc. [623]. If a person dies on a ship and if there is no fear of the decay of the dead body and if there is no problem in retaining it for sometime onthe ship, it should be kept on it and buried in the ground after reaching the land. Otherwise, after giving Ghusl, Hunut, Kafan and Namaz-e-Mayyit it should be lowered into the sea in a vessel of clay or with a

weight tied to its feet. And as far as possible it should not be lowered at a point where it is eaten upimmediately by the sea predators. www.al-islam.org/laws/burial.htm

67 NZ Herald , May 4 2011, Al-Qaeda Still A Formidable Foe68 http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/pakistan/8488662/Al-Qaeda-The-next-

generation.html69 http://www.nydailynews.com/news/world/2011/05/02/2011-05-02_final_ bin_laden_doomsday_

tape_may_be_released_by_al_qaeda_disciples_us_officials.html70 http://www.nybooks.com/blogs/nyrblog/2011/may/03/pakistan-and-al-qaedas-future/71 http://atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/ME03Df01.html


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effect change."73Other experts, however, believe that lack of charisma may prove less important than

ideology. In a sense, al-Qaeda has proved successful in spreading its franchise across

much of the Middle East, and the question will be whether with Zawahri at its helm itcan continue to inspire the next generation of jihadists, or not.

"The transition that the Middle East is passing through at the present time will be atesting ground whether these ideas will survive, will come back with a vengeance or willcease to be relevant," writes Nelly Lahoud, a senior associate at the Combating

Terrorism Center at West Point. "Will the new emerging regimes deliver something meaningful in the Muslim world?"74 The Qaeda narrative willlose adherents if they do, but could return with a vengeance if they do not, she added.

U.S. counterterrorism officials have described Al-Zawahiri as al Qaeda's chief

organizer and bin Laden's closest confidante. Like bin Laden, he has long believed tohave been hiding in the Afghanistan-Pakistan border. There could, however, be other challengers. Top on the list is al-Qaeda's leader in

Yemen, cleric Anwar al-Awlaki.75 The most potent and active offshoot group is al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula,

(AQAP), led by Nasser al-Wuhayshi, bin Laden's former secretary in Afghanistan whoescaped to Iran, was arrested, and subsequently extradited to Yemen in 2003. Afterescaping from prison in 2006 he spearheaded the merger of the Saudi and Yemenibranches of al-Qaeda in 2009.76

More than any other group, AQAP serves as connective tissue between al-Qaedabranches in other regions. Wuhayshi is buttressed in that regard by Anwar al-Awlaki, aU.S.-born radical cleric who gained a following via his Internet sermons and has becomea key recruiter.

Global Responses to the death of bin Laden: a brief selection of comments

Worldwide, officials, experts, and Islamist extremists warned that Western powers shouldbrace themselves for revenge attacks by supporters of bin Laden. 77 International policeagency Interpol alerted national forces to "a heightened terror risk from al-Qaedaaffiliated or al-Qaeda inspired terrorists as a result of Osama's death."78 Several countriesannounced they were stepping up security measures in the wake of Sunday's US military operation,

The Al Qaeda Response 79

Al Qaeda confirmed the death of its leader, Osama bin Laden, and vowed to avenge hisdeath, "a curse" for Americans and their allies. In a statement dated Tuesday May 3 andreleased Friday May 6 on Islamist websites and signed by its general command,80 theextremist network wrote that "Sheikh fighter Abu Abdullah, Osama bin Muhammad bin

Laden, was killed by the bullets of treason and apostasy."72 http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/03/world/asia/03zawahri.html?partner=rss&emc=rss73 http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2011-05-03/news/29499841_1_zawahri-new-al-qaida-bin74 ibid


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Ayman al-Zawahiri said the organization had "no shame" that the U.S. has "been ableto kill Osama." "But can Americans, with their media, their agents, their equipment,military, and intelligence services, kill what Sheikh Osama has devoted his life?" He asks.

The command of the network is committed to "continue without hesitation orreluctance, on the path of jihad, drawn by our leaders at their head Sheikh Osama." "We

will not deviate from this path until victory or death." To this end, "the soldiers of Islam will continue, in groups and individually, and tirelessly planning" of their struggle, warned the statement.

