BIPINCHANDRA,MRIDULAMUKHERJEE,ADITYAMUKHERJEE

IndiaAfterIndependence1947-2000

PENGUINBOOKS

Contents

AbouttheAuthor

Dedication

1.Introduction

2.TheColonialLegacy

3.TheNationalMovementanditsLegacy

4.TheEvolutionoftheConstitutionandMainProvisions

5.TheArchitectureoftheConstitution:BasicFeaturesandInstitutions

6.TheInitialYears

7.ConsolidationofIndiaAsaNation

8.ConsolidationofIndiaAsaNation:TheLinguisticReorganizationoftheStates

9.ConsolidationofIndiaAsaNation:IntegrationoftheTribals

10.ConsolidationofIndiaAsaNation:RegionalismandRegionalInequality

11.TheYearsofHopeandAchievement,1951-64

12.ForeignPolicy:TheNehruEra

13.JawaharlalNehruinHistoricalPerspective

14.PoliticalParties,1947-64:TheCongress

15.PoliticalParties,1947-65:TheOpposition

16.FromShastritoIndiraGandhi,1964-69

17.TheIndiraGandhiYears,1969-73

18.TheJ.P.MovementandtheEmergency:IndianDemocracyTested

19.TheJanataInterregnumandIndiraGandhi’sSecondComing,1977-84

20.TheRajivYears

21.TheRun-uptotheMillennium,1989-99

22.PoliticsintheStates(I):TamilNadu,AndhraPradesh,Assam

23.PoliticsintheStates(II):WestBengalandJammuandKashmir

24.ThePunjabCrisis

25.IndianEconomy,1947-1965:TheNehruvianLegacy

26.IndianEconomy,1965-1991

27.EconomicReformsSince19915

28.LandReforms:ZamindariAbolitionandTenancyReforms

29.LandReforms:CeilingandtheBhoodanMovement

30.LandReforms:CooperativesandanOverview

31.AgricultureGrowthandtheGreenRevolution

32.AgrarianStrugglesSinceIndependence

33.RevivalandGrowthofCommunalism

34.Caste,Untouchability,Anti-castePoliticsandStrategies

35.IndianWomenSinceIndependence

36.ThePost-ColonialIndianStateandthePoliticalEconomyofDevelopment:AnOverview

37.DisarrayinInstitutionsofGovernance

38.OntheEveoftheNewMillenniumAchievements,ProblemsandProspects

Notes

SelectBibliography

ANoteonStyle

Acknowledgements

Copyright

PENGUINBOOKS

INDIAAFTERINDEPENDENCE

BipanChandrawasborninKangra,HimachalPradesh.HewaseducatedatFormanChristianCollege,Lahore,andatStanfordUniversity,California.HewasProfessorofModernHistoryatJawaharlalNehruUniversity(JNU),NewDelhi,whereheiscurrentlyProfessorEmeritus.Prof.Chandraistheauthorofseveralbooksonnationalism,colonialism,andcommunalisminmodernIndia.

MridulaMukherjeewaseducatedatLadyShriRamCollege,NewDelhiandatJNU.SheisProfessorofModernIndianHistoryattheCentreforHistoricalStudies,JNU.Herareasofspecialinterestareagrarianhistory,peasantmovementsandthenationalmovement.

AdityaMukherjeewaseducatedatSt.Stephen’sCollege,Delhi,andatJNU.HeisProfessorofContemporaryIndianHistoryattheCentreforHistoricalStudies,JNU.Hisresearchinterestsareinmodernbusinesshistoryandcapitalistdevelopment,andcontemporaryeconomyandpolitics.

ToLateProfessorV.D.Mahajan

1Introduction

India’sindependencerepresentedforitspeoplethestartofanepochthatwasimbuedwithanewvision.In1947,thecountrycommenceditslongmarchtoovercomethecoloniallegacyofeconomicunderdevelopment,grosspoverty,neartotalilliteracy,wideprevalenceofdiseaseandstarksocialinequalityandinjustice.15August1947wasonlythefirststop,thefirstbreak—theendofcolonialpoliticalcontrol:centuriesofbackwardnesswerenowtobeovercome,thepromisesofthefreedomstruggletobefulfilled,andpeople’shopestobemet.Thetasksofnation-buildingweretakenupbytheIndianpeopleandtheirleaderswithacertainelan

anddeterminationandwithconfidenceintheircapacitytosucceed.JawaharlalNehru’sfamous‘TrystwithDestiny’speechontheeveofindependence,on14August,reflectedthisbuoyantmood.StartingoffwithabroadsocialconsensusonthebasiccontoursoftheIndiathatwastobebuilt—on

thevaluesofnationalism,secularismanddemocracyandthegoalsofrapideconomicdevelopmentandradicalsocialchange—wasagreatadvantage.Thesevaluesandgoals,andtheroadtotheirachievementhadbeenmappedovermorethanseventyyearsbythenationalmovement.Yet,therewasarealizationthatthisconsensushadtobecontinuouslywidenedandbuiltupon.CrucialinthisrespectwastheroleplayedbyNehruandtheideashedevelopedandpropounded.

TheBasicGoals

Thefirstandthemostimportanttaskwastopreserve,consolidateandstrengthenIndia’sunity,topushforwardtheprocessofthemakingoftheIndiannation,andtobuildupandprotectthenationalstateasaninstrumentofdevelopmentandsocialtransformation.Indianunity,itwasrealized,wasnottobetakenforgranted.IthadtobestrengthenedbyrecognizingandacceptingIndia’simmenseregional,linguistic,ethnicandreligiousdiversity.IndiannesswastobefurtherdevelopedbyacknowledgingandaccommodatingtheIndians’multipleidentitiesandbygivingdifferentpartsofthecountryandvarioussectionsofthepeopleanadequatespaceintheIndianunion.Theprojectwas,moreover,rightlyseentobealong-termandcontinuingprocesswiththeconceptofIndiannessbeingconstantlyredefined.Basic,inthisrespectwasalsothesecularvision.Thenation’sleaderssetouttobuildasecularsociety

andstate,undauntedbythePartitionofIndiaandtheensuingriots.ItwasalsoclearthatIndia’srevolutionhadtobetakenbeyondthemerelypoliticaltoinclude

economicandsocialtransformation.IndependentIndiahadtobeginitsupwardeconomicclimbfromanabysmallylowlevel.ThetechnologicalandproductivitylevelsofIndianagricultureandindustryweretobeconstantlyandrapidlyraised.Moreover,theIndianeconomy,evenwhilebeinganintegralpartoftheworldeconomy,wastobebasedonself-reliance,freeofsubordinationtothemetropolitaninterestsordominationbyforeigncapital.Thiscouldnotbeaccomplishedthroughtheunhamperedworkingofthe

marketforcesandprivateenterprise.Itwouldrequireplanningandalargepublicsector.India,therefore,setouttoachieve,especiallyafter1955,anintegratednationaleconomybasedonanindigenousindustry,cateringprimarilytoitsdomesticmarket.Whilesocialismwasalsosetoutasanobjective,theessenceofIndia’seffortwastowardsthestructuraltransformationofhereconomy,leadingtoitsbecominganindependent,nationaleconomy.Thesocialscenealsocalledforrapidtransformation.Despitelowercastemovementsinseveralparts

ofthecountryandGandhiji’scampaignagainstuntouchability,thecastesystemstilldominatedruralsocietyanduntouchabilitywastheprevailingmode—thelowercasteshadstillnot‘stood-up’.Maledominationwasstillnearlytotal,andwomensufferedimmensesocialoppressioninthefamily.PolygamyprevailedbothamongHindusandMuslims.Womenhadnorightofinheritance,northerightofdivorce,andwerestillbyandlargedeniedaccesstoeducation.ForIndians,illiteracyandignorancewerethenormin1951;only25percentofmalesand7.9percentoffemaleswereliterate.ThefoundersoftheIndianRepublichadthefarsightednessandthecouragetocommitthemselvesto

twomajorinnovationsofhistoricalsignificanceinnation-buildingandsocialengineering:first,tobuildademocraticandcivillibertariansocietyamonganilliteratepeopleandsecond,toundertakeeconomicdevelopmentwithinademocraticpoliticalstructure.Hitherto,inallsocietiesinwhichaneconomictake-offoranearlyindustrialandagriculturalbreakthroughhadoccurred,effectivedemocracy,especiallyfortheworkingpeople,hadbeenextremelylimited.Ontheotherhand,fromthebeginning,Indiawascommittedtoademocraticandcivillibertarianpoliticalorderandarepresentativesystemofgovernmentbasedonfreeandfairelectionstobeconductedonthebasisofuniversaladultfranchise.Moreover,thestatewastoencroachaslittleaspossibleonrivalcivilsourcesofpowersuchasuniversities,thePress,tradeunions,peasantorganizationsandprofessionalassociations.Themanysocial,economicandpoliticalchallengesthatthecountrywastofaceweretobedealtwithinademocraticmanner,underdemocraticconditions.Oneofthemajorpoliticaltasksfacingtheleadershipwastofurtherdevelopthedemocratic

consciousnessamongthepeopleinitiatedduringtheperiodofthefreedomstruggle.Theleadershipcompletelyrejectedthedifferentversionsofthe‘rice-bowltheory’,thatthepoorinanunderdevelopedcountryweremoreinterestedinabowlofricethanindemocracy,andthat,inanycase,democracywasuselesstothemifitcouldnotguaranteethemadequatefood,clothingandshelter.Further,itwasrealizedthatgivenIndia’sdiversity,ademocraticpoliticalstructurewasnecessaryfor

promotingnationalintegration.Democracywasalsoconsideredessentialforbringingaboutsocialchange.Nehru,inparticular,upheldperhapstheutopiannotionthatthepoorwouldsoonerorlaterasserttheirpowerthroughtheirvoteandbringintobeingasocialorderresponsivetotheirneeds.Economicdevelopmentandademocraticpoliticalorderweretobeaccompaniedbyrapidsocial

transformationsothatexistinggrosseconomic,casteandgenderinequalitieswererapidlyeliminated,povertywasremovedandthelevelsoflivingraised.ThestructureofIndiansocietywastoberapidlytransformedinabroadlysocialistdirection,butnotnecessarilytoresembleSoviet-styleCommunism.ItwasalsorealizedthattheseobjectivesrequiredthebroadestunityoftheIndianpeople.Therefore,alargesocialconsensushadtobeevolvedaroundthevisionofthefreedomstruggleandthedemocraticformsthroughwhichtheobjectiveswouldbeachieved.

Thenationalmovementhadarousedexpectationsofarapidriseinpersonalandsocietalprosperity,ofsocialandeconomicequityandequality,ofthegoodlife.IndiraGandhi’ssloganof‘GaribiHatao’in1971furtherfuelledtheseexpectationsasdidtheprocessofcontinuouspoliticizationsince1950.Theconstantlyrisingaspirationsandexpectationshadtobefulfilledasrapidlyaspossible,andwithoutlettingtoowideagapdevelopbetweenexpectationsandfulfilment.Inshort,theIndianpeopleandtheirleadershopedtoachieveinafewdecadeswhatothershadachievedinacenturyormore.Andthiswastobeonthebasisofdemocracy,avoidingbloodshedandauthoritarianism,andthroughaprocessofaccomodatingdiversesocial,economicandregionalinterests.Agrarianreforms,stateplanningandastrongpublicsectorweretoserveasthemajorinstrumentsforthepurpose.Atthesametime,politicalstabilityhadtobeassuredfortheaccomplishmentofallthesetasks.The

politicalsystemhadtocombinestabilitywithgrowth,socialtransformation,anddeepeningofthepoliticalprocess.TheIndianrevolutionhadtobegradual,non-violentandbasedonpoliticalstability,butithadtobearevolutionallthesame.

ATroubledDemocracy

Since1947anduntiltoday,manyIndiansandforeigners,criticsandadmirers,haveexpresseddoubtsaboutIndia’sabilitytodeveloporcontinueitsadvance,orevensustainitssocietalanddevelopmentaldesign.Fromthebeginningtherehaveexistedvocalprophetsofdoomandgloomwhohavebeenpredictingthatneitherfreedom,nordemocracy,norsocialismwouldsurviveinIndiaforlong,thattheIndianpoliticalsystemwouldcollapsesoonerorlater,thattheIndianunionwouldnotsurviveandthenationstatewoulddisintegrateintolinguisticandethnicfragments.TheyhaverepeatedlyarguedthatIndia’snumerousreligious,caste,linguisticandtribaldiversities,besidesitspoverty,socialmiseryandinequity,growingdisparitiesofwealth,rigidandhierarchialsocialstructure,massiveunemploymentandmultiplesocio-economicproblemswereboundtoundermineitsnationalunity,itsdemocraticinstitutionsanditsdevelopmentalefforts.Indiawould,therefore,eitherbreakuporalternativelybeheldtogetherbyacivilianormilitaryauthoritarian,dictatorialregime.Eversinceregionalpartiesstartedemerginginthesixtiesandmuchmoreduringtheeightiesand

nineties,manycommentatorshavebeenspeculating—somewithenthusiasm—astowhenthedisintegrationofIndiawouldtakeplace.Eventhesuccessinholdingtogetherandworkingasecularanddemocraticpoliticalsystemovertheyearshasnotdeterredtheprophetsofdoom.Ateveryinstanceofturmoilorperceivedpoliticalcrisis,asforexamplethewarswithChinaandPakistan,thedeathofthetoweringNehru,theassassinationofIndiraGandhi,communal,linguisticorcasteviolence,Naxaliteuprisings,secessionistmovementsinKashmir,theNorth-East,PunjabandearlierinTamilNadu,thesecriticsarticulatedandrenewedtheirforeboding.Asearlyas1960,theAmericanscholar-journalistSeligS.Harrisonpredicted:‘Theoddsarealmost

whollyagainstthesurvivaloffreedomand...theissueis,infact,whetheranyIndianstatecansurviveatall.’1

In1967,NevilleMaxwell,theTimescorrespondent,inaseriesofarticlesentitled‘India’sDisintegratingDemocracy’declared,‘ThegreatexperimentofdevelopingIndiawithinademocratic

frameworkhasfailed.’HepredictedthatthefourthgeneralelectionswhichwerethenforthcomingwouldbesurelythelastelectiontobeheldinIndia.2

ManyoftheCassandrasfeltjustifiedwhentheEmergencywasimposed.ManyarguedthatitprovidedasignposttoIndia’spoliticalfuture.SomewentfurtherandsaidthatthedemocraticsysteminIndiawasfinallyandpermanentlyineclipse,oratleastthatitwouldneverbethesameagain.Anothersetofdoom-wallasstressedtheincapacityofIndiatoachieveeconomicdevelopment.India’spoliticalinstitutionalstructure,accordingtothemdidnotcoincidewiththedevelopmentalgoalsthathadbeensetastheserequiredadegreeofcoercionifnotdictatorshiptobeachieved.Thentherewereleft-wingscepticswhoheldthatnosocial;economicorpoliticaldevelopmentwas

possiblewithoutaviolentrevolutionandthatnation-building,politicaldemocracy,economicdevelopment,nationalunityandnationalismweremereshamsmeanttodeludetheoppressedandtheexploited.They,therefore,arguedfororanticipatedapeasant-basedrevolutionasinChinaduring1925-1949oraworker-peasant-basedrevolutionasinRussiain1917.Accordingtothem,poverty,inequality,classdomination,andsocialoppressionwouldsoonerorlaterleadthevastmajorityofthepeopleonthepathofrevolution,puttinganendnotonlytocapitalismandfeudalismbutalso‘bourgeoisdemocracy’andthemulti-nationstate’.Intheearlyseventies,manyobservers,includingthewriterofanotepreparedbytheHomeMinistry,predictedthattheGreenRevolutionwouldturnRedsinceitwouldbenefitonlytherichfarmersanddisplacesmallpeasantsfromthelandandcreatefurtherunemploymentamongtheagriculturallabourers.Someoftheleft-wingprophetsofdoomevendeniedthepossibilityofindependenteconomicdevelopmentinIndiaandcontinuedtomaintainovertheyearsthatIndiawasenteringaphaseofdependencyandneo-colonialism,ifithadnotalreadydoneso.Itisalsointerestingthatthosewhodidnotsharethisscepticismoftheleftorthenon-leftwereusually

portrayedbythemasapologistsoftheEstablishment.AsW.H.Morris-Jones,perhapsthemostperceptiveofthepoliticalscientistsstudyingIndia,putitasearlyas1966:‘IthasbecomecustomarytoadopthighlyscepticalviewsonIndiandevelopments....Theposition,isnowreachedwherefailuretosharesuchattitudesistakenasthemark,inanIndian,ofsomekindofgovernmentpublicrelationsmanand,inanoutsider,ofamisguidedsentimentalist.’3

AnothersetofobserversoftheIndianscene,whowerelesspessimisticaboutthedemocraticpoliticalsystem,werepuzzledbyIndia’ssuccessinsustainingitselfinthefaceofitsfailureonsomanyfronts—inadequacyoflandreformsandtheexistenceoflarge-scalelandlessnessintheruralareas,theslowrateofgrowthinindustryandthenationalincome,thefailuretocheckthehighrateofpopulationgrowth,persistenceofgrossinequalities,casteoppression,discriminationagainstwomen,adysfunctionaleducationsystem,environmentaldegradation,growingpollutioninthecities,humanrightsabuses,factionalisminpolitics,chaoticpartysituation,growingpoliticalunrest,seccessionistdemandsandmovements,administrativedeclineandevenchaos,policeinefficiency,highlevelsofcorruptionandbrutality,andcriminalizationofpolitics.Theperplexityofmanyofthese‘puzzled’observerswasalsofuelledbythetruismthatdemocraticinstitutionscannotbetransferredbythefiatoftheframersofaConstitution.ButwhattheyfailedtoappreciateisthatdemocracyhadalreadybeenindigenizedandrootedintheIndiansoilbythefreedomstruggleandthemodernIndianintelligentsiaduringtheprevioushundredyearsorso.

Inourviewtheprophetsofdoomwerebasicallywrongintheirprophesies,buttheywerequiteoftenrightonthetargetascritics.ManyotheranalystsofIndiandevelopments,whohavenotsharedtheirscepticismandpredictions,haveponderedovertheproblemsofdemocracyanddevelopmentinanextremelydiversesocietyhavinganunderdevelopedeconomyandfacingeconomicscarcity.They,too,havebeenworriedbythefragilityofIndia’spoliticalstability.TheydonotbelievethatthereisasituationforadministrativeorpoliticalbreakdownbutmanyofthemwouldarguethatIndiaisbeginningtoface‘acrisisofgovernability’.Overtheyearstheyhavecontinuouslyemphasizedthatbasicstructuralandinstitutionalchangeswerenecessaryfordesirablesocialdevelopmentandthedeepeningandeffectivefunctioningofdemocracy.Evenwhilearguingagainstthesupportersofauthoritarianism,thefeasibilityordesirabilityofaviolentrevolution,andpredictionsofthebreakupofthecountry,theyhaveadvocatedandworkedfortheimplementationofaprogrammeofradicalreforms,moreorlessaroundtheGandhianandNehruvianagendaanditsfurtherdevelopment.

PoliticalLeadership

India’ssurvivalandgrowthasanationandademocraticpolity,asalsotheachievementofthenationalobjectivessetbythefreedomstruggledependedontheconfigurationanddevelopmentoflong-termsocio-economicandpoliticalforces.Butthequality,skillsandapproachofthepoliticalleaderswouldinevitablyplayasignificantrole.AnassetforIndia’searlyeffortsatprogress,startingin1947,wasthepersonalcalibreofherleaders.

Theywerededicated,imaginativeandidealistic.Theyenjoyedtremendouspopularsupportamongthepeopleandhadthecapacitytocommunicatewiththem,toenthusethemaroundanationalprogrammeandnationalgoals,toreflecttheirurgesandaspirations,andtoprovidethemstrongleadership.Theleadershadtremendousconfidenceandfaithinthepeopleandthereforeindemocraticinstitutionsanddependedfortheirpowerandlegitimacyonthem.Duringthenationalmovementtheleadershadalsoacquiredthevastcapacitytonegotiateandaccommodatediverseinterestsandapproachesandtoworkwithinaconsensualframework.Theycouldtakealong-termandall-Indiaviewandworkthroughstateandlocalleaders.ThishighqualityofleadershipwasnotconfinedonlytotheCongressparty.Theconservative

SwatantrawasheadedbyC.Rajagopalachari,thedissidentCongressmenbyJ.B.Kripalani,theHinducommunalistsbyShyamaPrasadMookerjee,thenon-CongressdalitsbyB.R.Ambedkar,theSocialistsbyAcharyaNarendraDevandJayaprakashNarayan,andtheCommunistsbyP.C.Joshi,AjoyGhoshandE.M.S.Namboodiripad.Incontrast,itcanbeassertedthataseriousprobleminthelastfewdecadeshasbeenthepaucityof

politicalleaderswiththequalitiesandskillsofthefoundersoftheRepublic.IndiraGandhididpossesssomeoftheirqualities.Butafterherandevenduringtheperiodthatshedominated—andperhapstosomeextentbecauseofit—agradualdeclineoccurredinthestatureofleadership,withfewhavingthewideappealoracceptabilityorthelargervision.Mostpoliticalleadersincreasinglyappealedtoaregionorareligionoracaste,oraconglomerateofcastes.TheoutcomeofthishasbeenthatwhilemanyIndianshavelookedforwider,all-IndialeadershiptothedescendantsofNehruandIndiraGandhi,othershavegivenallegiancetoleadersandpartiesfollowingpopulistoropportunistorcommunalandcasteistpolitics.

OurApproach

Thisworkisthestoryofapeopleonthemove,ofa‘gradualrevolution’,oftheeffortsoftheIndianpeopletorealizethevisionofthefreedomstruggle.Forus,writers,ithasalsobeenajourneyintoourpersonalpast,involvinganeffortatcoolanddispassionateanalysisthough,perhaps,failingattimestoavoidthepassion,whichinformsallthosewhoaredeeplyinvolvedintheefforttoraisethesocialconditionsoftheirpeople,andthebiasesacquiredwhenlivingthroughtheevents.Asthereaderswillsee,wehaveadoptedacriticalapproachtoourrecentpastandcontemporaryeventsbutwithinabroadlyoptimisticframework.Theyear1947usheredinaperiodofchangeanddevelopment.Inevitably,newproblems,often

engenderedbythechangeitself,wereaddedtotheoldones,requiringfreshsolutions.Thequestionsneedingtobeaddressedwereofthenatureoftheproblemsandhow,whenandwithwhatconsequencesweretheytackled.Afterall,hadnotGandhijipredictedontheeveofindependencethat‘withtheendofslaveryandthedawnoffreedom,alltheweaknessesofsocietyareboundtocometothesurface’.He,however,alsosaw‘noreasontobeunnecessarilyupsetaboutit.Ifwekeepourbalanceatsuchatime,everytanglewillbesolved.’4Historianswillhavetoevaluateinthecomingyears,howfartheaspirationsarousedbythefreedomstruggle’slegacy,intermsofnationalunity,democracy,secularism,independenteconomicdevelopment,equality,andremovalofpovertyhavebeenfulfilledinasubstantivemanner.Intheearlyyears,duringmuchoftheNehruera,therewasanairofoptimismandasenseof

achievement.ThiswasreflectedinNehru’slettertothechiefministers,writtenwithself-confidenceandsatisfactionjustafterwatchingtheRepublicDayparadeatDelhiin1955:‘Myheartwasfilledwithprideandjoyatthissightofournationonthemarchrealizingitsgoalsonebyone.Therewasasenseoffulfilmentintheairandofconfidenceinourfuturedestiny.’5Andherepeatedafewmonthslater:‘Thereisthebreathofthedawn,thefeelingofthebeginningofanewerainthelongandchequeredhistoryofIndia.IfeelsoandinthismatteratleastIthinkIrepresentinnumerableothersinourcountry.’6AndwhatmadeNehrusooptimistic?ToquoteNehru’sbiographer,S.Gopal:‘Individualfreedom,socialjustice,popularparticipation,planneddevelopment,nationalself-reliance,apostureofself-respectininternationalaffairs—allhighandnoblegoals,yetallbeingsteadilyachievedundertheguidanceofthePrimeMinister...’7

ItistruethatNehruandthegenerationthatwitnessedthecomingofindependencehadhopedforfarmoreprogressthanthecountrywasabletomake.Still,thepeopleandtheintelligentsiaremainedoptimistic,notonlyduringtheNehruerabutevenunderIndiraGandhi,atleasttill1973-74.Butgraduallytheeuphoriaandtheself-confidence,theenthusiasmandtheprideinachievementbegantodisappearandgivewaytofrustration,cynicismandasenseofdespair.Yet,asthisworkwouldbringout,whilemuchmorewasneededandcouldhavebeenachieved,but

wasnot,especiallyintermsofthequalityoflifeofthepeople,(andwhichwouldjustifyagreatdealofcriticismandevendespair),therewasconsiderablegain.Ourhopeandconfidenceinthefutureofthecountryanditspeopleisjustifiedbythisachievement.WebelievewhatVerrierElwin,theBritishscholar-missionarywhomadeIndiahishomeandtookup

itscitizenship,wrotein1963largelyexpressesourviewsandsentiments:‘AllthesameIamincurably

optimisticaboutIndia.Herangryyoungmenanddisillusionedoldmenarefullofcriticismandresentment.Itistruethatthereissomecorruptionandagooddealofinefficiency;thereishypocrisy,toomuchofit.Buthowmuchthereisonthecreditside!Itisathrillingexperiencetobepartofanationthatistrying,againstenormousodds,toreshapeitself.’8

PerhapstheattitudeforustotaketowardsourmanyfailuresistheoneadoptedbyGopalKrishnaGokhaletowardsthoseoftheModeratenationalists,atthetailendofhislife:‘Letusnotforgetthatweareatastageofthecountry’sprogresswhenourachievementsareboundtobesmall,andourdisappointmentsfrequentandtrying.ThatistheplacewhichithaspleasedProvidencetoassigntousinthisstruggle,andourresponsibilityisendedwhenwehavedonetheworkwhichbelongstothatplace.Itwill,nodoubt,begiventoourcountrymenoffuturegenerationstoserveIndiabytheirsuccesses;we,ofthepresentgeneration,mustbecontenttoservehermainlybyourfailures:For,hardthoughitbe,outofthosefailuresthestrengthwillcomewhichintheendwillaccomplishgreattasks.’9

2TheColonialLegacy

India’scolonialpasthasweighedheavilyinherdevelopmentsince1947.Intheeconomicsphere,asinothers,BritishruledrasticallytransformedIndia.ButthechangesthattookplaceledonlytowhathasbeenaptlydescribedbyA.GunderFrankasthe‘developmentofunderdevelopment’.Thesechanges—inagriculture,industry,transportandcommunication,finance,administration,education,andsoon—wereinthemselvesoftenpositive,asforexamplethedevelopmentoftherailways.Butoperatingwithinandaspartofthecolonialframework,theybecameinseparablefromtheprocessofunderdevelopment.Further,theyledtothecrystallizationofthecolonialeconomicstructurewhichgeneratedpoverty,adependenceonandsubordinationtoBritain.

BasicFeatures

TherewerefourbasicfeaturesofthecolonialstructureinIndia.First,colonialismledtothecompletebutcomplexintegrationofIndia’seconomywiththeworldcapitalistsystembutinasubservientposition.Sincethe1750s,India’seconomicinterestswerewhollysubordinatedtothoseofBritain.Thisisacrucialaspect,forintegrationwiththeworldeconomywasinevitableandwasacharacteristicalsoofindependenteconomies.Second,tosuitBritishindustry,apeculiarstructureofproductionandinternationaldivisionoflabour

wasforceduponIndia.Itproducedandexportedfoodstuffsandrawmaterials—cotton,jute,oilseeds,minerals—andimportedmanufacturedproductsofBritishindustryfrombiscuitsandshoestomachinery,carsandrailwayengines.ThisfeatureofcolonialismcontinuedevenwhenIndiadevelopedafewlabour-intensiveindustries

suchasjuteandcottontextiles.Thiswasbecauseoftheexisting,peculiarpatternofinternationaldivisionoflabourbywhichBritainproducedhightechnology,highproductivityandcapital-intensivegoodswhileIndiadidtheopposite.ThepatternofIndia’sforeigntradewasanindicationoftheeconomy’scolonialcharacter.Aslateas1935-39,food,drink,tobaccoandrawmaterialsconstituted68.5percentofIndia’sexportswhilemanufacturedgoodswere64.4percentofherimports.Third,basictotheprocessofeconomicdevelopmentisthesizeandutilizationoftheeconomicsurplus

orsavingsgeneratedintheeconomyforinvestmentandthereforeexpansionoftheeconomy.ThenetsavingsintheIndianeconomyfrom1914to1946wasonly2.75percentofGrossNationalProduct(i.e.,nationalincome).Thesmallsizemaybecontrastedwiththenetsavingsin1971-75whentheyconstituted12percentofGNP.Thepaltrytotalcapitalformation,6.75percentofGNPduring1914-46asagainst20.14percentofGNPduring1971-75,reflectsthisjump.Moreover,theshareofindustryinthislowlevelofcapitalformationwasabysmallylow,machineryformingonly1.78percentofGNPduring1914-46.(Thisfigurewas6.53for1971-75).

Furthermore,alargepartofIndia’ssocialsurplusorsavingswasappropriatedbythecolonialstateandmisspent.Anotherlargepartwasappropriatedbytheindigenouslandlordsandmoneylenders.Ithasbeencalculatedthatbytheendofthecolonialperiod,therentandinterestpaidbythepeasantryamountedtoRs1400millionperyear.By1937,thetotalruraldebtamountedtoRs18,000million.Accordingtoanotherestimate,princes,landlordsandotherintermediariesappropriatednearly20percentofthenationalincome.Onlyaverysmallpartofthislargesurpluswasinvestedinthedevelopmentofagricultureandindustry.Mostofitwassquanderedonconspicuousconsumptionorusedforfurtherintensifyinglandlordismandusury.Thentherewasthe‘Drain’,thatistheunilateraltransfertoBritainofsocialsurplusandpotential

investablecapitalbythecolonialstateanditsofficialsandforeignmerchantsthroughexcessofexportsoverimports.Indiagotbacknoequivalenteconomic,commercialormaterialreturnsforitinanyform.Ithasbeenestimatedthat5to10percentofthetotalnationalincomeofIndiawasthusunilaterallyexportedoutofthecountry.Howcouldanycountrydevelopwhileundergoingsuchadrainofitsfinancialresourcesandpotentialcapital?ThefourthfeatureofcolonialisminIndiawasthecrucialroleplayedbythestateinconstructing,

determiningandmaintainingotheraspectsofthecolonialstructure.India’spoliciesweredeterminedinBritainandintheinterestsoftheBritisheconomyandtheBritishcapitalistclass.AnimportantaspectoftheunderdevelopmentofIndiawasthedenialofstatesupporttoindustryandagriculture.Thiswascontrarytowhathappenedinnearlyallthecapitalistcountries,includingBritain,whichenjoyedactivestatesupportintheearlystagesofdevelopment.ThecolonialstateimposedfreetradeinIndiaandrefusedtogivetariffprotectiontoIndianindustriesasBritain,westernEuropeandtheUnitedStateshaddone.After1918,underthepressureofthenationalmovement,theGovernmentofIndiawasforcedtogrant

sometariffprotectiontoafewindustries.Butthiswasinadequateandineffective.Moreover,sincethe1880s,thecurrencypolicywasmanipulatedbythegovernmenttofavourBritishindustryandwhichwastothedetrimentofIndianindustry.Aspointedoutearlier,averylargepartofIndia’ssocialsurpluswasappropriatedbythecolonial

state,butaverysmallpartofitwasspentbyitonthedevelopmentofagricultureorindustryoronsocialinfrastructureornation-buildingactivitiessucheducation,sanitationandhealthservices.ThecolonialstatedevotedalmostitsentireincometomeetingtheneedsofBritish-Indian

administration,makingpaymentsofdirectandindirecttributetoBritainandinservingtheneedsofBritishtradeandindustry.Thebulkofpublicrevenuewasabsorbedbymilitaryexpenditureandciviladministrationwhichwasgearedtomaintenanceoflawandorderandtaxcollection.After1890,militaryexpenditureabsorbednearly50percentofthecentralgovernment’sincome.In1947-48,thisfigurestoodatnearly47percent.Besides,theIndiantaxstructurewashighlyinequitable.Whilethepeasantswereburdenedwithpaying

aheavylandrevenueformostofthecolonialperiodandthepoorwiththesalttax,etc.,theupperincomegroups—highlypaidbureaucrats,landlords,merchantsandtraders—paidhardlyanytaxes.Thelevelofdirecttaxeswasquitelow.Thenumberofincome-taxpayerswasonly360,000in1946-47.Itwasonlyunderthepressurefromthenationalandpeasantmovementsthatthelandrevenueandsalttaxstarted

comingdowninthetwentiethcentury.Aslateas1900-01landrevenueandsalttaxformed53percentand16percentofthetotaltaxrevenueofthegovernment.

EconomicBackwardness

ColonialismbecameafetteronIndia’sagriculturalandindustrialdevelopment.Agriculturestagnatedinmostpartsofthecountryandevendeterioratedovertheyears,resultinginextremelylowyieldsperacre,andsometimesevenreachingzero.Therewasadeclineinpercapitaagriculturalproductionwhichfellby14percentbetween1901and1941.Thefallinpercapitafoodgrainswasevengreater,beingover24percent.Overtheyears,anagrarianstructureevolvedwhichwasdominatedbylandlords,moneylenders,

merchantsandthecolonialstate.Subinfeudation,tenancyandshare-croppingincreasinglydominatedboththezamindariandryotwariareas.Bytheforties,thelandlordscontrolledover70percentofthelandandalongwiththemoneylendersandthecolonialstateappropriatedmorethanhalfofthetotalagriculturalproduction.Thecolonialstate’sinterestinagriculturewasprimarilyconfinedtocollectinglandrevenueandit

spentverylittleonimprovingagriculture.Similarly,landlordsandmoneylendersfoundrack-rentingoftenantsandsharecroppersandusuryfarmoreprofitableandsafethanmakingproductiveinvestmentinthelandtheyownedorcontrolled.Allthiswashardlyconducivetoagriculturaldevelopment.Inmanyareas,aclassofrichpeasantsdevelopedasaresultofcommercializationandtenancy

legislation,butmostofthemtoopreferredtobuylandandbecomelandlordsortoturntomoneylending.Asaresultcapitalistfarmingwasslowtodevelopexceptinafewpockets.Ontheotherhand,theimpoverishedcultivators,mostofthemsmallpeasants,tenants-at-willandsharecroppers,hadnoresourcesorincentivetoinvestintheimprovementofagriculturebyusingbettercattleandseeds,moremanureandfertilizersandimprovedtechniquesofproduction.Formostofthecolonialperiod,landlessnesshadbeenrising,sothatthenumberoflandlessagriculturallabourersgrewfrom13percentoftheagriculturalpopulationin1871to28percentin1951.Theincreaseintenant-farmingandshare-croppingandovercrowdingofagriculturewasfollowedbyanextremesubdivisionoflandintosmallholdingsandfragmentation.Further,theseholdingswerescatteredintonon-contiguousparcelsandwhichledtocultivationbecominguneconomicandincapableofmaintainingthecultivatorevenatasubsistencelevel.Ofcourse,thelinkagewiththeworldmarketanddevelopmentofroadsandrailwaysdidleadtoalarge

partofruralproduceenteringtheurbanandworldmarketsandtotheproductionofcommercialcrops.However,commercializationofagriculturedidnotleadtocapitalistfarmingorimprovedtechnology.Itschiefresultwasthatbettersoil.availablewaterandotherresourcesweredivertedfromfoodcropstocommercialcrops.Atatimewhenagricultureinthedevelopedcountrieswasbeingmodernizedandrevolutionized,there

wasnearabsenceofchangeinthetechnologicalorproductionbaseofIndianagriculture.Indianpeasantscontinuedtousetheprimitiveimplementstheyhadusedforcenturies.Forexample,in1951,therewereonly930,000ironploughsinusewhilewoodenploughsnumbered31.3million.Theuseofinorganicfertilizerswasvirtuallyunknown,whilealargepartofanimalmanure—cowdung,nightsoilandcattle

bones—waswasted.In1938-39,only11percentofallcroppedlandwasunderimprovedseeds,theirusebeinglargelyconfinedtonon-foodcashcrops.Agriculturaleducationwascompletelyneglected.In1946,therewereonly9agriculturalcollegeswith

3,110students.Therewashardlyanyinvestmentinterracing,flood-control,drainage,andde-salienationofsoil.Irrigationwastheonlyfieldinwhichsomeprogresswasmadesothatbythefortiesnearly27percentofthetotalcultivatedareawasirrigated.But,then,Indiahadalwaysbeenquiteadvancedinirrigationcultivation.AnothercentralaspectofIndia’seconomicbackwardnesswasthestateofitsindustry.Duringthe

nineteenthcentury,therewasaquickcollapseofIndianhandicraftandartisanalindustrieslargelybecauseofthecompetitionfromthecheaperimportedmanufacturesfromBritaintogetherwiththepolicyoffreetradeimposedonIndia.Theruinedartisansfailedtofindalternativeemployment.Theonlychoiceopentothemwastocrowdintoagricultureastenants,sharecroppersandagriculturallabourers.ModernindustriesdiddevelopinIndiafromthesecondhalfofthenineteenthcentury.But,bothin

termsofproductionandemployment,thelevelofindustrialdevelopmentwasstuntedandpaltrycomparedwiththatofthedevelopedcountries.Itdidnotcompensateevenforthehandicraftindustriesitdisplaced.Industrialdevelopmentwasmainlyconfinedtocottonandjuteandteainthenineteenthcenturyandtosugar,cementandpaperinthenineteenthirties.Therehadbeensomedevelopmentoftheironandsteelindustryafter1907,butaslateas1946,cottonandjutetextilesaccountedfornearly30percentofallworkersemployedinfactoriesandmorethan55percentofthetotalvalueaddedbymanufacturing.TheshareofmodernindustriesinnationalincomeattheendofBritishrulewasonly7.5percent.Indiaalsolaggedinthedevelopmentofelectricpower.Similarly,modernbankingandinsuranceweregrosslyunderdeveloped.AnimportantindexofIndia’sindustrialbackwardnessandeconomicdependenceonthemetropolis

wasthevirtualabsenceofcapitalgoodsandmachineindustries.In1950,Indiametabout90percentofitsneedsofmachinetoolsthroughimports.Theunderdevelopedcharacterofthismodernpartoftheeconomycanbeseenbycomparingcertaineconomicstatisticsfor1950and1984(thefiguresfor1984aregivenwithinbrackets).In1950Indiaproduced1.04milliontonsofsteel(6.9milliontons),32.8milliontonsofcoal(155.2milliontons),2.7milliontonsofcement(29.9milliontons),3millionrupeesworthofmachinetoolsandportabletools(3,28millionrupees),7locomotives(200),99,000bicycles(5,944,000),14millionelectricallamps(317.8million),33,000sewingmachines(338,000),anditgenerated14kwhelectricitypercapita(160kwh).In1950,thenumberofbankofficesandbrancheswas5,072;in1983thefigurehadrisento33,055.In1950,outofapopulationof357milliononly2.3millionwereemployedinmodernindustries.Anotherindexofeconomicbackwardnesswasthehighrural-urbanratioofIndia’spopulationbecause

ofgrowingdependenceonagriculture.In1951,nearly82.3percentofthepopulationwasrural.Whilein1901,63.7percentofIndianshaddependedonagriculture,by1941thisfigurehadgoneupto70.Ontheotherhandthenumberofpersonsengagedinprocessingandmanufacturingfellfrom10.3millionin1901to8.8millionin1951eventhoughthepopulationincreasedbynearly40percent.Tillthelatethirties,foreigncapitaldominatedtheindustrialandfinancialfieldsandcontrolledforeign

tradeasalsopartoftheinternaltradethatfedintoexports.Britishfirmsdominatedcoalmining,thejuteindustry,shipping,bankingandinsurance,andteaandcoffeeplantations.Moreover,throughtheir

managingagencies,theBritishcapitalistscontrolledmanyoftheIndian-ownedcompanies.Itmaybeaddedthatmanyofthenegativeeffectsofforeigncapitalaroseoutofthestatepowerbeingunderaliencontrol.Lopsidedindustrialdevelopmentwasyetanotherstrikingfeature.Industrieswereconcentratedonlyin

afewregionsandcitiesofthecountry.Thisnotonlyledtowideregionaldisparitiesinincomebutalsoaffectedthelevelofregionalintegration.ButthereweresomemajorchangesthatoccurredintheIndianeconomy,especiallyduringthethirties

andfortiesthatdidimpartacertainstrengthtoitandprovidedabaseforpost-independenceeconomicdevelopment.Onepositivefeaturewasthegrowthofthemeansoftransportandcommunication.Intheforties,India

had65,000milesofpavedroadsandnearly42,000milesofrailwaytrack.Roadsandrailwaysunifiedthecountryandmaderapidtransitofgoodsandpersonspossible.However,intheabsenceofasimultaneousindustrialrevolution,onlyacommercialrevolutionwasproducedwhichfurthercolonializedtheIndianeconomy.AlsotherailwaylineswerelaidprimarilywithaviewtolinkIndia’sinlandrawmaterial-producingareaswiththeportsofexportandtopromotethespreadofimportedmanufacturesfromtheportstotheinterior.TheneedsofIndianindustrieswithregardtotheirmarketsandsourcesofrawmaterialswereneglectedasnostepsweretakentoencouragetrafficbetweeninlandcentres.Therailwayfreightrateswerealsosofixedastofavourimportsandexportsandtodiscriminateagainstinternalmovementofgoods.Moreover,unlikeinBritainandtheUnitedStates,railwaysdidnotinitiatesteelandmachineindustriesinIndia.Instead,itwastheBritishsteelandmachineindustrieswhichwerethebeneficiariesofrailwaydevelopmentinIndia.TheGovernmentofIndiaalsoestablishedanefficientandmodernpostalandtelegraphsystem,thoughthetelephonesystemremainedunderdeveloped.AnotherimportantfeaturewasthedevelopmentofthesmallbutIndian-ownedindustrialbase.It

consistedofseveralconsumerindustriessuchcottonandjutetextiles,sugar,soap,paperandmatches.Someintermediatecapitalgoodsindustriessuchasironandsteel,cement,basicchemicals,metallurgyandengineeringhadalsobeguntocomeup,butonapaltryscale.By1947,Indiaalreadypossessedacoreofscientificandtechnicalmanpower,eventhoughfacilitiesfortechnicaleducationweregrosslyinadequate,therebeingonly7engineeringcollegeswith2,217studentsinthecountryin1939.Also,mostofthemanagerialandtechnicalpersonnelinindustrywerenon-Indian.Therewasalso,after1914,theriseofastrongindigenouscapitalistclasswithanindependent

economicandfinancialbase.TheIndiancapitalistswere,inthemain,independentofforeigncapital.Unlikeinmanyothercolonialcountries,theywerenotintermediariesormiddlemenbetweenforeigncapitalandtheIndianmarket,orjuniorpartnersinforeign-controlledenterprises.TheywerealsoperhapsmoreenterprisingthantheforeigncapitalistsinIndia,withtheresultthatinvestmentunderIndiancapitalgrewconsiderablyfasterthanBritishandotherforeigninvestment.BytheendofWorldWarII,Indiancapitalcontrolled60percentofthelargeindustrialunits.Thesmall-scaleindustrialsector,whichgeneratedmorenationalincomethanthelarge-scalesector,wasalmostwhollybasedonIndiancapital.By1947,Indiancapitalhadalsomadeagreatdealofheadwayinbankingandlifeinsurance.Indian

joint-stockbanksheld64centofallbankdeposits,andIndian-ownedlifeinsurancecompaniescontrolled

nearly75percentoflifeinsurancebusinessinthecountry.ThebulkofinternaltradeandpartofforeigntradewasalsoinIndianhands.ThesepositivefeaturesoftheIndianeconomyhave,however,tobeseeninawiderhistoricalcontext.

First,thedevelopmentofIndianindustryandcapitalismwasstillrelativelystuntedandseverelylimited.Then,occurringwithintheframeworkofacolonialeconomy,thisindustrializationtookplacewithoutIndiaundergoinganindustrialrevolutionasBritaindid.Theeconomydidnottake-off.Whateverdevelopmentoccurredwasnotbecauseof,butinspiteofcolonialismandofteninoppositiontocolonialpolicies.ItwastheresultofintenseeconomicandpoliticalstruggleagainstcolonialisminthecontextofBritain’sdecliningpositionintheworldeconomyandthetwoworldwarsandtheGreatDepressionofthethirties.Lastly,fuller,unfetteredorautonomouseconomicdevelopmentortake-offcouldnothavetakenplacewithoutabreakwithanddestructuringofcolonialism.Theendresultofcolonialunderdevelopmentwasthepauperizationofthepeople,especiallythe

peasantryandtheartisans.Extremeandvisiblepoverty,diseaseandhungerandstarvationwerethelotoftheordinarypeople.ThisfoundculminationinaseriesofmajorfamineswhichravagedallpartsofIndiainthesecondhalfofthenineteenthcentury;therewereregularscarcitiesandminorfaminesinoneortheotherpartofthecountrythroughoutBritishrule.Thelastofthemajorfaminesin1943carriedawaynearly3millionpeopleinBengal.ThereweremanyotherindicationsofIndia’seconomicbackwardnessandimpoverishment.Throughout

thetwentiethcentury,percapitaincomehadstagnatedifnotdeclined.During1941-50,theannualdeathratewas25per1,000personswhiletheinfantmortalityratewasbetween175and190per1,000livebirths.AnaverageIndianbornbetween1940and1951couldexpecttoliveforbarelythirty-twoyears.Epidemicslikesmallpox,plagueandcholeraanddiseaseslikedysentery,diarrhoea,malariaandotherfeverscarriedawaymillionseveryyear.Malariaaloneaffectedone-fourthofthepopulation.Healthservicesweredismal.In1943,therewereonly10medicalcollegesturningout700graduates

everyyearand27medicalschoolsturningoutnearly7,000licentiates.In1951,therewereonlyabout18,000graduatedoctors,mostofthemtobefoundincities.Thenumberofhospitalswas1,915with1,16,731bedsandofdispensaries6,589,with7,072beds.Thevastmajorityoftownshadnomodernsanitationandlargepartsofeventhosecitieswhichdid,werekeptoutofthesystem,modernsanitationbeingconfinedtoareaswheretheEuropeansandrichIndianslived.Amodernwatersupplysystemwasunknowninvillagesandabsentinalargenumberoftowns.Thevastmajorityoftownswerewithoutelectricity,andelectricityintheruralareaswasunthinkable.Alreadybytheendofthenineteenthcenturyitwasfullyrecognizedthateducationwasacrucialinput

andeconomicdevelopment,butthevastmajorityofIndianshadalmostnoaccesstoanykindofeducationand,in1951,nearly84percentwereilliterate,therateofilliteracybeing92percentamongwomen.Therewereonly13,590middleschoolsand7,288highschools.ThesefiguresdonotadequatelyreflectthestateofthevastmajorityofIndians,fortheyignoretheprevalenceoftheextremeinequalityofincome,resourcesandopportunities.Avasthumanpotentialwastherebyleftuntappedinsocietaldevelopmentforveryfewfromthepoorersectionsofsocietywereabletorise,toitsmiddleandupperlevels.Itisalsotobenotedthatahighrateofpopulationgrowthwasnotresponsibleforthepovertyand

impoverishment,forithadbeenonlyabout0.6percentperyearbetween1871and1941.Thus,astagnatingpercapitaincome,abysmalstandardsofliving,

stuntedindustrialdevelopmentandstagnating,low-productivity,semi-feudalagriculturemarkedtheeconomiclegacyofcolonialismasitnearedtheend.

TheColonialState

TheBritishevolvedageneraleducationalsystem,basedonEnglishasthecommonlanguageofhighereducation,fortheentirecountry.ThissystemintimeproducedanIndia-wideintelligentsiawhichtendedtohaveasimilarapproachtosocietyandcommonwaysoflookingatitandwhichwas,atitsbest,capableofdevelopingacritiqueofcolonialism—andthisitdidduringthesecondhalfofthenineteenthcenturyandafter.ButEnglish-basededucationhadtwoextremelynegativeconsequences.One,itcreatedawidegulfbetweentheeducatedandthemasses.Thoughthisgulfwasbridgedtosomeextentbythenationalmovementwhichdrewitsleadersaswellitscadresfromtheintelligentsia,itstillpersistedtohauntindependentIndia.Second,theemphasisonEnglishpreventedthefullerdevelopmentofIndianlanguagesasalsothespreadofeducationtothemasses.Thecolonialeducationalsystem,otherwisealsosufferedfrommanyweaknesseswhichstillpervade

India’sschoolsandcolleges.Itencouragedlearningbyrote,memorizationoftexts,andproofbyauthority.Therational,logical,analyticalandcriticalfacultiesofthestudentsremainedunderdeveloped;inmostcasestheycouldreproduceothers’opinionsbuthaddifficultyinformulatingtheirown.Amajorweaknessofthecolonialeducationalsystemwastheneglectofmasseducationasalsoofscientificandtechnicaleducation.Therewasalsothealmosttotallackofconcernfortheeducationofgirls,sothatin1951onlyeightoutof100womeninIndiawereliterate.Thecharacterofthecolonialstatewasquiteparadoxical.Whileitwasbasicallyauthoritarianand

autocratic,italsofeaturedcertainliberalelements,liketheruleoflawandarelativelyindependentjudiciary.Theadministrationwasnormallycarriedoutinobediencetolawsinterpretedbythecourts.Thisactedasapartialcheckontheautocraticandarbitraryadministrationandtoacertainextentprotectedtherightsandlibertiesofacitizenagainstthearbitraryactionsofthebureaucracy.Thelawswere,however,oftenrepressive.NotbeingframedbyIndians,andthroughademocraticprocess,theyleftagreatdealofarbitrarypowerinthehandsofthecivilservantsandthepolice.Therewasalsonoseparationofpowersbetweenadministrativeandjudicialfunctions.Thesamecivilservantadministeredadistrictascollectoranddispensedjusticeasadistrictmagistrate.Thecoloniallegalsystemwasbasedontheconceptofequalityofallbeforethelawirrespectiveofa

person’scaste,religion,classorstatus,butheretooitfellshortofitspromise.ThecourtactedinabiasedmannerwhenevereffortwasmadetobringanEuropeantojustice.Besides,ascourtprocedureswerequitecostly,therichhadbetteraccesstolegalmeansthanthepoor.Colonialrulersalsoextendedacertainamountofcivillibertiesintheformofthefreedomsofthe

Press,speechandassociationinnormaltimes,butcurtailedthemdrasticallyinperiodsofmassstruggle.Butafter1897,thesefreedomswereincreasinglytamperedwithandattackedeveninnormaltimes.Anotherparadoxofthecolonialstatewasthatafter1858itregularlyofferedconstitutionaland

economicconcessionswhilethroughoutretainingthereinsofstatepower.Atfirst,BritishstatesmenandadministratorsstronglyandconsistentlyresistedtheideaofestablishingarepresentativeregimeinIndia,arguingthatdemocracywasnotsuitedtoIndia.Theysaidonlyasystemof‘benevolentdespotism’wasadvisablebecauseofIndia’scultureandhistoricalheritage.ButunderIndianpressure,electionsand

legislatureswereintroducedbothattheCentreandintheprovinces.Nevertheless,thefranchise,ortherighttovote,wasextremelynarrow.Onlyabout3percentIndianscouldvoteafter1919,andabout15percentafter1935.Thegovernmentthushopedtoco-optandtherebyweakenthenationalmovementandusetheconstitutionalstructuretomaintainitspoliticaldomination.Thelegislatures,however,didnotenjoymuchpowertill1935andeventhensupremepowerresidedwiththeBritish.Thegovernmentcouldtakeanyactionwithouttheapprovalofthelegislaturesand,infact,coulddowhatitliked,whenitliked.Butthelegislatorsdidhavethepossibilitytoexposethebasic,authoritariancharacterofthegovernmentandthehollownessofcolonialconstitutionalreforms.Thelegislaturesdid,however,providesomeIndiansexperienceofparticipatinginelectionsatvarious

levelsandworkinginelectedorgans.Thisexperiencewasusefulafter1947whenIndiansacquiredrepresentativeinstitutions.Meanwhile,thenationalistsusedtheconstitutionalspaceinconjunctionwithmassstrugglesandintensepolitical,ideologicalcampaignstooverthrowcolonialrule.ThecoloniallegacyabouttheunityofIndiawasmarkedbyastrangeparadox.Thecolonialstate

broughtaboutagreaterpoliticalandadministrativeunificationofIndiathaneverachievedbefore.BuildingontheMughaladministrativesystem,itestablishedauniformsystemwhichpenetratedthecountry’sremotestareasandcreatedasingleadministrativeentity.TheBritishalsoevolvedacommoneducationalstructurewhichintimeproducedanIndia-wideintelligentsiawhichsharedacommonoutlookonsocietyandpolity,andthoughtinnationalterms.Combinedwiththeformationofaunifiedeconomyandthedevelopmentofmodernmeansofcommunication,colonialismhelpedlaythebasisformakingoftheIndiannation.ButhavingunifiedIndia,theBritishsetintomotioncontraryforces.FearingtheunityoftheIndian

peopletowhichtheirownrulehadcontributed,theyfollowedtheclassicimperialpolicyofdivideandrule.ThediverseanddivisivefeaturesofIndiansocietyandpolitywereheightenedtopromotecleavagesamongthepeopleandtoturnprovinceagainstprovince,casteagainstcaste,classagainstclass,HindusagainstMuslims,andtheprincesandlandlordsagainstthenationalmovement.Theysucceededintheirendeavourstoavaryingextent,whichculminatedinIndia’sPartition.TheBritishruledIndiathroughamodernbureaucracyheadedbythehighly-paidIndianCivilService

(ICS)whosememberswererecruitedthroughmeritbasedonopencompetition.Thebureaucracywasrule-bound,efficientand,atthetop,ratherhonest.FollowingIndianpressurethedifferentservicesweregraduallyIndianizedafter1918—by1947,nearly48percentofthemembersoftheICSwereIndian—butpositionsofcontrolandauthoritywereuptotheendretainedbytheBritish.IndiansintheseservicestoofunctionedasagentsofBritishrule.Thoughtheirseniorechelonsdevelopedcertaintraditionsofindependence,integrity,hardwork,and

subordinationtohigherpoliticaldirectiontheyalsocametoformarigidandexclusivecaste,oftenhavingaconservativeandnarrowsocial,economicandpoliticaloutlook.Whenmassivesocialchangeandeconomicdevelopmentwassoughtafter1947,therigidityandtheoutlookofthebureaucracybecameamajorobstacle.WhiletheICSwasmoreorlessfreeofcorruption,itflourishedatthelowerlevelsofadministration,

especiallyindepartmentswheretherewasscopeforit,suchaspublicworksandirrigation,theRoyalArmySupplyCorps,andthepolice.DuringtheSecondWorldWar,becauseofgovernmentregulationandcontrols,corruptionandblackmarketingspreadonamuchwiderscaleintheadministrationasalsodid

taxevasion,onceratesofincometaxandexcisewererevisedtoveryhighlevels.Therewasalsotheriseoftheparallel,blackeconomy.TheBritishleftbehindastrongbutcostlyarmedforcewhichhadactedasanimportantpillarofthe

BritishregimeinIndia.TheBritishhadmadeeveryefforttokeepthearmedforcesapartfromthelifeandthinkingoftherestofthepopulation,especiallythenationalmovement.Nationalistnewspapers,journalsandotherpublicationswerepreventedfromreachingthesoldiers’andofficers’messes.Theothersideofthemedal,ofcourse,wasthetraditionofthearmybeing‘apolitical’andthereforealsobeingsubordinated,aswasthecivilservice,tothepoliticalauthorities.ThiswouldbeablessinginthelongruntoindependentIndia,incontrasttothenewly-createdPakistan.Referringreproachfullytothelegacybequeathedbycolonialism,RabindranathTagorewrotejustthree

monthsbeforehisdeathin1941:ThewheelsoffatewillsomedaycompeltheEnglishtogiveuptheirIndianEmpire.ButwhatkindofIndiawilltheyleavebehind,whatstarkmisery?Whenthestreamoftheircenturies’administrationrunsdryatlast,whatawasteofmudandfilthwilltheyleavebehindthem.

3TheNationalMovementanditsLegacy

Anappreciationofthehundred-year-oldfreedomstruggleisintegraltoananalysisofdevelopmentsinpost-1947India.WhileIndiainheriteditseconomicandadministrativestructuresfromtheprecolonialandcolonialperiod,thevaluesandideals—thevision—andthewell-definedandcomprehensiveideologythatweretoinspireitinnationbuildingwerederivedfromthenationalmovement.RepresentingtheIndianpeople,itincorporatedvariouspoliticaltrendsfromtherighttotheleftwhichwerecommittedtoitsideologicalgoals;itexcludedonlythecommunalistsandthoseloyaltothecolonialrulers.Thesegoalsandvalueswere,moreover,notconfinedtotheintellectualsandthemiddleclasses.During

theeraofmasspolitics,tensofthousandsofthemosthumblecadresdisseminatedthemamongthecommonpeopleintheurbanaswellasruralareas.Consequently,theseidealsweretoplayacriticalroleinintegratingandkeepingtogetherIndiansocietyandpolityinthelastfivedecades.TheyservedtolinkthenationalliberationmovementwiththeeffortstodevelopIndia,inwhatJawaharlalNehrucharacterizedas‘acontinuingrevolution’.Itis,infact,theseidealsbywhichpeopleandpartiesarestillevaluatedandjudged.

CharacteroftheNationalMovement

Thefreedomstrugglewasperhapsthegreatestmassmovementinworldhistory.After1919,itwasbuiltaroundthebasicnotionthatthepeoplehadtoandcouldplayanactiveroleinpoliticsandintheirownliberation,anditsucceededinpoliticizing,anddrawingintopoliticalactionalargepartoftheIndianpeople.Gandhiji,theleaderwhomovedandmobilizedmillionsintopolitics,allhislifepropagatedtheviewthatthepeopleandnotleaderscreatedamassmovement,whetherfortheoverthrowofthecolonialregimeorforsocialtransformation.Headded,though,thatthesuccessorfailureofamovementdependedagreatdealonthequalityofitsleadership.Satyagraha,asaformofstruggle,wasbasedontheactiveparticipationofthepeopleandonthe

sympathyandsupportofthenon-participatingmillions.Infact,unlikeaviolentrevolution,whichcouldbewagedbyaminorityofcommittedcadresandfighters,anon-violentrevolutionneededthepoliticalmobilizationofmillionsandthepassivesupportofthevastmajority.Itmaybepointedout,parenthetically,thatitwasbecauseofthelongexperienceofthiskindofpolitical

participationbycommonpeoplethatthefoundersoftheIndianRepublic,whoalsoledthefreedomstruggleinitslastphase,couldreposefullfaithintheirpoliticalcapacity.Theleadersunhesitatinglyintroducedadultfranchisedespitewidespreadpovertyandilliteracy.

TheIndiannationalmovementwasfullycommittedtoapolitybasedonrepresentativedemocracyandthefullrangeofcivillibertiesfortheindividual.Itprovidedtheexperiencethroughwhichthesetwocould

becomeanintegralpartofIndianpoliticalthinking.Fromtheverybeginningthemovementpopularizeddemocraticideasandinstitutionsamongthepeople

andstruggledfortheintroductionofparliamentaryinstitutionsonthebasisofpopularelections.Startingfromtheturnofthetwentiethcentury,thenationalistsdemandedtheintroductionofadultfranchise.MuchattentionwasalsopaidtothedefenceofthefreedomofthePressandspeechagainstattacksbythecolonialauthoritiesbesidesthepromotionofotherpoliticalandeconomicpolicies.Throughout,themovementstruggledtoexpandthesemi-democraticpoliticalarenaandpreventtherulersfromlimitingtheexistingspacewithinwhichlegalpoliticalactivitiesandpeacefulpoliticalagitationsandmassstrugglecouldbeorganized.Congressministries,formedin1937,visiblyextendedcivillibertiestotheresurgentpeasants’,

workers’andstudents’movementsasalsotoradicalgroupsandpartiessuchasCongressSocialistpartyandCommunistparty.Fromitsfoundationin1885,theIndianNationalCongress,themainpoliticalorganofthenational

movement,wasorganizedondemocraticlines.Itreliedupondiscussionatalllevelsasthechiefmodefortheformationofitspoliciesandarrivingatpoliticaldiscussions.Itspoliciesandresolutionswerepubliclydiscussedanddebatedandthenvotedupon.Someofthemostimportantdecisionsinitshistoryweretakenafterrichandheateddebatesandonthebasisofopenvoting.Forexample,thedecisionin1920tostarttheNon-CooperationMovementwastakenwith1336votingforand884votingagainstGandhiji’sresolution.Similarly,attheLahoreCongressin1929,whereGandhijiwasaskedtotakechargeofthecomingCivilDisobedienceMovement,aresolutionsponsoredbyhimcondemningthebombattackontheViceroy’strainbytherevolutionaryterroristswaspassedbyanarrowmajorityof942to794.DuringtheSecondWorldWar,Gandhiji’sstandoncooperationwiththewareffortwasrejectedbyCongressinJanuary1942.Congressdidnotinsistonanidentityofviewpointsorpolicyapproacheswithinitsranks.Itallowed

dissentandnotonlytoleratedbutencourageddifferentandminorityopinionstobeopenlyheldandfreelyexpressed.Infact,dissentbecameapartofitsstyle.Atindependence,Congress,thus,hadtheexperienceofdemocraticfunctioningandstruggleforcivillibertiesforoversixtyyears.Furthermore,thedemocraticstyleoffunctioningwasnotpeculiartoCongress.MostotherpoliticalorganizationssuchastheCongressSocialistparty,tradeunionsandKisanSabhas,students’,writers’andwomen’sorganizations,andprofessionalassociationsfunctionedinthemannerofpoliticaldemocracies.Themajorleadersofthemovementwerecommittedwholeheartedlytocivilliberties.Itisworth

quotingthem.Forexample,LokamanyaTilakproclaimedthat‘libertyofthePressandlibertyofspeechgivebirthtoanationandnourishit’.1Gandhijiwrotein1922:‘Wemustfirstmakegoodtherightoffreespeechandfreeassociation...Wemustdefendtheseelementaryrightswithourlives.’Andagainin1939:‘Civillibertyconsistentwiththeobservanceofnon-violenceisthefirststeptowardsSwaraj.Itisthebreathofpoliticalandsociallife.Itisthefoundationoffreedom.Thereisnoroomtherefordilutionorcompromise.Itisthewateroflife.Ihaveneverheardofwaterbeingdiluted.’2ItthusbecomesclearthatGandhijiwasfullycommittedtoliberal,democraticvalues—onlyhealsosawtheirdeficienciesandbelievedthattheexistingliberaldemocraticstructure,asprevailingintheWest,wasnotadequateinenablingthepeopletocontrolthewieldersofpoliticalpower.JawaharlalNehruwrotein1936:‘Ifcivillibertiesaresuppressedanationlosesallvitalityandbecomesimpotentforanythingsubstantial.’3

Further,theresolutiononfundamentalrights,passedbytheKarachiCongressin1931,guaranteedtherightsoffreeexpressionofopinionthroughspeechorthePress,andfreedomofassociation.Theconsensusonthepracticeofnon-violenceduringthenationalmovementalsocontributedtothe

creationofatemperofdemocracyinthecountry.Discussion,debateandpersuasion,backedbypublicopinion,wasemphasizedforbringingaboutpoliticalandsocialchangeasopposedtoglorificationofviolencewhichliesattheheartofauthoritarianism.Thedefenceofcivillibertieswasalsonotnarrowlyconceivedintermsofasinglegrouporviewpoint.

Politicaltrendsandgroupsotherwisecriticalofeachotherandoftenatoppositeendsofthepoliticalorideologicalspectrumvigorouslydefendedeachother’scivilrights.TheModerates—GopalKrishnaGokhale,SurendranathBanerjeaandothers—defendedtheExtremistleaderTilak’srighttospeakandwritewhatheliked.AndCongressmen,votariesofnon-violence,defendedBhagatSinghandotherrevolutionaryterroristsbeingtriedintheLahoreandotherconspiracycasesasalsotheCommunistsbeingtriedintheMeerutConspiracyCase.In1928,thePublicSafetyBillandtheTradeDisputesBill,aimedatsuppressingtradeunions,theleftwingandtheCommunists,wereopposedintheCentralLegislativeAssemblynotonlybyMotilalNehrubutalsobyconservativessuchasMadanMohanMalaviyaandM.R.Jayakar,besidespoliticalspokespersonsoftheIndiancapitalistssuchasGhanshyamDasBirlaandPurshottamdasThakurdas.Thebasicnotionsofpopularsovereignty,representativegovernmentandcivillibertiestobeexercised

evenagainsttherulerswerenotpartofIndia’straditionnorwerethey,assomewronglyhold,‘thelastingcontributionofcolonialism.’Itwasthenationalmovementandnotthebureaucratic,authoritariancolonialstatethatindigenized,popularizedandrootedtheininIndia.Aspointedoutinanearlierchapter,thecolonialadministrationandideologiesnotonlytamperedwithcivillibertiesandresistedthenationalistdemandfortheintroductionofaparliamentarysystembasedonpopularelectionsbut,fromthemiddleofthenineteenthcentury,promotedtheviewthatforgeographical,historicalandsocioculturalreasonsIndiawasunfitfordemocracy.Itwasinoppositiontothiscolonialideologyandpracticethatthenationalmovement,influenceddeeplybydemocraticthoughtandtraditionsoftheEnlightenment,succeededinmakingdemocracyandcivillibertybasicelementsoftheIndianpoliticalethos.IffreeIndiacouldstartandpersistwithademocraticpolity,itwasbecausethenationalmovementhadalreadyfirmlyestablishedthecivillibertariananddemocratictraditionamongtheIndianpeople.ItwasthistraditionwhichwasreflectedintheIndianConstitutionandwhichprovedwrongCassandraswhohadrepeatedlypredictedthatdemocracyandcivillibertieswouldnotsurviveinasocietysodividedbylanguage,religion,casteandcultureandintheabsenceofaminimumofprosperityoreconomicdevelopmentandliteracyaswasthecaseinwesternEuropeandtheUnitedStates.Itisthistraditionwhichexplainswhymulti-partydemocracyandcivillibertieshavemetdifferentfatesinIndiaandPakistan,thoughbothequallyconstitutedcolonialIndia.Thepoliticalparty(anditspolitics)thatbroughtaboutPakistanwasnotknownforitsdefenceofcivilliberties,oritsfunctioningondemocraticlines,oritstolerancetowardsitspoliticalopponents.Democracywasno,asignificantpartofitspoliticalculture.Besides,thenationalmovementanditspoliticalculturewereweakpreciselyintheareaswhichcametoconstitutePakistan.Toconclude,overtheyears,thenationalistmovementsuccessfullycreated,analternativetocolonial

andprecolonialpoliticalculturebasedonauthoritarianism,bureaucratism,obedienceandpaternalism.Its

ideologyandcultureofdemocracyandcivillibertieswerebasedonrespectfordissent,freedomofexpression,themajorityprinciple,andtherightofminorityopiniontoexistanddevelop.

EconomicUnderpinningsoftheNationalMovement

TheIndiannationalmovementdevelopedacomplexandsophisticatedcritiqueofthebasicfeaturesofIndia’scolonialeconomy,especiallyofitssubordinationtotheneedsoftheBritisheconomy.Onthebasisofthiscritique,themovementevolvedabroadeconomicstrategytoovercomeIndia’seconomicbackwardnessandunderdevelopment.ThiswastoformthebasisofIndia’seconomicthinkingafterindependence.Thevisionofaself-reliantindependenteconomywasdevelopedandpopularized.Self-reliancewas

definednotasautarchybutasavoidanceofasubordinatepositionintheworldeconomy.AsJawaharlalNehruputitin1946,self-reliance‘doesnotexcludeinternationaltrade,whichshouldbeencouraged,butwithaviewtoavoideconomicimperialism.’4Atthesametime,thenationalistsacceptedfromthebeginningandwithnearunanimitytheobjectiveofeconomicdevelopmenttowardsmodernagricultureandindustryonthebasisofmodernscienceandtechnology—India,theyheld,hadtoindustrializeorgounder.Theyalsoemphasizedthecloselinkbetweenindustryandagriculture.Industrialdevelopmentwasseenasessentialforruraldevelopment,foritalonecouldreducepopulationpressureonlandandruralunemployment.Withinindustrialization,theemphasiswasonthecreationofanindigenousheavycapitalgoodsormachine-makingsectorwhoseabsencewasseenasacausebothofeconomicdependenceandunderdevelopment.Simultaneously,foressentialconsumergoods,thenationalistsadvocatedrelianceonmedium,small-scaleandcottageindustries.Small-scaleandcottageindustriesweretobeencouragedandprotectedasapartofthedevelopmentstrategyofincreasingemployment.Indiannationalistswereopposedtotheunrestrictedentryofforeigncapitalbecauseitreplacedand

suppressedIndiancapital,especiallyunderconditionsofforeignpoliticaldomination.Accordingtothemrealandself-reliantdevelopmentcouldoccuronlythroughindigenouscapital.Ontheotherhand,thenationalistsaverredthatifIndiawaspoliticallyindependentandfreetoevolveitsowneconomicpolicies,itmightuseforeigncapitaltosupplementindigenousefforts,becauseofhervastcapitalrequirementsandneedtoimportmachineryandadvancedtechnologyfromothercountries.Duringthethirtiesandfortiesabasicrestructuringoftheagrarianrelationsalsobecameoneofthe

objectivesofthenationalmovement.Allintermediaryrent-receiverssuchasthezamindarsandotherlandlordsweretobeabolishedandagriculturebasedonpeasantproprietors.Anactiveandcentralrolewasenvisagedforthestateineconomicdevelopmentbythenationalists.

Rapidindustrialization,inparticular,neededacomprehensivepolicyofdirectandsystematicstateintervention.Economicplanningbythegovernmentandthemassivedevelopmentofthepublicsectorwerewidelyacceptedinthethirties.Thestatewastodeveloplarge-scaleandkeyindustriesapartfrominfrastructure,suchaspower,irrigation,roadsandwater-supply,wherelargeresourceswereneeded,andwhichwerebeyondthecapacityofIndiancapital.Asearlyas1931,theResolutiononFundamentalRightsandEconomicProgramme,adoptedattheKarachisessionoftheIndianNationalCongressdeclaredthatinindependentIndia‘theStateshallownorcontrolkeyindustriesandservices,mineralresources,railways,waterways,shippingandothermeansofpublictransport.’5Interestingly,thesession

waspresidedoverbySardarPatel,theResolutiondraftedbyJawaharlalNehruandmovedintheopensessionbyGandhiji.TopromoteplanningasaninstrumentofintegratedandcomprehensivedevelopmentCongresssponsoredin1938theNationalPlanningCommitteewhiletheIndiancapitalistsformulatedtheBombayPlanin1943.Gandhijiwastheonlymajornationalistleaderwhodisagreedwiththeemphasisonmodernindustry.

But,intime,evenhemetthedominantviewhalfway.Inthethirties,herepeatedlyassertedthathewasnotopposedtoallmachineindustriesbutonlytothosewhichdisplacedhumanlabour.Headdedthathewould‘prizeeveryinventionofsciencemadeforthebenefitofall.’Butthiswassubjecttoonecondition:alllarge-scaleindustriesshouldbeownedandcontrolledbythestateandnotbyprivatecapitalists.Nevertheless,Gandhijididnotinsistthatthenationalmovementshouldaccepthiseconomicapproachoragenda,ashedidinthecaseofnon-violence,Hindu-Muslimunityandoppositiontountouchability.HealsodidnotcounterposehisviewstothoseoftheothernationalistsaswitnessedbyhismovingtheresolutionattheKarachisessionoftheCongressin1931whichfavoureddevelopmentoflarge-scaleindustryunderstateownershiporcontrol.Itisalsosignificantthatin1942hemadeJawaharlalNehruhisheirdespitethelatter’stotalcommitmenttothedevelopmentofindustryandagricultureonthebasisofmodernscienceandtechnology.Atthesametime,thenationalistmovementacceptedtheGandhianperspectiveoncottageandsmall-scaleindustries.ThisperspectivewastofindfullreflectionintheNehruvianSecondFiveYearPlan.

TheIndiannationalmovementwasquiteradicalbycontemporarystandards.Fromthebeginningithadapro-poororientation.Forexample,thepovertyofthemassesandtheroleofcolonialismasitssourcewasthestartingpointofDadabhaiNaoroji’seconomiccritiqueofcolonialism.WithGandhiandtheriseofasocialistcurrentthisorientationwasfurtherstrengthened.Theremovalofpovertybecamethemostimportantobjectivenexttotheoverthrowofcolonialism.Fromthelatetwenties,JawaharlalNehru,SubhasChandraBose,theCongressSocialists,the

Communists,theRevolutionaryTerroristsandvariousothersocialistgroupsstrovetogivethenationalmovementasocialistorientationandtopopularizethevisionofasocialistIndiaafterindependence.Socialistideasassumedprominencewithinthemovement,attractingtheyoungernationalistcadreandlargesectionsofthenationalistintelligentsia,buttheydidnotbecomethedominantcurrent.JawaharlalNehru,themajorideologueofsocialisminpre-1947India,readilyconcededthatCongresshadnotinanywayacceptedsocialismasitsideal.Ratherthegoalitsoughtwasthecreationofanegalitariansocietyinwhichallcitizenswouldhaveequalopportunitiesand‘acivilizedstandardoflife...soastomaketheattainmentofthisequalopportunityareality.’6

Nevertheless,evenwhilethequestionofthebasiceconomicstructureoffreeIndiaremainedopenandundecided,thesocialistsdidsucceedingivingthenationalmovementaleftisttilt.Itwascommittedtocarryingoutbasicchangesinsociety,economyandpolity.Itwentondefiningitselfinmoreandmoreradicalterms,basedonequityandsocialjusticeandgreatersocialandeconomicequality.Itacceptedandpropagatedaprogrammeofreformsthatwasquiteradicalbycontemporarystandards:compulsoryandfreeprimaryeducation,loweringoftaxesonthepoorandlowermiddleclasses,reductionofthesalttax,landrevenueandrent,debtreliefandprovisionofcheapcredittotheagriculturists,protectionoftenants’rightsandultimatelytheabolitionoflandlordismand‘landtothetiller’,theworkers’righttoaliving

wageandashorterworkingday,workers’andpeasants’rightstoorganizethemselvesandreformofthemachineryoflawandorder.AdramaticmomentintheevolutionofthisradicalorientationofthenationalmovementwastheKarachiresolutionofthe1931Congresswhichdeclaredthat‘inordertoendtheexploitationofthemasses,politicalfreedommustincluderealeconomicfreedomofthestarvingmillions.’7

AndtocrownthisgrowingradicalismwasthatofGandhijiwhodeclaredin1942that‘thelandbelongstothosewhoworkonitandtonooneelse.’8

Anaspectofitscommitmenttothecreationofanegalitariansociety,wasthenationalmovement’soppositiontoallformsofinequality,discriminationandoppressionbasedonsexandcaste.Itallieditselfwithandoftensubsumedmovementsandorganizationsforthesocialliberationofwomenandthelowercastes.Thenationalmovementbroughtmillionsofwomenoutofthehomeintothepoliticalarena.Itsreformagendaincludedtheimprovementoftheirsocialpositionincludingtherighttoworkandeducationandtoequalpoliticalrights.Aspartofitsstruggleagainstcasteinequalityandcasteoppression,abolitionofuntouchabilitybecameoneofitsmajorpoliticalprioritiesafter1920.Themovement,howeverfailedtoformandpropagateastronganti-casteideology,thoughGandhijididadvocatethetotalabolitionofthecastesystemitselfintheforties.ItwasbecauseoftheatmosphereandsentimentsgeneratedbythenationalmovementthatnovoicesofprotestwereraisedintheConstituentAssemblywhenreservationsfortheScheduledCastesandScheduledTribesweremooted.Similarly,thepassageoftheHinduCodeBillsinthefiftieswasfacilitatedbythenationalmovement’seffortsinfavourofthesocialliberationofwomen.

Secularism

Fromitsearlydays,thenationalmovementwascommittedtosecularism.Secularismwasdefinedinacomprehensivemannerwhichmeanttheseparationofreligionfrompoliticsandthestate,thetreatmentofreligionasaprivatematterfortheindividual,stateneutralitytowardsorequalrespectforallreligions,absenceofdiscriminationbetweenfollowersofdifferentreligions,andactiveoppositiontocommunalism.Forexample,tocountercommunalismandgiveexpressiontoitssecularcommitment,CongressinitsKarachiresolutionof1931declaredthatinfreeIndia‘everycitizenshallenjoyfreedomofconscienceandtherightfreelytoprofessandpractisehisreligion,’thatallcitizenswouldbe‘equalbeforethelaw,irrespectiveofcaste,creedorsex,’thatnodisabilitywouldattachtoanycitizenbecauseofcaste,creedorsex‘inregardtopublicemployment,officeofpowerorhonour,andintheexerciseofanytradeorcalling,’andthat‘theStateshallobserveneutralityinregardtoallreligions.’9

Itistruethatinhisearlyyears,Gandhi,adeeplyreligiousperson,emphasizedthecloseconnectionbetweenreligionandpolitics.Thiswasbecausehebelievedthatpoliticshadtobebasedonmorality,andtohimallreligionswerethesourceofmorality.Religionwas,infact,hebelieved,itselfmoralityintheIndiansenseofdharma.ButhenotonlymovedtheKarachiresolutionin1931,butwhenhesawthatthecommunalistswereusingreligionasasectarianbelief-systemtodividethepeople,heovertlybegantopreachtheseparationofreligionfrompolitics.Thushesaidin1942:‘Religionisapersonalmatterwhichshouldhavenoplaceinpolitics.’10Andagainin1947:‘Religionisthepersonalaffairofeachindividual.Itmustnotbemixedupwithpoliticsornationalaffairs.’11JawaharlalNehruwroteandspoke

passionatelyandwithdeepunderstandingoncommunalism.HewasperhapsthefirstIndiantoseecommunalismastheIndianformoffascism.Interestingly,theleadersofthenationalmovementneverappealedtothepeopleonreligiousgroundsorthattheBritishrulers’religionwasChristianity.TheircritiqueofBritishrulewasinvariablyeconomic,political,socialorcultural.Itistruethatthenationalmovementwasnotabletocounterforcesofcommunalismadequatelyor

evolveaneffectivestrategyagainstthem.ThiscontributedtothePartitionandthecommunalcarnageof1946-47.Butitwasbecauseofthestrongsecularcommitmentofthenationalmovementthat,despitethesetraumaticevents,independentIndiamadesecularismabasicpillarofitsConstitution,asalsoofitsstateandsociety.

Nation-in-the-making

Thenationalmovementrecognizedearlyonthattheprocessofnation-formationinIndiawasarecentone.Inotherwords,Indiawasanation-in-the-making.Promotingthisprocessthroughthecommonstruggleagainstcolonialismbecameabasicobjective.Inthisrespect,theleadershipofthemovementacknowledgedtheroleofcolonialisminunifyingIndiaeconomicallyandadministrativelyevenwhileitcriticizeditsfurtheringallkindsofpoliticallydivisivetendencies.Fromtheoutsetthemovementemphasizeditsall-Indianness.Forexample,theIndianNational

Congresswasfoundedin1885notasafederationoftheexistingprovincialpoliticalorganizationsbutasanewnation-wideorganizationcommittedtonation-widepoliticalmobilizationonthebasisofall-Indiademands.Itscadresanditsappeal,itsaudienceandaboveallitsleadershipweredrawnfromalloverIndia.Andfromthebeginningitemphasizedtheunityandintegrityofthecountry.Infact,itwastheallianceofthestatespeoples’movements,aspartoftheall-Indianationalmovement,thatenabledeasyintegrationoftheprincelystateswiththerestofIndiaafterindependence.Thisall-IndiannesswasnotapeculiarfeatureoftheIndianNationalCongress.Otherpoliticalparties

andpopularmassorganizationstoofollowedsuit.Tothenationalistleaders,thenotionofastructurednationdidnotcontradictitsunity.Theynotonly

acknowledgedbutalsoappreciatedIndia’srichcultural,linguistic,religious,ethnicandregionaldiversity.Theemergenceofastrongnationalidentityandthefloweringofothernarroweridentitieswereseenasmutuallyreinforcingprocesses.ThediversityandmultipleidentitieswerenotseenasobstaclestobeovercomebutaspositivefeaturesthatweresourcesofstrengthtoIndianculture,civilizationandthenation,andwereintegraltotheemergingnationhood.Theseregional-culturalidentities,inparticular,developednotinoppositiontobutaspartofthenationalmovementandtheall-Indiaidentity.Indiansocietywasalsodividedbyclass.Butwhilenotlettingclassdivisionstosegmentit,the

movementdidnotstandinthewayofclassorganizationsandclassstruggles.Overtime,thenationalmovementevolvedthedualconceptsandobjectivesofunityindiversityand

nationalintegration.Theformerwastobebasedonculturaldiversityandculturalinteraction,leadingtoafederalpolity.NationalintegrationwastoleadtoastrongpoliticalcentreandtheweavingofthedifferentculturalstrandsintoanevolvingcompositeIndianculture.

ForeignPolicy

IndependentIndia’sforeignpolicywasalsorootedintheprinciplesandpoliciesevolvedbythenationalistssincethe1870s.Overtime,Indianleadershaddevelopedabroadinternationaloutlookbasedonoppositiontocolonialismandsympathyandsupportforthepeoplesfightingfortheirindependence.Inthethirtiesandforties,thenationalmovementtookastronganti-fasciststand.ThiswasputforwardinamostexpressivemannerbyGandhi.CondemningHitlerforthegenocideoftheJews,andcondoningviolence,perhapsforthefirsttime,hewrotein1938:‘Ifthereevercouldbeajustifiablewarinthenameofandforhumanity,awaragainstGermany,topreventthewantonpersecutionofawholerace,wouldbecompletelyjustified.’12ThenationalistapproachtoworldproblemsduringthethirtieswasclearlyenunciatedbyJawaharlalNehruinhispresidentialaddresstotheLucknowCongressin1936:

Weseetheworlddividedupintotwovastgroupstoday—theimperialistandfascistononeside,thesocialistandnationalistontheother

...Inevitably,wetakeourstandwiththeprogressiveforcesoftheworldwhicharerangedagainstfascismandimperialism.13

ItisofgreatsignificancethatIndiannationalismwasnotchauvinistorjingoist.ItdidnottakerecoursetoreverseracismevenwhenactivelyopposingracismpractisedbytheBritishinIndia.OpposingandhatingBritishimperialism,ittraineditscadretoeschewhatredorbitternesstowardstheBritishpeople.

PoliticalNorms

Inamass-basedstruggle,ideologyanditsinfluenceplaysacriticalrole.Yet,amassmovementhasalsotoincorporateandaccommodatediversepoliticalandideologicalcurrentsinordertomobilizemillions.Besides,ithastobedisciplinedandorganizationallystrongandunited;yetitcannotaffordtobemonolithicorauthoritarian.Recognizingthisduality,Congress,underwhoseleadershipandhegemonytheanti-imperialiststruggle

waswaged,washighlyideologicalanddisciplinedwhilealsobeingideologicallyandorganisationallyopen-endedandaccommodative.RepresentingtheIndianpeopleandnotanyoneclassorstratum,Congresscouldnotbeandwasnotideologicallyhomogeneous.Widelydifferingideologicalandpoliticalstreamscoexistedwithinit.ItissignificantthatatnostagedidGandhijiclaimtohaveanideologicalmonopolyoverit.Congress,therefore,succeededinunitingpersonsofdifferentideologicalbents,differentlevelsofcommitmentandofvastlydifferentcapacitiestostruggletogetherforsomebroadcommonobjectivesandprinciples.Congresswasabletoachievethistaskbyfunctioningdemocratically.Therewasaconstantpublic

debateandcontentionbetweenindividualsandgroupswhichsubscribedtodivergentpolitical-ideologicaltendenciesorparadigms,eventhoughtheysharedmanyelementsofacommonvisionandwereunitedinstruggle.Themajorityviewregardingthestrategicandtacticalframeworkofthemovementprevailedbuttheminoritywasnotdecimated.Itremainedpartofthemovement,hopingonedaytohaveitsapproachaccepted.EvengroupsandmovementswhichwereoutsidetheCongressstreamevolvedacomplexandfriendlyrelationshipwithit.Thecommunal,casteistandloyalistpartiesandgroupsweretheonlyonestoadoptanadversarialapproachtowardstheCongress.ThenationalmovementthusbequeathedtoindependentIndiathepoliticaltraditionofcompromise,

accommodationandreconciliationofdifferentinterestsandpointsofview.Nehruworkedwithinthistraditioninevolvingnationalpoliciesafterindependence.Thisapproachis,however,nowrunningratherthin.Itwas,ofcourse,nevereasytotransferthistraditionofamassmovementtoapartyofgovernanceor

topartiesofoppositionforthatmatter.ButitwasaninvaluableexperienceandlegacyforallthosewhowantedtobuildastrongandprosperousIndiaandajustandegalitariansociety.Thehighestnormsofpoliticsandpoliticalbehaviourweresetupbythemovement.Itsmajorleaders

forexample,DadabhaiNaoroji,GopalKrishnaGokhale,LokamanyaTilak,Gandhiji,BhagatSingh,JawaharlalNehru,SubhasBose,SardarPatel,RajendraPrasad,C.Rajagopalachari,AcharyaNarendraDev,JayaprakashNarayan,possessedmoralintegrityofthehighestorder.Itwasbecauseofthismoralauthorityandhighmoralstandardsoftheleadershipthatthemovementcouldmobilizemillions.Thiswasalsotrueofthecadres,mostofwhomgaveuptheircareers,theirstudiesandtheirjobs,abandonedfamilylifeanddevotedtheirentirelivestothemovement.Also,judgedinitstotality,themovementwasabletomaintainharmonybetweenmeansandends.Themovementwasabletodevelopthecapacitytoevolve,renovateandchangewiththetimes.Itsprogrammeandpolicies,underwentcontinuouschangeandmovedinaradicaldirectioninresponsetotheurgesofthemassesastheywereawakenedtopoliticalactivityandtothechangingpoliciesofthecolonialrulers.Themovementwas,therefore,inmanywayshighlyoriginalandinnovative,keepingabreastwithcontemporaryworldthought,processesandmovements.Thelegacyofthenationalmovementcouldbesummarizedas:acommitmenttopoliticalandeconomic

independence,moderneconomicdevelopment,theendingofinequality,oppressionanddominationinallforms,representativedemocracyandcivilliberties,internationalismandindependentforeignpolicy,promotionoftheprocessofnation-in-the-makingonthebasisofthejoyousacceptanceofthediversity,andachievementofalltheseobjectivesthroughaccommodativepoliticsandwiththesupportofalargemajorityofthepeople.IndependentIndiahasasawholeremainedloyaltothebasicsofthelegacyofthenationalmovement,a

largepartofwhichisenshrinedintheConstitutionandincorporatedintheprogrammesandmanifestosofmostofthepoliticalparties.TheIndianpeoplehavetendedtousethislegacyastheyardsticktojudgetheperformanceofgovernments,politicalpartiesandinstitutions.Alegacy,especiallyofaprolongedmovement,tendstoendureforalongtime.Butnolegacy,however

strongandsound,canlastforever.Ittendstoerodeandbecomeirrelevantunlessitisconstantlyreinforcedanddevelopedandsometimestranscendedinacreativemannertosuitthechangingcircumstances.

4TheEvolutionoftheConstitutionandMainProvisions

TheConstitutionofIndiacameintoforceon26January1950.SincethenthedayiscelebratedasRepublicDay.Butbefore1950,26JanuarywascalledIndependenceDay.Since26January1930,itwasthedayonwhichthousandsofpeople,invillages,inmohallas,intowns,insmallandbiggroupswouldtaketheindependencepledge,committingthemselvestothecompleteindependenceofIndiafromBritishrule.Itwasonlyfittingthatthenewrepublicshouldcomeintobeingonthatday,markingfromitsveryinceptionthecontinuitybetweenthestruggleforindependenceandtheadoptionoftheConstitutionthatmadeIndiaaRepublic.TheprocessoftheevolutionoftheConstitutionbeganmanydecadesbefore26January1950andhas

continuedunabatedsince.ItsoriginsliedeeplyembeddedinthestruggleforindependencefromBritainandinthemovementsforresponsibleandconstitutionalgovernmentintheprincelystates.Morethanpassingresolutionsontheneedfor,orframingproposalsforconstitutionalreformtheheart

ofthenationalmovement’scontributionlayinitsconcretepoliticalpractice.Thispopularizedamongthepeoplethenotionsofparliamentarydemocracy,republicanism,civilliberties,socialandeconomicjustice,whichwereamongtheessentialprinciplesoftheConstitution.Forexample,theideaofaparliamentaryformofgovernmentwasintroducedintotheIndianpoliticalconsciousnessbytheinclusionoftheterm‘Congress’(theLowerHouseinUSA),inthenameoftheIndianNationalCongress.TheactualfunctioningoftheCongressorganization,especiallyfrom1920onwards,afterGandhijimodifiedtheCongressconstitution,wasbasedontheelectiveprinciple.Alloffice-bearerswerechosenthroughelection,beitthepresidentoftheAll-IndiaCongressCommittee(AICC)orthesecretaryofthevillage-levelCongressCommittee.TheAICC,whichconsistedofdelegateselectedbytheProvincialCongressCommittees(PCCs),wastheequivalentoftheLokSabhaortheparliament,andtheWorkingCommitteewastheequivalentoftheCabinet.TheCongresspresidentwasthecounterpartoftheprimeminister.Thus,whentheConstitutionin1950adoptedaparliamentaryformofgovernment,withaCabinetledbyaprimeminister,itwasnot,asiscommonlysupposed,theBritishparliamentthatitwasemulating.Itwasformalizingnationalistpractices,whichthepeoplewerealreadyfamiliarwith.Evenmorethantheform,itwasthespiritofdemocracy,onwhichinthelastandfirstresortthe

foundationsoftheConstitutionrest,thatwasinculcatedamongthepeoplebythenationalmovement.Thisfoundexpressioninwidespreadmassparticipation.Itensuredaplaceforadultfranchiseafterindependence.Couldwomenhavebeendeniedthevotein1950afterGandhijiasearlyas1930hadentrustedcrucialpartsoftheCivilDisobediencemovementtotheircare?Couldapropertyorincomequalificationco-existwiththeconceptsofdaridranarayanandantodya?CouldtheliteracyoreducationalqualificationbesmuggledintotheConstitutiononceGandhijihadbasedhisentirestruggleonthe‘dumbmillions’?

ThestruggleforthefreedomofthePressunderBritishrulewasvigorouslyfoughtbymanyleaders,andespeciallybyLokamanyaTilakwhopaidaveryheavypriceforthecombativetoneofhisnewspapers.ManyothernewspaperstooliketheLeader,AmritaBazarPatrika,BombayChronicle,TheHindustanTimes,TheHindu,theTribune,Searchlight,AndhraPatrika,Aaj,AnandaBazarPatrika,amongothersfunctionedasunpaidorgansofthenationalmovement.ThishistoryensuredthatfreedomofexpressionbecameafundamentalrightintheConstitution.

StepstotheConstitutionSwaraj...willnotbeafreegiftoftheBritishParliament.ItwillbeadeclarationofIndia’sfullself-expression.ThatitwillbeexpressedthroughanActofParliamentistrue.ButitwillbemerelyacourteousratificationofthedeclaredwishofthepeopleofIndiaevenasitwasinthecaseoftheUnionofSouthAfrica....TheBritishParliament,whenthesettlementcomes,willratifythewishesofthepeopleofIndiaasexpressednotthroughthebureaucracybutthroughherfreelychosenrepresentatives.Sivarajcanneverbeafreegiftbyonenationtoanother.Itisatreasuretobepurchasedwithanation’sbestblood.Itwillceasetobeagiftwhenwehavepaiddearlyforit.

Thisstatement,madebyGandhijiin19221,makescleartheBritishdidnotintroduceanyconstitutionalreformsororgansontheirowninitiativebutalwaysinbelatedandgrudgingresponsetosustainedIndiannationalistpressure.ThereisamythwhichhasbeencarefullyandoftensuccessfullypurveyedbyBritishadministratorsandlaterneo-imperialistscholarsthattheBritishinitiatedmodernresponsibleandconstitutionalgovernmentinIndiaandthattheConstitutionwasmerelytheculminationoftheseriesofconstitutionalinitiativesmadebythemin1861,1892,1909,1919and1935.Thiscanbedisprovedgiventhefactthattheirconcessions,ateverystage,fellfarshortofwhatIndiansweredemanding.Forexample,theelectiveprinciplewasfirstintroducedbytheBritishintheIndianCouncilsActof

1892.TheCongressanditsnationalistprecursors,andtheIndianPress,hadbeendemandingelectionstothecouncils,electedmajoritiesinthem,andgreaterpowerstothenon-officialmembersofcouncilsformanyyearsbeforethat.Nationalistdemandshadalreadyfarexceededwhatwasgrantedin1892.ItisalsonecessarytorealizethatnationalistdemandswerenotjustalittlemoreadvancedthanBritish

practice:theywerefarahead.WhentheCongressdemandedthatatleasthalfthemembersofthecouncilsheelected,andthatthereshouldbemaleadultfranchise,votebyballot,powertothelegislativecouncilstovoteonthefinancebills,etc.,theactualBritishpracticeinIndiawasthattheImperialorCentralLegislativeCouncilwasatotallynominatedbodyofamaximumofseventeenmemberswithanofficialmajorityandafewtokenIndianmembers.The1892Actintroducedelectedmembersbuttheywerestillinaminority,andhadveryfewpowers.Ontheotherhand,thenationalists’conceptionofthenatureofIndia’sconstitutional,frameworkwasadvancingrapidly.In1895,thereappearedtheConstitutionofIndiaBill,alsoknownastheHomeRuleBill,aboutwhoseauthorshipthereisnoconclusiveevidence,butwhich‘AnnieBesant...thought...wasprobablyissuedunderLokamanyaBalGangadharTilak’sinspiration’2,whichconceivedofbasichumanrightssuchasfreedomofexpression,equalitybeforethelaw,righttotheinviolabilityofone’shome,righttoproperty,etc.,forallcitizensofIndia.EventheGovernmentofIndiaAct,1935,thelastBritishenactment,failedtosatisfytherepeatedIndiandemand,firstmadein1895,foradeclarationoftherightsofthepeopleofIndia.TheIndianleadersfeltnonecessitytoabandontheconstitutionallegacyofthepre-independence

periodatthetimeofthewritingoftheConstitutionandtostartonacleanstate—thiswastheirownlegacyforwhichtheyhadfoughthardandmademanysacrifices.TheConstitutioncouldthusborrow

heavilyfromtheGovernmentofIndiaActof1935becausethosewhodraftedtheConstitutionhadnoneedtoprovetheirindependentcredentials.Theyalsobelievedthattheadvantagesoffamiliaritywhichexistinginstitutionshadshouldnotberejected.Sincetheyalsofreelyrejectedwhatwasunsuitableintheoldandaddedmuchthatwasnew,theydidnothesitatetoretainwhatwasofvalue.

ConstitutionalDevelopment

Beginninginthe1880sand1890swiththenotionthatBritainmustgrantresponsiblegovernmenttoIndia,thenationalmovement,bytheendoftheseconddecadeofthetwentiethcenturybeguntoespousethedoctrineofself-determinationortherightofIndianstoframetheirownconstitution.TilakandAnnieBesant,duringtheFirstWorldWar,hadlaunchedaHomeRuleagitation(thenamebeinginspiredbytheIrishHomeRuleMovement).TheCongress-MuslimLeagueSchemeforconstitutionalreformswhichemergedoutoftheCongress-LeaguePactof1916demandedthatfour-fifthsofthemembersoftheprovinciallegislaturesbeelected‘bythepeopleonasbroadafranchiseaspossible.’3In1918,theCongresssessionatDelhiresolvedthat:‘InviewofthepronouncementofPresidentWilson,MrLloydGeorge,andotherBritishstatesmen,thattoensurethefuturepeaceoftheworld,theprincipleofSelf-determinationshouldbeappliedtoallprogressivenations,...thisCongressclaimsrecognitionofIndia...asoneoftheprogressivenationstowhomtheprincipleofSelf-determinationshouldbeapplied.’4TheargumentsdidnotimpresstheBritishrulers,andthenewinstalmentofreformsin1919wasintroducedwiththeassertionthatthe‘timingandpace’ofconstitutionalreformwouldbedecidedbytheBritishalone.TheIndiananswertothiswastheNon-cooperationMovementledbyGandhiji.Afterthismovementendedin1922,andsectionsofCongressmennowconstitutedastheSwarajpartyfoughtelectionstothelegislativecouncils,theconstitutionalbattlewasjoinedwitharenewedvigour.OneinitiativeinwhichAnnieBesant,TejBahadurSapru,V.S.SrinivasaSastriplayedaleadingrole,

wastheCommonwealthofIndiaBillwhichwasdraftedinIndia,revisedbyLabourPartyleaders,acceptedunanimouslybytheExecutiveCommitteeoftheParliamentaryLabourParty,andhaditsfirstreadingintheHouseofCommonsinDecember1925.Itcouldnot,however,survivethedefeatoftheLabourgovernment.ItissignificantthattheBill,whichhadthesupportofverywidesectionsofIndianopinion,specifiedincleartermsthat‘IndiashallbeplacedonanequalfootingwiththeSelf-GoverningDominions.’5TheMemorandumaccompanyingtheBillremindedtheBritishoftheirhistory:6

Weseekanhonourableagreement,suchasBritainrefusedtoherAmericanColoniesandcreatedaRepublic,butmadewithherotherColoniesandcreatedpeaceandamity.

Atthisjuncture,averyprominentrolewasalsoplayedbyMotilalNehru,whointroducedaresolutionon8February1924intheCentralLegislativeAssemblywhichaskedthegovernment‘tosummon,atanearlydate,arepresentativeRoundTableConferencetorecommend,withdueregardtotheprotectionoftherightsandinterestsofimportantminorities,theschemeofaconstitutionforIndia.’7Thisschemewouldberatifiedbyanewly-electedIndianlegislatureandthensenttotheBritishparliamenttobeembodiedinastatute.ThiswasthefirsttimethatthedemandforaConstitutionandtheprocedureforitsadoptionwerespeltoutinsuchclearterms.Thisresolution,whichcametobeknownasthe‘NationalDemand’,waspassedbyalargemajorityintheCentralLegislativeAssembly—76forand48against.

TheBritish,showingtheircontemptforthe‘NationalDemand’,appointedtheall-WhiteSimonCommissioninNovember1927torecommendfurtherconstitutionalchanges.ThemovewasroundlycondemnedbyallsectionsofpoliticalopinioninIndia.LordBirkenhead,theSecretaryofState,whileannouncingtheCommissionintheHouseofLordson24November1927,alsorepeatedhischallengetoIndians,firstdeliveredon7July1925:‘LetthemproduceaconstitutionwhichcarriesbehinditafairmeasureofgeneralagreementamongthegreatpeoplesofIndia.’8

Thechallengewasacceptedand,attheinitiativeoftheCongress,anAllPartiesConferencewascalledinMay1928whichappointedacommitteechairedbyMotilalNehru‘todeterminetheprinciplesoftheConstitutionforIndia.’9TheNehruReport,submittedon10August1928,wasineffectanoutlineofadraftConstitutionforIndia.MostofitsfeatureswerelaterincludedintheConstitutionofIndia.Itvisualizedaparliamentarysystemwithfullresponsiblegovernmentandjointelectorateswithtime-boundreservationofseatsforminorities.TheNehruReportlaidspecialemphasisonsecuringfundamentalhumanrightsforthepeopleofIndia.Theseincludedtherightto‘thefreedomofconscienceandthefreeprofessionandpracticeofreligion,’‘therightoffreeexpressionofopinion,aswellastherighttoassemblepeaceablyandwithoutarms,andtoformassociationsorunions,’equalrightsformenandwomen,therighttoformunions,andtherighttofreeelementaryeducation.Interestingly,thesecularcharacteroftheStatewaslistedasafundamentalright.OfthenineteenrightslistedintheNehruReport,tenwereincorporatedintotheConstitution.TheNehruReportalsorecommendedthat‘theredistributionofprovincesshouldtakeplaceonalinguisticbasis.’10

TheNehruReportwasfollowedbyaboycottoftheSimonCommissionandmassdemonstrationswhereveritsmemberswent.InDecember1929,theCongressdeclaredcompleteindependenceasitsgoalandfollowedthisupwiththelaunchingofthemassCivilDisobedienceMovementinApril1930whichbroughthundredsofthousandsintothestreetsandsawaroundonehundredthousandinjail.ItwasbecomingincreasinglyclearthatIndianswereunlikelytobesatisfiedwithanythinglessthantherighttoframetheirownConstitution.Theideathatthisshouldbedonenotthroughtheconferencemethod,aswasthecasewiththeNehruReport,butviaaConstituentAssemblyelectedforthisspecificpurpose,onthebasisofthewidestpossiblefranchise,begantogainground.JawaharlalNehruwasthefirstnationalleadertoarticulatetheideain1933thoughM.N.Roy,theMarxistleader,hadmadethesuggestionearlier.InJune1934,theCongressWorkingCommittee,whilerejectingtheWhitePaperpresentedbytheBritishgovernmentonfurtherconstitutionalreform,resolvedthatthe‘onlysatisfactoryalternativetotheWhitePaperisaconstitutiondrawnupbyaConstituentAssemblyelectedonthebasisofadultsuffrageorasnearitaspossible.’11

ThedemandforaConstituentAssemblywasrepeatedfrequentlyafter1934andincludedintheCongressmanifestoforthe1936-37elections.TheCongresswonmajoritiesinsevenoutofelevenprovincesanddecidedtoformministries.However,itmadesurethatthiswasnotconstruedasacceptanceoftheexistingconstitutionalframework.ThemeetingoftheCongressWorkingCommitteeatWardhaon27-28February1937whichdecidedinfavourofacceptingofficealsoremindedthelegislatorsthataresolutionoftheFaizpurCongresshadboundthemtoarticulatethedemandforaConstituentAssemblyassoonaspossibleinthenewlegislatures.

From19to20March,thepromisedconventionofCongresslegislatorsandAICCmemberswasheldatDelhi,withJawaharlalNehruinthechair.Nehrutoldthedelegatesthattheyhadtoworkfora‘panchayatiraj,fashionedbyaConstituentAssembly,agrandpanchayatofthenation,electedbyallourpeople.’Inunequivocalterms,hesaid‘thisconstitutionmustthereforego,lock,stockandbarrel,andleavethefieldclearforourConstituentAssembly.’12

InJuly1937,Nehruagain,thistimeatrifleimpatiently,pressedthelegislatorstointroduceresolutionsintheassembliesrejectingthepresentconstitutionanddemandingaConstituentAssembly.InAugust,theWorkingCommitteeoftheCongressacceptedadraftresolutionpreparedbyAcharyaKripalani,whichwassenttoCongressmenintheprovincialassemblies.BetweenAugustandOctober1937,alltheCongressprovinces—Bombay,Madras,U.P.,Bihar,Orissa,CentralProvinces,North-WestFrontierProvince—aswellasSindpassedthisresolutionwhichdemandedthat‘theGovernmentofIndiaAct,1935...berepealedandreplacedbyaconstitutionforafreeIndiaframedbyaConstituentAssemblyelectedonthebasisofadultfranchise.’13On17September1937,aresolutionrecommendingreplacementofGovernmentofIndiaAct1935byaconstitutionframedbyaConstituentAssemblywasintroducedintheCentralLegislativeAssembly.S.Satyamurti,theCongressleaderwhointroducediturgedtheBritishgovernmenttograspthehandoffriendshipextendedbyMahatmaGandhibecause,onceagreatpeoplemakeuptheirmindtoobtaintheirfreedom,thereisnopoweronearth,notevenGreatBritain,whichcanstandintheirway.’14TheHaripurasessionoftheCongressinFebruary1938repeatedthesamedemand.FollowingtheoutbreakoftheSecondWorldWar,Congressministriesresignedinprotestagainsttheir

beingmadeapartytotheWarwithoutelicitingtheiropinionorconsent.Atthisjuncturetheministriespassedresolutionsinthelegislativeassemblieswhichassertedthat‘Indiashouldberegardedasanindependentnationentitledtoframeherownconstitution.’Soonafter,GandhijiaddedhisvoicetothatofNehruandtheCongress.Inanarticletitled‘TheOnlyWay’,hedeclaredthathewasnowevenmoreenthusiasticabouttheConstituentAssemblythanNehruhimself.‘Lookatthequestionfromanystandpointyoulike,itwillbefoundthatthewaytodemocraticSwarajliesonlythroughaproperlyconstitutedAssembly,callitbywhatevernameyoulike.’Healsothoughtthatabodybasedonunadulteratedsuffrageincludingbothmenandwomenwoulddofulljusticetorivalclaims.‘Iseemtoseeinitaremedy...forourcommunalandotherdistempers,besidesbeingavehicleformasspoliticalandothereducation...’15

AdiscussionbetweenGandhijiandJawaharlalNehruatameetingoftheCongressWorkingCommitteeheldatWardhafrom15-19April1940broughtoutGandhiji’soutstandingqualitiesofforesightandpragmatism.WhileJawaharlalNehrumaintainedthattheBritishgovernmentmustfirstdeclareIndiaindependent

andthencallaConstituentAssembly,GandhijifeltthattheAssemblycouldbecalledfirstandbeleftfreetodecideontheissueofindependence.Asithappened,andnotforthefirsttime,Gandhiji’sviewwasclosertotheactualturnofevents.16

The‘AugustOffer’madebyViceroyLinlithgowin1940inanattempttosecureIndiancooperationintheWareffortforthefirsttimeconcededthattheframingofthenewConstitutionshouldbeprimarily(thoughnotsolely)theresponsibilityofIndiansthemselves.Italsoofferedtosetup,aftertheconclusionoftheWar,‘abodyrepresentativeoftheprincipalelementsinIndia’snationallifeinordertodevisethe

frameworkofthenewConstitution.’Howthisbodywastobeconstituted—bydirectorindirectelectionsbasedonadultorrestrictedfranchise,orbynomination—wasnotspeltout.17

TheAugustOfferwasspurnedbyallthemajorpoliticalpartiesinIndia.CongressproceededinDecember1940tolaunchtheindividualCivilDisobediencecampaigntoregisteritsprotestagainstbeingmadeapartytotheWarwithoutitsconsent.ThepartyrefrainedfromactiveobstructionofthewareffortsinceitsympathizedwiththeaimsoftheWar.WhatitdeniedwastherighttoBritaintopresumeco-operationonIndia’sbehalf.Thedoorwasstillleftopenfornegotiations.InMarch1942,inthewakeoftheBritishcollapseinSouth-eastAsiaandthreedaysafterthefallof

Rangoon,WinstonChurchill,theprimeministerofBritain,announcedthedispatchtoIndiaofSirStaffordCripps,aprominentLabourPartymemberoftheWarCabinetandafriendofNehru.TheCrippsproposals,astheseconstitutionalconcessionscametobecalled,forthefirsttimeclearlyspeltouttheprocedureforthesettingupoftheConstituentAssembly.Toquote:18

ImmediatelyupontheresultsbeingknownofProvincialElectionswhichwillbenecessaryattheendofhostilities,theentiremembershipoftheLowerHousesofProvincialLegislaturesshallasasingleelectoralcollegeproceedtotheelectionoftheconstitution-makingbodybythesystemofproportionalrepresentation...IndianStatesshallbeinvitedtoappointrepresentativesinthesameproportiontotheirtotalpopulationasinthecaseofrepresentativesofBritishIndiaasawholeandwiththesamepowersasBritishIndianmembers.

TheCripps’proposalswereamajoradvanceinthepositionoftheBritishgovermnent.Forthefirsttime,itwasclearlyacceptedthattheConstitutionwouldbethesoleresponsibilityofIndiansalone.TheideaofaConstituentAssemblywasalsounambiguouslyacceptedanditsmodalitiesspeltout.However,otheraspectsoftheCripps’proposals,whichhaddivisivepotential,stoodinthewayoftheschemebeingacceptedbytheCongress.ThefailureoftheCripps’Missionledtoanotherroundofconfrontationbetweenthenationalmovement

andtheBritish.ThefamousAICCresolutionof8August1942whichaskedtheBritishto‘QuitIndia’andexhortedtheIndiansto‘Doordie’,alsosaidthattheprovisionalgovernmentoffreeIndiawouldevolveaschemeforaConstituentAssembly.ThemassupsurgethatfollowedlefttheBritishinnodoubtthatthetimeforthefinalnegotiationshadarrived.Therefore,soonaftertheWarendedinEuropeinMay1945,aWhitePaperonIndiawasissued.ThiswasfollowedbytheabortiveSimlaConferenceinJune-July1945.ThevictoryoftheLabourpartyintheBritishelectionsinJuly1945providedtheopportunityfora

freshinitiative.TheViceroy,LordWavell,announcingtheIndiapolicyofthenewgovernmenton19September1945,promisedtoconveneaconstitution-makingbodyassoonaspossible.On19February1946,theBritishgovernmentdeclaredthattheyweresendingaCabinetMissiontoIndiatoresolvethewholeissueoffreedomandconstitution-making.TheCabinetMission,whicharrivedinIndiaon24March1946,heldprolongeddiscussionswith

Indianleaders.On16May1946,havingfailedtosecureanagreement,itannouncedaschemeofitsown.Itrecognizedthatthebestwayofsettingupaconstitution-makingmachinerywould‘bebyelectionbasedonadultfranchise;butanyattempttointroducesuchastepnowwouldleadtoawhollyunacceptabledelayintheformulationofthenewconstitution.’19Therefore,itwasdecidedthatthenewly-electedlegislativeassembliesoftheprovincesweretoelectthemembersoftheConstituentAssemblyonthebasisofonerepresentativeforroughlyonemillionofthepopulation.TheSikhandMuslimlegislatorsweretoelecttheirquotaonthebasisoftheirpopulation.Therewerenumerousotherdetailsabout

proceduresandsuggestionsaboutthepowersoftheUnionandtheprovinces.ParticularlyimportantweretheprovisionsrelatingtogroupingofprovincesintosectionsA,B,andC.SectionAconsistedofMadras,Bombay,U.P.,Bihar,theCentralProvincesandOrissa—the‘Hindu-majority’provinces.SectionBandCsimilarlyconsistedofthe‘Muslim-majority’provincesofPunjab,NWFPandSindinthewestandAssamandBengalintheeast.TheCabinetMissionschemeproposedthattheConstituentAssembly,aftermeetingtoelectthechairmanandcompleteotherformalities,shoulddivideintosections.Theprovincialrepresentativesmeetingintheirrespectivesectionsshouldfirstdecidetheconstitutionsoftheconstituentprovincesandalsowhethertheywantedtoadoptanygroupconstitution.ItwasonlyafterthisprocesshadbeencompletedthattherepresentativesofalltheprovincesandthoseoftheprincelystatesweretomeetagaintosettletheConstitutionoftheUnion.TheUnionofIndiawastodealwithforeignaffairs,defenceandcommunications.TheCongressrespondedtotheCabinetMissionschemebypointingoutthatinitsviewtheConstituent

Assembly,onceitcameintobeing,wouldbesovereign.ItwouldhavetherighttoacceptorrejecttheCabinetMission’sproposalsonspecifics.ThoughanassuranceonthoselineswasnotforthcomingfromtheBritish,theCongressneverthelessdecidedafteragreatdealofdebatetoacceptthescheme,andtrytoworkit,astherewasafeelingthatoutrightrejectionwouldagaindelaytheprocessoftransferofpower.ThisiswhattheMuslimLeaguehopedtoachievebyitsintransigence.TheLeaguecontinuedtoopposetheConstituentAssemblyateverystage,before,aswellasafteritwasconstituted.

TheConstituentAssemblyThefirsttaskofthisAssemblyistofreeIndiathroughanewconstitution,tofeedthestarvingpeople,andtoclothethenakedmasses,andtogiveeveryIndianthefullestopportunitytodevelophimselfaccordingtohiscapacity.

ThesewerethehopesexpressedbyJawaharlalNehrubeforetheConstituentAssembly.20

TheConstituentAssemblywastohave389members.Ofthese,296weretobefromBritishIndiaand93fromtheprincelyIndianstates.Initially,however,theConstituentAssemblycomprisedonlyofmembersfromBritishIndia.ElectionsofthesewereheldinJuly-August1946.Ofthe210seatsinthegeneralcategory,Congresswon199.Italsowon3outofthe4SikhseatsfromPunjab.TheCongressalsowon3ofthe78Muslimseatsandthe3seatsfromCoorg,Ajmer-MerwaraandDelhi.ThetotalCongresstallywas208.TheMuslimLeaguewon73outofthe78Muslimseats.EspeciallysincetheConstituentAssemblywasnotelectedonthebasisofuniversaladultfranchiseand

wasthusnotastrulyrepresentativeincharacterastheCongresshadwishedanddemanded,andalsobecauseonlyMuslimsandSikhswererecognizedas‘minorities’deservingspecialrepresentation,aspecialeffortwasmadetoseethattheAssemblydidindeedreflectthediversityofperspectivespresentinthecountry.TheCongressWorkingCommitteeinearlyJuly1946specificallyinstructedtheProvincialCongressCommitteestoincluderepresentativesofScheduledCastes,Parsis,IndianChristians,Anglo-Indians,tribalsandwomenintheCongresslistforthegeneralcategory.TheotherimportantconsiderationinchoosingnamesforelectiontotheAssemblywasthatthevery

besttalentavailableinthecountrymustbeinvolvedinthetaskofthemakingoftheConstitution.TheleadwasgivenbyGandhijihimselfwhosuggestedthenamesofsixteeneminentpersonsforinclusionintheCongresslist.AltogetherthirtypeoplewhowerenotmembersoftheCongresswerethuselectedonthe

Congressticket.Further,‘theideologicalspectrumoftheAssemblywasbroadenedby...thediversenatureoftheCongressmembershipitself.’21

HavingfailedtopreventtheelectionoftheConstituentAssembly,theMuslimLeaguenowconcentrateditsenergiesonrefusingtojoinitsdeliberations.TheCongressandJawaharlalNehruaspresidentoftheinterimgovernmentcontinuedtomakeconciliatorygestures,buttonoavail.Accordingly,on20November1946,thedecisiontoconvenethefirstsessionoftheConstituentAssemblyon9December1946wasannounced.TheViceroy,LordWavell,infact,hadseemedreluctanttocalltheAssemblyanditwasCongress,

whichinsistedthatnowthattheAssemblyhadbeenelected,itwasnecessarythatitbegintofunction,regardlessofthewishesofthosewhochosetostayaway.NehruhadalsotofirmlyquashtheViceroy’sdesiretoappointtheprovisionalpresidentoftheAssemblyandissueinvitationstothememberstoattendthefirstsessioninhisownname.AtNehru’sinsistence,theoldestmemberoftheAssembly,DrSachchidanandSinha,becametheprovisionalpresidentandinvitationswereissuedinthenameofthesecretaryoftheConstituentAssembly.IndoingthisNehruwasestablishing,foralltosee,theindependenceoftheAssemblyfromBritishcontrol.ItwouldhardlybefairiftheConstituentAssembly,whichfromconceptiontofulfilmentwasanachievementoftheCongressandparticularlyofNehru,shouldbefinallypresentedtotheworldasachildoftheBritishgovernment.Besides,itscredibilityasalegitimateconstitution-makingbodyforindependentIndiadependednotonlyonitsbeingautonomousbutonitsbeingseenasautonomous.At11a.m.,on9December1946,theConstituentAssemblyofIndiabeganitsfirstsession.Forall

practicalpurposes,thechronicleofindependentIndiabeganonthathistoricday.Independencewasnowamatterofdates.TherealresponsibilityofdecidingtheconstitutionalframeworkwithinwhichthegovernmentandpeopleofIndiaweretofunctionhadbeentransferredandassumedbytheIndianpeoplewiththeconveningoftheConstituentAssembly.Onlyacoupd’étatcouldnowreversethisconstitutionallogic.Thefirstsessionwasattendedby207members.TheMuslimLeague,havingfailedtopreventthe

conveningoftheAssembly,nowrefusedtojoinitsdeliberations.Consequently,theseventy-sixMuslimmembersoftheLeaguestayedawayandthefourCongressMuslimmembersattendedthesession.On11December,DrRajendraPrasadwaselectedthepermanentChairman,anofficelaterdesignatedasPresidentoftheAssembly.On13December,JawaharlalNehrumovedthefamousObjectivesResolution,whichwasdebatedtill19DecemberbutitsadoptionwaspostponedtoenabletherepresentativesoftheMuslimLeagueandtheprincelystatestojoin.Atthenextsession,whichtookplacefrom20-22January1947,itwasdecidedtonotwaitanylongerfortheLeague,andtheObjectivesResolutionwaspassed.Thethirdsessionwasheldfrom28Aprilto2May1947andtheLeaguestilldidnotjoin.On3June,

theMountbattenPlanwasannouncedwhichmadeitclearthatIndiawastobepartitioned.ThiscompletelyalteredtheperspectiveoftheConstituentAssembly,astheCabinetMissionPlan,theessenceofwhichwasacompromisewiththeLeague,wasnolongerrelevant.WithIndiabecomingindependenton15August1947,theConstituentAssemblybecameasovereign

body,andalsodoubledasthelegislatureforthenewstate.ItwasresponsibleforframingtheConstitutionaswellasmakingordinarylaws.Thatitsfunctionasalegislatureaswellasitslargesizedidnotcomeinthewayofitseffectivelyperformingitsdutiesasaconstitution-makingbodyisduetotheenormous

preparatoryworkaswellasorganizationalskillsandhardworkofitsleadingmembers.Theworkwasorganizedintofivestages:first,committeeswereaskedtopresentreportsonbasicissues;second,B.N.Rau,theconstitutionaladviser,preparedaninitialdraftonthebasisofthereportsofthesecommitteesandhisownresearchintotheconstitutionsofothercountries;third,thedraftingcommittee,chairedbyDrAmbedkarpresentedadetaileddraftconstitutionwhichwaspublishedforpublicdiscussionandcomments;fourth,thedraftconstitutionwasdiscussedandamendmentsproposed;fifth,andlastlytheConstitutionwasadopted.Inaddition,acriticalrolewasplayedbytheCongressparty.IthadaskedaCommitteeofExpertsto

preparematerialandproposalsfortheConstitutionasearlyas4July1946.TheCommitteewaschairedbyNehruandhadAsafAli,K.T.Shah,D.R.Gadgil,K.M.Munshi,HumayunKabir,R.SanthanamandN.GopalaswamyAyyangarasmembers.NehrudraftedtheObjectivesResolutionandtheCongressWorkingCommitteeandAICCratifiediton20and21November1946wellintimeforitsintroductioninthefirstsessionoftheAssembly.ThispracticecontinuedtilltheConstitutionwasadopted,withtheCongressmenthoroughlydiscussingandexaminingeachprovisionintheirpartyforums,inadditiontoparticipatingfullyinthedebatesintheAssembly.Theparty’sdeepinvolvementintheprocessevenmadeitopentothecharge,madebyoneofitsownmembers,ShibbanLalSaxena,thatthisreducedtheproceedingsintheAssemblytoaformality!Theoverwhelmingopinion,however,sharedbyDrAmbedkaraswell,wasthatitsrolehadbeenalltothegoodasitensuredthateverydetailintheconstitutionwasthoroughlyscrutinized.ToquoteAustin:22

TheCongressAssemblyPartywastheunofficial,privateforumthatdebatedeveryprovisionoftheConstitution,andinmostcasesdecideditsfatebeforeitreachedtheflooroftheHouse.EveryoneelectedtotheAssemblyontheCongressticketcouldattendthemeetingswhetherornothewasamemberofthepartyorevenclosetoit.

JawaharlalNehru,whodraftedtheObjectivesResolution,whichspeltoutthephilosophyandbasicfeaturesoftheConstitution,setaformidableexamplebyhiskeeninvolvementineveryaspectoftheprocess.SardarPatel’sinterestwassecond,ifatall,onlytoNehru’s.HeplayedthedecisivepartinbringingintherepresentativesoftheerstwhileprincelystatesintotheConstituentAssembly,inseeingtoitthatseparateelectorateswereeliminatedandinscotchinganymoveforreservationofseatsforreligiousminorities.RajendraPrasadwonacclaimforhisimpartialityanddignityasPresidentoftheAssembly.MaulanaAzadbroughthisformidablescholarshipandphilosophicalmindtobearonmanyissuesofgraveimportance.Butperhapsaboveall,theCongressbroughtgreatcredittoitselfandenormousbenefittothenationby

adoptingacompletelynon-sectarianapproach,freelyrecruitingthebestavailabletalent,alwaysstrivingforconsensusratherthanimposingitswillthroughnumbers.InformedbyastrongsenseofitshistoricroleinlayingthefoundationsofindependentIndia,theCongresspartytriedhardtodoitsbestbythepeopleithadledtofreedom.InthewordsofGranvilleAustin,chroniclerofthehistoryofconstitution-makinginIndia:23

TheConstituentAssemblywasaone-partybodyinanessentiallyone-partycountry.TheAssemblywastheCongressandtheCongresswasIndia.Therewasathirdpointthatcompletedatighttriangle,thegovernment(meaningtheapparatusofelectedgovernmentbothprovincialandnational),fortheCongresswasthegovernmenttoo....Onemightassume,awareofthecharacterofmonolithicpoliticalsystemsinothercountries,thatamass-partyinIndiawouldberigidandnarrowinoutlookandthatitspowerfulleadershipwouldsilencedissentandconfinepolicyanddecision-makingtothehandsoftheselectfew.InIndiathereversewasthecase.ThemembershipoftheCongressintheConstituentAssemblyandoutsideheldsocial,economic,andpoliticalviewsrangingfrom

thereactionarytotherevolutionary,anditdidnothesitatetovoicethem.TheleadersoftheAssembly,whoplayedthesameroleintheCongressandintheUnionGovernment,werenationalheroesandhadalmostunlimitedpower;yetdecision-makingintheAssemblywasdemocratic.TheIndianConstitutionexpressesthewillofthemanyratherthantheneedsofthefew.

TheIndianConstitution:MainProvisions

TheConstitutionofIndialaysdownasetofrulestowhichtheordinarylawsofthecountrymustconform.Itprovidesaframeworkforademocraticandparliamentaryformofgovernment.TheConstitutionalsoincludesalistofFundamentalRightsandDirectivePrinciples,thefirst,aguaranteeagainstencroachmentsbythestateandthesecond,asetofdirectivestothestatetointroducereformstomakethoserightseffective.ThoughthedecisiontogiveIndiaaparliamentarysystemwasnottakenwithoutseriousdebate,yetthe

alternative—ofpanchayat-basedindirectelectionsanddecentralizedgovernment—didnothavewidespreadsupport.EspousedbysomeGandhians,notablyShrimanNarayan,thisalternativewasdiscardeddecisivelyinfavourofacentralizedparliamentaryconstitution.Theintellectualoremotionalcommitmentofmanymemberstosocialismalsoconfirmedtheconviction

aboutparliamentarygovernment.Whatmostmembersdesired‘wasnotthatsocialismbeembodiedintheConstitution,butthatademocraticconstitutionwithasocialistbiasbeframedsoastoallowthenationinthefuturetobecomeassocialistasitscitizensdesiredorasitsneedsdemanded.’24

AdultSuffrage

TheCongresshaddemandedadultsuffragesincethetwenties.Itwashardlylikelytohesitatenowthatithadtheopportunitytorealizeitsdreams.Afewvoicesadvocatedconfiningofadultsuffragetoelectionstothepanchayatsatthevillagelevel,andthenindirectelectionstohigherlevelbodies,buttheoverwhelmingconsensuswasinfavourofdirectelectionsbyadultsuffrage—notasmallachievementinaBrahmanical,upper-castedominated,male-oriented,elitist,largelyilliterate,society!AlladiKrishnaswamiAyyar,aforemostconstitutionalexpert,whoplayedacrucialroleintheframing

oftheConstitution,said:25

TheAssemblyhasadoptedtheprincipleofadultfranchisewithanabundantfaithinthecommonmanandtheultimatesuccessofdemocraticrule...Theonlyalternativetoadultsuffragewassomekindofindirectelectionbaseduponvillagecommunityorlocalbodies...Thatwasnotfoundfeasible.

Austinhascalleddirectelectionbyadultsuffragethe‘gong,thesinglenote,whosereverberationsmightawaken—oratleaststir—sleepingIndia.’26AveryperceptiveobservationwasalsomadebyK.M.Panikkarwhosaidthat‘adultsuffragehassocialimplicationsfarbeyonditspoliticalsignificance...Manysocialgroupspreviouslyunawareoftheirstrengthandbarelytouchedbythepoliticalchangesthathadtakenplace,suddenlyrealizedthattheywereinapositiontowieldpower.’27Theimpactofadultsuffrageisevennowbeingfelt,asnewgroupsatthelowerendofthesocialhierarchylearntoexperimentwithdifferentpoliticalpartiesandcandidatesforsecuringtheirfeltneeds.Thebeautyofadultsuffrageisthatitforcesthemostelitistofcandidatestoseekthefavourofthevoteofthehumblestvoter.TheextentoftheleapmadebytheConstitutioncanbefathomedonlyifitisrecalledthattilltheendof

Britishrule,‘thefranchisewasrestrictedbyproperty,educational,andotherqualificationsto

approximately15percentofthecountry’spopulation.’28

Preamble

ThebasicphilosophyoftheConstitution,itsmovingspirit,istobefoundinthePreamble.ThePreambleitselfwasbasedontheObjectivesResolutiondraftedbyNehruandintroducedintheAssemblyinitsfirstsessionon13December1946andadoptedon22January1947.ThePreamblestatesthatthepeopleofIndiaintheConstituentAssemblymadeasolemnresolvetosecuretoallcitizens,‘Justice,social,economicandpolitical;Libertyofthought,expression,belief,faithandworship;Equalityofstatusandofopportunity;andtopromoteamongthemall,Fraternityassuringthedignityof

theindividualandtheunityofthenation.’Ithasbeenpointedoutthattheprioritygiventotheconceptofjusticeascomparedtoliberty,equality,fraternity,andtosocialandeconomicascomparedtopoliticaljustice,wasdeliberate.Theorderofthewordsindicatethattheconceptofsocialandeconomicjusticewasperhapsconsidered‘themostfundamentalnorm’oftheConstitutionofIndia.29

FundamentalRightsandDirectivePrinciplesThecoreofthecommitmenttothesocialrevolutionliesinpartsIllandIV,intheFundamentalRightsandintheDirectivePrinciplesof

StatePolicy.ThesearetheconscienceoftheConstitution.30

WhileFundamentalRightsarejusticiableandDirectivePrinciplesarenot,thelatterarenolessimportantforthatreason.TheUniversalDeclarationofHumanRightsalsocontainstwosetsofrights,thetraditionalcivilandpoliticalrightsandtheneweconomicandsocialrights.IntheIndianConstitution,thefirstkindisincludedunderFundamentalRightsandthesecondunderDirectivePrinciples.Thereasonforthedistinctionbetweenthetwoisverysimplythatwhilethestatecouldstraightawayguaranteepoliticalandcivillibertiescontainedunder‘FundamentalRights’,itcouldonlysecureeconomicandsocialjusticeoveraperiodoftimeastheeconomydevelopedandsocialchangetookplace.Thelattersetofrightscouldnotthereforebemadejusticiable,i.e.,acitizencouldnotgotoacourtoflawincaseofdenial.Butnonetheless,thestatewasenjoinedupontodoitsutmosttoapplythesepreceptswhenmakinglaws.Bythisprocess,rightscontainedintheDirectivePrinciplescouldbecomejusticiableasandwhentheywereincorporatedintolaws.Thedecisiontohavewrittenrights,alistofrights,adeclarationofrightsintheConstitutionmarkeda

sharpbreakwithBritishconstitutionaltraditionandpractice.TheBritishhadconsistentlyrejectedIndiandemandsforalistofrights.Indians,ontheotherhand,becauseoftheircolonialexperience,haddevelopedahealthysuspicionofgovernmentandpreferredrightstobewrittendown.Theirpreferencewasinkeepingwithinternationaltrendsaswell.FollowingthesuppressionofhumanrightsinGermany,SovietUnion,andotherplaces,theAtlanticCharter,andtheUnitedNationsCharterhadbeendrawnupandtheUnitedNationsHumanRightsCommissionestablished.TheinclusionoffundamentalrightsintheConstitutionwasimperativealsobecausethefirst

ConstitutionofIndiaBillframedin1895hadcontainedthisconceptinembryo,andithadfiguredprominentlyintheMotilalNehruReportof1928.Further,itnotonlyrepresented‘advanceddemocraticthought’butwasalso‘aconvenientwayofsettingatrestthefearsofminorities.’31StungbytheBritish

claimthattheyhadstayedoninIndiatoprotecttheminoritieswhowouldotherwisebesuppressedbythemajority,theCongresswasdeterminedtoshowhowpatentlyfalsewasthisassertion.AsPatelsaid:32

Itisforustoprovethatitisabogusclaim,afalseclaim,andthatnobodycanbemoreinterestedthanusinIndia,intheprotectionofourminorities.Ourmissionistosatisfyeveryoneofthem...

AtnopointdidtheAssemblydoubttheneedforfundamentalrights.Theonlyquestionwas,howtodistinguishbetweenthoserightsthatcouldbegrantedimmediately,suchaspoliticalrights,andthosethatshouldbethereasidealstobereachedandcouldbegrantedonlyovertime,suchassocialandeconomicrights.ThesolutionwasfoundbyborrowingaconceptfromtheIrishConstitutionandencodingthesocioeconomicrightsas‘DirectivePrinciplesofStatePolicy’.Theseweremadenon-justiciable.Thepossibilityofcreatingtwokindsofrights,justiciableandnonjusticiable,wassuggestedbytheSapruReportof1945(thoughnotinthecontextofpositiveandnegativerights)andtheideawaspossiblytakenfromthere.TheFundamentalRightsaredividedintosevenparts:therightofequality,therightoffreedom,the

rightagainstexploitation,therighttofreedomofreligion,culturalandeducationalrights,therighttopropertyandtherighttoconstitutionalremedies.Theserights,whichareincorporatedinArticles12to35oftheConstitution,primarilyprotectindividualsandminoritygroupsfromarbitrarystateaction.Butthreeofthearticlesprotecttheindividualagainsttheactionofotherprivatecitizens:Article17abolishesuntouchability,Article15(2)saysthatnocitizenshallsufferanydisabilityintheuseofshops,restaurants,wells,roads,andotherpublicplacesonaccountofhisreligion,race,caste,sex,orplaceofbirth;andArticle23prohibitsforcedlabour,which,thoughitwasalsoextractedbythecolonialstateandtheprincelystates,wasmorecommonlyacharacteristicoftheexploitationbybig,semi-feudallandlords.Theserightsofcitizenshadtobeprotectedbythestatefromencroachmentbyothercitizens.Thus,thestatehadtonotonlyavoidencroachingonthecitizen’sliberties,ithadtoensurethatothercitizensdidnotdosoeither.AcitizenwhosefundamentalrighthasbeeninfringedorabridgedcouldapplytotheSupremeCourtorHighCourtforreliefandthisrightcannotbesuspendedexceptincaseofdeclarationofEmergency.Thecourtshavetherighttodecidewhethertheserightshaveindeedbeeninfringedandtoemployeffectiveremediesincludingissuingofwritsofhabeascorpus,mandamus,prohibition,quowarrantoandcertiorari.TheDirectivePrinciples,asstatedearlier,haveexpresslybeenexcludedfromthepurviewofthe

courts.Theyarereallyinthenatureofguidelinesorinstructionsissuedtofuturelegislaturesandexecutives.WhiletheConstitutionclearlyintendedDirectivePrinciplesandFundamentalRightstobereadtogetheranddidnotenvisageaconflictbetweenthetwo,itisafactthatseriousdifferencesofinterpretationhavearisenmanytimesonthisissue.Itisgenerallyagreedthattill1971thecourtsgavegreaterimportancetoFundamentalRightsthantoDirectivePrinciples,butthatthe25thand42ndAmendmentsin1971and1976broughtinbyIndiraGandhigaveprecedencetoDirectivePrinciples.In1980,however,inthelandmarkjudgementinMinervaMillsLimitedvs.UnionofIndia,theSupremeCourthasheldthatbothFundamentalRightsandDirectivePrinciplesareequallyimportantandonecannotbesacrificedfortheother(AIR1980SC1789).TheessenceoftheDirectivePrinciplesiscontainedinArticle38whichlaysdownthat‘theStateshall

strivetopromotethewelfareofthepeoplebysecuringandprotectingaseffectivelyasitmayasocialorderinwhichjustice,social,economic,andpolitical,shallinformalltheinstitutionsofthenational

life.’Thestatewasthustoensurethatallcitizenshaveadequatemeansoflivelihood,thatthereisequitabledistributionofmaterialresources,andconcentrationofwealthandmeansofproductionisavoided.Thereistobeequalpayforequalworkformenandwomenandthehealthofworkers,childrenandpregnantwomenwastobeprotected.Workersshouldgetalivingwageandjustandhumaneconditionsofwork.Allcitizensshouldhavetherighttowork,toeducationandpublicassistanceincaseofunemployment,oldage,sickness,etc.TheDirectivePrinciplesexpressedthehopethatwithintenyearsoftheadoptionoftheConstitution,therewouldbecompulsoryprimaryeducationofchildrenuptotheageoffourteenyears.Theobjectiveofacommoncivilcodewasalsodesired.Thestatewastotakestepstoorganizevillagepanchayats,toimprovestandardsoflivingandnutrition,providefreelegalaid,andpromoteeducationalandotherinterestsofScheduledCastesandTribesandotherweakersections.Itwastoprotectandimprovetheenvironmentandsafeguardtheforestsandwildlifeofthecountry.Thestatewasalsotopromoteinternationalpeaceandsecurity,maintainjustandhonourablerelationsbetweennations,inculcaterespectforinternationallawandtreatyobligationsandencouragesettlementofinternationaldisputesbyarbitration.ThePreamble,theFundamentalRightsandtheDirectivePrinciplesreadtogethermakeitclearthatthe

Constitutionaimedatcreatingconditionsforthebuildingofanegalitariansocietyinwhichindividualfreedomsweresecure.Itdidnotvisualizeabandonmentofoneidealforthepreservationoftheotherprinciple.Atthesametime,therelationshipbetweenindividuallibertyandsocialchangewasrightlyenvisagedasdynamic.ToquoteNehru:33

TheDirectivePrinciplesofStatePolicyrepresentadynamicmovetowardsacertainobjective.TheFundamentalRightsrepresentsomethingstatic,topreservecertainrightswhichexist.Bothagainareright...Nowitmaybethatintheprocessofdynamicmovementcertainexistingrelationshipsarealtered,variedoraffected.Infact,theyaremeanttoaffectthosesettledrelationshipsandyetifyoucomebacktotheFundamentalRightstheyaremeanttopreserve,notindirectly,certainsettledrelationships.Thereisacertainconflictinthetwoapproaches,notinherently,becausethatwasnotmeant,Iamquitesure.

Nonetheless,conflictsdidemergeandanumberofamendmentstotheConstitutionhadtobemadeinthefiftieswhentheimplementationofzamindariandjagirdariabolitionlegislationwasblockedinthecourtsonthegroundsofrighttoproperty,etc.DuringtheprocessoftheframingoftheConstitutionaswellasafteritcameintoforce,thepropertyprovisionsturnedouttobethemostcontroversial.Courtcaseschallengingtheagrarianreformsbegantoproliferate,andthe1stAmendmenttotheConstitutionbecamenecessary.Introducedin1951intheProvisionalParliament,thisamendmentinsertednewarticles31Aand31BandtheNinthSchedule,thussecuringtheconstitutionalvalidityofzamindariabolitionlawsbyamongotherthingsspecifyingthattheycouldnotbechallengedonthegroundsthattheyviolatedtheFundamentalRights.TherewereothercaseswhichshowedthatcertainarticlesrelatingtoFundamentalRightswereopento

interpretationinamannerthatwasnotenvisagedbytheConstitutionframers.Accordingly,in1951itself,intheProvisionalParliament,the1stAmendmentwaspassed.Thismadesomeimportantchangesinarticles15,19and31,dealingwiththeFundamentalRightsofequality,freedomofexpression,andofproperty.Theamendmentsensuredthatthezamindariabolitionlegislationcouldnotbechallenged,amongotherthings,onthegroundthattherighttopropertywasafundamentalright,thatthereservationofseatsineducationalinstitutionsandofgovernmentjobscouldnotbechallengedonthegroundthatitdeniedtherighttoequality,andthatthelegislationwhichplacedreasonablerestrictionsonfreedomofspeech,press,association,etc.,couldnotbequestionedonthegroundthatitviolatedtherighttofreedomof

expression,etc.Furtheramendmentshadtobemadeinlateryears,asforexamplein1955,inArticles31and31A,tomakethequantumofcompensationpaidforacquiredpropertynon-justiciableaswellasintroduceotherchanges.Insubsequentyearsaswell,manyimportantSupremeCourtjudgementsaswellasconstitutionalamendmentscontinuedtodefineandredefinetherelationshipbetweenindividualrightsandsocialgood,betweenFundamentalRightsandDirectivePrinciples.ThischangingrelationshipisperhapstobewelcomedsinceitisproofoftheabilityoftheConstitutionandoftheotherinstitutionsithashelpedflourishtoadapttotheneedsofnewgenerationsandtorespondtotheforcessetinmotionbythefast-changingworld.ItwouldperhapsbeappropriatetoconcludewithAustinthatthetensionbetweenthetwosetsofrightsrepresents‘theclassicdilemmaofhowtopreserveindividualfreedomwhilepromotingpublicgood.’34

ASecularState

TheConstitutiondeclaresIndiatobeasovereign,socialist,secularanddemocraticrepublic.Eventhoughthetermssecular(andsocialist)wereaddedonlybythe42ndAmendmentin1976,thespiritembodyingtheConstitutionwassecular.In1973theSupremeCourtheldthesecularcharacteroftheConstitutiontobeoneofthebasicfeaturesoftheConstitution.Further,theFundamentalRightsincludeprohibitionofdiscriminationongroundsofreligionandrighttofreedomofreligionincludingfreedomofconscienceandfreeprofession,practiceandpropagationofreligion,freedomtomanagereligiousaffairs,freedomtopaytaxesforpromotionofanyparticularreligionandfreedomonattendanceatreligiousinstructionorreligiousworshipincertaineducationalinstitutions,culturalandeducationalrightsincludingprotectionofinterestsofminoritiesandtheirrighttoestablishandadministereducationalinstitutions.ThedebateoverthemeaningofthetermsecularintheIndiancontexthasbeenaheatedone.Some

peoplehavearguedthatthewesterncontextfromwhichthetermsecularisborrowedisaverydifferentone.IntheWest,theoutcomeofthestrugglebetweentheChurchandthestateledtotheseparationofthetwo;theChurchwasallowedtodecideonreligiousrituals,thestatewastoregulatesecularaffairs.InIndia,theconceptofsecularismevolvedaspartofthestruggleofnationalistforcesagainstcommunalforcesthatwantedtousereligionforpoliticalpurposesanddividetheemergingnationonthebasisofreligion.Nehruputitbest:35

WecallourStateasecularone.Theword‘secular’,perhaps,isnotaveryhappyoneandyetforwantofabetter,wehaveusedit.Whatexactlydoesitmean?Itdoesnotobviouslymeanasocietywherereligionitselfisdiscouraged.Itmeansfreedomofreligionandconscience,includingfreedomforthosewhomayhavenoreligion.Itmeansfreeplayforallreligions,subjectonlytotheirnotinterferingwitheachotherorwiththebasicconceptionsofourState.

DrS.Radhakrishnan,therenownedscholarofIndianphilosophy,whowasPresidentofIndiafrom1962to1967,placedsecularismwithintheIndiantradition:36

Weholdthatnoreligionshouldbegivenpreferentialstatusofuniquedistinction...Nogroupofcitizensshallarrogatetoitselfrightsandprivilegesthatitdeniestoothers.Nopersonshouldsufferanyformofdisabilityordiscriminationbecauseofhisreligionbutallalikeshouldbefreetosharetothefullestdegreeinthecommonlife...SecularismasheredefinedisinaccordancewiththeancientreligioustraditionofIndia.

5TheArchitectureoftheConstitution:BasicFeaturesandInstitutions

BasicFeatures

TheConstitutionissupposedtohaveabasicstructurewhichcannotbealtered.ThiswasspeltoutbythefullbenchoftheSupremeCourtin1973inthemajorityjudgementintheKesavanandaBharaticase.1

InthewordsofD.D.Basu,thejudgementlaiddownthat‘therearecertainbasicfeaturesoftheConstitutionofIndia,whichcannotbealteredinexerciseofthepowertoamendit,underArticle368If,therefore,aConstitutionAmendmentActseekstoalterthebasicstructureorframeworkoftheConstitution,theCourtwouldbeentitledtoannulitonthegroundofultravires,becausetheword“amend”,inArticle368,meansonlychangesotherthanalteringtheverystructureoftheConstitution,whichwouldbetantamounttomakinganewConstitution.’2AccordingtoJusticeS.M.Sikri,thesebasicfeatureswerethesupremacyoftheConstitution,therepublicananddemocraticformofgovernment,thesecularcharacteroftheConstitution,theseparationofpowersbetweenthelegislature,executiveandthejudiciaryandthefederalstructure.Someoftheotherfeatureslistedweretheprinciplesoffreeandfairelections,3theruleoflaw,theobjectivesspecifiedinthePreamble,judicialreview,freedomanddignityoftheindividual,unityandintegrityofthenation,theprincipleofequality,theconceptofsocialandeconomicjustice,thebalancebetweenFundamentalRightsandDirectivePrinciples,theindependenceofjudiciary,andeffectiveaccesstojustice.4

The42ndAmendment(1976)madeduringtheEmergencyunderIndiraGandhideclaredthat‘thereshallbenolimitation’ontheamendingpowersofparliament,andthatnoconstitutionamendmentactcouldbe‘calledinquestioninanycourtonanyground.’ButtheSupremeCourtinMinervaMillsvs.UnionofIndia5reaffirmedtheapplicabilityofthedoctrineofbasicstructurebyholdingthat‘judicialreview’isabasicfeaturewhichcannotbetakenawayevenbyamendingtheConstitution.ThepresentpositionisthattheCourtcandeclareultraviresanyamendmenttotheConstitutionifitbelievesthatitwouldaffectoralteranyofthebasicfeaturesoftheConstitution.‘Thus,substantivelimitationfoundedonthedoctrineof“basicfeatures”hasbeenintroducedintoourConstitutionbyjudicialinnovation.’6

Whiletherehasbeensomedifferenceofopinionamongjudgesaboutthecontentsofthelistofbasicfeatures,thereisconsensusonthedoctrineof‘basicfeatures’or‘basicstructure’,anditcanbeusedtocheckanyattemptstosubverttheConstitutionthroughparliamentarymajorities.

FederalStructureorUnitary

TheIndianConstitutiondoesnotfitintoanyrigiddefinitionoffederalorunitary.ToquoteAustin:7

ThepoliticalstructureoftheIndianConstitutionissounusualthatitisimpossibletodescribeitbriefly.Characterizationssuchas‘quasi-federal’and‘statutorydecentralization’areinteresting,butnotparticularlyilluminating.ThemembersoftheAssemblythemselvesrefusedtoadheretoanytheoryordogmaaboutfederalism.Indiahaduniqueproblems,theybelieved,problemsthathadnot‘confrontedotherfederationsinhistory.’Thesecouldnotbesolvedbyrecoursetotheorybecausefederalismwas‘notadefiniteconcept’andlackeda‘stablemeaning’.Therefore,Assemblymembers,drawingontheexperienceofthegreatfederationsliketheUnitedStates,Canada,Switzerland,andAustralia,pursued‘thepolicyofpickandchoosetosee(what)wouldsuit(them)best,(what)wouldsuitthegeniusofthenationbest...Thisprocessproduced...anewkindoffederalismtomeetIndia’speculiarneeds.’

TheAssemblywasperhapsthefirstconstituentbodytoembracefromthestartwhatA.M.Birchandothershavecalled‘cooperativefederalism’.Itischaracterizedbyincreasinginterdependenceoffederalandregionalgovernmentswithoutdestroyingtheprincipleoffederalism.8(Interestingly,theconceptofco-operativefederalismwasre-introducedintothepoliticalvocabularybyP.Chidambaram,whenhewastheFinanceMinisterintheUnitedFrontgovernmentin1996-8.)ThedecisionoftheConstituentAssemblytohaveafederalconstitutionwithastrongCentrewas

occasionedalsobythecircumstancesinwhichitwastaken.AstrongcentralgovernmentwasnecessaryforhandlingthesituationarisingoutofthecommunalriotsthatprecededandaccompaniedPartition,formeetingthefoodcrisis,forsettlingtherefugees,formaintainingnationalunityandforpromotingsocialandeconomicdevelopment,whichhadbeenthwartedundercolonialrule.However,intheinitialmonthsofitsexistence,beforePartitionbecameanacceptedfact,the

ConstituentAssemblydidnotexpressitselfinfavourofastrongcentralgovernment.TheUnionPowersCommitteeoftheAssembly,headedbyNehru,hadinitsfirstreportprovidedforaveryweakcentralgovernment.ButoncethedecisiononPartitionwastakenandannouncedon3June1947,theConstituentAssemblyconsidereditselffreeoftherestraintsimposedbytheCabinetMissionPlanof1946,andmovedquicklyinthedirectionofafederationwithastrongCentre.DrB.R.Ambedkar,whileintroducingtheDraftConstitution,explainedwhytheterm‘UnionofStates’

waspreferredover‘FederationofStates’:9

TheDraftingCommitteewantedtomakeitclearthatthoughIndiawastobeafederation,thefederationwasnottheresultofanagreementbytheStatestojoininafederationandthatthefederationnotbeingtheresultofanagreement,nostatehastherighttosecedefromit.ThefederationisaUnionbecauseitisindestructible.ThoughthecountryandthepeoplemaybedividedintodifferentStatesforconvenienceofadministration,thecountryisoneintegralwhole,itspeopleasinglepeoplelivingunderasingleimperiumderivedfromasinglesource.

Indianfederalismhascertaindistinctivefeatures.Forexample,unliketheUS,whereapersonisacitizenoftheUS,aswellasofthestateinwhichheorsheresides,inIndiathereisonlyIndiancitizenship.TheConstitutionhasalsotriedtominimizeconflictbetweentheUnionandthestatesbyclearly

specifyinglegislativepowersofeach.Itcontainsthreelistsofsubjects.ThesubjectslistedintheUnionListcanonlybelegislateduponbytheunionparliament,theonesintheStateListonlybythestatelegislatures,andthoseintheConcurrentListcomewithinthepurviewofboth,butincaseofconflictbetweenUnionandstatelegislation,theUnionlawwillprevail.WhileitistruethattheoverwhelmingfinancialpoweroftheUnionandthedependenceofthestates

upontheUnionforgrants-in-aidfordischargingtheirfunctionsplaceslimitsonfederalism,neverthelessitwouldbeanexaggerationtomaintain,assomeanalystsdo,thatfederalismhaswitheredawayintheactualworkingoftheConstitution.Themostconclusiveevidenceofthesurvivalofthefederalsystemperhapsistobefoundinthecoexistenceofstategovernmentswithsharplydivergentideologicalcomplexions:LeftFrontandUnitedFrontgovernmentsinKerala,WestBengalandTripura,DMKand

AIADMKinTamilNadu,TeluguDesaminAndhraPradesh,JanataDalgovernmentsinGujaratandKarnataka,BJPinU.P.,MadhyaPradesh,Rajasthan,GujaratandHimachal,etc.,withaCongressorJanataDalorUnitedFrontorBJPgovernmentattheCentre.Agitationsforformationofnewstatesanddemands,oftensuccessful,formorefinancialpowerstothestates,alsotestifythatthefederalimpulseisalive.TheLeftFrontgovernmentinWestBengalrecentlycreatedhistoryon18June1998byquestioningtherightofBJP-ledgovernmentattheCentretosendafact-findingteamtoassessthestate’slawandordersituation,citingthatlawandorderisaStatesubject.TheCPM-ledgovernmentclearlyfoundthefederalprincipleausefulweaponofdefenceinthefaceofBJP’sattemptatapplyingpoliticalpressureinresponsetoitsally,theTrinamulCongress.ItalsodemonstratesthatconstitutionalargumentsareoftenoccasionedbypoliticalcontestsandnotbyconstitutionalanomaliesandfurtherthatthebalancebetweenthefederalandunitaryfeaturesoftheConstitutionateverypointintimeisafunctionasmuchofthepoliticalbalanceofforcesinthecountryasitisofconstitutionaldevelopments,courtjudgementsandthelike.ItwouldthenperhapsbefairtoconcludewithD.D.Basu,aleadingauthorityontheIndian

Constitution,thatitintroducesasystem‘whichistonormallyworkasafederalsystem,butthereareprovisionstoconvertitintoaunitaryorquasi-federalsystemunderspecifiedexceptionalcircumstances.’10ItisperhapsthisflexibilitywhichisusuallymissinginpurelyfederalconstitutionsthathasenabledtheconstitutionalframeworktoaccommodatethewidevarietyofCentre-staterelationshipsencounteredinthefiftyyearssinceindependence.

InstitutionsofGovernance

ThePresident

TheexecutivepowerisvestedbytheConstitutioninthePresidentofIndiabutinthewordsofAmbedkar,heisaconstitutionalheadwho‘occupiesthesamepositionastheKingundertheEnglishConstitution.HeistheheadoftheStatebutnotoftheExecutive.Herepresentsthenationbutdoesnotrulethenation.’11

TheheadoftheExecutiveisinfacttheprimeministerattheheadoftheCouncilofMinisterswhichisresponsibletoparliament.India’sparliamentaryformofgovernmentbearstheclosestresemblancetotheBritishsystem,withthedifferenceofcoursethatIndiahasnohereditarymonarchybutanelectedPresidentasitssymbolicheadofstate.TheIndianConstitutionthusformallyconfersanenormousrangeofpowersonthePresident,butthese

aretobeexercisedinaccordancewiththeadviceoftheCabinet.ButthePresidentisbynomeansafigureheadandthepoliticalsituationmayprovidemanyoccasionsfor,anactivistPresident.Thistension,betweenhisformalandrealpowershasbeenvisiblefromthetimeofthefirstPresident,DrRajendraPrasad.HavingseriousreservationsabouttheHinduCodeBillhetriedtoargueinSeptember1951thatthePresidenthadagreaterroletoplay.NehrupromptlysoughttheopinionofAlladiKrishnaswamyAyyar,theconstitutionalexpert,inMadrasandM.C.Setalvad,theAttorney-General.FortunatelyforIndiandemocracy,boththeexpertswerecategoricalthatacceptanceofPresidentRajendraPrasad’sargumentswouldupsetthewholeconstitutionalstructureandcouldleadtothePresidentassumingdictatorialpowers.RajendraPrasadwasthuspersuadedtoexerciseamorelimitedroleinkeepingwith

hisownearlierhopeexpressedintheConstituentAssemblydebatesthat‘theconventionunderwhichinEnglandtheKingactsalwaysontheadviceofhisMinisterswillbeestablishedinthiscountryalsoandthePresident...willbecomeaconstitutionalPresidentinallmatters.’12

ThedangerofaPresidentactuallyusinghispowersisleastlikelywhenasinglepartycommandsaclearmajority.Butthepotentialforpresidentialactivismoccursincaseoffracturedelectoralverdictsorsplitsintherulingparty,leadingtounstablecoalitiongovernments.Thefirsttimethishappenedwasin1979whentheJanatagovernmentledbyMorarjiDesaifellbecauseofasplitintherulingparty.ThePresident,NeelamSanjivaReddyusedhisdiscretioninrefusingMorarjiDesai’srequesttoformanewgovernment,askingCharanSinghtoprovehismajoritybyseekingavoteofconfidencebyafixeddateandconsultingotherpartyleadersbeforeacceptingthenewprimeminister,CharanSingh’sadvicetodissolvetheLokSabha.TheunstablesituationcreatedanopportunityforthePresidenttoexercisehisdiscretion.Inrecentyears,theseworriesaboutthePresident’srolehaveintensifiedbecauseofthefactthatthelast

timeanypartysecuredaclearmajorityinthenationalelectionswasin1984-5whenRajivGandhicametopowerafterIndiraGandhi’sassassination.Theelectionsof1989,1991,1996and1998—allcreatedampleopportunitiesandneedforpresidentialintervention.Forexample,inMarch1998,aftertheelectionresultsshowedthatwhentheBJPstakeditsclaimtoformthegovernmentonthegroundthatitwasthesinglelargestpartyandhadenoughsupportfromotherpartiestowintheconfidencevoteintheLokSabha,PresidentNarayananinsistedthatAtalBehariVajpayee,theleaderoftheBJP,furnishproofinwritingthathispartydidindeedenjoythesupportofitsallies.Thisresultedinanembarrassingwaitofafewdaysfortheprospectiveprimeministerbecauseoneofhiscriticalallies,J.JayalalithaoftheAIADMK(whosedesertionfinallyledtothecollapseoftheBJPgovernmentinApril1999)hadmanysecondthoughtsanddrovehardbargainsinwell-advertisedsecretmeetingsbeforefinallyconsentingtosendthecrucialmissiveextendingtheAIADMK’ssupporttotheBJP.ThePresident’srolewascriticalintheentireepisode.Hecouldhaverefusedtowaitendlesslyfortheletterofsupportandinvitedtheleaderofthenextlargestpartyorgroup,thusdenyingtheBJP’sclaimswhichwereinanycasebasedonawafer-thinmajority.Itisevidentthenthatunstableorambiguouspoliticalsituationsprovideroomforexerciseofpresidentialdiscretionandhencepotentialabuseormisuseofpowers.However,eveninotherwisestablesituations,ithashappenedthatpresidentshave,onoccasion,either

becauseofpersonalambitionoroutofasenseofdutytotheConstitution,exerciseddiscretionarypower.ThemostvividexampleisthatofPresidentZailSingh,whowasthefirsttousethePresident’spowertoreturnabilltoparliament.HealsowroteatthesametimetotheprimeministerthathewasnotbeingkeptinformedofimportantdevelopmentsandthiswaspreventinghimfromperforminghisconstitutionaldutyofensuringthatthegovernmentwasbeingruninaccordancewiththeletterandspiritoftheConstitution.Therewasmuchspeculationthathemightactuallydismisstheprimeminister.Laterinthesameyear,1987,whentheBoforsscandalaboutkickbacksindefencepurchasesbroke,itseemsthatZailSinghdidactuallydiscusswithpoliticalleadersofmanyhuesthepossibilityofdismissingRajivGandhiasprimeminister.Intheend,noneofitensued,butitisclearthatthepotentialforthePresidentsteppingoutsidetheconventionallimitsofhispowersexistsevenwhenaprimeministerenjoysmajoritysupportinparliament.ItistoberememberedthattheCongressunderRajivGandhihadthelargestmajorityeverintheLokSabha.

AnotherareaofdebaterelatestothePresident’sroleinthedismissalofstategovernmentsandimpositionofPresident’sRule.Recently,inFebruary1998,inthemidstoftheLokSabhaelections,theGovernorofU.P.,RomeshBhandari,dismissedtheBJP-ledgovernmentofKalyanSinghandsworeinanothermanaschiefminister.TheHighCourtreinstatedKalyanSinghandthegovernorsentareporttotheCentrerecommendingdissolutionoftheAssemblyandimpositionofPresident’sRule.TheCabinet,afterlongdeliberation,acceptedthegovernor’sreportandPrimeMinisterI.K.GujralrecommendedittothePresident.ButPresidentNarayananreturneditforreconsiderationtotheCabinet,inaclearexpressionofdisagreement.TheGovernorofU.P.accordinglyresignedandKalyanSinghcontinuedaschiefministerofU.P.withhisragbagcoalitionofdefectors,criminals,andothers.PresidentNarayananclearlyhadtoexerciseadifficultchoicehere.Therewereclaimsandcounter-

claimsabouttheextentofsupportenjoyedbytheKalyanSinghministry,thereweredefectionsandreturn-defectionsandallegationsofmonetaryandotherinducements.Nonetheless,thePresidentdecidedthatsincetheU.P.ministryhaddemonstrateditsmajoritysupport,howeverunfairlyacquired,ontheflooroftheHouse,hehadnorighttodismissit.Hiscriticsarguethatdemonstrationofmajoritysupportisnottheonlycriteriaonwhichtodecidewhethertheconstitutionalmachineryinastatehasbrokendownandsupportachievedthroughintimidationorinducementcanbequestioned.Itistobenotedthatthe44thAmendmenthasgivenhimtheauthoritytoaskthecouncilofministersto

reconsideritsadvice,butifthecouncilreiteratesitsposition,thePresidentmustaccepttheadvice.But,asseeninthecaseofPresidentNarayananandtheU.P.issue,thePresident’ssendingbacktheadviceforreconsiderationistakenveryseriouslyandisunlikelytobeignored.Inotherareas,thepowersofthePresidentarequiteclearlydefined.Whenabillispresentedtohim,

underarticle111,hemaywithholdhisassentand,ifhedesires,returnittoparliamentforreconsideration.IfbothHousesagainpassitandsenditbacktohim,heisobligedtogivehisassent.Inthecaseofmoneybills,however,hehasnodiscretion.Inanycase,hehasnoabsolutepowerofveto.The44thAmendmentin1978alsomadeitexplicitthatthePresidentcandeclareanEmergencyonly

afterreceivinginwritingthedecisionoftheCabinetadvisinghimtomaketheproclamation.DuringtheperiodofEmergencyaswell,heistoactontheadviceoftheCabinet.Itisveryclearthatalmostallhispowers,includingthoseofappointingvarioushighfunctionariessuchasjudgesofthehighercourts,governors,ambassadors,theAttorney-General,theComptrollerandAuditor-GeneralofIndia,etc.,aretobeexercisedontheadviceoftheCabinet.ThesameistrueofhispowersasSupremeCommanderofthearmedforces,andofhispowerstoissueordinanceswhenparliamentisnotinsession.ThePresidentiselectedforfiveyears,iseligibleforre-election,andcanberemovedthrough

impeachmentforviolationoftheConstitution.Heiselectedbyelectedmembersofbothhousesofparliamentandofstatelegislativeassembliesbyamethodofproportionalrepresentationthroughsingletransferablevote.EachMPorMLAhasasingletransferablevote,withavaluecorrespondingtothepopulationrepresentedbyhim.

Vice-President

IfthePresidentdiesinoffice,orisunabletoperformhisdutiesbecauseofabsence,illnessoranyothercause,orisremovedorresigns,theVice-PresidentisenjoineduponbyArticle65toactasthePresident.ThishashappenedontwooccasionswhenPresidents—DrZakirHussainandFakhruddinAliAhmed—

diedinofficeandVice-PresidentsV.V.GiriandB.D.Jattihadtostepin.Forthisreason,thechoiceofVice-Presidenthastobemadewithgreatcare.Innormaltimes,themainfunctionoftheVice-President,whoiselectedforfiveyearsbybothhousesofparliament,butisnotamemberofanylegislature,istoactasthechairpersonoftheRajyaSabha.

TheCouncilofMinistersandthePrimeMinister

TherealexecutivepowervestsundertheConstitutioninthecouncilofministersheadedbytheprimeminister.ThePresidentappointsasprimeministertheleaderofthepartythathasamajorityintheLokSabhaor,ifnopartyhasaclearmajority,apersonwhohastheconfidenceofthemajorityofthemembersoftheLokSabha.OtherministersareselectedbytheprimeministerandappointedbythePresident.Ministersmaybeappointedwithoutbeingmembersofparliament,buttheymustbecomemembersofanyonehouseeitherbyelectionornominationwithinsixmonths.ThecouncilofministersiscollectivelyresponsibletotheLokSabhaandhastoresignassoonasitlosestheconfidenceoftheLokSabha.Theprimeministeris,inNehru’swords,the‘linchpinofGovernment’13

AlmostallthepowersformallyvestedinthePresidentareinfactexercisedbytheprimeminister,whoisthelinkbetweenthePresident,theCabinet,andtheparliament.ThepositionoftheprimeministerinIndiahasacquireditspre-eminenceatleastpartlyfromthefactthatthefirstprimeminister,JawaharlalNehru,whoretainedhisofficeforalmostseventeenyears,hadsuchenormousprestigeandinfluencethatsomeofitrubbedoffontotheofficeitself.IndiraGandhiwasalsosopowerfulafterherelectionvictoryandtheBangladeshwarin1971thattheprimeminister’spositionwithinthepoliticalsystemacquiredenormousweight.Theprimeministerhasfullpowerstochooseministersaswellasrecommendtheirdismissal.Thisgivestheprimeministerenormouspowersofpatronage.TheConstitutiondoesnotmentiondifferentcategoriesofministerssuchascabinetministers,ministers

ofstateanddeputyministers,exceptinarticle352wherethecabinetisdefinedasthecouncilconsistingofministersofcabinetrank.Ineffect,however,thecabinetrankministerswhomeetregularlyincabinetmeetingschairedbytheprimeminister,arethemostimportantasallimportantdecisionsaretakenincabinetmeetings.TheConstitutiondoesnotallowthepossibilityofbreakdownofconstitutionalmachineryanddirect

PresidentialruleattheCentreasitdoesinthestates.Theremustalwaysbeacouncilofministers.Evenwhenavoteofno-confidenceispassedandthecouncilofministersresigns,theyareaskedbythePresidenttocontinuetillthenewoneisinplace.AnewconstitutionalcontroversyarosewiththerefusaloftheBJP-ledgovernment,whichwasvoted

outofofficeon17April1999,toactinthespiritofacaretakerashasbeentheconvention.Despiteprotestsbyoppositionparties,thegovernmentrejectedanynotionofcaretakerstatuswiththeargumentthatthereisnosuchprovisionintheConstitution.Howeveritisarguablethatthisstanceignoreswell-establishedpracticeandisself-serving.TheChiefElectionCommissioner’sadvicetothegovernmentthatitshouldactkeepinginmindthatthecountryisalreadyinelectionmodeeventhoughthestatutoryperiodofrestrainthasnotyetbegunalsofellondeafyears.(ThoughtheLokSabhawasdissolvedinApril1999,freshelectionsweredelayedtillSeptemberandOctoberduetothemonsoonandrevisionofelectoralrolls.)Thegovernmentatonestroketransferredeightsecretary-level(thehighestrankinthebureaucracy)officials,includingtheHomeSecretary,whoisresponsibleforlawandorder,on3May

1999,aftertheLokSabhahadbeendissolved.This,despitethefactthatoneofthemostimportantconventionsevolvedforensuringfairelectionsisthatofficialsarenottransferredonceelectionsareannounced.Sadly,theletteroftheConstitutionisbeingusedtodefyconstitutionalpractice.

TheParliament

TheIndianparliamenthastwohouses—theupperhousebeingcalledtheRajyaSabhaortheCouncilofStatesandthelowerhousetheLokSabhaortheHouseofthePeople.TheRajyaSabhahas250members,ofwhom238areelectedbyelectedmembersofthestatelegislativeassembliesorVidhanSabhasviaasystemofproportionalrepresentationbymeansofsingletransferablevote,whileanother12arenominatedbythePresident,ontheadviceofthegovernment,torepresentdifferentfieldssuchaseducation,socialwork,media,sports,etc.Everytwoyears,one-thirdofthemembersoftheRajyaSabharetire;butindividualmembers’termsareforsixyears,sothattheRajyaSabhaisapermanentbody.TheVice-PresidentofIndiaisthechairpersonandadeputychairpersoniselectedbyRajyaSabhamembersfromamongstthemselves.TheLokSabhaisdirectlyelectedbythepeopleforfiveyears.Itmaybedissolvedbeforeitstermis

over.IncaseanEmergencyisinforce,theLokSabhacanextenditstermforoneyearatatimebutnotbeyondsixmonthsaftertheEmergencyhasended.Inpractice,onlyoncehastheLokSabha’stermbeenextendedforayearin1976whenPrimeMinisterIndiraGandhihaddeclaredtheEmergency.AllIndiancitizens,eighteenorabove,areeligibletovote.Thewinningcandidateistheonethatisfirst

pastthepost,thatis,theonewhogetsthemaximumnumberofvotes.Thereisnorulethatthewinnermustgetatleast50percentofthevotes,asisthepracticeinmanyothercountries,thoughmanythoughtfulobservershavebeenurgingthatthissystemisadoptedtoensuretherepresentativenatureofthecandidateelectedandencouragecandidatestolookbeyondvote-bankstowidersectionsofvoters.Thereisnoproportionalrepresentation.Constituenciesareterritorialandsingle-member,anddividedamongstatesroughlyinproportiontothe

population.AcertainnumberarereservedforScheduledTribesandCastesinproportiontotheirpopulationinthatparticularstate.Thismeansthatif,say,inAndhraPradesh,40percentofthepopulationisScheduledCastesand10percentScheduledTribes,thenin40percentofLokSabhaseatsinAndhraPradeshonlyScheduledCastecandidatescancontestandinanother10percentonlyScheduledTribecandidatescancontest.Allthevotersresidinginthatconstituencywouldelectthesecandidates—therearenoseparateelectoratesastherewerebeforeindependence.Inrecentyears,pressurehasbuiltupforreservationofone-thirdofconstituenciesforwomenandabill

onthoselineswasalsointroducedinparliamentin1998,butitremainscaughtupinthewebofclaimsandcounter-claimsofcasteandreligiousgroupswhoaredemandingreservationwithinreservation,onthegroundthatelseonlyupper-caste,elite,Hinduwomenwillcornertheseatsreservedforwomen.Whateverthefinaloutcome,thecontroversyhasdemonstratedclearlytheself-propellingdynamicoftheprincipleofreservation.Howeverdesirabletheobjective,oncetheprincipleisaccepted,itisvirtuallyimpossibletoprevent

furtherclaimstothesamebenefitsbyothergroups.Thepracticeofreservationhasalsoshownthatitisalmostimpossibletoreverse.TheConstitutionhadenvisagedreservationsasashort-termmeasurelastingtenyears;nogovernmenthaseverseriouslyconsiderednotextendingthemeverytenyears,anditisnow

nearlyfiftyyears!Onthecontrary,demandsforandacceptanceofreservationhaveonlyincreased.Eventhequestion—whetherreservation,whichperseperpetuatescertaingroupidentities,canbecomeabarriertotheconceptofcitizenshipasembodiedintheConstitution—isdifficulttoaskintheprevailingpoliticalclimate.Disadvantagedgroups,andcertainlytheirleaders,areeasilyconvincedthatreservationisthepanaceaforallills,perhapsbecauseitenablesrapidupwardmobilityforsomevisibleandvocalsectionsofthegroupsorbecauseabirdinhandisconsideredtobebetterthantheinvisibleoneinthebushofthefuture.ThemaximumnumberofseatsintheLokSabhais552.Ofthese,550representterritorial

constituencies,andtwogotonominatedmembersfromtheAnglo-Indiancommunity.Membersmustbeatleasttwenty-fiveyearsofage.TheLokSabhaischairedbythespeaker,andinhisabsencebythedeputyspeaker,bothofwhomareelectedbymembersfromamongstthemselves.Byconvention,thespeaker’spostgoestothemajoritypartyandthedeputyspeaker’stotheOpposition.Butagain,inrecentdays,fracturedverdicts,unstablecoalitions,claimsofrivalgroupswithinandoutsidethegovernment,haveupsetestablishedconventions.Therewerefairlywell-establishedconventionsthattheelectionofthespeakeranddeputyspeakerwouldbekeptfreeofcontesttoassuretheirnon-partisanimageandthespeakershouldbeapersonofconsiderableabilityandinfluencecapableofassertinghisauthorityintheHouse.Butin1998,theBJP-ledgovernmentfirstbackedoutofapromisetosupportaCongressnominee,P.A.Sangma,asaconsensuscandidateandthenhadelectedanunknownface,Balayogi,topleaseitsalliancepartner,theTeluguDesamparty.Thisisunfortunate,fortheConstitutionhasentrustedgreatresponsibilitytothespeaker:withinandinallmattersrelatingtotheLokSabha,thespeaker’swordisfinal.Theparliamenthasextensivelegislativepowersandbillsmaybeintroducedinanyhouse.Tobecome

law,billsmustbepassedbybothhouses,andthenreceivepresidentialassent.ThePresidentmay,however,sendthebillsbacktoparliamentorthegovernmentforreconsideration.Iftheyarepassedagain,thePresidentcannotwithholdassent.Money-bills,however,mustbeintroducedfirstintheLokSabha,andonthePresident’srecommendation.TheygototheRajyaSabha,andifnotreturnedwithsuggestionsinfourteendays,aretakenaspassed.RecommendationsoftheRajyaSabhamayormaynotbeacceptedbytheLokSabhainthecaseofmoney-bills.TheConstitutionthusclearlyenvisagedparliamentasaninstitutionwithgreatdignityandaccorded

privilegestoitsmemberscommensuratewiththatposition.Unfortunately,inrecentyears,theconductofsomemembersandpartieswhohavedisturbedeventhePresident’saddress,indulgedinunnecessarywalkouts,shouting,evenphysicalscuffles,hasloweredthedignityoftheparliamentanddelayednecessarylegislativebusiness.Thishasledtoapopulardisgustwithmembersofparliamentandacommonfeelingthatparliamentisjustabigwasteoftaxpayers’money.

TheGovernmentintheStatesandUnionTerritories

TheConstitutionlaysdownthatthesystemofgovernmentatthestatelevelshallalsobebasedontheparliamentarymodelwiththechiefministerandhiscouncilofministersexercisingeffectiveexecutivepowerwhilebeingresponsibletothestatelegislature.ThegovernorismeanttobeaconstitutionalheadlikethePresidentbutwiththeveryimportantdifferencethatiftheconstitutionalmachinerybreaksdownandPresident’sRuleunderArticle356isimposed,thenthegovernorasthePresident’srepresentative

becomestheeffectiveexecutiveandrunsthestatewiththehelpofadvisersappointedbytheUnionGovernment.TheexpectationatthetimeoftheframingoftheConstitutionwasthatgovernorswouldbe‘peoplefrom

outside—eminentpeople,sometimespeoplewhohavenottakentoogreatapartinpolitics...aneminenteducationistorapersoneminentinotherwalksoflife.’14Butthishopehasbeenlargelybelied.Governorshaveovertheyearstendedmoreandmoretobeactivepoliticiansmanyofwhomhavereturnedtofulltimepolitics(iftheyatallgaveitupasgovernors!)oncetheirtermsareover.TheyhavetendedtocarryoutthedirectivesofthepartyinpowerinNewDelhiortheonethatappointedthemandhavesometimesevenbecomeactiveconspiratorsinmurkyprovincialtopplinggames.Allpartiesareguiltyofhavingfurtheredthistrendofappointingpliantgovernors.Theconventionofconsultingstatechiefministersbeforeappointinggovernorshasalsolapsedthoughdemandsforitsrevivalaregrowing.Therearenumerousexamplesofmisuseofgovernors’discretionarypowersbutthemostnotorious

onesarethefollowing.On2July1984,FarooqAbdullah,thechiefministerofJammuandKashmir,askedthegovernor,Jagmohan,toimmediatelycallasessionofthelegislativeassembly.Hewantedtotesthismajorityonthefloorofthehouseastwelvemembershaddesertedhisparty.Thegovernor,however,dismissedhisministryfromofficeandinstalledanewman,G.M.Shah,aschiefminister.Abdullahcampaignedagainsthisdismissalalloverthecountry.Theincidentwasalsocitedasproofofthecentralgovernment’sinfringementoftheautonomyofthestateandwasthusahandytoolforstokingsecessionistfires.Inasimilarfashion,inAndhraPradesh,thegovernor,RamLal,insteadofsummoningtheAssemblyas

desiredbythechiefminister,N.T.RamaRao(whoseTeluguDesamPartyhadsufferedasplit),sothathecouldtesthismajorityontheflooroftheHouse,dismissedthechiefministeron16August1984.N.T.RamaRaohadaskedforonlytwodaystoprovehismajority,hissuccessorwasgiventhirtydaysbythegovernorbutstillcouldnotmusterthestrength.IndiraGandhimadeapublicstatementthatshehadnopriorknowledgeofgovernorRamLal’saction,gothimtoresign,sentShankarDayalSharmaasthegovernor,andN.T.RamaRaowasagaininvitedtoformthegovernment.Inthisprocess,however,thedignityofthegovernor’sofficesufferedasevereblow.Allstateshavelegislativeassemblies,whichconsistofnotmorethan500andnotlessthan60

members.Afewstatesalsohavesecondchambersorlegislativecouncils.StateshaveexclusiverighttolegislateonitemsintheStatelist.TheycanalsolegislateonitemsintheConcurrentListbutifthereisalawpassedbytheUnionparliamentwhichisdifferentfromthatpassedbythestatelegislature,thentheUnionlawstands.TherearealsosevenareasknownasUnionTerritories,whicharedirectlyadministeredbyLieutenant-

GovernorsappointedbythePresident.Theseterritoriescanalsohavealegislatureandacouncilofministers,asinthecaseofDelhiandPondicherrybuttheirpowersaremorerestrictedthanthatoftheircounterpartsinthestates.

LocalGovernment

TheConstitutiondidnotcontainprovisionsfortheexactformthatlocalgovernmentinstitutionsweretotake,buttheDirectivePrinciplesspecificallylaiddownthatthestatesshouldtakestepstoorganizevillagepanchayatsandendowthemtofunctionasunitsofself-government(Article40).Thiswasto

allowthestatestheflexibilitytodeviseformsmostsuitedtotheirneeds.Besides,thelegacyofthefreedomstruggle,andespeciallyofGandhijihimself,whohadmadepanchayatsapartofhispoliticalprogrammesincetheNon-cooperationMovementof1920-22,madeitimperativethatlocalself-governingbodiesbesetup.However,notmuchprogresswasmadeintheearlyfifties.Centralgovernmenthadconcentratedits

effortsforlocaldevelopmentontheCommunityDevelopmentprogramme,whichtookablockofabout100villagesasaunitforpromotingdevelopmentalactivitieswiththehelpofvillagelevelworkers,socialworkers,agriculturalexperts,newly-appointeddevelopmentofficials,etc.Veryhighhopeshadbeenpinnedonthesuccessofthiseffort,andwhenitbecameapparentthatitwasnotmakingmuchheadway,ahigh-levelcommitteechairedbyBalwantraiMehta,aveteranGandhian,wasaskedin1956tomakerecommendationsforitsimprovement.TheMehtaCommitteediagnosedthelackofdemocraticlocalbodieswithrealpowersasthemajorcauseofthefailureofCommunityDevelopmentprogram.TheremedysuggestedwasthesettingupofPanchayatiRaj(PR)byinstitutingthreelevelsofrepresentativebodies.Thegrampanchayatatthevillagelevelwastobedirectlyelectedbyalladultresidentsofthevillage,andthepanchayatsamitiattheblocklevelandzillaparishadatthedistrictlevelweretoconsistofmembersindirectlyelectedfromthetierbelowaswellascooperativemovementofficials,parliamentariansandothersco-optedtothebody.Between1959and1962,stategovernmentsinallpartsofthecountryintroducedPanchayatiRaj

legislation.Overtheyears,however,thefunctioningofPanchayatiRajwasnotuptoexpectations,forvariousreasons.Stategovernments,whosedutyitwas,didnotoftenholdlocalelectionsontime,sometimesformanyyearsatatime,iftheyfearedanunfavourableresult.Panchayatsdidnothaveenoughresourcestobeinnovativeandindependent.Localbigwigsdominatedpanchayatsandcorneredbenefits.Anumberofcommitteesmadeextensivestudiesandgavevaluablesuggestions—theAsokaMehtaCommittee,1978,theG.V.K.RaoCommittee,1985,andtheL.M.SinghviCommittee,1986.AnewinitiativewastakenundertheleadershipofRajivGandhiin1988,whenacommitteeheadedby

P.K.ThungonrecommendedthatPanchayatiRajbodiesshouldbeconstitutionallyrecognizedandtheConstitutionshouldhaveaprovisiontoensuretimelyandregularelectiontothesebodiesandtheirtermshouldbefiveyears.In1989,theConstitution64thAmendmentBillwasintroducedinparliament.TheCongressdidnot,unfortunately,haveamajorityintheRajyaSabha,andoppositionparties,suspiciousofCongressintentionsthatthiswasanewdeviceforcurbingthepowersofthestates,blockeditspassageandpreventedagoodmeasurefrombecominglaw.ThattherewasnoprincipledobjectioninmindbecameclearwhentheNationalFrontgovernmentofV.P.Singhintroducedthesamebillwithminorchangeswithinayearoftheoldonebeingblocked.Historyhasitsironies:V.P.Singh’sgovernmentcollapsedbeforethebillscouldbepassedanditfelltotheCongress’slottoFinallyseethroughtheConstitution73rdand74thAmendmentBillsin1993.The73rdAmendmentprovidesforanelaboratesystemofestablishingpanchayatsasunitsofself-

government.ForthefirsttimeintheconstitutionalhistoryofIndia,theconstitutionofpanchayats,thedurationoftheirterm,theirmembership,theconstitutionofaFinanceCommissiontoreviewtheirfinancialpositionisdetailed.ItalsoaddsanewScheduletotheConstitution,theEleventhSchedule,whichlists29subjects,whicharetobehandledbythepanchayats.WiththisAmendment,PanchayatiRajinstitutionsareasmuchapartofthestructureofconstitutionalgovernmentinIndiaastheLokSabha.

TheJudiciary

Articles124-147and214-237oftheConstitutionlaydowntheentireframeworkofthesystemofjusticeinIndia.ThejudiciarywastobetheupholderoftheConstitution,afterall,andnodetailwastoosmallforensuringitsindependenceandeffectivity.Themethodofappointment,theyearsofservice,qualifyingconditions,powersofeachcourt,sizeofthebench,payandperquisites,andmuchmore,allwasspecifiedintheConstitution.TheIndianjudicialsystemconsistsofasinglehierarchyofcourtswiththeSupremeCourtatitsapex.

BeforetheSupremeCourtcameintobeinginJanuary1950,IndiahadaFederalCourtandfurtherappealslaywiththeJudicialCommitteeofthePrivyCouncilinBritain.ThejurisdictionofthePrivyCouncilwasabolishedinOctober1949andtheFederalCourtwasreplacedbytheSupremeCourtofIndiainJanuary1950.TheSupremeCourtconsistsofachiefjusticeandtwenty-fiveotherjudges(sevenin1950,gradually

increasedby1986totwenty-five)appointedbythePresidentafterconsultationwithsuchofthejudgesoftheSupremeCourtandtheHighCourtsasmaybethoughtnecessary.Theyholdofficetilltheageofsixty-five.Inthecaseofappointmentofjudgesotherthanthechiefjustice,thechiefjusticeshallalwaysbeconsulted(Article124).Byconvention,thechiefjusticeisalwaystheseniormostjudgeoftheSupremeCourt.In1973andagainin1976,thisconventionwasfloutedbyIndiraGandhiwhentheseniormostjudges(threein1973andonein1976)weresuperseded.Thisactionwasroundlycondemnedasanattackontheindependenceofthejudiciaryandnogovernmentsincehasdaredtorepeattheact.TheonlywayaSupremeCourtjudgecanberemovedfromofficeisifeachHouseofParliament

supportedbyamajorityoftheHouseaswellastwo-thirdsofthosepresentandvotingpassaresolutioninthesamesessionandpresentanaddresstothePresidentaskingforremovalonthegroundofprovenmisbehaviourorincapacity[Article124(4)1.Tofurtherensuretheindependenceofjudges,thereisabarontheirpleadingbeforeanycourtorauthorityinIndiaafterretirement[Article124(7)].TheSupremeCourthasoriginaljurisdictionincaseofappealsorwritsrelatingtoenforcementof

FundamentalRights,thatis,apersoncanstraightawayappealtotheSupremeCourtwithoutgoingthroughthenormallayersofthejudicialhierarchy[Article32].TheSupremeCourthasoriginaljurisdictionalsoinalldisputesbetweentheUnionandstatesaswellasbetweenstates.Itcantransfercasesfromlowercourtstoitself.Ithasappellatejurisdictioninconstitutional,civilandcriminalcases.Ithasalsosanctionedthepracticeofpublicinterestlitigationwhereinapersonoranorganizationcanappeal,tothehighestcourt,evenbymeansofanordinarypostcard,onanissuethatdoesnotaffecthimorherdirectlybutaboutwhichthereisreasonforconcernasacitizen.Amorerecenttrendisof‘judicialactivism’bywhichismeantjudgesinterveningtoforceexecutiveauthoritiestoperformtheirdutiessuchascollectinggarbage,placingcontrolsonvehicularpollution,etc.Whiletherehasbeensome,evenjustifiedcriticismofthistrend,itmustbeadmittedthatthejudiciarywasseenasthelastrefugebyafrustratedpublicunabletomakeitsvoiceheardinotherways.ThejudiciarywaseffectivepreciselybecauseofthepowergiventoitbytheConstitutionthatallauthoritiesmustimplementitsdecisionsandorders.TheSupremeCourthasplayedamajorroleininterpretingtheConstitution,especiallywithregardto

thechangingrelationshipbetweenFundamentalRightsandDirectivePrinciples,asdiscussedabove.WhileitislimitedinitspowersincomparisontotheUSSupremeCourtwhenitcomestodeclaringanylawunconstitutional,sinceitdoesnothavetheclauseof‘dueprocessoflaw’orstandardsofnatural

justice,ithasmadeupbyevolvingthedoctrineof‘BasicFeatures’,onthebasisofwhichevenanamendmenttotheConstitutioncanbedeclaredinvalidifitisdestructiveofthe‘BasicFeatures’oftheConstitution.ItseemsthatAlladiKrishnaswamiAyyar,aleadingmemberoftheDraftingCommitteeoftheIndianConstitution,wasrightinhispredictionthat:15

thefutureevolutionoftheIndianConstitutionwillthusdependtoalargeextentupontheSupremeCourtandthedirectiongiventoitbythatCourt.WhileitsfunctionmaybeoneofinterpretingtheConstitution,itcannot...ignorethesocial,economicandpoliticaltendenciesofthetimes...Oncertainoccasionsitmayappeartostrengthentheunionattheexpenseoftheunitsandatanothertimeitmayappeartochampionthecauseofprovincialautonomyandregionalism.Ononeoccasionitmayappeartofavourindividuallibertyasagainstsocialorstatecontrolandanothertime,itmayappeartofavoursocialorstatecontrol.Itisthegreattribunalwhichhastodrawthelinebetweenlibertyandsocialcontrol.

TheHighCourtsinthestateshavepowersoverallthesubordinatecourtsintheirjurisdiction.TheirpowerstoissuewritsorordersiswiderthanthatoftheSupremeCourtasitisnotrestrictedtocasesofviolationofFundamentalRights.TheHighCourtshavechiefjusticesattheirheadandotherjudgesasrequired.TheirmodeofappointmentissimilartothatofSupremeCourtjudges.JustasthelawdeclaredbytheSupremeCourtisbindingonallcourtsinIndia,alawdeclaredbyaHighCourtisbindingonallcourtsofthatstate.ThesubordinatecourtsineachstatearedirectlyunderthecontroloftheHighCourt.Districtjudgesare

appointedbythegovernorinconsultationwiththeHighCourt.Thelowerjudiciaryisrecruitedviaexaminationsfromamongthosewhohaveatleastthreeyears’experienceattheBar.Sadly,corruptionisquitecommonatthelowerlevels,buthappilystillnotcommon,thoughnotunknown,attheHighCourtlevel,andrare,ifnotabsent,intheSupremeCourt.Amajorproblemistheenormousbacklogofcasesanditcanoftentaketenoreventwentyyearsforacasetobedecided.Litigationisexpensiveandtime-consuming;asaresultcommonpeoplehesitatetotakerecoursetothecourts.Thejudiciaryisalsohemmedinbyaplethoraofoutdatedlawssomemorethanahundredyearsold.ThereisanurgentneedforjudicialreformbutthoughsubsequentchiefjusticesoftheSupremeCourthavepromisedreform,yetnotmuchhasactuallymovedontheground.

TheAdministrativeServices

Atindependence,Indiainheritedaspartofthecoloniallegacy,anadministrativestructurethathadbeenthemajorinstrumentofcolonialpowerandperhapsthechiefinstrumentofco-optionofnatives,fromthebrilliantscionsofprincelyandzamindarifamilieswhojoinedtheIndianCivilServiceICStotheMatricFailsonofthepoorBrahminpriestwhowashappytobecomeapeon.Britishrulewasbureaucraticrule,andthatwaswhatwasmostwrongwithit.ThechiefculpritswerethemembersoftheICS,asmallelitegroupofoverpaid,insensitive,mostlyBritishmen—sothenationalistargumenthadrunadnauseumbeforeindependence.ThenwhyweretheICSgivenconstitutionalguaranteesandtheadministrativestructureleftlargelyuntouchedafterindependence?Themajorreasonliesinthecircumstancesthatattendedindependence;Partition,transfersofpopulationunprecedentedinknownhistory,integrationofsome300princelystates,warinKashmir,theassassinationofGandhiji.Theoneislandofstability,ofpredictability,appearedtobetheadministrativestructure.MostoftheBritishmembersoftheICShadleft,thefewthatremainedwerepro-India.TheIndianmembersoftheICS,veryfewinnumber,madeitclearthattheyweremorethanwillingtohitchtheirwagonstothenewregime,someoutofnationalism,othersasgoodbureaucratswhosedharmaistocarryouttheordersoftheirsuperiors.Perhapsnational

leadershadnoreplytotheentreatyofSirUmaShankerBajpai,anoutstandingICSofficer,whosaidwithirrefutablelogic:‘IfIcouldservesowellaforeignpower,howmuchbetterwill1servemyowncountrymen?’TheICSwasthereforereplacedbytheIASorIndianAdministrativeServiceandthepre-independencestructureofall-Indiaservices,provincialorstateservicesandcentralorUniongovernmentserviceswasretained.TheConstitutionin‘PartXIV:ServicesundertheUnionandtheStates’whilelayingdownthatUnion

andStatelegislationwoulddetailtherulesforrecruitmentandconditionsofserviceforUnionandStateservicesrespectively,simultaneouslyprovidedconstitutionalguaranteesagainstarbitrarydismissal.TheConstitution(Article315)alsoensuresfairnessinrecruitmentbyprovidingforindependentpublicservicecommissions(fortheUnionandforeachstate).ThemembersofthecommissionsareappointedforatermofsixyearsbythePresidentorthegovernorandatleasthalfmustbecivilservantswithatleasttenyearsservice.Thecommissionsareentrustedwiththetaskofconductingexaminationsforrecruitmenttotheservicesandhavetobeconsultedonallmattersrelatingtothemethodofrecruitment,appointment,promotion,andtransferofaswellasdisciplinaryactionagainstcivilservants.TheConstitutionmentionsonlytwoall-Indiaservicesthatwereinexistenceatthattime:theIASand

theIndianPoliceService(IPS),butitprovidedformorebygivingthepowertotheRajyaSabhatoresolvebyatwo-thirdsmajoritytoestablishnewall-Indiaservices.TheIndianForestServiceandtheIndianEngineeringServicearetwoservicessetupunderthisconstitutionalprovision.Theall-Indiaserviceshavebeenasignificantforcefornationalintegration,fortypicallyhalfthecadreofeachstatemustcomefromoutsideit.Further,eachofficerspendsthefirstfewyearsatthedistrictorsub-districtlevel,thensomeatthestatelevel,followedbyastintattheCentre,thenusuallybacktothestateandsoon,thusacquiringfamiliaritywithalllevelsofadministrationandintimateknowledgeoftheworkculture,strengthsandweaknessesofeach.Thecentralservicesalsoperformaunifyingroleinthattheirrecruitmentbaseisthecountryasawhole.OfficersoftheAuditandAccountsService,orRailwayorCustomscanbeandarepostedindifferentpartsofthecountryeventhoughtheywillworkincentralgovernmentofficesandnotinstategovernmentofficesasinthecaseofIASorIPS.Provincialorstateserviceofficersarepostedwithinthestate,unlesstheyareondeputationorgetpromotedviainternalexaminations.Theconstitutionalsafeguardswereintendedtoencourageindependenceandintegrityinthe

bureaucracy.Nodoubtthishasensued,thereareanynumberofuprightcivilservantswhohavebeenabletoresistunwelcomepoliticalpressuresbecauseofthesecurityprovidedbyconstitutionalguaranteesofsecurityoftenure.Buttotalsecurityhastosomeextentalsoencouragedsloth,lackofinitiativeandevencorruption.Itissodifficulttodismissacivilservantthatevengrosscasesofcorruptionareignoredbecausetheresultsarenotlikelytobecommensuratewiththeeffort.Politiciansarealsomuchtoblame,astheyoftenencourageorevenpressurizeofficialstoperform

favoursforthemselvesandtheirassociatesinreturnformonetaryorotherrewards.TheperiodduringtheEmergency1975-77,followedbytheJanataGovernment1977-79,wasprobablythewatershedinthehistoryoftheIndianbureaucracy.MrsGandhihadpushedthenotionofa‘committed’bureaucracy,albeitwiththeprovisothatthecommitmentexpectedwastotheDirectivePrinciples.Inpractice,especiallywiththeascendancyofSanjayGandhi,thistendedtodegenerateintocommitmenttoaperson.Thosewhoshowed‘commitment’wererewardedandthosewhodidnotwerepunished.WithJanatacomingto

powerin1977,thependulumswungallthewayback.‘Victims’oftheEmergencywererewardedwithhighpostsand‘committed’officerssentintothewildernesstocooltheirheels.Subsequentregimesatthenationallevelhavemercifullynotindulgedinsuchvisible,largescale,playingoffavouritesthoughtheslowprocessoftheincreasingpolitician-officialnexuscontinuesapacewithcaste-basedpartiessuchastheBahujanSamajParty(BSP)orLalooPrasadYadav’sJanataDaladdinganewdimensionbyfavouringofficialsbelongingtothecastesonwhichtheirelectoralbaserests.Atthenationallevel,theBJP’saction,afterithadlostthevoteofconfidenceinApril1999,ofwholesaletransfersofseniorofficials,obviouslywithaneyetotheimpendingelections,isadisturbingtrend.

ConclusionIndiawoulddoasshehaddoneforcenturies:takewhatshedesiredfromotherculturesandbendittoherneeds.

—GranvilleAustin16

TheframersoftheIndianConstitutionhadborrowedfreelyandunabashedlyfromotherConstitutions,confidentthatthesoilhadbeenpreparedsufficientlyforexoticplantsandthemorehomegrownonestotakeroot.ThewisdomoftheUSConstitutionanditsSupremeCourt,theinnovationsoftheIrishConstitution,thetime-testedconventionsoftheBritishParliament,theadministrativeminutaeoftheGovernmentofIndiaAct1935,andmuchelse,especiallytheessenceoftheirownpeople’sstruggleforfreedom—allwentintothedesignandcontentoftheIndianConstitution.ThereweremanyscepticswhowonderedwhetherIndiacouldactuallydeliveronthefreedomsshepromised.Inretrospect,itmaybesaidthattheIndianConstitutionhasnotdisappointeditsarchitects,thoughit

mayhaveletdownthesceptics.Firstandforemost,theinstitutionscreatedbyitforfashioningademocraticstructurehavesurvivedandevolvedtomeetthechangingneeds.Despitestressesandstrains,perhapsinevitableinasituationofrapidtransition,thebasicframeworkofresponsiblegovernment,withthenecessarybalancebetweenelectedlegislatures,functionalexecutives,andvigilantjudiciary,hasacquiredalegitimacythatwouldbedifficulttoerode.NotwithstandingrarifiedacademicdebatesaboutwhetherIndiandemocracyisformalorsubstantive,IndianshaveacceptedthedemocracyenshrinedintheirConstitutionasrealenough.Theyarenotwrongindoingso,forwhentheylookaroundattheirneighboursinAsiaandAfrica,andevenatfarawayLatinAmerica,andatthetroubledpeoplesoftheerstwhileSocialistworldineasternEurope,theyknowtheworthofwhattheyhave.TheConstitutionhasalsobeenremarkablysuccessfulinprovidingaframeworkforprotectionofthe

FundamentalRightsoffreedomofspeechandexpression,includingthefreedomofthepress,freedomofassociation,includingtherighttojoinpoliticalpartiesofone’schoiceandformtradeunions,etc.Courtshaveactedasguardiansofcitizens’interestsagainstencroachmentbythestateaswellasprivateorganizationsandindividuals.Courtshavealsobeencreativeinexpandingthemeaningandscopeofrights.Forexample,therighttolifeinarticle21wasexpandedtoincludetherighttolivelihoodinthejudgementoftheSupremeCourtinthecaseofOlgaTellisv.BombayMunicipalCorporation,popularlyknownasthe‘PavementDwellers’Case’.17Therighttopersonallibertyguaranteedinarticle21hasbeeninterpretedtomeanthatapoorpersoncannotbeimprisonedfornotpayinghisdebts.Thisisnottosaythattheserightsarenotviolated,oftenwithimpunity,butthattheinstitutionalmechanismfortheir

redressalexistsandcanbeleveraged,andthatthemovementhasbeeninthedirectionofexpandingthescopeofrightsinthedirectionofamorejustandcaringsociety.TheConstitutionhasprovedsufficientlyflexibleinthematterofamendingitself.Article368which

containstheprovisionsforamendmentoftheConstitutionspecifiesthatanamendmentbillcanbeintroducedineitherhouseofparliamentandmustbepassedbyaclearmajoritywithtwo-thirdsofmemberspresentandvoting.However,incaseofamendmentsinArticle368itselforinarticlesdealingwiththeelectionofthePresident,theextentoftheexecutivepowersoftheUnionandthestategovernments,thejudiciary,thedistributionofpowers,andtherepresentationofthestatesintheparliament,theamendmentbillmustalsobepassedbythelegislaturesofatleasthalfthestates.ThishasensuredthatwhileamendmentsarenotsodifficultthattheletteroftheConstitutionbecomesabarriertosocialchange,yetitisnotpossibletomakechangesunlessarealconsensushasbeenbuiltup.Again,whileArticle368doesnotexcludeanypartoftheConstitutionfromthescopeofamendingprovisions,theSupremeCourthasineffectplacedlimitsontheamendingpowersbymeansofthedoctrineof‘basicstructure’or‘basicfeatures’oftheConstitution.WhileitispossibletoarguethatthisisnotenvisagedintheConstitutionitself,yetitcannotbedeniedthatthedoctrinemaywellactasahealthycheckontheambitionsofamendment-happygovernmentswithbigmajorities.Manysuggestionshaveemanatedfromdiversesourcesovertheyearsaboutchangesrequiredto,be

madeintheConstitution.SomewantintroductionofthePresidentialsystem,otherswantproportionalrepresentationinplaceoforinadditiontothefirstpastthepostsystem,stillotherswantthatwinningcandidatesshouldhavetosecureatleastfiftypercentofvotes,asinmanyothercountries.Arelativelyrecentadditionistheproposalthatavoteofno-confidencewhichbringsdownagovernmentshouldincludeavoteofconfidenceinanalternativegovernment-aproposalclearlyinspiredbyrecentrapidchangesingovernmentsandresultantfearsofinstability.Despiteconsiderableopposition,theBJP-ledNDAgovernmenthasappointedaConstitutionReviewCommissionin2000.Theoverallfeelingisthatmostpartiesandmostpeople,evenwhentheyseekimportantchanges,arequitecontenttoseekthesewithinthegivenstructureoftheConstitution.WecannotlayourfailuresatthedooroftheConstitution;wheretherearefailures,asindeedtherearemany,itisnottheConstitutionthathasfailedus,itiswewhohavefailedtheConstitution.AsRajendraPrasadsaidatthetimeoftheframingoftheConstitution,aConstitutioncanonlybeasgoodasthepeoplewhoworkit.Itisalsosignificantthateventhosecommentators,whoareverysharplycriticaloftheIndianpolitical

system,andpessimisticaboutitsfutureprospects,havelittlecriticismtoofferoftheConstitution.Itisnecessarytoemphasizethatatatimewhenmostotherinstitutionsofgovernancehavesufferedgreaterorlessererosionoflegitimacy,theConstitutionhascontinuedtocommandrespect.Thisisnotasmallgainforacountrywithsuchdiversityandcomplexity.Intheturbulenttimesthatperhapsawaitusinthenewmillennium,theConstitutionmaywellbeamuch-neededanchorofsupport.Itsunambiguouscommitmenttoademocratic,secular,egalitarianandcivillibertariansocietyshouldhelpgreatlyinkeepingtheshipofstatetiedfirmlytoitsmoorings.

6TheInitialYears

FifteenthAugust,1947,thefirstdayoffreeIndia,wascelebratedwithmuchexhuberanceandelation.Thesacrificesofgenerationsofpatriotsandthebloodofcountlessmartyrshadbornefruit.Butthisjoywastaintedbydespair,forthecountryhadbeendivided.Largepartsofthetwonewnationswereengulfedbycommunalriots.Therewasamassexodusofpeoplefrombothstatesacrossthenewborders.Therewasscarcityoffoodandotherconsumergoods,andafearofadministrativebreakdown.InamemorableaddresstotheConstituentAssemblyonthenightof14August,JawaharlalNehru,

speakingasthefirstprimeministerofafreeIndiaandgivingexpressiontothefeelingsofthepeople,said:

Longyearsagowemadeatrystwithdestiny,andnowthetimecomeswhenweshallredeemourpledge...Atthestrokeofthemidnighthour,whentheworldsleeps,Indiawillawaketolifeandfreedom.Amomentcomes,whichcomesbutrarelyinhistory,whenwestepoutfromtheoldtothenew,whenanageends,andwhenthesoulofanation,longsuppressed,findsutterance.ItisfittingthatatthissolemnmomentwetakethepledgeofdedicationtotheserviceofIndiaandherpeopleandtothestilllargercauseofhumanity.

..WeendtodayaperiodofillfortuneandIndiadiscoversherselfagain.1

Butindependencehadbeenaccompaniedbyamultitudeofproblems,and,ofcourse,centuriesofbackwardness,prejudice,inequality,andignorancestillweighedontheland.Thedebrisoftwocenturiesofcolonialismhadtobeclearedandthepromisesofthefreedomstruggletobefulfilled.Thelonghaulhadjustbegun.AsNehrudeclaredinhis14Augustspeech,‘Theachievementwecelebratetodayisbutastep,anopeningofopportunity,tothegreatertriumphsandachievements...Thatfutureisnotoneofeaseandrestingbutofincessantstrivingsothatwemayfulfilthepledgeswehavesooftentaken.’2

Thereweretheimmediateproblemsoftheterritorialandadministrativeintegrationoftheprincelystates,thecommunalriotsthataccompaniedPartition,therehabilitationofnearlysixmillionrefugeeswhohadmigratedfromPakistan,theprotectionofMuslimsthreatenedbycommunalgangs,theneedtoavoidwarwithPakistan,andtheCommunistinsurgency.Restorationoflawandorderandpoliticalstabilityandputtinginplaceanadministrativesystem,threatenedwithbreakdownbecauseofPartitionandtheillogicaldivisionofthearmyandhigherbureaucracyvirtuallyonreligiouslines,wereotherimmediatetasks.AsNehrudeclaredin1947,‘FirstthingsmustcomefirstandthefirstthingisthesecurityandstabilityofIndia.’3OrinthewordsofthepoliticalscientistW.H.Morris-Jones,thetaskwas‘toholdthingstogether,toensuresurvival,togetaccustomedtothefeelofbeingonthewater,toseetoitthatthevesselskeepafloat.’4

Inadditiontherewerethemedium-termproblemsofframingaconstitutionandbuildingarepresentativedemocraticandcivillibertarianpoliticalorder,organizingelectionstoputinplacethesystemofrepresentativeandresponsiblegovernmentsattheCentreandinthestates,andabolishingthesemi-feudalagrarianorderthroughthorough-goinglandreforms.

Thenewly-formedindependentgovernmentalsohadthelong-termtasksofpromotingnationalintegration,pushingforwardtheprocessofnation-in-the-making,facilitatingrapideconomicdevelopment,removingendemicpoverty,andinitiationoftheplanningprocess.Italsosoughttobridgeasquicklyaspossiblethegapbetweenmassexpectationsarousedbythefreedomstruggleandtheirfulfilment,togetridofcenturies-longsocialinjustice,inequality,andoppression,andtoevolveaforeignpolicywhichwoulddefendIndianindependenceandpromotepeaceinaworldincreasinglyengulfedbytheColdWarandgettingdividedintohostilepowerblocs.Alltheseproblemshadtobedealtwithwithintheframeworkofthebasicvaluestowhichthenational

movementhadbeencommittedandwithintheparametersofabroadnationalconsensus.Thepeopleandthepoliticalleadershipsetouttohandletheseshort-termandlong-termproblems

fuelledbyanoptimism,acertainfaithinthecountry’sfutureandwithajoiedevivre.ThismoodwastopersistformostoftheNehruyears.Thoughmany,especiallyontheleft,weredissatisfiedwithandbasicallycriticalofNehruandhispolicies,theytoosharedthisfeelingofhope.ThosewhohavelivedthroughtheNehrueraoftennowfeelthattheywereluckytohavedoneso.Nehruhimselfonceagainexpressedthisfeelingafternearlyadecadeasprimeminister:‘Thereisnolackofdramainthischangingworldofoursand,eveninIndia,weliveinanexcitingage.IhavealwaysconsidereditagreatprivilegeforpeopleofthisgenerationtoliveduringthisperiodofIndia’slonghistory...IhavebelievedthatthereisnothingmoreexcitinginthewideworldtodaythantoworkinIndia.’5

SomeofthiseuphoriadisappearedwiththeIndia-Chinawarof1962.ThewarbroughtinadegreeofrealismbutevensoneitherNehrunorthecountryexperiencedanysenseofdefeatism.Nehruhadalwaysbelievedthat‘India’sgreatestneedisforasenseofcertaintyconcerningherownsuccess.’6Anditwasthissenseofexcitementandofthecomingsuccesswhichhesucceededinimpartingtothemillions.Weshalldiscusstheshort-termproblemsinthefollowingsections.Thelong-termtasks,thematuringof

thecountryunderNehru’sstewardship,andthedevelopmentofthepoliticalpartiesarediscussedinsubsequentchapters.

IndependentIndiaembarkedonitstaskswiththebenefitofanoutstandingleadership,havingtremendousdedicationandidealismbesidesthepresenceofastrongnation-wideparty,theCongress.BesidethegreatNehrustoodagroupofleaderswhohadplayedanotableroleinthefreedommovement.Therewashisdeputyprimeminister,SardarPatel,aleaderwhopossessedastrongwillandwasdecisiveinactionandstronginadministration.ThentherewerethelearnedMaulanaAbulKalamAzad,theeruditeRajendraPrasad,andC.Rajagopalachari,endowedwitharazor-sharpintellect.Atthestatelevel,wereseveralleaderslikeGovindBallabhPantinU.P.,B.C.RoyinWestBengal,andB.G.KherandMorarjiDesaiinBombay,whoenjoyedunchallengedauthorityintheirstates.Alltheseleadershadskillsandexperiencetorunamodernanddemocraticadministrativeandpoliticalsystemwhichtheyhadacquiredthroughorganizingamassmovement,buildingupapoliticalparty,andparticipatingincoloniallegislaturesfordecades.Theyalsopossessedagreatdealoftalentinconsensus-building.Thenationalmovementhadbroughttogetherdifferentregions,sectionsofsocietyandideologicalcurrentsaroundacommonpoliticalagenda.OutsidetheCongressweretheSocialists,AcharyaNarendraDevandJayaprakashNarayan,theCommunists,P.C.JoshiandAjoyGhosh,theliberalcommunalist,ShyamaPrasadMookerjee,andtheDalitleader,DrB.R.Ambedkar.OntheperipherywereDrS.Radhakrishnan,

thedistinguishedphilosopher,DrZakirHussain,theeducationist,V.K.KrishnaMenon,whohadstruggledforIndia’sfreedominBritain,andahostofdedicatedGandhianleaders.TheleadersofindependentIndiawerepersonsoftotalpersonalintegrityandhadanausterelifestyle.

NofingerwaseverpointedatSardarPatel,forexample,evenasheperformedtheunenviablebutnecessarytaskofgatheringfundsfortheCongressfromtherich.TheCongressleadersalsosharedacommonvisionofindependentIndia.Theywerecommittedtothe

goalsofrapidsocialandeconomicchangeanddemocratizationofthesocietyandpolity,andthevaluesimpartedbythenationalmovement.Nehru’scommitmenttothesevaluesiswellknown.But,infact,SardarPatel,RajendraPrasadandC.Rajagopalachariwereequallycommittedtothevaluesofdemocracy,civilliberties,secularism,andindependenteconomicdevelopment,anti-imperialism,socialreformsandhadapro-poororientation.TheseleadersdifferedwithNehruprimarilyonthequestionofsocialismandclassanalysisofsociety.Wemaypointout,parenthetically,inthiscontextthatPatelhasbeenmuchmisunderstoodandmisrepresentedbothbyadmirersandcritics.Theright-wingershaveusedhimtoattacktheNehruvianvisionandpolicies,whilehisleftistcriticshaveportrayedhimasthearchetypalrightist.Both,however,havebeenwrong.Inanycase,itisimportantthatNehruandtheotherleaderssharedthebeliefthatforthecountry’sdevelopmentbuilding-upofanationalconsensuswasnecessary.Theleadership’spositionwasstrengthenedbythefacttheyenjoyedtremendouspopularityandprestigeamongalmosteverysectionofthepeople.Ontopofthat,thisteamwasheadedbyJawaharlalNehruwhoexercised,afterDecember1950,unchallengedauthorityinthepartyandthegovernment.AnotherpositivefeatureoftheIndiansituationwastheexistenceofCongress,astrong,democratically

functioning,India-widenationalparty,withanestablishedleadershipanddeeprootsandstrongsupportamongthepeople.ExceptfortheCommunistparty,itsauthorityorlegitimacywasquestionedbynobody.EvenasCongresswasbeingtransformedfromamovementintoapartyandwasstrugglingtoretainits

politicallyall-embracingandideologicallydiversecharacter,itsleadershipwasawareofthefactthatinthetroublesomepost-Partitonperiodthecountryneededagovernmentwhichwouldrepresentthewidestpossibleconsensusandcarrywithitdifferentshadesofopinionandsectionsofsocietyforimplementingacommonprogramme.So,eventhoughtheSocialistsandtheCommunistsmovedintotheOpposition,andtheCongresswasinanoverwhelmingmajorityintheConstituentAssemblyandenjoyedunchallengedpower,theCongressleadershipwidenedthebaseoftheConstituentAssemblyandthegovernmentbytheinclusionofdistinguishedandrepresentativenon-Congressmen.Thegovernmentvirtuallybecameanationalgovernment.Forexample,thefirstNehrucabinetoffourteenincludedfivenon-Congressmen:DrB.R.AmbedkarandShyamaPrasadMookerjee,bothofwhomhadopposedtheCongressbefore1947,JohnMathai,C.H.BhabhaandShanmukhamChetty.DrB.R.AmbedkarwasalsomadetheChairmanoftheDraftingCommitteeoftheConstitution.DrS.Radhakrishnan,thefirstVice-PresidentandthesecondPresidentofIndia,hadneverbeenaCongressman.

AccessionofthePrincelyStates

Unifyingunderoneadministration,post-PartitionIndiaandtheprincelystateswasperhapsthemostimportanttaskfacingthepoliticalleadership.IncolonialIndia,nearly40percentoftheterritorywasoccupiedbyfifty-sixsmallandlargestates

ruledbytheprinceswhoenjoyedvaryingdegreesofautonomyunderthesystemofBritishparamountcy.