Zawahiri also assures readers that the founder of al-Qaeda has resisted "by force" tomembers of the U.S. commandos, in an allusion to contradictory information that hascirculated about whether bin Laden was armed at the time of the American operation."He faced the weapons by weapons and force by force. He agreed to challenge the

group's arrogance which came with their equipment and their weapons" to kill him, writes the command network. The al-Qaeda message also urged "the Muslim people of Pakistan" to revolt to wash

the shame that was imposed by a gang of thieves and traitors". "They (the Pakistanis)must revolt strongly to clean their country of Americans who have spread corruption,"added the statement.

Responses in the Middle East

Al-Qaeda members will 'certainly' try to retaliate for the assassination of their leaderOsama bin Laden at the hands of a special US squad in Pakistan, experts in Jordan onIslamic organizations warned Monday (2 May).

"I believe al-Qaeda will certainly be involved in reprisal attempts particularly inEurope and the Middle East, where its members are most active," Mohammad AbuRomman, a renowned writer on Islamic groups, told German Press Agency dpa. "BinLaden so far represented the charisma leadership and the symbol for the organization,

whose absence will result in a vacuum that cannot be filled easily," Abu Romman said.81But Romann expected bin Laden's assassination to have "minimal repercussions in

the Arab street, because the event came in the middle of a spate of pro-democracy andpragmatic Arab uprisings that tangibly weakened the legitimacy of al-Qaeda's thought".

"Therefore, I believe al-Qaeda's activity will be increasingly confined to the Arabcountries in future and to become a local player with its role as international playershrinking," Abu Romman said.

Another expert on Islamic organizations, Marwan Shehadah, labelled the killing of bin Laden as "a setback" for al-Qaeda, and expected the terrorist group to elect either

75 http://edition.cnn.com/2011/WORLD/asiapcf/05/02/al.qaeda.what.now/76 http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703703304576299041912668436.html77 "Experts fear al Qaeda revenge attacks in Middle East". www.arabianbusiness.com/experts-fear-al-qaeda-

revenge-attacks78

ABC (Australia) News. "Fears bin Laden killing may spark reprisals" May 3 2011. www.abc.net.au/newsw/stories/2011/05/03/79 http://www.ennaharonline.com/en/international/6447.html80 SKY NEWS May 6 2001, "Al Qaeda Confirms Osama Bin Laden'sDeath".http://uk.News.yahoo. com/bin-

laden-ploted-attack-us-trains.


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Ayman Thawaheri or Abu Yahia al-Libi as new leader.82"I think al-Qaeda will stagesuicide bombings to avenge the assassination, but the attempts will be limited becausethe organization is besieged throughout the world particularly in Arab countries".

A comment from IraqIn Iraq, reaction to Bin Laden's death appeared almost universally positive.83 Leaders of the Awakening Movement, which has been credited with reducing al-Qaeda's influence in the country, said killing him reduces al-Qaeda's influence in Iraq.

A comment from Palestine 84

Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh has condemned the United States, accusing Washington of assassinating a "Muslim and Arabic warrior" and the "continuation of the Americanoppression and shedding of blood of Muslims and Arabs." Haniyeh's reactionunderscores the ideological roots Hamas and al Qaeda share. Hamas was founded by Sheikh Ahmed Yassin, a prominent Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood figure and al Qaeda

was co-founded, along with bin Laden, by Abdullah Azzam, another prominentPalestinian Muslim Brotherhood figure.

From Indonesia

In Indonesia radical cleric Abu Bakar Bashir said he didn't believe that bin Laden's death would lead to the end of al-Qaeda85. "We're still waiting for clarification from al-Qaeda, whether it's true or not - that news of his death," he said."When it's true, then it will notput al-Qaeda to death. Osama's death will not make al-Qaeda dead." The implied threatsin his words seem to be support attacks in response to bin Laden's death. Security forcesin Indonesia are on high alert over fears al-Qaeda affiliated groups are planning attacksfollowing the death of Osama bin Laden.