BritishpowerprotectedthemfromtheirownpeopleasalsoexternalaggressionsolongastheydidBritishbidding.In1947thefutureoftheprincelystatesoncetheBritishleftbecameamatterofconcern.Manyofthe

largerprincesbegantodreamofindependenceandtoschemeforit.TheyclaimedthattheparamountcycouldnotbetransferredtothenewstatesofIndiaandPakistan.TheirambitionswerefuelledbytheBritishprimeminister,ClementAttlee’sannouncementon20February,1947that‘HisMajesty’sGovernmentdonotintendtohandovertheirpowersandobligationsunderparamountcytoanygovernmentofBritishIndia.’7Consequently,rulersofseveralstatesclaimedthattheywouldbecomeindependentfrom15August1947whenBritishruleended.InthistheygotencouragementfromM.A.Jinnahwhopubliclydeclaredon18June1947that‘theStates

wouldbeindependentsovereignStatesontheterminationofparamountcy’andwere‘freetoremainindependentiftheysodesired.’8TheBritishstandwas,however,alteredtosomeextentwhen,inhisspeechontheIndependenceofIndiaBill,Attleesaid,‘ItisthehopeofHisMajesty’sGovernmentthatalltheStateswillinduecoursefindtheirappropriateplacewithoneortheotherDominionwithintheBritishCommonwealth.’9

TheIndiannationalistscouldhardlyacceptasituationwheretheunityoffreeIndiawouldbeendangeredbyhundredsoflargeorsmallindependentorautonomousstatesinterspersedwithinitwhichweresovereign.Besides,thepeopleofthestateshadparticipatedintheprocessofnation-in-the-makingfromtheendofnineteenthcenturyanddevelopedstrongfeelingsofIndiannationalism.Naturally,thenationalistleadersinBritishIndiaandinthestatesrejectedtheclaimofanystatetoindependenceandrepeatedlydeclaredthatindependenceforaprincelystatewasnotanoption—theonlyoptionopenbeingwhetherthestatewouldaccedetoIndiaorPakistanonthebasisofcontiguityofitsterritoryandthewishesofitspeople.Infact,thenationalmovementhadforlongheldthatpoliticalpowerbelongedtothepeopleofastateandnottoitsrulerandthatthepeopleofthestateswereanintegralpartoftheIndiannation.Simultaneously,thepeopleofthestateswereastirundertheleadershipoftheStates’PeoplesConferenceasneverbefore,demandingintroductionofademocraticpoliticalorderandintegrationwiththerestofthecountry.Withgreatskillandmasterfuldiplomacyandusingbothpersuasionandpressure,SardarVallabhbhai

PatelsucceededinintegratingthehundredsofprincelystateswiththeIndianunionintwostages.SomestateshadshownwisdomandrealismandperhapsadegreeofpatriotismbyjoiningtheConstituentAssemblyinApril1947.Butthemajorityofprinceshadstayedawayandafew,suchasthoseofTravancore,BhopalandHyderabad,publiclyannouncedtheirdesiretoclaimanindependentstatus.On27June1947,SardarPatelassumedadditionalchargeofthenewlycreatedStates’Departmentwith

V.P.MenonasitsSecretary.PatelwasfullyawareofthedangerposedtoIndianunitybythepossibleintransigenceoftherulersofthestates.HetoldMenonatthetimethat‘thesituationhelddangerouspotentialitiesandthatifwedidnothandleitpromptlyandeffectively,ourhard-earnedfreedommightdisappearthroughtheStates’door.’10He,therefore,setouttotackletherecalcitrantstatesexpeditiously.Patel’sfirststepwastoappealtotheprinceswhoseterritoriesfellinsideIndiatoaccedetotheIndian

unioninthreesubjectswhichaffectedthecommoninterestsofthecountry,namely,foreignrelations,

defenceandcommunications.Healsogaveanimpliedthreatthathewouldnotbeabletorestraintheimpatientpeopleofthestatesandthegovernment’stermsafter15Augustwouldbestiffer.Fearfuloftherisingtideofthepeoples’movementsintheirstates,andofthemoreextremeagendaof

theradicalwingoftheCongress,asalsoPatel’sreputationforfirmnessandevenruthlessness,theprincesrespondedtoPatel’sappealandallbutthreeofthem—Junagadh,JammuandKashmirandHyderabad—accededtoIndiaby15August1947.Bytheendof1948,however,thethreerecalcitrantstatestoowereforcedtofallinline.JunagadhwasasmallstateonthecoastofSaurashtrasurroundedbyIndianterritorityandtherefore

withoutanygeographicalcontiguitywithPakistan.Yet,itsNawabannouncedaccessionofhisstatetoPakistanon15August1947eventhoughthepeopleofthestate,overwhelminglyHindu,desiredtojoinIndia.TheIndiannationalistleadershadfordecadesstoodforthesovereigntyofthepeopleagainstthe

claimsoftheprinces.Itwas,therefore,notsurprisingthatinJunagadh’scaseNehruandPatelagreedthatthefinalvoice,likeinanyothersuchcase,forexampleKashmirorHyderabad,shouldbethatofthepeopleasascertainedthroughaplebiscite.Goingagainstthisapproach,PakistanacceptedJunagadh’saccession.Ontheotherhand,thepeopleofthestatewouldnotaccepttheruler’sdecision.Theyorganizedapopularmovement,forcedtheNawabtofleeandestablishedaprovisionalgovernment.TheDewanofJunagadh,ShahNawazBhutto,thefatherofthemorefamousZulfiqarAliBhutto,nowdecidedtoinvitetheGovernmentofIndiatointervene.Indiantroopsthereaftermarchedintothestate.AplebiscitewasheldinthestateinFebruary1948whichwentoverwhelminglyinfavourofjoiningIndia.ThestateofKashmirborderedonbothIndiaandPakistan.ItsrulerHariSinghwasaHindu,while

nearly75percentofthepopulationwasMuslim.HariSinghtoodidnotaccedeeithertoIndiaorPakistan.FearingdemocracyinIndiaandcommunalisminPakistan,hehoped,tostayoutofbothandtocontinuetowieldpowerasanindependentruler.ThepopularpoliticalforcesledbytheNationalConferenceanditsleaderSheikhAbdullah,however,wantedtojoinIndia.TheIndianpoliticalleaderstooknostepstoobtainKashmir’saccessionand,inlinewiththeirgeneralapproach,wantedthepeopleofKashmirtodecidewhethertolinktheirfatewithIndiaorPakistan.(NehruandPatelhadmadeasimilarofferinthecaseofJunagadhandHyderabad).InthistheyweresupportedbyGandhiji,whodeclaredinAugust1947thatKashmirwasfreetojoineitherIndiaorPakistaninaccordancewiththewillofthepeople.ButPakistannotonlyrefusedtoaccepttheprincipleofplebiscitefordecidingtheissueofaccessionin

thecaseofJunagadhandHyderabad,inthecaseofKashmirittriedtoshort-circuitthepopulardecisionthroughashort-sightedaction,forcingIndiatopartiallychangeitsattitudeinregardtoKashmir.On22October,withtheonsetofwinter,severalPathantribesmen,ledunofficiallybyPakistaniarmyofficers,invadedKashmirandrapidlypushedtowardsSrinagar,thecapitalofKashmir.Theill-trainedarmyoftheMaharajaprovednomatchfortheinvadingforces.Inpanic,on24October,theMaharajaappealedtoIndiaformilitaryassistance.Nehru,evenatthisstage,didnotfavouraccessionwithoutascertainingthewillofthepeople.ButMountbatten,theGovernor-General,pointedoutthatunderinternationallawIndiacouldsenditstroopstoKashmironlyafterthestate’sformalaccessiontoIndia.SheikhAbdullahandSardarPateltooinsistedonaccession.Andsoon26October,theMaharajaaccededtoIndiaandalsoagreedtoinstalAbdullahasheadofthestate’sadministration.EventhoughboththeNationalConference

andtheMaharajawantedfirmandpermanentaccession,India,inconformitywithitsdemocracticcommitmentandMountbatten’sadvice,announcedthatitwouldholdareferendumontheaccessiondecisiononcepeaceandlawandorderhadbeenrestoredintheValley.AfteraccessiontheCabinettookthedecisiontoimmediatelyflytroopstoSrinagar.Thisdecisionwas

bolsteredbyitsapprovalbyGandhijiwhotoldNehruthatthereshouldbenosubmissiontoevilinKashmirandthattheraidershadtobedrivenout.On27Octobernearly100planesairliftedmenandweaponstoSrinagartojointhebattleagainsttheraiders.SrinagarwasfirstheldandthentheraidersweregraduallydrivenoutoftheValley,thoughtheyretainedcontroloverpartsofthestateandthearmedconflictcontinuedformonths.Fearfulofthedangersofafull-scalewarbetweenIndiaandPakistan,theGovernmentofIndiaagreed,

on30December1947,onMountbatten’ssuggestion,torefertheKashmirproblemtotheSecurityCounciloftheUnitedNations,askingforvacationofaggressionbyPakistan.Nehruwastoregretthisdecisionlateras,insteadoftakingnoteoftheaggressionbyPakistan,the

SecurityCouncil,guidedbyBritainandtheUnitedStates,tendedtosidewithPakistan.IgnoringIndia’scomplaint,itreplacedthe‘Kashmirquestion’beforeitbythe‘India-Pakistandispute’.Itpassedmanyresolutions,buttheupshotwasthatinaccordancewithoneofitsresolutionsbothIndiaandPakistanacceptedaceasefireon31December1948whichstillprevailsandthestatewaseffectivelydividedalongtheceasefireline.Nehru,whohadexpectedtogetjusticefromtheUnitedNations,wastoexpresshisdisillusionmentinalettertoVijaylakshmiPanditinFebruary1948:‘IcouldnotimaginethattheSecurityCouncilcouldpossiblybehaveinthetrivialandpartisanmannerinwhichitfunctioned.Thesepeoplearesupposedtokeeptheworldinorder.Itisnotsurprisingthattheworldisgoingtopieces.TheUnitedStatesandBritainhaveplayedadirtyrole,Britainprobablybeingthechiefactorbehindthescenes.’11

In1951,theUNpassedaresolutionprovidingforareferendumunderUNsupervisionafterPakistanhadwithdrawnitstroopsfromthepartofKashmirunderitscontrol.TheresolutionhasremainedinfructuoussincePakistanhasrefusedtowithdrawitsforcesfromwhatisknownasAzadKashmir.SincethenKashmirhasbeenthemainobstacleinthepathoffriendlyrelationsbetweenIndiaand

Pakistan.IndiahasregardedKashmir’saccessionasfinalandirrevocableandKashmirasitsintegralpart.Pakistancontinuestodenythisclaim.KashmirhasalsoovertimebecomeasymbolaswellasatestofIndia’ssecularism;itwas,asNehruputit,basictothetriumphofsecularismovercommunalisminIndia.HyderabadwasthelargeststateinIndiaandwascompletelysurroundedbyIndianterritory.TheNizam

ofHyderabadwasthethirdIndianrulerwhodidnotaccedetoIndiabefore15August.Instead,heclaimedanindependentstatusand,encouragedbyPakistan,begantoexpandhisarmedforces.ButSardarPatelwasinnohurrytoforceadecisiononhim,especiallyasMountbattenwasinterestedinactingasanintemediaryinarrivingatanegotiatedsettlementwithhim.Time,Patelfelt,wasonIndia’sside,especiallyastheNizammadeasecretcommitmentnottojoinPakistanandtheBritishgovernmentrefusedtogiveHyderabadthestatusofaDominion.ButPatelmadeitclearthatIndiawouldnottolerate‘anisolatedspotwhichwoulddestroytheveryUnionwhichwehavebuiltupwithourbloodandtoil.’12

InNovember1947,theGovernmentofIndiasignedastand-stillagreementwiththeNizam,hopingthatwhilethenegotiationsproceeded,thelatterwouldintroducerepresentativegovernmentinthestate,

makingthetaskofmergereasier.ButtheNizamhadotherplans.HeengagedtheservicesoftheleadingBritishlawyerSirWalterMonckton,afriendofMountbatten,tonegotiatewiththeGovernmentofIndiaonhisbehalf.TheNizamhopedtoprolongnegotiationsandinthemeanwhilebuilduphismilitarystrengthandforceIndiatoaccepthissovereignty;oralternativelyhemightsucceedinaccedingtoPakistan,especiallyinviewofthetensionbetweenIndiaandPakistanoverKashmir.Inthemeanwhile,threeotherpoliticaldevelopmentstookplacewithinthestate.Therewasrapid

growth,withofficialhelp,ofthemilitantMuslimcommunalorganization,IttihadulMusliminanditspara-militarywing,theRazakars.Then,on7August1947theHyderabadStateCongresslaunchedapowerfulsatyagrahamovementtoforcedemocratizationontheNizam.Nearly20,000satyagrahiswerejailed.AsaresultofattacksbytheRazakarsandrepressionbythestateauthorities,thousandsofpeoplefledthestateandtookshelterintemporarycampsinIndianterritory.TheStateCongress-ledmovementnowtooktoarms.BythenapowerfulCommunist-ledpeasantstrugglehaddevelopedintheTelenganaregionofthestatefromthelatterhalfof1946.Themovement,whichhadwanedduetotheseverityofstaterepressionbytheendof1946,recovereditsvigourwhenpeasantdalams(squads)organizeddefenceofthepeopleagainstattacksbytheRazakars,attackedbiglandlordsanddistributedtheirlandsamongthepeasantsandthelandless.ByJune1948,SardarPatelwasgettingimpatientasthenegotiationswiththeNizamdraggedon.From

hissick-bedinDehraDun,hewrotetoNehru:‘Ifeelverystronglythatastagehascomewhenweshouldtellthemquitefranklythatnothingshortofunqualifiedacceptanceofaccessionandofintroductionofundilutedresponsiblegovernmentwouldbeacceptabletous.’13Still,despitetheprovocationsbytheNizamandtheRazakars,theGovernmentofIndiahelditshandforseveralmonths.ButtheNizamcontinuedtodraghisfeetandimportmoreandmorearms;alsothedepradationsoftheRazakarswereassumingdangerousproportions.Finally,on13September1948,theIndianarmymovedintoHyderabad.TheNizamsurrenderedafterthreedaysandaccededtotheIndianUnioninNovember.TheGovernmentofIndiadecidedtobegenerousandnottopunishtheNizam.HewasretainedasformalrulerofthestateoritsRajpramukh,wasgivenaprivypurseoffivemillionrupees,andpermittedtokeepmostofhisimmensewealth.WiththeaccessionofHyderabad,themergerofprincelystateswiththeIndianUnionwascompleted,

andtheGovernmentofIndia’swritranallovertheland.TheHyderabadepisodemarkedanothertriumphofIndiansecularism.NotonlyhadalargenumberofMuslimsinHyderabadjoinedtheanti-Nizamstruggle,MuslimsintherestofthecountryhadalsosupportedtheGovernment’spolicyandactiontothedismayoftheleadersofPakistanandtheNizam.AsPateljoyfullywrotetoSuhrawardyon28September,‘OnthequestionofHyderabad,theIndianUnionMuslimshavecomeoutintheopenonoursideandthathascertainlycreatedagoodimpressioninthecountry.’14

ThesecondandthemoredifficultstageofthefullintegrationoftheprincelystatesintothenewIndiannationbeganinDecember1947.OnceagainSardarPatelmovedwithspeed,completingtheprocesswithinoneyear.Smallerstateswereeithermergedwiththeneighbouringstatesormergedtogetherto‘formcentrallyadministeredareas.’Alargenumberwereconsolidatedintofivenewunions,formingMadhyaBharat,Rajasthan,PatialaandEastPunjabStatesUnion(PEPSU),SaurashtraandTravancore-Cochin;Mysore,HyderabadandJammuandKashmirretainedtheiroriginalformasseparatestatesoftheUnion.

Inreturnfortheirsurrenderofallpowerandauthority,therulersofmajorstatesweregivenprivypursesinperpetuity,freeofalltaxes.TheprivypursesamountedtoRs4.66croresin1949andwerelaterguaranteedbytheConstitution.Therulerswereallowedsuccessiontothegaddiandretainedcertainprivilegessuchaskeepingtheirtitles,flyingtheirpersonalflagsandgun-salutesonceremonialoccasions.Therewassomecriticismoftheseconcessionstotheprincesatthetimeaswellaslater.Butkeepingin

viewthedifficulttimesjustafterindependenceandthePartition,theywereperhapsasmallpricetopayfortheextinctionoftheprinces’powerandtheearlyandeasyterritorialandpoliticalintegrationofthestateswiththerestofthecountry.Undoubtedly,theintegrationofthestatescompensatedforthelossoftheterritoriesconstitutingPakistanintermsofareaaswellaspopulation.Itcertainlypartiallyhealed‘thewoundsofpartition’.TwoothertroublespotsremainedontheIndianbodypolitic.TheseweretheFrenchandPortuguese-

ownedsettlementsdottingIndia’sEastandWestcoasts,withPondicherryandGoaformingtheirhub.Thepeopleofthesesettlementswereeagertojointheirnewlyliberatedmother-country.TheFrenchauthoritiesweremorereasonableandafterprolongednegotiationshandedoverPondicherryandotherFrenchpossessionstoIndiain1954.ButthePortugueseweredeterminedtostayon,especiallyasPortugal’sNATOallies,BritainandtheUSA,werewillingtosupportthisdefiantattitude.TheGovernmentofIndia,beingcommittedtoapolicyofsettlingdisputesbetweennationsbypeacefulmeans,wasnotwillingtotakemilitarystepstoliberateGoaandotherPortuguesecolonies.ThepeopleofGoatookmattersintheirhandsandstartedamovementseekingfreedomfromthePortuguese,butitwasbrutallysuppressedasweretheeffortsofnon-violentsatyagrahisfromIndiatomarchintoGoa.Intheend,afterwaitingpatientlyforinternationalopiniontoputpressureonPortugal,NehruorderedIndiantroopstomarchintoGoaonthenightof17December1961.TheGovernor-GeneralofGoaimmediatelysurrenderedwithoutafightandtheterritorialandpoliticalintegrationofIndiawascompleted,eventhoughithadtakenoverfourteenyearstodoso.

TheCommunalHolocaust

ThePartitionandtheviolencewhichaccompaniedit,ledtonearlysixmillionrefugeespouringintoIndiahavinglosttheirall.Indiawasinthemidstofacommunalholocaust.Therewassenselesscommunalslaughteranda

fratricidalwarofunprecedentedproportions.UnspeakableatrocitieswereperpetratedontheminoritiesinbothIndiaandPakistan.Inthespanofafewmonths,nearly500,000peoplewerekilledandpropertyworththousandsofmillionsofrupeeswaslootedanddestroyed.Communalviolencethreatenedtheveryfabricofsociety.EveninDelhi,undertheverynoseofthecentralgovernment,thelootingandkillingofMuslimslastedseveraldays.Attheveryoutsetthepeopleandthegovernmentfacedthegravestofcrises.Thegreatdangerwasthat

theatmosphereandthementalitygeneratedbythePartitionandtheriotsmightpersistandstrengthencommunaltendenciesinIndianpolitics.ButIndiannationalismwasabletowithstandthetest.Despitethefiercepressureofcommunalsentiment,whichaffectedevensomeoftheimportantCongressleaders,bothattheCentreandinthestates,itistothecreditofthenationalleadershipandthepeoplethattheymanagedtomaintainIndia’ssecularpolity.ThiswasnoeasytaskandNehru,particular,hadtousethefullforceofhispersonality,includingthreatsofresignation,tomakethispossible.

Thesituationwasbroughtundercontrolwithinafewmonthsthroughdecisivepoliticalandadministrativemeasures.Forexample,duringAugust-September,thebackofcommunalviolenceinDelhiwasbrokenbybringingthearmyonthestreetsandorderingthepolicetoshootatcommunalmobsindulginginlootingandkilling.Infact,inspiteofmanyerrorsandweaknesses,theGovernmentofIndia’srecord,andinparticularNehru’spersonalrecord,indealingwiththepost-Partitionriotswasexemplary.ThegovernmentalsosucceededinprotectingtheMuslimminorityinthecountry,sothatintheendforty-fivemillionMuslimschosetoremaininIndia.Communalismwastherebycontainedandweakenedbutnoteliminated,forconditionswerestill

favourableforitsgrowth.Forcommunalismtobeeclipsedaconsistentstruggleagainstitwouldbeneededforaprolongedperiod.Morethananyoneelse,Nehruwasawareofthis.AndsohenevertiredofstressingthatcommunalismwasafundamentalissueofIndiapoliticsandthatitposedthemainthreattoIndia’sintegrity.‘Ifallowedfreeplay’,hewrotein1951,‘communalismwouldbreakupIndia.’15

Portrayingcommunalismas‘theIndianversionoffascism’,hesaidinOctober1947:‘ThewaveoffascismwhichisgrippingIndianowisthedirectoutcomeofhatredforthenon-MuslimswhichtheMuslimLeaguepreachedamongitsfollowersforyears.TheLeagueacceptedtheideologyoffascismfromtheNazisofGermany...TheideasandmethodsoffascistorganizationarenowgainingpopularityamongtheHindusalsoandthedemandfortheestablishmentofaHinduStateisitsclearmanifestation.’16

Nehrucarriedonamassivecampaignagainstcommunalismtoinstilasenseofsecurityintheminorities,throughpublicspeeches,radiobroadcasts,speechesinparliament,privatelettersandepistlestochiefministers.Herepeatedlydeclared:‘NoStatecanbecivilizedexceptasecularState.’17OnGandhiji’sbirthdayin1951,hetoldaDelhiaudience:‘Ifanypersonraiseshishandtostrikedownanotheronthegroundofreligion,Ishallfighthimtillthelastbreathofmylife,bothastheheadofthegovernmentandfromoutside.’18Democraticthoughhewas,heevenadvocatedabanonpoliticalorganizationsbasedonreligionandgottheConstitutionamendedtoenablethegovernmenttoimpose‘reasonablerestrictions’ontherighttofreespeechandexpressioninordertocurbcommunalspeechesandwritings.Inhisstruggleagainstcommunalism,NehrugotthefullcooperationofhiscolleagueslikeSardarPatelandC.Rajagopalachari.Patel,forexample,declaredattheJaipursessionoftheCongressinDecember1948thattheCongressandthegovernmentweredetermined‘tomakeIndiaatrulysecularstate.’InFebruary1949hedescribedthetalkof‘HinduRaj’as‘thatmadidea.’19Andhetoldhisaudiencein1950:‘Oursisasecularstate...HereeveryMuslimshouldfeelthatheisanIndiancitizenandhasequalrightsasanIndiancitizen.Ifwecannotmakehimfeellikethis,weshallnotbeworthyofourheritageandofourcountry.’20

AmajorsetbacktothecommunalforcesoccurredwithGandhiji’smartyrdom.ThetragedyofthecommunalriotsprecedingandaccompanyingindependencedeeplyaffectedGandhiji.WhentheentirenationwasrejoicinginAugust1947,themanwhohadledthestruggleoffreedomsince1919,themanwhohadgiventhemessageofnon-violenceandloveandcouragetotheIndianpeople,themanwhohadrepresentedthebestinIndiancultureandpolitics,wastouringthehate-tornlandsofBengalandBihar,tryingtodousethecommunalfireandbringcomforttopeoplewhowerepayingthroughsenselessslaughterthepriceoffreedom.Inreplytoamessageofbirthdaycongratulationsin1947,Gandhijisaid

thathenolongerwishedtolivelongandthathewould‘invoketheaidoftheall-embracingPowertotakemeawayfromthis“valeoftears”ratherthanmakemeahelplesswitnessofthebutcherybymanbecomesavage,whetherhedarestocallhimselfaMuslimoraHinduorwhatnot.’21

Thecelebrationsofindependencehadhardlydieddownwhenon30January1948,aHinducommunalfanatic,NathuramGodse,assassinatedGandhijiortheFatheroftheNation.Thewholenationwasshockedandstrickenwithgriefandcommunalismretreatedfromthemindsofmenandwomen.Expressingthenation’ssorrow,NehruspokeovertheAllIndiaRadio:

Friendsandcomrades,thelighthasgoneoutofourlivesandthereisdarknesseverywhere...Thelighthasgoneout,Isaid,andyetIwaswrong.Forthelightthatshoneinthiscountrywasnoordinarylight...thatlightrepresentedsomethingmorethantheimmediatepresent;itrepresentedtheliving,theeternaltruths,remindingusoftherightpath,drawingusfromerror,takingthis-ancientcountryto

freedom.22

RealizingtheRashtriyaSwayamSevakSangh(RSS)’sadherencetotheideologyofcommunalismandviolenceandthehatredthatithadbeenspreadingagainstGandhiandsecularismweretherealforcesbehindtheassassination—theRSSmenhadevencelebrateditinmanyplaces—thegovernmentimmediatelybannedtheRSSandarrestedmostofitsleadersandfunctionaries.Nehru,ofcourse,hadforsometimebeencharacterizingtheRSSasafascistorganization.InDecember1947hestated:‘WehaveagreatdealofevidencetoshowthattheRSSisanorganizationwhichisinthenatureofaprivatearmyandwhichisdefinitelyproceedingonthestrictestNazilines,evenfollowingthetechniqueoforganization.’23

Thegovernment,however,hadregardforcivilliberties,eveninthecaseoforganizationsliketheRSS.Nehru,forexample,hadwrittentoPatelon29June1949:‘inexistingcircumstancesthelesswehaveofthesebansanddetentions,thebetter.’24ThebanontheRSSwasliftedinJuly1949afterithadacceptedtheconditionslaiddownbyPatelastheHomeMinister.Theseconditionswere:TheRSSwouldadoptawrittenandpublishedconstitution,restrictitselftoculturalactivitiesandnotmeddlewithpolitics,renounceviolenceandsecrecy,professloyaltytoIndia’sflagandConstitutionandorganizeitselfalongdemocraticlines.

RehabilitationoftheRefugees

ThegovernmenthadtostretchitselftothemaximumtogiverelieftoandresettleandrehabilitatethenearlysixmillionrefugeesfromPakistanwhohadlosttheirallthereandwhoseworldhadbeenturnedupsidedown.Thetasktooksometimebutitwasaccomplished.By1951,theproblemoftherehabilitationoftherefugeesfromWestPakistanhadbeenfullytackled.ThetaskofrehabilitatingandresettlingrefugeesfromEastBengalwasmademoredifficultbythefact

thattheexodusofHindusfromEastBengalcontinuedforyears.WhilenearlyalltheHindusandSikhsfromWestPakistanhadmigratedinonegoin1947,alargenumberofHindusinEastBengalhadstayedonthereintheinitialyearsof1947and1948.ButascommunalriotsbrokeoutperiodicallyinEastBengal,therewasasteadystreamofrefugeesfromthereyearafteryeartill1971.Providingthemwithworkandshelterandpsychologicalassurance,thereforebecameacontinuousandhenceadifficulttask.UnlikeinBengal,mostoftherefugeesfromWestPunjabcouldoccupythelargelandsandpropertyleftbytheMuslimmigrantstoPakistanfromPunjab,U.P.andRajasthanandcouldthereforeberesettledonland.ThiswasnotthecaseinWestBengal.Alsobecauseoflinguisticaffinity,itwaseasierforPunjabiand

Sindhirefugeestosettleintoday’sHimachalPradeshandHaryanaandwesternU.P.,RajasthanandDelhi.TheresettlementoftherefugeesfromEastBengalcouldtakeplaceonlyinBengalandtoalesserextentinAssamandTripura.Asaresult‘averylargenumberofpeoplewhohadbeenengagedinagriculturaloccupationsbeforetheirdisplacementwereforcedtoseeksurvivalinsemi-urbanandurbancontextsas

theunderclass,’andcontributedto‘theprocessofimmiserisation’ofWestBengal.25

RelationswithPakistan

MoreintractablewastheproblemofdealingwithPakistan.DespitetheKashmirissue,NehruandtheGovernmentofIndiaadoptedtowardsPakistanapolicyofnon-rancourandfairdealingandofpromotingconciliationandreducingmutualtensions.InJanuary1948,theGovernmentofIndia,followingafastbyGandhiji,paidPakistanRs550millionaspartoftheassetsofPartition,evenwhenitfearedthatthemoneymightbeusedtofinancemilitaryactioninKashmir.Thegovernmentsofthetwocountriesdifferedonissuesraisedbyevacueeproperty,leftbehindbythosewhomigratedfromthetwocountries,buteveryeffortwasmadetoresolvethemthroughnegotiations.AlongwiththeKashmirissue,animportantsourceofconstanttensionbetweenthetwocountrieswas

thestrongsenseofinsecurityamongHindusinEastBengal,fuelledprimarilybythecommunalcharacterofPakistan’spoliticalsystem.ThisledtothesteadymigrationofthepersecutedHindusfromEastBengaltoWestBengalandretaliatoryattacksonMuslimsinWestBengal,leadingtotheirmigration.ManyurgedtheGovernmentofIndiatointerveneinEastBengalmilitarilytoprotecttheminoritythere.But,thoughveryconcernedaboutthefateofHindusinEastBengalandtheriseofcommunalsentimentinIndia,NehruandtheGovernmentofIndiarefusedtogetprovokedintoretaliatoryaction.Regardingitasahumanproblem,governmenttriedtosolveitthroughpersuasionandpressure,evenwhiletakingstrongactionagainstattacksonMuslimsinWestBengal.NehruurgedPakistantoputanendtocommunalattacksonHindusandtoprovidethemwithsecuritysothattheystayedoninEastBengal.Herepeatedlystressedthedutyofeachcountrytoprotectitsminorities.HeeventhoughtofresigningfromofficeandtouringEastBengalasaprivatepersontorepeatGandhiji’sapproachinNoakhali.On8April1950,theprimeministersofIndiaandPakistansignedanagreementknownastheNehru-

LiaqatPacttoresolvetheissueofprotectionoftheminorities.ThePactmetwiththestrongdisapprovaloftheHinducommunalistsandthetwoMinistersfromBengal,ShyamaPrasadMookerjeeandK.C.Neogi,resignedfromtheCabinetinprotest.ItwasplainsailingforthePactelsewhereinthecountry,givenSardarPatel’ssupportforit.ThemigrationofHindusfromEastBengal,however,continueddespitethePact.Notwithstandingcontinuousdifferencesandacrimony,thetwogovernmentswerealsoabletosign

severalagreementsontradeandtravelbetweenthetwocountries.OneofthemostticklishproblemsfacedbythetwocountrieswasthatofthedistributionofcanalwaterinPunjab.Showingadegreeofgenerosity,theGovernmentofIndiaagreedtosupplyanundiminishedquantityofwatertoPakistanpendingalong-termengineeringsolutiontotheproblembasedonmutualdiscussionundertheWorldBank’sauspices.Ingeneral,theGovernmentofIndiafollowedthepolicyoftryingtoimproverelationswithPakistan

and,aboveall,topreventtheemergenceofaclimateofhostilityandhatred.Nehru,inparticular,repeatedlyassuredthepeopleofPakistanthatIndiadidnotthinkofPakistanasanenemy.Oneofthe

reasonsforthispolicywastheefforttopreserveandstrengthenthesecularatmospherewithinIndia,whichwasbeingendangeredbytheHinducommunalists.And,undoubtedly,itdidservethatpurposeinthelongrun,eventhoughitfailedtomollifyPakistanorconvinceitofIndia’sgoodintentions.Nehruwasvoicinghisown,hisgovernment’sandothersecularIndians’opinionwhenin1950he

expressedthesentimentunderlyinghisapproachtowardsPakistan:Ultimatelywecannotgoagainstthecurrentsofhistory.IamsosureofthedesireofourpeoplethatIhavearrivedatthisconclusion.Thoughwemayhavebeenpartitionedandwemayhavebeendivorcedfromeachother,ourownhistorical,culturalandothercontacts,geographic,economicandeveryother,aresofundamentallygreat,despiteeverythingthathappened,anddespiteallthatpassionandprejudice,andinspiteofevengrossinhumanityandkilling,thatultimatelythebasicprincipleswillsurvive.Thesearethethingsthat

keepustogetherUnless,ofcourse,IndiaandPakistanareterriblybackwardcountriesculturally.26

NehruandtheCommunists

Intheearlypost-independenceperiod,thegovernmentwasfacedwithanotherchallenge;thistimefromtheleft.Asweshallseeinchapter15,theCommunistPartyofIndia(CPI)proclaimedthebeginningofageneralrevolutioninIndiainFebruary1948,declaringtheNehrugovernmentofbeinganagentofimperialistandsemi-feudalforces.Itinitiatedmilitantmassmovementsinvariousareas,themostprominentbeingtheattempttoorganizearailwaystrikealloverthecountryon9March1949.ItalsocontinuedthearmedstruggleintheTelenganaareaoftheHyderabadstatebegunearlieragainsttheNizam.Thiseffortatrevolutioncontinuedtillthemiddleof1951.Nehruwasappalled,butthoughhewashighlycriticalofthepolicyandactivitiesoftheCPI,he

resistedbanningittillhefeltthattherewasenoughproofofitsviolentactivities.EventhenhepermittedthebanningoftheCPIonlyinWestBengalandMadraswhereitwasmostactive.Beinginagreementwiththebasicsocio-economicobjectivesoftheCommunists,hebelievedthatthebestwaytocombattheirpoliticsandviolentactivitieswastoremovethediscontentofthepeoplethrougheconomicandotherreformistmeasures.Evenso,assoonastheCPIgaveupitsprogrammeofwagingarmedstruggle,includinginTelengana,anddeclareditsintentiontojointheparliamentarydemocraticprocess,NehrusawtoitthattheCPIwaslegalizedeverywhereanditsleadersandcadresreleased.Itwasalsoallowedtoparticipateinthegeneralelectionsof1951-52.Throughout,NehrudifferentiatedbetweentheCommunistsandthecommunalists.In1964,hesaidto

R.K.Karanjia27:NowbetweenthepartiesoftheRightandtheLeft,asyoudifferentiatethem,Iwouldalwayspreferapartywithsomeideologybuiltroundserioussocialandeconomicthinking.Youmentionedthecommunists.Thecommunists,withalltheirfaults,functionintermsofseriouseconomicsolutions.Whatwerepudiateisallthedogmaandviolenceoftheirapproach.Iftheycandivestthemselvesofthisobsessionandacceptthedisciplineofourparliamentarydemocracyingoodfaith,thereisnotmuchdifferencebetweentheirgoalofsocialismandours.Theotherpartiesyoumention,liketheJanSanghandSwatantra,seemtobeorganizedaroundplainlyfascistandfeudalconceptswithoutanysocialoreconomicbasis.Assuch,theyaredangeroustothecountryandourvaluesofdemocracyandsocialism.

7ConsolidationofIndiaAsaNation

Amajorproblem,perhapsthemostseriousone,thatIndiahasfacedsince1947hasbeenofnationalunityorconsolidationofthenation.TheproblemisalsosometimesreferredtoasnationalintegrationortheintegrationofIndianpeopleasapoliticalcommunity.

UnityinDiversity

TheIndiannationistheproductofahistoricalprocessandhasbeenthereforeinthemakingforverylong,atleastsomefivecenturies.TherootsofIndia’snationhoodliedeepinitshistoryandalsoinitsexperienceofthestruggleforindependence.Pre-colonialIndiahadalreadyacquiredsomeelementsofcommonexistenceandcommonconsciousness.Despiteitsimmenseculturaldiversity,certainstrandsofacommonculturalheritagehaddevelopedoverthecenturies,knittingitspeopletogetherandgivingthemasenseofoneness,evenwhileinculcatingtoleranceofdiversityanddissent.AsthepoetRabindranathTagoreputit,theunityofIndiaisthe‘unityofspirit.’Elementsofpolitical,administrativeandeconomicunityhaddevelopedespeciallyundertheMughals.Thepoliticsoftherulersandtheirterritorialambitionsoftencutacrossregionsandwere,attheirmostambitious,subcontinentalintheirreach.Also,despitebackwardmeansoftransportandcommunication,agreatdealofIndiawidetrade,specializationofproductionandcreditnetworksdeveloped,especiallyduringthelatemedievalperiod.AfeelingofIndianness,howevervague,hadcomeintobeing,astestifiedbythecurrencyoftheconceptsofBharatVarshaandHindustan.Aspointedoutinanearlierchapter,thecolonializationofIndianeconomy,societyandpolityfurtherstrengthenedtheprocessofIndia’sunification.Fromthemiddleofthenineteenthcentury,Indiansweremoreandmoresharingcommoneconomicandpoliticalinterestsandsocialandculturaldevelopmenteventhoughtheycontinuedtobedifferentiatedbylanguageandethnicity.Thenationalmovement,asseeninchapter3,playedapivotalroleinweldingIndianstogether

politicallyandemotionallyintoanationandintegratingtheminto‘acommonframeworkofpoliticalidentityandloyalty.’Thedepth,durationanddeepsocialpenetrationofthismovementcarriedthefeelingofunityandnationhoodtothemassofthepeople.Theleadersofthenationalmovementrealizedthatthemakingofthenationwasaprolongedand

continuousprocess,andwhichwasopentocontinuouschallengesandinterruption,disruptionandevenreversal.Onesuchdisruptionhadalreadyoccurredin1947.AsfoundersoftheRepublic,theseleaderswerethereforefullyawarethatafterindependencetootheprocessofunifyingIndiaandnationalintegrationwastobecarefullysustained,promotedandnurturedthroughideologicalandpoliticalendeavours.Infact,theleadersofIndiaafter1947sawthepreservationandconsolidationofIndia’sunityastheirbiggestchallenge.AsNehruputitin1952,‘themostimportantfactor,theoverridingfactor,istheunityofIndia.’1Toquotehimagain:‘Personally,Ifeel’,hesaidin1957,‘thatthebiggesttaskofallisnot

onlytheeconomicdevelopmentofIndiaasawhole,butevenmoresothepsychologicalandemotionalintegrationofthepeopleofIndia.’2

India’scomplexdiversityislegend.Itconsistsofalargenumberoflinguistic,culturalandgeographic-economiczones.Ithasfollowersofdifferentreligions,Hindus,Muslims,Christians.Sikhs,Parsis,BuddhistsandJews,apartfromthetribalswithamyriadbeliefsystems.In1950,theIndianConstitutionrecognizedfourteenmajorlanguages,besideshundredsothers,manyofwhichwerespokenbyjustamillionpersons.The1961Censuslisted1549languagesasmothertongues.Thetribals,constitutingoversixpercentofthepopulation,aredispersedalloverIndia.Giventhisdiversity,theleadersofthenationalmovementrealizedthattheIndiannationhadtobebuilt

onaverybroadfoundation.Indiacouldbeunifiedanditssegmentationovercomeonlybyacceptingthisimmensediversityandnotcounterposingittotheprocessofnation-in-the-making.TheemergenceofastrongnationalidentityandthepreservationofIndia’srichdiversitywereseenassimultaneousprocesses.Regionalculturalidentitieswoulddevelopnotinconflictwithbutaspartoftheall-Indiaidentity.ThisentireoutlookwasepitomizedinNehru’sapproachwhowroteinearly1951:‘WehavetorememberalwaysthatIndiaisacountrywithavarietyofcultures,habits,customsandwaysofliving...Itisverynecessary,Ithink,forallofustorememberthatthiswonderfulcountryofourshasinfinitevarietyandthereisabsolutelynoreasonwhyweshouldtrytoregimentitafterasinglepattern.Indeedthatisultimatelyimpossible.’3Atthesametime.thehopeaswellastheanswerwerethere:‘ButIndiaisfargreater,farricherandmorevariedthananypartofit.Wehavetodevelopanoutlookwhichembracesallthisvarietyandconsidersitourveryown.’4Thus,thedifferencesinlanguage,culture,religionandethnicweretobeseennotasobstaclestobeovercome,notasantitheticaltonationalconsolidation,butaspositivefeaturesthatweresourcesofstrengthtoemergingnationhood.Consequently,theconsolidationofindependentIndiawastooccuraroundtheconceptof‘unityindiversity’.Itwas,however,recognizedthatthediversityofIndiacouldalsobeasourceofweakness.Diversity

couldbeusedfordivisivepurposesandtransformedintodisruptivetendencies,suchascommunalism,casteism,linguist,andregionalexclusiveness.Theproblemofintegratingdiverseloyaltieswasthereforequitereal,especiallyasrapidsocialchangesledtoincreaseinthescaleandnumberofsocialconflicts.Theissuesofjobs,educationalopportunities,accesstopoliticalpowerandshareinthelargereconomiccakecouldanddidfuelrivalriesandconflictsbasedonreligion,region,caste,andlanguage.Specialeffortswerenecessary,differentfromthoseinotherpartsoftheworld,tocarefullypromotenationalunity.Thebroadstrategyfornationalconsolidationafter1947involvedterritorialintegration,mobilizationofpoliticalandinstitutionalresources,economicdevelopment,adoptionofpolicieswhichwouldpromotesocialjustice,removeglaringinequalitiesandprovideequalopportunities.Theleadershipevolvedapoliticalinstitutionalstructureconducivetonationalconsolidation.Atthe

heartofthisstructurelaytheinaugurationofademocraticandcivillibertarianpolity.Theargumentwasrejectedthatdemocracyandnationalintegrationwerenotcompatibleincaseofnewlyliberatedanddevelopingcountries,andthatanauthorianpoliticalstructurewasneededtoholdtogethersuchadiversenationasIndia.Onthecontrary,preciselybecauseIndiawassodiverseitneededdemocracyratherthanforceorcoerciantobindit.NehrurepeatedlywarnedhiscountrymenthatinIndia‘anyreversalofdemocraticmethodsmightleadtodisruptionandviolence.’India,heunderlined,couldonlybeheld

togetherbyademocraticstructurewithfullfreedomasalsoopportunityforthediversesocioeconomic,culturalandpoliticalvoicestoexpressthemselves.Theconstitutionalstructureestablishedin1950encompassedthedemandsofdiversityaswellasthe

requirementsofunity.ItprovidedforafederalstructurewithastrongCentrebutalsoagreatdealofautonomyforthestates.ThemakersoftheConstitutionkeptinviewthedifferencebetweendecentralizationanddisintegrationandbetweenunityandintegrationandcentralization.Theconstitutionalstructurewasnotonlyconducivetonationalintegrationbutprovidedthebasicframeworkwithinwhichthestruggleagainstdivisiveforcescouldbecarriedon.Thepoliticalleadershipwastouseelectionsbothtopromotenationalconsolidationandtolegitimizeitspoliciesofintegration.Theparliamentwastheinstitutionwherebasicandultimatepowerresidedandwhichactedastheopenarenawheredifferentpoliticaltrendscouldexpressthemselvesasalsocontendforpower.Invariably,theissuesandproblems,asalsoprogrammesandpolicies,debatedtherewereall-Indiainscale.AsAsokaMehtaputit,theparliamentactedasthegreatunifierofthenation.Also,politicalpartiesactedasagreatintegratingforce.Allthemajorpost-1947politicalparties—

Socialistparty,CommunistPartyofIndia,theJanSanghandlatertheSwatantraparty—wereall-Indiaincharacterandintheirorganizationandideology;theystoodfortheunityofthecountry.Theystrovefornationalgoalsandmobilizedpeopleonanall-Indiabasisandonall-Indiaissuesevenwhentheircapacitytodosowaslimitedtoparticularregions.AllthiswasperhapsevenmoretrueofCongressinthepost-independenceyears.Ithadastrongandlargeorganizationcoveringalmostallpartsofthecountry.Itwasabletomaintaininternalpartycoherenceandunity,andwasalsowillingtoplaytheroleofacementingforceinsocietyandpolity.Itisimportanttorememberthatimmediatelyafterindependence,withtherapidmarginalizationofthecommunalparties,themajordivideinIndianpoliticsandamongtheintelligentsiawasonpoliticalandideologicalgroundsratherthanonthebasisofcaste,religionorlanguage.Itisalsosignificantthatthemajorvocalsocialgroupsandclasses—thebourgeoisie,theworkingclassandtheintelligentsia—wereall-IndiainoutlookandstoodfornationalunityIndiannationalism,bothbeforeandafterindependence,hadlittledifficultyincomingtotermswiththeemergingclassconsciousnessasalsoclassorganizationssuchastradeunionsandKisanSabhasononesideandtheFederationofChambersofCommerceandIndustry(FICCI)ontheother.NosectionofIndiansocietyorpolitysawloyaltytoaclassorclassorganizationsasthreateningnationalcohesion.Theroleoftheleadershipanditsmanneroffunctioninginnation-makingandnationalconsolidationis

quiteimportant.Theleadersofthenationalmovementthoughtinnationaltermsandwerefullycommittedtonationalunityandconsolidation,andthiscommitmentwaswidelyaccepted.Further,theprominentleadersofindependentIndia—JawaharlalNehru,SardarPatel,MaulanaAzad,RajendraPrasad—werenotassociatedwithanyoneregion,language,religion,orcaste.ThiswasalsotrueoftheprominentoppositionleaderssuchasJayaprakashNarayan,J.B.Kripalani,RammanoharLohia,ShyamaPrasadMukherjee,B.T.RanadiveandAjoyGhosh.AmajorassetoftheCongressleadershipwasthatitwaswell-versedinaccommodativepolitics.As

broughtoutinchapter3above,ithadbeenabletokeepuniteddiversepoliticalandideologicaltrendsduringtheanti-imperialiststruggle.Followingthis,after1947,despiteneartotalpoliticaldominance,itwaswillingtoconciliateandaccommodate,tolistentoandappeasetheoppositionpartiesanddissentinggroups.Inparticular,itwasquitesensitivetopopularrumblingsonlinguisticorotherculturalissues.

Reactingstronglytoviolence,itresponded,oftensympathetically,todemandspressedthroughnon-violentmeansandmassbacking.Nehru,forexample,waswillingtopersuadeandaccommodatetheCommunistsoncetheygaveuprecoursetoviolence.Otherpoliticalpartiestoo,includingtheCPI,cametoshareaftersometimethesamemeans,methodsandvaluesforresolvingsocialconflicts,differingonlyinrhetoric.TheIndianarmyandadministrativeserviceswerealsoaforceforforgingnationalunity.India

developedafter1947anationaladministrativeservicewithrecruitmenttoitstopechelons,theIAS,theIPS,andothercentralservices,takingplaceonthebasisofindividualmerit,irrespectiveofcasteorreligion,fromallregionsandlinguisticareas.Theseserviceswereall-Indiaincharacterandsentimentandallofficersselectedweregivencommontrainingandowedallegiancetothecentralgovernment,whichalsohadtheultimatepowertopromoteordisciplinethem.Thecentralservices,asalsothestateservices,werebasicallynon-politicalandacceptedtheauthorityofthepartywhichwasvotedtopowerbythepeople.Likewise,thearmywasanationalforcewhoseofficersandrankswererecruitedfromallpartsofthecountry.TheIndianeconomy,nationalmarket,andtransportandcommunicationnetworkswerefurtherunified

after1947.Industrialdevelopmentwaspromotedonanationalscaleanddams,steelmills,fertilizerplants,cementfactories,andheavymachineryandelectricplantssoonbecamesymbolsofnationalendeavouraswellasnationalunity.JawaharlalNehruandotherleaderssaweconomicdevelopmentasessentialfornationalconsolidation.

Soonafterindependence,asweshallseeinchapter26,thegovernmentsetupaPlanningCommissionandtookactivemeasuresforplannedeconomicdevelopment.ThoughthegovernmentandthePlanningCommissiondidnotsucceedinputtinganendtoregionaleconomicdisparities,theydidavoidinequalityinthedistributionofeconomicresourcesamongstates.Ingeneral,thecentralgovernmentfollowedaccommodativepoliciestowardsthestates.Consequently,thoughtherewasconstantgrumblingandplentyofgrievancestherewasnoseriousdiscontentinthestatesandregionsongroundsofdiscriminationbythecentralgovernmentandthereforenoseparatistfeelingsonthataccount.Nationalintegrationalsorequiredpolicieswhichwouldpromotesocialjusticeandgreatersocialand

economicequality.Thenationalmovementhadalsolinkedtheprocessofnation-in-the-makingwithsocio-economicchangesintheinterestsoftheoppressedandthedeprived.Consolidationofthenationafterindependencehadtobejudgedintermsofhowitaffectedtheirlives.TheentireIndianpeopleandnotmerelythemiddleandupperclasseshadtobenefitfromthecomingofindependenceandprocessesofeconomicdevelopmentandpoliticaldemocracy.TheConstitutionlaidthebasisforreductionofsocialdisparitybyputtinganendtoanydiscrimination

ongroundsofreligioncasteorsex.Redeemingthenationalmovement’smajorpledgetothedepressedsectionsofsociety,itprovidedreservationsforScheduledCastesandScheduledTribesineducationalinstitutions,employmentandinthelegislatures.Soonafter1947,anumberofsocialreformsandwelfarelawswerepassed.Landlordismwasabolishedandtherewassomeredistributionofland.Alawwaspassedmakinguntouchabilityanoffence.Unfortunately,nostruggleagainstthehierarchicalcastesystemfollowed,sothat,ontheonehandcastediscriminationandoppressioncontinued,ontheother,casteismortheuseofcastesolidarityforelectoralandotherpoliticalpurposesbegantogrow.Themomentumofsocialreformwaslostbytheearlyfifties.Removalofsocialoppressionandsocialdiscriminationand

exploitation,basedoncaste,religion,languageorethnicity,andofgrosseconomicinequalityhasremainedtheweakestpartoftheagendafornationalintegration.Fromthestart,thefoundingfathersstoodforsecularismasthebasisforthenation.Undauntedby

Partitionandtheaccompanyingriots,theyremainedloyaltothesecularvisionofthenationalmovement.Theyalsodealtfirmlywithcommunalviolenceandonthewholesucceededinprotectingthereligiousminorities.IndependentIndia’sforeignpolicyservedasanotherunifyingforce.Thepolicyofnon-alignmentand

anti-colonialismandNehru’sgrowingstatureasaworldfigurecontributedtoasenseofnationalprideinIndiaamongallsectionsofpeoplealloverthecountryandirrespectiveoftheirpoliticalalignment.Atthemomentoffreedomtheneedforunitywasurgentbutalsopresentwastheproblemofintegrating

diverseloyalties.Thestrategiesandapproachespromotingintegrationrequiredtimebutthepeoplewereinahurryandtherewasplentyofscopeforconflicts.Manyobservers,infact,predictedgrowingdisunityandevenbreak-upofthecountry.Inthenextsectionandthefollowingchapterwewillstudysomeoftheareasofdiversitywhichproducedconflictsandthemannerinwhichthesedifferencesweresoughttoberesolved.

TheLanguageProblem

ThelanguageproblemwasthemostdivisiveissueinthefirsttwentyyearsofindependentIndia,anditcreatedtheapprehensionamongmanythatthepoliticalandculturalunityofthecountrywasindanger.Peoplelovetheirlanguage;itisanintegralpartofculture.Consequently,linguisticidentityhasbeenastrongforceinallsocieties.Thisisevenmoretrueofa

multilingualsocietylikeIndia’s.Linguisticdiversitywouldinevitablygivebirthtostrongpoliticalcurrentsaroundissueslinkedtolanguage,suchaseducationalandeconomicdevelopment,jobandothereconomicopportunitiesandaccesstopoliticalpower.TheIndianConstitutionrecognizessixteenmajorlanguages,includingEnglishandSanskrit.Inaddition,

thereareamyriadlanguagesspokenbythetribalsandothers,withorwithouttheirownscripts.ThemodelthatindependentIndiahasadoptedisnotthatofassimilationinto,orsuppressionofthemanylanguagesbyoneofthem.Thisisinanycaseimpossibleinademocraticpolity.Thefeasibleoptionistoacceptandlivewiththis‘multiplicity’inamannerthatconflictsituationsdonotemergeorpersistforlong.Theproblemposedtonationalconsolidationbylinguisticdiversityhastakentwomajorforms.These

arediscussedhereintwoseparatesections:(i)Thedisputeoverofficiallanguageoftheunion,and(ii)Thelinguisticreorganizationofthestates.

TheOfficialLanguage

ThecontroversyonthelanguageissuebecamemostvirulentwhenittooktheformofoppositiontoHindiandtendedtocreateconflictbetweenHindi-speakingandnon-Hindispeakingregionsofthecountry.Thedisputewasnotoverthequestionofanationallanguage,thatisonelanguagewhichallIndianswouldadoptaftersometime,sincetheviewthatonenationallanguagewasessentialtoanIndiannationalidentityhadalreadybeenrejectedoverwhelminglybythesecularmajorityofthenationalleadership.Indiawasamultilingualcountryandithadtoremainso.TheIndiannationalmovementhadcarriedonits

ideologicalandpoliticalworkthroughthedifferentIndianregionallanguages.ItsdemandthenwasforthereplacementofEnglishbythemothertongueasthemediumforhighereducation,administrationandcourtsineachlinguisticarea.JawaharlalNehruhadclearlyputacrossthisviewin1937:‘Ourgreatprovinciallanguages...areancientlanguageswitharichinheritance,eachspokenbymanymillionsofpersons,eachtiedupinextricablywiththelifeandcultureandideasofthemassesaswellasoftheupperclasses.Itisaxiomaticthatthemassescanonlygroweducationallyandculturallythroughthemediumoftheirownlanguage.Therefore,itisinevitablethatwelaystressontheprovinciallanguagesandcarryonmostofourworkthroughthem...Oursystemofeducationandpublicworkmustthereforebebasedontheprovinciallanguages.’5

TheissueofanationallanguagewasresolvedwhentheConstitution-makersvirtuallyacceptedallthemajorlanguagesas‘languagesofIndia’orIndia’snationallanguages.Butthemattercouldnotendthere,forthecountry’sofficialworkcouldnotbecarriedoninsomanylanguages.Therehadtobeonecommonlanguageinwhichthecentralgovernmentwouldcarryonitsworkandmaintaincontactwiththestategovernments.Thequestionarosewhatwouldbethislanguageofall-Indiacommunication?OrwhatwouldbeIndia’sofficialandlinklanguage?Onlytwocandidateswereavailableforthepurpose:EnglishandHindi.TheConstituentAssemblyheatedlydebatedwhichoneshouldbeselected.But,infact,thechoicehadalreadybeenmadeinthepre-independenceperiodbytheleadershipofthe

nationalmovement,whichwasconvincedthatEnglishwouldnotcontinuetobetheall-IndiamediumofcommunicationinfreeIndia.Forexample,evenwhileappreciatingthevalueofEnglishasaworldlanguage,throughwhichIndianscouldaccessworldscienceandcultureandmodernwesternideas,Gandhijiwasconvincedthatthegeniusofapeoplecouldnotunfoldnorcouldtheircultureflowerinaforeignlanguage.Infact,Gandhiji,duringthetwentiesemphasizedthatEnglishis‘alanguageofinternationalcommerce,itisthelanguageofdiplomacy,itcontainsmanyarichliterarytreasure,anditgivesusanintroductiontoWesternthoughtandculture.’ButhearguedEnglishoccupiedinIndia‘anunnaturalplaceduetoourunequalrelationswithEnglishmen.’6English‘hassappedtheenergyofthenation...ithasestrangedthemfromthemasses...ThesoonerthereforeeducatedIndiashakesitselffreefromthehypnoticspelloftheforeignmedium,thebetteritwouldbeforthemandthepeople.’7Andhewrotein1946:‘IlovetheEnglishtongueinitsownplace,butIamitsinveterateopponentifitusurpsaplacewhichdoesnotbelongtoit.Englishistodayadmittedlytheworldlanguage.Iwouldthereforeaccorditaplaceasasecond,optionallanguage.’8Nehruechoedthesesentimentsinhis1937articleon‘TheQuestionofLanguage’andalsoduringtheConstituentAssemblydebates.HindiorHindustani,theothercandidateforthestatusoftheofficialorlinklanguage,hadalready

playedthisroleduringthenationaliststruggle,especiallyduringthephaseofmassmobilization.Hindihadbeenacceptedbyleadersfromnon-Hindispeakingregionsbecauseitwasconsideredtobethemostwidelyspokenandunderstoodlanguageinthecountry.LokamanyaTilak,Gandhiji,C.Rajagopalachari,SubhasBose,andSardarPatelweresomeofHindi’senthusiasticsupporters.Initssessionsandpoliticalwork,theCongresshadsubstitutedHindiandtheprovinciallanguagesinplaceofEnglish.In1925,Congressamendeditsconstitutiontoread:‘TheproceedingsoftheCongressshallbeconductedasfaraspossibleinHindustani.TheEnglishlanguageoranyprovinciallanguagemaybeusedifthespeakerisunabletospeakHindustaniorwhenevernecessary.TheproceedingsoftheProvincialCongress

CommitteeshallordinarilybeconductedinthelanguageoftheProvinceconcerned.Hindustanimayalsobeused.’9Reflectinganationalconsensus,theNehruReporthadlaiddownin1928thatHindustaniwhichmightbewritteninDevanagariorUrduscriptwouldbethecommonlanguageofIndia,buttheuseofEnglishwouldbecontinuedforsometime.ItisinterestingthatultimatelytheConstitutionoffreeIndiawastoadoptthisstand,exceptforreplacingHindustanibyHindi.TherealdebateintheConstituentAssemblyoccurredovertwoquestions:WouldHindiorHindustanireplaceEnglish?Andwhatwouldbethetime-frameforsuchareplacementtohappen?Sharpdifferencesmarkedtheinitialdebatesastheproblemoftheofficiallanguagewashighly

politicizedfromthebeginning.ThequestionofHindiorHindustaniwassoonresolved,thoughwithagreatdealofacrimony.GandhijiandNehrubothsupportedHindustani,writteninDevnagariorUrduscript.ThoughmanysupportersofHindidisagreed,theyhadtendedtoaccepttheGandhi-Nehruviewpoint.ButoncethePartitionwasannounced,thesechampionsofHindiwereemboldened,especiallyastheprotagonistsofPakistanhadclaimedUrduasthelanguageofMuslimsandofPakistan.ThevotariesofHindinowbrandedUrdu‘asasymbolofsecession’.TheydemandedthatHindiinDevnagariscriptbemadethenationallanguage.TheirdemandsplittheCongresspartydownthemiddle.IntheendtheCongressLegislativePartydecidedforHindiagainstHindustaniby78to77votes,eventhoughNehruandAzadfoughtforHindustani.TheHindiblocwasalsoforcedtocompromise;itacceptedthatHindiwouldbetheofficialandnotthenationallanguage.Theissueofthetime-frameforashiftfromEnglishtoHindiproducedadividebetweenHindiandnon-

Hindiareas.ThespokespersonsofHindiareaswerefortheimmediateswitchovertoHindi,whilethosefromnon-HindiareasadvocatedretentionofEnglishforalongifnotindefiniteperiod.Infact,theywantedthestatusquotocontinuetillafutureparliamentdecidedtoshifttoHindiastheofficiallanguage.NehruwasformakingHinditheofficiallanguage,buthealsowasinfavourofEnglishcontinuingasanadditionalofficiallanguage,makingthetransitiontoHindigradual,andactivelyencouragingtheknowledgeofEnglishbecauseofitsusefulnessinthecontemporaryworld.ThecaseforHindibasicallyrestedonthefactthatitwasthelanguageofthelargestnumber,thoughnot

ofthemajority,ofthepeopleofIndia;itwasalsounderstoodatleastintheurbanareasofmostofnorthernIndiafromBengaltoPunjabandinMaharashtraandGujarat.ThecriticsofHinditalkedaboutitbeinglessdevelopedthanotherlanguagesasaliterarylanguageandasalanguageofscienceandpolitics.ButtheirmainfearwasthatHindi’sadoptionastheofficiallanguagewouldplacenon-Hindiareas,especiallySouthIndia,atadisadvantageintheeducationalandeconomicspheres,andparticularlyincompetitionforappointmentsingovernmentandthepublicsector.SuchopponentstendedtoarguethatimpositionofHindionnon-Hindiareaswouldleadtotheireconomic,political,socialandculturaldominationbyHindiareas.TheConstitution-makerswereawarethatastheleadersofamulti-lingualcountrytheycouldnot

ignore,orevengivetheimpressionofignoring,theinterestofanyonelinguisticarea.Acompromisewasarrivedat,thoughthisledtothelanguageprovisionsoftheConstitutionbecoming‘complicated,ambiguousandconfusinginsomerespects.’TheConstitutionprovidedthatHindiinDevnagriscriptwithinternationalnumeralswouldbeIndia’sofficiallanguage.Englishwastocontinueforuseinallofficialpurposestill1965,whenitwouldbereplacedbyHindi.Hindiwastobeintroducedinaphasedmanner.After1965itwouldbecomethesoleofficiallanguage.However,theparliamentwouldhavethepowerto

providefortheuseofEnglishforspecifiedpurposesevenafter1965.TheConstitutionlaiduponthegovernmentthedutytopromotethespreadanddevelopmentofHindiandprovidedfortheappointmentofaCommissionandaJointCommitteeoftheParliamenttoreviewtheprogressinthisrespect.Thestatelegislaturesweretodecidethematterofofficiallanguageatthestatelevel,thoughtheofficiallanguageoftheUnionwouldserveasthelanguageofcommunicationbetweenthestatesandtheCentreandbetweenonestateandanother.ImplementationofthelanguageprovisionsoftheConstitutionprovedtobeaformidabletaskeven

thoughtheCongresspartywasinpoweralloverthecountry.Theissueremainedasubjectofintensecontroversy,andwhichbecameincreasinglyacrimoniouswithpassageoftime,thoughformanyyearsnobodychallengedtheprovisionthatHindiwouldeventually,becomethesoleofficiallanguage.TheConstitution-makershadhopedthatby1965theHindiprotagonistswouldovercomethe

weaknessesofHindi,wintheconfidenceofnon-Hindiareas,andholdtheirhandforalongerperiodtillsuchtimetheyhaddoneso.ItwasalsohopedthatwiththerapidgrowthofeducationHinditoowouldspreadandresistancetoHindiwouldgraduallyweakenandevendisappear.But,unfortunately,thespreadofeducationwastooslowtomakeanimpactinthisrespect.Moreover,thechancesofHindi’ssuccessasanofficiallanguagewerespoiltbytheproponentsof

Hindithemselves.Insteadoftakingupagradual,slowandmoderateapproachtogainacceptanceofHindibynon-Hindiareasandtorelyonpersuasion,themorefanaticsamongthem,preferredimpositionofHindithroughgovernmentaction.Theirzealandenthusiasmtendedtoprovokeacounter-movement.AsNehrutoldtheparliamentin1959,itwastheirover-enthusiasmwhichcameinthewayofthespreadandacceptanceofHindifor‘thewaytheyapproachthissubjectoftenirritatesothers,asitirritatesme.’10

Hindisufferedfromthelackofsocialscienceandscientificwriting.Inthefifties,forexampletherewerehardlyanyacademicjournalsinHindioutsidetheliteraryfield.InsteadofdevelopingHindiasameansofcommunicationinhighereducation,journalism,andsoon,theHindileadersweremoreinterestedinmakingitthesoleofficiallanguage.AmajorweaknessoftheHindiprotagonistswasthat,insteadofdevelopingasimplestandardlanguage

whichwouldgetwideacceptanceoratleastpopularizethecolloquialHindiasspokenandwritteninHindiareasasalsoinmanyotherpartsofIndia,theytriedtoSanskritizethelanguage,replacingcommonlyunderstoodwordswithnewlymanufactured,unwieldyandlittleunderstoodonesinthenameofthe‘purity’oflanguage,freeofalieninfluences.Thismadeitmoreandmoredifficultfornon-Hindispeakers(orevenHindispeakers)tounderstandorlearnthenewversion.AllIndiaRadio,whichcouldhaveplayedanimportantroleinpopularizingHindi,insteadtooktosoSanskritizingitsHindinewsbulletinsthatmanylistenerswouldswitchofftheirradioswhentheHindinewswasbroadcast.Nehru,aHindispeakerandwriter,wastocomplainin1958thathewasunabletounderstandthelanguageinwhichhisownHindispeecheswerebeingbroadcast.ButthepurifiersofHindididnotrelentandresistedallattemptstosimplifytheHindiofnewsbroadcasts.ThisledmanyuncommittedpersonstojointheranksoftheopponentsofHindi.NehruandthemajorityofIndianleadershoweverremainedcommittedtothetransitiontoHindiasthe

officiallanguage.Theybelievedthat,thoughthestudyofEnglishwastobeencouraged,EnglishcouldnotcontinueforeverasIndia’sofficiallanguage.IntheinterestsofnationalunityasalsoeconomicandpoliticaldevelopmenttheyalsorealizedthatfulltransitiontoHindishouldnotbetime-boundandshould

awaitapoliticallymoreauspicioustimewhenthewillingconsentofthenon-Hindiareascouldbeobtained.Thenon-HindileadersbecamealsolessandlessopentopersuasionandtheiroppositiontoHindiincreasedwithtime.Oneresultofthisalienationofnon-HindilanguagegroupswasthattheytoowerenotopentorationalargumentsinfavourofHindi.InsteadtheyveeredtowardsanindefinitecontinuanceofEnglish.Sharpdifferencesontheofficiallanguageissuesurfacedduring1956-60,onceagainrevealingthe

presenceofdisruptivetendencies.In1956,theReportoftheOfficialLanguageCommission,setupin1955intermsofaconstitutionalprovision,recommendedthatHindishouldstartprogressivelyreplacingEnglishinvariousfunctionsofthecentralgovernmentwitheffectivechangetakingplacein1965.ItstwomembersfromWestBengalandTamilNadu,ProfessorSunitiKumarChatterjeeandP.Subbaroyan,however,dissented,accusingthemembersoftheCommissionofsufferingfromapro-Hindibias,andaskedforthecontinuationofEnglish.Ironically,ProfessorChatterjeewasinchargeoftheHindiPrachariniSabhainBengalbeforeindependence.TheCommission’sReportwasreviewedbyaspecialJointCommitteeoftheParliament.ToimplementtherecommendationsoftheJointCommittee,thePresidentissuedanorderinApril1960statingthatafter1965HindiwouldbetheprincipalofficiallanguagebutthatEnglishwouldcontinueastheassociateofficiallanguagewithoutanyrestrictionbeingplacedonitsuse.HindiwouldalsobecomeanalternativemediumfortheUnionPublicCommissionexaminationsaftersometime,butforthepresentitwouldbeintroducedintheexaminationsasaqualifyingsubject.InaccordancewiththePresident’sdirective,thecentralgovernmenttookaseriesofstepstopromoteHindi.TheseincludedthesettingupoftheCentralHindiDirectorate,publicationofstandardworksinHindiorinHinditranslationinvariousfields,compulsorytrainingofcentralgovernmentemployeesinHindi,andtranslationofmajortextsoflawintoHindiandpromotionoftheirusebythecourts.Allthesemeasuresarousedsuspicionandanxietyinthenon-Hindiareasandgroups.Norwerethe

Hindileaderssatisfied.Forexample,ProfessorSunitiKumarChatterjee,aneminentlinguistandaformerstaunchadvocateandpromoterofHindi,statedinhisdissentingnotetotheReportoftheOfficialLanguageCommissionthattheoutlookoftheCommissionwasoneofthe‘Hindispeakerswhoaretoprofitimmediatelyandforalongtimetocome,ifnotforever.’11Similarly,inMarch1958,C.Rajagopalachari,ex-PresidentoftheHindiPrachariniSabhaintheSouth,declaredthat‘Hindiisasmuchforeigntothenon-HindispeakingpeopleasEnglishtotheprotagonistsofHindi.’12Ontheotherhand,twomajorchampionsofHindi,PurshottamdasTandonandSethGovindDas,accusedtheJointParliamentaryCommitteeofbeingpro-English.ManyoftheHindileadersalsoattackedNehruandMaulanaAbulKalamAzad,theMinisterofEducation,fordraggingtheirfeetinimplementingtheconstitutionalprovisionsanddeliberatelydelayingthereplacementofEnglish.TheyinsistedthatthedeadlineforthechangeovertoHindilaiddownintheConstitutionmustberigidlyobserved.In1957,DrLohia’sSamyuktaSocialistPartyandtheJanSanghlaunchedamilitantmovement,whichcontinuedfornearlytwoyears,fortheimmediatereplacementofEnglishbyHindi.OneoftheagitationalmethodsadoptedbythefollowersofLohiaonalargescalewastodefaceEnglishsignboardsofshopsandinotherplaces.FullyawareofthedangerthattheofficiallanguageissuecouldposetoIndianpolity,theleadershipof

theCongresstookthegrievancesofthenon-Hindiareasseriouslyandhandledtheissuewithgreatcare

andcaution.Theattemptwastoworkforacompromise.Nehru,timeandagainmadeitclearthatanofficiallanguagecouldnotandwouldnotbeimposedonanyregionofthecountryandthatthepaceoftransitiontoHindiwouldhavetobedeterminedkeepinginviewthewishesofthenon-Hindipeople.InthishewassupportedbytheleadersofPrajaSocialistParty(PSP)andCommunistPartyofIndia(CPI).PSPcriticizedHindiextremismandsaidthatit‘mightseverelystraintheunityofamultilingualcountrylikeIndia.’13

ThehighlightofNehru’sapproachwasamajorstatementintheparliamenton7August1959.Toallaythefearsofthenon-Hindipeople,hegaveadefiniteassurance:‘IwouldhaveEnglishasanalternatelanguageaslongasthepeoplerequireit,andIwouldleavethedecisionnottotheHindi-knowingpeople,buttothenon-Hindi-knowingpeople.’HealsotoldthepeopleoftheSouththat‘iftheydonotwanttolearnHindi,letthemnotlearnHindi.’Herepeatedthisassuranceintheparliamenton4September1959.14

InpursuanceofNehru’sassurances,thoughwithdelaycausedbyinternalpartypressuresandtheIndia-Chinawar,anOfficialLanguagesActwaspassedin1963.TheobjectoftheAct,Nehrudeclared,was‘toremovearestrictionwhichhadbeenplacedbytheConstitutionontheuseofEnglishafteracertaindate,namely,1965.’15ButthispurposewasnotfullyservedastheassuranceswerenotclearlyarticulatedintheAct.TheActlaiddownthat‘theEnglishlanguagemay...continuetobeusedinadditiontoHindi.’Thenon-Hindigroupscriticizedtheuseoftheword‘may’inplaceoftheword‘shall’.ThismadetheActambiguousintheireyes;theydidnotregarditasastatutoryguarantee.ManyofthemwantedacastironguaranteenotbecausetheydistrustedNehrubutbecausetheywereworriedaboutwhatwouldhappenafterNehru,especiallyasthepressurefromtheHindileaderswasalsogrowing.ThedeathofNehruinJune1964increasedtheirapprehensionswhichwerefurtherfuelledbycertainhastystepstakenandcircularsissuedbyvariousministriestopreparethegroundforthechangeovertoHindiinthecomingyear.Forexample,instructionsweregiventhatthecentralgovernment’scorrespondencewiththestateswouldbeinHindi,thoughincaseofnon-HindistatesanEnglishtranslationwouldbeappended.LalBahadurShastri,Nehru’ssuccessorasprimeminister,wasunfortunatelynotsensitiveenoughtothe

opinionofnon-Hindigroups.Instead,oftakingeffectivestepstocountertheirfearsofHindibecomingthesoleofficiallanguage,hedeclaredthathewasconsideringmakingHindianalternativemediuminpublicserviceexaminations.Thismeantthatwhilenon-Hindispeakerscouldstillcompeteintheall-IndiaservicesinEnglish,theHindispeakerswouldhavetheadvantageofbeingabletousetheirmothertongue.Manynon-Hindileadersinprotestchangedtheirlineofapproachtotheproblemofofficiallanguage.

WhilepreviouslytheyhadwantedaslowingdownofthereplacementofEnglish,nowtheystarteddemandingthatthereshouldbenodeadlinefixedforthechangeover.Someoftheleaderswentmuchfurther.TheDravidaMunnetraKazaghamandC.Rajagopalachari,forexample,demandedthattheConstitutionshouldbeamendedandEnglishshouldbemadetheofficiallanguageofIndia.As26January1965approached,afearpsychosisgrippedthenon-Hindiareas,especiallyTamilNadu,

creatingastronganti-Hindimovement.On17January,theDMKorganizedtheMadrasStateAnti-HindiConferencewhichgaveacallforobserving26Januaryasadayofmourning.Students,concernedfortheircareersandapprehensivethattheywouldbeoutstrippedbyHindi-speakersintheall-Indiaservices,werethemostactiveinorganizingawidespreadagitationandmobilizingpublicopinion.Theyraisedandpopularizedtheslogan:‘Hindinever,Englishever.’TheyalsodemandedamendmentoftheConstitution.

Thestudents’agitationsoondevelopedintostate-wideunrest.TheCongressleadership,thoughcontrollingboththestateandthecentralgovernments,failedtogaugethedepthofthepopularfeelingandthewidespreadcharacterofthemovementandinsteadofnegotiatingwiththestudents,madeanefforttorepressit.WidespreadriotingandviolencefollowedintheearlyweeksofFebruaryleadingtolarge-scaledestructionofrailwaysandotherunionproperty.Sostrongwastheanti-HindifeelingthatseveralTamilyouth,includingfourstudents,burnedthemselvestodeathinprotestagainsttheofficiallanguagepolicy.TwoTamilministers,C.SubramaniamandAlagesan,resignedfromtheUnionCabinet.Theagitationcontinuedforabouttwomonths,takingatollofoversixtylivesthroughpolicefirings.TheonlyeminentcentralleadertoshowconcernfortheagitatorswasIndiraGandhi,thentheMinisterforInformationandBroadcasting.AttheheightoftheagitationsheflewtoMadras,‘rushedtothestorm-centreoftrouble’,showedsomesympathyfortheagitatorsandthusbecame,afterNehru,thefirstnorthernleadertowinthetrustoftheaggrievedTamilsaswellasofthepeopleoftheSouthingeneral.EffortsweremadebytheJanSanghandtheSSPtoorganizecounter-agitationintheHindiareasagainst

English,buttheydidnotgetmuchpublicsupport.TheagitationforcedboththeMadrasandtheUniongovernmentsandtheCongresspartytorevisetheir

stand.TheynowdecidedtoyieldtotheintensepublicmoodintheSouth,changetheirpolicyandacceptthemajordemandsoftheagitators.TheCongressWorkingCommitteeannouncedaseriesofstepswhichweretoformthebasisforacentralenactmentembodyingconcessionsandwhichledtothewithdrawaloftheHindiagitation.ThisenactmentwasdelayedbecauseoftheIndo-Pakwarof1965,whichsilencedalldissensioninthecountry.WiththedeathofLalBahadurShastriinJanuary1966,IndiraGandhibecametheprimeminister.As

shehadalreadywonthetrustofthepeopleoftheSouth,theywereconvincedthatagenuineeffortwouldbemadetoresolvethelong-festeringdispute.OtherfavourablefactorsweretheJanSangh’smutingoftheiranti-EnglishfervourandtheSSP’sacceptanceofthebasicfeaturesoftheagreementworkedoutin1965.DespitefacingeconomicproblemsandtheweakeningoftheCongress’spositioninparliamentinthe

1967elections,IndiraGandhimovedthebilltoamendthe1963OfficialLanguageActon27November.TheLokSabhaadoptedthebill,on16December1967,by205to41votes.TheActgaveanunambiguouslegalfortification,toNehru’sassurancesofSeptember1959.ItprovidedthattheuseofEnglishasanassociatelanguageinadditiontoHindifortheofficialworkattheCentreandforcommunicationbetweentheCentreandnon-Hindistateswouldcontinueaslongasthenon-Hindistateswantedit,givingthemfullvetopowersonthequestion.Avirtualindefinitepolicyofbilingualismwasadopted.TheparliamentalsoadoptedapolicyresolutionlayingdownthatthepublicserviceexaminationsweretobeconductedinHindiandEnglishandinalltheregionallanguageswiththeprovisothatthecandidatesshouldhaveadditionalknowledgeofHindiorEnglish.Thestatesweretoadoptathree-languageformulaaccordingtowhich,inthenon-Hindiareas,themothertongue,HindiandEnglishorsomeothernationallanguagewastobetaughtinschoolswhileintheHindiareasanon-Hindilanguage,preferablyasouthernlanguage,wastobetaughtasacompulsorysubject.TheGovernmentofIndiatookanotherimportantsteponthelanguagequestioninJuly1967.Onthe

basisoftheReportoftheEducationCommissionin1966,itdeclaredthatIndianlanguageswould

ultimatelybecomethemediumofeducationinallsubjectsattheuniversitylevel,thoughthethetime-frameforthechangeoverwouldbedecidedbyeachuniversitytosuititsconvenience.Aftermanytwistsandturns,agreatdealofdebateandseveralagitations,smallandbig,andmany

compromisesIndiahadarrivedatawidely-acceptedsolutionoftheverydifficultproblemoftheofficialandlinklanguageforthecountry.Since1967,thisproblemhasgraduallydisappearedfromthepoliticalscene,demonstratingthecapacityoftheIndianpoliticalsystemtodealwithacontentiousproblemonademocraticbasis,andinamannerthatpromotednationalconsolidation.Herewasanissuewhichemotionallydividedthepeopleandwhichcouldhavejeopardizedtheunityofthecountry,buttowhichawidelyacceptablesolutionwasfoundthroughnegotiationsandcompromise.AnditwasnotonlythenationalleadershipprovidedbytheCongress,withsomehiccupsontheway,whichcameuptothemark;theoppositionpartiestoomeasuredupwhenitcametothecrunch.Intheend,theDMK,inwhoserisetopowerthelanguageissueplayedanimportantrole,alsohelpedbycoolingdownthepoliticaltemperinTamilNadu.Ofcourse,nopoliticalproblemissolvedforalltimestocome.Problem-solvinginanationas

complexasIndiaisboundtobeacontinuousprocess.ButitissignificantthatHindihasbeenmakingrapidprogressinnon-Hindiareasthrougheducation,trade,tourism,films,radioandtelevision.TheuseofHindiasanofficiallanguagehasalsobeengrowingthoughEnglishisstilldominant.Simultaneously,English,asasecondlanguagehasbeenspreadingfast,includingintheHindi-speakingareas.AwitnessofthisisthenumberofprivateEnglish-mediumschools,howeverpoorinstaffandotherfacilities,whichnowdotthecountrysidefromKashmirtoKanyakumari.ThestandardsofspokenandwrittenEnglishhavefallenbuttheEnglish-knowingclasseshavemultipliedmanifold.BothEnglishandHindiarelikelytogrowaslinklanguagesjustasregionallanguagesaremoreandmoreoccupyingtheofficial,educationalandmediaspace.TheproofofthegrowthofHindi,Englishandregionallanguagesliesintherapidgrowthofnewspapersinallofthem.Infact,EnglishisnotonlylikelytosurviveinIndiaforalltimestocome,butitremainsandislikelytogrowasalanguageofcommunicationbetweentheintelligentsiaalloverthecountry,asalibrarylanguage,andasthesecondlanguageoftheuniversities.Hindi,ontheotherhand,hassofarfailedtoperformanyofthethreeroles.Ofcourse,theidealofmakingHindithelinklanguageofthecountryremains.ButthewaytheenthusiasticprotagonistsofHindipromotedHindi’scause,theypushedbackthechancesofthishappeningforalongtimetocome.

8ConsolidationofIndiaAsaNation:TheLinguisticReorganizationoftheStates

Thereorganizationofthestatesonthebasisoflanguage,amajoraspectofnationalconsolidationandintegration,cametotheforealmostimmediatelyafterindependence.Theboundariesofprovincesinpre-1947IndiahadbeendrawninahaphazardmannerastheBritishconquestofIndiahadproceededfornearlyahundredyears.Noheedwaspaidtolinguisticorculturalcohesionsothatmostoftheprovincesweremultilingualandmulti-cultural.Theinterspersedprincelystateshadaddedafurtherelementofheterogenity.Thecaseforlinguisticstatesasadministrativeunitswasverystrong.Languageiscloselyrelatedto

cultureandthereforetothecustomsofpeople.Besides,themassivespreadofeducationandgrowthofmassliteracycanonlyoccurthroughthemediumofthemothertongue.Democracycanbecomerealtothecommonpeopleonlywhenpoliticsandadministrationareconductedthroughthelanguagetheycanunderstand.Butthislanguage,themothertonguecannotbethemediumofeducationoradministrationorjudicialactivityunlessastateisformedonthebasisofsuchapredominantlanguage.Itisforthisreasonthat,withtheinvolvementofthemassesinthenationalmovementafter1919,

Congressundertookpoliticalmobilizationinthemothertongueandin1921amendeditsconstitutionandreorganizeditsregionalbranchesonalinguisticbasis.Sincethen,theCongressrepeatedlycommitteditselftotheredrawingoftheprovincialboundariesonlinguisticlines.Justfivedaysbeforehewasassassinated,Gandhiji,whileurgingthepeopleto‘discourageallfissiparoustendenciesandfeelandbehaveasIndians’,alsoarguedthat‘theredistributionofprovincesonalinguisticbasiswasnecessaryifprovinciallanguagesweretogrowtotheirfullheight.’1ItwasthereforemoreorlessuniversallyassumedthatfreeIndiawouldbaseitsadministrativeboundariesonthelinguisticprinciple.Butthenationalleadershiphadsecondthoughtsonthesubjectimmediatelyafterindependence.There

werevariousreasonsforthis.ThePartitionhadcreatedseriousadministrative,economicandpoliticaldislocation;andindependence,comingimmediatelyaftertheWar,wasaccompaniedbyseriouseconomicandlawandorderproblems.AlsotherewasthevexedKashmirproblemandawar-likesituationvis-à-visPakistan.Theleadershipfeltthatthemostimportanttaskforthepresentwastoconsolidatenationalunity;andanyeffortundertakenimmediatelytoredrawtheinternalboundariesmightdislocateadministrationandeconomicdevelopment,intensifyregionalandlinguisticrivalries,unleashdestructiveforces,anddamagetheunityofthecountry.Speakingonthelinguisticquestion,Nehruclearlystatedon27November1947:‘FirstthingsmustcomefirstandthefirstthingisthesecurityandstabilityofIndia.’2

Hence,whilestillcommittedtolinguisticstates.NehruandotherleadersaccordedthetaskofredrawingIndia’sadministrativemapalowpriority.Thetask,theyfelt,couldwaitforsomeyears.

ThelinguisticreorganizationofIndiawas,however,raisedquiteearlyintheConstituentAssembly.Itappointedin1948theLinguisticProvincesCommission,headedbyJusticeS.K.Dar,toenquireintothedesirabilityoflinguisticprovinces.TheDarCommissionadvisedagainstthestepatthetimeforitmightthreatennationalunityandalsobeadministrativelyinconvenient.Consequently,theConstituentAssemblydecidednottoincorporatethelinguisticprincipleintheConstitution.Butpublicopinionwasnotsatisfied,especiallyintheSouth,andtheproblemremainedpoliticallyalive.Toappeasethevocalvotariesoflinguisticstates,theCongressappointedacommittee(JVP)inDecember1948consistingofJawaharlalNehru,SardarPatelandPattabhiSitaramayya,PresidentoftheCongress,toexaminethequestionafresh.Thiscommitteeadvisedagainstthecreationoflinguisticstatesforthetimebeing,emphasizingonunity,nationalsecurity,andeconomicdevelopmentastheneedsofthehour.Yet,theCongressleadershipwouldnotopposeanypopulardemand.IntheJVPreport,aswellas

afterwards,theCongressleadershiplaiddownthatwherethedemandforalinguisticstatewasinsistentandoverwhelmingandwhereotherlanguagegroupsinvolvedwereagreeabletoit,anewstatecouldbecreated.TheJVPreportwasfollowedbypopularmovementsforstates’reorganizationalloverthecountry,whichpersistedwithvaryingdegreesofintensitytill1960.ThedemandforaseparateAndhrastatefortheTelugupeoplewasanexample.Thedemandhadbeenpopularfornearlyhalfacenturyandhadthesupportofallpoliticalparties.TheJVPacceptedthatastrongcasefortheformationofAndhraoutoftheMadrasPresidencyexisted,

particularlyastheleadershipofTamilNaduwasagreeabletoit.Butitdidnotconcedethedemandimmediately,becausethetwosidescouldnotagreeonwhichstateshouldtakeMadrascity.TheAndhraleaderswereunwillingtoconcedeMadraseventhoughonlinguisticandalsogeographicgroundsitbelongedtoTamilNadu.On19October1952,apopularfreedomfighter,PattiSriramalu,undertookafastuntodeathoverthe

demandforaseparateAndhraandexpiredafterfifty-eightdays.Hisdeathwasfollowedbythreedaysofrioting,demonstrations,hartalsandviolencealloverAndhra.ThegovernmentimmediatelygaveinandconcededthedemandforaseparatestateofAndhra,whichfinallycameintoexistenceinOctober1953.Simultaneously,TamilNaduwascreatedasaTamil-speakingstate.ThesuccessoftheAndhrastruggleencouragedotherlinguisticgroupstoagitatefortheirownstateor

forrectificationoftheirboundariesonalinguisticbasis.NehruwasnotinfavouratthattimeofcontinuingwiththeredrawingofIndia’sinternaladministrativeboundaries,buthewastoomuchofademocrattosternlyandconsistentlyopposethedemands.AsNehru’sbiographer,S.Gopal,hasputit:‘Hefeltthatitwouldbeundemocratictosmotherthissentimentwhich,ongeneralgrounds,hedidnotfindobjectionable.Indeed,alinguisticmosaicmightwellprovideafirmerbasefornationalunity.Whatconcernedhimwerethetiming,theagitationandviolencewithwhichlinguisticprovinceswerebeingdemandedandtheharshantagonismbetweenvarioussectionsoftheIndianpeoplewhichunderlaythesedemands.’3

Tomeetthedemandhalfwayandtodelaymatters,NehruappointedinAugust1953theStatesReorganizationCommission(SRC),withJusticeFazlAli,K.M.PanikkarandHridaynathKunzruasmembers,toexamine‘objectivelyanddispassionately’theentirequestionofthereorganizationofthestatesoftheunion.Throughoutthetwoyearsofitswork,theCommissionwasfacedwithmeetings,demonstrations,agitationsandhungerstrikes.Differentlinguisticgroupsclashedwitheachother,verbally

aswellassometimesphysically.AstheCommissionersreportedinsorrow:‘Ithasbeenmostdistressingtoustowitness...akindofborderwarfareincertainareasinwhicholdcomrades-in-armsinthebattleforfreedomhavepittedagainstoneanotherinacrimoniouscontroversy...Deliberateattemptstowhipuppopularfrenzybyanappealtoparochialandcommunalsentiments;threatsoflarge-scalemigration;assertionssuchasthatifacertainlanguagegroupisnotallowedtohaveanadministrativeunitofitsown,itsmoral,materialandevenphysicalextinctionwouldfollowasaninevitableconsequence;...allpointtoanacutelackofperspectiveandbalance.’4TheSRCsubmitteditsreportinOctober1955.Whilelayingdownthatdueconsiderationshouldbegiventoadministrativeandeconomicfactors,itrecognizedforthemostpartthelinguisticprincipleandrecommendedredrawingofstateboundariesonthatbasis.TheCommission,however,opposedthesplittingofBombayandPunjab.Despitestrongreactiontothereportinmanypartsofthecountry,theSRC’srecommendationswereaccepted,thoughwithcertainmodifications,andwerequicklyimplemented.TheStatesReorganizationActwaspassedbyparliamentinNovember1956.Itprovidedforfourteen

statesandsixcentrallyadministeredterritories.TheTelenganaareaofHyderabadstatewastransferredtoAndhra;KeralawascreatedbymergingtheMalabardistrictoftheoldMadrasPresidencywithTravancore-Cochin.CertainKannada-speakingareasofthestatesofBombay,Madras,HyderabadandCoorgwereaddedtotheMysorestate.BombaystatewasenlargedbymergingthestatesofKutchandSaurashtraandtheMarathi-speakingareasofHyderabadwithit.ThestrongestreactionagainsttheSRC’sreportandtheStatesReorganizationActcamefrom

MaharashtrawherewidespreadriotingbrokeoutandeightypeoplewerekilledinBombaycityinpolicefiringsinJanuary1956.Theoppositionpartiessupportedbyawidespectrumofpublicopinion—students,farmers,workers,artists,businessmen—organizedapowerfulprotestmovement.Underpressure,thegovernmentdecidedinJune1956todividetheBombaystateintotwolinguisticstatesofMaharashtraandGujaratwithBombaycityformingaseparate,centrallyadministeredstate.ThismovetoowasstronglyopposedbytheMaharashtrians.Nehrunowvacillatedand,unhappyathavinghurtthefeelingsofthepeopleofMaharashtra,revertedinJulytotheformationofbilingual,greaterBombay.Thismovewas,however,opposedbythepeoplebothofMaharashtraandGujarat.Thebroad-basedSamyuktaMaharashtraSamitiandMahaGujaratJanataParishadledthemovementsinthetwopartsofthestate.InMaharashtra,evenalargesectionofCongressmenjoinedthedemandforaunilingualMaharashtrawithBombayasitscapital;andC.D.Deshmukh,theFinanceMinisterintheCentralCabinet,resignedfromhisofficeonthisquestion.TheGujaratisfeltthattheywouldbeaminorityinthenewstate.TheytoowouldnotagreetogiveupBombaycitytoMaharashtra.ViolenceandarsonnowspreadtoAhmedabadandotherpartsofGujarat.Sixteenpersonswerekilledand200injuredinpolicefirings.InviewofthedisagreementoverBombaycity,thegovernmentstucktoitsdecisionandpassedthe

StatesReorganizationActinNovember1956.Butthemattercouldnotrestthere.Inthe1957electionstheBombayCongressscrapedthroughwithaslendermajority.Popularagitationcontinuedfornearlyfiveyears.AsCongresspresident,IndiraGandhireopenedthequestionandwassupportedbythePresident,S.Radhakrishnan.ThegovernmentfinallyagreedinMay1960tobifurcatethestateofBombayintoMaharashtraandGujarat,withBombaycitybeingincludedinMaharashtra,andAhmedabadbeingmadethecapitalofGujarat.

TheotherstatewhereanexceptionwasmadetothelinguisticprinciplewasPunjab.In1956,thestatesofPEPSUhadbeenmergedwithPunjab,which,however,remainedatrilingualstatehavingthreelanguagespeakers—Punjabi,HindiandPahari—withinitsborders.InthePunjabi-speakingpartofthestate,therewasastrongdemandforcarvingoutaseparatePunjabiSuba(Punjabi-speakingstate).Unfortunately,theissueassumedcommunalovertones.TheSikhcommunalists,ledbytheAkaliDal,andtheHinducommunalists,ledbytheJanSangh,usedthelinguisticissuetopromotecommunalpolitics.WhiletheHinducommunalistsopposedthedemandforaPunjabiSubabydenyingthatPunjabiwastheirmothertongue,theSikhcommunalistsputforwardthedemandasaSikhdemandforaSikhstate,claimingPunjabiwritteninGurmukhiasaSikhlanguage.EventhoughthedemandwassupportedbytheCommunistPartyandasectionofCongress,ithadgotmixedupwithreligion.ButNehru,asalsoamajorityofthePunjabCongressmen,feltthatthedemandforaPunjabistatewasbasicallyacommunaldemandforaSikh-majoritystate‘dressedupasalanguageplea’.NehruandtheCongressleadershipwereclearthattheywouldnotacceptanydemandforthecreationofastateonreligiousorcommunalgrounds.TheSRChadalsorefusedtoacceptthedemandforaseparatePunjabi-speakingstateonthegroundthatthiswouldnotsolveeitherthelanguageorthecommunalproblemofPunjab.(TheseveralpowerfulmovementsforaPunjabistatearediscussedseparatelyinchapter25onthePunjabcrisis.)Finally,in1966,IndiraGandhiagreedtothedivisionofPunjabintotwoPunjabi-andHindi-speakingstatesofPunjabandHaryana,withthePahari-speakingdistrictofKangraandapartoftheHoshiarpurdistrictbeingmergedwithHimachalPradesh.Chandigarh,thenewly-builtcityandcapitalofunitedPunjab,wasmadeaUnionTerritoryandwastoserveasthejointcapitalofPunjabandHaryana.Thus,aftermorethantenyearsofcontinuousstrifeandpopularstruggleslinguisticreorganizationof

Indiawaslargelycompleted,makingroomforgreaterpoliticalparticipationbythepeople.Eventssince1956haveclearlyshownthatloyaltytoalanguagewasquiteconsistentwith,andwas

rathercomplimentaryto,loyaltytothenation.Byreorganizingthestatesonlinguisticlines,thenationalleadershipremovedamajorgrievancewhichcouldhaveledtofissiparoustendencies.Statesreorganizationis,therefore,‘bestregardedasclearingthegroundfornationalintegration.’5Also,eventhoughduringtheagitationforstates’reorganizationthelanguageofwarringcampswasused,languagehasnotsubsequentlydefinedthepoliticsofthestates.Equallyimportant,linguisticreorganizationofthestateshasnotinanymanneradverselyaffectedthe

federalstructureoftheUnionorweakenedorparalysedtheCentreasmanyhadfeared.Thecentralgovernmentwieldsasmuchauthorityasitdidbefore.ThestateshavealsobeencooperatingwiththeCentreinplanningandeconomicdevelopment.Hardlyanypersoncomplainsofdiscriminationintheraisingorexpendingofresourcesongroundsoflanguage.Ifanything,thenationalgovernmenthasbeenstrengthenedbythecreationofcoherentstateunits.ToquoteW.H.Morris-Jones:‘Thenewlyfashionedunits,itistrue,haveaself-consciouscoherence,buttheyarewilling,thusequipped,todobusinesswiththecentre,toworkaspartsofawholethatisIndia.’6

Thus,states’reorganizationhasnotonlynotweakenedtheunityofthecountrybutasawholestrengthenedit,therebydisappointing‘theprophetsofgloom’andremovingtheapprehensionsofthefriendly.Toquotethepoliticalscientist,RajniKothari:‘Inspiteoftheleadership’searlierreservationsandominousforebodingsbysympatheticobservers,thereorganizationresultedinrationalizingthepoliticalmapofIndiawithoutseriouslyweakeningitsunity.Ifanything,itsresulthasbeenfunctional,in

asmuchasitremovedwhathadbeenamajorsourceofdiscord,andcreatedhomogeneouspoliticalunitswhichcouldbeadministeredthroughamediumthatthevastmajorityofthepopulationunderstood.Indeeditcanbesaidwiththebenefitofhindsightthatlanguage,ratherthanbeingaforcefordivisionhasprovedacementingandintegratinginfluence.’7

States’reorganizationdidnot,ofcourse,resolvealltheproblemsrelatingtolinguisticconflicts.Disputesoverboundariesbetweendifferentstates,linguisticminoritiesandeconomicissuessuchassharingofwaters,andpowerandsurplusfoodstillpersist.Linguisticchauvinismalsofindsoccasionalexpression.Butthereorganizationhasremovedamajorfactoraffectingcohesionofthecountry.

MinorityLanguages

Animportantaspectofthelanguageproblemhasbeenthestatusofminoritylanguages.Unilingualstateswerenotpossibleinwhatevermannertheirboundariesweredrawn.Consequently,alargenumberoflinguisticminorities,thatis,thosewhospeakalanguageotherthanthemainortheofficiallanguageofthestate,continuetoexistinlinguisticallyreorganizedstates.Overallnearly18percentofIndia’spopulationdonotspeaktheofficiallanguageofthestateswheretheyliveastheirmothertongue.Thereisofcourseagreatdealofvariationamongthestatesonthiscount.Accordingtothe1971census,thepercentagesoflinguisticminoritiestototalpopulationrangedfrom4inKeralato34inKarnataka,3.9inAssamto44.5inJammuandKashmir.Fromthebeginning,theimportantpointtobedecideduponwasthestatusandrightsoftheseminorities

intheirstates.Ontheonehand,therewasthequestionoftheirprotection,fortherewastheever-presentdangerofthembeingmetedoutunfairtreatment,ontheother,therewastheneedtopromotetheirintegrationwiththemajorlanguagegroupofastate.Alinguisticminorityhadtobegiventheconfidencethatitwouldnotbediscriminatedagainstbythemajorityandthatitslanguageandculturewouldcontinuetoexistanddevelop.Atthesametime,themajorityhadtobeassuredthatmeetingtheneedsofthelinguisticminoritywouldnotgenerateseparatistsentimentsordemandsandthattheminoritieswoulddevelopadegreeofstateloyalty.Toconfrontthisproblemcertainfundamentalrightswereprovidedtothelinguisticminoritiesinthe

Constitution.Forexample,Article30statesthat‘allminorities,whetherbasedanreligionorlanguage,shallhavetherighttoestablishandadministereducationalinstitutionsoftheirchoice’and,moreimportant,‘thatthestateshallnot,ingrantingaidtoeducationalinstitutionsdiscriminateagainstanyeducationalinstitutiononthegroundthatitisunderthemanagementofaminority,whetherbasedonreligionorlanguage.’Article347laysdownthatonademandbeingmadeonbehalfofaminority,thePresidentmaydirectthatitslanguageshallbeofficiallyrecognizedthroughoutthestateoranypartthereofforsuchpurposesashemightspecify.Theofficialpolicysince1956,sanctionedbyaconstitutionalamendmentinthatyear,hasbeentoprovideforinstructioninthemothertongueintheprimaryandsecondaryclasseswhereverthereisasufficientnumberofchildrentoformaclass.TheamendmentalsoprovidesfortheappointmentofaCommissionerforLinguisticMinoritiestoinvestigateandreportregularlyontheimplementationofthesesafeguards.Onthewhole,thecentralgovernmenthastendedtoplayaverypositiveroleindefenceoftherightsoftheminorities,buttheimplementationoftheminoritysafeguardsiswithinthepurviewofthestategovernmentsandthereforediffersfromstatetostate.Ingeneral,despitesomeprogressinseveralstates,inmostofthemthepositionofthelinguisticminorities

hasnotbeensatisfactory.Theconstitutionalsafeguardshavequiteoftenbeeninadequatelyenforced.TheCommissionerforLinguisticMinoritieshasinhisreportsregularlynotedinnumerablecasesofdiscriminationagainstlinguisticminoritiesinmattersofschooling,admissiontotechnicalandmedicalinstitutionsandemploymentinthestatepublicservicesbecauseoflackofproficiencyintheofficiallanguageofthestate.However,aredeemingfeatureisthatquiteoftenfacilitiesforprimaryeducationinthemothertongueoftheminoritieshavebeenprovided,thoughthesemaybeinadequateintermsofcompetentteachersandtextbooks.Butevenherethebigexceptionistheall-roundfailureinthecaseoftribalminoritylanguages.

Amongtheminoritylanguages,Urduisaspecialcase.ItisthelargestminoritytongueinIndia.Nearly23.3millionpeoplespokeUrduin1951.UrduspeakersconstitutedsubstantialpercentagesofthepopulationinU.P.(10.5),Bihar(8.8),Maharashtra(7.2),AndhraPradegh(7.5)andKarnataka(9).Moreover,anoverwhelmingmajorityofMuslims,India’slargestreligiousminority,claimedUrduastheirmothertongue.UrduisalsorecognizedasoneofIndia’snationallanguagesandislistedintheEighthScheduleoftheConstitution.WhilenearlyallthemajorlanguagesofIndiawerealsotheofficiallanguagesofonestateortheother,

UrduwasnottheofficiallanguageofanystateexceptthesmallstateofJammuandKashmirwherethemothertongueswereinanycaseKashmiri,DogriandLadakhi.Consequently,Urdudidnotgetofficialsupportinanypartofthecountry.Onthecontrary,itfacedofficialdiscriminationandhostilitybothinU.P.andBihar.WemaybrieflytakeupthecaseofU.P.,thoughthepositionwasnodifferentinBihar.TheU.P.governmentdecidedearlyontodeclareHindiastheonlyofficiallanguageofthestate;thesubterfugewasthatHindiandUrduwerenottwoseparatelanguagesandthereforetherewasnoneedtomakeUrduasecondofficiallanguage!Inpractice,Urdubegantobeabolishedinmanyprimaryschools.Itsuseasamediumofinstructionwasalsoincreasinglylimited.Forexample,in1979-80,only3.69percentofprimaryschoolstudentsreceivedinstructioninUrduwhilethenumberofUrduspeakersin1981was10.5percent.TheHindiprotagonistsalsobegantoeliminateUrduwordsfromwrittenHindi.TheneglectofUrduinthestateledthewell-known,left-wingUrducritic,S.EhteshamHusain,tocomplain:‘Urduisbeingconstantlytermedasonlyanoff-shootorvarietyofHindi,aforeignlanguage,alanguageoftheMuslims,aninstrumentofcommunalhatredandanenemyofIndianunity.Allthesecontrarythingsaresaidinthesamebreath,tosuppressit.’8

Urduspeakers,therefore,werepersistentindemandingthatUrdushouldberecognizedasthesecondofficiallanguageinthestateswhereithadalargepresence,especiallyinU.P.andBihar.TheU.P.governmentwasequallyconsistentandsuccessfulinopposingthedemand;itsmainjustificationbeingthattheStatesReorganizationCommissionhadrecommendedthatatleast30percentpopulationinastateshouldspeakalanguagebeforeitcouldbemadethesecondofficialorregionallanguage.JawaharlalNehru,inparticular,wasverysupportiveofUrduandcriticaloftheanti-Urduthinkingand

activitiesofalargenumberofpersons,includingCongressmen,innorthernIndia.‘Urdu’,hetoldtheparliament,‘isanexampleofintegrationinIndia,notonlyoflanguagesbutofminds,literaturesandcultures.ItiscentpercentanIndianlanguage.’9HepointedoutthatUrduhad‘enrichedIndiancultureandthought.’10HeaskedthechiefministerofU.P.todeclareUrduasasecondofficiallanguageindistrictswhereitwaswidelyusedandinotherareastogiveitthefullfacilitiesofaminoritylanguage.

ButevenwhenNehrusucceededinpersuadingtheU.P.governmenttoagreetotakecertainstepsinthisregard,theywerenullifiedbylaxityintheirimplementation.TheU.P.governmentrefusedtopasslegislationgivinglegalsanctitytotherightsgrantedtoUrduonthegroundthatsuchastepmightleadtocommunalriots.ThegovernmentsofAndhraPradeshandKarnatakaweremoresupportiveofUrdu.InAndhra,Urduhas

beenrecognizedsince1968asanadditionallanguagefortheTelenganaregion.Andinboththestates,adequatefacilitiesareprovidedforinstructionthroughthemediumofUrduintheprimarystageandforinstructioninUrduatthehigherschoolstages.TwootheraspectsofUrdu’spositionmaybenoted.First,unfortunatelythequestionofUrduhasgot

entangledwiththecommunalquestion.WhilemanyMuslimsregarditasthelanguageoftheircommunityassuch,manyHinducommunalistsarehostiletoitbecauseoftheiranti-Muslimideologicalposition.Second,despiteactivehostilityofmanyandofficialneglect,Urducontinuesnotonlytoexistbutevengrowintermsofliteraryoutput,journalsandnewspapersandespeciallyasthelanguageoffilmsandtelevisionbecauseofitsinherentvigourandculturalrootsamongtheIndianpeople.

9ConsolidationofIndiaAsaNation:IntegrationoftheTribals

Thetaskofintegratingthetribalpeopleintothemainstreamwasextremelycomplex,giventhevariedconditionsunderwhichtheyliveindifferentpartsofthecountry,andtheirdifferentlanguagesanddistinctcultures.The1971censusrecordedover400tribalcommunitiesnumberingnearly38millionpeopleandconstitutingnearly6.9percentoftheIndianpopulation.SpreadalloverIndia,theirgreatestconcentrationisinMadhyaPradesh,Bihar,Orissa,north-easternIndia,WestBengal,Maharashtra,Gujarat,andRajasthan.ExceptintheNorth-East,theyconstituteminoritiesintheirhomestates.Residingmostlyinthehillsandforestareas,incolonialIndiatheylivedinrelativeisolation,andtheirtraditions,habits,culturesandwaysoflifeweremarkedlydifferentfromthoseoftheirnon-tribalneighbours.Nevertheless,exceptintheNorth-East,thetwohadforcenturiesinteractedculturally,socially,economicallyandpolitically.Inmostpartsofthecountry,colonialismbroughtradicaltransformationofthetribalsastheirrelative

isolationwaserodedbythepenetrationofmarketforcesandtheywereintegratedwiththeBritishandprincelyadministrations.Alargenumberofmoney-lenders,traders,revenuefarmersandothermiddlemenandpettyofficialsinvadedthetribalareasanddisruptedthetribals’traditionalwayoflife.Theywereincreasinglyengulfedindebtandlosttheirlandstooutsiders,oftenbeingreducedtothepositionofagriculturallabourers,sharecroppersandrack-rentedtenants.Manywereforcedtoretreatfurtherintothehills.Belatedlegislationtopreventalienationoflandbythetribalpeoplefailedtohalttheprocess.VerrierElwin,wholivednearlyallhislifeamongthetribalpeopleincentralandnorth-easternIndiaandwhowasoneoftheformativeinfluencesintheevolutionofthenewgovernment’spoliciestowardsthetribes,wastorefertothefateofthetribalpeopleunderBritishruleasfollows:‘Butnowtheysufferedoppressionandexploitation,fortheresooncamemerchantsandliquor-venders,cajoling,tricking,swindlingthemintheirignoranceandsimplicityuntilbitbybittheirbroadacresdwindledandtheytheysankintothepovertyinwhichmanyofthemstilllivetoday.’1Simultaneously,‘missionariesweredestroyingtheirart,theirdances,theirweavingandtheirwholeculture.’2

Colonialismalsotransformedthetribals’relationshipwiththeforest.Theydependedontheforestforfood,fuelandcattlefeedandrawmaterialsfortheirhandicrafts.InmanypartsofIndiathehungerforlandbytheimmigrantpeasantsfromtheplainsledtothedestructionofforests,deprivingthetribalsoftheirtraditionalmeansoflivelihood.Toconserveforestsandtofacilitatetheircommercialexploitation,thecolonialauthoritiesbroughtlargetractsofforestlandsunderforestlawsWhichforbadeshiftingcultivationandputsevererestrictionsonthetribals’useoftheforestandtheiraccesstoforestproducts.Lossofland,indebtedness,exploitationbymiddlemen,denialofaccesstoforestsandforestproducts,

andoppressionandextortionbypolicemen,forestofficials,andothergovernmentofficialswastoleadtoaseriesoftribaluprisingsinthenineteenthandtwentiethcenturies—forexampletheSanthaluprisingand

theMundarebellionledbyBirsaMunda—andtotheparticipationofthetribalpeopleinthenationalandpeasantmovementsinOrissa,Bihar,WestBengal,Andhra,MaharashtraandGujarat.

RootsofIndia’sTribalPolicy

Thepreservationofthetribalpeople’srichsocialandculturalheritagelayattheheartofthegovernment’spolicyoftribalintegration.AsJawaharlalNehru,themaininfluenceinshapingthegovernment’sattitudetowardsthetribalsputit:‘Thefirstproblemwehavetofacethere(inthetribalareas)istoinspirethem(thetribalpeople)withconfidenceandtomakethemfeelatonewithIndia,andtorealizethattheyarepartofIndiaandhaveanhonouredplaceinit.’Atthesametime,‘Indiatothemshouldsignifynotonlyaprotectingforcebutaliberatingone.’3Indiannationalism,Nehruthought,wascapableofaccommodatingtheuniquenessofthetribalpeople.ThereweretwomajorapproachesregardingtheplacetobeaccordedtotribalsinIndiansociety.One

approachwastoleavethetribalpeoplealone,uncontaminatedbymoderninfluencesoperatingoutsidetheirworldandtoletthemstaymoreorlessastheywere.ThesecondapproachwasthatofassimilatingthemcompletelyandasquicklyaspossibleintotheIndiansocietyallaroundthem.Thedisappearanceofthetribalwayoflifewasnottoberegretted;itwastobewelcomedforthatwouldrepresenttheir‘upliftment.’JawaharlalNehrurejectedboththeseapproaches.Thefirstapproach,oftreatingthetribalpeople‘as

museumspecimenstobeobservedandwrittenabout,’was,hesaid,‘toinsultthem.’4Thetribalpeople,hewrote,‘couldnotbeleftcutofffromtheworldastheywere.’Isolationwasinanycaseimpossibleatthisstage,fortheprocessofpenetrationbytheoutsideworldhadalreadygonetoofarand‘itwasnotpossibleordesirabletoisolatethem.’5Thesecondapproachofallowingthem‘tobeengulfedbythemassesofIndianhumanity,’6oroftheirassimilationthroughtheoperationofnormaloutsideforceswasalsowrong,accordingtoNehru.Thiswouldleadtothelossofthetribals’socialandculturalidentityandofthemanyvirtuestheypossessed.Infact,hepointedout,‘ifnormalfactorswereallowedtooperate,unscrupulouspeoplefromoutsidewouldtakepossessionoftriballands...andforestsandinterferewiththelifeofthetribalpeople.’7Thiswouldalso‘upsettheirwholelifeandculture,whichhadsomuchofgoodinthem.’8

Insteadofthesetwoapproaches,NehrufavouredthepolicyofintegratingthetribalpeopleinIndiansociety,ofmakingthemanintegralpartoftheIndiannation,evenwhilemaintainingtheirdistinctidentityandculture.ThereweretwobasicparametersoftheNehruvianapproach:‘thetribalareashavetoprogress’and‘theyhavetoprogressintheirownway’.Progressdidnotmean‘anattemptmerelytoduplicatewhatwehavegotinotherpartsofIndia.’WhateverwasgoodintherestofIndiawould‘beadoptedbythemgradually.’9Moreover,whateverchangeswereneededwouldbe‘workedoutbythetribalsthemselves.’10

Theproblemwashowtocombinethesetwoseeminglycontradictoryapproaches.Nehrustoodforeconomicandsocialdevelopmentofthetribalpeopleinmultifariousways,especiallyinthefieldsofcommunication,modernmedicalfacilities,agricultureandeducation.Inthisregard,helaiddowncertainbroadguidelinesforgovernmentpolicy.

First,thetribalsshoulddevelopalongthelinesoftheirowngenius;thereshouldbenoimpositionorcompulsionfromoutside.Thenon-tribalsshouldnotapproachthemwithasuperioritycomplex.Rather,theunderstandingshouldbethattheyhadanequalcontributiontomaketotheevolutionofthecommoncultureandsocialandpoliticallifeofthecountry.Second,tribalrightsinlandandforestsshouldberespectedandnooutsidershouldbeabletotake

possessionoftriballands.Theincursionofthemarketeconomyintotribalareashadtobestrictlycontrolledandregulated.Third,itwasnecessarytoencouragethetriballanguageswhich‘mustbegivenallpossiblesupportand

theconditionsinwhichtheycanflourishmustbesafeguarded.’11

Fourth,foradministration,relianceshouldbeplacedonthetribalpeoplethemselves,andadministratorsshouldberecruitedfromamongstthemandtrained.Asfewaspossibleoutsidersshouldbeintroducedasadministratorsintribalareasandtheyshouldbecarefullychosen.Theyshouldhaveasympatheticandunderstandingapproach,andshouldnotconsiderthemselvessuperiortoorapartfromthetribalpeople.Theyshouldbepreparedtosharetheirlifewiththetribalpeopleamongwhomtheywork.Fifth,thereshouldbenoover-administrationoftribalareas.Theeffortshouldbetoadministerand

developthemthroughthetribalsownsocialandculturalinstitutions.Nehru’sapproachwasinturnbasedonthenationalistpolicytowardstribalssincethetwentieswhen

Gandhijisetupashramsinthetribalareasandpromotedconstructivework.AfterindependencethispolicywassupportedbyRajendraPrasad,thefirstPresidentofIndia,andothermajorpoliticalleaders.