Sydney Jones, in the Jakarta Post on May 4, said that the idea of al-Qaeda stillresonates, to the point that most self-respecting jihadi groups will want to identify withit.86 On January 25 this year, Umar Patek was arrested in Abbottabad, the same town

where bin Laden was living. It was probably not a coincidence and indeed, may havebeen part of the same operation. And he is not the only one. Muhammad Jibril, founderof the ar-Rahmah publishing company and arrahmah.com, was in regularcommunication with al-Qaeda's media outlet in Waziristan.87

Jones also comments that, "Other parts of the radical network in Indonesia are incommunication with the radical Yemen-based preacher, al-Awlaki, who is active in al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). The death of Bin Laden could lead to arenewed push to bolster these ties or to an intensified propaganda campaign based onal-Qaeda materials, especially from AQAP, translated into Indonesian. There is thus noreason to believe that the security situation in Indonesian has in any way beensignificantly improved by the killing of al-Qaeda's founder."88

81 http://www.monstersandcritics.com/news/middleeast/news/article_1636437.php/Jordanian-experts-predict-al-Qaeda-reprisals-in-Europe-Mideast

82 ibid


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Reaction from the United States

The U.S. State Department early Monday put U.S. embassies on alert and warned of theheightened possibility for anti-American violence after the killing of al-Qaeda leaderOsama bin Laden by American forces in Pakistan. 89

"Decapitation does not mean the end of the movement," 90 wrote Georgetown University Professor Bruce Hoffman, who has studied terrorism and insurgencies for morethan three decades."Some may see this as an opportunity to steal the limelight,"Hoffman said. "While the risk (of new attacks) may go up, the good news is that in therush to do something, some of these (groups) may go off half-cocked" and allow U.S.officials to learn more about the surviving terror networks.

"Perhaps the most troubling aspect of al-Qaeda's continuing influence is theemergence of so-called homegrown U.S. operatives who have drawn inspiration from

bin Laden and, more recently, radical Yemen cleric Anwar al-Awlaki", said Tom Kean,co-chairman of the 9/11 Commission , which identified a series of government security failures leading up to the 2001 attacks.91

When asked if the US is prepared for any al-Qaeda counter-attack, Kean said, "I'msure there will be such attempts, but probably by individuals, rather than a massive al-Qaeda attempt like 9/11. We particularly have to be prepared for attacks by our owncitizens. It's my belief that homegrown terrorism is the most dangerous threat right now.I'm sure al-Qaeda would like to be able to mount a massive attack, but they're probably not organized enough to do it." 92

Kean also added," I'm talking about al-Qaeda recruits who are U.S. citizens, with U.S.passports, who can travel freely. There is increasing evidence that al-Qaeda has changedits whole recruiting tactic to recruit people who are already here with U.S. passports,people who are nave enough to fall for their program. That's the biggest new danger."

Jane Harman, a former California congresswoman who served as the Democraticranking member of the Homeland Security intelligence subcommittee, said al-Qaeda willlikely survive bin Laden's death. "I think we should continue to worry," said Harman,now president of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars."The symbolic leaderis gone. But the operational leaders are not gone. Al-Qaeda is like an amoeba. The end

of this will not just be capture-and-kill operations," she said. "The end of this is winning the argument. We have to project a narrative that is more appealing to those who mightbe suicide bombers or the heads of al-Qaeda affiliates."93

Bruce Hoffman, makes the perceptive comment when he noted that Al-Qaeda willnot necessarily attack soon but we should brace ourselves once the 40-day mourning period that some Muslims observe ends. The dual prospect of punishing the UnitedStates and reigniting fear and anxiety must surely figure in al-Qaeda's calculus for the

83 http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/may/02/al-qaida-lose-grip-insurgents-iraq 84

http://www.weeklystandard.com/blogs/hamas-al-qaeda-alliance_558605.html85 http://www.foxnews.com/world/2011/05/02/radical-cleric-tied-bali-bombing-says-death-usama-bin-laden-death-al-qaeda/

86 http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/about/staff/field/asia/sidney-jones.aspx87 ibid


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future.94 He also pointed out, in a article published in the Washington Times , that al-Qaeda's May 6th statement indicates that al-Qaeda will seek to further strain Pakistan'srelations with America. By summoning its jihadi allies and ordinary citizens against the

Pakistani government, which the group described as "traitors and thieves who soldeverything to [Islam's] enemies,"al-Qaeda hopes to undermine Pakistan's fragile democracy and create a popular backlashagainst the United States.

The reaction in Pakistan

Protests in Pakistan sparked by Osama bin Laden's killing have drawn smaller crowdsthan those over U.S. drone attacks, showing that perhaps the al-Qaeda leader failed to winbroad support even amid widespread anti-American sentiment.95

Hundreds of people gathered in the cities of Karachi, Rawalpindi and Quettafollowing the al-Qaeda leader's killing. "In Pakistan, public perception isn't in favor of al-Qaeda but it's anti-American," Rashid Khan, a professor of international relations atthe University of Sargodha said in an interview. "People from outside usually confuseone with another." 96

The response from Israel

Israeli leaders have welcomed the assassination of Osama Bin Laden. What is interesting though, is that the Israeli foreign minister, Avigdor Lieberman, says that half an hour

before the operation was carried out, Israel was informed of its existence. Now not a lothas been made of this in either the Israeli or the international media but it's interesting nonetheless. Certainly Lieberman makes the point that in no way did Israel contribute tothe operation itself.97

Debka, the Israeli open source intelligence website, asked, "Why did the US andPakistan, who must have known where he was, not lay hands on him sooner? Was al-Qaeda's spirit and mastermind eliminated before his networks could move in on the

Arab uprisings?"98 The Debka posting points out that the linkage was drawn by Hillary Clinton: "history would record that bin Laden's death had come at a time when

peoples in the Middle East and North Africa were rejecting the extremist narrative and were standing up for freedom and democracy." 99

Reaction in the Social Media

Media such as Facebookand Twitter are alive with interpretations of events in Abbottabad.One very early series of Twitters, based on noises heard by a local resident, was:100

"Helicopter hovering above Abbottabad at 1AM (is a rare event)."

88 http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/about/staff/field/asia/sidney-jones.aspx89

http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/us_us_bin_laden_warnhttp://www.usatoday.com/news/world/ 2011-05-02-bin-laden-death-al-qaeda_n.htm90 http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2011-05-03-bin-Laden-Clinton-war-terror_n.htm91 http://blog.nj.com/njv_editorial_page/2011/05/post_55.html92 http://blog.nj.com/njv_editorial_page/2011/05/post_55.html


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"Go away helicopter- before I take out my giant swatter :-/""A huge window shaking bang here in Abbottabad.

I hope it's not the start of something nasty :-S""Seems like my giant swatter worked!"

Some blog-sites have interpreted this 'window shaking bang' as suggesting ahelicopter crash. It is, however, more likely to be the sound of the assault commencing.

Although one helicopter malfunctioned it is believed to have been landed in thecompound. It was subsequently blown up prior to the Seals extraction.

The Impact on Afghanistan and Pakistan 101

The death of bin Laden could help with efforts to split the Taliban from al-Qaeda,according to Lisa Curtis, Senior Research Fellow at The Heritage Foundation , a think tank based in Washington. Curtis, formerly with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, theCentral Intelligence Agency and the State Department's South Asia Bureau, said: "Itcould diminish the importance of al-Qaeda for the Taliban and thus make it easier forthe Taliban to renounce its ties to the organization." She added that at the very least, binLaden's death may cause "soul-searching among the Taliban leadership" as they weighedthe utility of remaining allied to an organization that has lost its founding leader.

From an operational standpoint, however, Curtis opined that al-Qaeda would stilllikely be able to continue to plot and carry out attacks as al-Zawahiri, the operational

brains behind al-Qaeda, "will likely continue with attack planning." There may yet bequestions regarding his legitimacy to lead the movement which could cause somedisarray in the ranks, she added.

The responses from around the globe are muted as might be expected. It is probably too early to assess the impact of bin Laden's death. Al-Qaeda is in mourning and thatmourning may well spread across the organizations that take their inspiration from hischarismatic inspirational leadership style. In this kind of asymmetric conflict the West isnot in control of what will happen or when it will happen. First, there is the forty day of mourning. Second, there will be are-organization of leadership responsibilities in the al-Qaeda net work and its associates.