Togiveshapetothegovernment’spolicy,abeginningwasmadeintheConstitutionitselfwhichdirectedunderArticle46thatthestateshouldpromotewithspecialcaretheeducationalandeconomicinterestsofthetribalpeopleandshouldprotectthemfromsocialinjusticeandallformsofexploitation,throughspeciallegislation.Thegovernorsofthestatesinwhichtribalareasweresituatedweregivenspecialresponsibilitytoprotecttribalinterests,includingthepowertomodifycentralandstatelawsintheirapplicationtotribalareas,andtoframeregulationsfortheprotectionoftribals’righttolandandalsotheirprotectionfrommoneylenders.Theapplicationofthefundamentalrightswasamendedforthispurpose.TheConstitutionalsoextendedfullpoliticalrightstothetribalpeople.Inaddition,itprovidedforreservationofseatsinthelegislaturesandpositionsintheadministrativeservicesfortheScheduledTribesasinthecaseoftheScheduledCastes.TheConstitutionalsoprovidedforthesettingupofTribalAdvisoryCouncilsinallstatescontainingtribalareastoadviseonmattersconcerningthewelfareoftribals.ACommissionerforScheduledCastesandScheduledTribeswasappointedbythePresidenttoinvestigatewhetherthesafeguardsprovidedforthemwerebeingobserved.Legislativeaswellasexecutiveactionwastakenbythestategovernmentstopreventlossoftribal

landstonon-tribalpeopleandtopreventexploitationofthetribalsbymoneylenders.Thecentralandthestategovernmentscreatedspecialfacilitiesandorganizedspecialprogrammesforthewelfareanddevelopmentofthetribalareasandthetribalpeopleincludingthepromotionofcottageandvillageindustriesandgenerationofemploymentamongthem.LargeexpenditureswereundertakenandlargesumssetapartinthePlansforthepurpose.Thefundingfortribalwelfaresignificantlyincreasedafter1971.Inspiteoftheconstitutionalsafeguardsandtheeffortsofthecentralandstategovernments,thetribals’

progressandwelfarehasbeenveryslow,andevendismal.ExceptintheNorth-East,thetribalscontinue

tobepoor,indebted,landlessandoftenunemployed.Theproblemoftenliesinweakexecutionofevenwell-intentionedmeasures.Quiteoftenthereisadivergencebetweenthecentralandthestategovernmentpolicies,thelatterbeinglessintunewithtribalinterests.Inparticular,stategovernmentshavebeenrelativelyineffectiveinadministeringthepositivepoliciesandlawslaiddownbythecentralgovernmentorbythestategovernmentsthemselves,asrepeatedlyshownbytheCommissionerforScheduledCastesandScheduledTribesandinthereportsofthePlanningCommission.Quiteoftenthefundsallocatedfortribalwelfarearenotspentorarespentwithoutcorrespondingresults,orareevenmisappropriated.Oneofthewatchdogsoftribalinterests,theTribalAdvisoryCouncils,havenotfunctionedeffectively.Oftentheadministrativepersonnelareill-trainedorevenprejudicedagainsttribals.Butsympathetic

officialsarealsoknowntobequicklytransferredoutoftribalareasunderthepressureoftraders,moneylenders,forestcontractorsandland-grabbers.Amajorhandicapfromwhichtribalssufferisdenialofjustice,oftenbecauseoftheirunfamiliarity

withthelawsandthelegalsystem.Lawspreventingtransferoflandtooutsidershavecontinuedtobeevaded,leadingtoalienationoflandandevictionoftribal.Rapidextensionofminesandindustrieshasworsenedtheirconditionsinmanyareas.Whiledeforestationproceedsapacethroughthecooperationofcorruptofficialsandpoliticianswithforestcontractors,thetribals’traditionalrightofaccesstotheforestanditsproduceiscontinuouslycurtailed.Forestlawsandregulationsarealsousedbyunsympatheticandoftencorruptforestofficialstoharassandexploitthetribalpeople.Asaresultoflossofland,deforestationandrestrictionsontheaccesstotheforest,thetribalpeoplehavebeenfacinggrowingunemploymentandhavebeenincreasinglydrivenintomoreinaccessiblestretchesofhillsandjungles.Theprogressofeducationamongthetribalpeoplehasbeendisappointinglyslow.Inmanyareas,

primaryeducationthroughthetriballanguageshastakenplace,butinothersthestategovernmentshavetendedtoneglecttriballanguagesandeducationthroughtheirmedium.Tribalsocietyalmosteverywherehasalsobeengraduallydevelopingclassdifferencesandaclass

structurewiththosebelongingtotheuppercrustoftenjoiningforceswiththeuppercrustoftheoutsiders.Further,themajorgainsofwhateverdevelopmenttakesplaceinthefieldsofeducation,employmentinadministration,economyandpoliticalpatronagearereapedbythesmallsegmentofthetribaleliteswhichhasslowlyemergedandgrown.Onthewhole,thoughthereareafewdangersignals,certainpositivedevelopmentsinthetribalsphere

haveoccurredsince1947.Legislationtoprotecttribalrightsandinterests,activitiesofthetribalwelfaredepartments,PanchayatiRaj,spreadofliteracyandeducation,reservationsingovernmentservicesandinhighereducationalinstitutions,andrepeatedelectionshaveledtoincreasingconfidenceamongthetribalpeopleandgreaterpoliticalparticipationbythem—oratleastbythegrowingmiddleclassesandintelligentsiaamongthem—intheconstitutionalpoliticalprocesses.Theyarenowinsistingonagreaterandmoreactivepoliticalroleforthemselves,andacquiringincreasingrepresentationindifferentpoliticalstructuresandinstitutions.Aboveall,theyaredemandingagreatershareinnationaleconomicdevelopment.Protestmovementshavesprungupamongtribalsoutoftheirfrustrationwiththelackofdevelopment

andwelfare.Theseareboundintimetoproducepositiveresults.Thegovernmentpolicyhasusuallybeenconciliatory,throughnotnecessarilysuccessfulinredressingtribalgrievances.Butsomeoftheprotest

movementshavetakentoviolence,leadingtostrongstateactionagainstthem.Littlegroundhasbeengainedbythem,thoughtheyhaveoftendramaticallydrawnnationalattentiontothetribalcondition.Thegrowingtribalantagonismtowardsthenon-tribalpeopleoroutsiderslivingintribalareashas

beenanotherunfortunatedevelopment.Undoubtedly,someoftheoutsidersliketraders,moneylenders,landlordsandgovernmentofficialshavebeenascourgeofthetribalareas,but,overdecades,manyotheroutsiders—peasants,workers,teachers,doctorsandothermiddleandlower-middleclasspersons—havenowsettledthere,outnumberingthetribalsinalmostalltribalareasoutsidetheNorth-East.Themassofthetribalsandnon-tribalsareequallypoorandhaveacommoninterestineconomicandsocialdevelopmentasalsosocialandeconomicjustice.Besides,mostofthemiddle-classnon-tribals,includingmanyofthetradersandindustrialists,doperformusefuleconomicfunctionsinthetribalareas.Anyundueantagonismandantipathybetweenthetribalsandnon-tribalswouldbeinimicalandevendangeroustoboth.Itisnolongertruethattheonlyrelationshipthatcanexistbetweenthetwoisanexploitativeone.Tribalscannotexpecttoreverttoisolationfromtheirnon-tribalneighboursortopreventmassiveinteractionwiththem,includingtheirin-migration.Infact,thetwocanprotectandpromotetheirinterestsonlythroughmutualcooperation.

TribalsintheNorth-East

Thetribesofnorth-easternIndia,consistingofoverhundredgroups,speakingawidevarietyoflanguagesandlivinginthehilltractsofAssam,sharedmanyofthefeaturesandproblemsofthetribalpeopleintherestofthecountry.Buttheirsituationwasdifferentinseveralrespects.Forone,theyconstitutedtheoverwhelmingmajorityofthepopulationinmostoftheareastheyinhabited.Then,non-tribalshadnotpenetratedtheseareastoanysignificantextent,thougheconomiccontactsbetweenthetribalandthenon-tribalareashadbeendevelopingovertime.ThiswasbecauseoftheBritishpolicyinthelatenineteenthcentury.ThetribalareasoccupiedbytheBritishthenformedpartoftheAssamprovincebutweregivena

separateadministrativestatus.Theirsocio-politicalstructurewasnotdisturbedandadeliberatepolicyofexcludingtheoutsidersfromtheplainswasfollowed.Inparticular,nonon-tribalplainsmenwereallowedtoacquirelandinthetribalareasbecauseofwhichthetribalssufferedlittlelossofland.Atthesametime,theBritishgovernmentpermittedandevenencouragedtheChristianmissionariesto

moveinandestablishschools,hospitalsandchurchesandtoproselytise,thusintroducingchangeandmodernideasamongsomeofthetribalyouth.Themissionaries,inturn,collaboratedwiththecolonialauthoritiesandhelpedkeepthenationalistinfluenceoutofthetribalareas,besidesencouragingtheirisolationfromtherestofthepopulationofAssamandIndia.Infact,immediatelyafterindependence,someofthemissionariesandotherforeignersevenpromotedsentimentinfavourofseparateandindependentstatesinnorth-easternIndia.ThevirtualabsenceofanypoliticalorculturalcontactofthetribalsintheNorth-Eastwiththepolitical

lifeoftherestofIndiawasalsoastrikingdifference.Aswehaveseeninanearlierchapter,apowerfulfactorintheunificationoftheIndianpeopleasanationwasthecommonbondsforgedinthecourseoftheanti-imperialiststruggle.ButthisstrugglehadlittleimpactamongthetribalsoftheNorth-East.ToquoteJawaharlalNehru:‘Theessenceofourstruggleforfreedomwastheunleashingofaliberatingforcein

India.Thisforcedidnotevenaffectthefrontierpeopleinoneofthemostimportanttribalareas.’12Andagain:‘ThustheyneverexperiencedasensationofbeinginacountrycalledIndiaandtheywerehardly

influencedbythestruggleforfreedomorothermovementsinIndia.TheirchiefexperienceofoutsiderswasthatofBritishofficersandChristianmissionarieswhogenerallytriedtomakethemanti-Indian.’13

ThetribalpolicyoftheGovernmentofIndia,inspiredbyJawaharlalNehruwasthereforeevenmorerelevanttothetribalpeopleoftheNorth-East.‘AllthisNorth-Eastborderareadeservesourspecialattention,’NehrusaidinOctober1952,‘notonlythegovernments,butofthepeopleofIndia.Ourcontactswiththemwilldousgoodandwilldothemgoodalso.Theyaddtothestrength,varietyandculturalrichnessofIndia.’14

AreflectionofthispolicywasintheSixthScheduleoftheConstitutionwhichappliedonlytothetribalareasofAssam.TheSixthScheduleofferedafairdegreeofself-governmenttothetribalpeoplebyprovidingforautonomousdistrictsandthecreationofdistrictandregionalcouncilswhichwouldexercisesomeofthelegislativeandjudicialfunctionswithintheoveralljurisdictionoftheAssamlegislatureandtheparliament.TheobjectiveoftheSixthSchedulewastoenabletribalstoliveaccordingtotheirownways.TheGovernmentofIndiaalsoexpresseditswillingnesstofurtheramendtheconstitutionalprovisionsrelatingtothetribalpeopleifitwasfoundnecessarytodosowithaviewtopromotefurtherautonomy.Butthisdidnotmean,NehruclarifiedthatthegovernmentwouldcountenancesecessionfromIndiaorindependencebyanyareaorregion,orwouldtolerateviolenceinthepromotionofanydemands.Nehru’sandVerrierElwin’spolicieswereimplementedbestofallintheNorth-EastFrontierAgency

orNEFA,whichwascreatedin1948outoftheborderareasofAssam.NEFAwasestablishedasaUnionTerritoryoutsidethejurisdictionofAssamandplacedunderaspecialadministration.Fromthebeginning,theadministrationwasmannedbyaspecialcadreofofficerswhowereaskedtoimplementspeciallydesigneddevelopmentalpolicieswithoutdisturbingthesocialandculturalpatternofthelifeofthepeople.AsaBritishanthropologistwhospentnearlyallhislifestudyingthetribalpeopleandtheirconditionwrotein1967,‘AmeasureofisolationcombinedwithasympatheticandimaginativepolicyofaprogressiveadministrationhasherecreatedasituationunparalleledinotherpartsofIndia.’15NEFAwasnamedArunachalPradeshandgrantedthestatusofaseparatestatein1987.WhileNEFAwasdevelopingcomfortablyandinharmonywiththerestofthecountry,problemsdevelopedintheothertribalareaswhichwerepartofAssamadministratively.TheproblemsarosebecausethehilltribesofAssamhadnoculturalaffinitywiththeAssameseandBengaliresidentsoftheplains.Thetribalswereafraidoflosingtheiridentitiesandbeingassimilatedbywhatwas,withsomejustification,seentobeapolicyofAssamization.Especiallydistastefultothemwastheattitudeofsuperiorityandevencontemptoftenadoptedbynon-tribalsworkingamongthemasteachers,doctors,governmentofficials,traders,etc.TherewasalsoafeelingamongthemthattheAssamesegovernmentfailedtounderstandthemandtendedtoneglecttheirinterests.ThisfeelingrepresentednotsomuchtherealityasthefailureofthepoliticalleadershipofAssamtoredresstribalgrievancesintimeandwithdeepconcern.Soon,resentmentagainsttheAssamgovernmentbegantomountandademandforaseparatehillstate

aroseamongsomesectionsofthetribalpeopleinthemid-fifties.Butthisdemandwasnotpressedwith

vigour;nordidtheGovernmentofIndiaencourageit,foritfeltthatthefutureofthehilltribeswasintimatelyconnectedwithAssamthoughfurtherstepstowardsgreaterautonomycouldbeenvisaged.ButthedemandgainedgreaterstrengthwhentheAssameseleadersmovedin1960towardsmaking

Assamesethesoleofficiallanguageofthestate.In1960,variouspoliticalpartiesofthehillareasmergedintotheAllPartyHillLeadersConference(APHLC)andagaindemandedaseparatestatewithintheIndianunion.ThepassageoftheAssamOfficialLanguageAct,makingAssamesetheofficiallanguageofthestate,andthustherefusalofthedemandfortheuseofthetriballanguagesinadministration,ledtoanimmediateandstrongreactioninthetribaldistricts.Therewerehartalsanddemonstrations,andamajoragitationdeveloped.Inthe1962elections,theoverwhelmingmajorityoftheAssemblyseatsfromthetribalareaswerewonbytheadvocatesofaseparatestate,whodecidedtoboycotttheStateAssembly.Prolongeddiscussionsandnegotiationsfollowed.Severalcommissionsandcommitteesexaminedthe

issue.Finally,in1969,throughaconstitutionalamendment,MeghalayawascarvedoutofAssamas‘astatewithinastate’whichhadcompleteautonomyexceptforlawandorderwhichremainedafunctionoftheAssamgovernment.MeghalayaalsosharedAssam’sHighCourt,PublicServiceCommissionandGovernor.Finally,asapartofthereorganizationoftheNorth-East,Meghalayabecameaseparatestatein1972,incorporatingtheGaro,KhasiandJaintiatribes.Simultaneously,theUnionTerritoriesofManipurandTripuraweregrantedstatehood.ThetransitiontostatehoodinthecaseofMeghalaya,Manipur,TripuraandArunachalPradeshwasquitesmooth.TroublearoseinthecaseofNagalandandMizoramwheresecessionistandinsurrectionarymovementsdeveloped.

Nagaland

TheNagasweretheinhabitantsoftheNagahillsalongtheNorth-EastfrontierontheAssam-Burmaborder.Theynumberednearly500,000in1961,constitutedlessthan0.1percentofIndia’spopulation,andconsistedofmanyseparatetribesspeakingdifferentlanguages.TheBritishhadisolatedtheNagasfromtherestofthecountryandleftthemmoreorlessundisturbedthoughChristianmissionaryactivitywaspermitted,andwhichhadledtothegrowthofasmalleducatedstratum.Immediatelyafterindependence,theGovernmentofIndiafollowedapolicyofintegratingtheNaga

areaswiththeStateofAssamandIndiaasawhole.AsectionoftheNagaleadership,however,opposedsuchintegrationandroseinrebellionundertheleadershipofA.Z.Phizo,demandingseparationfromIndiaandcompleteindependence.TheywereencouragedinthismovebysomeoftheBritishofficialsandmissionaries.In1955,theseseparatistNagasdeclaredtheformationofanindependentgovernmentandthelaunchingofaviolentinsurrection.TheGovernmentofIndiarespondedwithatwo-trackpolicyinlinewithJawaharlalNehru’swider

approachtowardsthetribalpeoplediscussedearlierinthischapter.Ontheonehand,theGovernmentofIndiamadeitclearthatitwouldfirmlyopposethesecessionistdemandfortheindependenceofNagaareasandwouldnottoleraterecoursetoviolence.Towardsaviolentsecessionistmovementitwouldfirmlyfollowapolicyofsuppressionandnon-negotiations.AsNehruputit,‘Itdoesnothelpindealingwithtoughpeopletohaveweaknerves.’16Consequently,whenonesectionoftheNagasorganizedanarmedstruggleforindependence,theGovernmentofIndiarepliedbysendingitsarmytoNagalandinearly1956torestorepeaceandorder.

Ontheotherhand,Nehrurealizedthatwhilestrongandquickmilitaryactionwouldmakeitclearthattherebelswereinano-winsituation,totalphysicalsuppressionwasneitherpossiblenordesirable,fortheobjectivehadtobetheconciliationandwinningoveroftheNagapeople.Nehruwasweddedtoa‘friendlyapproach’.EvenwhileencouragingtheNagastointegratewiththerestofthecountry‘inmindandspirit’,hefavouredtheirrighttomaintaintheirautonomyinculturalandothermatters.Hewas,therefore,willingtogoalongwaytowinovertheNagasbygrantingthemalargedegreeofautonomy.RefusingtonegotiatewithPhizoorhissupportersaslongastheydidnotgiveuptheirdemandforindependenceorthearmedrebellion,hecarriedonprolongednegotiationswiththemoremoderate,non-violentandnon-secessionistNagaleaders,whorealizedthattheycouldnothopetogetalargerdegreeofautonomyoramoresympatheticleadertosettlewiththanNehru.Infact,oncethebackofthearmedrebellionwasbrokenbythemiddleof1957,themoremoderate

NagaleadersheadedbyDrImkonglibaAocametothefore.TheynegotiatedforthecreationoftheStateofNagalandwithintheIndianunion.TheGovernmentofIndiaacceptedtheirdemandthroughaseriesofintermediatesteps;andtheStateofNagalandcameintoexistencein1963.AfurtherstepforwardwastakenintheintegrationoftheIndiannation.Also,politicsinNagalandsincethenfollowed,forbetterorworse,thepatternofpoliticsintheotherstatesoftheunion.WiththeformationofNagalandasastatethebackofrebellionwasbrokenastherebelslostmuchof

theirpopularsupport.Butthoughtheinsurgencyhasbeenbroughtundercontrol,sporadicguerillaactivitybyNagarebelstrainedinChina,PakistanandBurmaandperiodicterroristattackscontinuetillthisday.WemayalsorefertooneotherfeatureoftheNagasituation.EventhoughtherecordoftheIndianarmy

inNagalandhasbeenonthewholeclean,especiallyifthedifficultconditionsunderwhichtheyoperatearekeptinview,ithasnotbeenwithoutblemish.Itsbehaviourhasbeensometimesimproperandinrarecasesevenbrutal.Toomanytimesinnocentpeoplehavesuffered.Butthenithasalsopaidaheavypricethroughthelossofitssoldiersandofficersinguerillaattacks.

Mizoram

AsituationsimilartothatinNagalanddevelopedfewyearslaterintheautonomousMizodistrictoftheNorth-East.SecessionistdemandsbackedbysomeBritishofficialshadgrowntherein1947buthadfailedtogetmuchsupportfromtheyouthfulMizoleadership,whichconcentratedinsteadontheissuesofdemocratizationofMizosociety,economicdevelopmentandadequaterepresentationofMizosintheAssamlegislature.However,unhappinesswiththeAssamgovernment’sreliefmeasuresduringthefamineof1959andthepassageoftheActin1961,makingAssamesetheofficiallanguageofthestate,ledtotheformationoftheMizoNationalFront(MNF),withLaldengaaspresident.Whileparticipatinginelectoralpolitics,theMNFcreatedamilitarywingwhichreceivedarmsand

ammunitionandmilitarytrainingfromEastPakistanandChina.OnMarch1966,theMNFdeclaredindependencefromIndia,proclaimedamilitaryuprisingandattackedmilitaryandciviliantargets.TheGovernmentofIndiarespondedwithimmediatemassivecounter-insurgencymeasuresbythearmy.Withinafewweekstheinsurrectionwascrushedandgovernmentcontrolrestored,thoughstrayguerillaactivitycontinued.MostofthehardcoreMizoleadersescapedtoEastPakistan.In1973,afterthelessextremistMizoleadershadscaled-downtheirdemandtothatofaseparatestate

ofMizoramwithintheIndianunion,theMizodistrictofAssamwasseparatedfromAssamandas

MizoramgiventhestatusofaUnionTerritory.MizoinsurgencygainedsomerenewedstrengthinthelateseventiesbutwasagaineffectivelydealtwithbyIndianarmedforces.Havingdecimatedtheranksoftheseparatistinsurgents,theGovernmentofIndia,continuingtofollowtheNehruviantribalpolicy,wasnowwillingtoshowconsideration,offerliberaltermsofamnestytotheremnantsoftherebelforcesandconductnegotiationsforpeace.Asettlementwasfinallyarrivedatin1986.LaldengaandtheMNFagreedtoabandonunderground

violentactivities,surrenderbeforetheIndianauthoritiesalongwiththeirarms,andre-entertheconstitutionalpoliticalstream.TheGovernmentofIndiaagreedtothegrantoffullstatehoodtoMizoram,guaranteeingfullautonomyinregardtoculture,tradition,andlandlaws,etc.Asapartoftheaccord,agovernmentwithLaldengaaschiefministerwasformedinthenewStateofMizoraminFebruary1987.

Jharkhand

Jharkhand,thetribalareaofBiharconsistingoftheChotaNagpurandtheSanthalParganas,hasfordecadesspawnedmovementsforstateautonomy.InthisareaareconcentratedseveralmajortribesofIndia,namelySanthal,Ho,OraonandMunda.Unliketraditionaltribes,nearlyallofthesepracticesettledploughagricultureonthebasisoffamilyfarms.Economicdifferentiationhassetin;thereareasignificantnumberofagriculturallabourersandagrowingnumberofminingandindustrialworkers.Theland-holdingpatternamongtribalsisasunequalandskewedasamongnon-tribals.Alargeclassofmoneylendershasalsodevelopedamongthem.ThetribalsocietyinJharkhandhasincreasinglybecomeaclass-dividedsociety.Mostoftribalspractisetwoformalreligions—HinduismandChristianity.TheJharkhandtribes,however,sharesomefeatureswithotherIndiantribes.Theyhavelostmostof

theirland,generallytooutsiders,andsufferfromindebtedness,lossofemploymentandlowagriculturalproductivity.Theyorganizedseveralmajorrebellionsduringthenineteenthcentury;andmanyofthemactivelyparticipatedinthenationalmovementafter1919.In1951,theScheduledTribesconstituted31.15percentofthepopulationinChotaNagpur(30.94in

1971)and44.67percentofthepopulationintheSanthalParganas(36.22in1971).Thus,nearlytwo-thirdsofJharkhand’spopulationin1971wasnon-tribal.Theoverwhelmingmajorityofbothtribalsandnon-tribalswereequallyexploitedpoorpeasants,agriculturallabourersandminingandindustrialworkers.Inequalityinland-holdingandthemoneylendermenacewereequallyprevalentamongthetwoaswasthecommercializationofagricultureandcommercialactivity.Withthespreadofeducationandmodernactivityinthetribalareas,amovementfortheformationofa

separatetribalstateofJharkhand,incorporatingChotaNagpurandtheSanthalParganasofSouthBiharandthecontiguoustribalareasofMadhyaPradesh,OrissaandWestBengal,startedduringthelatethirtiesandforties.Realizingthattheinterestsofthetribalpeoplecouldbebestpromotedandtheirdominationbynon-tribalsendediftheyhadastateoftheirownwithintheUnionofIndia,theJharkhandpartywasfoundedin1950undertheleadershipoftheOxford-educatedJaipalSingh.Thepartyachievedaremarkablesuccessin1952electionswhenitwon32seatsinChotaNagpurandemergedasthemainoppositionpartyintheBiharAssembly.Itwon25seatsin1957.ButtheJharkhandpartyfacedamajordilemma.Whileitdemandedastatewherethetribalpeople

wouldpredominate,thepopulationcompositionofJharkhandwassuchthattheywouldstillconstituteaminorityinit.Toovercomethisproblemthepartytriedtogiveitsdemandaregionalcharacterby

openingitsmembershiptothenon-tribalsoftheareaandunderplayingitsanti-non-tribalrhetoric,evenwhiletalkingoftheempowermentoftribalsandtheirdominanceofthenewstate.TheStatesReorganizationCommissionof1955,however,rejectedthedemandforaseparateJharkhandstateonthegroundthattheregiondidnothaveacommonlanguage.ThecentralgovernmentalsoheldthattribalsbeingaminorityinJharkhandcouldnotclaimastateoftheirown.Bytheearlysixtiestherankandfileofthepartybegantogetdisheartenedandfrustrated.The

Jharkhandpartycouldwinonly20seatstotheBiharAssemblyin1962.In1963,amajorpartoftheleadershipoftheparty,includingJaipalSingh,joinedCongress,claimingthatby‘workingfromwithinCongress’itstoodabetterchanceofgettingitsdemandforaseparatestateacceptedbythegovernment.SeveraltribalpartiesandmovementsdevelopedinJharkhandafter1967,themostprominentbeingthe

JharkhandMuktiMorcha(JMM),whichwasformedinlate1972.TheJMMrevivedthedemandfortheJharkhandstate,butitmadetwoinnovations.Itrecognizedthehardrealitythatnearlytwo-thirdsofthepopulationofJharkhandwasnon-tribalandthat,therefore,amovementwhichappealedonlytothetribalpeoplecouldnotacquiretherequisitepoliticalstrength.TheJMM,thereforebegantoassertthatalltheolderresidentsoftheJharkhandregion,whethertribalornon-tribal,wereexploited,discriminatedagainstanddominatedbyNorthBiharandtherecentmigrants.It,therefore,putforwardthedemandforaseparatestateasaregionaloneonbehalfofthepeasantsandworkersoftheregion.Concentratingoneconomicissues,italsoacquiredthesupportofthenon-tribalpoor;severalnon-triballeadersandpoliticalactivistsjoinedit,thoughthebulkofitsfollowingwasstillthatoftribals.ThetriballeadersfeltthatdespitetheminoritycharacteroftribalsintheprojectedJharkhandstate,theywouldhaveafargreaterrepresentationandweightinthenewstatethantheyhadinBiharasawhole.TheJMMturnedtoaradicalprogrammeandideology.Joinedbyothergroups,especiallyleftistgroups

suchastheMarxistCoordinationCentre,itorganizedseveralmilitantagitationsonissuessuchasrecoveryofalienatedland,moneylenders’exploitation,employmentoftribalsinminesandindustriesandimprovedworkingconditionsandhigherwagesinthelatter,policeexcesses,high-handednessofforestofficialsandincreasingliquorconsumption.ShibuSorenemergedasthecharismaticleaderoftheJMMduringtheearlyseventies.Cooperationwiththeleftistsdidnot,however,lastlong;nordidthetribal/non-tribalalliance.The

movementfortheJharkhandstateunderwentconstantupsanddownsandsplitsovertheyearswithnewgroupscomingupeverysooften.MajordifferencesamongtheJharkhandleaderspertainedtothequestionofcooperationoralliancewiththemainall-Indiaparties.Manyofthembelievedthatinparliamentarydemocracy,asmallnumberofMPsorMLAscouldnotontheirowneasilygettheirdemandsaccepted.ShibuSoren,hisfollowersandsomeotherswerealsoawareofthefutilityofpermanentlyconfrontingstatepowerandtheinevitablerecoursetoviolenceandarmedstruggleasadvocatedbythemovement’sultra-leftistfringe.Themovementalsofounditdifficulttoshiftcompletelyfromtribaltoclass-basedregionalpolitics,

sinceitwasbasicallybuiltaroundtribalidentityandtribaldemands.Inparticular,thepolicyofreservationsfortribalscontainedthecontinuingseedsofdifferencesbetweentribalsandnon-tribals.Tribalsocietywasalsonothomogeneous;italsocontainedlandlords,richpeasants,tradersandmoneylenders.Aboveall,themaximumthemovementwasabletoextractfromtherulingpartiesinBiharandtheCentrewasapromiseofregionalautonomywithintheBiharstatefortheJharkhandregion.Infact,

asoftoday,thevariousconstituentsoftheJharkhandmovementhavealsoacceptedtheregionalautonomyformula,withdifferencesexistingonlyinregardtoitsexactformandcontent.

10ConsolidationofIndiaAsaNation:RegionalismandRegionalInequality

Inthefifties,manysawregionalismasamajorthreattoIndianunity.But,infact,regionalism,atnostagewasamajorfactorinIndianpoliticsandadministration;overtime,ittendedtobecomelessandlessimportant.WhatpreciselyisregionalismneedstobefirstunderstoodforappreciatingitsroleinIndianpolitics.Localpatriotismandloyaltytoalocalityorregionorstateanditslanguageandculturedonot

constituteregionalismnoraretheydisruptiveofthenation.Theyarequiteconsistentwithnationalpatriotismandloyaltytothenation.Tohaveprideinone’sregionorstateisalsonotregionalism.Apersoncanbeconsciousofhisorherdistinctregionalidentity—ofbeingaTamiloraPunjabi,aBengalioraGujarati—withoutbeinganythelessproudofbeinganIndian,orbeinghostiletopeoplefromotherregions.ThiswasputverywellbyGandhijiin1909:‘AsthebasisofmyprideasanIndian,ImusthaveprideinmyselfasaGujarati.Otherwise,weshallbeleftwithoutanymoorings.’1

TheIndiannationalmovementtoofunctionedonthisunderstanding.Fromthebeginningitfunctionedasanall-Indiamovementandnotasafederationofregionalnationalmovements.Italsodidnotcounterposethenationalidentitytoregionalidentities;itrecognizedbothanddidnotseethetwoinconflict.Aspiringtoormakingspecialeffortstodevelopone’sstateorregionortoremovepovertyand

implementsocialjusticethere,isnottobebrandedasregionalism.Infact,acertaininter-regionalrivalryaroundtheachievementofsuchpositivegoalswouldbequitehealthy—andinfactwehavetoolittleofit.Alsolocalpatriotismcanhelppeopleovercomedivisiveloyaltiestocasteorreligiouscommunities.DefendingthefederalfeaturesoftheConstitutionisalsonottobeseenasregionalism.Thedemandfor

aseparatestatewithintheIndianunionorforanautonomousregionwithinanexistingstate,orfordevolutionofpowerbelowthestatelevel,maybeobjectedtoonseveralpracticalgrounds,butnotasregionalist,unlessitisputforwardinaspiritofhostilitytotherestofthepopulationofastate.Iftheinterestsofoneregionorstateareassertedagainstthecountryasawholeoragainstanotherregionorstateinahostilemannerandaconflictispromotedonthebasisofsuchallegedinterestsitcanbedubbedasregionalism.Inthissense,therehasbeenverylittleinter-regionalconflictinIndiasince1947,themajorexception

beingthepoliticsoftheDravidaMunnetraKazhagam(DMK)inTamilNaduinthefiftiesandearlysixties.TheroleoftheDMKisdiscussedinchapter22,butitmaybeobservedthattheDMKhasalsoincreasinglygivenupitsregionalistapproachovertheyears.SomecitetheexampleofPunjabintheeighties,but,asweshallseeinchapter24,Punjab’swasacaseofcommunalismandnotregionalism.RegionalismcouldhaveflourishedinIndiaifanyregionorstatehadfeltthatitwasbeingculturally

dominatedordiscriminatedagainst.In1960,SeligHarrison,USscholarandjournalist,inhisfamous

work,India—TheMostDangerousDecades,hadseenamajorthreattoIndianunitybecauseofconflictbetweenthenationalgovernmentandtheregionsasthelatterassertedtheirseparateculturalidentities.But,infact,theIndiannationhasprovedtobequitesuccessfulinaccommodatingandevencelebrating—inNehru’swords—India’sculturaldiversity.ThedifferentareasofIndiahavehadfullculturalautonomyandbeenenabledtofullysatisfytheirlegitimateaspirations.ThelinguisticreorganizationofIndiaandtheresolutionoftheofficiallanguagecontroversyhaveplayedaveryimportantroleinthisrespect,byeliminatingapotentcauseofthefeelingofculturallossorculturaldominationandthereforeofinter-regionalconflict.Manyregionaldisputes,ofcourse,doexistandtheyhavethepotentialoffanninginter-statehostility.

Therehasbeenfrictionbetweendifferentstatesoverthesharingofriverwaters;forexample,betweenTamilNaduandKarnataka,KarnatakaandAndhra,andPunjabandHaryanaandRajasthan.BoundarydisputeshavearisenoutoftheformationoflinguisticstatesasinthecaseofBelgaumandChandigarh.Constructionofirrigationandpowerdamshascreatedsuchconflicts.But,whilethesedisputestendtopersistforalongtimeandoccasionallyarousepassions,theyhave,asawhole,remainedwithinnarrow,andwemightsayacceptable,limits.Thecentralgovernmenthasoftensucceededinplayingtheroleofamediator,thoughsometimesdrawingtheangerofthedisputantsonitself,butthuspreventingsharperinter-regionalconflicts.

EconomicImbalancesandRegionalism

Economicinequalityamongdifferentstatesandregionscouldbeapotentialsourceoftrouble.However,despitebreedingdiscontentandputtingpressureonthepoliticalsystem,thisproblemhasnotsofargivenrisetoregionalismorfeelingofaregionbeingdiscriminatedagainst.Atindependence,theleadershiprecognizedthatsomeregionsweremorebackwardthanothers.Onlya

fewenclavesorareasaroundCalcutta,BombayandMadrashadundergonemodernindustrialdevelopment.Forexample,in1948,BombayandWestBengalaccountedformorethan59percentofthetotalindustrialcapitalofthecountryandmorethan64percentofthenationalindustrialoutput.Undercolonialism,agriculturehadalsostagnated,butmoreineasternIndiathaninnorthernorsouthernIndia.Regionaleconomicdisparitywasalsoreflectedinpercapitaincome.In1949,whileWestBengal,PunjabandBombayhadpercapitaincomesofRs353,331and272respectively,thepercapitaincomesofBihar,OrissaandRajasthanwereRs200,188and173respectively.Fromthebeginning,thenationalgovernmentfeltaresponsibilitytocounterthisimbalanceinregional

development.Thus,forexample,the1956IndustrialPolicyResolutionoftheGovernmentofIndiaassertedthat‘onlybysecuringabalancedandcoordinateddevelopmentoftheindustrialandagriculturaleconomyineachregioncantheentirecountryattainhigherstandardsofliving.’Similarly,recognizing‘theimportanceofregionalbalanceineconomicdevelopmentasapositivefactorinpromotingnationalintegration,’theNationalIntegrationCouncilof1961urgedthat‘arapiddevelopmentoftheeconomicallybackwardregionsinanyStateshouldbegivenpriorityinnationalandStateplans,atleasttotheextentthattheminimumlevelofdevelopmentisreachedforallstateswithinastatedperiod.’2

Fromthebeginning,thecentralgovernmentadoptedawholerangeofpoliciestoinfluencetheratesofgrowthinpoorerstatesandregionssoastoreducetheireconomicdistancefromthericherstatesandregions.Amajorgovernmentinstrumentinbringingthisaboutwasthetransferoffinancialresourcesto

thepoorerstates.ImportantinthisrespectwastheroleoftheFinanceCommission,providedforintheConstitutionandappointedperiodicallybythePresident.TheCommissiondecidestheprinciplesonwhichdisbursementofcentraltaxesandotherfinancialresourcesfromthecentralgovernmenttothestatesoccurs.VariousFinancialCommissionshavetriednotonlytodojusticeamongthestatesbutalsotoreduceinter-statedisparitybygivingpreferentialtreatmenttothepoorerstates,byallocatinglargergrantstothemthantheirpopulationwouldwarrantandbytransferringresourcesfromthebetter-offstatestothem.Planningwasalsoseenaspowerfulinstrumentthatcouldbeusedtoremoveregionalinequality.The

SecondPlanreflectedthisobjectiveanditwasreiteratedinthesucceedingPlans.TheThirdPlanexplicitlystatedthat‘balanceddevelopmentofdifferentpartsofthecountry,extensionofthebenefitsofeconomicprogresstothelessdevelopedregionsandwidespreaddiffusionofindustryareamongthemajoraimsofplanneddevelopment.’3

Forthispurpose,thePlanningCommissionallocatedgreaterplanassistancetothebackwardstates.Thisassistanceisgivenintheformbothofgrantsandloansonthebasisofaformulawhichassignsanimportantplacetothedegreeofbackwardnessofastate.Moreover,biasinfavourofbackwardstatesinthedevolutionofresourcesfromtheCentretothestates,intheformbothoffinancialandplantransfers,hastendedtoincreasewithtime.Publicinvestmentbythecentralgovernmentinmajorindustriessuchassteel,fertilizers,oilrefining,

petrochemicals,machine-making,heavychemicalsandinpowerandirrigationprojects,roads,railways,postofficesandotherinfrastructuralfacilities,hasbeenatoolforthereductionofregionalinequality.IndiahasreliedheavilyonpublicinvestmentsincethebeginningoftheSecondPlanin1957andanefforthasbeenmadetofavourbackwardstatesinregardtothisinvestment.Intheplanningandlocationofthepublicsectorenterprisesbalancedregionalgrowthhasbeenan

importantconsideration,thoughthishasentailedacertaineconomiccosttotheenterprisesconcerned.BiharandMadhyaPradeshhavegainedthemostfromsuchinvestment;Assam,HimachalPradesh,JammuandKashmirandthenorth-easternstateshavealsobenefittedagreatdealfromthedevelopmentofinfrastructure,especiallyroads.Governmentincentiveshavebeenprovidedtotheprivatesectortoinvestinbackwardareasthrough

subsidies,taxconcessions,andconcessionalbankingandinstitutionalloansatsubsidisedrates.Thesystemoflicensingofprivateindustrialenterprises,whichprevailedfrom1956to1991,wasalsousedbythegovernmenttoguidelocationofindustriesinbackwardareas.Followingnationalizationofbanksin1969,theexpansionofthenetworkoftheirbrancheswasusedto

favourbackwardareas.Banksandotherpublicsectorfinancialinstitutionsweredirectedtopromoteinvestmentintheseareas.Also,variousministrieshaveevolvedschemesfordevelopmentofbackwardareas.Inparticular,povertyeradicationprogrammes,suchastheFoodforWorkprogrammeandtheIntensiveRuralDevelopmentprogramme,adoptedsincetheseventies,andtosomeextenteducation,healthandfamilyplanningprogrammesandthepublicdistributionsystemhavefavouredpoorerstates.Onesectorwheretheprincipleofthereductionofregionaldisparityhasnotbeenkeptinviewisthatof

investmentinirrigationandsubsidiestoagriculturaldevelopment.ThishasbeenespeciallysosincethesixtieswhentheGreenRevolutionbeganandinvestmentinruralinfrastructureandtechnologicalinnovationwasconcentratedinPunjab,HaryanaandwesternU.P.,namelyareaswhereirrigationwasor

couldbemadeavailablereadily.Inparticular,investmentinanddevelopmentofrain-feddrylandagriculturewasneglected.Theresultwasanincreaseinregionalagriculturaldisparity.ThespreadoftheGreenRevolutiontechnologyduringtheseventiestoAndhraPradesh,TamilNadu,Karnataka,easternU.P.andpartsofRajasthan,andduringtheeightiestotheeasternstatesofBihar,WestBengal,OrissaandAssamhasredressedtheregionalimbalancetoacertainextent.Economicmobilityofpopulationthroughmigrationofunskilledlabourfromthebackwardregionsand

ofskilledlabourtothemcanalsocontributetothelesseningofregionaldisparity;andtheIndianConstitutionguaranteesthismobility.Therehasbeenagreatdealofmigrationfromonestatetoanother.Somestates—HimachalPradesh,Orissa,BiharandKerala—havebenefittedfromout-migrationjustasBengal,GujaratandMaharashtrahavebenefittedfromin-migration.Certainotherstates,likePunjabandKarnatakahavehadthebenefitofbothout-migrationandin-migration.Unfortunately,asweshallseeinthenextsection,effortshavebeenmadebysomestatestoputchecksoninter-statemigration.Itwouldbeappropriateheretoaskhowfarhavethevariouseffortsofthenationalgovernment

succeededinreducingregionalinequality.Thepicturethatemergesisamixedone.Therehasbeenamarginalimprovementbutregionalinequalityespeciallyintermsofpercapitaincome,continuestoremainaprominentfeatureoftheIndianeconomy.Possibly,thesituationwouldhavebeenmuchworsebutforthegovernment’sactionswhichhaspreventedthewideningoftheeconomicgapbetweenstatesandregions.Therearealsootherdimensionstobeobservedwithregardtotheimpactofthesepolicies.Forone,therehascertainlybeenadeclineininter-stateindustrialdisparity,especiallyintheorganized

manufacturingsector.Thereisalsolessdisparityintermsofsocialwelfareasrepresentedbylifeexpectancy,infantmortalityandliteracy,thoughafewstateslikeKeralaandTamilNaduhavemovedfarahead.Aswehaveseenabove,theincreaseddisparityinagricultureisalsograduallygettingredressedthoughtherain-feddryareasarestilllaggingbehind.Whilethepercentageofpeoplebelowthepovertylinehassteadilydeclinedinallthestatesitisintheadvancedstatesthatmaximumprogresshasbeenmade,sothattheinter-regionaldisparityinthedistributionofpovertyhasbeengrowing.Overall,whiletherehasbeeneconomicgrowthinallstates,theratesofgrowthofdifferentstateshavebeenhighlydifferential,leadingtointer-statedisparitiesremainingquitewide.Somebackwardstateshavemanagedtopickthemselvesup,whileothershavefailedtodoso,withthe

resultthattherehasbeenachangeinthehierarchyofstatesintermsofdevelopmentandpercapitaincome.Thus,Bihar,MadhyaPradeshandOrissaarestillatthebottom.Maharashtra,PunjabandGujaratcontinuetoremainonthetop.TherehasbeenanimprovementinthepositionofthepreviouslyunderdevelopedstatesofHaryana,KarnatakaandTamilNadu,whiletherehasbeendeteriorationinthatofAssam,WestBengal,KeralaandU.P,withU.P.movingtothebottomlevelandWestBengaltothemiddle.AndhraPradeshandRajasthanhavestagnated,remainingjustabovethebottomlevel.Onthewhole,HaryanaisanexampleofthestateswhichhaveimprovedtheirpositionandBiharofoneofthosewhosepositionhasworsened.Whythendoesregionalinequalitypersistonsuchawidescale?Whataretheconstraintsonits

decline?OrwhyhaveBiharandU.P.performedsopoorly.Itemergesthattheconstraintisnotessentiallyofgeography,thatis,ofinequalityinsizeornaturalresources.Bihar,U.P.andOrissaare,forexample,verywellendowedbynature;theirpeoplewellknownfortheirindustriousnessbecauseofwhichthey

arewelcomedintherestofthecountry,andindeedoverseasintheWestIndies,MauritiusandFijitowheresomehavemigrated.Themajorreason,attheall-Indialevel,forcontinuingregionaldisparityhasbeenthelowrateof

economicgrowth.Tomakeadentonthisrequiresahighrateofnationalgrowthsothatlargerevenuescanberaisedanddevotedtothedevelopmentofthebackwardregionswithoutadverselyaffectingnationalgrowthitself.TherateofgrowthoftheIndianeconomywasaround3.5percenttilltheendofseventiesandaround5percentintheeighties.Thiswasnothighenoughtohaveasignificantimpactonregionalinequalitydespitepoliciesconsciouslydesignedtofavourbackwardregionsbeingfollowed.Itisonlyinthelastfewyearsthattherateofgrowthoftheeconomyhastouched7percent,whilepopulationgrowthhasalsosloweddown.Areductionineconomicinequalitymaycomeabout,providedtherighttypeofregionaldevelopmentalpoliciescontinuetobefollowed.We,however,feelthattherootsofsomestates’backwardnessliesintheirsocio-economicand

politicalorganizationitself.Forexample,theagrarianstructureinBiharandeasternU.P.isquiteregressiveandinmanypartsofthesestateslandreformshavebeeninadequatelyimplemented.(ThiswasalsotrueofOrissatillrecently.)Thefeudalmentalityisstillquitestrong.Also,inBiharandOrissalandconsolidationhasbeentardy,whichplayedanimportantroleintheagriculturaldevelopmentofPunjabandHaryana.Thebackwardstateshavealowerlevelofinfrastructuralfacilities,suchaspower,irrigation,roads,

telephones,andmodernmarketsforagriculturalproduce.TheseareessentialfordevelopmentandhavetobedevelopedbythestatesthemselvesbeingmostlyStatesubjects.Statesalsohavealowlevelofsocialexpenditureoneducationandpublichealthandsanitation,which

arealsoStatesubjects.Besides,theysufferfromalackoffinancialresourcestomeetplanexpenditure.Increasedcentralfinancialassistanceisunabletooffsetthisweakness.Aviciouscycleissetup.Alowlevelofeconomicdevelopmentandproductionmeanslessfinancialresourcesandlimitedexpenditureoninfrastructure,developmentplanningandsocialservices.Andthislowlevelofexpenditureinturnleadstolowlevelsofproductionandthereforeoffinancialresources.Politicalandadministrativefailurealsobolstersbackwardness.BiharandU.P.areclassiccasesof

states,bedevilledbyhighlevelsofcorruption,sheerbadadministration,anddeterioratinglawandorder.Asaresultwhatevercentralassistanceisavailableispoorlyutilizedandoftendivertedtonon-developmentheadsofexpenditure.Further,developmentofinfrastructure,includingroadsandelectricity,isneglectedandtheexistinginfrastructureisriddledwithinefficiencyandcorruption.Allthisturnsawaytheprivatesector,whichisamajorsourceofdevelopmentintheadvancedstates.TheroleofgreateradministrativeefficiencyisalsoprovedbythebetterratesofeconomicgrowthintherelativelybetteradministeredstatesofsouthandwesternIndiaascomparedtoBiharandU.P.Inpassing,itmaybementionedthatdisparitiesindevelopmentalsoexistwithineachstate.Inmany

cases,thisinequalityhasbecomeasourceoftensionandgivenbirthtosub-regionalmovementsforseparatestateswithintheIndianunion,orgreaterautonomyforthesub-regionswithintheexistingstates,oratleastspecialtreatmentandsafeguardsinmattersofemployment,educationandallocationoffinancialresources.Examplesofsuchsub-regionalfeelingsarethemovementsinTelenganainAndhraPradesh,VidarbhainMaharashtra,SaurashtrainGujarat,ChhattisgarhinMadhyaPradesh,UttarakhandandBundelkhandinU.P.,DarjeelingdistrictorGorkhalandinWestBengal,BodolandinAssam,toa

certainextentSouthBiharorJharkhandinBihar,andtheareasconsistingoftheoldprincelystatesofOrissa.Undoubtedly,regionaleconomicinequalityisapotenttime-bombdirectedagainstnationalunityand

politicalstability.Sofar,fortunately,ithasbeen‘digested’,absorbedandmitigatedbecauseitisnottheresultofdominationandexploitationofbackwardstatesbythemoreadvancedstatesorofdiscriminationagainsttheformerbythenationalgovernment.ItisnoteworthythatthepoliticallyimportantHindi-speakingstatesoftheIndianheartland—U.P.,Bihar,MadhyaPradeshandRajasthan,withnearly37percentoftheseatsintheLokSabha—areeconomicallybackward.Ontheotherhand,Punjab,Haryana,GujaratandMaharashtra,withonlyabout17percentoftheseatsintheLokSabha,arethehigh-incomestates.Itis,therefore,impossibleforanyonewhotalksoftheHindi-beltstates’dominationoftheotherstobetakenseriously.Ontheotherhand,thebackwardHindi-beltstateswieldsomuchpoliticalcloutthatitisimpossiblefor

themtoaccusethecentralgovernmentornon-Hindistatesofdominatingordiscriminatingagainstthem.ItisinterestingthatsofaraccusationsofcentraldominationhavecomefromtherelativelydevelopedstatesofPunjabandWestBengal—obviouslyforpoliticalandnoteconomicreasons.Intheall-Indiaservicestoo,liketheIAS,theHindiareasarenotadvantaged.ItisPunjab,TamilNadu,

KeralaandWestBengalwhichhaveahigherrepresentationthantheirpopulationwarrants.Anotherreasonforthelackofregionalismandfeelingofdiscriminationamongthepoorerstateshas

beentheconsciousnessoftheirintelligentsiathattheirpovertyandbackwardnessarebasicallytheresultoftheactionsoftheirownpoliticalandadministrativeclasses.Afterall,feelingsofdeprivationandlackofprogressareessentiallyarticulatedbytheintelligentsia.Atthesametime,thevastmajorityofthepeopleinthepoorerstatesareblissfullyunawareoftheirbackwardnessandpovertyincomparisonwithotherstates.Thisleadsbothtoabsenceofdiscontentwiththeirpositionasalsotoalackofefforttoreachequalitywiththemoreadvancedstates.However,withthespreadofeducationandthereachofthevisualandprintmedia,suchastelevisionandnewspapers,thisstateofaffairsislikelytochange.Nevertheless,aswasfullyrealizedbythefoundersoftheRepublic,itisnecessarytofirstcontain

regionalinequalitywithinpoliticallyandeconomicallyreasonableandacceptablelimitsandthentograduallymovetowarditselimination,byraisingtheratesofgrowthofthepoorerstatesbyallavailablemeansincludinggreatercentralassistanceasalsogreaterself-effortbythem.Thisalso,ofcourse,meansthat,asAjitMozoomdarhasargued,thenationalgovernmentneedstowield‘greaterauthoritythaninindustrialisedcountries,tobeabletodeviseandimplementstrategiesofeconomicandsocialdevelopment,andtodealwiththeproblemsofregionaldisparities,whicharemoreacute.’Italsomusthavetheauthority‘tomediateandresolveconflictsbetweenstatesovertheappropriationofnaturalresources’and‘toeffectsignificantresourcetransfersfromrichertopoorerstates.’4

SonsoftheSoilDoctrine

Sincethefifties,anuglyformofregionalismhasbeenwidelyprevalentintheformof‘thesonsofthesoil’doctrine.Underlyingitistheviewthatastatespecificallybelongstothemainlinguisticgroupinhabitingitorthatthestateconstitutestheexclusive‘homeland’ofitsmainlanguagespeakerswhoarethe‘sonsofthesoil’orthe‘local’residents.Allothers,wholivethere,oraresettledthereandwhosemothertongueisnotthestate’smainlanguage,aredeclaredtobe‘outsiders’.These‘outsiders’might

havelivedinthestateforalongtime,orhavemigratedtheremorerecently,buttheyarenottoberegardedas‘thesonsofthesoil’.Thisdoctrineisparticularlypopularincities,especiallyinsomeofthem.Unequaldevelopmentofeconomicopportunitiesindifferentpartsofthecountry,especiallythecities,

occurredinthesurgeofeconomicprogressafter1952.Demandorpreferenceforthe‘local’peopleor‘sonsofthesoil’overthe‘outsiders’inthenewly-createdemploymentandeducationalopportunitieswastheoutcome.Inthestrugglefortheappropriationofeconomicresourcesandeconomicopportunities,oftenrecoursewastakentocommunalism,casteismandnepotism.Likewise,languageloyaltyandregionalismwasusedtosystematicallyexcludethe‘outsiders’fromtheeconomiclifeofastateorcity.Theproblemwasaggravatedinanumberofcitiesorregionsbecausethespeakersofthestatelanguage

wereinaminorityorhadabaremajority.Forexample,inBombay,in1961,theMarathi-speakersconstituted42.8percentofthepopulation.InBangalore,theKannada-speakerswerelessthan25percent.InCalcutta,theBengalisformedabaremajority.IntheurbanareasofAssam,barely33percentwereAssamese.After1951therateofmigrationintothecitiesaccelerated.Theimportantquestionsthatariseare,whydid‘thesonsofthesoil’movementsdevelopinsomestates

andcitiesandnotinothers,whyweretheydirectedagainstsomemigrantsandlinguisticminoritygroupsandnotothers,whyweresometypesofjobstargettedandnotothers,why,technicalandprofessionaleducationasagainsttheso-calledartseducation?Conflictbetweenmigrantsandnon-migrants(andlinguisticminoritiesandmajorities)wasnotinherentandinevitable.Ingeneral,thetwohavelivedharmoniouslyinmostofthestates.Clearly,therewerespecificconditionsthatprecipitatedtheconflict.‘Thesonsofthesoil’movementshavemainlyarisen,andhavebeenmorevirulent,whenthereisactual

orpotentialcompetitionforindustrialandmiddle-classjobs,betweenthemigrantsandthelocal,educated,middle-classyouth.Thefrictionhasbeenmoreintenseinstatesandcitieswhere‘outsiders’hadgreateraccesstohighereducationandoccupiedmoremiddle-classpositionsingovernmentservice,professionsandindustryandwereengagedinsmallbusinesses,suchassmall-scaleindustryandshopkeeping.Activeinthesemovementshavealsobeenmembersofthelower-middleclassorworkers,aswellasrichandmiddlepeasantswhosepositionisunthreatened,butwhoincreasinglyaspiretomiddle-classstatusandpositionfortheirchildren.Allthesesocialgroupsalsoaspiretogivetheirchildrenhighereducation,especiallytechnicaleducation,suchasengineering,medicineandcommerce.Theeconomy’sfailuretocreateenoughemploymentopportunitiesfortherecentlyeducatedcreatedan

acutescarcityofjobs,andledtointensecompetitionfortheavailablejobsduringthesixtiesandseventies.Themajormiddle-classjobopportunitiesthatopenedupafter1952wereingovernmentserviceandthepublicsectorenterprises.Popularmobilizationandthedemocraticpoliticalprocesscouldthereforebeusedbythemajoritylinguisticgrouptoputpressureonthegovernmenttoappropriateemploymentandeducationalavenuesandopportunities.Somegroupscouldthentakeadvantageof‘thesonsofthesoil’sentimentforgainingpoliticalpower.Thiswasnotofcourseinevitable.TheCommunistpartyrefusedtouseanti-migrantsentimentsinCalcuttabecauseofitsideologicalcommitment,onereasonwhythecityhasnotwitnessedanymajor‘sonsofthesoil’movement.Similarly,thoughCongressmayhavetakenanopportunistandcompromisingstandwhenfacedwithmajor‘sonsofthesoil’movements,ithasnotinitiatedoractivelysupportedthem.

‘Outsiders’havebeenoftenfarmorenumerousinruralareasasagriculturallabourersorasworkersinlow-paidtraditionalindustries,suchasjuteorcottontextiles,thaninthecities.Here,however,‘thesonsofthesoil’sentimentwasabsent,norhostilitytowardsthe‘outsiders’manifestedbecausenomiddle-classjobswereinvolved.The‘locals’alsodidnotcompetewiththe‘outsiders’forthesejobs.Consequently,therehasbeenlittleconflictwiththe‘locals’whentherehasbeenlarge-scalemigrationoflabourersfromBiharandU.P.toPunjabandHaryanaorBombaycity,orofworkersfromBihartothejuteandothermillsofCalcutta,orofworkersfromBiharandOrissatotheteaplantationsinAssamandBengal,orofOriyabuildingworkerstoGujarat,anddomesticworkersalloverIndia.Suchmigrationshavenotposedathreattothelocalmiddleclasses;andinthelastcase—thatofthedomesticworkers—themiddleclasseshavebeenthechiefbeneficiariesasalsopromoteesofthemigration.However,morerecently,becauseofthehighersalariesandeducationandskillinvolved,competitionbetweenmigrantsandthe‘locals’hastendedtodevelopforemploymentinthetechnologicallyadvancedindustries.Anotherfactorthathasinfluencedtheemergenceornon-emergenceofanti-migrantmovementsinan

areaorregionhasbeentheexistenceornon-existenceofatraditionofmigration.Whenpeopleofastate,especiallythemiddleclasses,havethemselvesmigrated,therehasbeenlittleoppositiontoimmigration.ThishasbeenthecasewithWestBengal,Kerala,Punjab,BiharandU.P.Ontheotherhand,‘sonsofthesoil’movementshaveflourishedinMaharashtra,AssamandtheTelenganaareaofAndhraPradesh,thepeopleofwhichhavenothadatraditionofmigration.TheIndianConstitutionistosomeextentambiguousonthequestionoftherightsofthemigrants.

Article15prohibitsanydiscriminationonthegroundsofreligion,race,caste,sexorplaceofbirth.Article16prohibitsdiscriminationintheemploymentorappointmentstoanyofficeunderthestateongroundsof‘descent,placeofbirthorresidence’.However,theparliament,thoughnotanystatelegislature,canpassalawlayingdowntherequirementofresidencewithinastateforappointmentsunderthatstate.UnderpoliticalpressureandtakingadvantageoftheambiguityintheConstitution,manystates,infactreservejobs,orgivepreferenceforemploymentinstateandlocalgovernmentsandforadmissionintoeducationalinstitutionstolocalresidents.Theperiodofresidenceisfixedorprescribedinsuchcases.Also,whiletheConstitutionpermitsreservationorpreferenceinstatejobsonlyongroundsofresidenceandnotlanguage,somestategovernmentshavegonefurtherandlimitedthepreferencetothoselocalresidentswhosemothertongueisthestatelanguage.Theyhavethusdiscriminatedagainstlong-termmigrants,theirdescendants,andeventheresidentswhocanspeakthestatelanguagebutwhosemothertongueisaminoritylanguageinthestate.Thishas,ofcourse,beeninclearviolationoftheConstitution.Manystategovernmentshavealsogivendirectionstoprivateemployerstogivepreferencetolocalpersonsforemploymentintheirenterprises.

Themainargumentputforwardforreservationinemploymentandeducationforthelocalpersonshasbeenthatinthestatesconcernedtheyaresocially,economicallyandeducationallybackwardandarenotabletocompetewiththemoreadvancedmigrantcommunities.Also,intechnicalcollegesanduniversities,themorebackwardlocalstudentswouldbeoverwhelmedbythemoreadvancedstudentsfromotherstates.Itisbecauseofthis,inthepost-Nehruera,eventhecentralgovernmenthastendedtosupportpreferenceforresidentsofastateinemploymentincentralpublicsectorenterprisesbelowthelevelofacertaintechnicalexpertiseandincollegesanduniversities.Reservationsongroundsof

residencehavealsobeenapprovedbythecourts.However,asbroughtoutearlier,reservationsforthetribalpeopleareinaseparatecategory.Whilereservationofjobsinstateadministrationsandseatsininstitutionsofhighereducationforthe

backwardlocalresidentswasundesirablefromthepointofviewofnationalintegration,somejustificationcouldbefoundforit.However,therewasnonefortheanti-migrantmovementsofthesixtieswhichtriedtorestricttheflowofmigrantsfromotherstatesandwhichopenlyproclaimedantagonismandgeneratedhostilityagainstthem.Thesemilitantanti-migrantand‘sonsofthesoil’movementsweremainlycenteredintheurbanareasofAssam,TelenganainAndhra,Karnataka,MaharashtraandOrissa.TheworstcasewasthatofthemovementledbytheShivSenawhichappealedtoextremeregional

chauvinismandassumedfascistproportions.Foundedin1966,undertheleadershipofBalThackeray,theShivSenademandedthatpreferenceinjobsandsmallbusinessesshouldbegiventoMaharashtrians,whoweredefinedasthosewhosemothertonguewasMarathi.Raisingthesloganof‘MaharashtrafortheMaharashtrians’,theShivSenaorganizedamilitant,,andoftenviolentmovementagainsttheSouthIndians,especiallytheTamils,whoweredeclaredtohaveadisproportionateshareofofficejobssuchasclerksandtypistsinprivatefirmsandsmallbusinessessuchasteashopsandeatingplaces.In1969,theSenagavetheBombaycityatasteoffascistviolencewhenitorganizedarsonandterroragainstSouthIndians,lootedanddestroyedtheirtea-stallsandeatingplaces,overturnedcarsofTamilsandtoreoffTamilsignsfromshops.TheShivSenacouldnot,however,sustainitshate-SouthIndiancampaignorbecomeamajorpoliticalforceoutsideBombaycityorgetthesupportofanyall-Indiapoliticalparty.It,therefore,soonshifteditsideologicalbasetoHinducommunalism.Gainingawiderpoliticalconstituency,itwasthenabletoallyitselfwiththeBharatiyaJanataParty.The‘sonsofthesoil’movementsinAssamandTelengana,whichalsoassumedseriousproportionsand

werequitecomplex,hadsomeadditionalanddistinctivefeatures.Boththesemovementswillthereforebediscussedelsewhereinthechaptersonstatepolitics.Whileprotectiveandpreferentialregulationshavebeenwidespreadsincethelatesixties,antagonism,

hostilityandviolenceagainstmigrantshaveabatedinrecentyears.Theproblemposedby‘thesonsofthesoil’doctrineisstillsomewhataminoroneandthereisnogroundforpessimismonthatscore.Evenatitsheight,onlyafewcitiesandstateswereaffectedinavirulentform,andatnostagediditthreatentheunityofthecountryortheprocessofnation-in-the-making.Besides,itseffectsontheIndianeconomyhavebeennegligible:migrationwithinthecountryhasnotbeenchecked;inter-statemobilityisinfactgrowing.Buttheproblemislikelytolingertilleconomicdevelopmentisabletodealeffectivelywithunemployment,especiallyamongthemiddleclasses,andregionalinequality.Lookingbackatthedivisiveissuesofthepost-independenceperiod,thelinguisticreorganizationofthe

states,theintegrationofthetribals,andregionalinequalityandregionalism,itistobeobservedthattheprophetsof‘gloomanddoom’havebeendisproved.LinguisticstateshavestrengthenednotweakenedIndianunity,evenwhilepermittingfullculturalautonomytodifferentlinguisticareas.HindiandEnglisharegrowingasall-Indialanguages.RegionalmovementsliketheDMKhavebeendousedafter1967andarecontenttorenameMadrasstate,TamilNaduandMadrasasChennai.TribalsfeelsecureintheIndianunionregardingtheirculturalandeconomicautonomy,havealsogainedgreaterstrengththemselves,asalsopoliticalsupportinthecountryovertime.Theprocessofnation-in-the-makingisbeingpushed

forward.Anationalidentity,thatofbeingIndian,hascometobeacceptedbyallonthesubcontinent,andthefactofIndianunityisirreversible.Thisshouldnotsuggestthatallproblemsrelatedtotheseissueshavebeenresolvedforalltime.

Furthersocialandeconomicdevelopment,spreadofeducation,deepeningofdemocracyandpoliticization,ashasbeenseenelsewhere,couldcreatenewsourcesoftensionandconflictleadingtodisrupturetendencies.OptimismistobetemperedwithacontinuingconcernforthreatstoIndianunity.Yet,India’spastexperienceinovercomingdisruptiveforcesmaybeinstructiveforthefuture.Theroleandlegacyofthefreedomstruggle,thequalityandwisdomoftheleaders,theleadership’scorrectunderstandingofIndia’sdiversity,theleadership’srejectionofsecessionistdemands,whilerespectingthosewithintheconstitutionalframework,thedemocraticpoliticalstructure,andtheacceptanceoftheneedforastrongnationalgovernmentwithinafederalstructurehaveallcontributedtopromoteIndianunity.Here,itmustbeaddedthatastrongstateshouldnotbemistakenforanauthoritarianone.AstrongnationalgovernmentdoesnotentailweakstategovernmentsoranationalgovernmentthatridesroughshodoverthefederalprovisionsoftheConstitution.Federalismdoesnotmeanaweaknationalgovernment,ratheranon-dominatingnationalgovernmentwhichobservesthefederalfeaturesofthepolity.Astrongbutdemocraticnationstateisanecessityforadevelopingcountrywithstrongfederalfeatures.Whatitdoeswithitsstrengthdependsonthepoliticalnatureofthegovernmentandtherulingpartyoftheday.

11TheYearsofHopeandAchievement,1951-64

Theyearsfrom1951to1964,werethoseofmaturityandachievement.Theywerealsoyearsmarkedbyhighhopesandaspirations,optimismandconfidence.JawaharlalNehrucoulddeclareinApril1953:

Ishallnotrestcontentunlesseveryman,womanandchildinthecountryhasafairdealandhasaminimumstandardofliving...Fiveorsixyearsistooshortatimeforjudginganation.WaitforanothertenyearsandyouwillseethatourPlanswillchangetheentire

pictureofthecountrysocompletelythattheworldwillbeamazed.1

Andreflectingthemoodofthecountry,hewroteinJune1955:Eventhoughwehaveamultitudeofproblems,anddifficultiessurroundusandoftenappeartooverwhelm,mereistheairofhopeinthiscountry,afaithinourfutureandacertainrelianceonthebasicprinciplesthathaveguidedusthusfar.Thereisthebreathofthedawn,

thefeelingofthebeginningofanewerainthelongandchequeredhistoryofIndia.2

ThesewerealsotheyearswhenIndiawasmoreorlessstable,whenitspoliticalsystemtookonitsdistinctform,thecountrybegantoprogressinalldirections,andabovealltherewasthebeginningofthemassivereconstructionofthepolityandtheeconomy.Peopleexperiencedanadvancetowardsthebasicobjectivesofdemocracy,civilliberties,secularism,ascientificandinternationaloutlook,economicdevelopmentandplanning,withsocialismattheendoftheroad.Therewas,ofcourse,somediscontentamongtheintelligentsiaregardingtheslowpaceofdevelopment,especiallywithregardtotheproblemsofpovertyandemployment,andtheslowandunsatisfactoryprogressoflandreforms.Amongtheseveralareasofprogressandachievement,thoughmarkedbycertainweaknessesandlimitations,were,(a)theconsolidationofthenationandthesolutionofthelanguageandtribalproblems,(b)theinitiationoftheprocessofindependentandplannedeconomicdevelopment,(c)theevolutionofanindependentandinnovativeforeignpolicy,(d)theinitiationoftheelectoralprocess,(e)therootingofdemocracy,(f)thesettinginplaceofanadministrativestructure,(g)thedevelopmentofscienceandtechnology,and(h)thebeginningsofthewelfarestate.Thefirstthreeaspectsarediscussedinseparatechaptersinthisvolume;thelastfiveaspectsarediscussedbelowinthischapter.

TheRootingoftheElectoralProcess

Firstofallcametheentrenchmentofdemocracy—anachievementwhichhasenduredsothatitisnowtakenforgranted.TheprocesshadbegunwiththeframingoftheConstitutionafter1947anditspromulgationon26January1950.Democracytookagiantstepforwardwiththefirstgeneralelectionheldin1951-52overafourmonthperiod.Theseelectionswerethebiggestexperimentindemocracyanywhereintheworld.Theelectionswereheldonthebasisofuniversaladultfranchise,withallthosetwenty-oneyearsofageorolderhavingtherighttovote.Therewereover173millionvoters,mostof

thempoor,illiterate,andrural,andhavinghadnoexperienceofelections.Thebigquestionatthetimewashowwouldthepeoplerespondtothisopportunity.Manywereskepticalaboutsuchanelectoratebeingabletoexerciseitsrighttovoteinapolitically

matureandresponsiblemanner.Somesaidthatdemocraticelectionswerenotsuitedtoacaste-ridden,multi-religious,illiterateandbackwardsocietylikeIndia’sandthatonlyabenevolentdictatorshipcouldbeeffectivepoliticallyinsuchasociety.Thecomingelectionsweredescribedbysomeas‘aleapinthedark’andbyothersas‘fantastic’andas‘anactoffaith.’India’selectoralsystemwasdevelopedaccordingtothedirectivesoftheConstitution.TheConstitution

createdanElectionCommission,headedbyaChiefElectionCommissioner,toconductelections.Itwastobeindependentoftheexecutiveortheparliamentorthepartyinpower.Organizationoftheelectionswasawondroustask.Therewasahouse-to-housesurveytoregisterthe

voters.Withover70percentofthevotersbeingilliterate,thecandidatesweretobeidentifiedbysymbols,assignedtoeachmajorpartyandindependentcandidates,paintedontheballot-boxes(thiswaslaterchangedtosymbolsontheballotpapers).Thevotersweretoplacetheballotpapersintheboxassignedtoaparticularcandidate,andballotwassecret.Over224,000pollingbooths,oneforalmostevery1000voters,wereconstructedandequippedwithover2½millionsteelballot-boxes,oneboxforeverycandidate.Nearly620,000,000ballotpaperswereprinted.Aboutamillionofficialssupervisedtheconductofthepolls.Ofthemanycandidates,whoevergottheplurality,orthelargestnumberofvoteswouldgetelected.Itwasnotnecessaryforthewinningcandidatetohaveamajority.Inall,candidatesofoverfourteennationalandsixty-threeregionalorlocalpartiesandalargenumber

ofindependentscontested489seatsfortheLokSabhaand3,283seatsforthestateassemblies.Ofthese,98seatsfortheformerand669forthelatterwerereservedfortheScheduledCastesandtheScheduledTribes.Nearly17,500candidatesinallstoodfortheseatstotheLokSabhaandthestatelegislatures.Theelectionswerespreadoutovernearlyfourmonthsfrom25October1951to21February1952.(Laterthisperiodwasreducedtonineteendaysin1957andseventotendaysinsubsequentelections).Suitableconditionswerecreatedforthefreeparticipationoftheoppositionpartiesintheelections,

includingJanSanghandCPI.ThiswasdespitethefactthatJanSanghwascommunalandthemovingforcebehindit,namelytheRSS,hadbeenbannedonlythreeyearsearlierforspreadingcommunalhatredwhichhadledtotheassassinationofGandhiji.CPIhadadoptedaninsurrectionarypolicytillafewmonthsbeforetheelectionsandevenatthetimewasfirmlyopposedtotheconstitutionalstructure.TheOppositionwas,however,quitefragmented.Neitherthecommunalpartiesnortheleft-wingpartiescouldcometogethertoformelectoralalliancesorevenarriveatadjustmentsamongthemselves.ThefirstgeneralelectionsweremarkedbyavigorouselectioncampaignbyJawaharlalNehru.

Showingremarkableenergy,hecoverednearly40,000kilometersandaddressedthirty-fivemillionpeopleoratenthofIndia’spopulationduringhiselectiontour.AsNehru’sbiographer,S.Gopal,haspointedout,‘Asbefore1947,allthespeechesofNehruwerepartofaprocessofadulteducation,ofteachingthemassesthattheyhadmindswhichtheyshoulduse.’Infact,Nehruwasatthecentre-stageoftheelectioncampaign.Theoppositionpartiestoorecognizedhisimportance,andallofthem,toagainquoteGopal,‘joinedinattackinghimfromeverypossibleviewpoint.’3Nehrutoorecognizedhisowncentralityandwrote:‘ItistruethatwithoutmeintheCongress,therewouldhavebeennostablegovernmentinanyStateorintheCentre,andaprocessofdisruptionwouldhavesetin.’4

Inparticular,hemadecommunalismthecentralissueofhiscampaign.Thebasicstruggleatthetime,hesaid,wasbetweenthesecularandthecommunalforces,forthemaindangertoIndia’sintegritycamefromthelatter.‘Ifallowed’freeplay’,hewarned,communalism‘wouldbreakupIndia’.5Andhedeclared:‘Letusbeclearaboutitwithoutashadowofdoubt...westandtilldeathforasecularState.’6

Theelectionswereconductedinafair,free,impartialandorderlymannerwithverylittleviolence.ThiswaswidelyacknowledgedwhenSukumarSen,thefirstChiefElectionCommissioner,wasinvitedasanexpertadviseronelectionsbyseveralAsianandAfricancountries.TheelectionprocesswascompletedinMay1950whenRajendraPrasadwaselectedasthePresidentoftheRepublicandDrS.RadhakrishnanasitsVice-President.People’sresponsetothenewpoliticalorderwastremendous.Theyparticipatedinthepollsfully

awarethattheirvotewasaprizedpossession.Inmanyplaces,peopletreatedpollingasafestival,asapubliccelebration,withmanydeckingthemselvesfortheoccasioninfestiveclothing,thewomenwearingtheirsilverjewellery.Theyalsodemonstratedtheirabilitytoexercisetheirrighttovotecarefullydespitetheirpovertyandilliteracyandthecomplicatedvotingprocedures.Forexample,thenumberofinvalidvotescastwasaslowas3to4percent.TherewasalargeturnoutofvotersnotonlyintheurbanareasbutalsointheruralareasandamongtheScheduledCastesandScheduledTribes.Aremarkablefeaturewasthewideparticipationofwomen;atleast40percentofwomeneligibletovotedidso.Thus,thefaithoftheleadershipinthepeoplewasfullyjustified.Whentheelectionresultsweredeclared,itwasfoundthatnearly46.6percentoftheeligiblevoters

hadcasttheirvotes.SincethenthispercentagehasbeengoingupandhasbeencomparabletothevotingpercentagesintheUnitedStates.Party-wisetheelectionsresultsfortheLokSabhaandthestateassemblieswereasgiveninthetablebelow:

LokSabha

Note:KMPP=KisanMazdoorPrajaParty;RRP—RamRajyaParishad.

Themajorfeaturesofthiselectionwhichcharacterizedsubsequentelectionstill1962andevenlaterwere:i)TheCongresssweptthepollsbaggingnearly75percentoftheseatsintheLokSabhaand68.5per

centofthoseinthestatelegislatures.Butinbothcasesitgotlessthan50percentofthevotescast.Thiswasbecauseofthepluralityorfirst-past-the-postprinciplefollowedindecidingthewinner.TheelectionsrepresentedatriumphfortheCongressorganization,whichreacheddowntothevillagelevel,fortheideologyofsecularism,democracyandnational,unity,and,aboveall,fortheinspiringleadershipofNehru.TheCongressformedthegovernmentattheCentreandinallthestates.Itdidnotgetamajorityonitsowninfourstates—Madras,Travancore-Cochin,OrissaandPEPSU—butformedgovernmentseventherewiththehelpofindependentsandsmaller,localpartieswhichthenmergedwithit.ii)Boththepartiesoftheleftandthecommunalrightperformedpoorly.Thepoorperformanceofthe

SocialistPartyandtheKMPP(thetwotogetherwononly21seatsintheLokSabha)was,infact,quiteasurpriseinviewoftheirhighhopesandoptimisticprojections.TheSocialistpartywononly19seatsintheassemblyinU.P.,itsstrongestunit.Similarly,thethreecommunalpartiestheJanSangh,theHinduMahasabhaandtheRamRajyaParishad,wononly10LokSabhaseatsand6percentofthevotescast.iii)TheCommunistperformancewasbetterthanexpected.TheCPIalongwithitsallies,mostofthem

Communistsorfellowtravellersinreality,emergedasthesecondlargestgroupintheLokSabha.Itwastoretainthispositioninmostofthelaterelectionstill1977.TheCPIalsowonasizeablenumberofseatsinMadras,Travancore-CochinandHyderabad.iv)Theelectionsshowedthattheprincesandbiglandlordsstillwieldedagreatdealofinfluencein

somepartsofthecountry.Theirparty,theGanatantraParishad,won22.1percent(31seats)oftheassemblyseatsinOrissa.Similarly,thethreecommunalpartieswon64oftheir85assemblyseatsintheformerlyprincelystates.v)Theindependentsandthesmallregionalandlocalpartiesgotalargenumberofthevotesandseats

bothintheLokSabhaandthestateassemblies.However,theroleoftheindependentsinelectionsbothattheCentreandinthestates,starteddecliningsince1962.Thepoliticalsystemthatwasinitiatedbytheelectionsof1951-52hasbeendescribedbymany

politicalscientistsasthebeginningoftheone-partydominantsystem.But,infact,itrepresentedthebeginningofamulti-partysystemwiththeCongressenjoyingthespecialstatusofformingthecoreorthefocusofthesystemasalsoitsstabilizingforce.DespitethenumericallydominantpositionoftheCongress,theOppositionwasquiteeffectiveintheparliament.ItusedtheQuestionHourtogreateffectandmaintainedahighlevelofdebateintheparliament.TheeffectivityoftheOppositionowedagreatdealtothehighcalibreofthefewbutcapableoppositionmembersontheonehand,andNehru’srespectfortheoppositionopinionontheother.Noteworthyisthefactthatthoughotherformsofpoliticalparticipation,suchastradeunions,Kisan

Sabhas,strikes,hartals,bandhsanddemonstrations,wereavailabletothemiddleclasses,organizedworkingclass,andsectionsoftherichandmiddlepeasantry,electionswerethemainformofdirectpoliticalparticipationforthevastmassoftheruralandurbanpoor.Afewembryonic,negativefeatures—pointerstothefuture—alsosurfacedduringthefirstgeneral

elections.TherewasascrambleforticketsintheCongressandthesquabblesamongleadersforgetting

safeseatsfortheirfollowers.ManyoftheindependentcandidateswerethoserejectedbytheCongressandotherpoliticalparties.Factionalismalsomadeitsappearanceinabigwayinnearlyalltheparties.Villageswereoftendividedintofactionsirrespectiveofpartyorideology.Vote-banksalsobegantoemergesothatsomepeoplevotedaccordingtothedictatesoftheinfluentialpersonsonwhomtheyweredependenteconomically.Ofcourse,morelegitimately,localnotablessuchasfreedomfighters,doctors,lawyers,schoolteachersalsoguidedanddecidedthelocalvoters’preferences.Casteandkinshiptiesalsobegantoinfluencethevoterssignificantlyfromthiselectiononwards.After1952,duringtheNehruyears,twoothergeneralelectionswereheldfortheLokSabhaandstate

assembliesin1957and1962.Inboth,thevoterturnoutimproved—whilein1951-52itwas46percent,in1957itwas47percentandin1962nearly54percent.Inbothelections,theCongressagaingainedanoverwhelmingmajorityofseatsintheLokSabhawithaminorityofvotes;andneithertherightnortheleftcouldposeaseriouschallengetoit.Both,however,madeinroadsintotheCongresshegemonyinafewstates.In1957,theCommunistswereabletoformagovernmentinKerala,whichwasthefirstdemocratically-electedCommunistgovernmentanywhereintheworld.Thefairandpeacefulconductofthepollswasanindicationthatthedemocraticsystemandinstitutions,

alegacyofthenationalmovement,werebeginningtotakeroot.Theybeganfunctioningwithafairdegreeofcommitmenttodemocraticvalues.Itisalsosignificantthatpartiallyasaresultoftheconductoftheelections,theframeworkoftheConstitutioncametobeacceptedbyall,includingtheCommunistsandthecommunalists.FromthenceforthitwastakenforgrantedthatelectionswoulddecideastowhichpartywouldruleIndia,thatachangeingovernmentwouldoccurthroughtheconstitutionallyprovideddemocraticrules,thatelectionresultswouldbeacceptedbythedefeatedparties,howeverundesirabletheymightbefromtheirpointofview,andthatelectionswouldtakeplaceatregularintervals.ThesuccessfulconductofthepollswasoneofthereasonswhyIndiaandNehrucametobeadmiredabroad,especiallyintheex-colonialcountries.Theelectionsof1951-52becamethehealthyprecursorsofregularandfairelectionsintheyearsto

come.Since1952therehavebeentillnowtenelectionstotheLokSabhaandmanymoretothestateassemblieswitheverlargerturnoutofvoters,especiallyofruralfolkandwomen,indicatingthegrowingpoliticalawarenessamongthepeople.

EstablishmentofDemocraticInstitutions

Buildingonthetraditionsofthenationalmovement,theIndianleaders,andaboveallNehru,furtherstrengthenedthefoundationsofdemocracyinthecountrybythemanneroftheirpoliticalfunctioning.Theygavedueimportancetotheinstitutionalaspectsofthedemocraticsystemsothatgraduallyattachmentofpeopletoparliamentaryinstitutionsgrew.Theyadherednotonlytothespiritbutalsototheformsofdemocraticinstitutionsandprocedures.Nehru,inparticular,despiteholdingcompleteswaysawtoitthatpoliticalpowerwaswidelydispersedanddiffused.CivillibertieswereputonafirmfootingwiththePresshavingafreeplay,evenwhenitcriticizedthe

governmentseverely.Theindependenceofthecourtswascarefullynurtured,evenwhentheyturneddownanimportantpieceofpopularlegislation,namelyagrarianreform.Nehrutreatedtheparliamentwithrespectandmadeeveryefforttosustainitsdignity,prestigeand

power,eventhoughhispartyenjoyedanoverwhelmingmajorityinit.Hetriedtomakeitamajorforum

forexpressionofpublicopinion,andmadeitapointtositthroughtheQuestionHourandtoattendparliamentarydebates.TheOppositiontooplayeditspartbyrespectingtheparliamentanditsprocedures,functioningwithoutfearinitsportals,andkeepingthestandardofparliamentarydebatesatahighlevel.Moreover,parliamentarycommitteessuchastheEstimatesCommitteebegantoplayanimportantroleascriticsof,andwatchdogsover,thegovernmentadministration.UnderNehru’sleadershipthecabinetsystemevolvedinahealthymannerandfunctionedeffectively.

Theeffortwastomakethecabinetthechiefagentofcollectivepolicy-making.Nehrutreatedhiscabinetcolleagueswithcourtesyandrespect.C.D.Deshmukh,India’sFinanceMinisterfrom1950to1956,remarkedlaterinhisautobiography:‘NehruasheadoftheCabinetwasgentle,considerateanddemocratic,neverforcingadecisiononhiscolleagues...decisionsweretakenbyaconsensusandnever,asfarasIcanrememberinmytime,byvote.’7

DespitethedominanceoftheCongresspartytheroleoftheOppositionwasstrengthenedduringtheperiod.Nehrugavefullplayandrespecttotheoppositionpartiesandwasquiteresponsivetotheircriticism.Heoncedefineddemocracyasfollows:‘Intheultimateanalysis,itisamannerofthinking,amannerofaction,amannerofbehaviourtoyourneighbourandtoyouradversaryandopponent.’8Theoppositionparties,thoughsmallnumerically,wereabletotakeadvantageofthefactthattheCongresswasnotamonolithicpartyandencompassedwithinitselfseveralpoliticalandideologicaltrends.TheywereabletoinfluencethegovernmentpoliciesbyinfluencingthedifferentideologicalstrandsintheCongress.NehrualsorespectedandpromotedinternaldemocracyanddebatewithintheCongresspartyandencouragedittoaccommodatenewsocialforcesandtrends.Federalism,providedforintheConstitution,alsowasestablishedasafirmfeatureofIndianpolity

duringtheNehruyears,withagenuinedevolutionofpowertothestates.Respectingthestates’autonomy,Nehruwouldnotimposedecisionsonthestategovernmentsorinterferewiththeirpolicies,thoughhetookcaretoinformthemofhisownthinkingandoccasionallyadviseoreveninsistontheiracceptanceofaparticularpolicy.HealsopermittedthestateCongresspartiestochoosetheirpartyandgovernmentleaders.Herelieduponthestateleadersandgovernmentstounderstandbettertheirownintricateproblems.Intheprocess,hewaswillingtoputupwithagreatdeal.Infact,onereasonwhyNehruwouldnotgotoofarinforcingthestatestoeffectlandreformsthewayheconceivedthemwasbecauselandreformswereaStatesubjectandhewouldnotrideroughshodoverthestates’rightsandpowersevenforafavouritecauseofhis.Nehruwouldguideandadviseandurgebutwouldnotstepoutofconstitutionalboundaries;hewouldobserveconstitutionalnicetiesinspiritandform.Infact,amajorreasonfortheweaknessesoftheagricultural,educational,healthandothersocialwelfareprogrameslayintheCentre’sdependenceonthestatesfortheirimplementation,forthesewereStatesubjects.Atthesametime,Nehrudidnotpermitanyweakeningoftheprestigeorauthorityofthecentral

government.HealwaysmaintainedasharpdistinctionbetweencentralizationofpowerorCentre’sdominationofthestatesandastrongCentreneededfornationbuildingandmaintenanceoftheunityandindependenceofthecountryasalsotokeepundercheckdisruptiveanddivisiveforces.AmajorreasonthatledtothedevelopmentofharmoniousrelationsbetweentheCentreandthestates

andwhichkeptincheckcentrifugalforceswasthefactthatthesamepartyruledinbothplaces.TheleadingroleoftheCentrewasalsofacilitatedbythefactthatsomeofthetallestmenandwomeninIndianpoliticsheldofficeintheCabinetaswellastheCongressWorkingCommittee.

Thetraditionofthesupremacyofthecivilgovernmentoverthearmedforceswasfullyestablishedduringtheseyears.TheIndianarmedforceshadbeentraditionallynon-politicalandhadacceptedciviliancontrolandleadership.Butthecontinuationofthisrolebythemwasnotguaranteed.Nehru,inparticular,wasworriedaboutthepossibilityofthearmedforcesinterveninginpoliticsandthegovernmentincaseofexceptionalcircumstances,ashappenedinnineteenthcenturyFranceandGermanyandrecentlyinmanyThirdWorldcountries.ToavoidsuchapossibilityinIndiahetookseveralstepsinthisregard.Hekeptthesizeofthearmedforcesrelativelysmall,refusingtopermittheirexpansionevenafterlarge-scaleUSmilitaryaidtoPakistanbeganin1954.Theexpenditureonthedefenceforceswasalsokeptextremelylow,lessthantwopercentofthenationalincome.AbandoningtheBritishcolonialpracticeofrecruitingmeninthearmyonthecriteriaof‘martial’classes,thearmedforcesweregivenaheterogeneouscharacter,withalmosteveryregionandsectionofsocietybeingrepresentedinthem.Indiawasthusprotectedfromthedangerofmilitarisminitsformativeyears.Thesmallsizeofthearmedforcesandofexpenditureonthemwerealsopromptedbytwootherconsiderations:avoidanceofdiversionofscarceresourcesfromeconomicdevelopment;andgiventheabsenceofdomesticdefenceindustries,toavoiddependenceonforeignpowersandthepossibilityoftheirinterventioninIndia’sinternalandforeignaffairs.Oneblemish,thoughnotasimpleone,onthedemocraticrecordoftheNehruyearsoccurredwhenthe

CommunistgovernmentinKeralawasdismissedin1959andPresident’sRulewasimposedinthestate.

TheAdministrativeStructure

Immediatelyafterindependence,itwastobedecidedwhetherthegovernmentofindependentIndiashouldcarryonwiththeadministrativestructureandmachineryinheritedfromthecolonialregimeand‘designedtoservetherelativelysimpleinterestsofanoccupyingpower.’ThekingpinofthisstructurewastheIndianCivilService(ICS).Ifthestructurewastobereplacedor

overhauled,thebeginninghadtobemadewiththeICS.Initially,thereweredifferencesinapproachtothequestionbetweenNehruandPatel,who,asHomeMinister,dealtdirectlywiththeadministrativeservices.NehruwasastaunchcriticoftheICSandbureaucracyasawholenotonlybecauseoftheircolonialancestrybutalsobecauseoftheirbasicconservatism.In1946,hehaddescribedtheexistingadministrativestructureas‘theshipofState’whichwas‘oldandbatteredandslow-movingandunsuitedtothisageofswiftchange.’Hedeclaredthat‘itwillhavetobescrappedandgiveplacetoanother.’9

Patel,ontheotherhandfeltthatretentionoftheexistingadministrativemachinerywasnecessaryinthethentroubledtimeswhenitseemedthatinternalstabilitywasindangerandchaosimminent.Hewasnotinfavourofasuddendiscontinuityandvacuuminadministration,particularlyastheICSandotherall-Indiaservicesprovidedtheonlytrainedpersonnelavailable.Defendingtheall-IndiaservicesintheConstituentAssemblyin1949,Patelsaid:‘Ihaveworkedwiththemduringthisdifficultperiod...RemovethemandIseenothingbutapictureofchaosalloverthecountry’.Further:‘IfduringthelasttwoorthreeyearsmostofthemembersoftheServiceshadnotbehavedpatrioticallyandwithloyalty,theUnionwouldhavecollapsed.’10

NehruacceptedPatel’sposition,thoughgrudgingly,forhetoorealizedthattherewasnoalternativetorelianceontheexistingall-Indiaservicesifabreakdownofadministrationwastobeavoided.Overtime

hetoobegantorelyheavilyontheseservices,admiringtheiradministrativeefficiency,especiallyasherealizedthattheotheravailablehumanresourceswereratherpoor.Many,followingLeninintheStateandRevolution,havearguedthattheexistingstateadministrative

apparatusshouldhavebeen‘smashed’ordismantledandthatitwasperhapsquiteeasytodosointheverybeginningofanewstate.WethinkthatinlightofIndia’sandothercountries’historicalexperiencethereislittledoubtthathavingwell-trained,versatileandexperiencedcivilservicesattheoutsetwhenthecountrywasinturmoilwasadistinctassetandadvantagetoIndia;andthattheydidgiveagoodaccountofthemselvesinthetroubledpost-Partitionyears.However,whileretentionoftheexistingbureaucracyandtheadministrativestructurewasinevitable

andperhapsevensoundunderthecircumstances,thefailureto‘rebuildandtransformtheircharacter’wasclearlyaliability.Theadministrativestructurehadbeenbuiltduringthecolonialperiodlargelytomaintainlawandorderandtocollectlandrevenue.Ithadtobeoverhauled,howevergradually,tosuittheneedsofademocraticanddevelopingsocietyandmadecapableofexecutingtheneweconomicandsocialwelfaristpolicies.Nehruinparticularwasfullyawareoftheinadequacyoftheexistingbureaucracytounderstandthe

problemsofthepeopleandtoimplementthenewtasks.Asearlyas1951hecomplained:‘Werelymoreandmoreonofficialagencieswhicharegenerallyfairlygood,butwhicharecompletelydifferentinoutlookandexecutionfromanythingthatdrawspopularenthusiasmtoit.’11Hewasconvincedthatthesituationcouldberemediedintwoways:‘One,byeducatingthewholemachine.Secondly,byputtinganewtypeofpersonwhereitisneeded.’12Butneitheroftwostepswasactuallytaken.Rather,thenewIASwasformedverymuchintheoldICSmouldandthispatternwasfollowedalldownthebureaucraticstructure.Forexample,thefewwhojoinedtheCommunityDevelopmentprojectsoutofidealismandsocialcommitmentweresoonfrustratedwhentheydiscoveredthattheywerebeingdominated,lookeddownuponandtreatedaslow-paidunderlingsbythetraditional,higherbureaucrats.Theadministrationnotonlydidnotimproveovertheyears,itdeterioratedfurtherbecomingmore

inefficientandinaccessible.Theattitudeofthebureaucracy,especiallythepolice,towardsthepeopleandtheirproblemsalsobecameincreasinglyunhelpful.Aboveall,therewastheevilofcorruption.ThereweremajorsignalsintheNehruerathatpoliticalandadministrativecorruptionwasbeginningto

burgeon.Inthefifties,however,thetentaclesofcorruptionwerenotyetfar-reachingandchecksexistedintheformofapoliticalleadershipandcadreshavingrootsinthefreedomstruggleandGandhianethos,alarge,honestbureaucracy,especiallyinitsmiddleandhigherrungs,andajudiciaryhavingahighlevelofintegrityItwas,therefore,stillpossibletosquashtheevilwithacertainease.Nehruandotherleaderswereawareoftheproblemsrelatingtopublicadministration.InMay1948,

Nehrudrewtheattentionofthechiefministerstocomplaintsfromthepublic‘aboutourinefficiency,inaccessibility,delaysand,aboveall,ofcorruption,’andadded:‘Ifearthatmanyofthesecomplaintsarejustified.’13Similarly,inhislastlettertothechiefministersinMay1963,hepointedtotheneedto‘strengthenourGovernmentapparatusandtofightaceaselesswaragainstcorruptionandinefficiency.’Andheadded:

Thereisfartoomuchtalkofcorruption.Ithinkitisexaggeratedagooddealbutwemustrealizethatitisthereandmustfacethatwithallourwillandstrength.Ourgovernmentalapparatusisstillslowmovingandfullofbrakeswhichcomeinthewayofallthebrave

schemesthatwehaveinmind...IamwritingaboutthistoyoubecauseIfeelstronglythatwemustcleanupourpubliclife...14

Nehrualsotookconcreteactionwheneveracaseofcorruptioninvolvinghisministerswasmadeout.Buthewascharyofcarryingoutacampaignagainstcorruptionlestitcreateageneralatmosphereofsuspicionandaccusations,towhichhefeltIndianswerealreadytoosusceptible,andthuspreventofficialsandministersfromtakingtimelydecisionsandassumingresponsibility.

DevelopmentofScienceandTechnology

AmajorachievementoftheNehruerawasinthefieldsofscientificresearchandtechnologicaleducation.NehruwasconvincedthatscienceandtechnologywerecrucialtothesolutionofIndia’sproblems.AsearlyasJanuary1938,hehadsaidinamessagetotheIndianScienceCongress:‘Itwassciencealonethatcouldsolvetheseproblemsofhungerandpoverty,ofinsanitationandilliteracy,ofsuperstitionanddeadeningcustomandtradition,ofvastresourcesrunningtowaste,ofarichcountryinhabitedbystarvingpeople.’15ThisviewwasreiteratedintheScientificPolicyResolutionpassedbytheLokSabhainMarch1958acknowledgingtheroleofscienceandtechnologyintheeconomicsocialandculturaladvancementofthecountry.After1947,NehrualsobecameawareofthecriticalrolethatscientificresearchandtechnologywouldplayinIndia’sdefence.Aspartoftheefforttopromoteself-sustainingscientificandtechnologicalgrowth,thefoundationstone

ofIndia’sfirstnationallaboratory,theNationalPhysicalLaboratory,waslaidon4January1947.ThiswasfollowedbythesettingupduringtheNehruyearsofanetworkofseventeennationallaboratories,specializingindifferentareasofresearch.Toemphasizetheimportanceofscienceandscientificresearch,NehruhimselfassumedthechairmanshipoftheCouncilofScientificandIndustrialResearch,whichguidedandfinancedthenationallaboratoriesandotherscientificinstitutions.Urgentstepswerealsotakentoorganizethetrainingoftechnicalpersonnelsorelyneededbythe

country.In1952,thefirstofthefiveinstitutesoftechnology,patternedoftertheMassachusettesInstituteofTechnology,wassetupatKharagpur—theotherfourbeingsetupsubsequentlyatMadras,Bombay,KanpurandDelhi.Theextentoftheeffortputindevelopingscienceanditssuccessisrevealedbytheexpenditureonscientificresearchandscience-basedactivitieswhichincreasedfromRs1.10croresin1948-49toRs85.06croresin1965-66,andthenumberofscientificandtechnicalpersonnelwhichrosefrom188,000in1950to731,500in1965.Theenrolmentattheundergraduatestageinengineeringandtechnologywentupfrom13,000in1950to78,000in1965.Similarly,thenumberofundergraduatestudentsstudyingagricultureincreasedfromabout2,600in1950to14,900in1965.Overtheyearsscientificresearchbegan,however,tosufferbecausetheorganizationandmanagement

structureofthescientificinstituteswashighlybureaucraticandhierarchical,breedingfactionalismandintrigueasalsofrustrationamongtheirpersonnel.Thisbecameamajorfactorinthebraindrainofscientiststhatbeganinthelatefifties.Indiawasoneofthefirstnationstorecognizetheimportanceofnuclearenergy.Nehruwasconvinced

thatnuclearenergywouldbringaboutaglobalrevolutioninthesocial,economicandpoliticalspheres,besidesaffectingnations’defencecapabilities.InAugust1948,theGovernmentofIndiasetuptheAtomicEnergyCommissionwithHomiJ.Bhabha,

India’sleadingnuclearscientist,aschairman,intheDepartmentofScientificResearch,whichwasunderNehru’sdirectcharge,todevelopnuclearenergyforpeacefulpurposes.In1954,thegovernmentcreatedaseparateDepartmentofAtomicEnergyundertheprimeministerwithHomiBhabhaasSecretary.India’s

firstnuclearreactorinTrombay,Bombay,alsothefirstinAsia,becamecriticalinAugust1956.Heron-goingandfairlywelladvancednuclearprogrammeincludedthesettingupofseveralnuclearplantstoproduceelectricityinafewyearstime.ThoughIndiawascommittedtothepeacefulusesofnuclearpower,itsnuclearcapacitycouldeasilyhavebeenusedtoproducetheatomicbombandotheratomicweapons.Indiaalsotookupspaceresearch.ItsetuptheIndianNationalCommitteeforSpaceResearch

(INCOSPAR)in1962andestablishedaRocketLaunchingFacilityatThumba(TERLS).KrishnaMenon,asDefenceMinister,tookstepstoinitiatedefenceresearchanddevelopment.StepswerealsotakentoincreaseIndia’scapacityinproductionofdefenceequipmentsothatIndiagraduallybecameself-sufficientinitsdefenceneeds.Indiaalsochangedovertodecimalcoinageandametricsystemofweightsandmeasures,despitedirewarningsthatanilliteratepopulationcouldnothandlethechange.

SocialChange

ThevisionofthefoundingfathersoftheRepublicwentbeyondnationalintegrationandpoliticalstability.Indiansocietyhadtomovetowardssocialchange.Article36oftheConstitutioninthesectionontheDirectivePrinciplesofStatePolicystated:‘Thestateshallstrivetopromotethewelfareofthepeoplebysecuringandprotectingaseffectivelyasmaybeasocialorderinwhichjustice,economicandpolitical,shallinformallinstitutionsofthenationallife.’Thisconceptionofthenewsocialorderwasencompassedin1955bythephrase‘socialisticpatternofsociety’officiallyacceptedbytheCongressatitsAvadiSessionandlaterincorporatedasitsobjectiveintheSecondandThirdFiveYearPlans.Consequently,severalimportantmeasuresofsocialreforms,whichsomehavedescribedasthebeginningofawelfarestate,weretakenduringtheNehruyears.Veryimportantmeasuresinthisrespectwerethoseoflandreforms,theinitiationofplannedeconomicdevelopmentandrapidexpansionofthepublicsectorwhichweshallexamineinseparatechaptersofthisvolume.Inadditionfar-reachinglabourlegislationwasundertaken,includingrecognitionofcollectivebargaining,therighttoformtradeunionsandtogoonstrike,securityofemploymentandprovisionofhealthandaccidentinsurance.Therewerealsomovestowardsamoreequitabledistributionofwealththroughprogressiveandsteepincome-taxandexcisetaxpolicies.Expansionofeducationandhealthandothersocialservices,wasalsosought.NehruandotherleaderswerealsokeentoensurethatIndiansocialorganizationunderwentchange,

leadingtothesocialliberationofthehithertosociallybackwardandsuppressedsectionsofsociety.AsNehruputitin1956:‘Wehavenotonlystrivenforandachievedapoliticalrevolution,notonlyarewestrivinghardforaneconomicrevolutionbut...weareequallyintentonsocialrevolution;onlybywayofadvanceonthesethreeseparatelinesandtheirintegrationintoonegreatwhole,willthepeopleofIndiaprogress.’16

TheConstitutionhadalreadyincorporatedaprovisionabolishinguntouchability.ThegovernmentsupplementedthisprovisioilbypassingtheAnti-UntouchabilityLawin1955makingthepracticeofuntouchabilitypunishableandacognizableoffence.ThegovernmentalsotriedtoimplementtheclausesoftheConstitutionregardingreservationsineducationalinstitutionsandgovernmentemploymentinfavourofScheduledCastes(SCs)andScheduledTribes(STs)andotherweakersectionsofsociety.Othernecessarymeasuresweretakentoraisetheirsocialstatus,suchastheprovisionofspecialfacilitiesintheformofscholarships,hostelsaccommodation,grants,loans,housing,healthcareandlegal-aidservices.A

CommissionerofScheduledCastesandScheduledTribeswasappointedtomonitortheeffectiveimplementationofallsuchmeasuresandconstitutionalprovisions.However,inspiteofallthesesteps,theSCsandSTscontinuedtobebackwardandcasteoppressionwasstillwidelyprevalent,especiallyinruralareas,wheretheScheduledCastesandScheduledTribesalsoformedalargepartofthelandlessagriculturallabour,andthereforealsosufferedfromclassoppression.Therewasalsohardlyanyefforttoeradicatetheideologyofthecastesystemortoremovecasteinequalityandcasteoppressionsothatcasteismbegantospreadfromtheuppercastestothebackwardcastesandfromtheruraltotheurbanareas.Participatingactivelyinthenationalmovementforyears,women’sgroupsandorganizationswere

demandingrevisionoflawsregardingwomen’srightsinthefamily,andinNehrutheyhadafirmsupporter.Already,beforeindependence,NebruhadmadehispositiononthisissueclearandquotedCharlesFourier,theFrenchphilosopher:‘Onecouldjudgethedegreeofcivilizationofacountrybythesocialandpoliticalpositionofitswomen.’17

AmajorstepforwardinthisdirectionwastakenwhentheHinduCodeBillwasmovedintheparliamentin1951.Thebillfacedsharpoppositionfromconservativesectorsofsociety,especiallyfromJanSanghandotherHinducommunalorganizations.EventhoughactivelysupportedbythevocalmembersofCongresspartyandwomenMPsandotherwomenactivists,Nehrudecidedtopostponeenactmentofthebillinordertomobilizegreatersupportforit.Hewas,however,firminhisdeterminationtopassthebillandmadeitanissueintheelectionsof1951-52.Aftercomingbacktopower,thegovernmentpassedthebillintheformoffourseparateactswhich

introducedmonogamyandtherightofdivorcetobothmenandwomen,raisedtheageofconsentandmarriage,andgavewomentherighttomaintenanceandtoinheritfamilyproperty.Arevolutionarystepwasthustakenforwomen’sliberation,thoughitspracticewouldtakedecadestotakefulleffect.Animportantlacunainthisrespectwasthatauniformcivilcodecoveringthefollowersofallreligionswasnotenacted.ThiswouldhaveinvolvedchangesinMuslimpersonallawregardingmonogamyandinheritance.TherewasstrongoppositiontothisfromtheMuslimorthodoxy.TheprocessofsocialreformamongMuslimshadinthemodernperiodlaggedfarbehindthatamongHindusandconsequentlysocialchangehadbeenquiteslowevenamongmiddle-classMuslimwomen.NehruwasnotwillingtoalarmtheMuslimminoritywhichwas,hebelieved,evenotherwiseunderpressure.HewouldmakechangesinMuslimpersonallawandenactauniformcivilcodebutonlywhenMuslimswerereadyforit.

Education

Thefoundingfatherswerefullyawareoftheneedforbetterandwidereducationasaninstrumentofsocialandeconomicprogress,equalizationofopportunityandthebuildingupofademocraticsociety.Thiswasallthemoreurgentbecausein1951only16.6percentofthetotalpopulationwasliterateandthepercentagewasmuchlower,beingonly6percent,inthecaseofruralfamilies.Toremedythissituation,theConstitutiondirectedthatby1961thestateshouldprovidefreeandcompulsoryeducationtoeverychilduptotheageoffourteen.Later,thistargetwasshiftedto1966.Thegovernmentprovidedlargesumsfordevelopingprimary,secondary,higherandtechnical

education:whiletheexpenditureoneducationwasRs198millionin1952-52,by1964-65ithadincreasedtoRs1462.7million,i.e.bymorethanseventimes.Sinceeducationwasprimarilyastate

subject,Nehruurgedthestategovernmentsnottoreduceexpenditureonprimaryeducation,whateverthenatureoffinancialstringency.Ifnecessary,hesuggested,evenexpenditureonindustrialdevelopmentcouldbereduced.HetoldtheNationalDevelopmentCouncilinMay1961:‘Ihavecometofeelthatit(education)isthebasesofalland,onnoaccountunlessactuallyourheadsarecutoffandwecannot

function,mustwealloweducationtosuffer.’18

TheNehruyearswitnessedrapidexpansionofeducation,especiallyinthecaseofgirls.Between1951and1961schoolenrolmentdoubledforboysandtripledforgirls.From1950-51to1965-66thenumberofboysenrolledinclassesItoVincreasedfrom13.77millionto32.18million.Therelevantfiguresforgirlswere5.38millionand18.29million.Theprogresswasequallyrapidincaseofsecondaryeducation.Between1950-51and1965-66enrolmentincreasedfrom1.02millionto4.08million(bynearly4times)incaseofboysandfrom0.19millionto1.2million(bynearly61/2times)incaseofgirls.Thenumberofsecondaryschoolsincreasedfrom7,288to24,477duringtheseyears.Atthetimeofindependencetherewereeighteenuniversitieswithatotalstudentenrolmentofnearly

300,000.By1964,thenumberofuniversitieshadincreasedtofifty-four,thenumberofcollegestoabout2,500andthenumberofundergraduateandpost-graduatestudents,excludingintermediatestudents,to613,000.Thenumberofgirlsstudentsincreasedsix-foldandconstituted22percentofthetotal.However,theprogressinprimaryeducation,thoughrecognizable,didnotmatchtheneedsortheintentionsespeciallyasthenumberofeligiblestudentswasgrowingfastbecauseofthehighrateofpopulationgrowth.Theconstitutionaltargetoffreeandcompulsoryeducationtoallchildrenwasfirstshiftedfrom1961to1966andthentoadistantfuture.BytheendoftheThirdPlanin1965-66only61percentofthechildrenbetweensixandfourteenwereinschool,thefigureforgirlsbeingonly43percent.Consequently,widespreadilliteracycontinued;aslateas1991only52percentoftheIndianswereliterate.Butthesefiguresdonottellthefullstory.In1965,fivepercentoftheruralpopulationwasnotserved

byanyschoolatall.Moreover,thefacilitiesprovidedintheexistingschoolswereverypoor,withmajorityofschoolshavingnopuccabuilding,blackboardsordrinkingwater.Nearly40percentofprimaryschoolshadonlyoneteachertotakethreeorfourclasses.Aparticularmaladyofprimaryschoolingwasthehighrateofdropouts.NearlyhalfofthoseenrolledinclassIwouldhaveleftschoolbythetimetheyreachedclassIVandbeenrapidlyreducedtovirtualilliteracyagain.Moreover,thedropoutratewashigherincaseofgirlsthantheboys.Clearly,therewasnoequalopportunityineducationandthereforealsohardlyanyequalizationofopportunityinworkandemploymentforthepoorandthoseintheruralareaswhoconstitutedthevastmajorityoftheIndianpeople.Amajorweaknessthatcreptinwasthedeclineineducationalstandards.Despiterecognitionofthe

problem,exceptforthetechnologysector,theeducationalsystemwasleftuntouchedandunreformedandthequalityofeducationcontinuedtodeteriorate,firstinschoolsandthenincollegesanduniversities.Theideologicalcontentofeducationalsocontinuedtobethesameasinthecolonialperiod.Nehruwasawareoftheunsatisfactoryprogressineducationandneartheendofhisprimeministership

begantoputgreateremphasisonitsdevelopment,especiallyofprimaryeducation,which,henowstressed,should,bedevelopedatanycost.‘Inthefinalanalysis’,hewrotetothechiefministersin1963,‘righteducationopentoallisperhapsthebasicremedyformostofourills.’Also,‘Inspiteofmystrong

desireforthegrowthofourindustry,Iamconvincedthatitisbettertodowithoutsomeindustrialgrowththentodowithoutadequateeducationatthebase.’19

CommunityDevelopmentProgramme

Twomajorprogrammesforruraluplift,namely,theCommunityDevelopmentprogrammeandPanchayatiRaj,wereintroducedin1952and1959.Theyweretolaythefoundationsofthewelfarestateinthevillages.Thoughdesignedforthesakeofagriculturaldevelopment,theyhadmoreofawelfarecontent;theirbasicpurposewastochangethefaceofruralIndia,toimprovethequalityoflifeofthepeople.TheCommunityDevelopmentprogrammewasinstitutedonalimitedscalein1952covering55

developmentblocs,eachblocconsistingofabout100villageswithapopulationofsixtytoseventythousand.Bythemid-sixtiesmostofthecountrywascoveredbyanetworkofcommunityblocs,employingmorethan6,000BlockDevelopmentOfficers(BDOs)andover600,000VillageLevelWorkers(VLWsorGramSewaks)tohelpimplementtheprogramme.Theprogrammecoveredallaspectsofrurallifefromimprovementinagriculturalmethodstoimprovementincommunications,healthandeducation.Theemphasisoftheprogrammewasonself-relianceandself-helpbythepeople,popularparticipation

andresponsibility.Itwastobebasicallyapeople’smovementfortheirownwelfare.AsNehrustatedattheveryoutsetoftheprogrammein1952,thebasicobjectivewas‘tounleashforcesfrombelowamongourpeople.’Whileitwas‘necessarytoplan,todirect,toorganizeandtocoordinate;butit[was]evenmorenecessarytocreateconditionsinwhichaspontaneousgrowthfrombelow[was]possible.’Whilematerialachievementswereexpected,theprogrammewasmuchmoregeared‘tobuildupthecommunityandtheindividualandtomakethelatterabuilderofhisownvillagecentreandofIndiainthelargersense.’‘Theprimarymatteristhehumanbeinginvolved,’headded.Anothermajorobjectivewastoupliftthebackwardsections:‘Wemustaimatprogressivelyproducingameasureofequalityinopportunityandotherthings.’20In1952andinthelateryears,NehrurepeatedlyreferredtotheCommunityDevelopmentprogrammeandtheaccompanyingNationalExtensionServiceasrepresenting‘newdynamism’anda‘greatrevolution.’andas‘symbolsoftheresurgentspiritofIndia.’21

Theprogrammeachievedconsiderableresultsinextensionwork:betterseeds,fertilizers,andsoon,resultinginagriculturaldevelopmentingeneralandgreaterfoodproduction,inparticular,constructionofroads,tanksandwalls,schoolandprimaryhealthcentrebuildings,andextensionofeducationalandhealthfacilities.Initially,therewasalsoagreatdealofpopularenthusiasm,which,however,peteredoutwithtime.Itsoonbecameapparentthattheprogrammehadfailedinoneofitsbasicobjectives—thatofinvolvingthepeopleasfullparticipantsindevelopmentalactivity.Notonlydiditnotstimulateself-help,itincreasedexpectationsfromandrelianceonthegovernment.Itgraduallyacquiredanofficialorientation,becamepartofthebureaucraticframeworkandcametobeadministeredfromaboveasaroutineactivitywiththeBDOsbecomingreplicasofthetraditionalsub-divisionalofficersandtheVillageLevelWorkersbecomingadministrativeunderlings.AsNehruputitlaterin1963,whiletheentireprogrammewasdesignedtogetthepeasant‘outoftherutinwhichhehasbeenlivingsinceagespast,’theprogrammeitself‘hasfallenintoarut.’22

Theweaknessesoftheprogrammehadcometobeknownasearlyas1957whentheBalwantraiMehtaCommittee,askedtoevaluateit,hadstronglycriticizeditsbureaucratizationanditslackofpopularinvolvement.Asaremedy,theCommitteerecommendedthedemocraticdecentralizationoftheruralanddistrictdevelopmentadministration.OntheCommittee’srecommendation,itwasdecidedtointroduce,alloverthecountry,anintegralsystemofdemocraticself-governmentwiththevillagepanchayatatitsbase.Thenewsystem,whichcametobeknownasPanchayatiRajandwasimplementedinvariousstatesfrom1959,wastoconsistofathree-tier,directlyelectedvillageorgrampanchayats,andindirectlyelectedbloc-levelpanchayatsamitisanddistrict-levelzillaparishads.TheCommunityDevelopmentprogrammewastobeintegratedwiththePanchayatiRaj;considerablefunctions,resourcesandauthorityweretobedevolveduponthethree-tieredsamitistocarryoutschemesofdevelopment.Thus,thePanchayatiRajwasintendedtomakeupamajordeficiencyoftheCommunityDevelopmentprogrammebyprovidingforpopularparticipationinthedecision-makingandimplementationofthedevelopmentprocesswiththeofficialsworkingundertheguidanceofthethree-levelsamitis.Simultaneously,thecountrysidewascoveredbythousandsofcooperativeinstitutionssuchascooperativebanks,landmortgagebanksandserviceandmarketcooperatives,whichwerealsoautonomousfromthebureaucracyastheyweremanagedbyelectedbodies.Nehru’senthusiasmwasonceagainarousedasPanchayatiRajandcooperativeinstitutionsrepresented

anotherradicalstepforchangeinsociety.Theywouldtransferresponsibilityfordevelopmentandruraladi-ninistrationtothepeopleandaccelerateruraldevelopment.Theywouldthusletasinstrumentsfortheempowermentofthepeopleandwouldnotonlyleadtogreaterself-reliance,butwouldalsoactasaneducativetool,forbringingaboutachangeintheoutlookofthepeople.Aboveall,theywouldinitiatetheprocessofcreatingbetterhumanbeings.However,thesehopeswerebelied.ThoughadoptingPanchayatiRajinoneformoranother,thestate

governmentsshowedlittleenthusiasmforit,devolvednorealpoweronthepanchayatisamitis,curbedtheirpowersandfunctionsandstarvedthemoffunds.Thebureaucracytoodidnotslackenitsgriponruraladministrationatdifferentlevels.Panchayatswerealsopoliticizedandusedbypoliticianstogatherfactionalsupportinthevillages.Asaresult,thoughfoundationsofasystemofrurallocalself-governmentwerelaid,democraticdecentralizationasawholewasstuntedandcouldnotperformtheroleassignedtoitbytheBalwantraiMehtaCommitteeandJawaharlalNehru.Moreover,thebenefitsofcommunitydevelopment,newagriculturalinputsandtheextensionservices

weremostlygarneredbytherichpeasantsandcapitalistfarmers,whoalsocametodominatethePanchayatiRajinstitutions.ThebasicweaknessoftheCommunityDevelopmentprogramme,thePanchayatiRajandthecooperativemovementwasthattheyignoredtheclassdivisionoftheruralsocietywherenearlyhalfthepopulationwaslandlessorhadmarginalholdingsandwasthusquitepowerless.Thevillagewasdominatedsociallyandeconomicallybythecapitalistfarmersandtherichandmiddlepeasantry;andneitherthedominantruralclassesnorthebureaucratscouldbecomeagentsofsocialtransformationorpopularparticipation.

12ForeignPolicy:TheNehruEra

TheBasicParameters

India’seffortstopursueanindependentforeignpolicywasahighlightofpost-1947politics.Aproductofitslonghistoryandrecentpast,thispolicywasmarkedbyagreatdealofconsistencyandcontinuity.Despiterevolutionarychangesintheinternationalsituation,thebroadparameterswhichwereevolvedduringthefreedomstruggleandintheearlyyearsofindependencestillretaintheirvalidity.JawaharlalNehrustandsasthearchitectofthisnotmeanachievement.Herealizedthatgivenhergreatcivilization,Indiacouldnotbutaspiretotherighttospeakinherownvoice.Herrecent,hard-wonfreedomfromthecolonialyokewouldalsobemeaninglessunlessitfoundexpressionintheinternationalarena.Beingsubcontinentalinsize,too,ruledoutanassumptionofclientstatusforIndia.Anindependentvoicewasnotmerelyachoice,itwasanimperative.ItwasNehruwhogavethisvoiceashapeintheformoftheideaofnon-alignmentandanorganizational

cohesionthroughthenon-alignedmovement.TheimmediatecontextforemergenceofthismovementwasthedivisionoftheworldintotwohostileblocsafterWorldWarII,oneledbytheUSandthewesternpowersandtheotherbytheSovietUnion.Nehru’sunderstandingwasthatnewlyindependent,poorcountriesofAsiaandAfricahadnothingtogainandeverythingtolosebyfallingforthetemptationofjoiningthemilitaryblocsofthebigpowers.Theywouldendupbeingusedaspawnsincontestsforpowerofnorelevancetothem.Theirneedsweretofightpoverty,andilliteracyanddisease,andthesecouldnotbemetbyjoiningmilitaryblocs.Onthecontrary,Indiaandothersimilarlyplacedcountriesneededpeaceandquiettogetonwiththebusinessofdevelopment.Theirinterestslayinexpandingthe‘areaofpeace’,notofwar,orhostility.India,therefore,neitherjoinednorapprovedoftheBaghdadPact,theManilaTreaty,SEATO,andCENTOwhichjoinedthecountriesofWestandEastAsiatothewesternpowerbloc.ButIndiawentfarbeyondjustneutralityorstayingoutofmilitaryblocs.Nehruwasquicktorejectthe

chargeof‘immoralneutrality’hurledatIndiabyJohnFosterDulles.Non-alignmentmeanthavingthefreedomtodecideeachissueonitsmerits,toweighwhatwasrightorwrongandthentakeastandinfavourofright.Toquote:1

Sofarasalltheseevilforcesoffascism,colonialismandracialismorthenuclearbombandaggressionandsuppressionareconcerned,westandmostemphaticallyandunequivocallycommittedagainstthem...Weareunalignedonlyinrelationtothecoldwarwithitsmilitarypacts.WeobjecttoallthisbusinessofforcingthenewnationsofAsiaandAfricaintotheircoldwarmachine.Otherwise,wearefreetocondemnanydevelopmentwhichweconsiderwrongorharmfultotheworldorourselvesandweusethatfreedomeverytimetheoccasionarises.

Non-alignmentcametosymbolizethestruggleofIndiaandothernewly-independentnationstoretainandstrengthentheirindependencefromcolonialismandimperialism.Indiabeingthefirsttobecome

independent,rightlygavetheleadtootherex-coloniesinthisrespect.Andcollectivelythesenationscountedforagreatdeal.IntheUN.forexample,whosemembershiphadswollenwiththeirentry,theonecountry,onevotesystemenabledthenon-alignedbloc,oftenhelpedbytheSoviets,tocheckdominationbythewesternbloc.Non-alignment,thusadvancedtheprocessofdemocratizationofinternationalrelations.AbasicobjectiveofIndianforeignpolicy,thatofextendingsupporttocolonialandex-colonial

countriesintheirstruggleagainstcolonialism,waswellservedbythepolicyofnon-alignment.Anotherobjective,thatofpromotingworldpeace,wasalsofacilitatedbyit.Nehru’spassionateoppositiontowarandthethreatofnuclearconflictwhichloomedlargeafterHiroshimaiswellknown.Itgrewoutofhisexperienceofnon-violentstruggleandhisconvictioninGandhiwhohadresolvedtomakeithismissiontofightandoutlawtheatombomb.InspiredbyGandhi,andsupportedbygreatintellectualslikeEinsteinandBertrandRussell,NehrumadeitIndia’sroletoplacethegoalofpeace,nuclearandgeneraldisarmamentbeforetheworld.AtaboutthistimewhenNehruwaspointingoutthedangersofworldextinctionthroughnuclear

conflict,ChairmanMao,itisbelieved,toldNehruinaconversationthatafuturenuclearwarwasonlyanotherstageintheinevitablemarchtowardssocialism,andthatif300millionChinesediedinit,another300millionwouldsurvive!Nehruconstantlyemphasizedthatpeacefulco-existenceofcountrieswithdifferentideologies,differingsystems,wasanecessityandbelievedthatnobodyhadamonopolyonthetruthandpluralismwasafactoflife.Tothisendheoutlinedthefiveprinciplesofpeacefulcoexistence,orPanchSheel,forconductingrelationsamongcountries.Theseweremutualrespectforeachother’sterritorialintegrityandsovereignty,non-aggression,non-interferenceineachother’sinternalaffairs,equalityandmutualbenefit,andpeacefulco-existence.WhileNehrutirelesslyarticulatedhisideasaboutinternationalconductofnationsineveryavailable

forum,thereweresomelandmarkmomentsinhisquest.Beforeindependence,inMarch1947,athisinspiration,anAsianRelationsConferenceattendedbymorethantwentycountrieswasheldinDelhi.ThetoneoftheconferencewasAsianindependenceandassertionontheworldstage.Whilethisconferenceconcerneditselfwithgeneralissues,thenextonewascalledinresponsetoaveryspecificproblem:theDutchattempttore-colonizeIndonesiainDecember1948.NehruinvitedstatesborderingtheIndianOcean,andmostAsiancountriesaswellasAustraliacame.TheconferenceresolvedtodenyallfacilitiestoDutchshipping,andsentitsresolutionstotheUN.WithinaweektheSecurityCouncilresolvedthataceasefirebedeclared,andtheIndonesiannationalgovernmentberestored.Thede-colonizationinitiativewascarriedforwardfurtherattheAsianleaders’conferenceinColomboin1954andtheAfro-AsianconferencecalledbyIndiaandotherColombopowersinBandung,Indonesia,in1955.TheconferencewasalsoaprecursortotheBelgradeNon-alignedConference,asitpassedresolutionsonworldpeaceandthedangersofnuclearweapons.ThepinnacleofNehru’seffortswasreachedin1961whenhestoodwithNasserofEgyptandTitoofYugoslaviatocallfornucleardisarmamentandpeaceinBelgrade.Bynowhewasconvincedthattheremanentsofcolonialismwouldgivewaysoonandthenextchallengetheworldfacedwasthatofpreventinganuclearwar.AmajorfunctionofIndianforeignpolicywastopromoteandprotectIndianeconomicinterestsandto

facilitateheronthepaththatshehadchosenforherself.Non-alignment,bynottyingIndiatoanyonebloc,enabledhertodevelopeconomictieswithcountriesonbothsidesofthedivideasandwhensheneeded.

Sheneededandgotcapital,technology,machinesandfoodfromthewesterncountries.Shealsorelied,especiallyafter1954,ontheSovietUnionforbuildingupherpublicsectorindustries,somethingwhichtheUSwasreluctanttodo.Formilitaryequipment,Indiaspreadhernetfarandwideacrosstheideologicaldivide.IntheNehru

yearsaloneshebought,forexample,fortheAirForce,104ToofaniaircraftfromFrance,182Huntersand80CanberrasfromUK,110MystersfromFrance,16AN-12sand26Mi-4helicoptersfromtheSovietUnionand55FairchildPacketsfromtheUS.230VampireaircraftwereproducedunderlicencefromUKinIndia.FortheNavyandArmyaswell,similarpurchasesweremade.Inaddition,effortsweremadetoestablishadefenceproductionbaseandlicenceswereobtainedfromvariousforeigncountriestoproducethefollowingequipment:GnatinterceptoraircraftfromUK,HS-748transportaircraftfromUK,AllouetteHelicoptersfromFrance,MiGinterceptorsfromSovietUnion,L-70anti-aircraftgunsfromSweden,VijayantatanksfromUK,ShaktimantrucksfromGermany,Nissanone-tontruckandJonga-jeepsfromJapan,BrandtmortarsfromFrance,106mmrecoillessgunsfromUS,SterlingcarbinesfromUK,wirelesssetsfromdifferentcountries.2

ThevarietyofsourcesfromwhichdefenceequipmentalonewasacquiredshowsthatIndiasucceededinmaintainingsufficientlyfriendlyrelationswithalargenumberofcountries.Spreadinghernetwidealsoensuredthatexcessivedependenceonanyonecountrywasavoidedandbetterbargainscouldbedrivensincepotentialpartnersknewthatrivalsexisted.Inthisway,manyoftheinherentweaknessesofanewlyindependent,underdevelopedandpoorcountrywerereduced.Onthesamelines,IndiamaintainedanactivemembershipofvariousUNbodiesaswellasoftheIMFandtheWorldBank.ItisnosmallcredittoIndia’seconomicdiplomacythatshehasbeenthebiggestrecipientofconcessiohalfundinginabsoluteterms(notpercapita)frommultilateralinternationalagencies.Indianforeignpolicysometimeslinkedapparentlyirreconciliablegoals.Forexample,theSovietUnion

andIndiainitiatedin1963andsignedinAugust1964,August1965andNovember1965majorarmsdealsbywhichtheSovietUnionbecamethelargestarmssuppliertoIndiaandIndo-Sovietrelationsenteredaqualitativelynewphase.Atthesametime,IndiadecidedtoadopttheGreenRevolutiontechnologyforagriculturaldevelopmentwhichwasbackedbytheUS.ThearmsdealswiththeSovietUnionandtheGreenRevolutionwhichledtoIndiabecomingself-sufficientinfoodinafewyearstimeincreasedIndia’scapacitytostandonherownfeetandtakeamoreindependentstandinworldaffairs.Similarly,boththeUSandtheSovietUnionatdifferenttimesagreedtobepaidinrupees,thussavingIndiaprecioushardcurrency.Indiaalsomaintainedanactiveprofileinmultilateralbodiesandsoughtcontinuouslytouseher

presencetheretoheradvantage.SoonafterindependenceNehrudecidedtostaywithintheCommonwealthforthisveryreason.Despitestrongpublicopiniontothecontrary,hefeltthatonceIndiawasindependentandtherewasnoquestionofBritaindominatingoverher,Indiacouldbenefitfromherpresenceinamultinationalbody.Besides,membershipoftheCommonwealthprovidedacertainsecurityinasituationwhenIndiawasyettofindoutwhoherfriends(andenemies)weregoingtobe.IndiaalsoplayedanactiveroleintheUNpeace-keepingforcesinvariouspartsoftheworld,oftenatheavycosttoIndianlives.AcloserlookatsomeoftheinternationalsituationsinwhichIndiaplayedanactivepartwouldhelpillustratethecomplextasksdictatedbyhernon-alignedforeignpolicy.

InternationalRole

KoreanWar

TheendofWorldWarIIleftKoreadividedbetweenaCommunistNorthcontrolledbytheSocialistcampandaSouthKoreadominatedbytheWesternpowers.K.P.S.Menon,whowaselectedChairmanoftheUnitedNationsCommissiononKoreainlate1947,hadinhisreporttotheUNappealed‘tothegreatpowerstoletKoreabeunited’,warningthatelse‘Koreamayblowup’3butitwastonoavail.WhenNorthKoreainvadedSouthKoreain1950,India-supportedtheUSintheUNSecurityCouncil,condemningNorthKoreaasaggressorandcallingforaceasefire.ButAmericanpleasurewassoontoturnintoangerwhentheyfoundthatIndiaabstainedfromvotingonanotherresolutioncallingforassistancetoSouthKoreaandthesettingupofaunifiedcommandforthispurpose.India’smainconcernwastopreventtheentryofoutsidepowersintotheconflict.NehruappealedtoTrumanandStalinandreceivedawarmresponsefromthelatter.ButmeanwhileGeneralMacArthur,attheheadofUSforcesunderUNcommand,afterpushingNorth

KoreanforcesoutofSouthKorea,withouttheapprovaloftheUN,crossedthe38thparallelintoNorthKoreaandcontinuedtowardstheYaluriverthatseparatedKoreafromChina.ChouEn-lai,theChineseprimeministerwarnedthewesternpowersthroughtheIndianambassadortoChina,K.M.Panikkar,ofretaliation,buttonoavail.(IndiawastheonlylinkbetweentheWestandEastinPekingatthattime.)Chinathereuponsentinwavesofarmed‘volunteers’andsucceededinpushingbackAmericantroopstosouthofthe38thparallel,whichresultedinhugeChinese,KoreanandAmericancasualties.NehrutriedagainatthispointtobringaboutanendtothewarbyorganizingaconferencebuttheUSqueeredthepitchwithanill-timedUNresolutiondeclaringChinatheaggressor.IndiavotedagainstitbecauseitwasclearlyMacArthurandnotChinawhowastheaggressorinNorthKorea.AmilitarystalemateensuedbutdespiteIndia’stirelesseffortsittooktillJune1953togetbothsidestoagreetoaceasefireandevolveanacceptableformulafortherepatriationofprisonersofwar.ItwasKrishnaMenonwhofinallysucceededinfashioningaformulathattheGeneralAssemblyoftheUNand,afterStalin’sdeath,theSovietblocaccepted.ANeutralNationsRepatriationCommissionwassetupwithanIndian,GeneralThimayya,asitsChairman,andanIndian‘CustodianForce’underhischargewasmaderesponsibleforthedifficulttaskofrepatriationofsoldiers.TheKoreanwarhadtestedIndia’sfaithinnon-alignmentandcommitmenttopeacetotheutmost,and

shehadnotbeenfoundwanting.ShestoicallyfacedfirstChineseandSoviethostilitybecauseshevotedtodeclareNorthKoreatheinitialaggressor.ShethenenduredAmericanwrathforrefusingtogoalongwithwesterninterventioninthewar,andforrefusingtodeclareChinatheaggressor.Inthemidstofthis,in1950,ChinainvadedTibetandannexeditwithoutanyefforttokeepIndiainthepicture.Thoughupset,NehrudidnotallowthistoinfluencehisstandontheKoreanwar.IndiacontinuedtopresstheUNtorecognizeandgiveaseattoCommunistChinaintheSecurityCouncil,especiallynowthattheUSSRhadwithdrawnfromitinprotest.IndiaalsobadlyneededfoodaidfromtheUStomeetthenear-famineconditionsathomebutdidnotallowthistoblindittoUSstanceinKorea.Shecontinuedtopressaheadevenifsuccesswasnotalwaysapparent.Intheend,India’sstandwasvindicated:bothsideshadtorecognizethesameboundarytheyhadtriedtochange.Theworldnowrecognizedtheworthofnon-alignment.Itwasdifficulttodismissitasmealy-mouthed,cowardlyneutralityorasidealisthogwash.The

USSRclearlybegantoseeIndiainadifferentlight.TheSovietprimeminister,Bulganin,eventoldtheIndianambassador,K.P.S.Menon,thattheUSSR‘fullyappreciatedIndia’spositionintheCommonwealthandhopedthatIndiawouldcontinuetoremaininit.’ThiswasabigchangefromthetimewhenthemembershipoftheCommonwealthwasseenasfinalproofofIndia’ssuccumbingtowesternimperialism!

Indo-China

TheendoftheKoreanwarbroughtonlymomentaryrespitetoAsia.Inearly1954,Indo-ChinaappearedtobeonthebrinkofbecomingthenexttheatreoftheholycrusadesagainstCommunism,withtheUSkeentopourinmassiveaidtoshoreupthewearyandhesitantFrenchcolonialpowerinitson-going(since1945)warwiththeVietMinh.Nehru’sinitiativetoappealforaceasefireinFebruary1954wasfollowedupbyhisobtainingthesupportofseveralAsianleadersattheColomboConferenceinApril1954forhissix-pointproposalforasettlement.KrishnaMenonwassenttoexplaintheAsianpointofviewtotheGenevaConferenceonIndo-China(towhichIndiawasnotinvitedasamember).Thesesteps,besidesNehru’smeetingwithChouEn-Laiin1954inDelhi,andotherbehind-the-scenesparleysandassuranceshelpedpreventthefurtherinternationalizationoftheIndo-Chineseconflict.IndiaobtainedguaranteesfromChinafortheneutralizationofLaosandCambodiaandpromisesfromGreatBritainandFrancetoChinathattheywouldnotallowtheUStohavebasesinLaosandCambodia.ThesignificanceofIndia’sroleinthenegotiationswasevidentfromthereferencebyPierreMendes-France,theFrenchprimeminister,totheGenevaConferenceas‘thisten-powerconference—nineatthetable—andIndia’.4AtChina’srequest,IndiawasappointedChairmanoftheInternationalControlCommissionanditsworkincludedsupervisionofimportsofforeignarmamentsintoLaos,CambodiaandVietnam.Forthetimebeing,thedangeroftheChineseinterveningonbehalfoftheVietMinhandoftheUSincreasingitssupporttotheFrench,eventothepointofintroducingnuclearweaponsintotheregion,wasaverted.Francewastiredofthewar,BritainapprehensiveofbellicoseUSintentions,andtheUSSR,particularlyafterStalin’sdeath,gropingtowards‘peacefulcoexistence’.WhilethecontrolcommissionswerelatersubvertedthroughUSdiplomacy,andIndo-Chinabecamea

majorColdWartheatre,allsubsequentpeaceeffortsinfacttookupsolutionsprescribedbyNehru.

SuezCanal

In1956,inanimpulsivereactiontoUSandBritishpressuretoabandonitsdeclaredpolicyofnonalignment,thelatestmovebeingtheAnglo-AmericanwithdrawalofthepromisedfinancialaidforbuildingtheAswanDamontheriverNile,EgyptnationalizedtheSuezCanal.ThisalarmedtheusersofthecanalandBritainandFranceparticularlydemandedinternationalcontroloverit.IndiawasamajoruserherselfbutsherecognizedthatundertheConstantinopleConvention(1888)theSuezCanalwasanintegralpartofEgypt.SheurgedbothCairoandLondontoobserverestraintandtriedattheLondonConferenceinAugust1956togetagreementonaformulathatincludedEgyptiancontrol,anadvisoryrolefortheusers,andsettlementofdisputesinaccordancewiththeUNCharter.TheIndianproposalmetwithwidespreadapproval,includingfromEgypt.Later,whenFranceandBritaingotIsraeltoattackEgyptandlandedtheirtroopsinSuez,theywereseverelycondemnedbyeventheUS,andtheUN,andNehrucalledit‘nakedaggression’anda‘reversiontothepastcolonialmethods’.ThewithdrawaltookplaceunderUN

supervisionandIndiantroopsparticipatedinlargenumbersinthepeace-keepingforce.IndiacontinuedtosupportEgyptianinterestsinsubsequentnegotiationsleadingtothesettlementevenwhiletryingtoensurethatBritishandotherusers’interestswereprotected.Intime,evenBritainacceptedthefairnessofIndia’sapproachandtheepisodedidnotleaveanypermanentmarkonIndo-Britishrelations.

Hungary

TheSovietUnion’sintrusioninHungaryinOctober1956tocrusharebellionaimedattakingHungaryoutoftheSovietblocwasseverelycondemnedbytheUNanditdemandedwithdrawal.IndiaabstainedfromjoininginthisformalcondemnationandreceivedalotofflakintheWest.India’sstandwasthatwhiletheSovietsmustwithdraw,thesituationwasnotassimpleasmadeoutintheWest.Theexistenceoftwozonesofinfluence,WestandEast,inEurope,wasafactofpost-WorldWarIIlifeandanydisturbancecouldsetoffadominoeffect.NothingwastobegainedbyhumiliatingtheSovietsthroughformalcondemnation,whichinanycaseIndiarefrainedfromdoingasamatterofpolicy,asitonlyhardenedpositionsandmadefuturecompromisedifficult.NehruhimselfcriticizedtheSovietactionanddidnotsendanambassadortoBudapestfortwoyearstoshowhisunhappiness.TheSovietsreciprocatedbyabstainingwhenKashmirnextcameupintheUNSecurityCouncil.Thereafter,theyrevertedtotheirusualpracticeofvetoingresolutionsthatwereagainstIndianinterests!India’ssituationwasnotaneasyonebutshewithstoodconsiderablepressurefrombothsidesanddidnotflipineitherdirection.

TheCongo

AverymajorachievementofIndianforeignpolicywasitsroleinhelpingmaintaintheintegrityandindependenceofCongo.CongohadbarelygainedherindependencefromBelgiumon30June1960whenitscopper-richprovinceofKatangaannounceditsindependencefromtheCongo!Itshead,Tshombe,wasclearlybeingbackedbyBelgiumandBelgiantroopswerealsosenttotheCongolesecapitalostensiblytoprotectBelgiancitizens.Lumumba,theprimeministerofCongo,appealedtotheUN,USandUSSRforhelp,andtheUNaskeditsSecretary-General,DagHammarskjold,toorganizeallnecessaryhelp.Thenextfewmonthswitnessedanunseemlydramainwhichforeignpowersproppeduptheirfavouritelocalplayersinthemadscrambleforpower.TheUSsupportedthePresident,Kasavubu,theSovietsbackedPatriceLumumbaandtheBelgiansblessedthearmyleader,Mobutu.TheirtacticswereeventuallytoleadtothemurderofLumumba.Lumumba’smurdershockedtheworldandwhenNehruforcefullydemandedthattheUNplayamoredecisivepart,getridofthemercenariesandtheforeigntroops,stopthecivilwar,convenetheparliamentandformanewgovernment,andaddedthatIndiawasreadytocommittroopsforthepurpose,theUNagreed.TheSecurityCounciladoptedaresolutionon21February1961andIndianarmedforcessuccessfullybroughtthecivilwartoaclose,restoringthecentralgovernment’sauthorityoverKatangaandtherestofthecountrybyMarch1963.DagHammarskjoldisreportedtohavesaid,‘ThankGodforIndia,’5

andthepraisewasnotundeserved.ItwasindeedoneofthefinestmomentsforIndia’spolicyofnon-alignment,ofhelptonewly-independentcountriesofAfricaandAsia,andstrengtheningoftheroleofmultilateralbodiessuchastheUN.

Nehruhadagainshownthatgiventhewill,non-alignmentcouldworkandtherewasnotjustspacebutalsotheneedforthenon-alignedtoassertthemselvesonthesideofnewly-emergingnations.Theyweresoughtafterbyeagersuperpowersforenlistmentinanenterprisethatcouldonlytakeawaytheirfreedomevenbeforetheyhadhadtimetosavouritstaste.

RelationswithSuperpowers

USA

Indiannon-alignmentdidnotpreclude,butinfactdesired,afriendlyrelationshipwiththeUS,theleadingpowerinthepost-warworld.Indianeededtechnology,machines,andaidforitsdevelopmenteffort,foodforitspeople,andmoralsupportforitsnation-buildinganddemocraticefforts—allofwhichitthoughttheUScouldprovide.TheUSstandonKashmirhowevershookthishopeoffriendship.TheUNSecurityCouncil,dominatedbytheUSanditsallies,inthelatefortiesandearlyfiftiesevadedadecisionontheIndianchargeofPakistaniaggressionevenaftertheUNCommissionreportedthepresenceofPakistanitroopsinKashmir.AllfindingsbyUNmediatorsthatwerefavourabletoIndiawereignored,andthepowerfulwesternmediawasusedtospreadthemyththatIndiawasnotfulfillingUNdirectives.Indianrequestsforfoodaidwerekepthangingbecause,itwassaid,NehruneveractuallyaskedforitonhisvisittotheUSin1949,eventhoughhehadexplainedthedroughtsituationatlength.ShipmentsweresentonlyafterChinaandtheUSSRsteppedintohelp!TheUSdidnotappreciateIndia’srecognitionofCommunistChinainearly1950,nordiditlikeIndia’s

standthatthePeople’sRepublicofChinabegivenrepresentationintheUN.India’sinitialstandontheKoreanwarwaswelcomed,butherlaterpositionresented.Pakistanwasofferedsomekindofmilitaryaidin1952itself,thoughitwasmadepubliconlyin1953.ItwasostensiblygivenarmsagainstaSovietCommunistthreat,butthekindofweaponsitgotcouldnevercrosstheHinduKush,butcouldonlybeusedagainstIndia.IndianobjectionswerebrushedasidebytheUSwithmeaninglessassurancesthattheywouldnotbeusedagainstIndia.NehruexpressedhisunhappinessattheColdWarbeingbroughttothesubcontinentbytheinclusionofPakistaninCENTO,SEATO,etc.USdescriptionsofnon-alignmentasimmoraldidnothingtohelpmatterseither.OnGoa,too,theUSprovedtotallyinsensitivetoIndianconcerns.TheysupportedPortugal’sclaimin1955thatGoawasaprovinceofPortugalandattackedIndiavirulentlywhenitliberatedGoabyforcein1961afterwaitingpatientlyforfourteenyearsafterindependence.Amajorreasonforthedifficultrelationshipbetweentheworld’stwogreatdemocracieswasofcourse

theverydifferentperceptionsoftheColdWar.TheUSwasobsessedbyCommunismandcouldnotacceptthatothersmighthaveanalternativesetofpriorities.TheworldlookedblackandwhitefromWashington,butfromDelhiitlookedgrey.NehruhadknownCommunistscloselyascomradesintheIndianfreedomstruggle,hehadbeendeeplyinfluencedbyMarxism,andwhilehehadhisowndifferenceswiththemandhadevenhadtosuppressaCommunistinsurgencysoonaftercomingtopower,hedidnotregardthemasevil.NorwasIndiawillingtolineupbehindtheWestintheColdWarforgettingaidandarms,asPakistanwas,eventhoughithardlysharedtheUSviewoftheCommunistthreat.Besides,IndiahadencouragedothernationsofAsiaandAfricatoalsoremainnon-aligned.

Ithasbeensuggested,quitepersuasively,thatUSantipathytoIndiapre-datedIndia’srefusaltosidewithitintheColdWarandthattheUSestablishmentinherited,includingviaBritishintelligenceofficialswhohelpedsetuptheCIA,theBritishdislikeoftheCongressleaderswhohadbroughtdownthemightyEmpire,andapositiveattitudetowardsMuslimLeague/Pakistanbecauseitwaspro-BritishandhelpedintheWareffort.Theyalsoinheritedandthenmadetheirown,Britishfears(orshallonesayhopes)thatIndiawouldnotsurviveasaunit.Itsverydiversity,theUSthought,wouldleadtothedisintegrationofIndia.Asaresult,itwasnotconsideredasolidbulwarkagainstthespreadofCommunism.Therefore,evenifIndiahadwantedto,itcouldnothavebecomeafrontlinestate,backedbythewesternalliance,becausetherewasadeep-rootedsuspicionaboutherreliabilityandstability.Itisalsofeltthatwhilethe‘mainspringofAmericanpolicyispower—andahealthyrespectforit’,‘Indiadidnothavethe“power”andtheIndianleadershipdeliberatelytriedtodenigrateit(and)acceleratetheprocessofdiminishingtheutilityandusabilityofpowerininternationalpolitics.TheAmericanleadershipandestablishmentcouldneverunderstandthis.’6Therewasalsoastrongpro-colonialtrendintheAmericanestablishmentwhichhadsupportedtheFrenchandBritishtoreturntotheircoloniesaftertheWar,andevensupportedPortuguesecolonialisminAfricaandtheinternalcolonialismsofVorsterandIanSmithinSouthAfricaandRhodesia.ItwasunlikelythatIndia’sstronganti-imperialiststancewasmuchadmiredinthesequarters.ThisshouldnotsuggestthatIndo-USrelationsweremarkedbyunremittinghostility.Onthecontrary,

peopletopeoplerelationsremainedfriendly.EconomictiesgrewastheUSwasthesourceoftechnologyandmachines.LargesectionsofinfluentialopinioninIndiawerepro-USandanimportantsectionofinformedliberalopinionintheUS,whichincludedChesterBowles,JohnShermanCooper,andSenatorFulbright,waspro-India.Towardsthelatefiftiestherewasaconsiderableimprovementinrelations,atleastpartlybecausetheUSwasacquiringabetterunderstandingofIndianpolicyandperhapsbecausegreaterSovietfriendshipincreasedIndia’svalue.TheKennedyadministrationmadeaclearefforttoimprovetiesbysendingoneofitskeyfigures,amanwholovedIndiaandgotalongfamouslywithNehru,JohnK.Galbraith,asambassadorin1961.TheChineseattackonIndiain1962,howeverdrasticallyalteredthesituation.Shockedbeyondbelief,

NehruturnedtoKennedyforhelp.HewasluckythattheawkwardsituationwaspartiallyeasedforhimbecauseofthepresenceofGalbraithasthemediator.ButthatisastorythatisbettertoldaspartofthesadtaleofChina’sbetrayalofitsgreatfriendand

well-wisher.

SovietUnion

India’srelationswiththeSovietUnionbeganonacoolnotebutendedupacquiringgreatwarmth.TheSovietcoolnessgrewoutoftheirperceptionofIndiastillbeingunderimperialistinfluence.CommunistambivalencetowardstheIndianfreedomstruggleandtheleadersoftheCongresspartywastransferredtoNehru’sgovernment.TheCommunistPartyofIndiawasengagedinaninsurgencyagainsttheIndianstateinTelangana.India’sdecisiontostayintheCommonwealthwasseenbytheSovietsasproofofIndiansurrendertoimperialism,theSovietAmbassador,Novikov,callingit‘asaddayforIndiaandtheworld.’7

Nehruhad,however,fromthetimeofhisspeechasVice-Presidentoftheinterimgovernmentin1946,struckandmaintainedafriendlyapproachtowardstheUSSR.HeadmiredtheSovietUnionandhadvisiteditin1927.HerefusedtointerpretCommunistinsurgencyinIndiaasproofofSovietunfriendliness,andasaspecialgestureoffereddiplomaticrelationsevenbeforeindependence,aswellassenthissister,VijaylakshmiPandit,asambassador.Characteristically,Stalinnevergaveheranaudience.However,possiblybecauseofthewayIndiaconductedherselfintheKoreanwarcrisis,andher

evidentindependencefromimperialistinfluence,signsofathawbeguntoappearby1951-2.TheSoviets,alongwithChina,sentfoodshipmentstotideoverthedrought,atatimewhentheUSwasdraggingitsfeet.Stalinmetthenewambassador,S.Radhakrishnan,futurePresidentofIndia,afewtimes,andevenofferedatreatyoffriendship.SignsofsupportontheKashmirissueattheUNbegantoemerge,andtheCPIwastoldtocooloffitsattackonNehru’sgovernment.TheprocesswasspeededupafterStalin’sdeathin1954.TheUSSRofferedtogivemilitaryequipmenttoIndiain1954afterPakistanjoinedCENTOandSEATO,butconsistentwithitspolicyofnotacceptingfreemilitaryaid,Indiarefused.In1955,NehrupaidahighlysuccessfulvisittotheSovietUnion,followedinthesameyearbyanequallypopularvisitbyKhrushchevandBulganin.In1956,the20thCongressoftheComintern,theSoviet-controlledbodywhichlaiddowntheideologicallineforallCommunistparties,putitssealontheprocessofde-StalinizationbegunafterStalin’sdeath,andtriedtosoftentheColdWarstancebytalkingofpeacefulcoexistencebetweencountriesbelongingtodifferentsocialsystems.ItalsointroducedthetotallynewconceptinMarxismofapeacefulroadtoSocialism.ItisanothermatterthattheUSwassotakenupwithitsownrhetoricthatitfailedcompletelytorespondtothesepossibilities.ForIndo-USSRties,thiswasagreathelp,forallideologicalimpedimentstoco-operationwereremoved.From1955,USSRgavefullsupporttotheIndianpositiononKashmir,andfrom1956usedorthreatenedtouse,itsvetointheUNSecurityCounciltostallresolutionsunfavourabletoIndiaonKashmir.Thesignificanceofthiscannotbeunderestimated,asIndiawasinaveryawkwardsituationintheSecurityCounciltilltheUSSRstartedprotectingher.TheconsistentsupportonKashmirwentfarinbindingIndo-Sovietfriendship.Bothcountriesalsotookacommonstandagainstcolonialism.IntheUN,theUSSRsupportedIndiaontheintegrationofGoainoppositiontotheUS.ThepathofeconomicdevelopmentthatIndiachose,basedonplanningandaleadingroleforthepublic

sectorinindustrialization,especiallyinheavyindustry,broughtherclosertotheUSSR.Whilethewesternpowers,especiallytheUS,hesitatedtohelp,theSovietsreadilycameforwardwithassistanceinthebuildingoftheBhilaisteelplantin1956.ThenfollowedtheBritishinDurgapurandtheGermansinRourkela.TheUSwasagainapproachedfortheBokaroplant,butwhenitcontinuedtoremaincoy,theSovietssteppedinagain.Inlateryearstheyplayedacriticalroleinoilexplorationaswell.In1973-74,itwasestimatedthat‘30percentofIndia’ssteel,35percentofouroil,20percentofourelectricalpower,65percentofheavyelectricalequipmentand85percentofourheavymachine-makingmachinesareproducedinprojectssetupwithSovietaid’.8

WhenrelationsbetweenIndiaandChinabegantodeterioratefrom1959withtheDalaiLamaseekingrefugeinIndiaandmilitaryclashesontheSino-Indianborder,theUSSRdidnotautomaticallysidewithitsCommunistbrother,butremainedneutral,whichitselfwasagreatachievementatthattime.NehruwaswellawareofthesignificanceoftheSovietstance,andhemovedclosertoUSSR.TheChinesealsodatethebeginningoftheirdifferenceswiththeSovietUniontothesameepisode.Inthesameyear,Indiaand

theSovietUnionsignedtheirfirstagreementformilitarysuppliesandin1960Indiareceived‘supplydroppingaircraft,helicoptersandengineeringequipmentfortheBorderRoadsDevelopmentBoardwhichwastoconstructroadsintheareasdisputedbyChina.’9Inmid-1962,anagreementpermittingIndiatomanufactureMiGaircraftwasconcluded,thisbeingthefirsttimetheSovietshadletanon-CommunistcountrymanufacturesophisticatedmilitaryequipmentwhicheventheChinesehadnotbeenlicensedtodo.TheChineseattackonIndiainOctober1962foundtheUSSRagainmaintainingneutrality,atleast

partlybecauseitoccurredwhentheCubanmissilecrisiswasatitspeak.Later,inDecember1962,Suslov,theimportantSovietleader,atthemeetingoftheSupremeSoviet,unambiguouslydeclaredthatChinawasresponsibleforthewar.Unlikethewesternpowerswhofailedtodeliveronpromisesofmilitarysuppliesinthewakeofthe

Indo-Chinawar,theSovietsin1963signedmoreagreementsforsaleofarmsandsuppliedinterceptorsandhelicopters,tanks,mobileradarsets,surface-to-airmissiles,submarines,missileboatsandpatrolships.TheyhelpedIndiadevelopmanufacturingfacilitiesforMiGaeroplanesandtobuildanavaldockyard.ItwasthisindependentmanufacturingbasethathelpedIndiatowinthe1971war.Importantly,unliketheUS,theyneitherstationedpersonneltosuperviseuseofequipment,norlaiddowndifficultconditionsfordeploymentofequipment.TheSovietUniontoogainedfromthislink.Indiawasanimportantentry-pointtotheAfro-Asianworld

ofnewly-independentcountrieswhodidnotwanttobecomeUSsatellitesandwereopentoSovietfriendship.ThishelpedtheUSSRintheColdWaraswell.TheSovietshad,likeIndia,alongborderwithChinaandmanyunresolvedboundarydisputes.FriendshipwithIndiakeptChinaincheckandthissuitedtheSoviets.Indiannon-alignmenttiltedthebalanceawayfromtheWestandthistoowasahelp.SurroundedbyUS-inspiredpactsandmilitarybases,theUSSRcoulddowithafewfriends,andthereforetherelationshipwasoneofequality.Besides,forallitsfaults,Marxismisanti-racist,anti-imperialistandpro-poor,andthisprecludedanyadoptionofapatronizingattitudebytheSoviets,somethingwhichtheAmericansoftentendedtoslipinto;muchtoIndianannoyance.Indo-SovietfriendshipthusemergedasoneofthemostcriticalelementsofIndianforeignpolicy.

RelationswithNeighbours

India’srelationswithherneighbourswereofcentralconcerntoherandfortunately,till1962,apartfromPakistan,shewasongoodtermswithallherneighbours.WithNepal,shesignedaTreatyofPeaceandFriendshipin1950,whichgaveNepalunrestrictedaccessforcommercialtransitthroughIndia,andsecuredNepal’stotalsovereigntywhilemakingbothcountriesresponsibleforeachother’ssecurity.WithBurma,too,theproblemofIndiansettlersandalongunchartedborderweresettledamicably.TheissueofTamilsettlersinSriLankawasnotaseasyofsolution,andtensionsremained,butitdidnotflareupinthisperiod,andotherwiseamicabletiesweremaintained.WithPakistan,however,andinlateryearswithChina,seriousproblemswerefaced,andtherelationswiththemarediscussedatlengthbelow.

Pakistan

NehruandtheCongressleadershadagreedreluctantlytothePartitionofIndiaasthesolutiontoanintractableproblemandalsointhehopethatthiswouldendthehostility.But,infact,theacrimonywas

onlytransferredtotheinternationalsphere.CommunalriotsandtransfersofpopulationonanunprecedentedscalehadinanycaseledtostrainedrelationsbutthePakistaniinvasionofKashmirinOctober1947,justtwomonthsafterindependence,unleashedachainofcauseandeffectwhoselatestactwasplayedoutonlyrecentlyinKargil.Asdescribedearlierinchapter7,Kashmir’saccessiontoIndiawasatroubledone.WhentheBritishleft,mostoftheIndianstatesruledindirectlybytheBritishbutnominallybyIndianprincesjoinedupwitheitherIndiaorPakistanandtheveryrealdangerofBalkanization,almostencouragedbytheBritish,wasaverted.However,afewstates,someofwhoserulers,encouragedbyBritishofficersandPakistan,entertainedgrandiosebutunrealambitionsofindependence,heldoutforsometime.AmongthesewereHyderabad,Junagadh,andKashmir.HyderabadandJunagadhhadlittlerealchoiceastheyweresurroundedbyIndianterritory.ButKashmirhadaborderwithPakistan,amajorityMuslimpopulation,aHinduruler,andaradicalpopularmovementfordemocracyledbySheikhAbdullahandtheNationalConferencewhichwasveryfriendlywithNehruandtheCongress—enoughpotentingredientsforwhippinguparecipefortrouble.TheMaharajaaskedforastandstillagreementforoneyeartomakeuphismind.PakistanformallyacceptedhisrequestandthoughIndiawasyettoreplyitsstandhadalwaysbeenthatthepeople’swishesshouldbeascertainedbyanelectionandthereforeitwasquitewillingtowaitandaccepttheverdictoftheelections.However,clearlyworriedthatthepopularverdictinKashmirwasnotlikelytogoinitsfavour,Pakistandecidedtojumpthegunandsentinso-calledtribesmenfromtheFrontierprovince,aidedbyregulararmedforces,toinvadeKashmir.TheMaharajaappealedtoIndiaforhelpbutIndiacouldonlysendinherarmiesifKashmiraccededtoIndia.TheMaharajasignedtheInstrumentofAccession,theonlylegalrequirement,ashadhundredsofotherrulers,andKashmirbecameapartofIndia.IndiantroopsreachedSrinagarjustintimetosavethecapitalcityfromfailingintothehandsoftheinvaders.IndiapushedbackthePakistani‘volunteers’,andalsoputinacomplaintwiththeUNagainstPakistaniaggression.There,insteadofgettingjustice,IndialearntherfirstlessoninColdWarpolitics.EncouragedbytheBritishwhocontinuedtonurturearesentmentoftheCongressandIndiaandafondnessfortheMuslimLeagueandPakistan,andalsoforstrategicreasonsofwantingPakistanasafrontlinestateagainsttheUSSR,theUSalsolinedupbehindPakistan.TheSovietUnionhadnotyetmadeupitsmindwhetherIndiawasanylonger‘arunningdogofBritishimperialism’andsoitgavenosupport.Nevertheless,IndiadutifullyacceptedtheUNresolutionaskingforaceasefire,eventhoughthemilitarysituationwastoheradvantage.NehruwasmuchcriticizedlaterforgoingtotheUNandforofferingtoholdaplebiscite.Butneithercriticismholds,asPakistancouldhavegonetotheUNifIndiahadnot,andtheUNcouldhaveaskedfortheholdingofaplebiscite.Indiahasalsobeenoftenmisunderstoodonitslaterrefusaltoholdaplebiscite,becauseitisnotwidelyknownthattheUNresolutionofAugust1948laiddowntwopreconditionsforholdingaplebiscite.One,thatPakistanshouldwithdrawitsforcesfromthestateofJammuandKashmirandtwo,thattheauthorityoftheSrinagaradministrationshouldberestoredoverthewholestate.TheseconditionswerenevermetandinthemeantimeKashmirwentontoholdelectionsforitsConstituentAssembly,whichvotedforaccessiontoIndia.TheIndiangovernmentnowtookthestandthattheConstituentAssembly’svotewasasufficientsubstituteforplebiscite.KashmirlaterparticipatedintheIndiangeneralelectionsaswellashelditsownstateelections,thusrenderingirrelevantthedebateoverplebiscite.Inanycase,Indiahadneveracceptedthetwo-nationtheorythatallMuslimsnaturallyowedallegiancetotheMuslimLeagueandallMuslimmajorityareasbelongedtoPakistanandonthatbasisKashmirshouldgo

toPakistan—aPakistaniargumentthatoftenappealedtowesternobserversunfamiliarwiththehistoryoftheIndiannationalmovement.Therewasabriefperiodin1953-54whenitseemedtheKashmirissuemayberesolved.On

MohammedAliBograbecomingprimeministerin1953,followingcordialvisitsbetweenhimandNehru,ajointcommuniquewasissuedon20August1953,statingthatNehruhadagreedtoholdaplebisciteinKashmir.ButthebriefflameofhopewassnuffedoutbytheexigienciesofColdWarpolitics.TheUShaddecidedafterKoreathatIndiannon-alignmentwasimmoralanditshouldgivemilitaryaidtoPakistan.IntheUNSecurityCouncil,whileIndiawantedasPlebisciteAdministratorsomeonefromasmallneighbouringcountry,thenamethatwasproposedwasofaseniorUSServiceOfficer,AdmiralNimitz.Thelastchanceofacompromisedisappeared.TheKashmirissuecontinuedtobeusedtoneedleIndiaintheUN,especiallyasPakistanbecamemore

andmoreintegratedintotheUS-fedwesternalliancesystemviamembershipofCENTO,SEATO,theBaghdadPactandamilitarypactwiththeUSin1954.IndiahadclearlyrefusedtoplaytheUSgameandPakistanwasmorethanwilling.(BeforeindependencetootheMuslimLeaguehadhappilyplayedtheBritishgame;itschild,Pakistan,nowdidUSbidding.TheCongresscontinueditsanti-imperialisttradition.)Inthissituation,togetasolutiononKashmirwouldneedamiracle.OnlywhentheSovietUnionbegantounderstandthevalueofIndiannon-alignmentandopenlysupportedIndiaonKashmircouldIndiaheaveasighofrelief.From1956onwards,theSovietUnionuseditsvetopowersintheUNSecurityCounciltothwartallresolutionsonKashmirunacceptabletoIndia.Indiacould,withSovietsupport,wardofftheinternationalpressureontheKashmirissuethroughthe

mid-andlatefiftiesandearlysixties.ButtheChineseattackin1962whichforcedhertoturntotheWestforhelp,madeitverydifficultforhertowithstandUSandBritishpressure.From1962PakistanalsobegantolineupwiththeChinese,thusthreateningtoengulfIndiainapincermovement,whichalmostcametruein1971butdidn’t,tothegreatdisappointmentoftheUS.Inthemid-sixties,forashortwhile,theUSSRalsoexploredthepossibilityofmovingalittleclosertoPakistan(theTashkentinitiativebyKosygintoendtheIndo-Pakwarof1965waspartofthat)butfortunatelyforIndia,andnotwithoutIndianencouragement,theUSSRrealizedthatPakistanwastoodeeplyintegratedintothewesternsystemtobeofusetoit.TherancourthatcharacterizedIndo-PakrelationswasasourceofgreatsadnesstoNehruandIndiansin

general.Acommonhistory,geography,culture,andgoalofimprovingtheconditionoftheirpoverty-strickenpeopleshouldhavebroughtaboutcooperationbetweenthetwocountries.Nehrutriedhisbesttoremoveallotherirritantsintherelationship,andshowedgreatgenerosityonthedivisionofpre-Partitionassets,compensationtorefugeesanddivisionofIndusbasinwaters.HeevenvisitedPakistanin1953.ThereisalittleknownstoryaboutalargesumofmoneythatIndiawastogivePakistanaspartofthePartitionsettlement.WhenPakistaninvadedKashmir,theIndiangovernmentheldupthetransfer.GandhijicametoknowofitandimmediatelyhaditsenttoPakistan,brushingasidetheobjectionsofNehruandPatelthattheywereonlywithholdingitforthetimebeingsothatitwasnotusedforthepurposesofwar.Atthesametime,GandhijifullysupportedtheIndianarmeddefenceofKashmir.ItissometimessaidthatPakistaniforeignpolicyisbetterthanours.Itmayhelptorememberthe

commentofK.P.S.Menon:10

ThenetresultofPakistan’sdiplomacy,however,wasthatAyubKhanlosthisjob,YahyaKhanlosthisfreedomandPakistanlosthalfitsterritory.

China

IndiaadoptedapolicyoffriendshiptowardsChinafromtheverybeginning.TheCongresshadbeensympathetictoChina’sstruggleagainstimperialismandhadsentamedicalmissiontoChinainthethirtiesaswellasgivenacallforboycottofJapanesegoodsinprotestagainstJapaneseoccupationofChina.IndiawasthefirsttorecognizethenewPeople’sRepublicofChinaon1January1950.NehruhadgreathopesthatthetwocountrieswiththeircommonexperienceofsufferingatthehandsofcolonialpowersandcommonproblemsofpovertyandunderdevelopmentwouldjoinhandstogiveAsiaitsdueplaceintheworld.NehrupressedforrepresentationforCommunistChinaintheUNSecurityCouncil,didnotsupporttheUSpositionintheKoreanwar,andtriedhisbesttobringaboutasettlementinKorea.In1950,whenChinaoccupiedTibet,Indiawasunhappythatithadnotbeentakenintoconfidence,butdidnotquestionChina’srightsoverTibetsinceatmanytimesinChinesehistoryTibethadbeensubjugatedbyChina.In1954,IndiaandChinasignedatreatyinwhichIndiarecognizedChina’srightsoverTibetandthetwocountriesagreedtobegovernedintheirmutualrelationsbytheprinciplesofPanchSheel.DifferencesoverborderdelineationwerediscussedatthistimebutChinamaintainedthatithadnotyetstudiedtheoldKuomintangmapsandthesecouldbesortedoutlater.RelationscontinuedtobecloseandNehruwenttogreatlengthstoprojectChinaandChouEn-laiatthe

BandungConference.In1959,however,therewasabigrevoltinTibetandtheDalaiLamafledTibetalongwiththousandsofrefugees.HewasgivenasyluminIndiabutnotallowedtosetupagovernment-in-exileanddissuadedfromcarryingonpoliticalactivities.Nevertheless,theChinesewereunhappy.Soonafter,inOctober1959,ChineseopenedfireonanIndianpatrolneartheKongkaPassinLadakh,killingfiveIndianpolicemenandcapturingadozenothers.Letterswereexchangedbetweenthetwogovernments,butacommongrounddidnotemerge.Then,ChouEn-laiwasinvitedfortalkstoDelhiinApril1960,butnotmuchheadwaycouldbemadeanditwasdecidedtoletofficialssortoutthedetailsfirst.

The1962ChineseAttack

On8September1962,ChineseforcesattackedtheThaglaridgeanddislodgedIndiantroops,butthiswastakenasaminorincident.NehruwentofftoLondonforaconferenceandafterreturninghomeonceagainleftforColomboon12October.Aweeklater,theChinesearmylaunchedamassiveattackandoverranIndianpostsintheeasternsectorinNEFAorwhatwaslaterArunachalPradesh.TheIndianarmycommanderinNEFAfledwithoutanyeffortatresistanceleavingthedoorwideopenforChinatowalkin.Inthewesternsector,on20October,thirteenforwardpostswerecapturedbytheChineseintheGalwanvalley,andtheChushulairstripthreatened.TherewasagreatoutcryinthecountryandafeelingofpanicaboutChineseintentions.ItwasthoughtthattheChinesewouldcomerushingintotheplainsandoccupyAssam,andperhapsotherpartsaswell.NehruwrotetwoletterstoPresidentKennedyon9November,describingthesituationas‘reallydesperate’andaskingforwide-rangingmilitaryhelp.HealsosoughtBritain’sassistance.Twenty-fourhourslater,theChinesedeclaredaunilateralwithdrawal

and,asunpredictablyasithadappeared,theChinesedragondisappearedfromsight,leavingbehindaheart-brokenfriendandaconfusedanddisorientedpeople.

TheAftermath

Indiatookalongtimetorecoverfromtheblowtoitsself-respect,andperhapsitwasonlythevictoryoverPakistanintheBangladeshwar,inwhichChinaandUSAwerealsosupportingPakistan,thatrestoredthesenseofself-worth.Nehruneverreallyrecoveredfromtheblow,andhisdeathinMay1964wasmostlikelyhastenedbyit.Worse,atthepinnacleofhisoutstandingcareer,hehadtofaceattacksfrompoliticalopponentswhowouldneverhavedaredotherwise.HewasforcedtosacrificeKrishnaMenon,hislong-timeassociateandthendefenceminister.Thepolicyofnon-alignment,whichhehadnurturedwithsuchcare,seemedforawhileunlikelytobeabletowithstandthebody-blowdeliveredbyafriend.Theironywasthatitwasderailedbyasocialistcountryandnotbyacapitalistpower.Right-wingforcesandpro-WestelementsloudlycriticisedNehru.Theyusedtheopportunitytoblockaconstitutionalamendmentaimedatstrengtheninglandceilinglegislation.TheThirdPlanwasbadlyaffectedandresourceshadtobedivertedfordefence.TheCongresslostthreeparliamentaryby-electionsinarowandNehrufacedinAugust1963thefirstno-confidencemotionofhislife.India’srelationswithothercountrieswerepowerfullyaffectedbytheChineseattack,asthe‘China

factor’loomedlargeinforeignpolicy.TheUSandtheUKhadrespondedpositivelywithhelpinthecrisis,sotheycouldnotbeshruggedoffonceitreceded.Truetoform,however,withPakistaniprompting,theytriedtheirbesttouseIndia’sweaknesstogethertosurrenderonKashmir,hintingbroadlyataquidproquobywayofmilitaryaid,butNehrumanagedsomehowtowithstandthepressure.Norwerethesecountrieswillingtoreallyunderwritemassiveaidinreturnforabandoningnon-alignment.Thefiguresmentionedwereintherangeof$60-120million,hardlyprincelysums!ButtherewasconsiderableincreaseinUSinfluence,especiallyonmilitaryaffairs.USintelligenceagenciesdevelopedlinksinthenameofcounteringtheChinesethreat,andevenplantinganuclear-powereddeviceintheHimalayastomonitorChinesemilitaryactivities.Nehrutriedtocounterthissubtly,andpushedaheadwithmilitaryagreementswiththeSoviets,whoactuallyturnedouttobefarmorewillingtogiveIndiawhatsheneededinthelong-termthantheUS,whichputimpossibleconditionsforniggardlyamountsofaid.PakistansidleduptoChina,andthinkingIndiawastrulyweakenedlaunchedthe1965war.

WhoseFaultWasIt?

Atthetimeoftheattack,andafterwards,inthePressandinacademicwriting,attemptshavebeenmadetoholdNehruresponsibleforChineseperfidy.OnekindofargumentseeshimasanaivefoolwhowasblindedbysentimentandfailedtoguardIndianinterestsinthefaceofaninevitableCommunistbetrayal.Anotherview,expoundedmostnotablybyNevilleMaxwellinIndia’sChinaWar,makesNehruouttobeastubbornnationalistwho,pushedbyjingoistpublicpressure,refusedtosettletheborderswithChinaontheveryreasonabletermsofferedbytheChineseandinsteadfollowedfrom1959a‘forwardpolicy’whichprovokedtheChinesetoattackinself-defence.NeitherviewdoesjusticetothesophisticationofNehru’sunderstandingofChinaandthesubtletyofhispolicy.Nehru’sunderstandingofChinesehistory,ofthehistoryofrevolutions,especiallytheRussian

revolution,hadconvincedhimthatChinashouldnotbeisolatedandpushedintoacorner,butshouldbe

broughtintothecommunityofnationsanditsrevolutionhumanized.‘WeknowenoughhistorytorealizethatastrongChinaisnormallyanexpansionistChina,’11hesaid,butdidnotwanttoprecipitateanyconflictwithChinaasitwouldbeasdisastrousforbothcountriesaswastheFrench-Germanconflict.Beforethe1962attack,on7December1961,intheLokSabhahesaid,‘ahugeelephantofacountrysittingonourborderisitselfafactthatwecouldnotignore.’HeaddedthatsoonaftertheChineserevolutionhehadcome‘totheconclusionthatourbordersweregoingtobe,well,threatenedinsomeway.’Nehru’slongstatementon3September1963intheRajyaSabhaexplainedatlengthaboutnotwantingtospendtoomuchonthemilitary,abouttheemphasisonbuildingone’sownstrengthasthatistheonlysecurity.‘Nocountrythatisnotindustrializedismilitarilystrongtoday,’and‘therealthingbeforeuswastostrengthenIndiaindustriallyandnotsuperficially,bygettinganoddgunoranoddaircraft.’WithPakistanalreadyhostile,Indiadidnotneedanotherneighbourasanenemy.Preparingforwarontwofrontswouldhavemeantanendtodevelopment.Therefore,theconflict,evenifinevitable,shouldbedelayedasmuchaspossiblebyadoptingafriendlyapproachandaskingotherstodothesame,forexamplebytryingtogetChinaintotheUN.HeunderstoodthattheChineseoccupationofTibet,meantacommonborderwithattendantconflicts.

ButhealsosawthatChinacouldnotthinkofexpansionismasyet,asithadbigproblemstosolve.AftertherevoltinTibet,andtheDalaiLama’sarrival,andtheborderclashes,hewaswellawareofthedangers,butwhatgoodwouldithavedonetothreatenChina?InanefforttocheckmatetheChinesehedidmakediplomaticpreparations,bymovingclosertotheSoviets.HehadneverboughtthelinethatCommunistChinaandCommunistUSSR,wouldteamup,andperhapsalongwithIndianCommunists,threatentheIndianstate.HedidnotbelievethatChinawasatoolinthehandsoftheSoviets,nordidhemakethemistakeofthinkingthattheSovietUnionwouldbackCommunistbrothersagainstIndianfriends,asmanyinIndiaargued.Nehruwasshockedatthescaleoftheattack,ashehadthoughtattheremaybeoccassionalborder

skirmisheshereandthere,butnotaninvasionofthisnature.Heerredinnotanticipatingtheprecisenatureoftheattack,ratherthanintheforeignpolicyhepursued.AfurthermistakewasthepanicinappealingtoUSAandUKforhelp,asnextdaytheChinesewithdrew.IrresponsibleattacksonNehrubysectionsofthePress,theoppositionparties,andevenmembersofhisownpartyhadledtothisknee-jerkresponse.ThefailureofnerveonthebattlefieldwascompoundedbythatinthecountryatlargewithNehruratherthantheChinesebecomingthebuttofattack!Sadly,thecountryshowedaninabilitytofaceadversitystoically,withfaithinitsprovenleaders,andinsteadfellintodespairandmutualrecrimination.Tohiscredit,Nehrutriedhisbesttoretrievethesituationandgetthecountrybacktoitsbearings.MostcommentatorsarenowagreedthatIndia’sdefeatatChina’shandsin1962wasnottheresultof

Nehru’snaivefaithinChinesefriendshipandUtopianpacifismandconsequentneglectofIndia’sdefencepreparedness.Onthecontrary,between1949-50and1962,thestrengthoftheIndianArmedForcesdoubledfrom280,000to550,000andthatoftheIndianAirForcefromsevencombatsquadronsin1947tonineteenby1962.ThewarwithPakistanin1965wasfoughtwiththesameequipmentandnodebacleoccurred.NehruwaswellawareandhadbeenwarningofthepossibilitiesofborderclasheswiththeChinesesince1959.ButneitherthepoliticalnorthemilitaryleadershipanticipatedtheprecisenatureoftheChineseattack,andwerethereforetakenbysurprise.Apparently,themilitaryleadershipthoughtintermsofeitherborderclashesorafull-scalewarintheplainsofAssam,butnotaboutthepossibilityofa

limiteddeepthrustandwithdrawal.TheChiefofStaff,GeneralThimayya,believedthatatotalwarwithChinawasunthinkablebecauseshewouldhavefullSovietsupport.HeandotherseniorofficersdonotappeartohavebeenawareofSino-Sovietdifferences.NordoesheseemtohaveconceivedofarolefortheAirForce‘atatimewhentheIndianAirForcecouldhaveswepttheskiesoverArunachalPradeshandTibetwithoutanyoppositionfromtheChinese.’12(NehruaskedtheUSforanaircoverwithoutconsultinghisownAirForce.)Thefailurewasalso,itisfelt,duetothelackofapropersystemofhigherdefencecommandand

management,andbecausetherewasnosystemofdefenceplanning,andthestructureofcivil-militaryrelationswasflawed.Thechiefsofstaffwerenotintegratedintothecivilianpolicymakingstructure,butremainedtheatrecommanderspreparingforthenear-termfuturebutnotforthelong-termfuturesecurityenvironment.DespiteNehru’swarningssince1959,oftroublewithChina,muchprofessionalthoughthadnotgoneintotheplanningforawarintheHimalayas.Itwasafailureoflogistics,ofintelligence,orratherofanalysisofintelligence,ofcoordinationofdifferentwingssuchastheArmywiththeAirForce,etc.Itwasafailureofnerveonthepartofthemilitarycommander,whohadanexcellentrecordandhadbeendecoratedearlier,butwithdrewwithoutafight,thoughitisbelievedhecouldhaveheldoutforatleastsevendays.TheChinese,ontheirpart,withdrewasquicklyastheycame,havingachievedtheirobjectiveofhumiliatingIndiabyaquickbutlimitedthrustdeepintoIndianterritory.Again,theIndiansidehadfailedtoanticipatetheChinesewithdrawalandhadnowbegunplanningtofaceafull-scalewarintheplainsofAssam.Maxwell’stheoryofIndianaggressivenessisnottreatedseriouslybymostexperts,asitistooobvious

thatIndiahadnoinkling,leavealoneintentions,ofprovokingaconflict.Herprimeministeranddefenceministerwereoutofthecountry,thechiefofstaffonleave,aseniorcommanderonacruise.WhatwasIndiatogainfromprovokingawaranyway?Onthecontrary,itcanbeshownthatitwasChineseimperatives,ofwhichMaxwellshowsnoawareness,thatbroughtthemtowar,notIndianprovocation.AndthefactorsthatpropelledChinainthedirectionofconflictwerebeyondNehru’scontrol.TakeTibet.EverystrongChinesegovernmenthadtriedtointegrateTibet.ButTibetwanted

independence.Nevertheless,NebruacceptedtheChinesepositiononTibetinthe1954PanchSheelagreementwithoutevengettingaquidproquoontheborder,whichwaspossiblyamistake.Onlyin1959didChouEn-laiclaimterritoryinLadakhandNEFA,thisisinthewakeoftheKhamparevoltandtheflightofDalaiLamatoIndiawithmanyrefugees.ChinaaccusedIndiaofinstigatingtheDalaiLamaandobjectedtotheasylum.NoIndiangovernmentcouldhaverefusedasylumandIndiadidnotinstigatetherebellion.NehrudidnotallowaTibetangovernment-in-exile,oranypoliticalactivities.ButhecouldnothavepreventedtheTibetanrevolt!NorcouldNehrusucceed,despitehisbestefforts,ininfluencingUSpolicy.TheUSrefusalto

accommodateChina,herinsistencethatFormosa(laterTaiwan)wastheonlylegitimateChina,whichalsomeantthatCommunistChinawasdeniedaseatintheSecurityCounciloftheUN,theattempttocheckmateherinKorea,andIndo-China,frustratedherandpushedheronthepathtoaggressiveassertion.Infact,theUSplayednosmallroleinmakingChinaparanoidabouthersecurityandhelpingtheextremistleftelementstocometotheforeinChina.NorwasNehruthearchitectofSino-Sovietdifferenceswhichhadtheirownroletoplayinincreasing

Chineseinsecurityandpushingherinanadventuristdirection.Thesedifferencesexistedforsometime

butcameintotheopenin1959.WhenclashestookplacebetweenIndiaandChinaontheborder,theSovietsremainedneutral.InApril-May1962,anumberofincidentsoccurredontheSino-SovietborderinSinkiang.TheSovietschargedtheChinesewithmorethan5,000violationsoftheborder,andtheChinesechargedtheSovietswithenticingtensofthousandsoftheircitizensacrosstheborder.In1959,theSovietshadrepudiatedthetreatythattheyhadsignedwithChinaondevelopmentofnuclearweapons.InthefirstweekofAugust,1962,theSovietssignedanagreementwithIndiaonthemanufactureofMiG-21aircraft.TheyhadnotdonesowithChina.InthelastweekofAugust,theSovietstoldtheChinesethattheyweregoingaheadwithnegotiationsforaPartialTestBanTreaty.TheChinesetookthisasbeingaimedatcheckingtheireffortstodevelopnuclearweapons.ThiswasallthemoregallingtotheChinesebecausetheyfeltthatSovietUnionwasnowinapositiontouseitsweighttosecureChineseinterestsintheinternationalarena.ToquoteV.P.Dutt,Sinologistandforeignpolicyexpert:13

Chinahadarrivedatanewtheoreticalunderstandingofitsownnationalinterests.IthaddespairedofapeacefulsolutiontotheoutstandingproblemswiththeUnitedStatesandthefulfillmentofitsprimaryobjectives,namelythereturnofTaiwan...acceptanceofChinaasagreatpower,seatintheSecurityCouncil...IthadnowcometobelievethattheinternationalbalanceofforceswasshiftinginfavourofthesocialistcampinviewofSovietadvancesinrocketryandICBMsandthatthetimehadcomefortheadoptionofanuncompromisingandmilitantlineinordertocompeltheUnitedStates...tomakeconcessionstoChina.

TheChinesewerealsoupsetthatAfro-AsiancountrieswerefollowingIndia’slineofseekingfriendshipandassistancefrombothUSSRandUSA,ratherthantheChineselineofkeepingadistancefromboth.ByreducingIndia’sstature,theycouldhopetohavetheirlineaccepted.Therefore,itisnotatallunlikelythattheChineseattackonIndiahadlittletodowithissuesbetween

IndiaandChina,butwasareactiontoafeelingofisolation,abandonmentandfrustration.ByattackingIndia,theymayhavewantedtotoppleNehruoratleastpushIndiaintothewesterncampsothattheUSSRcouldhavenoillusionsaboutIndiannon-alignmentandwouldhavetorethinkitspolicyofpeacefulcoexistence,which,theChinesefigured,wasleadingtotheirisolation.Theyfailedonbothcounts.Infact,V.P.Dutt14testifiesthatDengXiaopingsaidlatertoanIndiandelegationofwhichhewasamemberthatitwasKhrushchevwhowasresponsibleforthe1962war.Thus,thecausesofthe1962attackwererelatedmoretoChina’sowncompulsions,thattoanythingthat

NehruorIndiadidorcouldhavedone.NotbeingabletogettherecognitionoftheUS,aUNseat,leadershipofAfro-Asia,SovietsupportonthenuclearissueortheborderdisputewithIndia,aleftwardturntookplaceinChinesepolitics.ByhumiliatingIndia,itwantedtoshowthatherpolicyofpeaceandnon-alignmentwasnotfeasible.NorwastheSovietpolicyofpeacefulco-existence.Indiawouldleavethepolicyofnon-alignmentunderpressureandothercountriesofAsiaandAfricawouldfollowtheChineselead.Thus,thecauseoftheIndianmilitaryhumiliationcouldnotbereducedtoIndianforeignpolicyfailure.Itcould‘onlybecharacterizedasoneofthoseunforseeablerandomeventsofhistory.’15

IfIndia’spolicytowardsChinawasafailure,whichothercountry’swasasuccess?TheUSdidacompletevolte-facein1971,andtheUSSRbeganchanging,atleastafter1959.ThedebacleoftheIndia-ChinawarinnowayraisesdoubtsonthecorrectnessofNehru’sbasicthrust

inforeignpolicy.Forexample,non-alignmentensuredthatevenintheIndia-Chinawar,theUSandtheSovietblocswerenotrangedonoppositesidesandIndiasucceededingettinggreaterorlessersympathyfromboth.ThiswasanunusualoccurrenceinthedaysoftheColdWar.Secondly,NehruhadbeenrightinpursuingapolicyoffriendshipwithChina,evenifitendedthewayitdid.Especiallygiventhehostile

relationshipwithPakistan(whichsurfacedsoonafterindependencewiththeconflictoverKashmirandgrewintoaseriousthreatwhenitwasexacerbatedbytheUSdecisionin1954togivemilitaryhelptoPakistan),itwasinIndia’sinteresttotryitsbesttoavoidhavinganotherhostileneighbourandthusbecaughtinapincermovement.India’sespousalofChina’srighttohaveaseatintheUNwasnotgivenupbyNehruevenaftertheIndo-Chinawarsinceherightlybelievedthatthewesternpowers’isolationofChinaonlypushedherintobecomingmoreirresponsible.Besides,asNehruwasmostfondofpointingout,defencewasnotjustamatterofweapons,itwasalsoafunctionofeconomicdevelopment,ofself-reliance;otherwisedefencewasonlyskin-deep.AnewlyindependentpoorcountrylikeIndiacouldhaveill-affordedtodivertherscarceresourcesintobuildingupamassivemilitarymachine.Onthecontrary,bybuildingupIndia’seconomicstrength,Nehruenabledhissuccessorstowinimpressivemilitaryvictories.

Conclusion

ThepoliticalforesightandpragmatismthatinformedNehru’spracticeofnon-alignmentistestifiedtobythequickcoursecorrectionthathashadtobeundertakeneverytimeattemptshavebeenmadetomoveawayfromit.WhenIndiraGandhibecameprimeministerin1966,shefeltthatrelationswiththeUSandtheWest

couldbeandneededtobedramaticallyimproved.Thiswasbecause,ontheonehand,UShadabetterideaofChinesemilitancyandhadpromisedhelpifChinaattackedagain,andontheother,thegravefoodshortagescausedbythedroughtandthecriticaleconomicsituationcausedbythecumulativeeffectofthetwowarsin1962and1965necessitatedsuchhelp.ItwasinpursuanceofthislinethatMrsGandhiagreedtodevaluetherupeeonUSadvicethoughitisanothermatterthatitmighthavebeeninIndianinteresttodoso.ShealsovisitedtheUSinthehopeofreceivingeconomicassistance,expeditingfoodshipmentsandofevolvinganewrelationship.ShecamebacksadderandwiserandfoundthatPresidentLyndonJohnson,despitepublicposturingtothecontrary,deliberatelydelayedrespondingtourgentIndianrequestsforfoodandothereconomichelp.IndiraGandhilatersaidthatonereasonforthiswastopressurizeIndiatostopcriticismofUSbombingofVietnam.IndiraGandhiwas,however,quicktolearnherlesson.ShesetIndiafirmlyonthepathofagriculturalindependenceviaimplementationoftheGreenRevolutionstrategyandsetaboutstrengtheningthenon-alignmentmovementandIndianautonomyininternationalaffairs—thelatterbeingintimatelytiedtothe

former.ShealsograduallystrengthenedtieswiththeSovietUnion,persuadingitthroughavigorousdiplomaticeffortin1966-67toresistfromapositionoftreatingIndiaandPakistanonthebasisofparityandgivingmilitaryassistancetoPakistan.TheJanatagovernmentwhenitcametopowerin1977talkedloudlyaboutpractisinggenuinenon-

alignment,butfoundsoonthattheearlierarticlehadbeengenuineenoughandessentially,fellbackonfollowingtheNehruvianpolicies.TheyenteredintonegotiationsforhugearmsdealswiththeSovietUnionwhichwereconcludedbyMrsGandhionherreturntopowerin1980.Theyalsohadtorenegeontheirpromiseofcuttingdowndefenceexpenditure.RajivGandhitoofoundverysoonthathisattemptstocomeclosertotheUSwerenotveryfruitfuland

revertedbacktotheemphasisonnon-alignment,nucleardisarmament,supporttoSouthAfrica,andsoon.

Non-alignmentwasnotablueprintforpolicy,itwasanapproach,aframework,amethod,notastraitjacketbutalodestarbywhichtheyoungnationcouldsteeritscourseinthedarknight.InsteadofimposinganyrigidityinIndianforeignpolicy,non-alignmentletitevolvetomeetthechangingneedsofIndiansociety.ItdidnotcomeinthewayofthecloserelationshipthatdevelopedwiththeUSSRfrom1954onwards.NordiditcomeinthewayofIndiajoiningtheCommonwealth.Infact,Nehru’sinternationalistandhumanitarianworld-viewdidnotleadtoanysacrificeofIndianinterestsorneglectofherdefenceneeds,asissometimesalleged.NorwasNehruapacifistwhorefusedtouseforcetodefendIndianinterestswhennecessary.In1947-48,heorderedtheuseofforceinKashmir(withGandhiji’sapproval),JunagadhandHyderabad,andin1961inGoa.ThevisionarynatureofNehru’sunderstandingofinternationalrelationsisshownbythefactthatthe

restoftheworldhasslowlycometoadoptmuchofwhatwasdismissedasnaiveandimpracticalwhenfirstarticulated.Nucleardisarmamenthasbecomeanacceptedandmuch-desiredgoalglobally.BoththeUSandtheex-SovietUnionagreedthatanuclearwarcouldnotbewonandthereforemustnotbefought.InFebruary1972,theAmericansandtheChinesesignedtheShanghaiCommuniquewhichdeclaredtheirmutualrelationstobebasedontheFivePrinciplesofPeacefulCo-existence—Nehru’sPanchSheel!ItisnosmallconsolationtoIndiathattheChinesewereforcedtoadopttheverysameprinciples,

expoundedbytheverysameman,thattheyhadbetrayedsoheartlesslyin1962whentheyattackedIndia.TheseprincipleswerefirstembodiedatNehru’sinstanceintheAgreementonTibetbetweenIndiaandChinain1954.InfurthervindicationofNehru,andGandhi,theSovietleaderMikhailGorbachevsignedwithPrimeMinisterRajivGandhitheNewDelhiDeclarationofNovember1996,layingdowntheprincipleofnon-violenceininternationalrelations,andincommunitylifewithinnations.Itisbeingincreasinglyrealizedthatevenconventionalwarsaretoodestructive.Besides,theyhavesingularlyfailedeithertochangebordersverymuch(asintheIraq-Iranwar)ortokeeppopulationsunderoccupation(asinVietnam,Afghanistan,theWestBank,etc.)Theonlyworkableidealisthatofanuclear-weaponfreeandnonviolentworld.OnemayconcludewithaquotefromaletterwrittentoNehrubyChurchill,anoldfoe:16

Ialwaysadmiredyourardentwishforpeaceandtheabsenceofbitternessinyourconsiderationoftheantagonismsthathadinthepastdividedus.Yoursisindeedaheavyburdenandresponsibility,shapingthedestinyofyourmanymillionsofcountrymen,andplayingyouroutstandingpartinworldaffairs.Iwishyouwellinyourtask.Remember‘TheLightofAsia’.

13JawaharlalNehruinHistoricalPerspective

JawaharlalNehrucanbejustifiablyconsideredanarchitectofmodernIndia.OneofthegreatIndiansofthetwentiethcentury,hehasbeenvariouslydescribedasademocrat,socialist,humanistandvisionary,buthewasalltheseandmore.AnyassessmentofhisroleinthemakingofindependentIndiawouldneedtotakecognisanceofhisimmensestatureandextraordinarypersonalityandwould,therefore,inevitablybecomplexandsomewhatcontroversial.WhatwasitaboutNehruwhichmakessomanyIndianstodaylookbackontheNehruerawithsuch

nostalgia?Thatperiodwasevenmorefullofmiseryandpovertythanthepresent.Thenwhydidhispresencemakesomuchofadifference?WhataretheabidingelementsofNehru’scontributiontothemakingofindependentIndia;whatishislegacy?Whatdidhe,andunderhisleadershiptheIndianpeople,achieve?WhatabidingvaluesdidhetrytoinculcateamongIndiansthataretodaytreatedasaguideandmeasureoftheirownandtheirleaders’actions,pronouncements,andideas?Andwashe‘equaltohisopportunities’?Itistheanswerstothesequestionswhichwilldeterminehisplaceinhistoryandnotwhathefailedtoachieveandwhatremainstobedone.SpacedoesnotpermitadiscussionofNehruthepersonhere,buttherewasagreatdealabouthis

personalitywhichisadmirable.Itisnoaccidentthatallthosewhocameincontactwithhimfellunderhisspell.Therangeofhisinterestsandconcernswaswideindeed;frombasiceducationtoheavyindustry,fromstatisticscollectiontoworldpeace,fromwomen’sliberationtotribalwelfare,andfromarttomountain-climbingandcricket.HewasaveritableRenaissanceman,besidesbeingaproductoftheEnlightenmentwithhiscommitmenttorationality,humanity,respectfortheindividual,independenceofspiritandsecularism.Wideandgenerousinhisoutlookoneveryfacetoflife,hetriedtoinculcatethesameamongthepeopleasalsohisco-workers.Ashewrotetothechiefministersin1954:‘IfIndiaistobereallygreat,asweallwanthertobe,thensheisnottobeexclusiveeitherinternallyorexternally.Shehastogiveupeverythingthatisabarriertogrowthinmindorspiritorinsociallife.’1

AchildoftheIndiannationalrevolution,Nehruwasaboveallanationalist.AsaBritishpoliticalscientistputit,‘Evenhisenemiescouldneveraccusehimofthinkinginanybutnationalterms;caste,creed,town,tongue—noneoftheseloyaltiesmeantanythingtohim;itwasIndiafirstandIndialast.’2

Nehruadheredtothiscommitmenttonationalism,nationalunityandnationalindependenceafter1947.Itwasthemainstayofhisthinkingandpoliciesandisintegraltoanyunderstandingofthem.ForNehruindependencehadtogobeyondmerepoliticalindependence.Hewasalsostrongly

committedtochangeanddevelopment,thebuildingofanequitableandegalitarian,justanddemocraticsociety—asocialistsociety—,layingdownthefoundationsofademocraticandcivillibertarianpolityandtheconsolidationofIndiaasanation.Andhetriedallhislife—bothbeforeandaftertheattainmentofindependence—tolinkhisdualcommitmenttonationalismandsocialism.

Thiswasanuncharteredpath.NeitherMarxnorGandhiji,twolong-terminfluencesonhim,providedguidelinesonhowtogoaboutbuildinganation.Buthesetuponthishardtaskwithadegreeofexcitementandoptimism.HehadalwaysbelievedthatIndia’sgreatestneedwas‘forasenseofcertaintyconcerningherownsuccess.’ThissenseofexcitementandfaithinthecomingsuccesshedidnotabandonevenafterthedefeatandbetrayaloftheIndo-Chinawarof1962.And,whatismoreimportant,hesucceededinimpartingthissensetomillionsofIndians.Democracy,ruleoflaw,respectforthefreedomanddignityoftheindividual,socialequityand

equality,non-violence,rationalityintheguidanceofhumanaffairsandmorality-basedpoliticswerethepillarsofhisbasicapproachtonationbuilding.Personalintegrity,loveandconfidenceintheIndianmasseswerehismajorassetsinthistask.

ConsolidationofIndianIndependence

Maintenance,strengtheningandconsolidationofIndia’sindependencewereamongNehru’smostpressingtasks.Inaworldthatwassharplydividedbetweenthetwosuperpowers—theUnitedStatesandtheSovietUnion—whichweredeterminedtoextendtheirhegemonyovertherestoftheworld,Nehruresistedallpressuresandrefusedtobecometheirpawn.India’sinternalpolicies—rightorwrong—developedoutsidethedirectinfluenceofthesuperpowers,andIndiaremainedinfullcontrolofherinternalaswellasherexternalpolicies.NehrualsosuccessfullyresistedpenetrationofIndia’spoliticalandeconomicstructureandinstitutionsbyoutsideagencies.Clearly,independencedependedontheeconomicstrengthofacountry.Giventhis,Nehrusetout,with

agreatdealofsuccess,tobuildanindependentandself-relianteconomyandmadeanall-outefforttobreakoutofcolonialunderdevelopmentandtoensureself-sustainingandself-generatinggrowth,bothinagricultureandindustry.Heputagreatdealofemphasisonself-relianceandcautionedagainstdependenceonothernations.Rapidindustrialization,particularlygrowthofheavyindustries,planning,developmentofthepublicsector,atomicenergyandscienceandtechnology,technicalmodernizationandthetrainingofalargetechnicalandscientificcadrewereregardedbyNehruasnecessarypartsoftheeffortatindependenteconomicdevelopmentandself-reliance.ThebiggestachievementheclaimedforplanningandforCongressrulewasthecreationof‘afeelingofconfidence...afeelingofself-reliance.’3Thiswouldfurtherstrengthennationalindependencebyincreasingtheself-confidenceandself-respectofthepeople.

ForgingNationalUnity

Nehrusucceededinmaintainingandstrengtheningthenationalunityforgedduringthefreedomstruggleandrenderedfragilebythemannerofthetransferofpowerin1947.Healsosucceededincheckingthedisruptiveforces,consolidatingthenationandtheindependentstate,andpromotingthepsychologicalintegrationoftheIndianpeople.Thiswasnomeantask.Casteism,provincialism,tribalism,linguisticchauvinism—largelytranscendedduringthefreedomstruggle—weresurfacingagain;theprincelystateswerethere,and,ofcourse,therewastheeverpresentdangerofcommunalism.NehrurecognizedthatIndiawasnotyetastructurednationbutanation-in-the-making.Healsokeptin

viewandmadeallowanceforIndia’simmensevarietyanddiversity.Heconstantlyurgedthepeopleto

develop‘anoutlookwhichembracesallthisvarietyandconsidersitourveryown.’4Aspecificexpressionofthisstrategyofunityindiversitywashispolicytowardsthetribalpeople.Overall,despitethepersistenceofmanydisruptiveforces,attimesdormant,attimesactive,thereisnodoubtthatNehrusucceededinkeepingthemundercheck,andprovidedthemuchneededpoliticalstabilityandpushforwardtotheprocessofnationalintegration,ofnation-building.Infact,hesubordinatedallotherquestionsandissuestothistask.BehindtheFiveYearPlanslaytheconceptofnationalunity.NehrualsosawthatinIndia’scaseunityandindependencewerecloselyrelated.‘Weliveina

dangerousage’,hewrotein1953,‘whereonlythestrongandtheunitedcansurviveorretaintheirfreedom.’5

NurturingDemocracyandParliamentaryGovernment

Carryingonthetraditionsofthenationalmovement,NehrucarefullynurturedandentrencheddemocracyandparliamentarygovernmentinindependentIndia.Hefoughtthreegeneralelectionsonthebasisofuniversaladultfranchiseandsecretballotandmadeelectionsthenorm,notanexception.Nehru’scommitmenttodemocracyandcivillibertieswastotal.Tohimtheyrepresentedabsolute

valuesandnotmeanstoanend.Hewouldnotsubordinatethemtoanyothergoals,whetherofsocialchangeorsocio-economicdevelopment.Hewasawarethattheparliamentarysystemhaditsweaknesses,andmadeeffortstoremovesomeofthem.Buthewouldnot,hedeclared,‘giveupthedemocraticsystemforanything.’6

EvenhisimmensepersonalpowerandpopularitycouldnotcorruptthedemocratinNehru.Onthecontrary,Nehruusedthisstrengthtoreinforcethedemocraticprocessandthelibertariantradition.Thoughdominatingpoliticsafter1950,withintheCongresspartytoohepromotedinternaldemocracyandopendebate.Healsohelpedcreateaninstitutionalstructurewhichwasdemocraticandinwhichpowerwasdiffused:aConstitutionwithbasiccivillibertiesenshrinedinit,asovereignparliamentelectedonthebasisofuniversalsuffrageandregularelections,afreePress,acabinetgovernmentandanindependentjudiciary.ThiscommitmenttodemocracywasrootedinNehru’sdeepandunqualifiedfaithinandrespectforthe

commonman.‘Thatisenoughreligionforme,’heoncedeclared.7Hewaswillingtobackfully‘thefreemarketofideas’becausehebelievedthatinthelongrunpeoplecoulddiscriminatebetweendifferentideas.Atthesametime,hewasawareoftheauthoritariantendenciesinthecountryandeveninhisownparty.‘Ourdemocracy’,hesaidin1951,‘isatenderplantwhichhastobenourishedwithwisdomandcare.’8Andsohetriedhisbesttoinstilinthecommonfolk,atastefordemocraticconcepts.Heregularlytouredthelandsharinghisideaswiththepeople,tryingtoeducatetheminthewaysofrationalanddemocraticthinking.WhenaskedwhathislegacytoIndiawouldbe,herepeated:‘Hopefully,itisfourhundredmillionpeoplecapableofgoverningthemselves.’9

DemocracywasintrinsictoNehru’sideaofsocialandpoliticaldevelopment.Democracywouldenablethepeopletomobilizethemselvesandtoexertpressurefrombelowtoachievesocialjusticeandequality,aswellasreductionofeconomicinequality,whichovertimewouldleadtosocialism.Thepoliticalpartyinpowerwouldeitherimplementthepopularmandateorwouldgetsweptaway.Hewasawarethatthisprocessmighttaketime,forparliamentarysystemanduniversalsuffragegavetherightto

governbutnotnecessarilythepowertodoso.Butsoonerorlater,hebelieved,thepowerwouldfollowtheright;andhedidhisbesttobringthisabout.Thisisonereasonwhyheplacedsomuchemphasisonelections,besidescommunitydevelopmentprojects,PanchayatiRaj,cooperativesanddecentralizationofallkindsofpower.Particularly,toensuretheunityofadiversesocietylikeIndia’s,Nehruargueddemocracywas

essential.NoamountofforceorcoercioncouldholdIndiatogether.‘InIndiatoday,’hesaidin1960,‘anyreversalofdemocraticmethodsmightleadtodisruptionandviolence.’10

Nehruwasawareoftheformidable,novelandunprecedentedcharacterofhisefforttodevelopthecountryeconomicallyonthebasisofademocraticandcivillibertarianpoliticalstructure.Noothercountryhadattemptedthissofar.Mostothernationsandsocietieshadusedauthoritarianandadministrativemeasuresandinstitutionsduringtheperiodoftheireconomictake-off.Nehruwasawarethathispathofdevelopmentmightslowdowntherateofeconomicdevelopment.ButIndianpeople,hefelt,werewillingtopaythispriceforthesakeofademocraticpoliticalorder.ThroughouthislifeNehruopposeddogmaandadogmaticmentality.Thiswashismajorobjectionto

religionandbecameamajorgroundforhisfavouringascientifictemperandoutlookonlifeanditsproblems.

BuildingSocialism

Nehrurejectedthecapitalistdevelopmentalandcivilizationalperspectiveand,instead,workedforfundamentaltransformationofIndiansocietyinasocialistdirection.Clearly,hedidnotsucceedinbuildingasocialistsocietyandtherewasalargegapbetweenhispreceptsandpractice.Buthedid,overtheyears,grapplewiththeproblemofinitiatingsocialisminanunderdevelopedcountrywithademocraticpolity.ItwasNehru,aboveall,whocarriedthesocialistvisiontomillionsandmadesocialismapartoftheirconsciousness.Moreover,hisideasonsocialismandhisstrategyforitsestablishmentanddevelopment,asalsohispoliticalpracticeprovideddeepinsightsintotheproblemofsocialisttransformationinthemodernworld.WhatdidsocialismmeantoNehru?Infact,Nehruneverdefinedsocialismintermsofadefinite

schemeorrigidgeneralprinciples.Tohim,generally,socialismmeantgreaterequalityofopportunity,socialjustice,moreequitabledistributionofhigherincomesgeneratedthroughtheapplicationofmodernscienceandtechnologytotheprocessesofproduction,theendingoftheacutesocialandeconomicdisparitiesgeneratedbyfeudalismandcapitalism,andtheapplicationofthescientificapproachtotheproblemsofsociety.Socialismalsomeanttheeventualendingoftheacquisitivementality,thesupremacyoftheprofitmotive,andcapitalistcompetitivenessandthepromotioninsteadofthecooperativespirit.Italsomeantthegradualendingofclassdistinctionsandclassdomination.Socialismalsolaiddownthelarge-scalesocialownershiporcontrolovertheprincipalmeansofproduction.ButNehruinsistedthat,firstofall,socialismconcernedgreaterproduction,fortherecouldbenoequaldistributionofpoverty.Infact,tohimsocialismwasequaltogreaterproductionplusequitabledistribution.InIndianconditions,Nehruregardedsocialisttransformationasaprocessandnotasanevent.

Socialismwasthennotaclearlypre-defined,pre-laid-outschemetowardswhichtheprocessoftransformationmoved.Instead,socialismwasexpectedtogoonbeingdefined,stagebystage,astheprocessadvanced.Therewastobenosuddenbreakbutgradualchange.Socialisttransformationwasto

beviewedintermsofaseriesofreformswhichwouldoccurwithintheorbitoftheexistingsocio-economicstructure,butwhichwould,overtimeandintheirtotality,amounttoarevolutionorastructuralsocialtransformation.Nehrudescribedthesereformsas‘surgicaloperations’.Socialistrevolutionwould,thus,consistofaseriesof‘surgicaloperations’performedthroughthedueprocessoflawbyademocraticlegislature.Nehrubelievedthatdemocracyandcivillibertieshadtobebasicconstituentsofsocialism,andwere

inseparablefromit.Onthebasisofhisexperienceofthenationalmovement,Nehrucametotheviewthatbasicsocial

changecanbe,andshouldbe,broughtaboutonlythroughabroadsocietalconsensusortheconsentoftheoverwhelmingmajorityofthepeople.AshetoldTiborMendein1956:‘Onehastocarrypeoplewithone.’Theymustbewillingto‘acceptchanges.’Parliamentcould,ofcourse,legislate,butitwasfarmoreimportantthat‘averylargesectionofthepeoplemustalsoacceptit—or,atanyrate,activelyorpassively,bereadytoacceptit.’11OnanotheroccasionhetoldthepresidentsoftheProvincialCongressCommitteesthathewasconvincedoftheimportanceof‘carryingourpeoplealongthelineofprogress.Wearenotasectarianbodyconsistingoftheelect.Wearefellow-travellerswiththepeopleofIndia.’12

Therewereseveralmajorcorollariesofthisapproach.First,theprocessofsocialtransformationmighthavetobesloweddown,fortheprocessofreconcilingdifferentviewsinsideandoutsidetheCongresspartyandofwinningtheactiveorpassiveconsentofthepeoplewasatime-consumingone.Nehruwaswillingtoslowdownthepaceofsocialistdevelopmentinordertopersuadeandcarrythepeopleandhiscolleagueswithhimratherthantorideroughshodovertheiropinionsortoignoreandshowdisrespecttotheautonomyofthevariousinstitutionsofthestate.Besides,toendureandstrikedeeproots,socialismrequiredpopularacceptanceandademocraticapproach.Learningfromtheexperienceoftheriseoffascisminthethirties,Nehruarguedthatintheabsenceofa

broadsocietalconsensus,anyradicalstepstowardssocialismwouldinvitethedangeroffascism.‘Anattemptatprematureleftism’,hewrotetoJayaprakashNarayanin1948,‘maywellleadtoreactionordisruption.’13Nehruwasawareofthesocialpresenceofthepowerfullandedelementswiththeirsocialprestigeandeconomicpowerandnumericalstrength.Hewasalsoconsciousofthefactthathispartyhad,despitehischarismaandpersonalpopularity,securedlessthan50percentofthevotescastinthe1952and1957elections.Ontheotherhand,thedifferentrightistpoliticalelementshadtogethersecuredmorethan25percentofthepopularvotefortheLokSabhaelectionsintheseyears;andthiswasapartfromtheright-wingstrengthinsidetheCongressitself.Aboveallhefeltthatthemiddlestrata,urbanaswellasrural,hadtobehandledwithcareandcautionfortheyconstitutedaverylargesectionofthepeople—anditwasthemiddlestratawhichhadformedthebackboneoffascisminGermany.Anyfrontalattackonthepropertiedclasseswaslikelytopushthemandthemiddlestratatotakingafascistposition.Anyeffortatmakingaminorityrevolutionorwhentheoverwhelmingmajorityofthepeoplehadnotbeenwonoverwasmorelikelytoresultincounter-revolutionandtheoverthrowofdemocracythaninthecomingofsocialistrevolution.Evenapartfromfascism,suchaneffortwoulddividetheIndianpeoplewhentheirunitywasbothessentialandfragile.IndiaoftheNehruerawasquiteoftencriticizedforbeingasoftstateandNehruwasaccusedofbeinga

weakruler.ButNehrudidnotagree,forhewasawareofthedangerofauthoritarianismposedbytoostrongastateandtoostrongaruler.Justbeforehisdeath,hesaidin1964:‘Oneshouldnotmistake

gentlenessandcivilityofcharacterforweakness.Theycriticizemeformyweakness,butthisistoolargeacountrywithtoomanylegitimatediversitiestopermitanyso-called“strongman”totrampleoverpeopleandtheirideas.’14

OnereasonNehruadoptedanopen-endedapproachtowardssocialismwasbecauseofhisbeliefthatitwasnotpossibletomobilizealargemajorityaroundaclear-cut,structured,ideologicaldefinitionofsocialism.Alargemajoritycouldbemobilizedonlybyunitingdiverseinterestsandmultipleviewsandideologicalstrandsaroundacommonsocialistvisionorbroadframework.OvertimeNehrucametobelievethatasocialistsocietycouldbeachievedthroughpeacefulandnon-

violentmeans.Whilerecognizingtheexistenceandsignificanceoftheclassstrugglehebelievedthatitcouldberesolvedthroughnon-violentmeansandtheruleoflaw.OneotheraspectofNehru’sapproachtopoliticsandsocialismdeservestobestressed.Withthe

passageoftimehecameveryclosetoGandhijiinemphasizingthatinbuildingasocialistIndiaasmuchimportanceshouldbeattachedtothemeansastotheends.Wrongmeans,hesaid,wouldnotleadtorightresults.Hisbeliefintheinseparabilityofthemeansandtheendswasanotherreasonwhyheincreasinglycondemnedallrecoursetoviolenceevenforaworthyobjectivelikethatofsocialism.

PlanningforEconomicDevelopment

NehrulookeduponrapideconomicdevelopmentasbasicforIndia’sindependenceandunityandfortheremovalofpovertyandimplementationofhissocialwelfaristpolicies.Inthechapteron‘ObjectivesofPlannedDevelopment’whichhewrotefortheThirdFiveYearPlanheobserved:‘Ahighrateofeconomicgrowthsustainedoveralongperiodistheessentialconditionforachievingarisingleveloflivingforallcitizens,andespeciallyforthoseinlowincomegroupsorlackingtheopportunitytowork.’15AndhetoldtheAvadisessionoftheCongress:‘WecannothaveaWelfareStateinIndiawithallthesocialismorevencommunismintheworldunlessournationalincomegoesupgreatly.Socialismorcommunismmighthelpyoutodivideyourexistingwealth,ifyoulike,butinIndiathereisnoexistingwealthforyoutodivide;thereisonlypovertytodivide...HowcanwehaveaWelfareStatewithoutwealth?’16Inotherwords,productionwasessentialwhateverthenatureofsociety—socialistorcapitalist.ThethreepillarsofNehru’sdevelopmentstrategy,representing‘afairlywidespreadintellectual

consensusofthetime,’17wereplanningforrapidindustrialandagriculturalgrowth,apublicsectortodevelopstrategicindustriesandamixedeconomy.NehrupopularizedtheconceptofplanningandmadeitapartofIndianconsciousness.Indiawastohaveamixedeconomyasatransitionalstage,withtheprivatesectorfunctioningforalongtimetocomethoughwithintheframeworkofplanning.Inthelongrun,thestatewastooccupythecommandingheightsoftheeconomy,owningorcontrollingallbasicindustriesandstrategicsectorsoftheeconomy.Thepublicsectorwasnottobebasedonlyonstate-runenterprises.Nehruwasveryclearthatthecooperativeprincipleshouldbeencouragedandcooperativesintrade,industryandagricultureshouldplayanincreasinglylargerrole.Inthelongrun,theroleofthemarketforcesandprofitmotivewastobecomelesssignificant.Atthe

sametime,Nehruwasquiteclearthatovertimethepublicsectormustgenerateadditionalsources.AccordingtotheIndustrialPolicyResolutionof1956,whichhehelpeddraft,thepublicsectorwas

expectedto‘augmenttherevenuesofthestateandprovideresourcesforfurtherdevelopmentinfreshfields.’Takingapragmaticviewofthequestion,healsoheldthatwherepublicsectorperformedwell,itshouldremain,andwhereitdidnot,itwastobereplaced.AboveallNehruwantedtobuildanindependentself-relianteconomy,forindependencedependedon

economicstrengthandthecapacitytoresisteconomicandpoliticaldomination.Emphasisonrapidindustrializationandagriculturalself-sufficiency,planning,publicsectorandheavy,capitalgoodsindustry,minimaluseofforeigncapitalandaid,science,technologyandtechnicalmodernization,thetrainingofalargetechnicalandscientificcadre,andatomicenergywasseenbyNehruasnecessarypartsoftheeffortatindependenteconomicdevelopment.Inachievingthis,thereishardlyanydoubtthathewaseminentlysuccessful.Indiadidmakethetransitionfromacolonialtoanindependenteconomy,thoughacapitalisteconomy.Whatevertheweaknessesthatemergedlater,Nehru’seconomicpolicydidprovetobetherightoneforIndiaandasaresulthereconomicachievementwasquitesubstantial.

OpposingCommunalism

Nehru’scommitmenttosecularismwasunsurpassedandall-pervasive.Communalismwentagainsthisgrain,andhefoughtitvigorouslythroughouthislife.HehelpedsecularismacquiredeeprootsamongtheIndianpeople;andhepreventedtheburgeoningforthofcommunalismwhenconditionswerefavourableforit.Thoughonalmostallissueshebelievedinconsensusandcompromise,communalismwastheexception,forashesaidin1950,anycompromiseoncommunalism‘canonlymeanasurrenderofourprinciplesandabetrayalofthecauseofIndia’sfreedom.’18

KeepinginviewIndia’sspecificsituation,Nehrudefinedsecularisminthedualsenseofkeepingthestate,politicsandeducationseparatefromreligion,makingreligionaprivatematterfortheindividual,andofshowingequalrespectforallfaithsandprovidingequalopportunitiesfortheirfollowers.HedefinedcommunalismastheideologywhichtreatedHindus,Muslims,SikhsorChristiansashomogeneousgroupsinregardtopoliticalandeconomicmatters,as‘politicsundersomereligiousgarb,onereligiousgroupbeingincitedtohateanotherreligiousgroup.’19

Nehruwasoneofthefirsttotrytounderstandthesocio-economicrootsofcommunalism,andhecametobelievethatitwasprimarilyaweaponofreaction,eventhoughitssocialbasewasformedbythemiddleclasses.HealsomostperceptiblydescribedcommunalismastheIndianformoffascism.Incontrast,heregardedsecularismasanessentialconditionfordemocracy.HealsodidnotdistinguishbetweenHindu,Muslim,SikhorChristiancommunalisms.Theywere,he

said,differentformsofthesameideologyandhad,therefore,tobeopposedsimultaneously.Whilehewasveryclearthatsecularismmeantgivingfullprotectiontotheminoritiesandremovingtheirfears,atthesametime,hewasasopposedtominoritycommunalismsastothecommunalismofthereligiousmajority.Healsoarguedmostconvincinglythatsecularismhadtobethesolebasisfornationalunityinamulti-religioussocietyandthatcommunalismwas,therefore,clearlyadangertonationalunityandwasanti-national.Therewas,however,amajorlacunainNehru’sapproachtotheproblemofcommunalism,whichcan

beseenasacertaineconomistic,deterministicandreductionistbias.Believingthatplanningandeconomicdevelopmentandthespreadofeducation,scienceandtechnologywouldautomaticallyweaken

communalthinkingandhelpformasecularconsciousness,heignoredtheneedforstruggleagainstcommunalismasanideology.Asaresulthepaidlittleattentiontothecontentofeducationortothespreadofscienceandscientificapproachamongthepeople.Whileveryactivehimself,hefailedtousetheCongressasanorganizationtotakehisownbrilliantunderstandingofcommunalismtothepeople.HealsocompromisedwithhisownstandwhenhepermittedtheCongressinKeralatoenterintoanalliancewiththeMuslimLeagueandChristiancommunalgroupsin1960.Further,hewasunabletopersuadethestategovernmentstotakestrongadministrativestepsagainsttheinstigatorsorperpetratorsofcommunalviolence.Sadly,sorrowoverthelarge-scalecommunalviolencemarkedthelastyearsofhislife.

OpposingConservatism

Nehrudidnotdevotemuchtimeandefforttosocialreforminthenarrowsenseoftheterm.Buthewasopposedtosocialconservatism;and,realizingthatmenandwomendonotlivebybreadalone,heregularlyemphasizedthenecessityofbringingaboutchangesinthesocialspherealongwitheconomicandpoliticalchanges.OneofhisgreatestachievementsasprimeministerwasthepassageoftheHinduCodeBills.Anotherwasthecarewithwhichhepromotededucationamonggirlsandpublicemploymentofmiddle-classwomen.