In the United States it is closure that is sought by many. The death of bin Laden may well pave the way for the trials of those who are charged with 9/11 and who areincarcerated in Guantanamo Bay. When justice is seen to be done American style, thenperhaps the people will put the events of 9/11 behind. In the Arab Muslim world andin the wider Islamic world people are already moving on-for most life is so much more

93 http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/2011-05-02-bin-laden-death-al-qaeda_n.htm94 http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/topic-a-the-world-after-bin-laden/2011/05/02/

AFF7ujhF_print.html95

http://www.businessweek.com/news/2011-05-06/protests-in-pakistan-on-bin-laden-show-limits-of-his-support.html96 ibid97 http://blog.newshound.biz/2011/05/middle-east-reaction-to-osamas-death/98 [email protected]


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fragile. What will stay though are the memories, not of 9/11, but of a pious Muslim manof vision who stood up to America and who took his protest - his violent protest- tothe very heart of American life and who eventually paid the price with his life.

The question that now arises is what of the movement he and al-Zawahiri founded- what is its current status. To this question we now turn.

99 ibid.100 file:///C:/DOCUME~1/User/LOCALS~1/Temp/TWEETSFROMABBOTABAD.htm101 http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/article1986246.ece


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Structure and Organization 35

Structure and Organization

Chapter 2

Information mostly acquired from the defector Jamal al-Fadl provided Americanauthorities with a rough picture of how the group was organized - but that was almosta decade ago. Theories abound on the current model but it is apparent that a cellular, asopposed to hierarchical, command structure is maintained. Organizational specialistspoint out al-Qaeda's network structure is both its strength and a weakness. Thedecentralized structure enables al-Qaeda to have a worldwide base; however, actsinvolving a high degree of organization, such as the 9/11 attacks, take time, effort,finance, and energy to plan and to carry out with the precision required for success. Itcan seldom be duplicated.

Peter Bergen, director of national security studies at the New America Foundation,made the following observation about the assumption that Zawahiri will replace binLaden as al Qaeda's leader:

"The conventional view is that Zawahiri, an Egyptian doctor and al-Qaeda's longtime second in command, has been bin Laden's "brain." But in making the most important strategic shift in al-

Qaeda's history - identifying the United States as its key enemy, rather than Middle Eastern regimes -bin Laden brushed aside Zawahiri's obsessive focus on overthrowing the Egyptian government. Noman

Benotman, a Libyan militant who has spent considerable time talking with both of al-Qaeda's leaders,told me in an interview that "Osama influenced Zawahiri with his idea: Forget about the 'near enemy'; the main enemy is the Americans." Bin Laden also kept Zawahiri in the dark for years about al-

Qaeda's most important operation - the planning for the 9/11 attacks - cluing in his deputy only during the summer of 2001." 102

As mentioned earlier in this brief, Asia Times Online reported on May 4 that in theabsence of bin Laden, al-Qaeda's shura (council), would run the organization and a new emir would be decided later. It is not a foregone conclusion that Zawahiri has, or will,assume control. A new generation of commanders includes Sirajuddin Haqqani, QariZiaur Rahman, Nazir Ahmad and Ilyas Kashmiri. Al-Awlaki, the US citizen with a highprofile in al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula is considered by many agencies to be a key

102 http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/five-myths-about-osama-bin laden/2011/05/05/ AFkG1rAG_story_1.html


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figure in 2011 but this may be driven by his western profile and communication skillsrather than his command potential.

Television news channels reported on May 7 that interrogation of those detained at

the Abbottabad compound suggested that Osama bin Laden has been side-lined for anumber of years, with Zawahiri holding the operational leadership. Bin Laden's role may have been more that of 'Patron' for propaganda purposes.

Al Jazeera points out that the Facebookpage, "We Are All Osama bin Laden" whichhas been deleted several times before reappearing online, 'highlights the nebulousstructure of al-Qaeda - a web which not only empowered its localized members tocommit acts of violence under the al-Qaeda 'brand', but which rendered its leadershiplargely irrelevant."103

The lack of clear structure makes the very existence of al-Qaeda, as a real