PursuingForeignPolicy

Asbroughtoutinchapter12above,Nehru’sforeignpolicywasamanysplendouredphenomenon.NehruusedforeignpolicyasaninstrumenttodefendandstrengthenIndia’snewlywonindependenceandtosafeguardIndia’snationalinterestsandtodeveloptheself-reliance,self-confidenceandtheprideoftheIndianpeople,evenwhileservingthecauseofworldpeaceandanti-colonialism.ItissignificantthatsuccessiveprimeministersafterNehru,tilltoday,havecontinuedtofollowthebroadframeworkofhisforeignpolicy.

AssessingNehru

Nehru’splaceinhistoryshouldrightlytakeintoaccounthispoliticalweaknesses.Thisinnowaydiminisheshimforhestillemergesasapersonwhotoweredoverhiscontemporaries.AcriticalweaknessofNehru’sstrategyofconsolidationoftheIndiannation,economicdevelopment

andsocialtransformationflowedfromhisnon-adherencetotheGandhianstrategyofnon-violentstruggleinonecrucialaspect—itsemphasisonthemobilizationofthepeople.Nehrudidseethenecessityofinvolvingalargenumberofpeopleinnationbuilding.Buthehadanoverpoweringbeliefinspontaneity,inthepoormobilizingontheirown;hebelievedinthereductionistnotionthattheexerciseoffranchisewouldgraduallyeducatethemassestovoteintheirowninterest.Healsoharbouredthenineteenth-centuryliberalnotionthathisspeechesorthoseofotherrighttypeleaderswouldbythemselvesarouseandactivizethemasses.ThereisnodoubtthatNehrufeltdeeplyandpassionatelyforthepeople;hisswayoverthemasseswas

immenseaswashiscapacitytocommunicatewiththem,tosensetheirfeelingsandtowintheirlove,affectionandtrust.Butanactiveinvolvementofthepeopleinpoliticsandtheirownsocialliberationrequiredorganizationandmobilization,aparty,howeverlooselystructured,cadres,however

democraticallyorganized,andaminimumofideology,howeverbroad,non-dogmaticandopen-ended.Infact,Nehru’sownmodelofdevelopmentandsocialtransformationdependedonactivepressurefrombelowbythedeprived,theexploitedandthedominated.Suchactivepopularparticipationinpoliticsalonewouldenableparliamentarydemocracytoserveasaninstrumentofnationbuilding,socialchangeandequity.ButNehrufailedtohelpcreateanyinstitutionsorstructuresoragentsthroughwhichthepeopleoreven

thelower-levelcadresofhisownpartycouldbemobilizedandactivizedandpoliticallyeducated.Theonlyformofmobilizationwashisextensivetoursthroughwhichhecommunicatedwiththepeople,educatedthemandcreatedpopularsupportforhispolicies.Before1947,thepoliticalharvestofhistourshadbeengatheredbythelocalCongresscommitteesandthenationalistcadres.Butafter1947,intheabsenceofanypopularlevelorganizationtofollow-uptheoutcomeofhistours,thepoliticalandorganizationalbenefitsweremoreoftenthannotreapedbythepartybossesfromthelocaltothestatelevel.TheNehruvianperiod,itisnoteworthy,didnotwitnessgreaterparticipationbythepeopleinthe

politicalprocessesexceptintheformofelections.Actually,therewasgradualdemobilizationofthepeopleandtheweakeningovertimeofthelinkbetweenpoliticsfrombelowandthenationalleadershipinpowerasalsobetweenpoliticsandsocialandconstructivework;atleastinthemediumrun—tobecalculatedindecades—electoralpoliticsstrengthenedtheholdofthelocaleconomicandpoliticalelite.Nehrualsofailedtobuildinstitutionsandorganizationalstructurestoimplementhisvisionorpolicies

ortomobilizethepeoplebehindthem;hecreatednosocialinstrumentsandthisledtoageneralweaknessinexecutionofhispoliciesandideas,andwasamajorreasonfortheshortcomingsintheimplementationofthelandreforms,theexecutionoftheCommunityDevelopmentprojectandthemanagementofthepublicsector.TheCongresspartycouldhaveplayedtheroleoforganizingsecularandnationalistforcestoback

Nehru’spoliciesandtopopularizeandtomobilizethepeoplebehindthem.ButNehrualsoneglectedparty-building,evenafterheacquiredcompletecontroloveritin1951.Hehadneverbeenabuilderororganizerofthepartybeforeindependence.ButthisweaknessbecameaseriousflawafterGandhijiandSardarPatel,stalwartorganizersofthepartybefore1947,leftthesceneandNehrubecameitssoleleader.OneresultofthiswasthatCongresswasincreasinglyweakenedasanorganizationandbegantoloseitsroleasaninstrumentforsocialchangeortheimplementationofgovernmentpoliciesoreveneducationinthepartyideology.Instead,itgraduallyveeredtowardsmachinepolitics.TheconsequencewasthatNehruincreasinglystartedrelyingongovernmentadministrationand

bureaucracyforimplementinghispolicies.EventheCommunityDevelopmentprogrammeandthePanchayatiRaj,thetwogreateffortstoinvolvethepeopleintheirowndevelopment,endedupunderbureaucraticcontrol;andthevillagelevelsocialworker,thekingpininruralreconstruction,becameacoginthebureaucraticmachineandspentaslittletimeaspossibleinthevillage.Furthermore,theadministrativestructureandthebureaucracyremainedunreformedandunreconstructedandasdistantfromthepeopleasbefore.Nehrualsodidnotvigorouslyattackthroughmassmobilizationandmasseducationalcampaignsthose

aspectsofthesocialstructure,suchasthecastesystem,maledomination,kinshipnetworks,economicdependenceoftheruralpoorontheruralrichandgrowingcorruption,whichwerebolsteringtheexisting

socio-economicsystem.Healsowenttoofarinstressingtheroleofconsentandconversionofthedominantsocialclasses.HehadinheritedthisbelieffromGandhiji.But,then,GandhijihadalsobelievedinorganizingactivepoliticalandideologicalstrugglesagainstthecurrenttargetsofhispoliticswhethertheyweretheBritish,theprincesortheorthodoxamongtheuppercastes.AmajorpartofGandhiji’sstrategyhadbeento‘convert’thembyisolatingthemfrompublicopinion.Nehrudidnotpursuethispartofhismentor’sstrategy.Nehrucouldsetgoalsandobjectives,hecouldformulatepeople’sdesires,hecouldinspirepeople

withavision,hewasalsoaskilfulpolitician,buthelackedthecapacitytodesignastrategicframeworkandtodevisetacticalmeasurestoachievethegoalsheset.ThisprovedtobeafailingforNehruasanation-builder.Whilestronglyopposedtopoliticalopportunismandmanipulation,hecouldreplacetheseonlywithadhocpoliticalandadministrativemeasures.Thisoftenleftthefieldopentothemanipulators.Thisweaknesswasheightenedbythefactthathewasapoorjudgeofmenandwomen.Tohiscredit,Nehrucouldseetheprocessofthepoliticalmanoeuvrestakingover,butcoulddolittletocounterit.Andso,actingashisownleaderoftheOpposition,heobservedanddenouncedthecorruption,careerism,bureaucratization,andthemanyotheremergingillsofadevelopingex-colonialsociety,butwasunable,apartfromexhortations,totakethenecessaryconcretestepstocontrolthem.Wemaypointtosomeofthelargeareasofneglectwhichhavetodayassumedmonstrousproportions:theentireeducationalsystemwasleftuntouchedandunreformed,andfailedtoreachthemajorityofthepopulation;noworthwhilepoliticalandideologicalmassstrugglewaswagedagainstcommunalismasanideology;thetardyandinadequateimplementationoflandreformsleftalegacyofeconomicinequality,socialoppressionandpoliticalviolenceinruralIndia;theinadequatestepstakentocurbcorruptioninitsinitialstages,ledlatertoitsassumingshockingdimensionsandpervadingalmosteveryareaoflife,administrationandpolitics.Toconclude,asthefirstprimeministerofindependentIndia,Nehruwasfacedwithdauntingtasks.In

spiteofthis,measuredbyanyhistoricalstandardshisachievementswereofgiganticproportions.Herootedcertainvalues,approaches,objectives,goalsandanoutlookandmadethemanintegralpartoftheethosoftheIndianpeople.Asoneofhisbiographers,GeoffreyTysonhassaid,‘IfNehruhadbeenadifferentkindofman,Indiawouldhavebecomeadifferentkindofcountry.’20

NehruandtheNehruerahaverecededintohistoricalmemory—onlythoseabovefiftyyearswouldrememberhimasaperson.MostIndians—eventhosewhoduringhislife-timewerehisharshcritics—harkbacktotheNehruera,identifywithhim,anddrawinspirationfromhislifeandwork,hissocialvision,andthevalueshesustainedintheendeavourtobuildahappierandhealthiersocietyinwhichclass,casteandgenderoppressionwouldceasetoexist.Thelegacyheleftbehindisinmanyrespectsasheet-anchorfortheIndianpeoplewhoaretodaybuffetedaboutinaseaofdespair.Whatmorecouldapeopleaskfromaleader?Hasanysociety,anypeople,therighttoaskaleader,howevergreat,tosolveallitsproblemsonceforall?

14PoliticalParties,1947-64:TheCongress

Indiaisvirtuallytheonlypost-colonialnationtosustainasystemofparliamentarygovernmentforoverfiftyyearsafterindependence.Itis,ofcourse,truethatthroughouttheNehruyearsCongresswasdominantpoliticallyandretainedpowerattheCentreandinalmostallthestates.But,simultaneously,amulti-partysystembasedonfreecompetitionamongpartiesandstrongparliamentaryinstitutionsalsodevelopedfromthebeginning.Thenatureandworkingofthepartysysteminplaceatthetimeofindependencewithseveralpoliticalparties—theCongress,theSocialistParty,theCommunistParty,theKisanMazdoorPrajaPartyandtheBharatiyaJanSangh—functioningactivelyandsuccessfullyin1951-52wascrucialtothedevelopmentofparliamentarydemocracyinIndia.Allthemajorpoliticalpartieswerenationalorall-Indiaincharacter,intheirstructure,organization,

programmesandpolicies,evenwhentheirpoliticalbaseswerelimitedtospecificareasorclassesandsectionsofsociety.Theyhadnationalobjectives,tookupsignificantall-Indiaissues,sustainedanall-Indialeadershipandputforwardprogrammesconcernedwiththesocial,economicandpoliticaldevelopmentofthecountryasawhole.ThoughtheoppositionpartiesremainedindividuallyquiteweakcomparedtoCongressintermsof

masssupportasalsoseatsintheparliamentandthestatelegislatures,theywerequiteactiveandpoliticallydidnotplayjustaperipheralrole.Theyvigorouslycampaignedforalternativesetsofeconomicandpoliticalpolicies.Moresignificantly,non-CongresscandidatespolledmorevotesthantheCongressinthegeneralelectionsof1951-52,1957,and1962;and,despitethefirst-past-the-pollelectoralsystem,theycaptured26percentoftheLokSabhaseatsin1952,25percentin1957and28percentin1962.Theyfaredevenbetterinthestateassemblieswheretheirstrengthwas32percentoftheseatsin1952,35percentin1957,and40percentin1962.Whatisevenmoreimportant,theyputconsiderablepressureonthegovernmentandtherulingpartyandsubjectedthemtoconsistentcriticism.Inpractice,theyalsowieldedagreatdealofinfluenceonpublicpolicies,infact,quiteoutofproportiontotheirsize.Onereasonwhytheoppositionpartiesremainedweakinthisperiodwasbecauseoftheirinabilityto

unite.TheyfoundtheyhadmoreincommonwithoneortheotherwingofCongressthanwitheachother.Thiswasnotaccidentalbecauseexceptforthecommunalandcasteistpartiesalltheotheroppositionpartieshadbefore1947beenpartofthenationalmovementandtheCongress.Itwasonlywhentheleftandrightpartiescouldunite,formallyorinformally,thattheycoulddefeattheCongressin1977and1989.TheIndianNationalCongresswasthenthemostimportantpoliticalorganizationinIndiaat

independenceand,infact,throughouttheNehruera.Therewasnoalternativetoitonthehorizon.Itenjoyedimmenseprestigeandlegitimacyastheleaderandheirofthenationalmovement.Itsreachwasnational;itcoveredtheentiresub-continent.Itssocialbaseextendedfromthemetropolitancitiestothe

remotestofvillagesandfromthebigcapitaliststotheruralpoor.Congressgavethecountryastablegovernment;itwasamajorinstrumentofthepoliticalstabilityIndiaenjoyedforseveraldecades.ItisaxiomaticamonghistoriansandpoliticalscientiststhatafterindependenceCongresswas

transformedfromamovementintoaparty.Butthisisahalf-truth,fornorealbreakoccurredimmediatelyafter15August1947.Infact,thiswastheproblemthatCongressfaced.Inthechangedcircumstancesitcouldnolongerbetheleaderofamassmovement;butcoulditbecomeamodernpartyforformingagovernment,andyetretainthecharacterofabroadcoalitionforthepurposesofnation-building?Asaparty,ithadtohaveacertainorganizationalcohesion;thisitsecuredbyintroducing,atSardarPatel’sinitiative,aprovisionthatnopersonbelongingtoanyotherpoliticalpartyorgroup,whichhaditsownconstitutionandorganizationalstructure,couldbeitsmember.(Ithadpermittedthisbefore1947whentheCongressSocialistsandtheCommunistswereitsmembers,evenwhileformingtheirownparties.)Butitretaineditsideologicalandprogrammaticdiversityandopennessasalsoacertainorganizationallooseness.TheCongressSocialistsmisunderstoodtheemergingcharacterofCongressandassumed,especially

afterthePatelamendment,thatitwasnolongertobebroad-basedandwasbeingtransformedintoaright-wingbourgeoispartywithadefiniteideologicalandprogrammaticcommitmenttothecapitalistpathofdevelopment.Giventheseperceiveddifferences,theSocialistsdecidedtoleaveCongress.Thiswascertainlyablowtothebroad-basedcharacteroftheparty.JawaharlalNehru,ontheotherhand,wasconvincedthatitwasbothpossibleandnecessarytoretain

theall-embracingconsensualcharacterofCongressandthatwithoutitsleadershipthecountrywouldneitherbepoliticallystable,norcapableofeconomicandsocialdevelopment.Hewasthereforeunwillingtodividethepartyalongleft-rightlinesandstayedwithCongressasdidalargenumberoftheCongressSocialistswhosawCongressandNehruasmoreeffectiveinstrumentsofsocialismandsocialchange.However,realizingthatthedepartureoftheSocialistswouldadverselyaffectthesocialistaspirationsofCongress,hemade,asweshallsee,severalattemptstobringthembackintothepartyoratleasttogettheircooperationinhisnation-buildingefforts.HealsoconstantlystrovetoreformCongressandgiveitaleft-turn,howeverarduousthetask.Healsoadoptedareconciliatoryapproachtowardspoliticalopponentsotherthanthecommunalists.Congressdid,ofcourse,becomeafter1947adistinctpoliticalparty,competingwithotherpartiesfor

politicalpowerbutitdidnotbecomeamonolithicparty.Itretaineditsamorphousandnationalconsensualcharacterwithagreatdealofideologicalflexibilityandvagueness.Thoughthepartyobservedacertaindegreeofdiscipline,itsfunctioninganddecision-makingremaineddemocraticandopen.Therewasstillagreatdealofdebatewithinitasalsotoleranceofdifferentviewpoints,tendenciesandopendissent.TheviewsofthepartymembersgotreflectedintheAllIndiaCongressCommitteeandtheannualsessionsoftheparty.Thedistrictandprovincialpartyorganizationalstructuresalsofunctionedeffectivelyandconveyedtotheleadershipthedifferentpointsofviewprevailingintheparty.ImportantinthisrespectwastheroleofNehruwhofunctionedasademocratinsidethepartyasalsoinrelationtotheoppositionparties.Congressalsoremainedsensitiveto,andfunctionedasthemediumforthereconciliation,

accommodationandadjustmentofdiverseanddivergentclass,sectionalandregionalinterests,asithaddoneduringtheperiodoftheanti-imperialiststruggle.Italsohadthecapacitytocontain,compromiseand

reconciledifferentandcompetingpointsofviewwithintheparty.Whileplacatingthepropertiedandsociallydominantgroups,itwassimultaneouslyabletoappealtothepoorandthedeprived.Itwasalsoabletoaccommodatenewsocialandpoliticalforcesastheygraduallyemergedandenteredthepoliticalarena,especiallyastheleftpartiesfailedtorepresentandmobilizethem.Thisall-embracing,inclusivecharacterCongresswasabletoretaininpartbecauseofitsinheritancein

thenationalmovementbutlargelybecauseoftheNehruviannotion,broughtoutinchapter13,thatnationalconsolidation,democracyandsocialchangerequiredtheactiveorpassiveconsentoftheoverwhelmingmajorityofthepeople.DuringtheNehruera,CongressremainedbasicallyapartyoftheCentreormiddlewithaleft

orientation—inotherwords,aleft-of-the-centreparty—thoughithadrightandleftminoritiesatitsflanks.Broadly,itstoodfornationalism,economicdevelopment,socialjustice,redistributionofwealthandequalizationofopportunitiesencompassedbythebroadideaofdemocraticsocialism.Asacentristpartyithadthreeimportantfeatures.First,theoppositionparties,otherthanthecommunalparties,wereabletoinfluenceitthroughtheirmassagitationsorthroughlike-mindedgroupswithinit,fortherealwaysexistedinsideCongressgroupswhichreflectedthepositionsoftheoppositionparties.Second,thisconciliatoryattitudeledtotheoppositionpartiesbeingopentoabsorption.Congresswasabletoabsorbthesocialbase,cadres,programmesandpoliciesoftheoppositionparties,andtopacifyandcooptpopularmovementsthroughconcessionsandconciliation.Third,theoppositionparties,bothoftheleftandtheright,tendedtodefinethemselvesinextremetermsinordertopreventtheircadresandfollowers—andevenleaders—frombeingcooptedorabsorbedbyCongress.Thishappenedwheneverthesocialistandcommunistpartiesadoptedrealisticdemandsorfollowedanon-antagonisticapproachtowardsCongressanditspolicies.Buttheseextremepositionsalsohadnegativeconsequencesforthepartiesconcerned—theytendedtoisolatethemfurtherfrompublicopinionandalsomadethemvulnerabletosplits.

LeadershipofPartyVersusGovernment

AmajorproblemthatCongresshadtodecideonasapartyattheveryoutsetwaswhatwouldbethepreciserelationshipbetweentheleadershipofthepartyandthatofthegovernment.InNovember1946,Nehrujoinedtheinterimgovernmentandresignedfromthepartypresidentshiponthegroundthatthetworolesoftheleaderofthegovernmentandthepresidentofthepartycouldnotbecombined.HissuccessorasCongresspresident,J.B.Kripalani,however,demandedthatthepresidentofthepartyanditsWorkingCommitteeshouldhaveadirectroleingovernmentpolicy-makingandthatallgovernmentdecisionsshouldbetakeninconsultationwiththem.NehruandSardarPatelandotherleadersholdinggovernmentpositionsdidnotagreewithKripalani.

Theysaidthattheproceedingsandthepapersofthegovernmentweresecretandcouldnotbedivulgedtopersonsoutsidethegovernment.Theparty,theyargued,shouldlaydowngenerallong-termpoliciesandgoalsbutshouldnotinterferewiththespecificproblemsofgovernance.Thegovernment,intheirview,wasconstitutionallyaccountabletotheelectedlegislature;itcouldinnocasebemadeaccountabletotheparty.Inessencetheyarguedfortheautonomyoftheparliamentarywingandandevenitssupremacyoverthepartyinsofarasgovernmentaffairswereconcerned.Kripalaniwouldnotagreetothisvirtualsubordinationofthepartytothegovernmentandfeeling

frustratedbytherefusalofthegovernmenttoconsulthimonseveralimportantissuesresignedfromthe

partypresidentshipinNovember1947withoutcompletinghistwo-yearterm.ExplaininghisresignationtotheAICCdelegates,hesaid:‘HowistheCongresstogivetheGovernmentitsactiveandenlightenedcooperationunlessitshighestexecutiveoritspopularlychosenheadistakenintofullconfidenceon

importantmattersthataffectthenation.’1

KripalaniwassucceededinofficeforoneyearbyRajendraPrasadandsubsequentlyfortwoyearsbyB.PattabhiSitaramayya.Neitherofthetwoassertedtheprincipleoforganizationalsupremacyorevenequalityandconfinedthefunctionsofthepartypresidenttoorganizationalaffairs.Butbeforetheissuecouldbeclinched,theNehru-Tandontussleoverorganizationalcontrolintervenedonceagainandrakedupthisquestionamongothers.Acrisisinvolvingdifferencesoverpolicies,andpartyandgovernmentmanagementbrokeoutin1950

overthequestionofPurshottamdasTandon’spresidentshipoftheCongress.WiththeCommunistsleavingtheCongressin1945andfromtheendof1947adoptingatotallyhostileattitudetowardsNehruandthegovernment,andtheSocialistspartingwayswithCongressin1948,theradicalforcesinCongresswereweakened.Theconservativeforcesthendecidedtoassertthemselvesandtomakeabidforcontroloverthepartyandthepoliciesofthegovernment.Butbeforewetakeupthiscrisis,wemayverybrieflydealwiththetensionresultingfromtheNehru-Pateldifferences.

NehruandPatel

SardarPatelhasbeenmuchmisunderstoodandmisrepresented.SomehaveusedhimtoattacktheNehruvianvisionandpolicies;othershavemadehimouttobethearchetypalrightist.Bothhavebeenwrong.PatelwasundoubtedlythemainleaderoftheCongressrightwing.Buthisrightiststancehasoftenbeengrosslymisinterpreted.LikeNehru,hefullysharedthebasicvaluesofthenationalmovement:commitmenttodemocracyandcivilliberties,secularism,independenteconomicdevelopment,socialreformandapro-poororientation.Hestoodfortheabolitionoflandlordismbutthroughpaymentofcompensation.Astaunchopponentofcommunalismhewasfullycommittedtosecularism.In1946-47hetookruthlessactionagainsttherioters.In1950hedeclared:

OursisasecularState.WecannotfashionourpoliciesorshapeourconductinthewayPakistandoesit.Wemustseethatoursecularidealsareactuallyrealizedinpractice...HereeveryMuslimshouldfeelthatheisanIndiancitizenandhasequalrightsasanIndian

citizen.Ifwecannotmakehimfeellikethis,weshallnotbeworthyofourheritageandofourcountry.2

Hewasalsoutterlyintolerantofnepotismandcorruption.Patel’sconservatism,however,foundexpressionwithregardtothequestionsofclassandsocialism.Before1947,hehadopposedtheSocialistsandtheCommunists.After1947,hearguedsuccessfullybothforstimulustoprivateenterpriseandtheincorporationoftherightofpropertyasafundamentalrightintheConstitution.Thus,theright-wingstanceofPatelwasbasicallyamatterofsocialideology.Buthispositiveapproachtocapitalismandthecapitalistswascombinedwithtotalpersonalintegrityandanausterelifestyle.Hecollectedmoneyfromtherichforthenationalmovementbutnonedareofferhimapaisaforhisownorhisfamily’suse.Infact,therelationshipbetweenNehruandPatelwashighlycomplex.Historiansandpolitical

scientistshavegenerallytendedtoemphasizethedifferencesbetweenthetwoandoverlookedthecommonness.

Certainly,theirdifferencesanddisputeswerereal,asalsosignificant,buttheyhavebeenexaggeratedtotheextentoffalsifyinghistory.PatelandNehruhadtemperamentalaswellasideologicaldifferences.After1947,policydifferences

onseveralquestionscroppedupbetweenthem.Thetwodifferedontheroleandauthorityoftheprimeminister,themannerinwhichtheriotsof1947weretobehandledandtherelationswithPakistan.TheelectionofPurshottamdasTandonasCongresspresidentin1950createdawidebreachbetweenthem.Nehruopposed,thoughunsuccessfully,Patel’sviewthattherighttopropertyshouldbeincludedamongthefundamentalrightsoftheConstitution.Severaltimestheirdifferencesonquestionsofpolicyledtonearbreachesandoffersofresignationfromthegovernmentbyoneortheother.Acertaintensionwasalwayspresentbetweenthetwo.Yet,thetwocontinuedtostickandpulltogetherandtherewasnofinalpartingoftheways.Thiswas

becausewhatunitedthemwasmoresignificantandofabidingvaluethanwhatdividedthem.Alsotheycomplementedeachotherinmanyways:onewasagreatorganizerandableadministrator,theothercommandedimmensemasssupportandhadawidesocialanddevelopmentalperspective.Ifanything,PatelbuttressedNehru’sroleevenwhilechallengingitinsomerespects.Besides,therewasconsiderablemutualaffectionandrespectforeachotherandeachrecognizedtheindispensabilityoftheother.Gandhiji’sdeathalsomadeadifference;thetworealizedthatithadmadetheircooperationallthemorenecessary.Botharrivedatanagreementthroughtheprocessoffrankdiscussiononalmosteverymajorgovernmentpolicydecision.Patelwouldarguehiscase,sometimesstrongly,wouldwinitsometimes,butwhenhecouldnot,hewouldinvariablyyieldtoNehru.ThroughoutPatelremainedNehru’sloyalcolleague,assuringhimofcompletesupportforhispolicies.AfterGandhiji’sdeath,herepeatedlydescribedNehruashis‘leader’.On14November1948—Nehru’sbirthday—hewastosay:‘MahatmaGandhijinamedPanditNehruashisheirandsuccessor.SinceGandhiji’sdeathwehaverealizedthatourleader’sjudgementwascorrect.’3AndNehrureciprocated:‘TheSardarhasbeenatowerofstrength;butforhisaffectionandadviceIwouldnothavebeenabletoruntheState.’4

PurshottamdasTandonVersusNehru

ThestrugglebetweentherightwingofthepartyandNehrucametoaheadinAugust1950overthequestionoftheelectionofthepartypresidentandlastedforoveroneyear.Thestruggleinvolvedquestionsofpolicyandideology;butitwasalsoimportantbecausethenewoffice-bearerswouldplayadecisiveroleinthenominationofthepartycandidatesinthecominggeneralelections.ThethreecandidateswhocontestedtheelectionforthepartypresidentshipwerePurshottamdas

Tandon,supportedbyPatel,J.B.Kripalani,supportedbyNehru,andShankarraoDeo.NehruwasopposedtoTandonbecauseofhisoverallconservativesocial,economicandpoliticaloutlook.HemadeitclearthathewouldfinditdifficulttocontinueasamemberoftheCongressWorkingCommitteeorevenofthegovernmentifTandonwereelected.SupportersofTandon,ontheotherhand,hopedforhiselection‘tocurb’Nehru,tochangehisforeign,economicandsocialpolicies,especiallyhispoliciestowardsPakistanandtheHinduCodeBill.Inacloselyfoughtelectionon29August1950,Tandonwonwith1306votes,withKripalanigetting

1092andDeo202votes.Subsequently,TandonpackedtheWorkingCommitteeandtheCentralElection

Committeewithhismen.Afteragreatdealofinternaldebateandtussle,alargenumberofCongressmen,ledbyKripalani,resignedfromthepartyinJune1951andformedtheKisanMazdoorPrajaParty,eventhoughNehruandAzadadvisedagainstthestep.Nehrunowdecidedtogivebattle.RegardingtheCongressasindispensable(Patelhavingdiedon15

December1950),hedecidedtointervenedirectlyinpartyaffairs.Whilekeentopreservepartyunity,hewasnotwillingtolettherightwingdominatethepartyorthecomingelectionprocess.Withgreatskillanddeterminationandbringingintoplayhisconsiderablepoliticaltalents,hegottheAICCtopassresolutionsfullyendorsinghissocial,economicandforeignpolicies.Then,on6August1951,heresignedfromtheWorkingCommitteeandtheCentralElectionCommitteeaskingCongressmentochoose‘whichviewpointandoutlookaretoprevailintheCongress—Tandon’sormine’.5TherewasnodoubtastowhattheCongressmen’schoicewouldbe,especiallyinviewofthecomingelectionswhichcouldnotbewonwithoutNehru’sleadershipandcampaigning.InsteadofacceptingNehru’sresignation,Tandon,fullyrealizingthatNehru’spoliticalpositionwasstrongerthanhisownorhisfriends’,decidedtohimselfresign.TheAICCacceptedTandon’sresignationon8SeptemberandelectedNehrutotheCongresspresidency.NehruacceptedtheAICCdecision,eventhoughhewasinprincipleopposedtotheprimeministerbeingthepartypresident.Butthenhehadalreadysaidearlierthat‘necessitymightcompel’himtodoso‘inspecialcircumstances.6

TheentireepisodeledtolittlebitternessasTandonresigned‘withgraceandlittlerecrimination’andNehrugraciouslyaskedTandontojoinhisWorkingCommittee.TheofferwasimmediatelyacceptedbyTandon.Nehrualsoaskedthedissidentstorejointheparty,andseveralofthem,includingRafiAhmedKidwai,didso.Nehrunowemergedastheunchallengedleaderoftheparty—theleaderwhohadthefinalwordinthe

partyasalsothegovernmentandheenjoyedthispositiontillhisdeathin1964.ThoughhefailedtobringKripalaniandmanyotherrebelsbacktotheparty,hesucceededinmaintainingthepluralist,consensualasalsotheleft-of-the-centrecharacteroftheCongress.AnotheraspectoftheconflictbetweenNehruandTandonwasconnectedtotherelationshipbetween

thepartyorganizationandtheparliamentarypartyandthegovernment,whichhadcroppedupearlierduringKripalani’spresidency.AfterhiselectionasCongresspresident,TandonhadagainraisedtheissueofthepartycontroloverthegovernmentandheandhissupportershaddeclaredthattheprimeministerandhisCabinetmustcarryoutthemandategivenbythepartyandberesponsibletoitforthecarryingoutofpolicies.However,Tandon’sresignationandNehru’spresidencyconfirmedtheprominentroleoftheprimeministerandtheCabinetintheformulationandcarryingoutofthegovernmentpolicies;thepartypresidentandtheWorkingCommitteeweretoconcentrateontheorganizationalaspectsoftheparty.ThoughNehruneveragainbecamethepresidentofthepartyafter1953,therewasnoconflictbetweenthepartyandthegovernmentinhislifetime.AfterNehrutoo,ithasbeenwidelyacceptedthatinaparliamentarydemocracywheretheexecutiveisdirectlyorindirectlyelectedbythepeople,therecannotbetwocentresofpowerandtherealstatepowerhasinevitablytoresideintheparliamentarywing.ButthesituationinIndiainthisrespectisnotlikethatinBritainortheUS,wherethepartyleadership

playsasubsidiaryrole.InCongressthepartypresidentmattersmuchmore.Thepartyplaysanimportantroleinformulatingpoliciesandinselectingthecandidatesforthestateandparliamentaryelections.Also,inavastcountrylikeIndiawithalargelyilliteratepopulation,therulingpartyanditspoliticalworkers

areneededtoactaslinksbetweenthegovernmentandthepeople,toconveypopulargrievancestothegovernmentleadersandtoexplainthegovernmentpoliciestothepeople.Thepartyalonecanguaranteetheproperimplementationofgovernmentpoliciesandprovideacheckonthebureaucracy.Forexample,aproperimplementationoflandreformscouldhavebeenachievedthroughanactiveandaliveparty.Unfortunately,evenwhilerealizingtheimportanceoftheparty,Nehruandhiscolleaguesneglectedthe

organizationandfailedtoassignitscadrepropertasks,asalsotogivethemtheirduehonourandimportance.Instead,therewasacertaindevaluingandatrophyingofthepartyandpartywork.Everybodywhomatteredinthepartywantedtobeintheparliamentorstatelegislaturesandthenoccupyministerialchairs.Ministersandlegislatorstookuppartyworkonlywhenpushedoutfromministerialandlegislativepositions,andtheyoftendidthattoosothattheycouldmanoeuvrethemselvesbackintoparliamentarypositions.N.SanjivaReddy,wholeftthechiefministershipofAndhratobecomethepresidentoftheparty,wastopubliclyremarkthat‘ajuniorministershipinastategovernmentofferedgreatersatisfactionthanpresidencyoftheCongressparty.’7

Atthesametime,thatthepartystillmatteredisconfirmedbythefactthatalmosteveryprimeministerafterNehrueithertriedtohaveahenchmanorasycophantasthepartypresidentorherself/himselfassumedthepartypresidency.

Intra-CongressRivalry

EvenintheearlyyearsthereweresignsthatCongresswasgraduallybeginningtolosetouchwiththepeopleanditsstandardsbeginningtodecline.Acertaintendencytowardsdeteriorationisperhapsinevitableinarulingpartybutthedeteriorationanddeclineshouldremainwithinreasonablebounds.ThiswascertainlythecasewiththeCongressintheearlyyearsafterindependence;buttheerosionofthepartyvaluesandstandardswasstillworrisome.Therewerecertaintendenciesinthepartywhichwerefraughtwithdanger.Therewas,asapoliticalscientistsaid,‘increasingcorruption,disillusionment,andlossofelaninthe

CongressParty,’8or,asNehrubemoanedasearlyas1948,‘theprogressivecollapseofthemoraleandidealisticstructurethatwehadbuiltup.’9Apatronagesystemwasinitiatedespeciallyintheruralareasleadingtotheemergenceofpoliticalbrokersandmiddlemenandvote-banks.Factions,factionalismandfactionalintriguesariddisputes,oftenbasedonpersonalandgroupinterests,thoughsometimesinvolvingideologicalandpolicydifferences,emerged,leadingeventonon-democraticfunctioningatthelowerlevelsoftheorganizationandtarnishingtheimageoftheparty.Intenserivalryandconflictbetweentheorganizationmenandministerialistsinthestatesledtointra-partyconflicts,withtheformeroftenbehavingasanoppositionparty,theirmajorpoliticalobjectivebeingtodethronetheministerialistsandtooccupytheirseats.ThistendedtocreateamongthepeopletheimageoftheCongressasapartyofoffice-seekers.Aboveall,therewastheincreasinglossofidealismandneglectofideology,especiallyasconcerns

socialwelfareandsocialtransformation.ThenetresultwasthattheCongressincreasinglylosttouchwiththepeopleanditnolongerappealedtotheintelligentsiaandtheyoungerpeopleandwasthereforeunabletorecruitthebestofthemintotheparty.Mostoftheidealistyouthpreferredtojointheoppositionparties.TheCongresswastherebyfailingtotrainanewgenerationofleaderstoreplacethosethrownupbythe

nationalmovement.ThedeteriorationwasbeginningtoaffectallpoliticalpartiesbutitaffectedtheCongresstoamuchgreaterextent,itbeingtherulingparty.Nehruwas,ofcourse,awareofthisstateofaffairsinthecountryandintheCongress.Inamoodof

disillusionment,despairanddespondency,hewrotein1948:‘Itisterribletothinkthatwemaybelosingallourvaluesandsinkingintothesordidnessofopportunistpolitics.’In1949:‘Ourstandardshavefallengreatly.Indeed,wehavehardlyanystandardsleftexceptnotbebefoundout.’Andthen,againin1950:‘Wehavelostsomething,thespiritthatmovesandunlesswerecapturethatspirit,allourlabourwillyieldlittleprofit.’10In1957hetoldtheCongressMPs:‘TheCongressPartyisweakandgettingweaker...Ourstrongpointisthepast.Unlesswegetoutofourpresentrut,theCongressPartyisdoomed.’11

Unfortunately,Nehruwasnopartyorganizerorreformernordidheandothertallleadersworkinginthegovernmenthavetimetodevotetopartyorganization.TheimportantworkofbuildingthepartyandtoningitupwereneglectedduringtheyearsofNehru’stotaldominanceofthepartyandthegovernment.Infact,Nehruwascompelledtorelyonthestateparty‘bosses’forrunningthepartymachine.Nevertheless,beingverymuchanideologue,hemadeseveralmajorattemptstokeepthepartyanchoredideologicallyandpoliticallytoitssocialistandidealistmoorings.

TheSocialistsandtheCongress

ThedepartureoftheSocialistshadweakenedtheradicalforcesinCongressandthespacevacatedbythemwasbeingincreasinglyfilledbyvestedinterests—landlords,richpeasants,andevenprinces.NehrurealizedthatCongresshadbeenweakenedideologicallybytheabsenceoftheSocialistsandthathewasbeinggraduallygettinghemmedinbyconservativemodesofthinking.AtthesametimehealsofeltthattheCongresswasindispensableandthatitwouldbewrongandcounter-productivetoeitherdivideorleaveit.Theanswer,therefore,wastoreformandimproveaunitedCongressdespiteitsmanyweaknesses.Nehru,therefore,triedseveraltimestobringtheSocialistsbackintotheCongressortoatleastget

theirco-opertationintheimplementationofadevelopmentalandegalitarianagenda.HedidnotsimultaneouslywootheCommunistsfor,asweshallseeinthenextchapter,theywereorganizationally,politicallyandideologicallyonacompletelydifferenttrackfromthatoftheCongress.Buthedidtry,withsomesuccess,tobringtheCommunistsintothemainstreamofparliamentarypolitics.TheSocialistsontheotherhand,Nehrufelt,hadthesameprinciplesandobjectivesashehad.Moreover,hehadagreatpersonalregardandaffectionforseveralSocialistleaders,especiallyJayaprakashNarayan,whoforyearswascloseenoughtohimforyearstoaddresshimas‘Bhai’(brother).HisfirstattempttobringtheSocialistsbackintotheCongresswasin1948itselfwhenheexpressedhis

distressatthegrowingdistancefromthem,which,hesaid,was‘notgoodeitherforus(theCongress)ortheSocialistParty,andcertainlynotgoodeitherforthecountry.’12ButtheSocialistswerestillquiteangrywithandcriticalofNehru.Jayaprakash,forexample,wrotetoNehruinDecember1948:‘Youwanttogotowardssocialism,butyouwantthecapitaliststohelpinthat.’13HealsotoldNehruinMarch1949thattheproposedlegislationoutlawingstrikesintheessentialserviceswas‘an

uglyexampleofgrowingIndianfascism.’14

NehruinturnfeltthattheSocialists‘continuetoshowanamazinglackofresponsibilityandconstructivebentofmind.Theyseemtobeallfrustratedandgoingmentallytopieces.’15

AnothereffortbyNehruin1951toimproverelationswiththeSocialistsonceagainmetwitharebuff.BelievingthatNehruwasshieldingandsupportingreactionaryforces,JayaprakashNarayanonceagainpubliclydenounced‘Nehru’snaked,openfascism’anddeclaredthathisgovernmentwas‘followingfaithfullyinthefootstepsofHitlerintheirdealingswithlabour.’16

Afterwinningthegeneralelectionsin1952NehrumadehismostseriousefforttoworktogetherwiththeSocialists,hopingtobuildabroadpoliticalfronttopromoteeconomicdevelopmentandstrengthenthelefttrendwithintheCongress.In1957,heaskedtheSocialiststocooperatewiththeCongress;healsohopedtobringJayaprakashintotheCabinet.Inresponse,JayaprakashwantedtheCongresstoadoptaradicalprogrammeframedbyhimbeforeheandtheSocialistsjoinedit.His14-pointprogrammeincludedspecificconstitutionalamendments,administrativeandlandreformsandnationalizationofbanks,insuranceandmines.NehruwasinagreementwithmanyofJayaprakash’sfourteenpoints,butherefusedtoenterintoaprior

commitment.Ifhecouldhaveformulatedandpersuadedhispartytoacceptandimplementsuchafull-scaleradicalprogrammehewouldnothaveneededSocialistco-operation.ThissupportwasneededpreciselysothathecoulddosoafterstrengtheningthelefttrendintheCongress.ImplementationofaradicalprogrammewouldbetheresultoftheSocialistsrejoiningtheCongressbutnotaconditiontobemetpriortotheirrejoining.NehruwaspreparedtostrengthentheradicalforcesinsidetheCongressandnotsplitthepartyinordertoaccommodatetheSocialists.HewasconvincedthattheCongressandthegovernmenthadtogostepbysteptowardsradicaltransformation,thathehadtobuildalargersocietalconsensusfortakingstepstowardssocialism,thatspecificstepsandtheirtimingweretobedeterminedpragmatically,andthatheneededSocialistsupportpreciselytoachieveallthis.ButJayaprakashcouldalsonotresilefromhispositionforhewasafraidthatthatwouldleadtoasplitinhisownparty.Fromnowon,whilethedominantsectionoftheSocialistscontinuedtobeconvincedthatNehruandthe

Congresswerecommittedtoconservativepolicies,NehrubecameincreasinglycontemptuousoftheSocialistsandfeltthathewouldhavetoimplementhissocialistagendaalone,withthehelpoftheleftwingoftheCongressandwithouttheaidoftheSocialists.HispersonalrelationswithJayaprakashalsodeterioratedashefeltthatthelatter‘hatestheCongresssomuchastopreferthedeviltoit’.17WitheverypassingyeartherelationsbetweentheCongressandNehruandtheSocialistswentonbecomingmoreacrimonious.InOctober1956,NehruwroteinapersonalletterthatJayaprakashwassayingandwriting‘thingswhichhavelittletodowithsocialismandwhichhavemuchtodowithnonsense.’18HealsofeltthatJayaprakashwas,inthewordsofS.Gopal,‘willingtojoinforceswithanygroupinordertodefeattheCongress.’MorespecificallyheaccusedJayaprakashofsupportingtheSwatantrapartyandencouragingtheHinducommunalists.JayaprakashinturnaccusedNehruof‘havingdeterioratedfromanationalleadertoapartisanoftheCongress.’19

Clearly,thiswasalsothebeginningoftheSocialistpolicyofanti-CongressimwhichwentfarbeyondoppositiontotheCongressonthebasisofaleftorsocialistcritique.TheothersideofthemedalwasthatthispolicytendedtoweakentheSocialiststhemselvesandleadtosplitsintheirrankandwitheverysplitsomeSocialistsjoinedtheCongress.

SocialismintheCongress

WithhisfailureinseekingthehelpoftheSocialiststorenovatetheCongressandshakeitoutofitsstaleness,Nehrudecidedtoactonhisown,byradicalizingpartypolicies,especiallywithregardtothelimitedstepstakensofarforsocialequalityandequityasalsoeconomicdevelopment.In1953itselfhehadadoptedthepolicyofextendinglandreformsfromtheabolitionoflandlordismtothefixationofceilingsonlandholdings.ThencametheadoptionofthesocialistpatternofsocietyastheobjectiveoftheCongressatitsAvadiSessioninJanuary1955.TheAvadiResolutiondeclared:

Planningshouldtakeplacewithaviewtotheestablishmentofasocialisticpatternofsociety,wheretheprinciplemeansofproduction

areundersocialownarshiporcontrol,productionisprogressivelyspeededupandthereisequitabledistributionofthenationalwealth.20

TheSecondandThirdFiveYearPlansprovidedfurthercommitmenttothesocialisticpatternofsociety.ButNehrudefinedthisinquiteaflexiblemanner,allthewhileputtingstrongemphasisonmodernizationoftheeconomyandincreasedproduction.WhileplacingtheSecondFiveYearPlanbeforeparliament,hestated:‘Idonotproposetodefinepreciselywhatsocialismmeans...becausewewishtoavoidrigidordoctrinairethinking’.Andthenadded:‘Butbroadlyspeaking...wemeanasocietyinwhichthereisequalityofopportunityandthepossibilityforeveryonetoliveagoodlife...Wehavetherefore,tolaygreatstressonequality,ontheremovalofdisparities,andithastoberememberedalwaysthatsocialismisnotthespreadingoutofpoverty.Theessentialthingisthattheremustbewealthandproduction.’21Inthechapteronthe‘ObjectivesofPlannedDevelopment’whichhewrotefortheThirdFiveYearPlandocument,afterreiteratingtheobjectiveofplanninginthesametermsastheAvadiResolution,hequotedfromtheSecondPlan:‘Thesocialistpatternofsocietyisnottoberegardedassomefixedorrigidpattern.Itisnotrootedinanydoctrineordogma.Eachcountryhastodevelopaccordingtoitsowngeniusandtraditions.Economicandsocialpolicyhastobeshapedfromtimetotimeinthelightofhistoricalcircumstances.’22

AnindirectresultoftheleftturntakenbytheCongresswastheadverseimpactonthepoliticalfortunesofthepartiesoftheleftandtherightwhichtendedtogetmarginalized.Inparticular,bystealingthethunderoftheSocialistsandtheCommunists,italsotendedtopromotedissensionsanddivisionamongthem.TheCongressmovedfurthertotheleft,programmatically,when,atitsNagpursessioninJanuary1959,

itpassedaresolutiondeclaringthat‘thefutureagrarianpatternshouldbethatofcooperativejointfarming.’Initially,servicecooperativesweretobeestablishedwhichwouldultimatelybetransformedintofarmingcooperativesonapurelyvoluntarybasis.Inadditiontherewastobeaceilingonland-holdingsandstatetradinginfoodgrains.TheNagpurdecisionsfacedoppositionbothwithinandoutsidethepartyandwerequietlyjettisoned.Landceilingswerecircumventedbythestategovernmentsunderthepressureofcapitalistfarmersandrichpeasantssupportedbythemiddlepeasants.Thesmallexperimentsincooperativefarmingwereafailure,andstatetradinginfoodgrainswassoonfoundtobeunworkable.Nehruwasquitewillingtolearnanddiscardunworkablepolicies,andexceptforthelandceilings,otheraspectsoftheNagpurResolutionweresoonabandoned.However,thecommitmenttosocialismwasonceagainvigorouslyassertedattheBhubaneshwarsessionoftheCongressinJanuary1964.WhilerefusingtolettheCongressbedividedsharplyonaleft-rightbasis,NehrukepttheCongresson

aleft-of-the-centrecourse.Heconsistentlyattackedtheright-wingpartiesandindividualsandtreatedthe

leftpartieswithrespectevenwhilecriticizingthemandmakingclearhisdifferenceswiththem.

DeclineofCongress

ThestrongerassertionofitscommitmenttosocialismdidnotstoptherotintheCongressparty.Therewasgrowingcriticismofthepartyinthecountryasalsodisillusionmentwithit.Alsointernaldivisionsinthepartyweregrowingmoreserious.Theoldleadershadgrownjadedwhilenewsuitableleaderswerenotcomingforth.Thepartyorganizationcontinuedtoweaken;thepartyhadbeeninpowertoolong.AlargenumberofCongressmenwerenolongersatisfiedwithpartywork—theyhungeredforofficialpositions,influenceandpatronage.Administrativecorruptionwasbeginningtogobeyondtolerablelimits.TheCongresswasdriftingawayfromthepeopleandlosinggroundtotheoppositioninthestates.Thegrowingweaknessofthepartywasrevealedbythelossin1963ofthreeprestigiousLokSabhaby-electionsinthepartystrongholds.Peoplehadbeguntoaskthequestions:AfterNehru,who?AndafterNehru,what?Nehru,aidedbytheMadraschiefminister,K.Kamaraj,nowmadealastefforttoinfusenewlifeinto

thepartyandrestorethebalancebetweenthepartyandthegovernment.ThiswassoughttobeachievedthroughwhatcametobeknownastheKamarajPlan,producedinAugust1963atameetingoftheCongressWorkingCommittee.TheessenceofthePlanwasthatanumberofleadingCongressmenwhowereinthegovernmentasUnioncabinetministersoraschiefministersinthestatesshouldvoluntarilyresignfromtheirpostsandtakeuppartyorganizationalworkinordertorevitalizetheparty.Nehruwastodecidewhoseresignationsweretobefinallyaccepted.ThiswouldalsoenableNehrutocleansethepartyatthetop.TheKamarajPlanreceivedenthusiasticresponsefromthepartyrankandfile.Immediatelynearly300

resignationsfromministerialposts,includingthoseofallmembersoftheUnioncabinetandallchiefministers,followed.On24August,Nehruannouncedtheacceptanceoftheresignationsofsixseniorcabinetministers—MorarjiDesai,LalBahadurShastri,S.K.Patil,JagjivanRam,B.GopalaReddyandK.L.Shrimali—andsixchiefministers.TheKamarajPlanhad,however,cometoolate.Nehruwasalreadyasickpersonandsufferedastroke

atBhubaneshwarinJanuary1964anddidnothavetheenergytotakethenecessaryfollow-throughaction.TheleadersrelievedfromgovernmentofficewerenotassignedanypartydutiesexceptforKamarajwhobecamethepartypresidentinJanuary1964;theysulkedorintriguedagainstpoliticalrivalsinthestates.ThePlanalsofailedasameansofcleansingthepartyofthedross.Themoraleofthepartycontinuedtosink,andCongressmenwereasobsessedwithadministrativepowerandpatronageasbefore.AnindirecteffectofthePlanwastoweakenMorarjiDesai’spositionintheparty.Anotheroutcomeofitwasthat,whilefailingtorestoretheprestigeandimportanceofpartyorganizationalwork,itincreasedthepowerofthestatepartybossesincentralpoliticstillIndiraGandhicutthemdowntosizein1969.WhenNehrudiedinJune1964,theCongresswascontinuingtogodownhill.

15PoliticalParties,1947-65:TheOpposition

TheSocialistParty

OfallthepoliticalpartiesthatemergedimmediatelyafterindependencetheSocialistPartyheldthegreatestpromise.InJayaprakashNarayanithadaleadernextonlytoJawaharlalNehruinmasspopularity.Ithadalsoseveralotherbrilliantleaders,forexampleAcharyaNarendraDev,AchyutPatwardhan,AsokaMehta,DrRammanoharLohiaandS.M.Joshi.However,thefirstproblemtheSocialistsfaced—andthiswasaproblemtheycontinuedtofacetotheend—wasthatoftheirrelationshipwithCongress.TheSocialistPartyhadbeenbornin1934andhadremainedsincethenapartofCongress,thoughithaditsownseparateconstitution,membership,disciplineandideology.Believingthatindependencecouldnotbeachievedthroughnegotiations,theSocialistPartyhad

boycottedthenegotiationswiththeCabinetMissionandrefusedtoparticipateintheConstituentAssemblyortheinterimgovernmentortoacceptmembershipoftheCongressWorkingCommittee.IthadstoutlyrejectedtheMountbattenPlanfortheindependenceandPartitionofthecountry.ImmediatelyafterindependenceithadgiventhesloganofIndia’sdevelopmentintoasocialiststateandsociety.MostSocialistswantedCongresstomakeadefiniteprogrammaticandideologicalcommitmenttosocialism.Theybelievedthatbyrefusingtodoso,ithadbecomearight-wingbourgeoisparty.Inearly1948Congressframedarulethatitsmemberscouldnotbelongtoanotherpartywhichhaditsownconstitutionanddiscipline.SincetheSocialistswerenotwillingtodissolvetheirownparty,theydecidedinMarch1948toleaveCongressandalsodeclaredthattheirobjectivewastoestablishademocraticsocialistsociety.LeavingCongressprovedtobeahistoricmistakeonthepartoftheSocialists.Congressstillretained

itsall-embracingcharacterand,therefore,tolerancefordiverseviews;itwasimposingonlyorganizationaluniformityandnotanideologicalone.Hence,therewasnoquestionoftheSocialistsbeingaskedtogiveuptheirideologyorpolicies.ThepositionwassimilartothatprevailingintheEuropeanlabourparties.SincetherewasnobarrierinCongresstoinformalorganizationofdifferenttrends,theSocialistscouldhavecontinuedtofunctioninCongressasaloosegroupastheconservativesweredoing,withoutformingaseparateorganizationandbreakingdiscipline.TheSocialistshadassumedthatwiththeachievementofindependence,therenolongerexistedany

commontasktounitethemwiththenon-SocialistsinCongress.But,infact,thiswasnotso,asthematerial,socialandpoliticalfoundationsofasocialistIndiastillneededtobelaidthrougheconomicdevelopmentwithequity,seculardemocracyandconsolidationofnationalunity.AndCongresswasstillthemainorganizationthatcouldfulfilthistask.AsHariharnathShastri,amemberoftheNationalExecutiveoftheSocialistPartyandaformerpresidentoftheAllIndiaTradeUnionCongress,putitwhenresigningfromthepartyforitsrefusaltojointheCongress-sponsoredIndianNationalTradeUnion

Congress:‘Theunfinishedtaskofnationalrevolutiondemandsthefull-fledgedallegianceofallsectionsofthepeopleandeveryprogressivegroupinthecountry,includingtheSocialistsandtheCongress.’1

Politicalskillandleadershiptofunctioninapartythatwaspracticallyafrontlaypreciselyincompetingwithothertrendsinitwithoutbreakingpartydiscipline,soastobuildabroadcoalitionfornationbuildingandsocialchangeand,ultimately,socialism.True,theSocialistswereaminorityinCongressandwerefacingresistanceandorganizationaldiscriminationattheparty’slocallevel.Politicalwisdom,asalsotheartofpoliticslayinacceptingthissituationandthenstrugglingtograduallychangethebalanceofpowerbetweentherightandtheleftwithintheCongressbypulling,inchbyinch,theCentretowardstheleft.ThisispreciselywhattherightdidthroughouttheperiodofGandhiji’sandNehru’sdominationoftheCongress.InsteadofbreakingawaywhenNehrucommittedCongresstoasocialisticpatternofsociety,itcontinuedinsideCongress,representinganideologicalandpolicytrend,thoughconstantlyfeelingthepressureoflosingouttotheleft.NeithertheSocialistsnortheCommunistsorthetwotogether—animpossibilityatthetime—werecapableofreplacingCongressorbringingaboutsocialismandsocialchangeontheirowninoppositiontoCongress.Nehru’spoliticalacumenandhistoricalinsightlaypreciselyinrecognizingthis.AtthetimeoftheSocialistsplitfromCongress,alargenumberofSocialistsstayedintheparentorganizationperceivingitselfandJawaharlalNehruasthemoreeffectiveinstrumentsofsocialchange.AcharyaNarendraDev,themosterudite,matureandlevelheadedoftheSocialistleaders,wasalsoopposedtothedecisionofleavingCongressbuthedecidedtoabidebyit.TheSocialists’departurefromCongressseriouslyweakenedtheleftinsideCongressandledtoNehru

beinghemmedinbyconservativeforcesin,hisparty.It,thus,didincalculableharmtothelefttrendinIndianpolitics.Ontheotherhand,itinitiatedtheprocessoftheself-destructionoftheSocialistParty,leadingtorepeatedsplitswithinit.TheSocialists’optimismregardingthepopularityoftheirpartywastobesoonbelied.Thegeneral

electionsof1951-52provedtobeaneardisasterfortheparty.Allitsnationalleadersweredefeatedanditwononly12seatsintheLokSabha,thoughreceiving10.6percentofthepopularvote.Inthestates,itwon124ofthe2,248seatswithnearly58percentofitscandidateslosingtheirdeposits;anditswinningtallyinitsstrongholdsofU.P.,BiharandBombaywas18outof390,23outof240and9outof269seatsrespectively.InthemeanwhileCongressdissidentsledbyJ.B.KripalanihadformedinJune1951theKisan

MazdoorPrajaParty(KMPP).ClaimingtobeGandhian,andbeinginbasicagreementwithCongressprogrammeandpolicies,thenewpartypromisedtoimplementthatprogramme.Twoofitsleaders,P.C.Ghosh,andT.Prakasam,hadbeenCongresschiefministersintheirrespectivestates,i.e.,WestBengalandMadras,whileKripalaniwastheCongresspresidenttill1950andhadjustlosthisbidtobere-elected.ThereasonsfortheirleavingCongresswerepersonalratherthanideological.TheKMPPtooenteredthegeneralelectionswithhighhopesandwasevenmoredisappointedwiththe

resultsthantheSocialistParty.Itwon9seatsintheLokSabhaandpolled5.8percentofthevotes;butwononly77seatsinthestatelegislativeassemblies.Subsequently,boththeSocialistPartyandKMPP,havinggrosslymiscalculatedtheirelectoralstrength

andbeingafraidofmarginalizationbyCongressandtheCommunists,decidedtomergeandthusconsolidatetheoppositionforces.Theleadersofthetwopartiesfeltthattherewerenoideologicalor

programmaticdifferencesbetweenthem.AsKripalanisaid:‘Webothwantaclasslessandcastelesssocietyfreefromsocial,politicalandeconomicexploitation.TheSocialistscallittheSocialistsociety.WecallittheSarvodayasociety.’2

ThetwopartiesmergedinSeptember1952toformPrajaSocialistParty,withKripalaniasthechairmanandAsokaMehtaasthegeneralsecretary,ItbecamethelargestamongtheoppositionpartiesandheldthepromiseofbeinganalternativetoCongress.Itstwoconstituentshadreceived17.4percentofthepopularvoteinthe1952elections.Itspartyorganizationcoveredtheentirecountryandithadalargenumberofwell-knownandpopularleadersatboththenationalandstatelevels.Butthepartycouldnotmaintainitscohesionforlong.Fromthebeginningitwasrackedbyideologicalandfactionalquarrels;anditregularlyunderwent

splits.Italsosufferedfromwidespreadindisciplineamongitsleadersandcadres.Fromtheoutset,itwastroubledbymajordifferencesoveritsdistinctroleinIndianpoliticsasanoppositionparty.Theissuesthattorethepartyapartfrom1953to1964concernedtheattitudethatitshouldadopttowardsCongressasalsothemilitantandextra-constitutionalagitations,andtheroleitshouldplayinnation-buildingactivities.InJune1953,attheparty’sBetalConference,AsokaMehtaofferedhisthesisthatinabackwardcountrytheimportanttaskwasthatofeconomicdevelopmentandthat,therefore,inaconstructivespirit,theOppositionshouldcooperatewiththerulingpartyinthattask,thoughnotuncritically.AstheCongressandPSPsharedacommonbeliefinnationalism,socialismanddemocracy,hesaid,PSPshouldlookforareasofagreementwithCongressandopposeitonlywhenmattersofprinciplewereinvolved.Mehtawarnedthatnon-cooperationwithCongressandall-outoppositiontoitwouldmakePSPpoliticallyineffectiveforalongtimetocome.Thepartyconference,however,rejectedMehta’sthesisinfavourofDrRammanoharLohia’sapproach.

LohiastoodfordeterminedoppositiontoCongressandapositionofequidistancefrombothCongressandtheCommunists.Healsoadvocatedtheorganizationofmilitantmassoppositionmovementseveniftheywerenotwithinthelegal,legislativeandconstitutionalframework.Lohiaandhisfollowerswerealsonoteasilyamenabletopartydiscipline.Fromthebeginning,PSPsufferedfromineffectiveandunstableleadership.Overaperiodoftime,most

ofitsleadershad‘renounced,defected,orbeenexpelledfromtheParty,eachtimeleavingitalittleweakerbytakingwiththemtheirloyalsupporters.’3LohiaandhisgroupleftPSPattheendof1955.AcharyaNarendraDevdiedin1956.JayaprakashNarayanwithdrewfromactivepoliticsin1954andannouncedthathewoulddedicatehislifetoBhoodanandotherconstructiveactivities.Afterthegeneralelectionsof1957,heretiredfrompolitics,declaredthatpartypoliticswasnotsuitabletoIndiaandadvocated,instead,‘partylessdemocracy.’In1960,Kripalanileftthepartytoplayanindependentroleinpolitics.In1963,AsokaMehtaagreedtobecomethedeputychairmanofthePlanningCommissionand,whenexpelledfromtheparty,joinedCongressinthesummerof1964,takingnearlyone-thirdofPSPcadreswithhim.ManystatelevelleadersalsoregularlydefectedtoCongress—amongthemwereT.PrakasaminAndhra,PattomThanuPillaiinKerala,P.C.GhoshinBengal,MahamayaPrasadSinhainBiharandTrilokiSinghinU.P.Finally,in1971,morethanhalfofthepartycadresjoinedCongress.AllthiswasreflectedinthesteadydeclineofPSPinthegeneralelections.Thepartywon19seatsin

theLokSabhawith10.4percentofthetotalvotesin1957;12seatswith6.8percentvotesin1962;and13seatswith3.1percentofthevotesin1967.Thevirtualdemiseofthepartycamein1971whenitwon

only2seatswith1percentshareofthevotes.TheremnantsofthepartyjoinedtheSocialistPartytoformtheSamyuktaSocialistParty.AreasonforthefailureoftheSocialistswastheirinabilitytodistinguishthemselvesfromCongress,

especiallyaftertheAvadiResolutioncommittingitselftoasocialisticpatternofsociety.Infact,theycouldhaveplayedameaningfulroleonlyasapartofCongress,withwhichtheysharedacommitmenttonationalism,secularism,apolitybasedonparliamentarydemocracyandcivilliberties,andsocialchange.OutsideCongresstheywereboundtobemarginalizedandsplinteredbyabiggerpartywithabetterandmoreinfluentialleaderinNehru,havingthesameparadigmandthereforemoreorlessthesameappeal.AfterleavingPSP,DrLohiaformedtheSocialistPartyattheendof1955.Thehallmarkofthenew

partywaspoliticalmilitancy.Itwasunremittinglyinvolvedinagitations,civildisobediencemovements,walk-outsfromthestatelegislaturesanddisruptionsoftheirproceedings.Thepartyanditsmainleader,Lohia,wereanti-NehruintheextremeandalsototallyopposedtoCongress.Thetwoissuesthattheyemphasizedwerefirstly,theimmediateabolitionofEnglishanditsreplacementbyHindiasthesolelinklanguageandsecondly,reservationofover60percentofjobsforthebackwardcastes,theScheduledCastes,theScheduledTribesandwomen.TheyaccusedtheNehrugovernmentofbeingdominatedbyandservingthecauseoftheuppercastes.Inmanyways,theyweretheinitiatorsofthecasteistpoliticsoftheninetiesinsofarastheystartedmakingappealstocasteasthebasicfeatureoftheparty’sideology.Lohia,himselfabrilliantintellectual,alsoencouragedacertainanti-intellectualismamonghisfollowers.Later,in1967,LohiaandhisfollowerswerealsotoseekcooperationwiththeSwatantrapartyandJanSangh,ontheonehand,andtheCommunists,ontheother,inordertodefeatCongress.Theyclearlyarticulatedandinitiatedthepoliticsofanti-Congressism.TheSocialistpartywasalsonotfreefromdissidence,defectionsandsplits,especiallyafterthedeathofDrLohiain1967.ItmergedwithPSPin1964tobreakfreein1965andthentomergewithitagainin1971.Butbythenittoohadbeenreducedtoarump.TheLohiaSocialistswon8seatsintheLokSabhain1957,6in1962,23in1967and3in1971whenitpolledonly2.4percentoftotalvotes.

TheCommunistParty

CommunistPartyofIndia(CPI)wasapartofCongresssince1936but,unwillingtoaccepttheCongressdiscipline,itleftthepartyin1945.From1942to1945ithadaremarkablegrowth,eventhoughitgotisolatedfromthemainstreamofthenationalmovementandconsequentlysufferedintermsofitshegemonicinfluenceoverthepeople.In1947,CPIstartedoutwithcertainadvantages;ithadseveralableleadersandthousandsofdevoted,disciplinedandhardworkingcadreswhowereactiveamongthepeasants,workers,studentsandtheintelligentsia.But,asinthecaseoftheSocialistParty,CPIwasplaguedbyintensefactionalisminthepost-1947yearsandwasengulfedbyinternalcriseseveryfewyearstillitformallysplitin1964.FactionsinCPIwereformed,however,largelyaroundpoliticalandideologicaldifferences.Putsimply,CPIcouldnotagreeuponastandonthequestionwhichP.C.Joshi,theparty’sgeneralsecretaryfrom1935to1948,raisedasearlyas1950:‘WhatisthepoliticalsituationinIndia?’CPIhadgonethroughagreatdealofinnerturmoilanddivisionduring1947.Initially,itrecognizedthat

IndiahadbecomefreeandadvisedallprogressiveforcestorallyroundNehruagainstthereactionary

communalandpro-imperialistforces.Later,underSovietguidance,itdeclaredinDecember1947thatIndia’sindependencewasfake(yehazadijhootihai),15Augustwasadayofnationalbetrayal,Congresshadgoneovertoimperialismandfeudalism,Nehruhadbecomeastoogeofimperialism,thegovernmentwasrulinginafascistmanner,andtheConstitutionthatwasbeingframedwasacharterofslavery.TheCommunistshad,therefore,totakeuptheanti-imperialistandanti-feudaltasks,fightforfreedomanddemocracyandinitiateanarmedstruggle.AtitsSecondCongressheldinCalcuttainFebruary1948,thepartychoseB.T.Ranadiveinplaceof

P.C.Joshiasitsgeneralsecretary.ItdeclaredthatthemassesweredisillusionedwithCongressbecauseofthedeterioratingeconomicsituationandthebetrayaloftheanti-imperialistcauseandwerereadytorevolt.Theparty,therefore,gaveacallforanimmediatearmeduprising.CPIorganizedseveraladventuristactions,twoprovingtobeparticularlydisastrous.ItdecidedtocontinuethearmedpeasantstruggleinTelengana,whichhadbeengoingonagainsttheNizamofHyderabadsince1946,buttodirectitnowagainsttheIndiangovernment.TheresultWasthedeathofthousandsofheroicpartyandpeasantactivistsintheunequalandunpopularfightagainsttheIndianarmy.Thesecondmajordisastrousstepwastodeclareanationalrailwaystrikeon9March1949inthehopethatitwouldleadtoanall-Indiageneralstrikeculminatinginageneral,country-wideuprising.Thestrikewas,however,acompleteflop.Thepartyalsoindulgedinseveralterroristacts.Asaconsequence,theCPIwasbannedinseveralstates.ItgraduallygotisolatedfromIndianopinionandwasorganizationallydecimatedthroughexpulsionsandresignations,itsmembershipdecliningfromnearly90,000toabout18,000in1951.Neartheendof1951,whenAjoyGhoshbecamethegeneralsecretaryoftheparty,anewprogramme

andanewtacticallinewereacceptedunderthedirectguidanceofStalin,leadingtothetemporaryunificationoftheparty.ButthisstilldidnotrepresentanewunderstandingoftheIndiansocialandpoliticalreality.Indiawasstillseenasessentiallyacolony,thetransferofpowerin1947as‘betrayal’,theIndiangovernmentassubservienttoimperialismandasrepresentinglandlords,princesandthereactionarybigbourgeoisiecollaboratingwithBritishimperialism,andtheIndianpoliticalsystemasbasicallyundemocraticandauthoritarianwiththegovernmenthavingestablishedapolicestate.ThepoliticaltaskwasstillseentobetheeventualoverthrowoftheIndianstatethrougharmedstruggle.ThenewelementinCPI’spolicywasthattheoverthrowofthestatewastobepartofthefutureagendabecausethepeoplewerenotyetreadyforthetask;theystillsufferedfrom‘illusions’aboutCongressandNehru.Immediately,thepartywas,therefore,toturnawayfromrevolution-making,towithdrawthearmedstruggleinTelengana,andtoparticipateintheapproachinggeneralelections.ThepartywashelpedinmakingthechangebythefactthatNehruwasbynowinfullcommandofthegovernment.HeacceptedtheCommunistscredentialsandclearedthewayforCPIbylegalizingthepartyalloverthecountry.CPIparticipatedenthusiasticallyinthefirstgeneralelections.Itconcentrateditseffortsinonlythose

areaswhereithadrecognizablestrength,thatis,inwhatweretobecomeAndhraandKerala.Alongwithitsfrontorganization,thePeople’sDemocraticFrontinHyderabad,itcontestedonly61seatsfortheLokSabhaandwon23with4.6percentshareofthevotesandemergedasthelargestoppositionparty,doingbetterthanexpectedbyanyone.Itwastodoevenbetterin1957whenitwon27seatsand8.92percentofthevotes.ItwonamajorityinKeralaandformedthefirstdemocratically-electedConununistgovernmentanywhereintheworld.Italsowonrepresentationinalmosteverystatelegislature.In1962,itwon29seatsintheLokSabhaand9.94percentofthevotes.Bythistimeithademergedasastrongpolitical

forceinKerala,WestBengalandAndhraandamongtheworkingclassandtheintelligentsiaalloverthecountry.The1952electionspromisedthatthepartywouldintimebeconsideredasthepoliticalalternativeto

Congress.Thepromisedidshinebrightforafewyears,asithaddonefortheSocialistsintheearlyfifties,butitremainedessentiallyunfulfilled.Thetrucewithinthepartyprovedtobequitetemporary.Almostimmediatelyaftertheelectionsdifferencesinthepartysurfacedagain.Despitearrivingatanagreedprogrammein1951,thepartywasnotabletomaintainaconsensusonsuchmajorissuesasthenatureoftheIndianstate,theroleofdifferentsocialclassesandstrata,especiallytheIndianbourgeoisie,thenatureoftheclassalliancewhichwouldmaketheIndianrevolution,theverynatureandmeaningofrevolutioninIndia,asalsothedeterminationoftheprincipalenemyagainstwhomtherevolutionwouldbedirected,theattitudetobeadoptedtowardstheCongress,thegoveriunentandJawaharlalNehruandtheirreformist,nation-buildingactivities.Regardingtheclassalliance,therewasagreementononepoint:thenationalbourgeoisiewastobealliedwith—buttherewasnoagreementonwhoconstitutedthenationalbourgeoisieandwhorepresenteditinIndianpoliticsandthestate.Thepartywastornbycontroversiesandconflictsasittriedunsuccessfullytocometogripswiththeactualcourseofsocialdevelopmentwithintheconfinesofthe1951programme.Itwasthrownintoconfusionateveryfreshturnofevents.Gradually,thedifferenceshardenedintofactions,evenunityontacticsbrokedownandthepartyorganizationtendedtogetparalysed.Overtheyears,thepartymadefourmajorchangesinitsofficialposition.First,atitsMaduraiCongress

in1953,itacceptedthatGovernmentofIndiawasfollowinganindependentforeignpolicythoughinitsinternalpoliciesitwasstillnotindependentandwasahagentofimperialism.Second,atitsPalghatCongressheldin1956,thepartyacceptedthatIndiahadwonindependencein1947andwasnowasovereignrepublic.Thepartynowheldthatthegovernment’spoliciesweredirectedatbuildingcapitalismbutbyfollowinganti-peoplepoliciesandgivingconcessionstotheimperialists.Thegovernmentwasthereforebasicallyreactionaryandtheparty’smaintaskwastobuilda‘democraticfront’toreplaceCongress.Thisfront,however,wasnottobeanti-CongressbecauseCongresscontainedmanydemocratswhohadtobewonoveranddetachedfromtheirleaders.Third,atitsAmritsarCongress,in1958,thepartydeclaredthatitwaspossibletoadvancetosocialismthroughpeacefulandparliamentarymeans.Italsodeclaredthatifitcametopoweritwouldgrantfullcivillibertiesincludingtherightoftheoppositionpartiestoopposethesocialistgovernmentandthesocialistsystemthroughconstitutionalmeans.Fourth,atitsVijayawadaCongressin1961,thepartydecidedtofollowapolicyofstruggleaswellasunitytowardsCongress.ThestruggleaspectwouldbeprimarybutprogressivepoliciesofCongresswouldbesupported.TheexpectationwasthatCongresswouldsplitalongprogressive-reactionarylinesandthepartywouldthenunitewiththeprogressivesection.Theagreementsatthepartycongresseswere,however,onlyonthesurface.Thedifferenceswerein

factsharpeningwithtime,withnewissues,suchastheattitudetobeadoptedtowardstheSovietcritiqueofStalin,Russia-ChinadifferencesandtheIndia-Chinawarof1962,beingaddedtothelonglist.OnewingofthepartysupportedthegovernmentwholeheartedlyagainsttheChineseattack,theotherwingwhileopposingtheChinesestandonthequestionofIndia-ChinafrontiersalsoopposedtheunqualifiedsupporttotheNehrugovernmentbecauseofitsclasscharacter.TheSoviet-ChinaideologicalsplitalsohadagreatdealofresonanceinCPI,andmanyinitweresympathetictotheChineseposition.The

ChinesefuelledthedifferencesinCPIbygivingacalltoalltherevolutionaryelementsintheCommunistspartiesoftheworldtosplitfromthosesupportingthe‘revisionist’Sovietline.CPIfinallysplitin1964,withoneparty,representingtheearlier‘right’and‘centrist’trends,being

knownasCPIandtheotherparty,representingtheearlier‘left’trend,beingknownaftersometimeastheCommunistParty(Marxist)orCPM.Apartfrompersonalandfactionaldifferences,thesplittookmainlyadoctrinalform.AccordingtoCPM,theIndianstatewas‘theorganoftheclassruleofthebourgeoisieandlandlords,

ledbythebigbourgeoisie,whoareincreasinglycollaboratingwithforeignfinancecapital.’4Congresswasthechiefinstrumentoftherulingclassesandwould,therefore,havetobedestroyed.CPMdidnotbelievethatitsgoalofestablishingapeople’sdemocraticstatecouldbeestablishedthroughpeaceful,parliamentarymeans,especiallyastheIndianConstitutionwasinherentlyanti-democraticand‘mustgolock,stockandbarrel’.Thepartywould,however,usetheConstitutionasan‘instrumentofstruggle’andtrytobreakit‘fromwithin’.Tobringaboutrevolutioninsocialrelations,CPMbelieved,itwouldbecomenecessarytostartanagrarianrevolutionandanarmedstruggleundertheleadershipoftheworkingclassanditsparty.Thepartywouldtrytocreatesuitableconditionsforanarmedstruggleassoonaspossible,andwoulduseparticipationinparliamentarypoliticstocreatetheseconditionsandtoovercometheillusionsthatpeoplestillhadregardingtheusefulnessoftheparliamentandtheConstitution.AlargenumberofthosewhowentovertoCPMbelievedthatitwouldleadtheminmakingarevolution.Initsinternationaloutlook,CPMcontinuedtoregardStalinasagreatMarxistwhowasbasicallycorrectinhispoliciesthoughhemadesomeavoidableerrors.ItclaimedtotakeanindependentstandonSoviet-ChinesedifferencesbutwasclosertotheChineseindemandinganattackonSoviet‘revisionism.’CPItoowantedto‘completetheanti-imperialist,anti-feudalrevolution,’butitwoulddosobyforming

anationaldemocraticfrontwhichwouldincludeprogressivesectionsofCongress.Moreover,thisfrontneednotbeledbytheworkingclassorCPI.Thepartyalsodeclaredthattransitiontonationaldemocracyandthensocialismwascapableofbeingaccomplishedbypeacefulandparliamentarymeans.BoththeCommunistpartieslatersplitfurtherandhavemoreorlessstagnatedandremained‘smalland

growing,’thoughtheyjointlywitheachotherandotherpartiesformedgovernmentsinWestBengal,KeralaandTripuraandalsomadetheirpresencefeltintheparliament.Butoutsidethesestatestheyhavehardlyanoticeablepresence.Ingeneral,theyhavefailedtoconductpoliticsamongthepeopleandbecometheleadersofabroadmassmovement.LiketheSocialists,theCommunistsalsofailedtorealizetheirpoliticalpotential,thoughtheydidnotdisintegrateanddisappearastheSocialistpartieshaddone.HowisthefailureoftheundividedCPIanditsoffshootstomeasureuptothechallengesofindependent

Indiaandtomakeapoliticalbreakthroughdespitefavourablesocio-economicconditionstobeexplained?Therewas,ofcourse,thefailureofCPItounderstandthecomplexIndiansocialdevelopmentandthechangingmoodofthepeople.Forexample,ittookiteightyearsforittorecognizethatIndiahadbecomefreein1947andanothernineforthebreakawayCPItoacceptthatindependentcapitalismwasbeingbuilt.Theairydebatesofthefiftiesandsixtiesweremuchmoretheologicalinnature.Ontheotherhand,thebasicformulaethattheeconomywasincrisis,theeconomicconditionsofthepeoplewereworsening,theclasscontradictionsweregettingintensified,andthepeopleweredisillusionedwithCongresswererepeatedinresolutionafterresolutionwithoutanyin-deptheconomicorpoliticalanalysis.

Thehopewasthattheparty,withitscommittedcadresandcarefully-whettedmembers,tightdisciplineandcorrectpartyline,wouldleadthepeople’srevolutionwhenevertheinevitablesocial,economicandpoliticalbreakdownoccurredandarevolutionarysituationdeveloped.Theresultwasthatthepartyanditscontendinggroupsandfactionsremainedstuckingroovesfromwhichtheyfounditincreasinglydifficulttoextricatethemselves.ParticularmanifestationsoftheCommunistfailuretocometogripswiththeIndianpoliticalrealityare

relatedtothreeareas.Despitetoilinghardintheanti-imperialistcauseandbeingapartofthemainstreamnationalmovementledbyCongressandGandhiji,bothbeforeandafterindependence,thepartyfailedtoappreciatecorrectlythecharacterofthefreedomstruggleasamassivenationalrevolution,comparabletotheRussianandChineserevolutions.Afterindependence,CPIbyandlargefailedtocometotermswithnationalismandtheproblemsofnationaldevelopmentandconsolidationofthenation.Nationalismhadadifferentmeaningintheex-coloniesthanintheEuropeancontext.Here,itwasnotmerelyorevenprimarilyabourgeoisphenomenonortheideologicalreflexofbourgeoisinterests.Here,itdidnotreflectthebefoggingofthepeople’smindsbybourgeoisideology;onthecontrary,itreflectedthegraspofanimportantaspectoftherealitybythepeoplewhoexpectedaunitedandstrongIndiatobecomeavehiclefortheimprovementoftheirsocialcondition.Similarly,nationbuildingwasnotabourgeoistask.TheCommunistscouldnotbecomeahegemonicorevenamajorforcebecausetheyfailedtotakeuptheleadershipinnationbuildingandsocialdevelopmentofthenationasawhole,inallitsaspects;fromeconomicdevelopmentandthespreadofeducation,scientifictemper,scienceandtechnologyandproductivitytothefightagainstthecastesystemandforequityandequality,andtheguardingoftheindependence,integrityandsecurityofthenation.Next,CPIwasalsonotabletoworkoutthefullandrealimplicationsofacivillibertarianand

democraticpolity.Itgotrepeatedlyboggeddownwithproblemsposedintheabstract,suchasrevolutionaryversusnon-revolutionarypath,violentversusnon-violentmeans,parliamentaryworkversusarmedstruggleandsoon.Therealproblemwasnotposed:whatdiditmeantobeasocialrevolutionaryinthecontextofpost-independentdemocraticIndia?ElectoralandparliamentarypoliticswerenottobeencompassedbythetraditionalCommunistnotionofusingthemasmereforumsofpropagandaandasmeasuresoftheCommuniststrength.Despitethebourgeoissocialstructureunderpinningit,India’sdemocraticpolitymarkedahistoricalleap;itmeantabasicchangeintherulesofpoliticalbehaviour.India’sparliamentaryinstitutionsandframeworkhadtobeseenasthepoliticalchannelsthroughwhichsocialtransformationwastobebroughtabout.CPIdidhesitatinglymovetowardsthisunderstandingatitsAmritsarCongressin1958,buttheeffort

waspatchyandshort-lived;andinner-partycontentionssoonledtoitsbeingabandoned.CPIalsofailedtorealizethatinademocraticpolity,socialtransformationcouldoccuronlythroughaseriesofradicalreformswhichhadtobeputintopracticeandnotpursuedmerelytoexposetherulersandtheexistingsocialsystem.Inotherwords,insteadofpromisingwhatitwoulddoafteritcametopower,thepartyhadtostruggletoinfluenceexistingsocialdevelopmentinthedirectionofitsvision.Intheabsenceofsuchanapproach,CPIfailedtoadoptapositiveandapoliticallyviableattitudetowardsthenationbuildingandreformistmeasuresandpoliciesoftheNehrugovernment.Atthesametime,thepartyfailedtobecomeanalternativetoCongress,andtocomeupwithitsownagendaofnationaldevelopmentandsocialjustice.

Oneresultofthiswasthatgraduallytheoppositionspacebegantobeoccupiedbyreactionarycommunalandcasteistparties.Lastly,CPI’scentralized,bureaucraticandbasicallysecretpartystructure,relyingonwhole-timeparty

cadres,alsodidnotsuitademocraticandopensociety.Suchapartycouldnothopetodevelopmassinstitutionsandmasspower.Thisweaknessofthepartywascompoundedinthepre-1962yearsbyacertainsubserviencetotheSovietleadershipandtheimportationofthedoctrineofendsjustifyingthemeansintoinner-partydisputes.

BharatiyaJanSangh

TheBharatiyaJanSangh,foundedinOctober1951,wasbasicallyacommunalpartyandhastobestudiedassuch.Acommunalpartyisonewhichisstructuredaroundcommunalideology.Acommunalpartycannotbedefinedbyspecificpolicies,foritcandiscardanyofitsprogrammaticandpolicyelementsandsometimesadopttheveryoppositeones.Itseconomic,politicalandsocialpoliciesaregenerallyahuskoramaskwhichcanbechangedatappropriatemomentstosuititselectoralorotherpoliticalneeds,whichitperceivesasessentialforthecaptureofpoliticalpower,whichinturnthepartyneedstoimplementitscommunalagenda.Acommunalpartyisnotaconservativepartyforitisnotcommittedtotheconservationoflargeelementsoftheexistingsocial,economicandpoliticalstructure.Itis,however,aright-wingpartyforitcannotcommunalizethestateandsocietywithoutstrengtheningthereactionaryandexploitativeelementsoftheeconomy.TheJanSanghcouldnot,however,openlyprofessitscommunalideologyasithadtofunctionwithin

twomajorconstraints.Beinganelectoralparty,operatinginaseculardemocraticpolity,ithadtotrytocobbletogetheranelectoralmajorityandthereforeappeal,tonon-communalvoters,asalsoobeyelectorallawsforbiddingpoliticalappealstoreligion.Further,becauseofthefirmideologicalcommitmentofthenationalmovementandtheanti-communalsentimentinIndia,especiallyaftertheassassinationofGandhiji,communalismhadabadodouraboutit.TounderstandthebasiccommunalcharacteroftheJanSanghanditspolitics,firsttheRashtriya

SwayamsevakSangh(RSS)istobestudied,fortheformerwasacreationofRSS,andhadremainedunderthelatter’stightideologicalandorganizationalcontrolsinceitsfoundation.TheJanSanghdrewitsorganizedstrength,centralizedcharacterandideologicalhomogeneityfromRSS.Alsothegrassrootworkers,thewell-trainedanddisciplinedcadresandorganizers,andintimenearlyallthetopleadersofJanSangh,especiallyitssecretariesandgeneralsecretaries,wereprovidedbyRSS.Foundedin1925,RSSwasorganizedonauthoritarianandmilitaristiclineswhich,functioningbelowthesurfaceandglorifyingviolence,developedbasicallyasananti-Muslimorganization.Itdidnotparticipateintheanti-imperialistmovementorwageanyanti-imperialiststruggleevenofitsownconceptiononthegroundthatithadtoconserveitsstrengthforitsmaintaskofprotectingHindusfromMuslimdomination.TheRSSgrewinnorthernIndiainthefortiesbecauseofthecommunalizationofpoliticsduringthewaryearsandlarge-scalecommunalviolenceduring1946-1947,inwhichitplayedanactiverole.TheRSSwasbannedanditsleadersandworkersarrestedaftertheassassinationofGandhiji.Thoughnotdirectlyinvolvedintheassassination,theRSShadbeenwagingacampaignofhatred

againstGandhijiandotherCongressleaders,publiclyandinitsshakhasorbranches,oftenbrandingthemasanti-Hinduand‘traitors’.Forexamplereferringtothem,M.S.Golwalkar,thesupremeheadoftheRSS

nominatedassuchforlife,wrotein1939:‘Strange,verystrange,thattraitorsshouldsitenthronedasnationalheroes.’5

KeenonpersuadingthegovernmenttoliftthebanontheRSS,itsleadersgaveanundertakingin1949thatitwouldnottakepartinpolitics.But,infact,theywerequitekeentodoso.JanSanghprovidedtheperfectcoverforthis‘frontorganization’.ThebasicguidelinesofRSS’scommunalapproachtowardsMuslimswerelaiddownbyGolwalkarin

WeorOurNationhoodDefined,whereMuslimswereportrayedasaperpetuallyhostileandalienelementwithintheIndianbodypoliticandsociety,whomusteitheraccepttotalsubordinationtoHindusorceasebeingMuslims.Thisisevidentfromthepassagebelow.

InHindusthanexistsandmustneedsexisttheancientHindunationandnoughtelsebuttheHinduNation...Solong,however,asthey(Muslimsandothernon-Hindus)maintaintheirracial,religiousandculturaldifferences,theycannotbutbeonlyforeigners...Thereareonlytwocoursesopentotheforeignelements,eithertomergethemselvesinthenationalraceandadoptitsculture,ortoliveatthesweetwillofthenationalrace....Thenon-HindupeoplesinHindusthanmusteitheradopttheHinducultureandlanguage,mustlearntorespectandholdinreverenceHindureligion,...inoneword,theymustceasetobeforeigners,ormaystayinthecountry,whollysubordinatedtotheHindunation,claimingnothing,deservingnoprivileges,farlessanypreferentialtreatment—notevencitizen’srights...inthiscountryHindusalonearetheNationandtheMoslemsandothers,ifnotactuallyanti-nationalareatleastoutsidethebodyof

theNation.’6

GolwalkarrepeatedlyreferredtoMuslimsas‘ourfoes’,‘ouroldandbitterenemies’,‘ourmostinveterateenemies’,andsoon,andsaid:‘We,Hindus,areatwaratoncewiththeMoslemsontheonehandandBritishontheother.’7Morerecently,inOctober1991,BalasahebDeoras,thesuccessorofGolwalkarastheheadofRSS,condemned‘theaggressiveanddivisivementalityoftheMuslims’andaccusedthesecularpartiesofnothesitating‘tosacrificenationalinterestsandtofulfileventheantinationalpoliticalaspirationsoftheMuslims.’8

InviewofthecarefullycultivatedcommunalfeelingsamongitscadresandadherentsbyRSS,itwasnotaccidentalthat,asthenotedjournalistKrishanBhatiawrotein1971,‘theRSShasbeenbehindsomeoftheworstcommunalriotsduringthepastthirtyyears.’9Atamorepopularlevel,theOrganiserandthePanchjanya,theunofficialorgansofRSS,continuetillthisdaytopublisharticlesstressing,withgreaterorlesserstridency,dependingonthepoliticalsituation,thatHindusconstitutetheIndiannationandemphasizingthedangersfromschemesofthe‘IslamizationofIndia’.JanSanghwaslaunchedasapoliticalpartyinOctober1951withDrShyamaPrasadMookerjeeasits

president.Ostensibly,JanSanghWasanindependentpartyinitsownrightandunderMookerjeeitdidenjoyacertaindegreeofindependence,buteventhenitsspearheadwastheRSSanditscarefullychosencadreswhowereputincrucialpositionsinthenewparty.AfterMookerjee’sdeathin1953,thefigleafofbeinganindependentpartywasgraduallygivenup.Since1954,whenitssecondpresident,MauliChandraSharma,resignedinprotestagainsttheRSSdominationoftheparty,JanSanghanditslaterdayreincarnation,BharatiyaJanataParty(BJP),havebeenmoreopenlyassociatedwithandcontrolledbyRSS,whichhasprovidedthemwiththebulkoftheirleadersatthetopaswellasthelowerlevels.ThoughJanSanghovertimeadoptedaradicalprogrammeasbefittedapetitbourgeouise,national-

socialisttypeparty,andsupported,forexample,amixedeconomybasedonplanningandpublicsector(thelattercontrollingthecommandingheightsoftheeconomy),zamindariabolition,landceilingsandlandtothetiller,thecauseofagriculturallabourandoftheworkingclassinthemodernsector,regulationoflarge-scaleindustries,nationalizationofkeyindustries,servicecooperativesintheruralsector,

ceilingsonpersonalincome,etc.,theseweremerelyformalpositions.Theissueswhichreallymatteredandonwhichthepartyanditsmembersconcentratedandexertedthemselveswereverydifferent,namelycommunalquestions.Alltheparty’spopularslogansandeverydayagitationalissueswerefilteredthroughcommunalglassesorideology.Thepartydeclareditselftobenon-communalandsecularandformallyadmittedMuslimsasmembers.Initially,italsodeclaredthatitsobjectivewastoworknotforHinduRashtrabutBharatiyaRashtra;butthelatterwassodefinedastostandforHinduRashtra.AdmittingMuslimsintothepartywasalsoperceivedbyitsleadersandcadresasamereformalityandtechnicality—apoliticalmanoeuvre.JanSanghworkersatthelowerlevel,itsleadersinpublicspeechesanditsjournalspromotedinasubtleandsubterraneanmannerdistrustandhatredofMuslims.JanSanghconsistentlyaccusedthesecularpartiesofappeasementofMuslimsandpanderingtotheir

interests.EvenasoberleaderlikeMookerjeeattackedNehruregularlyforfollowing‘asuicidalpolicyofappeasementofMuslims.’10Onitspart,JanSanghdeclaredthatitwouldpromotenationalunityby‘nationalizingallnon-HindusbyinculcatinginthemtheidealofBharatiyaCulture.’11

JanSanghwasstronglyanti-Pakistan.Accordingtooneofitsresolutions,Pakistan’s‘aimistosustainthefaithofIndianMuslimswiththeultimateobjectiveofestablishingMuslimdominationovertherestofIndiaaswell.’12Initsinitialyears,theJanSangharguedforthereunitingofIndiaandPakistaninpursuitofitscentralobjectiveofAkhandBharat.JanSanghalsoaccusedthegovernmentofconsistentlypursuingapolicyofappeasementofPakistan.ItwasonlylaterthatthesloganofAkhandBharatwasabandonedandevenhostilitytoPakistanwasmuted,especiallyafterJanSanghmergedintoJanataPartyin1977andAtalBehariVajpayeebecametheforeignminister;buthostilitytoMuslimsasproxiesforPakistanremainedasbefore.JanSanghemphasizedthepropagationofBharatiyacultureandtheestablishmentofBhartiya

nationalism.Thesetwotermswereneverdefinedexceptveryvaguelyasbeingbasedonnon-westernandtraditionalvalues.Infact,theword’Bharatiya’wasaeuphemismfortheword‘Hindu’andanattemptonthepartofJanSanghtoavoidthecommunallabel.Ascommunalismbegantogrow,JanSanghpublicationsopenlystartedusingthetermsHinducultureandHindunationalismandcontinuetodoso.Inrealityeventheterm‘Hindunationalism’wasamisnomerandasubstitutefortheterm‘Hinducommunalism’.DenyingtheculturaldiversityofIndia,JanSanghalsoraisedthesloganof‘onecountry,oneculture,

onenation’andassertedthatallthosewhodidnotacceptthisoneculturehadimbibed‘anti-nationaltraits’.TherewasalsoastrongelementofrevivalisminitstalkofBharatiyaspiritualandmaterialvalues;therevivalofBharatiyacultureratherthanitsdevelopmentengagedthem.ItalsoaccusedCongressofimportingforeigntechnologyandpromisedthatinsteaditwouldaimatdeveloping‘aself-sufficientandself-generatingeconomy’bydeveloping‘ourowntechnique’.13AdisguisedoppositiontoparliamentarydemocracyandsecularismwasalsointendedwhenitrepeatedlyaccusedCongressofdevelopingIndianpoliticallifeonthebasisofforeignideas.However,graduallyitgaveupsuchrevivalistformulationsasalsoitstalkofBharatiyavalues.Theirplacewastakenbytheopenlycommunalterm‘Hindutva’.Foryears,JanSanghtookastridentstandandanagitationalapproachinfavourofSanskritizedHindi

andagainsttheretentionofEnglishasanofficiallinklanguageofIndia.Later,keepinginviewitsneed

forexpansioninnon-Hindiareas,itquietlyacceptedthe1965decisiontoretainEnglishalongwithHindisolongasthenon-Hindistateswantedthis.ItalsoopposedthedevelopmentofUrduinU.P.andotherpartsofnorthernIndia.ItforcefullyopposedtheHinduCodeBill,andafteritspassagepledgedtorepealthislegislation.Interestingly,JanSanghopposedthelinkingofreligionwithpoliticsanddidnottakeupanyreligious

issueotherthanthatofalegalbanoncow-slaughter.Thereasonsforthischangeintheeightieswillbediscussedinchapter33on‘CommunalisminIndependentIndia’.Infact,significantchangesintheofficialprogrammeandpoliciesasalsointhesocialandregional

baseofJanSangh-BJPoccurredovertheyears.Onlythecentralityofcommunalideologyremained.And,ofcourse,nopartyorleadershipcanbeseparatedfromtheideologywithwhichitoperatesamongthepeople.Electorally,JanSanghremainedthroughoutthisphaseonthemarginsoftheIndianpolity.In1952,itwon3seatsintheLokSabhawith3.06percentofthenationalvote.(ThecombinedtotalofJanSangh,HinduMahasabhaandRamRajyaParishadwas10seatswith6.4percentofthevotes.Thus,theoverallperformanceofthethreeHinducommunalpartieswasquitepoor).In1957,JanSanghwon4seatsintheLokSabhawith5.97percentofthetotalvotes.Thisdidnotmarkanyrealgrowthofcommunalism,foritoccurredbecauseJanSanghabsorbedalargepartofthepoliticalbaseofHinduMahasabhaandRRP,thetotalscoreofthethreepartiesbeing5MPswith7.17percentofthevotes.In1962,JanSanghwon14seatswith6.44percentofthetotalvotes—thethreecommunalpartiesgot17seatsand7.69percentofthevotes.Thehigh-watermarkofJanSanghbeforeitbecameBJPwasreachedin1967whenitwon35seatswith9.35percentofthepopularvote,withHinduMahasabhaandRRPhavingdisappearedaspoliticalforces.Itstally,however,camedownagainin1971whenitgot22seatsintheLokSabhaand7.4percentofthevotes.Throughout,thepartydidnotwinasingleseatinSouthIndiaanditlostitspoliticalholdcompletelyinWestBengalafterthedeathofShyamaPrasadMookerjee.Infact,itspoliticalinfluencewasmainlyconfinedtoPunjab,Haryana,HimachalPradesh,Delhi,Rajasthan.U.P.,MadhyaPradeshandBihar.

TheSwatantraParty

TheSwatantraParty,thefirstauthenticall-Indiasecularconservativeparty,cameintobeinginearlyAugust1959.Ithadanumberofdistinguishedleaders,mostofthemoldCongressmen,forexample,C.Rajagopalachari,MinooMasani,N.G.RangaandK.M.Munshi.Right-winggroupsandpartieshad,ofcourse,earlierexistedatthelocalandregionallevels,butSwatantra’sformationwasthefirstattempttobringthesehighlyfragmentedright-wingforcestogetherundertheumbrellaofasingleparty.TheprovocationwastheleftturnwhichtheCongresstookatAvadiandtheNagpurResolution.Favouringthenineteenthcenturyconceptionofthe‘nightwatchman’orlaissez-fairestate,Swatantra

stoodforfree,privateenterpriseandopposedtheactiveroleofthestateineconomicdevelopment.Itwantedtoradicallyrestrictcentralizedplanningandtheroleofpublicsector,asalsostate-regulationoftheeconomy.Itopposedanynationalizationofprivateenterpriseandanyextensionoflandreforms,especiallyfixationofceilingsonlandholdings.SwantantrawasfullycommittedtosecularismandthatwasonereasonitfounditdifficulttomergeorformageneralalliancewithJanSangh,thoughitenteredintoseat-sharingarrangementswithit.Infact,manyconservativeintellectuals,businessmenandpoliticalleaderswelcomedtheformationofSwatantrabecauseitprovidedanon-socialist,constitutionalistand

secularconservativealternativetotheCongress.SwatantraleadersaccusedCongressofacceptingcommunistprinciplesandtryingtoabolishprivateproperty.TotallymisrepresentingNehru’sposition,theyaccusedhimoftryingtointroducecollectivefarmingandChinese-typecommunes.Nehru,Rajagopalacharisaid,wastreading’theroyalroadtoCommunism’.Swatantra,ontheotherhand,was

‘dedicatedtosavingIndiafromthedangersoftotalitarianism.’14

Inforeignaffairs,Swatantraopposednon-alignmentandacloserelationshipwiththeSovietUnionandadvocatedanintimateconnectionwiththeUnitedStatesandwesternEurope.Iturgedthegovernmenttoworkforadefencealliancewithnon-CommunistnationsoftheSouthAsianregionandofAsiaasawhole,includingPakistan,underaUSumbrella.ThesocialbaseofSwatantrawasquitenarrow,consistingof(i)someindustrialistsandbusinessmen,

whoweredisgruntledwithgovernmentcontrol,quotasandlicencesandattacksonthemanagingagencysystemandfearfulofnationalization,besideslackingconfidenceinNehru(ii)princes,jagirdarsandlandlords,whoweremiserableandangryatthelossoftheirfiefdomsorlands,socialpowerandstatus,anddeterioratingeconomicconditions,and(iii)ex-landlordturnedcapitalist-farmersandrichandmiddlepeasantsinsomepartsofthecountry,whohadwelcomedtheabolitionoflandlordismbutwerefearfuloflosingpartoftheirlandiflandreformswentanyfurtherbywayoflandceilingandthegrowingawarenessandpoliticalpoweroftheruralpoor,especiallytheagriculturallabourers.SwatantrawasalsojoinedbyafewretiredcivilservantsanddisgruntledCongressmen,leadingahistoriantodescribeitas‘aholdingcompanyforlocaldissidentgroups.’Theex-landlordsandrichpeasantscontrolledthevotesofmanyoftheireconomicandsocialdependentswhiletheerstwhileprinces,jagirdarsandzamindarscouldappealtoremnantsoftraditionalfeudalloyalties.Swatantradidnotfarebadlyin1962elections.Itwon18seatsintheLokSabhawith6.8percentof

thepopularvote.Itemergedasthemainoppositioninfourstates—Bihar,Rajasthan,GujaratandOrissa.Outof18seats,7werewoninBihar,butthesesevenmembersincludedtheRajaofRamgarh’smother,wife,brother,sister-in-lawandbusinessmanager!In1967,thepartysecured44seatsintheLokSabhawith8.7percentofthetotalvotes.Inboththeelections,ex-princes,jagirdarsandbiglandlordswereinthemainresponsiblefortheparty’swins.Rivenwithfactionsanddefectionsandfailingtoacquireamassfollowing,thepartyrapidlydeclinedafterthedeathofC.Rajagopalachariin1967.In1971,itsecuredonly8seatsintheLokSabhawith3percentofthevotes.Feelingasenseofhopelessness,mostofthepartyleadersjoinedtheBharatiyaLokDalin1974,afewwentbacktoCongress,whileasmallfactionledbyMasanicarriedon.SwatantrafailedmainlybecausetherewasasyetnospaceinIndianpoliticsforaconservativeparty,

forradicalizationofpoliticswasstillinprogress.Moreover,right-wingclassinterestswerestillquitediverseandfragmentedandnoteasilyamenabletocoalescence.AlsotherichandmiddlepeasantswerenotyetfullyandirrevocablyalienatedfromCongress,especiallyascooperativefarminghadbeenputincoldstorageandlandceilinglawsactuallyposedlittlethreattotheexistingholdings.Ontheotherhand,theywerethemajorbeneficiariesofseveralgovernmentpoliciesandmeasures:reductionoflandrevenueandextensionofservicesincludingprovisionofruralcredit,improvedtransport,irrigationandelectrification.Thebusinessclass—thebourgeoisiewhetherbigorsmall—wasalsoasawholenotunhappy.Byand

large,itacceptedthatthegovernmentmustplayanactiveroleinpolitics.Itfoundthatplanning,public

sectorandgovernmentregulationsdidnotblockitsgrowthand,instead,inmanyrespects,helpedittodevelop.Themixedeconomyalsoleftenoughscopeforitsexpansion.Inanycase,asapropertiedclass,itwasnotwillingtoopposeaparty—Congress—whichwascertaintoretainpowerintheimmediatefuture.Aboveall,thoughsteadyinpursuingitsdevelopmentalandreformistagenda,theNehrugovernment,Congressandthebroadclass-coalitionNehruhadbuiltupwereinactualpracticequitemoderateindealingwithandconciliatorytowardsthepropertiedclasses.Theydidnotposearadicalorrevolutionarychallengetothecapitalistsocialorder.Nehruwouldnotantagonizethecapitalistclassandtheagrarianbourgeoisie—thecapitalistfarmersandtherichpeasantry—toanextentwheretheywouldfeelthattheywerebeingdriventothewall.Eventheprincesandlandlordshadnotbeenwipedoutandhadbeenconsoledwithcompensationandothereconomicconcessions.Consequently,inmostcasestheiroppositionremainedlatentanddidnotmanifestitselfinpoliticalaction.Moreover,Nehruinvariably’respondedtopressureatthemargin’.Justashehadbeenreceptivetotheleftinthefifties,henowrespondedtotherightanddidnottakeupstatetradinginfoodgrainsorcooperativefarming.Simultaneously,landceilinglawsweremadequiteinnocuousbythestategovernments,whichwerequitereceptivetotherichpeasantdemands.Lastly,theCongressrightrealizedthatsolongasNehruwasalivehispositioninthecountrywas

unassailable;it,therefore,showednoinclinationtoleavetheshelterofthebanyantreethatwasNehru.Ontheotherhand,whenCongresssplitin1969andCongress(O)emergedasapoliticalforce,thereasonfortheexistenceofSwatantraasaseparateright-wingpartydisappeared,fortheformerwasmuchmorepotentasaright-wingparty.

CommunalandRegionalParties

Alargenumberofcommunalandregionalpartiesexistedbetween1947and1964.Amongthecommunalparties,HinduMahasabhawasanoldparty,butitsoonfadedfromthepoliticalsceneafter1952,whenithadwonfourseatsintheLokSabha,asitgraduallylostitssupportbasetoJanSangh.SamewasthecasewithRamRajyaParishad.BecauseofitsassociationwiththedemandforPakistan,MuslimLeaguelaydormant,withmanyofitsdemoralizedleadersandactivistsjoiningCongressandotherparties.However,itrevivedinpartsofTamilNaduandinKeralawherefirstCongressandthenCPIandCPMgaveitrespectabilitybymakingitanalliancepartner.AkaliDalwasanothermajorcommunalparty,thoughlimitedtoPunjab.Itisdiscussedinchapter24.Alargenumberofregionalpartiesappearedonthesceneduringtheperiod.ThemoreimportantofthesewereDravidaMunnetraKazhagaminTamilNaduandtheJammuandKashmirNationalConference,whicharediscussedinchapter22.WehavealreadydiscussedtheJharkhandpartyinBiharinchapter9.TheothermajorregionalpartieswereGanatantraParishadinOrissa,AllPartiesHillleaders’ConferenceinAssam,andScheduledCastesFederationinMaharashtra.Therewerealsoseveralsmallleftparties,usuallyconfinedtoonestate:RevolutionarySocialistParty(KeralaandWestBengal),ForwardBloc(WestBengal)andPeasantsandWorkersParty(Maharashtra).Mostoftheregionalleftandcommunalgroupsandpartiescannot;however,bediscussedhere,thoughtheyplayedasignificantroleinparticularstatesandregions.

16FromShastritoIndiraGandhi,1964-69

Nehru’sdeathinMay1964providedatestofthestrengthoftheIndianpoliticalsystem.Many,bothinIndiaandabroad,predictedthatitwouldbeseverelydamaged,andmightevenbreakdownthroughdissensionandfactionalturmoilintheCongresspartyontheissueofsuccession.Butthesuccessionoccurredinamature,dignifiedandsmoothmannerandrevealedthestrengthofIndiandemocracy.Perhaps,itwasbecauseofhisfaithinIndiandemocracythatNehruhadrefusedtonameasuccessor.ThereweretwomaincontendersfortheleadershipoftheCongressparliamentarypartyandtherefore

fortheprimeminister’sjob,MorarjiDesaiandLalBahadurShastri.Desaiwasseniorandmoreexperienced,asoundadministratorandscrupulouslyhonest.Buthewasrigidandinflexibleinoutlookandhadthereputationofbeingself-righteous,arrogant,intolerantandaright-winger.Moreover,hewasquiteunpopularwithalargesectionoftheparty.Shastriwasmild,tactfulandmalleable,highlyrespectedandknowntobepersonallyincorruptible.ThesuccessionoccurredunderthedirectionofagroupofCongressleaderswhocametobe

collectivelyknownastheSyndicate.Thegroup,formedin1963,consistedofK.Kamaraj,theCongresspresident,andregionalpartybosses,AtulyaGhoshofBengal,S.K.PatilofBombay,N.SanjeevaReddyofAndhraPradesh,andS.NijalingappaofMysore(Karnataka).Desaiwasutterlyunacceptabletothem.TheyfavouredShastribecause,inadditiontohisotherqualities,hehadwideracceptabilityinthepartyandwhichwouldkeepthepartyunited.Theyalsohopedthathewouldbemoreamenabletotheirwishesandnotchallengetheirleadershipintheparty.They,aswellasotherpartyleaders,werealsokeentoavoidacontest,whichwouldintensifythe

factionalism.presentintheparty.KamarajtriedtoascertainthecandidatearoundwhomtherewouldbewiderconsensusamongthepartyMPsandannouncedthatShastriwasmoregenerallyacceptable.ThoughprivatelysuggestingthattheSyndicatehad‘stage-managed’thedecision,Desaiaccepteditandretiredfromtheraceinadignifiedmanner.Shastri,electedunopposedastheparliamentaryleaderbythepartyMPs,wassworninasprimeministeron2June1964,i.e.,withinaweekofNehru’sdeath.

TheShastriYears

Acceptingthelimitedcharacterofhispoliticalmandate,ShastrididnotmakeanymajorchangesinNehru’sCabinet,exceptforpersuadingIndiraGandhi,Nehru’sdaughter,tojoinitasMinisterofInformationandBroadcasting.Underhimthecabinetministersfunctionedmoreautonomously.Healsodidnotinterfereinpartyaffairsorwiththeworkingofthestategovernments.Onthewhole,hekeptalowpoliticalprofileexcepttowardstheendofhisadministration.Thoughthecountrywasatthetimefacedwithseveraldifficultproblems,Shastri’sgovernmentdidnot

dealwiththeminadecisivemanner;itfollowedapolicyofdriftinstead.Asdiscussedinchapter7,the

problemoftheofficiallanguageofHindiversusEnglish,flaredupinearly1965,butthecentralgovernmentfailedtohandleiteffectivelyandallowedthesituationtodeteriorate.Theproblemwas,however,finallyresolvedinearly1966.ThedemandsforPunjabiSuba(state)andGoa’smergerwithMaharashtrawerealsoallowedtosimmer.TheIndianeconomyhadbeenstagnatinginthepreviousfewyears.Therewasaslowdownintherate

ofindustrialgrowthandthebalanceofpaymentsproblemhadworsened.But,atthatmoment,themostseriousproblemwasthesevereshortageoffood.Agriculturalproductionhadsloweddown,therewasseveredroughtinseveralstatesin1965andbufferfoodstocksweredepletedtoadangerousextent.Clearly,long-termmeasureswereneededtodealwiththesituation.Butthosewerenottaken,particularlyasthechiefministersoffoodgrain-surplusstatesrefusedtocooperate.AftertheUSsuspendedallfoodaidbecauseoftheIndo-Pakwar,thegovernmentwascompelledtointroducestatutoryrationingbutitcoveredonlysevenmajorcities.ThegovernmentalsocreatedtheStateFoodTradingCorporationinJanuary1965,butitdidnotsucceedinprocuringasignificantamountoffoodgrains.However,onepositivedevelopmentwastheinitiationoftheGreenRevolutionstrategywiththepurposeofincreasingagriculturaloutputandachievingself-sufficiencyinfoodinthelongrun.Itwasthoughonlylater,inIndiraGandhi’sregime,thatthisstrategywaspursuedvigorously.Ingeneral,Shastriwasaccusedbycriticsinsideandoutsidethepartyofbeing‘aprisonerof

indecision’andoffailingtogiveadirectiontogovernmentpoliciesoreventoleadandcontrolhiscabinetcolleagues.HefeltsounsureandinadequateunderpressuresofgovernmentandcommentsofthecriticsthatinaprivatechatwithanewsmanearlyinJanuary1965hewondered‘whetherhehadbeenrighttoofferhimselfforthePrimeMinistershipandwhetherhehadthecapacitytocarrytheburdenthattheofficeinvolved.’1

Withthepassageoftime,however,Shastribegantoshowgreaterindependenceandtoasserthimself,somuchsothatKamarajbegantocomplainthathewasquiteoftenbeingbypassedbyShastriinimportantdecision-making.TheIndiangovernmentwasamongthefirsttocriticizetheUSbombingofNorthVietnam.ShastrialsosetuphisownPrimeMinister’sSecretariat,headedbyL.K.Jha,hisprincipalprivatesecretary,asasourceofinformationandadvicetotheprimeministeronpolicymatters,independentoftheministries.TheSecretariat,whichcametobeknownasthePMO(PrimeMinister’sOffice)startedacquiringgreatdealofinfluenceandpowerinthemakingandexecutionofgovernmentpolicy.Later,underIndiraGandhi,itemergedasavirtuallyalternative,independentexecutive.Itwas,however,withthebriefIndo-PakwarinAugust-September1965thatShastri’smomentcame.TheKashmirissuehadbeensimmeringforyears,withPakistandemandingreopeningofthequestion

andIndiamaintainingthatKashmirbeingapartofIndiawasasettledfact.In1965,thefollowersofSheikhAbdullahandotherdissidentleaderscreatedagreatdealofunrestintheKashmirValley.ThePakistanileadershipthoughtthatthesituationtherewasripeforanintervention,especiallyasPakistanhadsuperiorityinarms,havingacquiredsophisticatedUSmilitaryequipment.Possibly,thePakistangovernmentwantedtofaceIndiamilitarilybeforeIndia’seffortstoimproveitsdefencesafterthedebacleof1962werestillincomplete.Firstcamethedress-rehearsalandaprobe.PakistantestedIndia’sresponsetoamilitarypushby

occupyinginApril1965apartofthedisputedandundemarcatedterritoryinthemarshyRannofKutch,borderingtheArabianSeaandGujarat.Therewasamilitaryclashbut,becauseofthenatureofthe

terrain,India’smilitaryresponsewasweakandhesitant.OnBritain’sintervention,thetwosidesagreedtoreferthedisputetointernationalarbitration.Unfortunately,theconflictintheRannofKutchsentwrongsignalstotherulersofPakistan,whoconcludedthatIndia’sgovernmentandarmedforceswerenotyetreadyforwar.TheypaidnoheedtoShastri’sstatement,giveninconsultationwiththeArmyChief,GeneralJ.N.Chaudhri,thatwheneverIndiagavebattleitwouldbe‘atatimeandplaceofitsownchoosing.’2

InAugust,thePakistangovernmentsentwell-trainedinfiltratorsintotheKashmirValley,hopingtofomentapro-Pakistanuprisingthereandthuscreateconditionsforitsmilitaryintervention.TakingintoaccounttheseriousnessofthisPakistan-backedinfiltration,ShastriorderedthearmytocrosstheceasefirelineandsealthepassesthroughwhichtheinfiltratorswerecomingandtooccupysuchstrategicpostsasKargil,UriandHajiPir.Also,unlikein1962,theentirecountryralliedbehindthegovernment.Inresponse,on1September,PakistanlaunchedamassivetankandinfantryattackintheChhambsector

inthesouth-westofJammuandKashmir,threateningIndia’sonlyroadlinkwithKashmir.ShastriimmediatelyorderedtheIndianarmytonotonlydefendKashmirbutalsotomoveacrosstheborderintoPakistantowardsLahoreandSialkot.Thus,thetwocountrieswereinvolvedinwar,thoughanundeclaredone.TheUSAandBritainimmediatelycutoffarms,foodandothersuppliestobothcountries.ChinadeclaredIndiatobeanaggressorandmadethreateningnoises.However,theSovietUnion,sympathetictoIndia,discouragedChinafromgoingtoPakistan’said.UnderpressurefromtheUNSecurityCouncil,bothcombatantsagreedtoaceasefirewhichcameinto

effecton23September.Thewarwasinconclusive,withbothsidesbelievingthattheyhadwonsignificantvictoriesandinflictedheavydamageontheother.Theonlyeffectiveresultwasthat‘invasionbyinfiltration’ofKashmirhadbeenfoiled.Atthesametime,thethreeweeksoffightinghaddoneimmensedamagetotheeconomiesofthetwocountries,apartfromthelossoflifeandcostlymilitaryequipment.Resourcesurgentlyneededforeconomicdevelopmenthadbeendrained;andthedefencebudgetsofthetwocountrieshadbeguntomountagain.Indianswere,however,euphoricovertheperformanceoftheIndianarmedforceswhichrecovered

someoftheirpride,prestigeandself-confidencelostintheIndia-Chinawarin1962.Moreover,Indiaasawholeemergedfromtheconflictpoliticallystrongerandmoreunified.Therewerealsoseveralothersatisfactoryaspects.TheinfiltratorshadnotsucceededingettingthesupportofKashmiripeople.AndIndiansecularismhadpasseditsfirstmajortestsince1947-48withflyingcolours:therewasnocommunaltroubleduringthewar;IndianMuslimshadgivenwholeheartedsupporttothewareffort;andMuslimsinthearmedforceshaddisappointedPakistanbyfightingbravelyalongsidetheirHindu,SikhandChristiancomrades.AsaresultofthewarShastribecameanationalheroandadominatingpoliticalfigure.SubsequenttotheceasefireagreementandunderthegoodofficesoftheSovietUnion,GeneralAyub

Khan,thepresidentofPakistan,andShastrimetinTashkentinSovietUnionon4January1966andsignedtheTashkentDeclaration.UnderthisDeclaration,bothsidesagreedtowithdrawfromalloccupiedareasandreturntotheirpre-warAugustpositions.IncaseofIndia,thismeantwithdrawingfromthestrategicHajiPirpassthroughwhichPakistaniinfiltratorscouldagainentertheKashmirValleyandgivingupotherstrategicgainsinKashmir.Shastriagreedtotheseunfavourabletermsastheotheroptionwastheresumptionofthemutuallydisastrouswar;thatwouldalsohavemeantlosingSovietsupportonthe

KashmirissueintheUNSecurityCouncilandinthesupplyofdefenceequipment,especiallyMiGplanesandmediumandheavytanks.TheTashkentConferencehadatragicconsequence.Shastri,whohadahistoryofhearttrouble,diedin

Tashkentofasuddenheartattackon10January,havingservedasprimeministerforbarelynineteenmonths.

Shastri’sdeathonceagainbroughttheissueofsuccessiontothefore.This,thesecondsuccessionintwoyears,wasagainsmoothlyaccomplished,andaffirmedtheresilienceofIndia’spoliticalsystem.MoraijiDesaiwasonceagaininthefield.Kamaraj’sandtheSyndicate’sdislikeforDesaihadnot

lessened,andtheylookedaroundforacandidatewhocoulddefeatDesaibutremainundertheirshadow.TheirchoicefellonIndiraGandhi:shewasNehru’sdaughter,hadanall-Indiaappealandaprogressiveimage,andwasnotidentifiedwithanystate,region,casteorreligion.TheyalsothoughtthatIndiraGandhi,beinginexperiencedandayoungwomanandlackingsubstantialrootsintheparty,wouldbemorepliableandmalleable.ItwasKamarajwhostage-managedherelection.Thecontestwasvirtuallydecidedwhen12outof14chiefministersthrewtheirweightbehindher,hopingtoacquiregreaterpowertoruntheirstatesandalsotocashinonhermassappealandtheNehrunametoattractthevotersintheforthcomingelections.TherewasnoprocessofconsensusthistimeasDesaiinsistedonacontest.Hefeltconfidentof

winningbecauseofhisseniorityandpositioninthepartyandespeciallywhenhisopponentwas,asheputit,‘thismerechokri(ayoungbratofagirl).’AsecretballotintheCongressparliamentarypartywasheldon19January1966,andIndiraGandhidefeatedDesaiby355votesto169.Herbeingawomanhadbeennohandicap,forwomenhadparticipatedactivelyinthefreedomstrugglewiththousandsofthemgoingtojailandseveralofthemhadheldhighpositionsinCongress,includingitspresidentship.Afterindependence,too,theyhadoccupiedhighoffices,ofgovernorsandcabinetministersattheCentreandinthestates,includingthatofthechiefministerofU.P.,India’slargeststate.

IndiraGandhi:TheEarlyYears

IndiraGandhi’sgovernmentwasfacedwithseveralgraveproblemswhichwerelonginthemakingbutwhichrequiredimmediateattentionandsolutions.PunjabwasontheboilandtheNagaandMizoareaswereinrebellion.ShedealteffectivelywiththeseproblemsbyacceptingthedemandforPunjabiSuba(seechapter24)andbeingfirmwiththeNagaandMizorebels,showingwillingnesstonegotiatewiththemandacceptingtheNagarebels’demandforautonomy(seechapter9).Itwas,however,theeconomicsituationwhichwasintractable.Theeconomywasinrecessionandfast

deteriorating.Industrialproductionandexportsweredeclining.Therainsfailedforthesecondsuccessiveyearin1966,andthedroughtwasmoreseverethanin1965,andledtogallopinginflationandgravefoodshortages.Famineconditionsprevailedinlargepartsofthecountry,especiallyinBiharandeasternU.P.Thewarsof1962and1965andthePakistan-Chinaaxishadledtoasharpriseinmilitaryexpenditureanddiversionofresourcesfromplanningandeconomicdevelopment.Budgetdeficitsweregrowing,endangeringtheFourthFiveYearPlan.Thesituationrequiredharddecisionsandtheirfirmenforcement,butthegovernmentvacillated,wasslowintakingdecisionsand,whatwasevenworse,tardyand

ineffectiveinimplementingthem.Inparticular,itcouldnotreduceitsownbloatedadministrativeexpenditurewhichthefinancialsituationrequired.Thegovernmenthowever,succeededremarkablyindealingwiththedroughtandfaminesituation.The

problemsofprocurementanddistributionoffoodgrainsandpreventionoffaminedeathswerehandledonawar-footing.Therewereveryfewfaminedeathsascomparedtotherecordofmillionsdyinginthecolonialperiodfromcomparativeorevenlesserintensitydroughtsandfamines.ThiswasamajorachievementforIndiandemocracy.Theonedecisivesteptakenbythegovernmenttodealwiththedeterioratingeconomicsituationandto

bolsterfoodimportsboomerangedandprovedtobethemostcontroversialofMrsGandhi’searlydecisions.Asalreadymentioned,Indianexportswerenotgrowingandeventheexistingoneswerebeingheavilysubsidizedbythecentralexchequer.IndiraGandhi’sadvisersarguedthatthiswasduetotherupeebeinggrosslyover-valued.Ifitweredevalued,therewouldbeagreaterinflowofthemuch-neededforeigncapital.IndiawasheavilydependentforitsfoodsecurityonimportsofwheatfromtheUSunderthePL-480aidprogramme.AlsotherewasanurgentneedforeconomicaidbytheWorldBankandtheInternationalMonetaryFund(IMF),stoppedduringtheIndo-Pakwar,toberesumed.TheUS,theWorldBankandtheIMFhowever,insistedondevaluationoftherupee.Consequently,theGovernmentofIndiadevaluedtherupeeby35.5percenton6June,barelyfourmonthsafterMrsGandhiassumedpower.Therewereangrycountry-wideoutburstsagainstthedecision.Allsectionsofpoliticalopinion

opposedthestep,themostvolublecriticsbeingtheleftgroupsandparties,themajorityofintellectualsandKamaraj,whoalsoresentedthefactthathewasnotconsultedbeforethedecisionwastaken.ThecriticswithintheCongresspartyalsofeltthatsuchacontroversialandunpopulardecisionshouldnothavebeentakeninanelectionyear.Therewasalsothewidespreadresentmentagainstthegovernmentforactingunderforeignpressure.Thedevaluation,ironically,failedinitsstatedobjectivesofincreasingexportsandattractingforeigncapital.Norwasthereasignificantincreaseintheflowoffoodandotherforeignaid.Manyyearslater,in1980,MrsGandhiwastoconfessthatthedevaluation‘wasthewrongthingtodoanditharmedusgreatly.’3

Afewmonthsaftercomingtopower,MrsGandhitookmajorinitiativesinthefieldofforeignaffairs.UrgentlyneedingAmericanwheat,financialaidandcapitalinvestment,sheinitiallytriedtobuildbridgeswiththeUnitedStates,especiallyduringhervisittoWashingtoninMarch1966.PresidentJohnsonpromisedtosend3.5milliontonsoffoodgrainstoIndiaunderPL-480andgive900milliondollarsinaid.ButactualdespatchestoIndiawereirregularandcameinsmallinstalments.Moreover,thePresidenttookchargeofthedispatchesinordertocontroltheiramountandtimingona‘tonbyton’basisandthustoensurethat‘Indiachangeditsfarmpolicy’asalsoitspositiononVietnam.4IndiraGandhifelthumiliatedbythis‘ship-to-mouth’approachbytheUnitedStates,andrefusedtobowbeforesuchham-handedandopenpressure.Shealsodecidedtogetoutofthisvulnerablepositionassoonaspossible.Infact,IndiawasneveragaintotrytocomeclosetotheUSononerousterms.IndiraGandhi’sdisappointmentwiththeUSfoundexpressioninthesphereofforeignpolicy.She

starteddistancingherselffromthatcountry.DuringhervisittoWashington,inMarch-April1966shehadremainedsilentonVietnam.Now,inJuly1966,sheissuedastatementdeploringUSbombingofNorthVietnamanditscapitalHanoi.InthelatterpartofJuly,inMoscow,shesignedajointstatementwiththe

SovietUniondemandinganimmediateandunconditionalendtotheUSbombingandbrandingUSactioninVietnamas‘imperialistaggression’.InWashington,MrsGandhihadagreedtotheUSproposalforanIndo-AmericanEducational

FoundationtobefundedbyPL-480rupeefundstotheextentof300milliondollars.Shenowabandonedtheproposal,partiallybecauseithadbeenvehementlycriticizedbyalargenumberofIndianintellectualsandthoseofleftistopinion,bothinsideandoutsideCongress,asanAmericanefforttopenetrateandcontrolhighereducationandresearchinIndia.MrsGandhidevelopedcloselinkswithNasserofEgyptandTitoofYugoslaviaandbegantostressthe

needfornon-alignedcountriestocooperatepoliticallyandeconomicallyinordertocounterthedangerofneo-colonialismemanatingfromtheUSandWestEuropeancountries.WorriedbytheSovieteffortstobuildbridgeswithPakistanandtooccupyapositionofequidistancefrombothIndiaandPakistan,MrsGandhiassuredtheSovietleadersofIndia’scontinuingfriendship.ShealsoexpressedadesiretoopenadialoguewithChinabuttherewasnothawinSino-Indianrelationsatthetime.Ingeneral,aftertheWashingtonfiasco,shefollowedapolicyofsturdyindependenceinforeignaffairs.The1966wasoneofcontinuouspopularturmoil,ofmasseconomicdiscontentandpoliticalagitations

provokedbyspirallingprices,foodscarcity,growingunemployment,and,ingeneral,deterioratingeconomicconditions.Addingtothisunrestweretherisingandoftenunfulfilledaspirationsofdifferentsectionsofsociety,especiallythelowermiddleclasses.Manywereabletosatisfythembutmanymorewerenot.Moreover,thecapitalistpatternofdevelopmentwasincreasingeconomicdisparitybetweendifferentsocialclasses,strataandgroups.Awaveofpopularagitations—demonstrations,studentstrikesandriots,agitationsbygovernment

servants—commencedataboutthesametimeMrsGandhiwasbeingsworninasprimeminister.Theseagitationsoftenturnedviolent.Anewfeaturewasthebandhswhichmeantclosureofatown,city,orentirestate.Lawandorderoftenbrokedownastheagitatingcrowdsclashedwithlathi-wieldingpolice.Sometimesthearmyhadtobecalledin.Lathi-chargesandpolicefiringsbroughttheadministrationintofurtherdisrepute.Teachersandothermiddleclassprofessionalssuchasdoctorsandengineersalsonowbegantojointheranksofstrikersandagitatorsdemandinghigherpayanddearnessallowancestooffsetthesharpriseinprices.Therewasgrowinglossofpublicconfidenceintheadministrationandtherulingpoliticalleadership.Oppositionpoliticalparties,especially,CPM,SocialistsandJanSangh,tookfulladvantageofthe

popularmoodtocontinuallyembarrassthegovernmentandtooktheleadinorganizingbandhsandotheragitations.Someofthembelievedthatadministrativebreakdownwouldcreateconditionsforthemtocometopowerthroughelectionsorthroughnon-parliamentary,extra-constitutionalmeans.Consequently,theyoftendidnotobservedemocraticboundariesorconstitutionalproprieties.JanSanghandothercommunalforcesalsoorganizedafiercecountry-wideagitationdemandingatotal

banoncow-slaughter,hopingtocashinonthereligiousfeelingsofmanyHindusinthecomingelections.Butthegovernmentstoodfirmagainstthedemandbecauseofitscommunalcharacterandbecausemanyoftheminoritiesandlow-castegroupsamongHindusatebeefbecauseofitslowprice.MrsGandhitoldtheparliament:‘ThisisnotanattackontheGovernment.Itisanattackonourwayoflife,ourvaluesandthetraditionswhichwecherished.’5On7November,amobofhundredsofthousands,ledbynakedsadhus,carryingswords,spearsandtrishuls(tridents),virtuallytriedtoinvadetheParliamentHouse,tryingto

destabiliseconstitutionalgovernmentandburningbusesandcars,lootingshops,attackinggovernmentbuildingsontheway.TheyalsosurroundedKamaraj’shousewiththeintenttoassaulthim.Aclashwiththepoliceoccurredleadingtothedeathofonepolicemanandsixsadhus.BlamingtheHomeMinister,GulzariLalNanda,forinepthandlingofthesituationshedemandedhisresignation.Themovementsoonfizzledoutandcow-slaughterbecameanon-issueevenintheelectionsthatfollowed.Theyear1966alsowitnessedthebeginningofthedownslideoftheparliamentasaninstitution.There

wereconstantdisturbancesandindisciplineintheparliamentwithsomemembersoftheoppositionshowingcompletedisregardforparliamentarydecorumandniceties.Manyatimetheyoungprimeministerwasnotextendedthecourtesyinkeepingwithheroffice.Shewasoftensubjectedtohecklingandharassment,viciousandvulgarpersonalattacks,malechauvinistandsexistreferencesandunfoundedallegations.DrRammanoharLohia,inparticular,missednoopportunityofridiculingher,anddescribedheras‘goongigudiya’(dumbdoll).Evenintheparty,IndiraGandhihadtofacearathertroublesomesituation.Forone,therewasthe

erosionofpopularsupportforCongress.Thepartyhadbeendeclining,becomingdysfunctionalandlosingpoliticalinitiativesinceNehru’stime.Itwasincreasinglyriddenwithgroupismandfactionalrivalriesateverylevel,leadingtotheformationofdissidentgroupsinalmosteverystate.MrsGandhi’sownpositioninthepartyhadremainedweakandinsecure.Onbecomingtheprimeminister,shehadnotbeenabletoformacabinetofherownchoice,havinghadtoleaveallimportantportfolios—Home,Defence,Finance,ExternalAffairs,andFood—undisturbed.Kamaraj,thepartypresident,andtheSyndicateconsistentlytriedtoreassertthepartyorganization’spositionvis-a-vistheprimeminister,andtorestrictherfreedomofactioninframingandimplementingpolicies.Theyalsodidnotletherhavemuchofasayintheparty’sinternalaffairsorintheselectionofcandidatesfortheparliamentaryelections.IndiraGandhihadtotolerateallthisbecauseof1967beinganelectionyear.Also,asapoliticalleader,shesufferedatthistimefromtwomajorweaknesses:shewasineffectiveasaleader—heropponentsquiteoftensucceededinisolatingherintheparliamentarypartyandeveninthecabinet

—andshelacked‘ideologicalmoorings’.

The1967GeneralElectionsandStateCoalitions

ThefourthgeneralelectionstotheLokSabhaandthestateassemblies,heldinFebruary1967,hadaradicalimpactonIndianpolitics.Therun-uptotheelectionsandtheelectionsthemselvesweremarkedbyseveralfeatures.TheCongresspartyhadexhausteditsmandateandlostitscharacterandmotivationasapartyofsocial

andinstitutionalchange.Therewaslarge-scaledisenchantment,especiallywithitstopleaders,becauseofcorruptionandthelavishlifestyleofmanyofthem.ManyoftheregionalandlocalCongressbosseswereperceivedbythepeopleasbeingdevotedtoloavesandfishesofoffice,politicalwheelingdealingandfactionalinfighting.AtthesametimepeoplefeltfrustratedbecausetherewasnootherpartywhichcouldreplaceCongress.Theoppositionpartiesdidnotraiseanybasicsocialissuesduringtheelectioncampaign.TheycampaignedmainlyonthequestionofdefeatingCongress.Therewas,however,agreatpoliticalawakeningamongthepeople;in1967theturnoutoftheeligiblevoterswas,at61.1percent,thehighestwitnessedsofar.

Congresshadbeendecliningsince1964.Itnowwentintoelections,undertheleadershipoftheSyndicate,weakened,dividedandfaction-ridden,withtheleadershipshowinglittleawarenessoftheparty’sdeclineinpublicsupportandestimation.Earlierfactionalismhadbeenconfinedtothestates,nowitalsoengulfedtheCentre.Earlier,thecentralleadershipmoderatedconflictsatthestatelevel,sothatthedissidentsdidnotfeelisolated.NowthecentralleadershipsupportedthedominantgroupsinthestatesinordertosecureitsownpositionattheCentre.AspointedoutbyZareerMasani,‘Theresultwasacontinuouspower-struggleatalllevelsofCongressleadershipandtherapiderosionofsuchpartydiscipline,confidenceandcomradeshipasCongresshadbuiltupduringtheIndependencemovement,andwithoutwhichitcouldnothopetoremainunited.’6

FactionalisminCongresswasfullyreflectedintheselectionofpartycandidates.TheticketdistributionwasdominatedbytheSyndicatememberswhoactedinahighlypartisanmanner.NearlyathousandCongressmen,whohadbeendeniedtickets,nowchosetostandagainsttheofficialCongresscandidatesasindependentsorasmembersofnewstate-leveldissidentgroups.Animportantfeatureofthe1967electionswasthecomingtogetheroftheoppositionparties;someof

themformedanti-Congressfrontsinsomestates.Inothercases,theyenteredintoaseriesofelectoraladjustmentsbysharingseatsandavoidingcontests.Quiteoften,thedissidentCongresspartiesandgroupsalsojoinedthisprocess.Butthecoalescingpartieswereinalmostallcasesideologicallyandprogrammaticallydisparate,theironlycement,beingthedesiretodefeatCongress.LohiaSocialistswerethemostpromiscuous—theydidnothesitatetojointhecommunalJanSanghandtherightistSwatantra.Similarly,inmanystatesthesecularSwatantraandthecommunalJanSanghjoinedforces.Inafewstates,theCommunist-right-wingdividewasalsobridged.InTamilNadu,Swatantra,CPM,MuslimLeagueandthechauvinistDMKwerepartners.CPMandMuslimLeaguewerealliesinKerala,aswereJanSangh,AkalisandCPMinPunjab.TheelectionresultsweredramaticandCongresssufferedaserioussetback.Thoughitsucceededin

retainingcontroloftheLokSabha—itwon284outof520seats—itsmajoritywasdrasticallyreducedfrom228in1962to48.ExceptinWestBengalandKerala,wheretheleftpartiesgained,thebeneficiariesoftheCongressdeclinewerethecommunal,feudal,right-wingandregionalparties.Congressalsolostitsmajorityintheassembliesofeightstates—Bihar,U.P.,Rajasthan,Punjab,WestBengal,Orissa,MadrasandKerala.JanSanghemergedasthemainoppositionpartyinU.P.,MadhyaPradeshandHaryana,SwatantrainOrissa,Rajasthan,AndhraPradeshandGujarat,SSPinBihar,andtheCommunistsinWestBengalandKerala.The1967electionsrevealedcertainlong-termtrendsandalsohadcertainlong-termconsequences.

ApartfromgeneraldisenchantmentwithCongressbecauseofthevariousfactorsmentionedintheprevioussection,defectionbytherichandmiddlepeasantsfromtheCongresscampplayedamajorroleintheCongressdebacleinthenorthernstates.Asaresultofthelandreformsoftheearlyfifties,landownershipandsocialpowerhadgradually

shiftedtotherichpeasants.Theyfeltthattheirnewlyacquiredeconomicpositionandsocialstatus,associatedwithcontrolofland,wasthreatenedbytheprojectedfoodgrainsprocurementpolicies,thelandreformsandotherpopulistrhetoricofCongress,especiallyofIndiraGandhiandtheCongressleftists.Therewasalsogrowingclasscleavageinthecountryside,andanypoliticalawakeningorincreaseinthebargainingpoweroflandlesslabourwouldendangerrichpeasantdominationofthe

village.Therichpeasantswantedtoplayafargreater,infact,thehegemonicrole,intheclassalliancesthatCongresshadforgedandtogetthegovernmentpolicieschangeddirectlyintheirfavour.InSouthIndia,classandcastestructureorconfigurationwasdifferentfromthatintheNorthandthe

largepresenceofCommunistskepttherurallandownerstiedtoCongress.Moreover,alternativerichpeasantpartieswerenon-existent.InBihar,U.P.andPunjab,ontheotherhand,alternativepartiesintheformofSSP,BKD,andAkaliDalwereavailabletoactasvehiclesofrichpeasantinterests.Inreality,Congresswasnowhereanti-richpeasantbutitwassoperceivedinNorthIndiabecauseofits

radicalrhetoric.ItisalsotruethatCongress,couldnotagreetofullysatisfyrichpeasantdemandswithoutalienatingtheruralpoororendangeringthepathofeconomicdevelopmentandindustrializationithadadopted.Therichpeasantsalsohadtheadvantageofcarryingwiththemlargesegmentsofthemiddleandeven

smallpeasants.Theysharedacommonideologyofpeasantproprietorshipandcommonaspirationstoownandcontrolland.Tosomeextent,theysharedcommoninterestsintermsofthepricesofagriculturalproductsandrelationshipwithagriculturallabourers.Theyalsobelongedtothesameintermediateorbackwardcastes.Therichpeasantsalsoincreasinglycontrolledruralvote-banksandthereforethevoteofthemarginalfarmersandagriculturallabourers,havinggraduallydisplacedfeudalandsemi-feudallandlordsfromthatrole.Theyalsohadthenecessarymusclepowertopreventtheagriculturallabourers,thelargenumberofthembeingDalits(ScheduledCastes),fromgoingtothepollingbooths.The1967electionsheraldedtheeraofthegreaterimportanceofrichandmiddlepeasantsinIndian

politics,theirhegemonyovertheruralsocial,economicandpoliticalscene,andtheirdislikeofCongressandCommunistswhichpersiststillthisday.Onlyacoalitionofsmallpeasantsandagriculturallabourerscouldchallengethishegemony.AndthisiswhatIndiraGandhitriedtoaccomplishelectorallyin1971withoutattackingtheinterestsoftherichpeasantry.

CoalitionGovernments

The1967electionsalsoinitiatedthedualeraofshort-livedcoalitiongovernmentsandpoliticsofdefection.ThoughtheelectionsbrokeCongress’smonopolyofpowerinthestates,Congresswasreplacednotbyasinglepartyinanyofthestatesbutbyamultiplicityofpartiesandgroupsandindependents.Coalitiongovernmentswereformedinallopposition-ruledstatesexceptinTamilNadu.InPunjab,BiharandU.P.,oppositiongovernmentsincludedSwatantra,JanSangh,BKD,SocialistsandCPI.ThoughCPMdidnotjointhesegovernments,it,too,activelysupportedthem.Thus,thesegovernmentswereideologicallyheterogeneous;andtheleft-rightorsecular-communaldivideswerealmostcompletelybridgedinthem.Congresstooformedcoalitiongovernmentsinsomeofthestateswhereithadbeenreducedtoa

minority,allyingwithindependentsandbreakawaygroupsfromtheoppositionparties.ExcepttheDMKgovernmentinTamilNaduandtheSwatantra-ledgovernmentinOrissa,thecoalition

governmentsinalltheotherstates,whetherformedbyCongressortheopposition,provedtobehighlyunstableandcouldnotstayinpowerforlong.Allthecoalitiongovernmentssufferedfromconstanttensionsandinternalstrainsbecauseoftheheterogeneityofthepartners.Mostoften,exceptinWestBengalandKerala,thecontinuousbargainingamongthepartnerswasnotonpoliciesbutonministerialberths,patronage,andinterestgroups.Thisalsoledtobloatedcabinets.Thesegovernmentswouldget

formed,breakupasaresultofchangingloyaltiesofMLAsandthengetre-formedagain.Parties,includingCongress,wouldtoppleexistinggovernments,changepartnersandformnewgovernments.Inbetweengovernments,astatewouldsometimesundergoaperiodofPresident’sRuleorevenmid-termpolls,whichseldomchangedthepatternofseatsintheassembly.Thus,fromthe1967generalelectionstotheendof1970,Biharhadsevengovernments,U.P.four,Haryana,MadhyaPradesh,PunjabandWestBengalthreeeachandKeralatwogovernmentalchanges,withatotalofeightspellsofPresident’sRuleinthesevenstates.Inthetopplingandfreshgovernmentformationgame,smallpartiesandindependentscametoplayanimportantrole.Theotherimportantfeatureofthecoalitiongovernmentsoftheperiodwasthebeginningofthepolitics

ofdefection.Manyofthegovernmentalchangesinthenorthernstatesweretheresultofdefectionsorfloorcrossingsbyindividuallegislators,bothpartymembersandindependents.Corruptlegislatorsindulgedinhorse-tradingandfreelychangedsides,attractedmainlybylureofofficeormoney.InHaryana,wherethedefectionphenomenonwasfirstinitiated,defectinglegislatorsbegantobecalledAyaRamandGayaRam(in-comingRamandout-goingRam).Consequently,exceptinthecaseofthetwoCommunistpartiesandJanSangh,partydisciplinetendedtobreakdown.Between1967and1970nearly800assemblymemberscrossedthefloor,andnearly155ofthemwererewardedwithministerialoffices.Theproblemofdefectionswastobecomelongtermandperpetualbecausedefectors,whochanged

sidesandtoppledgovernmentsforpurelypersonalandoftencorruptreasons,wereseldompunishedbythevotersandwereelectedagainandagain.Itwasonlywiththepassageoftheanti-defectionlawbytheRajivGandhigovernmentin1986thatacheckwasplacedonthedefectionphenomenon.Interestingly,throughoutthisriseandfallofmanystategovernments,thecentralgovernmentremained

stabledespitethesmallmajorityenjoyedbytherulingparty.NordiddefectionstakeplaceattheCentredespitetheabsenceofananti-defectionlaw.Similarly,despiteatonetimenearlyhalfthestatesbeingruledbytheOpposition,thefederalsystemcontinuedtofunctionmoreorlessasbefore.Also,eveninthestatestheinstabilityofgovernmentsdidnotleadtothebreakdownofadministration.Anti-Congressismgainedgroundwiththeseelectionsbothamongtheoppositionpartiesandalarge

sectionoftheintelligentsia.Anti-Congressismasapoliticalphenomenonis,ofcourse,tobedistinguishedfromoppositiontoCongress,whichwasbasedondifferencesinideology,policiesorprogramme.Ontheotherhand,anti-Congressismrepresented‘awearinesswithCongressandahankeringafteralmostanythingelse.’7Theanti-CongressintellectualsandtheSocialistswerewillingtobackanypartyfromCPMtoBKDtoJanSanghinordertoweakenCongress.CPMandCPIalsoincreasinglyadoptedsuchaposition.Thehigh-priestofanti-CongressismwasRammanoharLohiawho,inthewordsofthepoliticalscientistRajniKothari,devotedhimself‘tothemissionofdestroyingtheCongressmonopolyofpowerbyunitingallanti-Congressforcesinthecountry.’8Lohiadidsucceedinpolarizingthepolityin1967alongCongressversusanti-Congresslinesbuttheresultswerenot,andhavenotbeen,eitherpositiveorenduring.Anti-Congressismalsoignoredthefactthatmostoppositionpartieswereclosertosomewingorthe

otherofCongressthantoanotheroppositionparty.TheCommunistsandSocialistswere,forexample,closertotheCongressleftandSwatantratotheCongressright,whileJanSanghwas,becauseofitscommunalideology,opposedbothtoCongressandothersecularpartiesintheOpposition.

TheseriousCongressreversesledmanycommentatorstopredictthatitwasthebeginningoftheendofCongressdominationofIndianpolitics.But,infact,thiswasnotso.Congresswasstillnotonlythelargestpartyinthecountrywithamajorityintheparliamentbutalsotheonlynation-widepartywithanation-wideorganizationandfollowing.Also,therewasnocohesiveOpposition,andtheoppositionpartieshadfailedtokeeppowerinthestateswhereCongresshadbecomeaminority.Atthesametime,thereisnodoubtthatCongresswouldnowhavetolookforfreshpoliticalwaysofattractingpeople,whohadhadenoughofpromisesandwantedconcreteresults.ItcouldnolongergetsupportonthebasisofitsroleinthefreedomstruggleoritsachievementsduringtheNehruera;itwouldhavetorenewitself.The1967electionsdrasticallychangedthebalanceofpowerinsideCongress.Itsdominantleadership

intheformoftheSyndicatereceivedamajorblowasseveralSyndicatestalwarts,includingKamaraj(itsPresident),AtulyaGhosh(WestBengal)andS.K.Patil(Bombay),bitthedust.MostoftheloyalfollowersoftheSyndicatefailedtogetelectedtotheparliamentandthestateassemblies,leavingtheminnopositiontocontroltheprocessofgovernment-formationattheCentreastheyhaddonein1964and1966.Paradoxically,despitetheshocktoCongress,IndiraGandhi’spositioninthepartyandthegovernment

wasnotweakened.Onthecontrary,itfurtherstrengthenedasKamarajandtheSyndicate,havingbeencutdowntosize,werenolongerinapositiontochallengeher.Moreover,thoughnotyetapopularortoweringleaderlikeJawaharlalNehru,shehadbeenthestarandtheonlyall-Indiacampaignerandvote-catcherforCongress.IndiraGandhi’sindependentandstrongpositioninthepartywasdemonstratedbyherunchallenged

leadershipoftheCongressparliamentarypartyandherrelativeindependenceintheformationofherCabinetanddistributionofportfolios.Theonlychallengetoher,thatfromMorarjiDesai,soonpeteredoutasheshiedawayfromacontestand,instead,bargainedforapositioninthecabinetasdeputyprimeminister.Giventheparty’sfragilemajorityintheparliament,IndiraGandhiagreedtoDesai’sdemand.Thedesignationofdeputyprimeministerwas,however,amereformality—itgavestatusbutnospecialpowersintheCabinetexceptthoseofhispositionasthefinanceminister.Theyears1967-1969provedtobeameretransitionalstageorinterregnum.Thegovernmentmarked

timeasCongressmovedtowardsasplitin1969,whichmarkedanewstageinIndianpoliticaldevelopment.Therewas,however,amajordevelopmentonthelefttowhichwewillbrieflyturnbelow.

TheNaxalites

TheCPMhadoriginallysplitfromtheunitedCPIin1964ongroundsofdifferencesoverrevolutionarypolitics(oftenequatedwitharmedstruggle)andreformistparliamentarypolitics.Inpractice,however,heedingtheexistingpoliticalrealities,theCPMparticipatedactivelyinparliamentarypolitics,postponingarmedstruggletothedaywhenarevolutionarysituationprevailedinthecountry.Consequently,itparticipatedinthe1967electionsandformedacoalitiongovernmentinWestBengalwiththeBanglaCongress,withJyotiBasu,theCPMleader,becomingthehomeminister.Thisledtoaschismintheparty.Asectionoftheparty,consistinglargelyofitsyoungercadresandinspiredbytheCulturalRevolution

thengoingoninChina,accusedthepartyleadershipoffallingpreytoreformismandparliamentarianismand,therefore,ofbetrayingtherevolution.Theyarguedthatthepartymustinsteadimmediatelyinitiatearmedpeasantinsurrectionsinruralareas,leadingtotheformationofliberatedareasandthegradual

extensionofthearmedstruggletotheentirecountry.Toimplementtheirpoliticalline,therebelCPMleaderslaunchedapeasantuprisinginthesmallNaxalbariareaofnorthernWestBengal.TheCPMleadershipimmediatelyexpelledtherebelleaders,accusingthemofleft-wingadventurism,andusedthepartyorganizationandgovernmentmachinerytosuppresstheNaxalbariinsurrection.ThebreakawayCPMJeaderscametobeknownasNaxalitesandweresoonjoinedbyothersimilargroupsfromCPMintherestofthecountry.TheNaxalitemovementdrewmanyyoungpeople,especiallycollegeanduniversitystudents,whoweredissatisfiedwithexistingpoliticsandangryattheprevailingsocialconditionandwereattractedbyradicalNaxaliteslogans.In1969,theConununistPartyMarxist-Leninist(ML)wasformedundertheleadershipofCharu

Majumdar.SimilarpartiesandgroupswereformedinAndhra,Orissa,Bihar,U.P.,PunjabandKerala.TheCP(ML)andotherNaxalitegroupsarguedthatdemocracyinIndiawasasham,theIndianstatewasfascist,agrarianrelationsinIndiawerestillbasicallyfeudal,theIndianbigbourgeoisiewascomprador,IndiawaspoliticallyandeconomicallydominatedbyU.S.,BritishandSovietimperialisms,Indianpolityandeconomywerestillcolonial,theIndianrevolutionwasstillinitsanti-imperialist,anti-feudalstage,andprotractedguerrillawarfareontheChinesemodelwastheformrevolutionwouldtakeinIndia.TheNaxalitegroupsgotpoliticalandideologicalsupportfromtheChinesegovernmentwhich,however,frownedupontheCP(ML)sloganof‘China’sChairman(MaoZe-Dong)isourChairman.’CP(ML)andotherNaxalitegroupssucceededinorganizingarmedpeasantbandsinsomeruralareas

andinattackingpolicemenandrivalcommunistsasagentsoftherulingclasses.Thegovernment,however,succeededinsuppressingthemandlimitingtheirinfluencetoafewpocketsinthecountry.Notabletofacestaterepression,theNaxalitessoonsplitintoseveralsplintergroupsandfactions.ButtherealreasonfortheirfailurelayintheirinabilitytoroottheirradicalisminIndianreality,tograspthecharacterofIndiansocietyandpolityasalsotheevolvingagrarianstructureandtowidentheirsocialbaseamongthepeasantsandradicalmiddleclassyouth.ThedisavowaloftheCulturalRevolutionandMaoismofthesixtiesandearlyseventiesbythepost-MaoChineseleadershipinthelateseventiescontributedfurthertothecollapseoftheNaxalitemovementasasignificanttrendinIndianpolitics.

17TheIndiraGandhiYears,1969-73

Congresssplitin1969.Theeventwastheoutcomeofamultiplicityoffactors.WehavealreadydiscussedinthepreviouschapterthedecayoftheCongresspartywhichwasreflectedintheelectoraldebacleof1967.DiscerningCongressmenrealizedthatsubstantialstepshadtobetakentoreversetheprocessandrejuvenatethepartyandthegovernmentandthatmeremanipulationwouldnotwork.ThisalsobecameevidentwhenCongressfaredquitebadlyinthemid-termelectionsinfourstatesinFebruary1969.Thesplitof1969wasinpartananswertopeople’sthinkingofwhatshouldbedoneinthesecircumstances.Thedeteriorationinthesocio-economicsituation,discussedinthepreviouschapter,continued.The

rateofeconomicgrowthhadbeenslowingdownsince1962andplanningwasinacrisis.Domesticsavingsandtherateofinvestmentwerestagnatingorevenfalling.USaidhadshrunkin1968tohalfofwhatitwasin1964-65.Corruption,theblackeconomyandblackmoneyhadgrownbyleapsandbounds.Consequently,therewaswidespreadunrestinthecountrysideandgrowthofdiscontentintheurbanareasamongthelower-middleclasses,studentsandtheworkingclass.Moreover,therewasagrowingtendencyamongthediscontentedtotakerecoursetoextra-constitutionalandevenviolentmeansasexemplifiedbythegrowthoftheNaxalitemovementsindifferentpartsofthecountry.Theemergenceofanewformofindustrialactioncalledgheraounderwhichworkers’besiegedthefactorymanagersintheirofficesforhoursorevendaystilltheirdemandsweremetwasanothersuchexample.Thegheraotacticspreadlatertootherspheresoflifesuchaseducationalinstitutions.ThepoliticaltensioninsideCongressovertheunsettledquestionofrelationsbetweenitsministerial

andorganizationwings,referredtointhelastchapter,becamemorepronounced.ThoughIndiraGandhihadacquiredacertaincontroloverthegovernmentaftertheblowsufferedbytheSyndicatein1967elections,shehadhardlyanyorganizationalbaseintheparty.Moreover,afterthere-electionofKamarajandS.K.Patiltotheparliamentinby-elections,theSyndicatemembers,joinedbyMorarjiDesai,theiroldfoe,onceagainassertedthatthepartyanditsWorkingCommitteeshouldformulatepoliciesandthegovernmentshouldbeaccountabletothepartyorgansfortheirimplementation.TheywouldalsonotletIndiraGandhi‘meddle’inpartyaffairs.OnKamaraj’sretirementaspartypresidentattheendof1967,theyfoiledIndiraGandhi’sattempttohaveafriendlypersonelectedtosucceedhim.Instead,thepostwenttotheconservativeNijalingappa,anoriginalmemberoftheSyndicate.IndiraGandhiwasalsonotabletohavesomeofherpeopleelectedtothenewWorkingCommittee.During1968-69,theSyndicatemembers,followingthelogicoftheirapproach,begantoactivelyplot

todislodgeIndiraGandhifromtheofficeoftheprimeminister.On12March1969,Nijalingappawroteinhisdiary:‘Iamnotsureifshe(MrsGandhi)deservestocontinueasP.M.Possiblysoontheremaybeashowdown.’Andon25AprilhewrotethatDesai‘discussedthenecessityoftheP.M.beingremoved.’1

IndiraGandhi’sresponsetotheSyndicate’sassertionwasquitecautiousandcalculated.Shedidnotwanttojeopardizetheunityofthepartyandtheexistenceofhergovernmentbyprecipitatingaconflictwiththeorganizationalwing,especiallyasthepartyenjoyedonlyasmallmajorityintheLokSabha.Shealsorealizedthatshehadhardlyanyorganizationalbaseintheparty.Thereupon,shetriedhardtoavoidanopenconflictandasplitandtoaccommodatetheSyndicateandDesaiinbothcabinet-makingandpolicies.Butshewouldnotcompromiseinregardtothesupremepositionandpowersoftheprimeministerorofthegovernmentoveritspoliciesandadministration.Thegovernment,shesaid,deriveditsauthorityfromtheparliamentandthepeoplethroughelectionsandnotfromthepartyorganization.Therefore,whenfacedwithadirectchallengetoherposition,shetooktheplungeandfoughtbackwithunexpectedstrengthandruthlessness.She,too,decidedtoacquireapreponderantpositionintheparty.Theinner-partystruggleinCongressalsoacquiredanideologicalcomplexion.Verysoonafterthe1967

elections,twointerlinkedquestionsbecamesignificant.Firstly,howwerethegrowingpopularprotestsandtheaccompanyingviolencetobehandled?Secondly,howwasthepartytoreverseitsdeclineandrecoveritspopularappeal?Thepartywassoondividedonbroadlyright-leftlinesinaddressingthesequestions,asalsoregardingthefutureorientationofitseconomicandpoliticalpolicies.ThoughCongresshadalwaysbeenideologicallyheterogeneous,accommodatingdiverseideological

strandsandsectionalinterests,ithadalwaysleanedtowardsavagueradicalism,nurturingaleft-of-centreimage.TheinitialresponseofmostCongressmentotherubbingtheirpartyhadreceivedin1967electionswastotilttotheleft.Thus,inMay1967,theCongressWorkingCommitteeadoptedaradicalTen-PointProgrammewhichincludedsocialcontrolofbanks,nationalizationofgeneralinsurance,statetradinginimportandexporttrade,ceilingsonurbanpropertyandincome,curbonbusinessmonopoliesandconcentrationofeconomicpower,publicdistributionoffoodgrains,rapidimplementationoflandreforms,provisionofhouse-sitestotheruralpoor,andabolitionofprincelyprivileges.ButtheCongressright,thoughalwaystherebutearliersubduedbyNehru,nowgrewmoreassertive

andwaswillingtoopenlyadvocatemoreright-wingpolicies.RepresentedbyMorarjiDesaiandNijalingappa,thenewCongresspresident,andothermembersoftheSyndicate,excludingKamaraj,ithadonlyformallyacceptedtheTen-PointProgrammeandwasdeterminedtostallitsimplementation.Therightwinginsteadadvocated,(a)intheeconomicfield,furtherdilutionofplanning,lesseremphasisonpublicsector,andgreaterencouragementtoandrelianceonprivateenterpriseandforeigncapital,(b)inforeignpolicy,strengtheningofpoliticalandeconomicrelationswiththeWestingeneralandtheUnitedStatesinparticularand(c)inthepoliticalfield,suppressionoftheleftandprotestmovements,especiallythoseoftheruralpoorinordertogetbackthesupportofrichpeasantsandlargelandowners.TheCongressleft,ontheotherhand,arguedforanewpoliticalandeconomicstrategythatwouldgo

backtoandfurtherdevelopNehru’ssocialisticagendaandfurtherdeepenthepoliticalprocess.ItwantedthatCongressshouldimmediatelyimplementtheTen-PointProgrammeandenhanceitsappealtotheurbanandruralpoorandthedisadvantagedsocialgroupssuchasHarijans,tribals,minoritiesandwomenonthebasisofaprogrammeofradicalreforms.TheCongressshouldneutralizeworking-classmilitancyviaeconomicconcessionsratherthanthroughadministrativesuppression.Ingeneral,itwishedCongressshouldonceagainbecomethevehicleforsocialchangeandeconomicdevelopment.Vigorousplanningandrapidindustrialization,andreduceddependenceonforeigncollaborationshouldberesumed.Theleftputemphasisonthereconstructionofthepartyonthebasisofdemocraticfunctioninganditsreactivation

atthegrassrootstoputanendtobossism.Inforeignpolicy,theleftadvocatedcloserrelationswiththeSovietblocandYugoslavia,Egyptandothernonalignedcountries.AsconflictbetweentherightandtheleftdevelopedwithintheCongressparty,therightalsoadvocated

greaterpartydisciplineandreigninginoftheYoungTurksandotherleftists.Theleft,ontheotherhand,openlyattackedMorarjiDesaiastherepresentativeofbigbusinessandpressedforthefullnationalizationofbanks,abolitionoftheprivypursesoftheex-rulers,andacompletebanoncompanydonationstopoliticalparties.Interestingly,asthestrugglebetweentheCongressrightandleftintensified,bothstartedrelyingonthe

outsidesupportoftheoppositionpartiesclosertothemideologically.InthewordsofZareerMasani,‘the“YoungTurks”...favouredcooperationwiththeCommunistsandotherLeftparties,theSyndicateleanedtowardsanunderstandingwiththeRight-wingSwatantraandJanSangh.Bothsidessaw“like-minded”OppositionpartiesaspotentialalliesinacoalitiongovernmentattheCentreintheeventoftheCongresssplitting.’2

Initially,withaviewtoavoidorganizationalandideologicalpolarizationandasplitintheparty,IndiraGandhiadoptedacautious,non-partisanattitudeintheheateddebatebetweentherightandtheleftintheparty.Butbeingquitesensitivebothtopeople’sneedsandtotheirmoods,shebecameconvincedthatthepartyaswellasthecountrycouldflourishonlyunderleft-of-centreradicalprogrammesandpolicies.Gradually,overtime,shebegan,hesitatinglyandcautiously,tooptfortheleft’sapproachandeconomicpolicies.ItwasthedeathofPresidentZakirHusaininMay1969thatprecipitatedtheeventsleadingtothelong-

awaitedsplitinCongress.WhilethePresident’spositionintheIndianConstitutionisthatofaformalheadofthestate,incaseofahungparliament,wherenopartyenjoyedamajority,hecouldplayadecisivepoliticalrolebyinvitingoneofthecontendersfortheprimeminister’soffice.TheSyndicatewasthereforedeterminedtohavetheirownmanoccupythePresident’soffice.InthepartyconclaveatBangalorefrom11to13July,theSyndicate,enjoyingamajorityintheCongressparliamentaryboard,anddespiteIndiraGandhi’sopposition,nominatedSanjivaReddy,aprominentmemberoftheSyndicate,astheCongresscandidateforpresidentship.FeelingdriventothewallandawareoftheSyndicate’sultimatedesigntooustherfromofficebyusing

SanjivaReddy’spresidency,IndiraGandhidecidedtofightwithnoholdsbarred,riskall,andcarrythebattletotheopponents’campwithradicalideologyashermainweapon.WithindaysoftheBangaloremeeting,on18July,shetookawaytheFinanceportfoliofromDesaionthegroundsthatasaconservativehewasincapableofimplementingherradicalprogramme.MorarjiwasleftwithnooptionbuttoresignfromtheCabinet.AssumingtheFinanceportfolioherself,IndiraGandhiimmediately,on21July,announcedthenationalizationoffourteenmajorbanksthroughapresidentialordinance.Shealsoannouncedherplantowithdrawthespecialprivilegesoftheprinces.Thecommonpeoplewelcomedherannouncementsenthusiastically,asdidtheentireleft.Herpopularitysoaredasshewasseenasachampionofthemasses.TheSyndicateandDesai,however,decidedtoswallowthehumiliation,andwaitforReddytobe

electedasthePresident.ButIndiraGandhiwasbeginningtoplayhercardswell.Reddywasopposedbytheseniorstatesman,CD.Deshmukh,asthecandidateofSwatantrataandJanSangh,andV.V.Giri,the

Vice-President,whohaddecidedtostandasanindependent,supportedbythetwoCommunistparties,SSP,DMK,MuslimLeagueandasectionoftheAkaliDal.IndiraGandhiwantedtosupportGiri,butdidnotknowhowshecouldgoagainstherparty’scandidate

whosenominationpapersshehadfiled.AtthisstagetheSyndicatemadeamajorblunder.ToassureReddy’selection,NijalingappamettheleadersofJanSanghandSwatantraandpersuadedthemtocasttheirsecondpreferencevotes,onceC.D.Deshmukhhadbeeneliminatedinthefirstround,infavourofReddy.IndiraGandhiimmediatelyaccusedtheSyndicateofhavingstruckasecretdealwithcommunalandreactionaryforcesinordertooustherfrompower.Shenow,moreorlessopenly,supportedGiribyrefusingtoissueapartywhipinfavourofReddyandbyaskingCongressMPsandMLAstovotefreelyaccordingtotheir‘conscience’.Intheelection,nearlyone-thirdofthemdefiedtheorganizationalleadershipandvotedforGiri,whowasdeclaredelectedbyanarrowmarginon20August.Thetwosidessparredforsometime,withIndiraGandhioccupyingthehighgroundofsocialismand

democracy.On8November,inanopenlettertoallCongressmen,shedeclared:‘Whatwewitnesstodayisnotamereclashofpersonalitiesandcertainlynotafightforpower...Itisaconflictbetweenthosewhoareforsocialism,forchangeandforthefullestinternaldemocracyanddebateintheorganization...andthosewhoareforthestatusquo,forconformism...TheCongressstandsfordemocracy,secularism,socialismandnon-alignmentininternationalrelations.’3TheSyndicateinturnaccusedIndiraGandhiofhypocrisy,desiringtoconcentrateallpowerinherhands,andtryingtoestablishaCommunistdictatorship.Intheend,on12November,thedefeatedandhumiliatedSyndicatetookdisciplinaryactionagainst

IndiraGandhiandexpelledherfromthepartyforhavingviolatedpartydiscipline.ThepartyhadfinallysplitwithIndiraGandhisettinguparivalorganization,whichcametobeknownasCongress(R)—RforRequisitionists.TheSyndicate-dominatedCongresscametobeknownasCongress(O)—OforOrganization.Inthefinalcountdown,220oftheparty’sLokSabhaMPswentwithIndiraGandhiand68withtheSyndicate.IntheAllIndiaCongressCommitteetoo446ofits705memberswalkedovertoIndira’sside.TheCongress(R)wasbynomeansaleftistpartyfor,liketheoldCongress,itstillcontainedtheentire

spectrumofpolitical,socialandeconomicopinion.Buttherewasonebigdifference.Itnowclearlyoccupiedtheleft-of-centrepositioninIndianpoliticsjustastheCongress(O)didtheright-of-centre.Further,IndiraGandhiwasnowtheunchallengedleaderofboththegovernmentandthenewparty,whichsoonbecametherealCongress.Shealsohadthemassofthepeople,boththemiddleclassesandthepoor,andalargesectionoftheintelligentsiabehindher.Infact,theextentofherpoliticalpowerfarsurpassedanythingthatherfatherhadeverenjoyed.

Towardsthe1971GeneralElections

DespiteherimmensepopularityandclearvictoryovertheSyndicate,IndiraGandhiwasstillpoliticallyvulnerableforherpartydidnotcommandamajorityintheparliament.Shewasdependentonissue-basedsupportbythetwoCommunistparties,someSocialists,DMK,AkaliDal,andsomeindependents.Inspiteofthis,carryingonwithherleft-of-centrestance,sheundertookseveralradicalsteps.When,inFebruary1970,theSupremeCourtinvalidatedbanknationalizationonthegroundsthatitwasdiscriminatoryandthecompensationpaidwasinadequate,thegovernmentusedapresidentialordinancetorenationalize

themafterovercomingthelegallacunae.Italsoinitiatedseveralschemesforthenationalizedbankstograntloanstosmall-scaleentrepreneurs,farmers,rickshawandtaxidrivers.etc.InAugust1970,whenthegovernmentlostbyonevoteintheRajyaSabhaaconstitutionalamendmentto

abolishtheprivypursesandotherprivilegesoftheprinces,itissuedapresidentialorderderecognizingtheprincesandthusendingalltheirmonetaryandotherprivileges.Thisordertoowas,however,immediatelyinvalidatedbytheSupremeCourt.Thegovernmentabolishedthemanagingagencysystem,whichhadenabledahandfulofcapitaliststo

controlalargenumberofindustrialenterprisesinwhichtheyhadlittleornofinancialstake.ThegovernmentappointedaMonopoliesandRestrictiveTradePractices(MRTP)Commission,undertheMRTPActpassedin1969,tochecktheconcentrationofeconomicpowerinthehandsofafewleadingbusinessfamilies.IndiraGandhiaskedthechiefministerstoimplementmorerigorouslytheexistinglandreformlawsandtoundertakefurtherlandceilingslegislation.Thegovernmentalsolaunchedthemuch-postponedFourthFiveYearPlan,itsinvestmentoutlaybeingdoublethatoftheThirdPlan.IndiraGandhi’smainpoliticalachievementwasthatshecheckedthemoodofdespair,frustrationand

cynicismthathadprevailedsince1962andinitiatedaclimateofhopeandoptimism.Asaresultofherradicalandegalitarianprogrammeandslogans,IndiraGandhi’spopularitygrewfurther;andshereplenishedtheCongressparty’ssocialsupportbase,especiallyamongtheruralandurbanpoorand,tosomeextent,amongthemiddleclasses.Notsurprisingly,therichpeasantsandthecapitalistswerefurtheralienatedfromher.Becauseherswasaminoritygovernment,IndiraGandhifeltrestrictedandfrustratedbyher

dependenceonotherpartiesforgettinglegislationpassedintheLokSabha.Toovercomethissituation,shewaslookingforanissueonwhichtogotothepolls.ThisopportunityarosewhentheSupremeCourtrefusedtoletherabolishtheprivypursesoftheprinces.On27December1970shedissolvedtheLokSabhaandcalledelectionsinFebruary1972,oneyearaheadoftime.Thenon-Communistoppositionparties—Cong(O),JanSangh,SwatantraandtheSamyuktaSocialist

Party(SSP)—formedanopportunistic,unprincipledelectoralallianceknownastheGrandAlliance.Intheabsenceofanyideologicalcoherenceandpositivecommonprogramme,theGrandAllianceconcentrateditsfireonthepersonofIndiraGandhi.‘IndiraHatao’,(RemoveIndira)becameitscampaignsloganandascurrilousroundofpersonalabuseandcharacter-assassinationofIndiraGandhithemaincontentofitselectionpropaganda.Insharpcontrast,IndiraGandhirefusedtoreciprocateinkind,avoidedpersonalattacksand

campaignedonnationalissueswithageneralemphasisonsocialchange,democracy,secularismandsocialism.Morespecificallyshefocussedonthegrowthofthepublicsector,impositionofceilingonrurallandholdingsandurbanproperty,removalofglaringdisparitiesinincomeandopportunity,andabolitionofprincelyprivileges.Inparticular,sheconcentratedherfireontheJanSanghasadivisivecommunalforceandtheleft-wingextremistsforpromotingviolence.Sheappealeddirectlytothevoterstodefeatthosewhowerecominginthewayofhereffortstobringaboutsocialchange.Thedeprivedanddisadvantagedgroupsshetargettedwerethelandlesslabourers,ScheduledCastesandTribes,minorities,women,andtheunemployedanddisaffectedyouth.Shecounteredthesloganof‘IndiraHatao’withthemoreeffectiveslogan‘GaribiHatao’(RemovePoverty).Tothemiddleclassesandthepropertiedshe

promisedastrongandstablegovernment,actionagainstforcesofviolenceanddisorderandfullscopetotheprivatesectortoplayitsproperroleinthemixedeconomy.TheresultsoftheFebruaryelectionsturnedouttobeanoverwhelmingpersonaltriumphforIndira

GandhiandarudeshocktotheOpposition.Congress(R)sweptthepolls,winning352ofthe518LokSabhaseats.Thisgavethepartyatwo-thirdsmajorityrequiredtoamendtheConstitution.TheGrandAllianceandtheRightsufferedacrushingdefeat.TheonlyoppositionpartiestofarewellwereCPM,CPIandDMK,thelasttwobeing,however,Congressallies.The1971electionsrestoredtheCongresspartytoitsdominantpositioninIndianpolitics.Byvotingfor

Congressthepeoplehadsimultaneouslyvotedforchangeandstability.Also,aftertheunhappyexperienceofcoalitiongovernmentsinthestatesafter1967,peopledidnotwanttheunnervingdramaofdefectionsandrapidchangesinpartyalignmentstoberepeatedattheCentre.Theelectionsalsorepresentedfurtherpoliticizationofthemasses.People’svoteshadcutacrossreligious,casteandregionalbarriers.Electionshadalsoshownthatoncenationalissueswereraised,vote-banksandpoliticsofpatronagebecamerelativelyirrelevantandthatincreasinglypeoplecouldnolongerbedictatedto,bulliedorbought.IndiraGandhihadthusdemonstratedthatbuildingacoalitionofthepoorandthedisadvantagedaroundanationalprogrammecouldbeaviablepoliticaloption.IndiraGandhireceivedthemandateshehadsought.andshenowbecametheunchallengedleaderof

Congressandthedominantpoliticalfigureinthecountry.Nobodywouldcallhera‘gungigudiya’again.Butthefaiththevoters,especiallythepoor,hadreposedinheralsorepresentedadangersignal.Shehadraisedhighhopesamongthem;andshehadnowtodeliveronherpromises,forshehadtheparliamentarystrengthtopassanylaws,totakeanyadministrativemeasures,andtherecouldbenoalibisorexcusesforfailure.However,thefulfillmentofthemandateof1971wasagainpostponed,for,onthemorrowofIndira

Gandhibeingsworninasprimeminister,theBangladeshcrisisoccurred.

TheChallengeofBangladesh

Almostimmediatelyafterthe1971generalelections,amajorpolitical-militarycrisisbrokeoutinEastPakistan(nowBangladesh).Indiawasinevitablydrawnintothefray,leadingtoabloodywarbetweenIndiaandPakistan.Pakistanhadbeencreatedaroundtheideologicalassumptionthat.becauseoftheirfaith,theMuslimsof

Indiaconstitutedaseparatenation.ButreligionwasnotenoughtoweldtogetherthePunjabi-speakingpartofWestPakistanwiththeBengali-speakingEastPakistan.TheWestPakistanipoliticalandeconomicelitesoonacquiredadominantpositioninPakistan’sarmy,bureaucracy,economyandpolityresultingineconomicandpoliticaldiscriminationagainstEastPakistan.Moreover,intheabsenceofpoliticaldemocracy,theBengalishadnomechanismthroughwhichtoremedythesituation.Consequently,overtime,thepeopleofEastPakistandevelopedapowerfulmovementfordemocracyinPakistanandgreaterautonomyforEastPakistan.Insteadofcomingtotermswiththismovement,therulingeliteofPakistandecidedtosuppressitandwhichultimatelytransformeditintoamovementforindependencefromPakistan.InDecember1970,GeneralYahyaKhan,themilitarydictatorofPakistan,heldfreeelectionsinwhich

Bengal’sAwamiPartyunderthepopularleadershipofSheikhMujiburRahmanwonmorethan99per

centoftheseatsinEastBengalandanoverallmajorityinPakistan’sNationalAssembly.ButthearmyandYahyaKhan,backedbyZulfiqarAliBhutto,theleadingpoliticianofWestPakistan,refusedtolettheAwamiPartyformthegovernment.Whenthelatterstartedacivildisobediencemovementtoenforcetheconstitutionalprovision,inasuddenmoveon25March1971,YahyaKhanorderedamilitarycrackdownonEastPakistan.MujiburRahmanwasarrestedandtakentoanunknowndestinationinWestPakistan.TheWestPakistanarmyinitiatedareignofterror,killinginnocentcitizens,burningvillagesandcrops.ThousandsofintellectualsandBengalimembersofthepoliceandarmywereindiscriminatelybutsystematicallyeliminatedinordertodeprivethepeopleofanyleadership.Foroversixmonths,thearmycommittedrape,torture,arson,brutalkillingsandotherheinouscrimes.LargesectionsoftheEastPakistanpolice,paramilitaryorganizationsandEastBengalregimentsreactedbyrevolting.TheAwamiLeagueleaders,whosucceededinescapingtoCalcutta,formedaGovernmentofBangladeshinexile,organizedtheMuktiBahini(Liberationarmy)andlaunchedafierceundergroundmovementandguerrillawarfare.ThebrutalityofthePakistanarmywasspeciallydirectedagainsttheHindusremaininginEastPakistan

whowerefacedwithvirtualgenocide.They,butalsoalargenumberofMuslims,ChristiansandBuddhists,wereforcedtomigratetoandseekshelterinWestBengal,AssamandMeghalayainIndia.ByNovember1971,thenumberofrefugeesfromEastBengalhadreachedtenmillion.InIndiatherewasawaveofsympathyforthepeopleofEastBengalandastrongdemandforswift

actionagainstPakistan.But,IndiraGandhi,thoughconvincedthatwarwithPakistanwaslikely,opposedhastyaction.Throughoutthecrisis,sheactedwithimmensecouragebutalsowithabundantcautionandcarefulandcoolcalculation.ShedidnotwanttostrengthenPakistanipropagandathattheentiremovementforautonomyinEastPakistanandtheconsequentrevoltwasnotapopularuprisingbutanIndianconspiracy.ShealsodidnotwanttodoanythingwhichwouldleadtoIndiabeingaccusedofviolatinginternationallawandnorms.Infollowingapolicyofrestraint,IndiraGandhihadtwoothermajorconsiderationsinview.First,ifit

wastobewar,itshouldcomeatatimeofIndia’schoosing.Carefulplanningandpreparationswerenecessary.MilitaryoperationsinEastPakistancouldnotbeundertakenduringthemonsoonwhenthelargenumberofriversandrivuletstherewouldbeinfloodandthemarshesimpassable.TheHimalayanpasseswouldgetsnowboundonlyinwintermakingitimpossibleforChinatointerveneandsendtroopstoaidPakistan.TheMuktiBahinialsoneededtimetogainenoughstrengthtoconfrontthePakistaniarmyinregularwarfare.Secondly,IndiraGandhirealizedthatinternationalopinionhadtobeeducatedandwonovertothe

causeofBangladeshandmadeawareofIndia’spredicamentinregardtotherefugeesandhowtheywereplacinganunbearableburdenonIndia,endangeringitseconomicandpoliticalstability.ThisshehopedwouldmakeothercountriessympathetictoIndiaoratleastnothostiletoitshouldtherebeneedforamilitaryintervention.Therefugees,sheunderlined,shouldreturnwithoutdelay,butthiscouldonlybeachievedifaclimateofconfidenceandpeacewascreatedinEastPakistanbythePakistangovernment.Forthenexteightmonths,IndiraGandhifollowedafour-prongedpolicy.Indianotonlygavesanctuary

totheBangladeshgovernmentinexile,buttheIndianarmygavemilitarytrainingonIndiansoilandmaterialaidinmoneyandmilitaryequipmenttotheMuktiBahini.TheIndiangovernmentwasalsogenerousinprovidingfood,clothing,shelterandmedicalaidtotherefugeesinspiteofitsbeinga

tremendousstrainonIndia’sresources.AlmostfromtheoutsetinApril1971,theIndianarmedforcesbegantoprepareforswiftmilitaryaction,thoughinutmostsecrecy,incaseapeacefulsolutionoftherefugeeproblemcouldnotbefound.Moreover,themilitaryoperationhadtobeswiftandfinishedbeforethebigpowerssucceededinhaltingtheconflictandimposingaceasefire.India’scampaignreceivedaverypositiveresponsefromthemedia,theintelligentsiaandthestudents

intheWestandultimatelyfromtheWestEuropeangovernmentsbesidesthepeopleandthegovernmentsoftheSovietUnionandotherEuropeanCommunistcountries.ButthegovernmentsoftheUnitedStatesandChinaadoptedanunsympatheticandevenhostileattitudetowardsIndia.IgnoringIndianprotest,theUScontinuedtosupplyarmstoPakistan.ItalsotriedtoposetheproblemofBangladeshprimarilyasanissuebetweenIndiaandPakistanratherthanoneofBangladesh’sindependence.ChinawasfullysupportiveofPakistanasithadbecomevirtuallyitsally.InJuly-August1971PakistanhadhelpedtobringaboutaUS-Chinadetente.TosecureitselfagainstapossibleUS-Chinainterventionincaseeventsledtoawar,on9AugustIndia

swiftlysigneda20-yearIndo-SovietTreatyofPeace,FriendshipandCooperation.Thetreatyprovidedforimmediatemutualconsultationsandappropriateeffectivemeasuresincaseofeithercountrybeingsubjectedtoamilitarythreat.ThetreatywaswidelywelcomedbypeopleinIndiaandgaveabigboosttotheirmorale.IndiraGandhiwasnowfullofself-confidence.InaprogrammeontheBBC,sheasserted:‘Wearenot

dependentuponwhatothercountriesthinkorwantustodo.Weknowwhatwewantforourselvesandwearegoingtodoit,whateveritcosts...wewelcomehelpfromanycountry;butifitdoesn’tcome,well,itisallrightbyus.’4ConvincedfromthebeginningthatawarbetweenIndiaandPakistanontheBangladeshissueandtheproblemoftherefugeeswasinevitable,IndiraGandhiwaspreparedforitbyNovember-end.Butshewasreluctanttotakeactionfirst,eventhoughtheIndianarmywasreadyandinfact4DecemberhadbeendesignatedasthedaytheIndianarmedforceswoulddirectlyundertaketheliberationofBangladesh.But,atthisstage,YahyaKhanobligedIndiraGandhibypushingthebuttonfirst.EquallyconvincedthatwarwascomingandgreatlyharassedbytheMuktiBahini’ssteppedupguerrillawarfareandtheIndianarmedforces’excursionsintoBangladesh,hedecidedtotakeadvantageofthefirststrike.On3December,Pakistan’sairforcelaunchedasurpriseattackoneightmilitaryairfieldsinwesternIndia,hopingtoinflictseriousdamageontheIndianairforceandalsotointernationalizetheBangladeshissueandsecureUNintervention.Buthewastofailinbothobjectives.TheIndianairforcewasrelativelyunharmed;anticipatingaPakistaniattack,theIndianairforcehadwithdrawnbeforehandtointeriorairfields.IndiaimmediatelyrecognizedBangladeshandgaveastrongmilitaryreply.TheIndianstrategywasto

holdthePakistaniforcesinthewesternsectorthroughstrongdefensiveaction,whilewagingashort,swiftanddecisivewarintheEast,forcingthePakistanarmytheretosurrenderbeforetheUS,ChinaortheUNcouldintervene.BrilliantlyledbyGeneralJ.S.Arora,theIndianarmy,joinedbytheMuktiBahini,virtuallyranthrough

EastBengalandreachedDacca,itscapital,withinelevendays,andsurroundedthePakistanigarrisonthere.Since,inthewordsofHenryKissinger,theUSSecretaryofState,PresidentNixonwas‘notinclinedtoletthePaksbedefeated,’5theUSgovernmenttriedtointervene,declaredIndiatobetheaggressorandstoppedalleconomicaidtoit.ButitstworesolutionsintheUNSecurityCouncil

proposingaceasefireandmutualtroopwithdrawalswerevetoedbytheSovietUnion,withBritainandFranceabstaining.TheChinesethreatalsodidnotmaterializeasitconfineditsinterventiontobitterverbaldenunciations.Moreorlessindesperationandreminiscentofthegunboatdiplomacyofthenineteenthcentury,onNixon’sorders,segmentsoftheUSSeventhFleet,ledbythenuclearaircraftcarrier,U.S.S.Enterprise,setoutfortheBayofBengalon9DecemberwiththeobjectiveofforcingIndiatodelaythefallofDacca.ButIndiraGandhicalmlyignoredtheAmericanthreatand,instead,askedGeneralManekshaw,India’sArmyChief,tohurrythecompletionofIndia’smilitaryplan.TheIndianarmedforces,havingsurroundedDaccaon13December,forcedthedefeatedanddemoralized93,000strongPakistanarmyinBangladeshtosurrenderon16December.FollowingthesurrenderinDacca,on17December,theIndiangovernmentannouncedaunilateral

ceasefireonthewesternfront.Thecontinuationofthewarwouldhavebeenhazardousbothondiplomaticandmilitarygrounds.TheUnitedStates,ChinaandtheUNwerethenlikelytointervenemoreactively.TheSovietUnionalsodidnotfavourfurtherfighting.Waronthewesternfrontwouldalsohavebeenverycostlybothintermsofmenandmaterials.WhileintheEast,thepeoplehadwelcomedIndiantroopsassaviours,intheWestthepeopleandthearmedforces,stillintact,wouldfighttenaciouslytodefendtheirhomesandhomeland.Moreover,continuationofhostilitiesinthewesternpartwouldhavebeenaimless,forafteralldisintegrationofPakistanorannexationofanypartofitwasnot,andcouldnotbe,anobjectiveofIndianpolicy.PakistanreadilyacceptedtheceasefireandreleasedMujiburRahman,whocametopowerin

Bangladeshon12January1972.IndiahadseveralgainstoshowfromtheBangladeshwar.ThebalanceofpowerinSouthAsiahad

beenalteredwithIndiaemergingasthepre-eminentpower.ThegraverefugeeproblemhadbeensolvedwiththetenmillionrefugeespromptlyandsmoothlysentbacktotheirhomesinBangladesh.Thehumiliatingmemoryofthedefeatin1962waswipedoutandIndia’slostprideandself-respectrestored.Indiahadnotonlydefeatedatroublesomeneighbourbuthadasserteditsindependenceinforeignaffairsandindefenceofhernationalinterest.IthadbeenshownthatIndiawasnotaweakpoliticalentityontheworldstageevenifitwasnotyetaworldpower.ThewarhadalsodemonstratedthestrengthofIndiansecularism.Hindus,Muslims,Christians,Sikhs,

allhadstoodtogetherasciviliansorsoldiersatthismomentofcrisisagainstaMuslimcountry.Further,abigblowhadbeengiventothetwo-nationtheory,thebasisforPartitionin1947.MuslimsinIndiacouldnowseewhattreatmenthadbeenmetedouttoBengaliMuslimsbytheupholdersofthattheory.TheBangladeshwarwasalso,inrealterms,apersonalvictoryforIndiraGandhi.Indiansadmiredher

toughnessanddeterminationandthesuperbleadershipqualitiesshehaddisplayedthroughoutthecrisis.Herpopularitystretchedphenomenally,andherprestigewentupinthecommunityofnations.Shewas‘atthepinnacleofherpowerandglory’.ManyIndiansreferredtoherasamodern-dayDurgaandanincarnationofShaktiorfemaleenergy.Atthismomentofhertriumph,IndiraGandhigladlysharedherglorywithManekshawwhowasmadeaFieldMarshal,thefirstinIndia.Thewarhadended;theceasefirehadcome—butpeacehadnot.Indiastillheldover90,000prisoners

ofwarandwasinoccupationofnearly9,000squarekilometresofPakistaniterritory.PakistanwasyettorecognizeBangladesh.IndiraGandhirealizedthatamutuallyarrivedatIndo-Paksettlementwasnecessaryforadurablepeace.AhostilePakistanwouldnotonlyforceIndiatomaintainahighlevelof

defenceexpenditurebutalsoenableoutsidepowerstointerfereinsubcontinentalaffairs.AsummitconferencebetweenIndiraGandhiandZulfiqarAliBhutto,thenewly-electedprimeministerofPakistan,washeldinSimlainJune1972;agreatdealofhardbargainingtookplaceandthetwosignedanagreementwhichcametobeknownastheSimlaDeclaration.IndiaagreedtoreturnthePakistanterritoryithadoccupied,exceptsomestrategicpointsinKashmir,mainlyintheKargilsector,whichwerenecessarytosafeguardthestrategicroadlinkbetweenSrinagarandLehinLadakh.Inreturn,PakistanagreedtorespecttheexistingLineofControl(LoC)inKashmirandundertooknottoalteritunilaterallybyforceorthreatofforce.ThetwocountriesalsoagreedtosettlealltheirdisputesthroughbilateralnegotiationswithoutanyoutsidemediationbytheUNoranyotherpower.IndiaalsoagreedtoreturntheprisonersofwartoPakistanbutthiswastobecontingentuponaBangladesh-Pakistanagreement.ThisoccurredthenextyearwhenPakistanrecognizedBangladeshinAugust1973.ThejustificationIndiraGandhiofferedtotheparliamentinJuly1972forsigningtheSimlaDeclaration

wassignificant.Shesaid:‘AllIknowisthatImustfightforpeaceandImusttakethosestepswhichwillleadustopeace...ThetimehascomewhenAsiamustwakeuptoitsdestiny,mustwakeuptotherealneedsofitspeople,muststopfightingamongstourselves,nomatterwhatourpreviousquarrels,nomatterwhattheprevioushatredandbitterness.Thetimehascometodaywhenwemustburythepast.’6

ATimeofSuccess

Theyear1972,whichwasalsothetwenty-fifthyearofIndia’sindependence,markedthebeginningofanewperiodinwhichconditionswereripeforthegovernmenttofulfillitselectoralpromises.Therewaspoliticalstabilityinthecountry;thegovernmenthadatwo-thirdsmajorityintheLokSabha;andIndianshadacquiredfreshandheightenedself-confidenceintheirowncapacitiesandcapabilitiesaswellasfaithinthepoliticalleadership.Butbeforethispositiveprocesscouldbeinaugurated,theCongressleadershipfeltthatitmustacquire

theleversofpowerinthestates,whichwere,afterall,theagenciesfortheimplementationofmuchofthereformsanddevelopmentalprogrammeandpolicies.Consequently,electionswereheldinMarch1972forthelegislativeassembliesinallstatesexceptUP.,TamilNadu,KeralaandOrissa.OnceagainCongresswonamajorityinallthestates.Thetwoelectionsof1971and1972ledtoavirtualdemiseofSwatantraandCongress(O).ThepoliticalcommandatboththeCentreandthestateswasnowunified.IndiraGandhihadalsoacquiredvirtuallycompletecontrolovertheparty,herCabinet,andthechiefministers.During1971-74,thegovernmentundertookseveralmeasurestoimplementitsleft-of-centreagenda.In

August1972,generalinsurancewasnationalizedandfivemonthslaterthecoalindustry.Ceilingswereimposedonurbanlandownership.TheMRTPActtocheckconcentrationofindustrialenterprisesinafewhandshadalreadybeenpassedin1969andaMRTPCommissionappointedin1971toimplementtheAct.ButIndiraGandhirefusedtogoanyfurtherinnationalizingindustry,despitepressurefromtheCPIandleftistswithinherparty;sheremainedfullycommittedtoamixedeconomy.Legislationtoreduceceilingsonagriculturallandholdingsanddistributesurpluslandtothelandlessandmarginalfarmerswasalsopassedinseveralstates.Thecentralgovernmentinitiatedaprogrammeofcheapfoodgraindistributiontotheeconomicallyvulnerablesectionsofsocietyandacrashschemeforcreatingemploymentinruralareas.Italsomadeitcompulsoryfornationalizedbankstoopenbranchesin

underbankedareassuchassmalltowns,ruralclustersandthepoorerpartsofthecitiesandtomakecreditavailabletosmallindustries,farmers,roadtransportersandself-employedpersons.Toreducebusinessmen’sinfluenceinpolitics,thegovernmentimposedabanondonationsbyjoint-stockcompaniestopoliticalparties.MrsGandhialsotriedtostrengthenthePlanningCommissionandtheplanningmechanism.Thegovernmentgotpassedtwoimportantconstitutionalamendments.TheSupremeCourthadintwo

judgementsin1951and1965upheldtheparliament’srighttoamendthefundamentalrighttopropertysoastomakeanylegislationregardingitnon-justiciable.Butin1967theSupremeCourthadintheGolakNathcasereversedthesedecisionsandlatersetasidebanknationalizationandtheabolitionofprivypurses.The24thAmendmenttotheConstitutionpassedin1971restoredparliament’sauthoritytoamendthefundamentalrights.The25thAmendmentpassedinthesameyeargaveparliamentthepowertodecidetheamounttobepaidascompensationandthemodeofpaymentincaseofanyprivatepropertytakenoverforfuturepurposes.Thus,theSupremeCourtwouldnolongerhavethepowertodeclaresuchcompensationtobeinadequate.The24thand25thAmendmentsweretorectifyasituationwherethecourtshadtakenaconservativesocialposition,comeinthewayofagrarianreformlegislation,thenationalizationofindustriesandotherbusinessenterprises,hinderedmeasurestocheckconcentrationofwealthandeconomicpowerinprivatehands,assertedjudiciary’ssupremacyoverparliament,andassumedpowersovertheconstitutionalamendmentprocesswhichthemakersoftheConstitutiondidnotintend.Afurther,lesssignificant,constitutionalamendmentabolishedtheprivilegesaswellasthepursesoftheformerprinces.IndiaachievedamajorsuccessintermsofabreakthroughinscienceandtechnologywhentheAtomic

EnergyCommissiondetonatedanundergroundnucleardeviceatPokhraninthedesertsofRajasthanon18May1974.TheIndiangovernment,however,declaredthatitwasnotgoingtomakenuclearweaponseventhoughithadacquiredthecapacitytodoso.ItclaimedthatthePokhranexplosionwasanefforttoharnessatomicenergyforpeacefulpurposesandtomakeIndiaself-reliantinnucleartechnology.Then,suddenlyin1973,thetidechangedforIndiraGandhi.Theeconomy,thepolityandthecredibility

ofIndiraGandhi’sleadershipandCongressgovernmentstartedgoingdownhill.ThedisillusionmentfoundexpressionintheJ.P.movementof1974.ItwasfollowedbytheEmergencyin1975.Discontentandunrestmarkedthisphasewhichistakenupinthenextchapter.

18TheJ.P.MovementandtheEmergency:IndianDemocracyTested

In1975,IndiaexperienceditsgreatestpoliticalcrisissinceindependencewhenInternalEmergencywasdeclaredon26June.HowdidtheEmergencycomeabout?Wastherenootherchoice,asIndiraGandhimaintained,orwasittheultimateexpressionofherauthoritariantendencies,astheOppositionalleged?Ordidbothsidesindulgeinobfuscation.Theissueinfact,isquitecomplex.

ThePre-EmergencyCrises

Bythebeginningof1973IndiraGandhi’spopularitybegantodecline.People’sexpectationswereunfulfilled.Littledentwasbeingmadeinruralorurbanpovertyoreconomicinequality,norwasthereanylesseningofcasteandclassoppressioninthecountryside.Theimmediateprovocationfortherisingdiscontentwasthemarkeddeteriorationintheeconomic

situation.Acombinationofrecession,growingunemployment,rampantinflationandscarcityoffoodstuffscreatedaseriouscrisis.Theburdenoffeedingandshelteringnearly10millionrefugeesfromBangladeshduring1971haddepletedthegrainreservesand,combinedwiththecostoftheBangladeshwar,hadledtoalargebudgetarydeficit.Thewarhadalsodrainedforeignexchangereserves.Monsoonrainsfailedfortwoyearsinsuccessionduring1972and1973,leadingtoaterribledroughtinmostpartsofthecountryandamassiveshortageoffoodgrains,andfuellingtheirprices.Thedroughtalsoledtoadropinpowergenerationandcombinedwiththefallinagriculturalproduction,andthereforeinthedemandformanufacturedgoods,ledtoindustrialrecessionandriseinunemployment1973alsowitnessedthenotoriousoil-shockwhenworldpricesofcrudeoilincreasedfour-fold,leadingtomassiveincreaseinthepricesofpetroleumproductsandfertilisers.Thisdrainedforeignreserves,furtherincreasedthebudgetarydeficitanddeepenedeconomicrecession.Withallthis,pricesrosecontinuously,by22percentin1972-73alone.Thepricerise,whichaffectedboththepoorandthemiddleclasses,wasaccompaniedbyscarcityofessentialarticlesofconsumption.Therewerefoodriotsinseveralpartsofthecountry.Economicrecession,unemployment,priceriseandscarcityofgoodsledtolarge-scaleindustrialunrest

andawaveofstrikesindifferentpartsofthecountryduring1972and1973,culminatinginanall-IndiarailwaystrikeinMay1974.Therailwaystrikelastedtwenty-twodaysbutwasbrokenintheend.MrsGandhi’spopularityamongtheworkerswaserodedfurther.Lawandorderdeteriorated,particularlyduring1974-75.Strikes,studentprotestsandpopular

demonstrationsoftenturnedviolent.Manycollegesanduniversitieswereclosedforprolongedperiods.InMay1973,therewasamutinyinU.P.bytheProvincialArmedConstabulary,whichclashedwiththearmysenttodisciplineit,leadingtothedeathofoverthirty-fiveconstablesandsoldiers.Totacklethedeterioratingeconomic,politicalandlawandordersituationfirmandclearleadership

wasneeded,asexhibitedduringtheBangladeshcrisisandinthehandlingofforeignaffairs.Butthatwas

notforthcoming.Thepoliticalsituationwasworsenedbytheplayofotherfactors.Congresshadbeendecliningasanorganizationandprovedincapableofdealingwiththepoliticalcrisisatthestateandgrassrootslevels.Thegovernment’scapacitytoredressthesituationwasseriouslyimpairedbythegrowingcorruptioninmostareasoflifeandthewidespreadbeliefthatthehigherlevelsoftherulingpartyandadministratiorwereinvolvedinit.ThewhiffofcorruptiontouchedevenIndiraGandhiwhenherinexperiencedyoungerson,SanjayGandhi,wasgivenalicencetomanufacture50,000Maruticarsayear.AmajornewdevelopmentwasthegrowingdetachmentofthreemajorsocialgroupsfromCongress.

Whilethepoorcontinuedtosupportit,thoughmorepassively,themiddleclasses,becauseofpriceriseandthestinkofcorruption,therichpeasantry,becauseofthethreatoflandreform,andthecapitalists,becauseofthetalkofsocialism,nationalizationofbanksandcoalminingandanti-monopolymeasures,turnedagainstCongressandIndiraGandhi.Desperationoftheoppositionpartiesalsocontributedtotheunderminingofthepoliticalsystem.Utterlydisparateideologicallyandprogrammatically,theonlythingunitingthesepartieswasanti-Congressism.Buttheywereinnoposition,eitherseparatelyorincombination,toposeapoliticalchallengetoCongress,havingbeenthoroughlydefeatedanddown-sizedonlyrecentlyinthegeneralelectionsof1971andstateassemblyelectionsof1972.Unwillingtowaittillthenextelectionstotesttheirpopularitytheydecided,irrespectiveoftheconsequences,toblindlysupportanygroupormovementinanyformagainstthegovernmentattheCentreorinastate.

GujaratandBiharUnrest

WhatturnedthevariouseconomicandpoliticalcrisesintooneofthepoliticalsystemweretwopopularmovementsinGujaratandBiharagainstthefaction-riddenCongressgovernments,andtheleadershipprovidedtotheBiharmovementbyJayaprakashNarayan.AmajorupheavaloccurredinGujaratinJanuary1974whenpopularangerovertheriseintheprices

offoodgrains,cookingoilandotheressentialcommoditiesexplodedinthecitiesandtownsofthestateintheformofastudentmovementwhichwassoonjoinedbytheoppositionparties.Formorethantenweeksthestatefacedvirtualanarchywithstrikes,looting,riotingandarson,andeffortstoforceMLAstoresign.Thepolicerepliedwithexcessiveforce,indiscriminatearrestsandfrequentrecoursetolathi-chargesandfiring.ByFebruary,thecentralgovernmentwasforcedtoaskthestategovernmenttoresign,suspendtheassemblyandimposePresident’sRuleinthestate.ThelastactoftheGujaratdramawasplayedinMarch1975when,facedwithcontinuingagitationandafastuntodeathbyMorarjiDesai,IndiraGandhidissolvedtheassemblyandannouncedfreshelectionstoitinJune.OntheheelsoftheGujaratagitationandinspiredbyitssuccess,asimilaragitationwasstartedby

studentsinBiharinMarch1974.Thestudents,startingwiththegheraooftheassemblyon18March,repeatedlyclashedwiththeoveractivepolice,leadingtothedeathof27peopleinoneweek.Moreover,asinGujarat,oppositionpartiesquicklyjoinedforceswiththestudentagitators.TheBiharmovementwas,however,characterisedbytwonewfeatures.JayaprakashNarayan,

popularlyknownasJP,cameoutfrompoliticalretirement,tookoveritsleadership,andgaveacallfor‘TotalRevolution’or‘astruggleagainsttheverysystemwhichhascompelledalmosteverybodytogocorrupt.’1DemandingresignationoftheCongressgovernmentinBiharanddissolutionoftheassembly,heaskedthestudentsandthepeopletoputpressureontheexistinglegislatorstoresign,paralyzethe

government,gheraothestateassemblyandgovernmentoffices,setupparallelpeople’sgovernmentsalloverthestate,andpaynotaxes.ThesecondfeaturewasthefirmrefusalofIndiraGandhitoconcedethedemandforthedissolutionoftheassembly,lestitspreadtocoverotherpartsofthecountryandthecentralgovernment.JPalsodecidedtogobeyondBiharandorganizeacountry-widemovementagainstwidespread

corruptionandfortheremovalofCongressandIndiraGandhi,whowasnowseenasathreattodemocracyandportrayedasthefountainheadofcorruption.JPnowrepeatedlytouredtheentirecountryanddrewlargecrowdsespeciallyinDelhiandotherparts

ofNorthIndiawhichwereJanSanghorSocialiststrongholds.TheJPMovementattractedwidesupportespeciallyfromstudents,middleclasses,tradersandasectionoftheintelligentsia.Italsogotthebackingofnearlyallthenon-leftpoliticalpartieswhohadbeentrouncedin1971andwhosawinJPapopularleaderwhowouldenablethemtoacquirecredibilityasanalternativetoCongress.JPinturnrealizedthatwithouttheorganizationalstructuresofthesepartieshecouldnothopetofaceIndiraGandhieitherinthestreetsoratthepolls.ThefervoroftheJPMovement,however,didnotlastlonganditbegantodeclinebytheendof1974.

Mostofhisstudentfollowerswentbacktotheirclasses.Moreover,themovementhadfailedtoattracttheruralandurbanpooreveninGujaratandBihar.DenouncingtheJPMovementforitsextra-parliamentaryapproach,IndiraGandhichallengedJPtotesttheirrespectivepopularityinBihar.asalsothecountryasawholeinthecominggeneralelections,dueinFebruary-March1976.JPacceptedthechallengeandhissupportingpartiesdecidedtoformaNationalCoordinationCommitteeforthepurpose.ItappearedatthisstagethattheissueastowhoactuallyrepresentedtheIndianpeoplewouldbe

resolvedthroughthedemocraticelectoralprocess.However,thiswasnottobe.AsuddentwisttoIndianpoliticswasgivenbyajudgementon12June1975byJusticeSinhaoftheAllahabadHighCourt,onanelectionpetitionbyRajNarain,convictingMrsGandhiforhavingindulgedincorruptcampaignpracticesanddeclaringherelectioninvalid.Theconvictionalsomeantthatshecouldnotseekelectiontoparliamentorholdofficeforsixyearsandthereforecontinueasprimeminister.MostobserversatthetimenotedthatJusticeSinhahaddismissedthemoreseriouschargesagainsther

buthadconvictedheroftechnicalandtrivial,evenfrivolous,offencesagainsttheelectionlaw.MrsGandhirefusedtoresignandappealedtotheSupremeCourt.WhiletheSupremeCourtwouldhearherappealon14July,JusticeV.R.KrishnaIyer,thevacationJudgeoftheSupremeCourt,createdfurtherconfusionwhenhedecidedon24Junethat,tillthefinaldisposalofherappealbythefullbenchoftheSupremeCourt,MrsGandhicouldstayinofficeandspeakinparliamentbutcouldnotvoteinit.Inthemeanwhile,MrsGandhisufferedanotherpoliticalblowwhentheGujaratassemblyelection

resultscameon13June.TheoppositionJanatafrontwon87seatsandtheCongress75seatsinahouseof182.Surprisingly,theJanatafrontsucceededinformingagovernmentinalliancewiththesameChimanbhaiPatelagainstwhosecorruptionandmaladministrationthepopularmovementhadbeeninitiated.TheAllahabadjudgementandtheGujaratassemblyresultsrevivedtheoppositionmovement.JPand

thecoalitionofoppositionpartieswere,however,notwillingtowaitfortheresultofIndiraGandhi’sappealtotheSupremeCourtorthegeneralelectionstotheLokSabhadueineightmonths.Theydecidedtoseizetheopportunityand,accusingMrsGandhiof‘clingingtoanofficecorruptlygained,’demanded

herresignationandcalledforacountry-widecampaigntoforcetheissue.InarallyinDelhion25Junetheyannouncedthatanation-wideone-weekcampaignofmassmobilizationandcivildisobediencetoforceMrsGandhitoresignwouldbeinitiatedon29June.Thecampaignwouldendwiththegheraooftheprimeminister’shousebyhundredsofthousandsofvolunteers.Inhisspeechattherally,JPaskedthepeopletomakeitimpossibleforthegovernmenttofunctionandonceagainappealedtothearmedforces,thepoliceandthebureaucracytorefusetoobeyanyorderstheyregardedas‘illegal’and‘unconstitutional’.MrsGandhi’slighteningresponsewastodeclareastateofInternalEmergencyon26June.

TheJPMovement

HowdidtheEmergencycomeabout,whatwasitslegitimacy,whatdiditmeaninpractice,andwhywasitliftedintheendandwithwhatconsequences;theseissuesdeservecriticalattention.ThemainjustificationoftheJPMovementwasthatitarosetoendcorruptioninIndianlifeandpolitics,

whosefountainheadwasostensiblyMrsGandhi,andtodefenddemocracywhichwasthreatenedbyherauthoritarianpersonalityandstyleofpoliticsandadministration.JPoftenaccusedIndiraGandhioftryingtodestroyalldemocraticinstitutionsandestablishaSoviet-backeddictatorshipinherhungerforpower.Hercontinuationinoffice,hesaid,was‘incompatiblewiththesurvivalofdemocracyinIndia.’2Later,manyothercriticsandopponentsofMrsGandhiexpressedsimilarviews.IndiraGandhijustifiedheractioninimposingtheEmergencyintermsofnationalpoliticalinterestsand

primarilyonthreegrounds.First,India’sstability,security,integrityanddemocracywereindangerfromthedisruptivecharacteroftheJPMovement.ReferringtoJP’sspeeches,sheaccusedtheoppositionofincitingthearmedforcestomutinyandthepolicetorebel.Second,therewastheneedtoimplementaprogrammeofrapideconomicdevelopmentintheinterestsofthepoorandtheunderprivileged.Third,shewarnedagainstinterventionandsubversionfromabroadwiththeaimofweakeninganddestabilizingIndia.Infact,neitherJPnorIndiraGandhichosethedemocraticwayoutofthecrisis.JPshouldhave

demandedandIndiraGandhishouldhaveofferedtoholdfreshelectionstoLokSabha,whichwereinanycasedueinearly1976,earlier,inOctober-November1975itself,andthusprovidedapracticalalternativetoboththedemandforherresignationandtheEmergency.BothJP’sandMrsGandhi’spositionsneedtobeexaminedcritically,inlightofsubsequentpoliticaldevelopments.

TheJPMovementwasflawedinmanyrespects,intermsofbothitscompositionanditsactionsandthecharacterandphilosophyofitsleader.JayaprakashNarayanwasjustlyrenownedforhisintegrity,lackofambitionforoffice,fearlessness,selflessnessandsacrificeandlife-longcommitmenttocivillibertiesandtheestablishmentofajustsocialorder.But,ideologically,hewasvague.Fromtheearlyfiftieshebecameacriticofparliamentarypoliticsandparliamentarydemocracy.Foryears,hetriedtopopularisetheconceptof‘partylessdemocracy’.During1974-75healsoadvocated‘TotalRevolution’(SampooranKranti).Bothconceptswereunclearandnebulous,andatnostagewasheabletodelineateorexplainwhatapoliticalsystemwithoutpoliticalpartieswouldinvolveorhowwouldthepopularwillgetexpressedorimplementedinit.Similarly,thesocio-economicandpoliticalcontent,programmeorpoliciesoftheTotalRevolutionwasneverproperlydefined.Atthesametime,JPwasademocratandnot

anauthoritarianleader.Norwasthemovementheledin1974-75yetauthoritarianorfascist,but—andthisisimportant—itwascapableofcreatingaspaceforitsfascistcomponent.JP’stalkofpartylessdemocracyandTotalRevolutionandthecritiqueofparliamentarydemocracy,hazyandindistinctive,couldalsobedangerous,foritencouragedcynicism,scornanddespairtowardsdemocraticinstitutions.Thiscouldcreateapoliticalclimatefavourabletoauthoritarianismandfascism,ashappenedinItalyandGermanyafter1919andinPakistanandIndonesiainthesixties.ThenebulousnessofJP’spoliticsandideologyisalsoillustratedbythefactthathetookthesupportof

politicalpartiesandgroupswhichhadnothingincommonintermsofprogrammeandpoliciesandwereideologicallyincompatible.TheJPMovementcametoincludethecommunalJanSanghandJamaat-e-Islami,theneo-fascistRSS,theconservativeandsecularCong(O),SocialistsandtheextremeleftNaxalitegroups.Almostentirelynegativeinitsapproach,themovementcouldnotfashionanalternativeprogrammeorpoliciesexceptthatofoverthrowingIndiraGandhi.Initslaterphases,themovementdependedfororganizationontheRSS-JanSangh,whichaloneamong

itsconstituentshadastrongwell-knitorganization,trainedcadreandbranchesalloverthecountry,especiallyinnorthernandcentralIndia.EveninBihar,theAkhilBharatiyaVidyarthiParishad(ABVP),afrontorganizationofRSS,hadcometoformthebackboneofJP’smainpoliticalvehicle,theChhatraYuvaSangharshaVahini.Consequently,thoughJPremainedthemovement’schiefmobilizer,itcametobeincreasinglydominatedbyRSS-JanSangh.Thisresultedinthepoliticalcharacterofthemovementalsoundergoingamajorchange;notchangeofpoliciesorofthestategovernmentsbuttheremovalofIndiraGandhibecamethemovement’smaingoal.Furthermore,ithadapotentiallyundemocraticcharacterintermsbothofitsdemandsandthemethodsadoptedorplanned.It’sobjectivewasnottheblockingoforbringingaboutchangesinparticulargovernmentpoliciesbutunderminingfirstthegovernmentofBiharandthenattheCentre.Thedemocraticallyelectedlegislaturesandgovernmentsweretobedissolvedandreplacednotthroughelectionsbutthroughextra-constitutionalmassagitationsmainlyconfinedtourbanareas.Thisamountedtoacovertdemandforabasicchangeofthepoliticalsystem.TheagitationalmethodsadoptedandpropagatedbytheJPMovementwerealsoextra-constitutional

andundemocratic.Goingfarbeyondpeacefulprocessions,demonstrationsandpublicrallies,inBihar,asearlierinGujarat,thetacticwastoforcethegovernmenttoresignandthelegislaturestobedissolvedbygheraoinggovernmentoffices,theassembly,andtheGovernorandthusparalyzethegovernmentandtointimidateandcoerceindividualelectedlegislatorstoresignfromtheassemblies.ThistacticwastoberepeatedinJune-July1975attheCentre.MoreseriouswasJP’sincitementtothearmy,policeandcivilservicestorebel.Severaltimesduring

thecourseofthemovement,heurgedthemnottoobeyordersthatwere‘unjustandbeyondthecalloftheduty’or‘illegalandunjust’or‘unconstitutional,illegaloragainsttheirconscience.’Thedecisionregardingunconstitutionality,andsoon,oftheorderswastobemadebytheindividualsconcernedthemselves.ButthesevariousexhortationscouldpossiblybeconsideredmoreanexpressionofJP’shazythinkingthananactualcallforrebellion.Aswehaveseenearlier,theclimaxoftheJPMovementcameon25June1975whenapubliccallwas

givenforanation-widemasscivildisobediencemovementwhichwouldculminateinagheraooftheprimeminister’sresidence,thusforcinghertoresignortoenactanotherJallianwalaBaghmassacre—amassacreshewouldneverbeabletolivedown.Theentireoppositiongameplanwasmadeexplicitby

MorarjiDesaiinaninterviewlaterintheevening:‘Weintendtooverthrowher,toforcehertoresign.Forgood...Thousandsofuswillsurroundherhousetopreventherfromgoingoutorreceivevisitors.We’llcamptherenightanddayshoutingtohertoresign.’3Inotherwords,theoppositionplanhadallthehallmarksofacoupd’état.ThesituationthatwasbeingcreatedbytheJPMovementwasthatofinsurrectionwithoutrevolution.

Thetacticsitevolvedovertimeamountedtoarevolution.Butthiswastobearevolutionwithoutarevolutionaryparty,organization,ideologyorprogrammetogiveitdirectionandleadership.Infact,itwastobearevolutiontobemadewithrelianceonamixoftheideologylesscadreoftheChhatraVahini,theconservativecadreofCong(O),BKDandSwatantrapartyandthecommunalneo-fascistcadreofRSS-JanSangh.Theadoptionbyapopularmovementoftherhetoricofrevolutionandofextra-legalandextra-

constitutionalandoftenviolentagitationalmethodsisnotcompatiblewiththefunctioningofademocraticpoliticalsystem.But,whatismoreimportant,whensuchrhetoricandmethodsarenotpartofarevolutionarydesigntochangethesocio-economicorderinafundamentalmanner,whenmassesenterintoachaoticanddisorganizedmovementwithouttheleadershipofaproperlyconstitutedandledrevolutionaryparty,whenfaithinapoliticalsystemisdestroyedwithoutcreatingfaithinanalternativesystem,theresultantpossibilityisthatoftheestablishmentofanauthoritarian,oftenfascist,regimeorofpoliticalchaos,anarchyanddisintegrationofthepoliticalentity.Historically,suchamixhasbeenthehallmarknotofarevolutionbutofacounter-revolution,asthehistoryoftheriseoffascisminEuropeanddictatorialregimesinLatinAmericaindicates.Letmeaddacaveathere.ThedangerofauthoritarianismdidnotcomefromJayaprakashNarayanwho

wasnotplanningorgivingdirectiontoanauthoritariancoupd’état.Buttherewere,aspointedoutabove,othersaroundhimwhoweresoinclinedandwhowereincreasinglycomingtocontrolthemovementandwhocouldcapitalizeonhisideologicalwoollinessandbasicallyweakpersonality.Inanycase,theproperdemocraticoptionsopentotheOppositionwere:(i)towaitfortheSupreme

Courtjudgementand,ifitwentagainstMrsGandhi,todemanditsimplementation;(ii)towaitforthegeneralelectionstoLokSabhadueinearly1976andinthemeanwhileusepeacefulagitationandpropagandatoerodeMrsGandhi’sstandingamongthepeople;(iii)todemandthat,becausetheAllahabadjudgementhaderodedMrsGandhi’smandatetorule,freshelectionsshouldbeheldimmediately—sayinOctober-November1975.Infact,thoseintheoppositionwhowantedtodefeatMrsGandhiatthehustlingshadwonoutin

October-November1974whenJPhadacceptedMrsGandhi’schallengetoletthenextgeneralelectionsdecidethefateofhismovement’sdemands.Butoneyearorevensixmonthsisalongtimeinpolitics.Apopularmovementcouldbothgainorlosemomentuminthatperiod.Therewasalsonoguaranteeofsuccessinthecomingelections,especiallyasCongress’sbaseinSouthIndiaandamongtheruralpoor,womenandtheminoritiesseemedtobeintact.EveninGujaratelectionsinearlyJune,CongresshadfailedtogetamajoritybutsohadtheoppositionJanatacombinedespiteJPandMorarjiDesaileadingitselectioncampaign.TheAllahabadjudgementmarkedaturning-pointinthisrespect.SensingtherealpossibilityoftheimmediateousterofMrsGandhi,JP,Morarjiandotherswentovertothecoupd’étatschool.

TheEmergency

TheimpositionoftheEmergencybyMrsGandhiwasalsoflawed.Shewastoclaimlaterthatfacedwithanextra-constitutionalchallengeshehadnootheroption.Resignation,shesaid,wouldhavestrengthenedtheforcesthatwerethreateningthedemocraticprocessandbringingthecountrytotheedgeofanarchyandchaos.Therewas,moreover,nolegal,politicalormoralreasonwhysheshouldstepdownduringthehearingofherappeal.But,asalreadyindicatedearlier,inrealityshetoohadanotherdemocraticoption.Shecouldhave

declaredthatLokSabhawouldbedissolvedandfreshelectionstoitwouldbeheldinOctober-November.IfJPandtheOppositionhadacceptedheroffer,thedoortoademocraticresolutionofthepoliticalimpassethroughanappealtotheelectoratewouldhavebeenopened.Iftheydidnot,andstucktotheirdemandforherresignationandtheirdeclaredmethodstobringitabout,shecouldlegitimatelydeclareanInternalEmergencyastheonlyviableandavailableoptionformeetingtheirextra-constitutionalchallenge.Simultaneously,shecouldannouncethattheEmergencywouldbeliftedassoonastheOppositiongaveupitsdemandforherresignation,agreedtoadheretotheSupremeCourtorparliament’sjudgement,andacceptedthetestofelections.Interestingly,itmaybepointedout,thisisexactlywhatGeneraldeGaulledidwhenfacedwiththemuchmorepervasiveandradicalupsurgeofstudentsandworkersinMay1968.And,ofcourse,theprotestingstudentsandworkersandmostoftheirleadersacceptedthechallengetofacedeGaulleinelections.Inanycase,therewasnojustificationforthelongevity(aboutnineteenmonths)oftheEmergency,oncetheperceivedthreattolawandorderwasover,orforthedraconiancharacteroftheEmergencymeasures.ThepoliticaltragedywasthatboththeJPMovementandIndiraGandhishunnedtheoptionofelections,

whichareinademocracythevehiclesforthelegitimationofapoliticalregimeandforexpressionofpopularwill.Thiswas,ofcourse,soinpartbecauseofthemannerinwhichthepoliticalconflictduring1974-75haddeveloped,withthetragicconsequencethatapoliticalatmospherehadbeencreatedinwhichdialogueandaccommodationbetweenthetwoopposingforceswasnotpossible.

MrsGandhiproclaimedastateofInternalEmergencyunderArticle352oftheConstitutiononthemorningof26June,suspendingthenormalpoliticalprocesses,butpromisingtoreturntonormalcyassoonasconditionswarrantedit.TheproclamationsuspendedthefederalprovisionsoftheConstitutionandfundamentalrightsandcivilliberties.ThegovernmentimposedstrictcensorshiponthePressandstifledallprotestandoppositiontothegovernment.Intheearlyhoursof26June,hundredsofthemainleadersoftheOppositionwerearrestedundertheMaintenanceofInternalSecurityAct(MISA).AmongthosearrestedwereJayaprakashNarayan,MorarjiDesai,andAtalBehariVajpayeeandCongressdissidentssuchasChandraShekhar.Severalacademics,newspapermen,tradeunionistsandstudentleaderswerealsoputbehindbars.Manyofthearrestedweregraduallyreleased:JPin1975ongroundsofhealthandothers,includingCharanSinghandVajpayee,during1976.Severalextremecommunalandultra-leftorganizations,includingRSS,AnandMarg,Jamaat-i-IslamiandMaoistCP(ML),werebanned.ArrestscontinuedthroughouttheperiodoftheEmergencythoughmostofthearrestedwerereleasedafterafewdaysormonths.Inall,morethan100,000werearrestedduringaperiodofnineteenmonths.Amongthosearrestedwerealsoalargenumberofanti-socialelementssuchassmugglers,hoarders,blackmarketeersandknowngoondas.

DuringtheEmergencytheparliamentwasmadeutterlyineffective.TheoppositionofafewbraveMPs,whohadnotbeenarrested,wasnullifiedastheirspeecheswerenotpermittedtobereportedinthePress.Thestategovernmentswererigidlycontrolled.Thetwonon-CongressgovernmentsofDMKinTamilNaduandJanatainGujaratweredismissedinJanuaryandMarch1976despitebeingquitecompliant.TheCongresschiefministersofU.P.andOrissa,werereplacedfornotbeingreliableenough.TheCongresspartywasalsostrictlycontrolled.Internaldemocracywithinthepartywasmoreorlesscompletelysnuffed.Fromthesecondhalfof1976theYouthCongressledbySanjayGandhibecamemoreimportantthantheparentorganization.Aseriesofdecrees,lawsandconstitutionalamendmentsreducedthepowersofthejudiciarytocheck

thefunctioningoftheexecutive.TheDefenceofIndiaActandtheMISAwereamendedinJuly1975tothedetrimentofthecitizens’liberties.InNovember1976,aneffortwasmadetochangethebasiccivillibertarianstructureoftheConstitutionthroughits42ndAmendment.Puttinganendtothejudicialreviewofaconstitutionalamendment,becauseitwassaidthatthejudiciarywasobstructingpro-poorsocio-economicmeasuressuchaslandreformlegislationinthenameofdefendingfundamentalrights,itwaslaiddownthattherewouldbenolimitationwhateveronthepowerofparliamenttoamendtheConstitution.FundamentalrightswereindirectlyemasculatedbybeingmadesubordinatetoanexpandedversionoftheDirectivePrinciplesofStatePolicyembeddedintheConstitution.Thus,theEmergencyconcentratedunlimitedstateandpartypowerinthehandsoftheprimeministerto

beexercisedthroughasmallcoterieofpoliticiansandbureaucratsaroundher.

PublicResponsetotheEmergency

WhileasectionoftheintelligentsiareactedtotheEmergencywithmarkedhostility,thelargemajorityofthepeopleinitiallyrespondedtoitwithpassivity,acquiescence,acceptanceorevensupport.Itwasonlyfromthebeginningof1976thattheEmergencystartedbecomingunpopular.Whywasthisdelayedreaction?Forone,thepeoplehadnoexperienceinrecentmemory,thatissinceindependence,ofanauthoritarianrule.Therewasbewildermentasalsopersonalfearoftheunknown.Moreover,apartfromthearrestofoppositionleaders,therepressivemeasureswerealmostentirelydirectedeitheragainstanti-socialelementsoragainsttheextremecommunalrightortheminisculefarleft,whohadenjoyedlittlepopularsupportbeforetheEmergencyandwhowereinanycaseknowntobeaversetodemocracy.Thenumberofpersonsarrestedinthefirstfewdaysintheentirecountrywaslessthan10,000.Butmanyofthedetenuswerereleasedwithinashortspanoftime.Aboveall,alargenumberofpeoplewereimpressedbythepositiveoutcomeofsomeofthewell-publicizedEmergencymeasuresmostofwhichcould,ofcourse,havebeentakenwithoutanEmergency.Withtherestorationofpublicorderanddiscipline,manyfeltrelievedthatthecountryhadbeensaved

fromdisorderandchaos.Therewaslesscrimeinthecities;gheraosanduncontrolled,oftenviolent,demonstrationscametoanend;therewasaperceptiblelesseningoftensionintheair;therewascalmandtranquilityonthecampusesasstudentsandteacherswentbacktoclassrooms.InderMalhotra,aperceptivejournalist,wastowritelater:‘Thereturnofnormalandorderlylife,afterrelentlessdisruptionbystrikes,protestmarches,sit-insandclasheswiththepolice,wasapplaudedbymostpeople...Initsinitialmonthsatleast,theEmergencyrestoredtoIndiaakindofcalmithadnotknownforyears.’4

Therewasalsoanimmediateandgeneralimprovementinadministration,withgovernmentservantscomingtoofficeontimeandbeingmoreconsideratetothepublic.Quick,dramaticandwell-publicizedactionwastakenagainstsmugglers,hoarders,blackmarketeers,illegaltradersinforeigncurrencyandtaxevaders,withseveralthousandofthemputbehindbarsundertheMISA.Therewasamajor,dramaticimprovementintheeconomy,thoughonlysomeofitwasreallyduetostepstakenundertheEmergency;someofitbeingtheresultofexcellentrainsandsomeofthepoliciesinitiatedmuchbeforetheEmergency.Mostwelcomewasthedramaticimprovementinthepricesituation.Pricesofessentialgoods,includingfoodstuffs,camedownandtheiravailabilityinshopsimproved.PopularhopeswereraisedandtheEmergencymademorepalatablebytheannouncementon1Julyof

theomnibusTwenty-PointProgrammebyMrsGandhi,itsedgebeingthesocio-economicupliftofthevastmassoftheruralpoor.TheProgrammepromisedtoliquidatetheexistingdebtoflandlesslabourers,smallfarmersandruralartisansandextendalternatecredittothem,abolishbondedlabour,implementtheexistingagriculturallandceilinglawsanddistributesurpluslandtothelandless,providehousesitestolandlesslabourersandweakersections,reviseupwardsminimumwagesofagriculturallabour,providespecialhelptohandloomindustry,bringdownprices,preventtaxevasionandsmuggling,increaseproduction,streamlinedistributionofessentialcommodities,increasethelimitofincome-taxexemptiontoRs8,000,andliberalizeinvestmentprocedures.SeriouseffortsweremadetoimplementtheTwenty-PointProgramme;andsomequickresultswere

producedintermsofreductionofprices,freeavailabilityofessentialcommodities,andcheckonhoarding,smugglingandtaxevasion.ButtheheartoftheTwenty-PointProgrammewasitsagendaoftheupliftoftheruralpoor.Someprogresswasmadeeventhere.ThreemillionhousesiteswereprovidedtothelandlessandtheDalits.About1.1millionacresofsurpluslandwasdistributedtothelandless;thiswas,however,lessthan10percentofthesurplusland.Bondedlabourwasmadeillegalbutlittledentwasmadeinthepractice.Lawswerepassedindifferentstatesplacingamoratoriumontherecoveryofdebtsfromthelandlesslabourersandsmallfarmersandinsomecasestoscale-downorliquidatetheirdebts.Butthescaleofthealternatecreditprovidedthroughnationalizedbanksandruralcooperativeinstitutionswassmallanddependenceontheusuriousmoneylenders,whowereoftenalsothebiglandowners,remained.Minimumwagesforagriculturallabourerswereenhancedbuttheirenforcementwasagaintardy.Onthewhole,however,theruralsegmentoftheTwenty-PointProgrammeranoutofsteamasitsprogresswashinderedbylargelandownersandrichpeasantsandanunsympatheticbureaucracy.Consequently,thoughtheprogrammebroughtsomerelieftotheruralpoor,therewaslittleimprovementintheirbasiccondition.Amajorfactorinthepeople’sacceptanceoftheEmergencywasitsconstitutional,legalandtemporary

character.ItwasproclaimedunderArticle352oftheConstitution.Itwasapprovedbyparliamentandlegitimizedbythecourts.Tothepeople,itrepresentedaninterimmeasure,atemporarysuspensionofthenormalrulesandinstitutionsofdemocracy.Theydidnotseeitasasubstitutefordemocracyorasanattempttoimposeadictatorship.ThroughouttheEmergency,MrsGandhiassertedthatshewasfullycommittedtomulti-partydemocracyandafreePress,thattheEmergencywasanabnormalremedyforanabnormalsituation,andthatdemocraticconditionswouldberestoredandelectionsheldassoonasthesituationreturnedtonormal.TheIndianpeopletendedtotakeMrsGandhiatherwords.

TowardsEndingtheEmergency

Withinafewmonths,however,thepeoplestartedgettingdisillusionedwiththeEmergency.Populardiscontentfrommid-1976reacheditszenithsixmonthslater.Thereasonsforthisarevaried.Relieftothepeopledidnotlastlong.EconomicgrowthofthefirstyearoftheEmergencywasnot

sustained.Agriculturaloutputdeclined;pricesroseby10percentbytheendof1976.Thecorrupt,black-marketeersandsmugglersresumedtheiractivitiesastheshockoftheEmergencyworeoff.Thepoorweredisenchantedwiththeslowprogressintheirwelfareandworkerswereunhappybecauseoflimitsonwages,bonusanddearnessallowanceandrestrictionsontherighttostrike.Thegovernmentservantsandteachersbecamediscontentedbecausetheywerebeingdisciplinedintheirworkplacesandinmanycaseswerebeingforcedtofulfilsterilizationquotas.Infact,norealprogressalongtheproclaimedlineswaspossible,forMrsGandhiandCongressfailed

tocreateanynewagenciesofsocialchangeororgansforpopularmobilization.ReliancefortheimplementationoftheTwenty-PointProgrammeandotherdevelopmentalprogrammeswasplacedexclusivelyonthesameoldcorruptandinefficientbureaucracyandmanipulativeanddiscreditedpoliticians.Sofarasthecommonpeoplewereconcerned,matterstookaturnfortheworse,fortherewerenoavenuesofprotestoranyothermechanismforthevoicingandredressaloftheirgrievances.Evencommonpeopleandnotmerelyintellectualsandpoliticalworkerslivedinanatmosphereoffearandinsecurity.Thebureaucracyandthepolicenowgotincreasedpowerthatwasuncheckedbycriticismand

exposurefromthePress,courts,MLAsandMPs,politicalpartiesandpopularmovements.Thetwosetouttoabusethispowerinusualforms.Thisaffectedallbuteventuallythepoorwerethemostaffected.ThiswasparticularlytrueinnorthernIndia.Simultaneously,thedrasticpresscensorshipandthesilencingofprotestledtothegovernmentbeingkeptincompleteignoranceofwhatwashappeninginthecountry.Also,becausethepeopleknewthatwhatappearedinthePressorontheradiowasheavilycensored,theynolongertrustedthem.Theynowreliedmuchmoreonrumoursandtendedtobelievetheworstregardingthegovernment’sactionsorintentions.Denialofcivillibertiesbegantobefeltbythecommonpeopleasitbegantoimpacttheirdailylivesin

theformofharassmentandcorruptionbypettyofficials.DelayinliftingtheEmergencybegantogeneratethefearthattheauthoritarianstructureoftherulemightbemadepermanentorcontinueforalongtime,particularlyasMrsGandhihadgotparliamenttopostponeelectionsbyoneyearinNovember1976.Theintelligentsia—teachers,journalists,professionals,andsmalltownlawyers—andmiddleclassesinparticularviewedthe42ndAmendmenttotheConstitution,passedinSeptember1976,asanefforttosubvertdemocracybychangingtheverybasicstructureoftheConstitution.TheEmergency,earlieracceptable,begantoloselegitimacy.AmajorreasonforthegrowingunpopularityoftheEmergencyregimewas,however,thedevelopment

ofanextra-constitutionalcentreofpowerassociatedwiththerisetopoliticalpowerofMrsGandhi’syoungerson,SanjayGandhi,whoheldnoofficeinthegovernmentorCongress.ByApril1976,SanjayGandhiemergedasaparallelauthority,interferingatwillintheworkingofthegovernmentandadministration.HewascourtedandobeyedbyCabinetministers,Congressleaders,chiefministersandseniorcivilservants.WithinCongress,heemergedastheleaderoftheYouthCongresswhichsoonrivalledtheparentpartyinpoliticalweight.

InJuly1976,Sanjayputforwardhisfourpointswhichgraduallybecamemoreimportantthantheofficialtwentypoints.Thefourpointswere:don’ttakedowryatthetimeofmarriage;practisefamilyplanningandlimitfamiliestoonlytwochildren;planttrees;andpromoteliteracy.SanjayGandhiwasalsodeterminedtobeautifythecitiesbyclearingslumsandunauthorizedstructuresimpedingroads,bazaars,parks,monuments,etc.PushedbySanjayGandhi,thegovernmentdecidedtopromotefamilyplanningmorevigorouslyand

eveninanarbitrary,illegitimateandauthoritarianmanner.Incentivesandpersuasionwereincreasinglyreplacedbycompulsionandcoercionandaboveallbycompulsorysterilization.Governmentservants,schoolteachersandhealthworkerswereassignedarbitrarilyfixedquotasofnumberofpersonstheyhadto‘motivate’toundergosterilization.Thepoliceandadministrationaddedtheirmighttotheenforcementofthequotas.Themostaffectedweretheruralandurbanpoorwhooftenprotestedinallsortsofeverydayways,includingrecoursetoflight,hidingandrioting.Moreover,inviewofpresscensorship,stories,trueandfalse,offorciblevasectomiesandviolentresistancebythepeoplespreadquicklyandwidely.Slumclearanceanddemolitionofunauthorizedstructuresfollowedthepatternofthefamilyplanning

programmebutwereenforcedwithevengreatercallousnessandcruelty,thoughtheyaffectedmainlyDelhiandafewothercities.Thus,thealreadyexistingclimateoffearandrepression,corruptionandabuseofauthoritywasfurther

worsenedbytheexcessescommittedunderSanjayGandhi’sdirection.

SurpriseElections1977

On18January1977,MrsGandhisuddenlyannouncedthatelectionstoLokSabhawouldbeheldinMarch.Shealsosimultaneouslyreleasedpoliticalprisoners,removedpresscensorshipindotherrestrictionsonpoliticalactivitysuchasholdingofpublicmeetings.Politicalpartieswereallowedtocampaignfreely.Theelectionswereheldon16Marchinafreeandfairatmosphere,andwhentheresultscameinitwas

clearthatCongresshadbeenthoroughlydefeated.BothMrsGandhiandSanjayGandhilosttheirseats.MrsGandhiissuedastatementacceptingtheverdictofthepeoplewith‘duehumility’.WhydidMrsGandhiannounceandthenholdopenandfreeelections?Afterallshehadgotparliament

topostponeelectionsbyoneyearonlytwomonthsbeforeinNovember1976.Thereisuptonownosatisfactoryanswertothequestion,thoughtherehasbeenagreatdealofspeculation.Threebroadexplanationsareoffered.Firstly,thefavourableviewisthatthedecisionwasanexpressionofMrsGandhi’sunderlying

commitmenttoliberaldemocracyanddemocraticvalues.MaryC.Carras,herbiographer,hasarguedthat,‘Throughoutherlifeherself-imagehadbeenthatofademocrat;indeedherself-respectderivesingoodpartfromthisself-image...Shewascompelledtoprovetotheworldand,aboveall,toherself,thatsheisandalwayshasbeenademocrat.’5IntheopinionofsomeotherwritersonceMrsGandhibecameawareoftheEmergencyexcessesandrealizedthatthemattersweregettingoutofhercontrol,shedecidedtogetoutofthistrapbyholdingelectionsevenifitmeantlosingpower.TheunfriendlyviewisthatMrsGandhicompletelymisreadthepopulartemperand,misinformedby

sycophantsandintelligenceagencies,wasconvincedthatshewouldwin.Isolatedfrompublicopinion,

shewasunawareoftheextenttowhichherrulehadbecomeunpopular.BywinningtheelectionshehopedtovindicatetheEmergencyandalsoclearthewayforSanjayGandhitosucceedher.ThethirdviewisthatsherealizedthatthepoliciesoftheEmergencyhadtobelegitimizedfurther

throughelections.TheimpositionoftheEmergencyhadbeenlegitimizedattheoutsetbytheconstitutionalprovision,butthatwasnotenoughinviewofthedeep-seatedtraditionsofIndianpeople.Moreover,therewereclearsignsofrestivenessandevendiscontentamongthepeople.TheEmergencyregime,shemusthaverealized,wasincreasinglygettingdiscreditedandwasquitefragile.EithertheauthoritariancontentoftheEmergencywouldhavetobedeepened,withrecoursetoincreasingruthlessnessandbrutalityinsuppressingdissent,orgreaterlegitimacyandpoliticalauthorityacquiredbychangingbacktoademocraticsystem.TheformeroptionwouldnotworkinacountryofIndia’ssizeanddiversityandalsoinviewofitsdemocratictraditions.Thepeoplewouldnotacceptthelevelofrepressionthatitwouldrequire.During1975-77,manyIndiansandIndia’sfriendsabroadhaddoubtsaboutthefutureofthedemocratic

systeminIndia,thoughtheyhopedthatitwouldsurvivethepoliticalcrisis.ThelesssympatheticsaidthatdemocracyinIndiawas‘permanentlyineclipse’andthatIndiahadfinallyjoinedtheranksofotherpost-colonialsocietiesasanauthoritarianstate.ManyotherssaidthatthebasicchangesinitiatedbytheEmergencyandtheessentialfeaturesofthenewkindofregimewouldcontinueeveniftheEmergencywereendedandtheparliamentarysystemrestored.Somecommentatorswentfurtherandarguedthattheshifttowardsauthoritarianismhadbeengoingonsince1950andwasinherentinapoorandilliteratesociety.OthersheldthatthedemocraticconstitutionalsystemestablishedinIndiain1950wasnotsuitedtothegeniusofIndiaortheneedsofitspeople.Stillothersfeltthatitwasnotpossibletocombineeconomicdevelopmentwithdemocracy.Manyradicalsarguedthat,inanycase,liberaldemocracywasonlyafacadehidingtheunderlyingbrutalrealityofclassdominationandthesuppressionofpeople’sstruggles.TheEmergencyhad,therefore,onlyremovedthefacade;itdidnotmeananybasicpoliticalchangeexceptthatthesocialandpoliticalrealitywasnowvisibletoall.Therewere,ofcourse,manyinIndiaandabroadwhowereconvincedthattheEmergencywasa

temporarydeparturefromthebasiccommitmentofIndianpeopleanditspoliticalleadershiptodemocracyandthatdemocracywouldbesoonerorlaterrestoredinthecountry.ThedemocraticsysteminIndianotonlysurvivedtheJPMovementandtheEmergencybutemerged

stronger.Since1977,alltalkoftheneedfordictatorshiptodevelopeconomicallyandtoendcorruptionhasdieddown.Thosewhoholdthisviewhavebeenreducedtoatinyminorityandthattooamongthemiddleclasses;nointellectualorpoliticalleaderofanystaturehasespouseditforseveralyears.Inthissense,theliftingoftheEmergencyandthefreeelectionsthatfollowed,wereadefiningmoment

inIndia’spost-independencehistory.TheyrevealedtheIndianpeople’sunderlyingattachmenttodemocraticvalueswhichwereinturntheresultoftheimpactofthefreedomstruggleandtheexperienceofdemocraticfunctioning,includingfreeelections,since1947.AsTariqAlipointedout,intheelectionsofMarch1977‘theurbanandruralpoordemonstratedinaveryconcreteandstrikingfashionthatquestionsofbasiccivilrightswerenotmerelythepreoccupationsoftheurbanmiddleclasses.’6InderMalhotra,coveringtheelectioncampaign,reportedofthe‘trulyremarkable’mannerinwhich‘villageaudiencesintheremotecountrysidereacttosophisticatedargumentsaboutcivilliberties,fundamentalrightsandindependenceofthejudiciary.’7

WhateverthecharacteroftheJPMovementoroftheEmergencyregime,thereisnodoubtthatthedecisionofMrsGandhitoholdgenuinelyfreeelections,andherdefeatandtheOpposition’svictorythatfollowedwerearemarkableachievementofIndiandemocracy.Theyears1975-77havebeendescribedastheyearsofthe‘testofdemocracy’;thereisnodoubtthattheIndianpeoplepassedthetestwithdistinctionifnotfullmarks.

19TheJanataInterregnumandIndiraGandhi’sSecondComing,1977-84

ImmediatelyaftercomingoutofthejailsinJanuary1977,theoppositionleadersannouncedthemergerofCongress(O),JanSangh,BharatiyaLokDal(BLD)andSocialistPartyintothenewJanataParty.TheCongresswasdealtablowbythesuddendefectionfromiton2February1977ofJagjivanRam,H.N.BahugunaandNandiniSatpathywhoformedtheCongressforDemocracy(CFD).AlongwithDMK,AkaliDalandCPMitforgedacommonfrontwiththeJanataPartyinordertogiveastraightfighttoCongressanditsallies,theCPIandAIADMKintheMarchelectionstotheLokSabha.TheoppositionfrontmadetheEmergencyanditsexcesses,especiallyforcedsterlizationsandthe

restrictionofcivilliberties,themajorissuesofitselectioncampaign.ThepeoplealsotreatedtheelectionsasareferendumontheEmergency.Withthepopularupsurgeinfavourofthem,theJanataPartyanditsallieswerevictoriouswith330outof542seats.Congresstrailedfarbehindwithonly154seats,withCPIitsallygetting7andtheAIADMK21seats.CongresswasvirtuallywipedoutinNorthIndia—itwononly2outof234seatsinsevennorthernstates.BothIndiraGandhiandSanjayweredefeated.Theelectoralverdictwas,however,mixedinwesternIndia.SurprisinglyintheSouth,wheretheEmergencyhadbeenlessvigorous,andthepro-poormeasuresoftheTwenty-PointProgrammebetterimplemented,Congressimproveditsperformance,winning92seatsinplaceof70in1971.Janatawononly6seatsinthefoursouthernstates.TheCongressforDemocracymergedwithJanataPartyimmediatelyaftertheelections.Therewasanear-crisisovertheissueofprimeministershipbetweenthethreeaspirants,Morarji

Desai,CharanSinghandJagjivanRam.Thematterwasreferredtotheseniorleaders,JayaprakashNarayanandJ.B.Kripalani,whoruledinfavourofthe81-year-oldDesai,whowassworninasprimeministeron23March.Oneofthefirststepstakenbythenewgovernmentwastotrytoconsolidateitsholdoverthestates.

ArguingthatinthosestateswhereCongresshadlostinnationalelections,ithadalsolostthemandatetoruleevenatthestatelevel,thegovernmentdismissednineCongress-ruledstategovernments,andorderedfreshelectionstotheirstateassemblies.Intheassemblyelections,heldinJune1977,JanataanditsalliescameoutvictoriousinthesestatesexceptinTamilNaduwhereAIADMKwon.InWestBengal,theCPM,aJanataally,gainedanabsolutemajority.ControloverboththeparliamentandthestateassembliesenabledtheJanataPartytoelectunopposed

itsowncandidate,N.SanjeevaReddy,asthePresidentoftheUnioninJuly1977.TheJanatagovernmenttookimmediatestepstodismantletheauthoritarianfeaturesoftheEmergency

regimeandtorestoreliberaldemocracy.ItrestoredfundamentalrightsandfullcivillibertiestothePress,politicalpartiesandindividuals.Throughthe44ndConstitutionalAmendment,italsomodifiedthe42ndAmendmentpassedduringtheEmergency,repealingthoseofitsprovisionswhichhaddistortedthe

Constitution.TherightsoftheSupremeCourtandHighCourtstodecideonthevalidityofcentralorstatelegislationwasalsorestored.

JanataPartyinCrisis

ThepoliticalsupporttotheJanataregime,however,soonbegantodeclineanddisillusionmentwithitsetin,givenitsnon-performanceinadministration,implementingdevelopmentalpolicies,andrealizingsocialjustice.Thepoliticalmomentumoftheregimewaslostbytheendof1977andtheuneasycoalitionthatwasJanataPartybegantodisintegrate,thoughthegovernment,remainedinpowertillJuly1979.Bythenthelackofconfidenceinitscapacitytogovernhadbeguntoturnintoanger,forseveralreasons.First,theJanataPartywasnotabletodealwiththerapidlygrowingsocialtensionsinruralareas,ofwhichtheincreasingextentofatrocitiesontheruralpoorandtheScheduledCasteswasonemanifestation.JanataParty’ssocialbaseinNorthIndiaconsistedprimarilyofrichandmiddlepeasantsbelongingmostlytointermediatecastesandlargelandownersbelongingtouppercastesandtheurbanandruralshop-keepers,smallbusinessmenandthepettybourgeoisie.TherurallandownersfeltthatwiththeJanatagovernmentsattheCentreandthestates,theyhadnowunalloyedpowerinthecountryasawholeandinruralareasinparticular.Ontheotherhand,theruralpoor,mostlylandlesslabourersandbelonginglargelytotheScheduledCastes,toohadbecomeconsciousoftheirrightsandfeltemboldenedbytheprolongedfunctioningofdemocracyandadultfranchise.TheyalsodefendedandassertedtherightsandbenefitstheyhadobtainedundertheTwenty-PointProgramme.InmanystatesthelandownerstriedtoforciblytakebacktheplotsgiventothemandthemoneylendersbegantoreclaimdebtscancelledduringtheEmergency.TheresultwasthewideprevalenceofcastetensionsandviolentattacksontheScheduledCastesinNorthIndia,anearlyinstancebeingthekillingandtorchingofHarijansatBelchiinBiharinJuly1977.Therewasrecrudescenceoflarge-scalecommunalviolence.Thereweregrowingagitations,

lawlessnessandviolencewhichparticularlyaffectedcollegesanduniversities,oftenleadingtotheirclosure.Themiddleof1979alsowitnessedawaveofstrikesandmutiniesbypolicemenandparamilitaryforces.Next,theJanataregimeexplicitlyrepudiatedtheNehruvianvisionofrapideconomicdevelopment

basedonlarge-scaleindustry,modernagriculture,andadvancedscienceandtechnology.Butitfailedtoevolveanyalternativestrategyormodelofeconomicandpoliticaldevelopmenttodealwiththeproblemsofeconomicunderdevelopment.Janata’seconomicpolicymerelycounterposedruraldevelopmenttoindustry-orientedgrowth.This

policycametobebasedonthreepillars:labour-intensivesmall-scaleindustry,notascomplementarytobutinplaceoflarge-scaleindustry;decentralizationinplaceofnationalplanning;andrich-peasant-ledagriculturaldevelopmentbasedongeneroussubsidies,reductioninlandrevenue,andmassiveshiftofresourcesfromindustrytotheruralsector.Thisshiftineconomicpolicywasarecipeforlowornon-economicdevelopment.Interestingly,theJanataPartymadenoefforttofulfillitsearlierradicaldemandsforlandreformand

paymentofhigherwagestoagriculturallabourers.TheonepositiveeconomicstepthattheJanatagovernmentdidundertakewastheefforttoprovideemploymenttotheruralunemployedthroughthe‘FoodforWork’programme,whichwasusedtoimprovevillageinfrastructuresuchasroads,school

buildings,etc.,andwhichwasparticularlyefficientlyimplementedbytheCPMgovernmentinWestBengal.AfterthefirstyearofJanatarule,theeconomystarteddriftingwithbothagricultureandindustry

showingstagnationorlowratesofgrowth.Severedroughtconditionsanddevastatingfloodsinseveralstatesaffectedagriculturalproductionin1978and1979.Pricesbegantorisesharply,especiallyasfoodgrainsstockshadbeenusedupinthe‘FoodforWork’programme.Internationalpricesofpetroleumandpetroleumproductsagainrosesteeply.Theheavydeficit-financinginthe1979budget,presentedbyCharanSinghasfinanceminister,alsohadamarkedinflationaryimpact.1979alsowitnessedwidespreadshortagesofkeroseneandothergoodsofdailyconsumption.Bytheendofthatyear,inflationhadgonebeyond20percent.TheJanatagovernment’stenurewastoobriefforittoleavemuchofanimpactonIndia’sforeign

policy,thoughwhilecontinuingtofunctionwithintheexisting,widelyacceptedframework,itdidtrytoreorientforeignpolicy.Ittalkedof‘genuinenon-alignment’whichmeantstrengtheningtieswithUSandBritainandmoderatingitscloserelationswiththeSovietUnion.HoldingthepartytogetherseemstohavebeenamajorpreoccupationoftheJanataleaders.Already

disintegratingbytheendof1977,by1978-79,thegovernment,lackingalldirection,wascompletelyparalyzedbytheconstantbickeringandinfightinginthepartybothattheCentreandinthestates.Eachpoliticalcomponenttriedtooccupyasmuchpoliticalandadministrativespaceaspossible.Intheideologicalsphere,theJanSanghtriedtopromoteitscommunalagendaviatextbooksandrecruitmenttotheofficialmedia,educationalinstitutionsandthepolice.TheJanataPartyremainedacoalitionofdifferentpartiesandgroupsandwasavictimoffactionalism,manipulationandpersonalambitionsofitsleaders.Thedifferentconstituentsweretoodisparatehistorically,ideologicallyandprogrammatically;boundonlybyananti-IndiraGandhisentimentandthedesireforpower.JanSangh,itsbestorganizedanddominantcomponentwithninetyMPs,wascommunalandpopulistwithumbilicaltiestoRSSwhichprovideditcadresandideologyandwhichwasnotwillingtoletitbeincorporatedinorintegratedwithotherparties.Congress(O)wassecularbutconservativeandbasicallyCongressinmentality.BLDwassecular,butastrictlyrich-peasantpartywithnoall-Indiaordevelopmentalvision.TheSocialistswerelargelyideologylessandrootlessexceptinBihar.

TheRevivaloftheCongress

Inthemeanwhile,theCongresswitnessedbothasplitandarevival.FeelingthatIndiraGandhiwasnotonlyaspentforcebut,muchworse,aseriouspoliticalliability,alargenumberofestablishedCongressleaders,ledbyY.B.ChavanandBrahmanandReddyturnedagainsther.She,inturn,splitthepartyinJanuary1978,withherwingbeingknownasCongress(I)(forIndira)andtheotherlater,asCongress(U)(forDevrajUrs).Thereafter,IndiraGandhi’spoliticalfortunesbegantoreviveandintheFebruary1978electionsto

stateassembliesCongress(I)defeatedbothJanataandtherivalCongressinKarnatakaandAndhra.Thereweretworeasonsforthisrevival.OnewastheJanatagovernment’sefforttowreakvengeanceonIndiraGandhiandpunishherforthehappeningsoftheEmergency.SeveralCommissionsofEnquiry—themostfamousbeingtheShahCommission—wereappointedtoinvestigateandpinpointthemalpractices,excesses,abusesandatrocitiescommitedbyIndiraGandhiandtheofficialsduringtheEmergency.In

1979,specialcourtsweresetuptotryherforallegedcriminalactsduringtheEmergency.Thecommonpeople,ontheotherhand,begantoincreasinglyviewIndiraGandhi’spersecutionnotasjusticebutasrevengeandvendettaandanefforttodisgraceher.Theyfeltshehadalreadybeenpunishedenoughbybeingvotedoutofpower.Moreover,deepdown,theruralandurbanpoor,Harijans,minoritiesandwomenstillconsideredIndiraGandhiastheirsaviour,theirIndiraAmmaorMotherIndira.However,thegovernmentremainedignorantofIndiraGandhi’sgrowingpopularity,thankstothebias

ofthePressagainsther.AdramaticdemonstrationofhergrowingpopularitycamewhenshewonaparliamentseatwithalargemarginfromtheChikamagalurconstituencyinKarnatakainNovember1978.Ironically,soonafter,on19December,JanatauseditsmajoritytoexpelherfromtheparliamentforbreachofprivilegeandcontemptoftheHouseonaminorchargeandcommittedhertojailforaweek.ThefactionalstruggleintheJanatagovernmentandthepartytookanacuteforminthemiddleof1979.

CharanSingh,thehomeminister,hadbeenforcedtoresignfromtheCabineton30June1978,and,wasthen,broughtbackasfinanceministerinJanuary1979.HebrokeupthepartyandthegovernmentinJulywiththehelpoftheSocialists,whowalkedoutofthepartyandthegovernmentontherefusaloftheJanSanghmemberstogiveuptheirdualmembershipofJanataPartyandRSS.Havingbeenreducedtoaminority,MorarjiDesai’sgovernmentresignedon15July.Aweeklater,CharanSinghformedthegovernmentinalliancewiththeChavan-wingoftheCongress(U)andsomeoftheSocialistsandwiththeoutsidesupportofCong(I)andCPI.Buthenevergottofacetheparliamentas,on20August,adaybeforetheconfidencevote,IndiraGandhiwithdrewhersupportafterCharanSinghrejectedherdemandforthescrappingofspecialcourtssetuptoprosecuteher.OnCharanSingh’sadvice,thePresidetdissolvedtheLokSabhaandannouncedmid-termelections.Theelections,heldinJanuary1980,werefoughtprimarilybetweenCong(I),Cong(U),LokDal,the

newpartyfloatedbyCharanSinghandSocialists,andJanata,nowconsistingprimarilyofJanSanghandahandfulofoldCongressmensuchasJagjivanRamandChandraShekhar,CPMandCPIwerenotinthepictureexceptinWestBengalandKerala.HavingbeendisenchantedwithJanata’snon-governance,lackofvisionandincessantmutualquarrels,thepeopleonceagainturnedtoCongressandIndiraGandhi,perceivingherCongresstobetherealCongress.TheJanataParty’smainappealconsistedofwarningsagainstthethreattodemocracyandcivilliberties

ifIndiraGandhicamebacktopower.CharanSinghtalkedof‘peasantraj’.IndiraGandhiconcentratedonJanata’snon-governance,askedthepeopletovotefor‘agovernmentthatworks.’Thepeople,onceagaincuttingacrosscaste,religionandregionasin1971and1977,gaveamassive

mandatetoCong(I),whichsecured353outof529seats,thatisatwo-thirdsmajority.LokDalwith41,Janatawith31andCong(U)with13laggedfarbehind.CPMandCPIalonewithstoodtheCongresstideandwon36and11seatsrespectively.Aftertheelections,JanataPartysplitonceagain,withtheoldJanSanghleadersleavingittoformthe

BharatiyaJanataPartyattheendof1980andJagjivanRamjoiningCong(U).

IndiraGandhi’sReturn

Afterhavingbeenoutofofficeforthirty-fourmonths,IndiraGandhiwasonceagaintheprimeministerandCongresswasrestoredtoitsoldpositionasthedominantparty.FollowingthewrongprecedentsetupbyJanatagovernmentin1977,Congressgovernmentdissolvedtheninestateassembliesinthe

opposition-ruledstates.Intheassemblyelections,subsequentlyheldinJune,CongresssweptthepollsexceptinTamilNadu.Itnowruledfifteenofthetwenty-twostates.ThoughonceagaintheprimeministerandtheonlyIndianleaderwithanationalappeal,IndiraGandhi

wasnolongerthesamepersonshewasfrom1969to1977.Shenolongerhadafirmgraspoverpoliticsandadministration.Despiteenjoyingunchallengedpower,sheditheredintakingsignificantnewpolicyinitiativesordealingeffectivelywithanumberofdisturbingproblems.Shedid,however,stillmanagesomesuccessinthefieldsofeconomicandforeignpolicy.But,onthewhole,therewasalackofdirectionandasenseofdrift,whichledtoafeelingamongthepeoplethatnotmuchwasbeingachieved.TheEmergencyandtheJanatayearshadlefttheirmarkonher.Shewassuspiciousofpeoplearoundherandtrustednonebutherson,Sanjay.Herearlierenergy,decisivenessanddeterminationwerereplacedby‘anapproachofhesitationandcaution’.Astimepassedsheshowedsignsofbeingatiredperson.Besides,IndiraGandhihadfewpoliticalinstrumentstoimplementherelectionpromises.Mostofthe

well-knownandexperiencednationalandstateleadersandhercolleaguesofthepasthaddesertedherduring1977-78.Withafewexceptions,thepoliticalleadersaroundher,intheCentreasalsointhestates,wererawuntriedmenandwomen,noneofwhomhadapoliticalbaseoftheirownandwhohadbeenchosenmorefortheirloyaltythanfortheiradministrativeorpoliticalcapacities.SanjayGandhi’sdeathwhileflyingastuntplaneon23June1980lefthershakenandfurtherweakened.

Shetriedtofillhisplacewithherelderson,RajivGandhi,whowasbroughtintopolitics,gotelectedasanMPandthenappointedasthegeneralsecretaryofthepartyin1983.Likethefirstone,amajorweaknessofIndira’ssecondprimeministerialinningswasthecontinuing

organizationalweaknessofCongressandherfailuretorebuilditandstrengthenitsstructure.Thisinevitabilityaffectedtheperformanceofthegovernmentanditspopularity,foraweakpartystructuremeantthechokingofchannelsthroughwhichpopularfeelingscouldbeconveyedtotheleadershipandthenatureandrationaleofgovernmentpoliciesexplainedtothepeople.DespiteIndiraGandhi’stotaldominationofthepartyandthegovernment,thecentralleadershipofthe

partyagainfacedtheproblemofcontinuousfactionalismandinfighting—infact,virtualcivilwar—withinthestateunitsofthepartyandthestategovernments.Oneresultofthisinfightingandtheconsequentfrequentriseandfallofchiefministerswasthatpartyorganizationalelectionswererepeatedlypostponedand,intheend,notheld.AnotherresultwastheerosionofthefeelingthatCongresscouldprovidestategovernmentsthatworked.Organizationalweaknessalsobegantoerodetheparty’ssupportandadverselyaffectitselectoralperformance,withdissidentsoftensabotagingtheprospectsoftheofficialpartycandidates.Anexampleofthiserosionoftheparty’spopularitywastheseriouselectoraldefeatitsufferedin

January1983intheelectionstothestateassembliesofAndhraandKarnataka,thetwostateswhichCongresshadruledcontinuouslysincetheirinception.InAndhra,CongresssufferedamassivedefeatatthehandsofthenewlyformedTeluguDesamparty,ledbythefilm-star-turnedpolitician,N.T.RamaRao.TheCongresswononly60seatsagainstTeluguDesam’s202.InKarnataka,aJanata-ledfrontwon95seatsinthe224-seatassembly,withCongressgetting81seats.WhilefacinghardlyanychallengeattheCentrefromoppositionparties,fromthebeginningofher

secondprimeministershipIndiraGandhifacedcertainintractableproblemsarisingoutofcommunal,linguisticandcasteconflicts;noneofthesewasdealtwithfirmnessandinsightandallofthemwereto

dragonforyears.Threeofthemostseriousofthesearediscussedbelowinotherchapters:Kashmirinchapter22,Assaminchapter23,Punjabinchapter24.Communalismgainedstrengthasdiscussedinchapter33becauseofthemomentumitgainedduring1977-79.Itsovertmanifestationwasconimunalriots,whichspannedalltheyearsfrom1980to1984andbeyondandwhichbegantoengulfevenSouthIndia.Similarly,atrocitiesontheScheduledCastesandScheduledTribescontinuedastheybegantoassert

theirsocialandconstitutionalrights.However,administrativeandjudicialaction,whichincludedlongtermsofimprisonment,wastakeninsomecasesagainsttheperpetratorsoftheatrocities.Thoughhesitatingly,Indiaonceagainresumeditstasksofplanningandeconomicdevelopment,with

greaterfinancialallocationsbeingmadeforthepurpose.ThegovernmentalsotooknoteofthechangesinworldeconomyandtheirimpactonIndiaand,whilemakingeffortstostrengthenthepublicsector,initiatedmeasuresforwhathascometobeknownaseconomicliberalization.But,asbroughtoutinchapters25-32ontheeconomy,thegovernmentproceededverygraduallyandhesitatinglybecauseIndiraGandhiwasworriedabouttheroleofmultinationalcorporationsinerodingIndia’sself-reliance.Thegovernment,however,succeededinraisingtherateofeconomicgrowthtoover4percentperyear,withalargeincreaseinagriculturalandpetroleumcrudeproduction(fordetails,seethechapters25-32),andingraduallybringingdowntherateofinflationto7percentin1984.IndiraGandhi’sgovernmentalsoachievedsomesuccessinforeignpolicy.InMarch1983,Indiahosted

theseventhsummitoftheNon-AlignedMovementwithIndiraGandhiasitschairman.AsformalleaderoftheNon-AlignedMovementsheactivelyworkedforanewinternationaleconomicorderthatwouldbemorefairtothedevelopingcountries.Whenon26December1979theSovietUnionsentitstroopsintoAfghanistantohelpitsbeleaguered

government,MrsGandhirefusedtocondemndieactionbut,atthesametime,sheadvisedtheSovietUniontowithdrawitstroopsfromAfghanistanasspeedilyaspossible.She,however,opposedtheindirectinterventioninAfghanistan’scivilwarbytheUnitedStatesandPakistan.MrsGandhi’sstandonAfghanistanissuewasdeterminedbyIndia’slong-termfriendshipand‘special’relationshipwiththeSovietUnionandIndia’sstrategicinterestinpreventingAfghanistanfromhavinganadministratorhostiletoIndia.IndiraGandhitriedtoimproveIndia’srelationswiththeUSdespiteitstilttowardsPakistan.Shealso

triedtonormalizerelationswithChinaandPakistan,despitethelatter’ssupporttotheterroristsinPunjab.Shedidnot,however,hesitatetoorderthearmyinApril1984todeployabrigadeattheSiachenglacieralongthelineofcontrolinKashmir.Onthemorningof31October1984,IndiraGandhi’slongtenureasprimeministerwasbroughttoan

endbyherassassinationbytwoSikhmembersofhersecurityguard.TheCongressParliamentaryBoardimmediatelynominatedherforty-year-oldson,RajivGandhi,asprimeminister.

IndiraGandhi—AnEvaluation

AnyassessmentofIndiraGandhihastoacknowledgethatshewasahighlycomplexperson,fullofcontradictions,andwhichmadeherextremelycontroversial.Duringhertwentyyearsinpowershemadeimmensecontributionsandexhibitedmanyremarkablefeaturesofherpoliticalpersonalityandapproach.

Ofcourse,thereweremajorweaknesses,butthese,aswellasherstrengths,aretobeseeninlightofhowshechangedovertheyears.IndiraGandhipossessedgreatpoliticalskillwhichshecontinuouslydevelopedovertimeasshefaced

newsituationsandchallenges.Thoughinthehabitofsolicitingopinionandadvicefromallaroundher,sheherselfinvariablymadethefinaldecision.Forallofherpoliticallife,IndiraGandhiconductedherselfwithfiercecourage.She,asalsoherpoliticalopponents,werequiteconsciousofthisqualityofhers.Possessedofextraordinarywill,asapoliticalfighterIndiraGandhiwastough,resolute,decisiveand,whennecessary,ruthless.Thoughquitecautiousbynatureandtemperament,whennecessarysheactedboldly,swiftly,withasuperbsenseoftiming,anddecisively,asforexample,inthecaseoftheCongresssplitin1969,theBangladeshcrisisin1971,thedefianceoftheUSdecisiontosendtheSeventhFleettotheBayofBengalinDecember1971,thecreationofthePunjabiSubain1966,theimpositionoftheEmergencyin1975,andtheJanata’spersecutionofherthroughEnquiryCommissionsduring1977-79.AmajorfeatureofIndiraGandhi’spoliticswasheridentificationwithandherpassionateloveofthe

countryanditspeople,herprideinIndia’sgreatnessandconfidenceinitsfuture.IndiraGandhiwasacutelyawareofIndia’snationalinterestsandcommitedtomaintainingitsprestigeamongthecommunityofnations.Fullyrealizingthatrealnationalgreatnessandindependencelieinacountry’sinherentstrength,she

strovehardandsuccessfully,inthefaceofmanydiredomesticeconomicandpoliticalproblems,tomakeIndiaeconomically,politically,culturally,technologicallyandmilitaryself-reliantandindependentandtogivethecountryconfidenceinitsabilitytodoso.Indiaunderherleadershipwasoneofthefewcountriestoovercometheoil-shockoftheseventies.ThesuccessoftheGreenRevolutionmadeIndiaself-sufficientinfoodgrainsandbrokeitsdependenceonfoodimports.ThroughouttheNehruandIndiraGandhiyearsIndiawasshieldedfromtherecessionarycyclescommoninothercapitalisteconomies.IndiraGandhiusedherfirmgraspofworldpoliticstoensurethattherewasnosuccessfulovertor

covertforeigninterferenceinIndia’sinternalaffairs.ShekeptIndiafreeofboththeColdWarblocsandthetwosuperpowers.Whileadheringtothepolicyofnotgoingnuclear,sherefusedtosignthenuclearnon-proliferationtreatyeventhoughitwassponsoredbyboththeUnitedStatesandtheSovietUnion.ShestrengthenedtheforeignpolicycarefullycraftedbyNehru.IndiraGandhialsoactivelypromotedtheprocessofnation-in-the-making,strengthenedthecountry’s

unity,heldittogetherduringadifficultperiod,andintheendgaveherlifeforthepurpose.Withallherflawsandfailures,sheleftthecountrystrongerandmoreself-confidentthanitwaswhenshetookcommandofitin1966.IndiraGandhiwaspragmaticandlackedNehru’sideologicalmoorings,butsheremainedcommittedto

aprogressive,reformist,left-of-centrepoliticalorientation.IntheeconomicfieldsheremainedloyaltotheNehruvianobjectiveofrapideconomicdevelopmentandstrengthenedplanningandthepublicsectorwhilemaintainingamixedeconomyand,exceptforthebriefperiodof1971-1974,ahealthyprivatesectorthoughunderrigidstatecontrol.She,however,triedtorelaxthiscontrolgradually—perhapstoogradually—during1980-1984.Ideologically,sheremainedtruetothenationalmovement’sseculartraditionandconsistentlyopposed

thecommunalforces,lookingupontheRSS,inparticular,asagreatmenacetotheunityandintegrityofthecountryandtoitsdemocraticpolity.Herfirmcommitmenttosecularismwasshownbyherinsistence

onmakingDrZakirHussain,aMuslim,thecountry’sPresidentandwhenshecountermandedtheordertoremovefromdutyherSikhsecurityguardsinOctober1984,onthegroundthatIndiawasasecularcountry.Forthelatterdecisionshepaidwithherlife.IndiraGandhi’smajorpoliticalassetwasherempathyandaffectionforthepoor,theunderprivileged

andtheminorities,concernfortheirsocialconditionandanunmatchedcapacitytocommunicatedirectlywiththem.Thepoor,inturn,almostthroughoutherpoliticalcareer,lookeduponherastheirsaviourandgaveherimmenseloveandtrust.ThereisalsonodoubtthatIndiraGandhiplayedanimportantroleinpoliticizingthepeople,especiallyinmakingthepoor,theHarijansandtribals,theminoritiesandwomenawareoftheirsocialconditionanditsunderlyingunjustcharacter,andinarousingconsciousnessoftheirinterestsandthepoliticalpowerthatinheredinthem.However,inspiteofallthepowerthatshewieldedforoversixteenyears,IndiraGandhiachieved

littleintermsofinstitutionaldevelopment,administrativeimprovement,managementofthepoliticalsystemandfar-reachingsocio-economicchange.Hercrucialweaknessasapoliticalleaderlayintheabsenceofanystrategicdesignandlong-termperspectivearoundwhichhereconomic,politicalandadministrativepolicieswereframed.Asalreadymentionedearlier,shewasamasterofpoliticaltacticsandtheirtiming,withoutmatchamonghercontemporaries.Butherbrillianttacticswereatnostagecomponentsofapre-conceivedstrategy.EventheimpositionoftheEmergencywasnotpartofanalternativestrategicdesignformanagingthepoliticalsystembutmerelyanadhocresponsetoasituationofcrisis.Buttactics,howeversound,cannotsufficeinthemselves.Theyaretheshort-term,issue-to-issuepoliciesthroughwhichastrategyisimplemented.Withoutastrategy,tactics,howeverbrilliant,hangintheair.Theydonotevenhelpformulatepolicieswhichareadequatetotheachievementoftheproclaimedobjectivesofaleadershiporwhichenableittomoveacountrytowardsthedesireddestination.Ineconomicdevelopmentandforeignpolicy,theNehruvianstrategiesweretheretoguideherandafter

someinitialvacillationIndiraGandhiwentbacktothem.Formanagementofthepoliticalsystem,orevenovercomingtheinstabilityofthestate,ordevelopmentoftheadministrativestructureoratleastpreventingitsdownslide,therewerenoclear-cutorspecificstrategiesuponwhichtofallbackandIndiraGandhifailedtoevolveanyofherown.ShedidnotcreativelydevelopNehru’sstrategyeveninthefieldofeconomicpolicytomeetachangednationalandworldeconomicsituationasisevidentfromherhesitanteffortstorelaxthelicence-quota-regulationregime.Similarly,shefailedtoevolveastrategicframeworktodealwithcommunalismandseparatism,resultinginherfailuretodealeffectivelywiththePunjab,AssamandKashmirproblems.TheconsequencesofIndiraGandhi’sfailuretoevolveandfunctionwithinastrategicframeworkwere

feltinseveralotherfieldsalso.Despitemassiveelectoralmajorities,IndiraGandhiwasnotabletomaketheinstitutionalchangesinpoliticalorgovernmentalapparatus—theparliament,cabinet,policeorbureaucracyorCongresspartyortheeducationalsystem—neededtoimplementherownagenda.Notonlydidshenotbuildanynewinstitutionsormakeanyefforttoreformorstrengthenoldones,muchworse,shemadelittleefforttochecktheerosioninmostinstitutionsand,infact,contributedtothedecayofsome.Asaresult,increasinglyovertime,IndiraGandhicametorelyonpersonalpowerratherthanonpoliticalandadministrativeinstitutions.Sheconcentratedandcentralizedauthorityanddecision-makinginthepartyandthegovernmentinherhands.Shesystematicallyunderminedherownpartyleaderswhohadanindependentpoliticalbaseoftheirown,andchoseaschiefministerspersonswhocouldnot

survivewithouthersupport.Oneresultofthiswasthatthepowerandinfluenceofthechiefministersdeclinedovertheyears.Moreover,nothavingapoliticalbaseoftheirown,thesecandidateswerevictimsofcontinuousfactionalisminthepartyatthestatelevel.IndiraGandhiwasforcedtoreplacethemfrequently,creatinginstabilityintheadministrationandthepartyorganizationinthestate.Hertimewastakenupinday-to-dayfire-fightingofproblemsrelatingtothepartyandgovernmentmanagement;shehadnotimeforevolvingstrategiesandbroaderpolicyframeworksfordealingwiththeseriousproblemsofthecountryortheparty.ItissignificantthattheonlymajorinstitutionshebuiltupwasthatofthePrimeMinister’sSecretariat

(PMO),whichshehadinheritedfromShastriandwhichbecameanindependentbureaucraticsourceofpolicy,adviceandinitiativeanddecision-making,thusseverelyunderminingtheautonomousroleofthecabinetmembers.Nevertheless,despitealltheconcentrationofpowerinherhands,itwouldbewrongtosaythatIndira

Gandhiwasundemocraticortriedorevenwantedtoimposeanauthoritarianregime.Exceptfortheperiod1975-77,shefunctionedwithintheparliamentaryframeworkandplayedanimportantroleinIndiaremainingonthedemocraticpath.Sheaccepted,evenwhenshedidnotlikeit,theauthorityofthejudiciary.ShedidnottinkerwiththePress,evenwhenitsubjectedhertocalumnies,orwithacademicfreedom,evenwhenalargenumberofacademicintellectualshadbecomeseverecriticsofher.EventheEmergencywasimposedinaccordwiththeprovisionsoftheConstitution.Moreover,itwasshewholiftedtheEmergency,announcedandheldelections,gracefullyacceptedtheverdictofthevoteandgaveuppower—afeatrarely,ifatall,performedbydictators.AnexampleofIndiraGandhi’sfailuretobuildupinstitutionswasinrespectoftheCongressparty.She

hadhardlyanycapacityoreventimeforpartyorganization,butwasnotwillingtosharethetaskwithothers.Eventhoughshereplenishedtheparty’ssocialsupportbase,shefailedtoreorganizeandrevitalizeitafterthe1969split.Asaresult,itwasunabletokeepcontactwiththepeopleexceptduringtheelections;andasanorganizationitgraduallydecayed,especiallyatthelocalandstatelevels.Sheruledsupremeintheparty—shevirtuallynominatedthepartypresident,membersofitsWorkingCommittee,headsofitsstateunitsandotherpartyorganizations.Therewasalsohardlyanyinner-partydemocracyanddebateonissues,nottospeakofcriticismofthecentralleadership.ThecultureofsycophancyprevailedevenafterthedeathofSanjayGandhi.However,despitehertotalsupremacy,IndiraGandhicouldnotpreventtheprevalenceofintensefactionalisminthepartyatthelocalandstatelevels.And,manyatime,sycophantsturnedintorebelsandparty-splitterswhenfrustratedintheirhopes.Onceagain,politicalandtacticalskillenabledIndiraGandhitomanageandcontrolthepartybutshe

couldnotaccomplishthestrategictaskofreinvigoratingitorbuildingitupasanorganization.Shedidsucceedinreachingouttothepeopleandestablishingdirectcontactwiththem,butonlythroughpopulistmeasuresandonlyduringelectoralcampaignsandmassmeetings.Thiscouldenableherandthepartytohavedominanceinthelegislaturesandoverthegovernment,butitdidnotmakeitpossibleforthepartytoexercisepoliticalhegemonyamongthepeopleoutsidethelegislaturesorkeepforlongthesupportgainedatthepolls.Consequently,throughmostofherprimeministerialperiodshewastroubledandharassedbypopularmovementsandagitations.Eventhoughprovidingsomesuccourandbenefitstothepoorandoppressed,IndiraGandhifailedto

fulfilherpromiseofbringingaboutradicalsocio-economicchangeorcombiningeconomicgrowthwith

socialjustice.Inspiteofherlongtenure,theeconomyandsocietydidnotmovemuchtowardsgreatersocialandeconomicequality.Infact,quitethereverse;Indiaof1984wasmorenotlessinequitablethanIndiaof1966.ThisincapacitytomoveIndiainagreateregalitariandirectionwasfurtherintensifiedbyherfailureto

reshapeCongressintoapopularinstrumentofpoliticaleducationandmobilizationandanagentofsocialandpoliticaltransformation.Congresscontinuedtoharbourstronglyconservativeasalsoradicalelements.WhilethepoorandthedeprivedgaveherandCongressmassiveelectoralsupportin1971,1972and1980,thecompositionandstructureofthepartycontinuedunchangedandperhapsevenworsenedwiththeinductionofblackmoneyandcriminalsintopartiesandpolitics.Agiantofaperson,withmanystrengthsandmanyweaknesses,IndiraGandhistrodetheIndian

politicalstageafterindependencelongerthananyotherleader—longerthanevenherfather—andshewasfullyjustifiedintellingafriendafewdaysbeforeherassassination:‘Whateverhappenstome—IfeelIhavepaidallmydebts.’1AndIndiaanditspeopleweresurelyricherforherhavingdoneso.

20TheRajivYears

AssumingOffice

Rajiv,sonofIndiraGandhiandgrandsonofJawaharlalNehru,becameprimeministerofIndiaonthenightof31October1985.Thatmorning,IndirahadbeguntowalkfromherhometoherofficetokeepanappointmentforatelevisioninterviewwithPeterUstinov.Instead,shemetherfateinthepersonoftwoSikhguardswhoshotathertotakerevengeforherstormingoftheGoldenTempletoflushoutSikhterroristsinJune1984.Bytheafternoon,Indirawasdeclareddeadand,whileRajivwasawayinWestBengal,seniorCongressleadershad(withtheconcurrenceofthePresident,GianiZailSingh,whohadrushedbackfromYemen)decidedtoaskRajivtobecomeprimeminister.AreluctantRajiv,persuadinganevenmorereluctantSonia,hisItalian-bornwife,acceptedthisdecisionwhichwouldultimatelyleadtohistragicdeathsixandahalfyearslateratthehandsofaTamilterroristhumansuicide-bomber.RajivGandhi,apilotwithIndianAirlinesforfourteenyears,hadkeptstudiouslyalooffrompolitics

tillthedeathofhisyoungerbrother,Sanjay,inanaircrashinJune1980.AfterSanjay’sdeath,IndirapersuadedhimtohelpherandinJune1981heformallyenteredpoliticsbygettingelectedtotheLokSabhafromAmethi,theconstituencyinU.P.vacatedbySanjay’sdeath.HewasplacedinchargeoforganizingtheAsianGamesinNewDelhiin1982,andbyallaccountsdidacommendablejob.InFebruary1983,hebecameoneofthesevennewgeneralsecretariesoftheCongress,withtheresponsibilityofrejuvenatingtheCongressatthegrassroots,theurgencyofthetaskhavingbeenbroughthomebylossesinprovincialelections.Butthegradualapprenticeshiptopoliticswascutshortandhewascatapultedintothedrivingseat.Withelectionsdueinafewmonths,Congressleadersnaturallywantedsomeonewhocouldrallythepeople.Rajiv,intheirjudgement,wasmostlikelytoharnessthesympathywavegeneratedbyIndira’smartyrdom.Intheevent,theyturnedouttobecorrect,andtheCongresswonbyitslargestevermajorityinthe

generalelectionsheldfrom24-27December1984,alittleearlierthanscheduled.IftheseatswoninthepollsheldlaterinPunjabandAssamarecounted,thepartygarnered415outof543LokSabhaseats.RajivhimselfwonbyahugemarginfromAmethiinU.P.,intheprocessdefeatingconclusivelySanjay’swife,Maneka,whowantedtoestablishherclaimtoSanjay’slegacy.TheCongresselectioncampaignhadfocusedonthethreattoIndia’sunityandintegrityand,sinceIndira’sdeathwasseenbypeopleasproofofthethreat,theresponsewasenormous.Thehugemajorityalsomeanthigh,evenunreal,expectations,whichRajivhimselfoncedescribedas‘scary’.1

Infact,Rajivwasfacedwithmajorcrisesfromtheoutset.Hehadhardlyanytimetocometotermswiththepersonalgriefofhismother’sviolentdeath.AsthedignitariesfromacrosstheworldwerearrivinginDelhiforIndiraGandhi’sfuneral,ahorrificmassacreofSikhsinrevengeforherassassinationwastakingplaceinthecity,especiallyonitsoutskirtsinthe‘re-settlementcolonies’wherethepoorer

sectionslived.From31October,thedayofIndira’sdeath,to3November,manySikhswereattacked,theirbusinessesandhouseslootedandburnt,andaround2,800killed.2Theperpetratorswerethepoor,usuallyslum-dwellers,wholookeduponIndiraastheirleaderandsympathizer,andweredisorientedbyherviolentdeath.IthasalsobeenallegedthatCongresspartyworkersandevensomelocallevelleaderswereinvolvedinassistingandguidingthecrowd,andthatthepoliceatthelocallevelturnedablindeyetowhatwasgoingon.ThisallegationhassometimesbeenenlargedintoabroaderchargethattheCongress,withdirectionsfromthetop,organizedthemassacre,achargethatisobviouslyunfoundedandhasbeenimpossibletoprove.ItisalsotruethatthousandsofSikhswereshelteredandprotectedbyHindufriendsandneighbours.Thegovernment’sdelayinbringingthesituationundercontrolcanonlybeexplainedbytheconfusionfollowingIndira’sassassination,withtheswearing-inofthenewprimeminister,theresponsibilityofarrangingthefuneral,whichwasattendedbythousandsofpeople,andlookingaftertheforeignguests.Italsotookawhileforthefullimportofthescaleofthemassacretobecommunicatedandunderstoodatthehigherlevelsofthegovernment.On3November,thedayofthefuneral,Rajivvisitedsomeoftheaffectedareasinthemorning,andlaterthearmywascalledinandtheviolencesuppressed.Manyvoluntaryagencies,whosepersonnelweregenerallyHindu,workedformonthstobringrelieftothefamiliesofvictims.Similarviolence,thoughonasmallerscale,brokeoutinsomeotherNorthIndiancities,especiallyKanpurandBokaro.Withintwoweeksofhisbecomingprimeminister,thereoccurredtheBhopalgasleaktragedy,inwhich

around2,000people,mostlypoorslum-dwellers,losttheirlivesandmanythousandsmoreweretakenillbecauseofpoisonousemissionsfromachemicalsfactoryrunbyUnionCarbide,amultinationalcompany.ThelegalbattleforcompensationdraggedonforyearsinIndianandUScourts,andthefinalsettlementwasnotagenerousone,andwasfurtherboggeddowninbureaucraticdelaysduetodifficultiesofidentifyingthesufferers.

TheFirstRound

Despitethesetravails,Rajiv’sadministrationtookoffonapositivenote,andanumberofpolicyinitiativeswerelaunched.Atthepoliticallevel,hesetinmotiontheprocessthatculminatedinthePunjabandAssamaccords,whichhavebeendiscussedelsewhereinthebook.Butperhapshismostwell-knowninitiativewasthesettingupofsix‘technologymissions’,somethingthatformanyIndiansepitomizedthenew,modernandtechnologicalapproachoftheyouthfulprimeminister.Theideawastoapplyscienceandtechnologytosixareasofunderdevelopmentinwhichascientificapproachwouldbeusefulinsolvingproblems.Thesetarget-orientedprojectsweredesignatedas‘technologymissions’andinmostcasesthearrivalofthemillenniumwassetasthetargetdate,theideabeingthatIndiamustenterthenewmillenniumasamodernnation.Themostimportantofthesewasthedrinkingwatermission,whoseaimwastoprovidedrinkingwatertoallIndianvillages,onlyone-fifthofwhichhadpotablewatersupplies.Theideawastousesatellitesandthedisciplinesofgeology,civilengineeringandbiochemistryforidentifying,extractingandcleansingwatersupplies.Theliteracymissionwasaimedatattackingtheseriousproblemofmassilliteracywhichalmostfortyyearsafterindependenceafflictedalmostsixtypercentofthepopulation.Thiswastobeachievedbymakinguseofandextendingthetelevisionnetworkinruralareas,aswellasbyusingvideoandaudiocassettesandothermethods.Infact,thiswasprobablyinthelongrunthemostsignificantofthemissions,astheTotalLiteracyCampaignthatitspawnedmadea

majordentinmanyregionsandbroughtthewholeissuetothecentreofpoliticaldebate.Thethirdmissionwastargettedattheimmunizationofpregnantwomenandchildren,againanideathathascaughtonandispursuedwithgreatervigourtodaywiththemasscampaignforimmunizationofchildrenagainstpoliobeingarecentexample.Thefourthmissionwastopromotethe‘WhiteRevolution’,ormilkproduction,byimprovingthemilkyieldandhealthofcowsandbuffaloes,andthiswasremarkablysuccessful.Indiaimportedalargequantityofedibleoils,whichaddedconsiderablytoherforeignexchangedeficit,andthefifthmissionwaschargedwiththetaskofexpandingedibleoilproduction.Theaimofthesixthmissionwastobringonetelephonetoeveryvillageinthecountrybytheendofthecentury.Themanwhoinspiredandhelpedimplementthetechnology-missionapproachwasSamPitroda,a

youngUS-trainedIndiantelecommunicationsexpertwhohadmadeafortuneintheUSfromtelephoneswitchingsystems.HehadconvincedMrsGandhioftheneedtosetupC-DotortheCentrefortheDevelopmentofTelematics,andhenowbecameRajiv’sadviserontechnologymissions,andTelecomCommissionchairman.AbigpushwasalsogivenbyRajivtoIndia’scomputerizationprogramme,whichwasalreadybeing

formulatedunderMrsGandhi.Importdutiesoncomponentswerereducedsothatdomesticproducerscouldenhanceproduction,foreignmanufacturerswereallowedtoenterthehomemarketsothatqualityandcompetitivepriceswereensured,anduseofcomputersinofficesandschoolswasencouraged.Realizingthatthefuturewasatstake,Rajivignoredmuchill-informeddebateaboututilityofcomputersinalabour-surplussociety,andwentaheadwiththepolicythathasstoodthecountryinverygoodstead,withcomputersoftwareemergingasamajorforeignexchangeearner.Indiahadmissedoutontheindustrialrevolutionbecauseofitscolonialstatus,anditwasimperativethatshetakepartintheinformationandcommunicationrevolution(thiswasaviewheldbymanyfarsightedIndians,andRajivshareditandputhisweightbehindtheefforttomakeitcomereal).Effortsatliberalizationofcontrolsintheeconomyasawhole,increaseofexports,reductionofimportduties,etc.werealsomade,andthesehavebeendiscussedelsewhereinthebook.Muchlipservicehadbeenpaidtotheneedfordoingsomethingtostrengthenlocalself-government

institutions.ItwasRajivandhisgovernmentthattooktheinitiativetodeepenandstrengthenpanchayatiinstitutionsbygeneratingdebateandbringingforwardlegislationtomakepanchayatelectionsmandatorybygivingthemaconstitutionalsanction.ThisnecessitatedaconstitutionalamendmentanditwasRajiv’sgreatregretthattheoppositionparties,fornogoodreason,blockedthepassageofthebillsintheRajyaSabhawheretheCongressdidnothaveamajority.(Seechapter5,sectiononlocalgovernment.)Asstrikingastheobjectivewastheprocess.BetweenDecember1987andJune1988,Rajivmet400districtcollectorsorofficersinchargeofdistricts.InJuly1988therewasameetingwithchiefsecretaries,thehighestofficersofstates,inJanuary1989aPanchayatiRajsammelanof8,000delegates,followedbyaconferenceonPanchayatiRajforWomeninMay.TheAllIndiaCongressCommitteediscussedandsupportedtheproposalsinMay1989,andameetingofchiefministersofstateswasheldthereafter.Rajivcouldclaimwithsomejustice,ashedid,that‘neverbeforehasagovernmentatthehighestleveltakensocarefullyintoaccounttheviewsofsomanytensofthousandsofpeopleateverylevelaboutdemocracyanddevelopmentatthegrassroots.’3

AnothermeasuredirectedattheruralpoorwastheJawaharRozgarYojanaorEmploymentPlanwhichaimedatprovidingemploymenttoatleastonememberofeveryruralpoorfamilyfor50-100daysinthe

year.InauguratedtomarkthebirthcentenaryofJawaharlalNehru(bornin1889),thecentralgovernmentpromisedtomeet80percentofthecostofthescheme.Theneweducationpolicy,too,haditsfocusontheruralareasandthepoor,withitsmainplanksbeingtheliteracycampaign,OperationBlackboard(whichaimedatprovidingbasicamenitiestoschools)anddistanceeducation.ThemuchreviledNavodayaVidyalayas,afavouritewhippingboyofRajivbaiters,andcitedadnauseumasproofoftheelitistnatureofRajiv’seducationpolicy,wereinfactaimedatprovidingqualityeducationtothechildrenofpoorruralfamilieswhoweretobechosenbymeritforfreeeducationandstayintheresidentialschoolstobesetupineverydistrict.TheNationalPerspectivePlanforWomenwasdraftedin1988,andamongitsimportantproposalswas

thereservationof30percentofelectedseatsforwomeninallpanchayatbodies,whichwasincludedinthePanchayatiRajlegislation.Italsorecommendedthat50percentofgrassrootsfunctionariesshouldbewomen.Theplanaddressedissuesofwomen’shealthandeducationaswell.Legislationstrengtheningthepunishmentfordowry-relatedoffenceswasalsopassedin1986.TheprotectionoftheenvironmentwasaprojectclosetoRajiv’sheartasithadbeentohismother’s,

andamongotherthingshelaunchedamassiveefforttocleantheriverGanga,theholiestofIndianrivers,whichhadbecomeshamefullypollutedinmanyparts.HecreatedanewMinistryforEnvironmentandenvironmentalclearanceforbigprojectswasmademandatory.AttheNon-AlignedMovement’sninthsummit,heplacedbeforeittheproposalforaPlanetProtectionFundtohelpdevelopingcountriesaccessadvancedtechnologyfortheprotectionoftheenvironment.WhileitbecamequitefashionableincertainelitecirclestoberatetheculturalpolicyoftheRajiv

governmentascateringtotheWestbyholdingveryexpensivefestivalsofIndiainmanywesterncountries,itwasforgottenthatatthesametimesevenzonalculturalcentresweresetupindifferentpartsofthecountrytoshiftthefocusofstatepatronageoftheartsawayfromthecapitalandencouragelocalandregionalculturalforms.Also,whatevertheircriticism(thereissometruthinthechargeofover-enthusiasmleadingtopreciousculturalpropertybeingtransportedabroadandsufferingdamage,thoughwhetherthiswasaspecialfeatureofRajiv’sregimeissuspect)thefestivalsdidsucceedinplacingIndiaontheworldculturalmap.Ifoneofthelegitimatefunctionsofagovernmentistoenhancethestandingofthecountryitgovernsontheworldstage,thenthefestivalsofIndiafulfilledthatfunction.Thereappearedtobeaseriousefforttocleanupthepoliticalandbureaucraticsystem,byintroducing

greateropenness,accountability,andtakinglegislativeandothermeasurestodissuadeoffenders.AmongthesewastheAnti-DefectionAct,draftedafterdiscussionswithoppositionpartiesandpassedin1985,whichlaiddownthatone-thirdofthemembersofapoliticalpartyintheparliamentwouldhavetochangeloyaltiesforittoberecognizedasasplitinaparty.AnyotherdefectionswouldinviteexpulsionfromtheHouse.Thiswasmeanttocheckthetendencyofhorse-tradingandshiftingpartyloyaltiesthatwasbecomingabaneoftheIndianpoliticalsystem.LokAdalats,andtheConsumerProtectionActwerepartofthesamestream.Greaterfreedomtogovernmentmedia,especiallytheincreasinglypopulartelevision,andencouragementtoprogrammescriticalofgovernmentandintendedtokeepministersandbureaucratsontheirtoes,carriedtheprimeminister’spersonalimprint.4V.P.Singh’smuchadvertisedraidsonbusinesshouses,whichRajivsupported,certainlyinthebeginning,alsohelpedprovidetheambiencethatgaveRajivtheMrCleanlabel.

ButitwashisspeechatthecentenarycelebrationsoftheCongressinDecember1985thatreallyshookcriticsandadmirers(andatthattimethereweremoreadmirersthancritics,asRajivenjoyedahoneymoonforthefirsteighteenmonthsofhisterm).Rajivusedtheoccasiontolaunchafrontalattackonwhathedescribedasthepower-brokerswhohadreducedthegreatpartytoashellofitsformerself,andpromisedtorejuvenateitbyremovingtheirstranglehold.Thiswasreadasasignaltotheoldleaderstogettheiracttogetherorelse.ManypartymenwhowereotherwisesympathetictoRajiv’spoliciesdidnotappreciatehis‘disrespectful’styleandthoughtthecentenaryofthegrandoldpartyaninappropriateoccasionforthisexercise.However,RajivwasnomoresuccessfulatholdingelectionswithinthepartythanwashismotherorhissuccessorasCongressprimeminister.Theholdofpartybossesatthelocallevelmeantthattheycouldregisterbogusmembersandmanipulateelections,andintheprocessacquirefurtherlegitimacybyvirtueofbeingelected!Rajivsoonalsofoundthatheneededtobuildlinkswithpartystalwartsandpoliticswasdifferentfromrunninganefficientcorporation.Overtime,andpartlyashisowncloseadvisers,ArunNehru,ArunSingh,andV.P.Singh,wereestranged,hebroughtbackoldadvisers.Theprocessreachedfullcircleinearly1989withthereturnofR.K.Dhawan,MrsGandhi’scloseadviser,whoepitomizedtheoldsystemthatRajivhadvowedinhisinnocenceinDecember1985tooverturn!

ForeignPolicyInitiatives

Rajivpursuedforeignaffairswiththeenergyofanactivist,travellingextensivelytocountriesbigandsmall,andparticipatinginawiderangeofinternationalfora.Heputhisownpersonalstamponforeignpolicy,evenwhilepursuingthewell-laidoutpathofhisgrandfatherandmother.ThishedidbyzealouslyadvocatingthecausesofnucleardisarmamentandthefightagainstapartheidinSouthAfricaandofNamibianindependence.Alittlewhilebeforeherdeath,IndirahadformedtheSix-NationFive-ContinentInitiative,bringingtogetherheadsofgovernmentofArgentina,Greece,Mexico,Sweden,TanzaniaandIndia,toputinternationalpressureonsuperpowerstoreduceweaponsandeliminatenuclearweapons.Withinamonthofwinningtheelections,Rajivheldthefirstsummitofthesixleaders.ItisimportanttorememberthatthiswasbeforeGorbachev’sassumptionofpowerandbeforedisarmamentwasontheagendaofsuperpowerrelations.RajivmetGorbachevafterhetookoverthereinsintheUSSR,andfoundinhimabelieverindisarmament.Infact,RajivbegantohailGorbachevasaforceforpeacemuchbeforetheUSwokeuptothenewleader’snewideas.InNovember1986,ontheoccasionofGorbachev’svisit,heandRajivgaveacallforanon-violentworld,andtheDelhiDeclaration,astheprogrammecametobecalled,setforthaplanfordisarmament.TheSixNationInitiativetoomaturedintoaActionPlanforNuclearDisarmament,whichRajivthenpresentedtotheUNGeneralAssembly’sthirdspecialsessionondisarmamentinJune1988.Thisplancalledfortheeliminationofallnuclearweaponsby2010.ClosetoRajiv’sheartwasthestruggleagainstapartheidinSouthAfrica.Inkeepingwithtradition

(GandhijiwasthefirsttotakeuptheissueinSouthAfricain1893,andNehruthefirsttoraiseitintheUNinthelateforties,andIndiathefirstcountrytoapplysanctionsbybreaking-offtradeanddiplomaticlinks.),Rajivtookupthecausewithfervour,evensucceedingingettingthemajorityintheCommonwealthinfavourofsanctionsbutfailingtomoveanobdurateMrsThatcher.MoresuccessfulwasthesettingupoftheAFRICA(ActionforResistingInvasion,ColonialismandApartheid)Fundatthenon-alignedsummitatHararein1986.BytheBelgradeNon-alignedSummitmeetingthreeyearslater,hewas

abletoshowacollectionofhalfabilliondollarsgivenbydevelopinganddevelopedcountriestohelpthefrontlineAfricanstatesovercomethelossestheysufferedbecauseofsanctionsagainstSouthAfrica.Namibianindependencewasacloselyassociatedcause,NamibiabeingheldasacolonybySouth

Africa.RajivextendeddiplomaticrecognitiontoSWAPO,theorganizationfightingforNamibianindependence,andvisitedthefrontlinestatesofZambia,Zimbabwe,AngolaandTanzaniainMay1986,besidesaddinghisvoicetothecauseatallinternationalgatherings.Namibiagotherindependencein1990,bywhichtimeRajivwasnolongerprimeminister,butheattendedthecelebrations,wherehemetNelsonMandela,andthuswasabletowitnessthesuccessoftwofavouritecauses.RelationswiththesuperpowersimprovedduringRajiv’stenure,butdidnotundergoanymajorchange.

ContrarytospeculationbasedontheyoungPM’spreferenceforopen-marketpoliciesandatechnocraticbias,RajivdidnottilttowardstheUS.HisvisittotheUSin1985wasasuccessfulone,andhegotalongwellwithReagan,evenpersuadinghimtoletIndiahavethesupercomputershehadbeenwantingforprocessingherweatherdata.ButwiththeUScommittedtosupportingPakistan,topromotetheMujahideenagainsttheUSSRinAfghanistan,therewaslittlechanceofanyradicalshifts.WithGorbachev,however,averycloserelationshipdeveloped,andthetwoleadersmetatotalofeighttimesinfiveyears.Rajiv’svisittoChinain1988,thefirstbyanIndianprimeministersinceNehru’smaidenvisitin1954,

wasremarkableinthatithappenedatall.ItwasalsomadememorablebyTVimagesofDengholdingontoRajiv’shandforwhatseemedlikeeternity,andbyhisreferringtomistakesmadebypeopleofhisgenerationwhichthenewgenerationrepresentedbyRajivGandhishouldnotrepeat.Theimportanceofthismeetingwasalsobecausetherehadbeenasuddendipinrelationsin1986followingsomeborderincidents.Thevisitwasfollowedbyeffortstosolvelong-standingproblemsonaregularbasis,improvementoftradeandextensionofconsularcontacts.IndiaevenrefrainedfromcondemningtheTiananmenSquaremassacreof4June1989,clearproofthatrecentimprovementsinrelationsweresoughtnottobejeopardized.Withimmediateneighbours,relationswerenotverygoodduringRajiv’stime.Bangladeshwasmoving

inamoreandmoreIslamicdirection,anddisputesoverwatercontinued.WithNepaltherewastrouble,theirgovernmentimposedheavydutiesonIndiangoods,gavediscountsindutiestoChinesegoods,received,in1988,hugeamountsofassaultriflesandanti-aircraftgunsfromChinaandaskedIndianresidentstogetworkpermitsforworkinginNepal(thiswhenlakhsofNepalisworkandliveinIndiawithoutanypermits).TheIndiangovernmentimposedwhatamountedtoaneconomicblockadeinMarch1989,andbySeptembernegotiationsforasolutionbegan.Maldivesfacedacoupattempt,askedforIndianhelp,whichwasgivenandtheattemptscotched.WithPakistan,thingsweremuchthesamedespitehopesarousedbyBenazirBhuttobecomingprimeminister,andRajivvisitingPakistan(thefirstprimeministertodosoafterNehru),whatwithPakistanisupporttoinsurgencyinKashmirandPunjabcontinuingapace.InSriLanka,however,Indiagotinvolvedinamessysituationfromwhichshefounditdifficultto

extricateherself.TheproblembeganwhenthousandsofTamilsfromSriLankafledtoTamilNaduinIndiain1983whentheSriLankangovernmentlaunchedheavyrepressiononJaffna,thebaseoftheLTTE,anorganizationfightingforTamilautonomyandlater,independencefromSriLanka.PublicopinioninIndia,especiallyinTamilNadu,whosepeoplespokethesamelanguageastherefugees,wasstronglyin

favourofIndiadoingsomethingtohelptheSriLankanTamils.PassionswerefurtherrousedwhenSriLankaimposedablockadeonJaffna,preventingdailynecessitiesfromreachingpeople.IndiasentsuppliesinfishingboatsbuttheSriLankanNavystoppedthem.Thiswasfollowedbyair-droppingofsuppliesbyIndiantransportplanes,whichcarriedIndianandforeignjournalistsaswell.SriLankarealizedithadgonetoofarandpermittedsuppliesbyboat.ButtheproblemofTamilinsurgencywascontinuing,andtheSriLankangovernmentrealizedthatnocountryotherthanIndiacouldhelp.PresidentJayewardeneapproachedRajiv,andthenegotiationsledtoanaccordinJuly1987bywhichthenorthernandeasternprovincesofSriLankawhereTamilswerethemajoritywouldbemergedintoasingleprovince,substantialdevolutionofpowerwouldtakeplace,theLTTEwouldbedissolvedandarmssurrenderedinaveryshorttime,andtheIndianArmywouldcometotheaidoftheSriLankangovernmentifrequestedbySriLanka.TheaccordfailedtotakeoffbecausetheLTTEhadgivenonlyreluctantconsent,werenotsignatories,anddidnottrusttheSriLankangovernment,andrefusedtosurrender.Jayewardene,inthemeantime,askedfortheIndianArmytohelpimplementtheaccord,andsinceitwastheLTTEthatwasstandingintheway,thearmygotinvolvedinanincreasinglymessyfightwiththeTamilguerillas,whohadanedgesincetheyknewtheterrainandhadlocalsupport.TheIndianArmywasinanunenviablepositionwithTamilsresentingitbecauseitwasdisarmingtheLTTE,andSriLankansresentingitforbeingaforeignarmy.ThesituationgotevenmessierwithPremadasasucceedingJayewardeneandaskingtheIndiangovernmenttowithdrawitsarmy.Rajivagreedtoaphasedwithdrawal,andthesoldiersstartedtocomehomeinmid-1989,butwithdrewfullyonlyafterthe1989elections.TheSriLankanimbrogliowastocostRajivhislife.IndiaplayedamajorroleinnegotiatingtheVietnamesewithdrawalfromKampuchea(Cambodia).It

wasreminiscentofNehru’sdayswhenIndiawascalledupontoplaytheroleofthehonestbrokerinSouth-eastAsia,Korea,Congo,andsoon.InJanuary1987,VietnamletitbeknowntoIndiathatitwantedtowithdrawfromKampucheawhichithadoccupiedafewyearsagoandthatitwishedIndiatoworkoutthemodalitiesinconsultationwithothercountries.NatwarSingh,theMinisterofStateforExternalAffairs,didalotofshuttlediplomacyinSouth-eastAsia,metthedeposedKampucheanrulerPrinceSihanoukanumberoftimesinParis,arrangedmeetingsbetweenSihanoukandHengSamarian.Asasettlementapproached,theUSandChinagotintotheactandtriedtosidelineIndia.Atwenty-onenationmeetingwasheldinParis,towhichIndiawasinvited,andthesettlementresultedinaVietnamesewithdrawal,electionsunderUNauspices,andinstallationofacoalitiongovernmentofSihanoukandHengSamarian.RajivGandhigaveanewlifetotheNon-alignedMovement(NAM)bygivingitapurpose:nuclear

disarmament.HealsotriedtopromotetheideaofaG-15,amorecompactversionofG-77,whichapproximatedmorecloselytotheG-7.HeplacedIndiaquiteprominentlyontheworldmap,makingherpresencefeltinavarietyofforaonanumberofissues.Hetravelledabroadonanaverageonceamonthduringhisfiveyearterm,eveninvitingsnipesfrompoliticalopponentsabouthis‘occasionalvisitstoIndia’.InkeepingwithhisefforttobuildIndia’simageinthecommunityofnations,Rajivwasalsocommitted

tomaintainingandenhancingIndiansecurity.Hegavethego-aheadtothemodernizationofthearmedforces,whichledtothedoublingofthedefenceexpenditure.Theguidedmissiledevelopmentprogramme,initiatedbyMrsGandhiin1983,begantoshowresultsandtwoshort-rangemissiles,TrishulandPrithvi,

andoneintermediate-rangemissile,Agni,inwhichRajivhadtakengreatinterest,weresuccessfullytested.TheIndianNavywasconsiderablyexpandedwiththeleaseofanuclear-poweredsubmarinefromUSSRandthepurchaseofasecondaircraftcarrierfromBritain.ThearmygothowitzergunsfromSwedenandsanctionfordevelopmentofanall-Indianbattletank,theArjun.InthelasttwoyearsofRajiv’stenure,defencespendingwasone-fifthoftotalgovernmentexpenditure.

BoforsandItsAftermath

Ironically,itwastheseverysamedefencepurchasesthatweretobecometheproverbialalbatrossaroundRajiv’sneck.ThebigonewasBofors,thestinkofwhichcontinuestothisday,butitstartedwithsmallerscandalsaroundFairfaxandtheHDWsubmarinedeal.Verybriefly,sincedetailsareavailableaplentyelsewhere,theFairfaxcontroversycentredontheappointmentbyV.P.Singh,Rajiv’sfinanceminister,whohadbecomenotoriousforhis‘raidraj’,ofanAmericandetectiveagency,Fairfax,toinvestigatetheillegalstackingofforeignexchangeinoverseasbanksbyIndians.AforgedletterwhichsuggestedthattheinvestigationsincludedAmitabhBachchan,aclosefriendoftheprimeminister,surfacedfromnowhere,andbigindustrialists,NusliWadiaofBombayDyeingandAmbaniofReliancewerereportedtobeinvolvedinthegameonoppositesides.ThetransferofV.P.SinghfromFinancetoDefence,whichRajivclaimedwasbecauseheneededsomebodycapabletohandleDefenceatthetimebecauseofthecrisiswithPakistan,wasprojectedbytheOppositionasproofthatRajivwastryingtoshieldhisfriendAmitabh.ThiswasfollowedbytheHDWsubmarinescandal.WhenIndiawantedtoplaceafurtherorderfortwomoresubmarineswiththeHDWshipyardinWestGermanyfromwhomithadboughtfourin1981,andaskedforsomepricediscount,theshipyarddeclinedsayingithadtopayheavy7percentcommissiononthesaleanyway.V.P.Singh,whowasdefenceminister,withoutspeakingtoRajiv,orderedanenquiry.ThiswastakenasanunfriendlyactsinceMrsGandhiherselfwasdefenceministeratthetimeoftheawardofthecontractin1981,andaCongressgovernmentwasinpower.TherewascriticismofSingh’sconductintheCabinetmeeting,andhesoonresignedfromthegovernment.TheOppositionandthePressdeclaredthisasproofofV.P.Singh’shonestyandRajiv’sattemptsatacover-up.TheMrCleanlabelwasshiftedtoSinghandRajiv’shoneymoonwasover.On16April1987,afewdaysafterSingh’sresignation,theBoforsscandalbroke.Theallegations,

whichfirstappearedonSwedishRadio,werethattheequivalentofsixtycroresofIndianrupeeswerepaidasbribestoIndianofficialsandCongresspartymemberstosecurethecontractforthe410howitzergunstoBoforscompanyofSwedeninfaceofstiffcompetitionfromaFrenchgun.Theallegations,whichweretakenupinabigwaybytheIndianPress,particularlytheIndianExpress,andlaterTheHindu,soonsnowballedintoamajorattackonRajivhimselfwithsectionsoftheoppositionpartieschargingthatheandhisfamilyweretherecipientofthemoney.ThesituationwasbadenoughforRajivtomakeapublicdenialofhisandhisfamily’sinvolvement.ItalsoprovidedanopportunitytoGianiZailSingh,thePresident,totryandsettlescoreswithRajiv.AnnoyedbecauseRajivhadbeenlaxinobservingtheconventionofregularlycallingonthePresidenttokeephiminformedofimportantdevelopments,andalsobecausehewasnotconsultedaboutthePunjabandMizoaccords,andluredbytheprospectofasecondterm,ZailSinghbecamethecentreofamajorconspiracyinmid-1987todismissRajivfromoffice.OppositionleadersandsomeCongressdissidentsencouragedthePresidenttodismissRajivonchargesofcorruptionorfailingtofulfiltheconstitutionalrequirementofkeepingthePresidentinformed.Zail

SinghwasalmostpersuadedbutV.P.Singh,whowasthealternative,declinedtoplaythegameandamajorconstitutionalcatastrophewassaved.ItistoRajiv’sgreatcreditthat,inthemidstofscandalsandconspiracies,hepersonallyhandledwith

greatelan,fromallaccounts,thecrisisarisingoutofoneoftheseverestdroughtsofthetwentiethcentury.TheSouth-westmonsoonfailedin1987(June-September),affectingone-fourthofthepopulationofthecountry,livinginone-thirdofalldistrictslocatedinelevenstates.Amassiveeffortwaslaunchedtomovefoodanddrinkingwater,andtostartemploymentschemes,inaffectedareas.ItwasclaimedbyRajivwithjustifiablepridethatnotasinglelifewaslost.This,inacountrywheremillionsdiedinaman-madefamineasrecentlyas1943,fouryearsbeforeindependence.ButBoforsandthestinkofcorruptionwouldnotgoaway,andresurfacedin1989,theelectionyear.

TheJointParliamentaryCommitteeReporthadgivenamoreorlesscleanchit,buttheComptrollerandAuditor-General’sReportcastdoubtsontheprocedureforselectionofgunsandraisedotherissuesaswell.Thoughitsaidnothingofthekind,theOppositioninsisteditwasproofofRajiv’sguiltanddemandedhisresignation.TheyfolloweditupwithenmasseresignationfromtheLokSabha,whichwasnogreatsacrificesinceelectionswereroundthecorneranyway,butwerenonethelessanembarassmentforthegovernment.AndRajivwenttohissecondgeneralelectionswiththecountryinamoodverydifferentfromtheoneinhisfirstround.Alittleolderandmuchwiser,Rajivhadmuchtolookbackuponwithpride.ExceptforSriLanka,his

handlingofforeignaffairshadmetwithconsiderableapproval.India’sstandingintheworldhadbeenenhanced,notdeclined,andrelationswithsuperpowersandneighbourswereonanevenkeel,somewhatbetter,certainlynoworsethanbefore.Theeconomyhaddonewell,registeringthehighestratesofgrowthtodate,thoughthedeficitanddebtwaspilingup.Thesecurityanddefencepolicyhadbeenasoundonewiththeoverduemodernizationofthearmedforcessetinmotion.Computerizationwasgivenabigpush,anecessityifIndiawastoremaininthereckoningintheworldsystem.Anti-povertyprogrammesingeneralandtheliteracy,drinkingwater,immunization,andPanchayatiRajinitiativesinparticular,hadthepoor,andtheruralareasastheirmainfocus,thusgivingalietochargesofelitism.Therewereseveralweaknesses,nodoubt.AmongthemwasRajiv’stendencytochangehismindtoo

often.HeshuffledhisCabinetonceeverytwomonthsonanaverage,forexample.Hewasalsogiventoflashesoftemper,andsometimesspokewithouthavingthoughtthroughtheconsequences,asinthefamousincidentwhenhedismissedtheForeignSecretaryinapressconference.Chargesofinaccessabilityalsobegantobemade,andsomethoughtthathewasalsobecomingarrogant,butthesearetheusualproblemsofhighoffice.Thebiggestproblem,infact,washisrelativelackofpoliticalexperience,unfamiliaritywiththenuancesofgrassrootsmobilization,partyorganization,etc.Butmostobserverswereagreedthathewaslearningfast,andthathewasnomoretheawkwardleader,thathehadbeguntoenjoytheroughandtumbleofIndianpolitics.Also,by1989hehadpassedacrucialtestofpoliticalleadership:ofhavingthenervesforit.HewithstoodBofors,inwhichthemostviciouspersonalallegationsweremadeabouthim,andhewasreadytoendurethegruellingelectioncampaignforasecondtime.Whetherhewonorlost,hehaddecidedbeyonddoubtthathewasgoingtobeaplayerinthegreatIndiangame.

21TheRun-uptotheMillennium,1989-99

RajivGandhihadsucceededinplacingtheideaofpreparingforthetwenty-firstcentury—thefirstcenturyofthenewmillennium—inthemindsofthinkingIndians.WhenheaskedforamandateforthesecondtimeinNovember1989,therewasjustadecadetogofortheambitioustargetshehadsetbeforethenation,andwhichhehopedtohavetheopportunitytopursue.Butrunningagovernmentandwinninganelectionaretwodifferentpropositionsandsuccessinoneisnoguaranteeoftheother.Despiteunprecedentedeconomicgrowth,averagingaround5.5percentperannum,thehighestexpenditureeveronanti-povertyprogrammes,analmostflawlesshandlingofthedroughtof1987,significantforeignpolicyachievements,the‘hava’orwindblewintheoppositedirection.V.P.Singh’ssingle-mindedcrusadeagainstcorruption,whichhehadcarriedonunremittinglysincehisexpulsionfromtheCongressin1987,hadtouchedasensitivechord.Corruptionatthelowerlevelsofthebureaucracywasanissueofeverydayconcernforallcitizens,richorpoor,anditwaswidelyfeltthathighlevelcorruptioncreatedconditionsoflegitimacyforthelowerlevelvariety.V.P.Singhcourtedandwonthesupportofawiderangeofforces,whichincludedSarvodayaworkers,tradeunionistssuchasDattaSamant,thefarmers’movementledbySharadJoshiinMaharashtra,andsomesectionsofradicalanti-Congressintellectuals.Apartfromchoosinganemotiveissue,V.P.Singhalsofashionedaconsummatepoliticalstrategyfor

isolatingRajivandCongress.HefirstjoinedtogetherwithallthoseCongressmenwhohadbecomeestrangedwithRajivforonereasonoranother.AmongthesewasArifMohammadKhan,ayoungsecularMuslimleaderconsideredclosetoRajiv.ArifhadachievedinstantfamebyresigningontheissueoftheShahBanocase.Thiscase(seechapter35)inwhichtheSupremeCourtgrantedmaintenancetoaMuslimwomandivorcedbyherhusbandbecamecontroversialbecauseitwasopposedbyorthodoxMuslimsonthegroundsthatitinterferedwiththeMuslimpersonallaw.Arif,encouragedbyRajiv,hadputupabrilliantdefenceofthejudgementintheparliament,butwasdismayedandresignedhisministershipwhenRajiv,comingunderenormouspressurefromapowerfulagitationandcloseadvisers,agreedtointroduceabilltonegatethejudgement.Rajiv’sstandontheShahBanocasehadfirstcosthimMuslimsupportand,oncehechangedhismind,Hindusupportaswell,sincehewasseenasappeasingMuslims.Inmanyways,Arif’sresignationwasthebeginningoftheturnaroundinRajiv’sfortunes.ArifwasjoinedinthewildernessbyArunNehru,theestrangedcousinwhomRajivhadedgedoutwhenheseemedtobebecomingtoopowerfulandinquisitiveasMinisterofStateforHome.V.P.Singh,Arif,andArunNehru,joinedbyRamDhan,V.C.Shukla,SatpalMalikandotherCongressdissidents,formedtheJanMorcha,orPeople’sFronton2October1987.Withthisasthecore,V.P.Singhbegantobuildananti-Rajivpoliticalbloc.Heplacatedtheleftpartiesbycallingthemhisnaturalalliesandissuingstatementsagainst

communalism,butmadesurehehadtheBJPonhissidebyspeakingfromtheirplatformandmaintaining

closelinkswithVajpayeeandAdvani.However,morethanV.P.Singh’sstrategy,itwastheinherentanti-CongressismoftheleftandtheBJPthatbroughtthemtosupportV.P.Singh.HisresoundingvictoryintheAllahabadby-electioninJune1988againstCongress,inwhichtheBoforsgunhadbecometheunofficialcampaignsymbol,hadconvincedthemthathewastheanswertotheiranti-Congressprayers.AndthoughtheleftpartieswerealwaysquicktodenyanytruckwithBJP,especiallywhenitbecameclearlaterthatBJPwasthemainbeneficiaryoftheelectoralunderstandinginthe1989elections,itisafactthattheywerefullyawareofV.P.Singh’sdealingswithBJP.CitingJyotiBasu’spresenceatapublicrallyheldtofelicitateV.P.SinghforhisvictoryintheAllahabadby-election,inwhichhesharedthediaswithAtalBehariVajpayeeoftheBJP,V.P.Singh’sbiographer,SeemaMustafa,says:‘ThatV.P.Singhalonewasnotresponsibleforthe“understanding”reachedwiththeBJPandthatithadthecovertsupportoftheLeftbecomesclearfromthismove.Indeed,eventuallytheLeftpartiestoldVPthattheywouldnotmakean

issueofanyelectoralagreementwiththeBJP,althoughtheywouldnotbeabletosupportitopenly.’1

ThefeelingamongtheleftandV.P.Singhwasthat,asin1977-79,BJPwouldnotbeabletogainmuchasitdidnothaveanyindependentstrength.BJP,ontheotherhand,wentalong,oftenswallowinginsultsthatapartywithlessdisciplinewouldhavefoundimpossibletogetitscadretotolerate,intheconvictionthatthedislodgingofCongresswasanecessarysteponitsroadtopower.TheassociationwithleftandsecularforcesgaveitthecredibilityitlackedbyremovingthestigmaofcommunalismthathadensureditremainedonthefringesofIndianpolitics—astigmathathadbeenattachedtoitbytheeffortsofsecularnationalistssincethedaysofthefreedomstruggle.BJPincreaseditstallyfrom2in1984to86in1989,andthisjumpputitonthepathtopower,whichitachievedin1998.Toquote,‘Thebroadalliance[formedin1989]wasdefinitelyoneofthefactorsresponsiblefortheriseoftheBJP.’2

Thestrategyforoppositionunitywasconceivedasathree-stageprocess.Thefirststagewastheunityofcentristnon-Congresssecularnationalparties,thesecondtheformationofaNationalFrontofallnon-leftsecularparties,regionalandnational,andthethirdtheseatadjustmentswithleftpartiesandBJP.Thesecondstagewascompletedfirst,withtheNationalFrontofsevenpartiesbeingformedon6August1988.On11October1988,thebirthdayofJayaprakashNarayan,JanataDalwasformedwiththemergeroftheJanMorcha,Congress(S),JanataandLokDal.ThethirdstagewasreachedwhentheJanataDal-ledNationalFrontandBJPagreednottocontestagainsteachotherinaround85percentoftheseatswherethetwowouldhaveotherwisenominatedcandidates,andasimilararrangementforasmallernumberofseatswasreachedbetweentheNationalFrontandtheCommunistparties.

TheNationalFrontGovernment,1989-90

TheelectionresultswereablowtoCongressevenifitwasstillthesinglelargestpartywith197seatsand39.5percentvoteshare.RajivmadeitclearthatCongresswasnotinterestedintryingtoformagovernment.WiththeleftpartiesandtheBJPquicklydeclaringthattheywouldsupportaNationalFrontgovernmentfromtheoutside,thestagewassetforthesecondnon-Congressgovernmentinpost-independenceIndiatotakeoffice.TheNationalFronthadwon146seatsandwassupportedbytheBJPwith86andtheleftpartieswith52seats.Thebeginningswerenotsmooth,however,withChandraShekhartotallyopposedtoV.P.Singhas

primeminister,andDeviLalinsistinghebemadedeputyprimeministeratleast.Withelectionsover,all

thedifferencescausedbyclashingambitions,oversizedegos,ideologicalpreferences,cametotheforeanditwaswithsomedifficultythatV.P.Singhtookoathasprimeministeron2December1989accompaniedonlybyDeviLalasdeputyprimeminister.Thelackoftrustthatwastobecomemoreopenlaterwasevidentevenattheswearing-inceremonywhereDeviLalmadeajokeofhimselfbyinsistingoninsertingthetermdeputyprimeministerintotheoathdespitethePresident’sgentleadmonitionthatheshouldonlysay‘minister’,asifhewasnotsurethattheprimeministerwouldsticktohispromise!ThoughV.P.Singhstartedoutwithahigh-profilevisittoPunjabinwhichhevisitedtheGoldenTemple

anddrovearoundinanopenjeep,asiftoheightenthecontrastwiththeheavilyguardedRajiv,andmademanynoisesaboutreversingCongresspolicies,itwastypicalofhisadministrationthatthehigh-soundingwordsdidnotleadanywhere.Punjabwasasbadaseverattheendofhisterm,andKashmirwasmuchworse.HemadeGeorgeFernandesheadoftheKashmirAffairsCommittee,butallowedArunNehruandMuftiMohammedSayeedtocontinuetointerfere,andthen,withoutconsultinganybody,appointedJagmohantheGovernorofKashmir!Sureenough,FarooqAbdullah,thechiefministerofKashmir,resignedinprotest,sinceJagmohanwasthemanwhohadcosthimhischiefministershipin1983byencouragingdefectionsagainsthim.Truetoform,Jagmohandissolvedtheassembly,and,againwithoutconsultinganyone,V.P.Singhrecalledhim,andmadehimaRajyaSabhamembertomollifyhim.Infact,apartfromcompletingthewithdrawalofIndiantroopsfromSriLanka,andsettlingthetradeandtransitdisputewithNepal,therewaslittlethattheNationalFrontgovernmenthadtoshowforitself.ItwasalsounabletouseitscloutwithBJPandtheMuslimleaderstobringthemtoaresolutionoftheAyodhyadispute.Onthecontrary,Advani’srathyatra,whichisdiscussedbelow,inflamedcommunalpassionstofeverpitch,justasMandalarousedcastefeelingsasneverbefore.Perhapsthemainreasonfortheinabilityofthegovernmenttogetitsacttogetherwastheenormous

amountoftimeandenergyspentontryingtoresolveinternaldifferences.ChandraShekharmadenosecretofhisantipathytotheprimeminister.HelostnotimeinsupportingFarooqAbdullahwhenheresigned.AjitSinghwasdislikedbyDeviLal,andDeviLalbyalmosteverybodyelsebutChandraShekhar.DeviLaldislikedAjitSingh,thesonofCharanSingh,whofirstarticulatedpeasantinterestsinNorthIndiain1967,buthelovedhisownson,OmPrakashChautala,somuchthathemadehimchiefministerofHaryanainhisplaceoncehebecamedeputyprimeminister.AscandalfollowedChautala’sattempttoseekelectionfromMeham,asenquiriesestablishedthatlarge-scaleriggingandphysicalintimidationofvotershadoccurred,andtheelectionwascountermandedbytheElectionCommision.Chautalaresignedaschiefministeronlytobereinstatedtwomonthslater.ThisprovedtoomuchforatleastArifandArunNehru’andtheyresignedfromthegovernment.Asifoncue,V.P.Singhalsoresigned,butwaspersuadedtocontinueafterassurancesofChautalasteppingdown.Butthatwasnotthelasttrickthe‘ElderUncle’or‘Tau’,asDeviLalwascalled,haduphissleeve.HenowaccusedArifandArunNehruofcorruption,andproducedaletterpurportedlywrittenbyV.P.SinghtothePresidentofIndiain1987,accusingthemofinvolvementintheBoforsdeal.V.P.Singh,declaringthattheletterwasabadlydisguisedforgery,dismissedDeviLalon1August1990.Neveronetotakethingslyingdown,DeviLalgaveacallforabigpeasants’rallyinNewDelhion9

AugusttoshowV.P.Singhhistruestrength.ThoughV.P.Singhdeniesthis,itiswidelybelievedthat,rattledbythisthreat,andwantingtodivertattention,hemadethemostcontroversialdecisionofhisrule.On7August,heannouncedintheparliamentthatthereportoftheMandalCommission,appointedbythe

Janatagovernment(1977-79)andquietlyignoredbyMrsGandhi,wouldbeimplemented.Therecommendationswerethat27percentofjobsinthegovernmentservicesandpublicundertakingsbereservedforcandidatesbelongingtothe‘backwardcastes’,thusbringingthetotalinthereservedcategoryto49.5percent,as22.5percentwasalreadyreservedfortheScheduledCastesordalitsandtheScheduledTribes.3Therecommendationsincluded,asasecondstage,tobeimplementedlater,reservationsineducationalinstitutionsandpromotions.Theannouncementwasgreetedwithwidespreaddismayandanger.Eventhosewhodidnotdisagree

withthedecisioninprinciplewereupsetatthesuddenandarbitrarymannerinwhichitwastaken.Inwhatwasbecominganincreasinglyfamiliarpattern,V.P.Singhdidnotconsultevencloseassociatesbeforemakingtheannouncement.BijuPatnaik,R.K.Hegde,YashwantSinha,andArunNehruwereamongthoseunhappywiththedecisionforonereasonoranother.TheleftpartiesandBJPwereupsetthattheyhadnoclueaboutthedecision.DeviLalandChandraShekharcameoutinstrongcondemnation.Thecriticismsrangedfromthemove’stimingandlackofefforttobuildupaconsensus,tothedivisivenatureofthemoveandthefaultycriteriausedforidentifyingbackwardcastes.CPMwantedeconomiccriteriatobeusedasthebasisofreservation,andmanyothers,includingHegde,agreedwiththatview.Eminentsociologistspointedoutthatthemethodofidentificationofbackwardcasteswasoutdatedandchangesinsocialstructuresinceindependencehadnotbeentakenintoaccount.Amongthosewhowerecalled‘backwardcastes’inthereportwerethesectionswhowerethemajorbeneficiariesoflandreformsandtheGreenRevolutionandtheycouldhardlyclaimspecialtreatmentongroundsofbackwardness.Therewere,nodoubt,somesectionsamongthoseidentifiedasbackwardcasteswhowereinfactnotverydifferentfromScheduledCastesintheireconomicandsocialstatus,anddeservedspecialtreatment,buttheyneededtobeidentifiedcarefullyandseparately,for,iftheywerelumpedtogetherwithcasteswhowerebackwardonlyinname,theywereunlikelytobeabletocompeteforbenefits.4,TheworstaspectoftheMandaldecisionwasthatitwassociallydivisive;itpittedcasteagainstcaste

inthenameofsocialjustice;itmadenoefforttoconvincethosewhowouldstandtolosethattheyshouldacceptitinthelargerinterest;itencouragedthepotentialbeneficiariestotreatallthosewhoopposedthedecisionasrepresentingupper-casteinterests,andre-introducedcasteasaconceptandidentityeveninthosesectorsofsocietyfromwhereithadvirtuallydisappeared.Further,onewouldhaveexpectedthatfortyyearsafterreservationswerefirstintroducedforScheduledCastesintheConstitution,aseriousdebateandempiricalexaminationoftheirefficacyasastrategyforsocialjusticewouldbeinorderbeforetheywereextendedtonewsections.Theargumentsthatreservationswereperpetuatednotbecausetheyservedtheinterestsofthereallydisadvantagedbutoftheelitesamongthecastesbenefitingfromreservation,thatthefocusonreservationasthepreferredandoftensolestrategyforsocialjusticepreventedconsiderationofotherequallyifnotmoreeffectivestrategies,5thatpoliticsofcasteidentitybenefitedleadersratherthanthevictimsofthecastesystem—alltheseneededtobeseriouslydebatedandthecaseforextensionofreservationestablishedandpublicopinionbuiltarounditbeforesuchmajorsocialengineeringwasattempted.ThestrongandviolentreactionofthestudentcommunityinNorthIndia6illustratesthis.Inasituation

wherelargenumbersofstudentslookuponemploymentinthegovernmentsectorasamajorcareeroption,andonethatitisstillpossibletoavailofwithoutusinginfluenceormoneyasrecruitmentisdonevia

competitiveexaminations,thesuddenblockingofalmostonehalfoftheseatsforreservation,seemedpatentlyunfair.Thiswasespeciallyso,astheyrecognizedthatmanyofthosewhowouldbenefitwereeconomicallyandsociallytheirequalsorevensuperiors.ThiswasseenasverydifferentfromreservationforScheduledCastes,asthesocialandeconomicdisabilitywasunambiguous,andasocialconsensushadbeenbuiltontheissuesincethedaysofthefreedomstruggle.Besides,studentswerenotinnocentofthepoliticalmotivesthatunderlaythedecision,asthesewerebeingloudlydebatedbytheleadersoftheNationalFrontitself.Anti-Mandalprotesttooktheformofattacksonpublicproperty,burningofbuses,rallies,meetings,

discussionsinthePress.Studentswereintheforefront,andwereoftensupportedbyothersectionsofsociety,suchasteachers,officeworkers,andhousewives.TownsandcitiesinNorthIndiawerethelocaleandpolicefiringwasresortedtoinDelhi,Gorakhpur,Varanasi,andKanpuramongotherplaces.Frommid-September,desperatethatprotestswereprovingfutile,afewstudentsattemptedself-immolation.Passionsranhigh,withthoseforMandalcondemningthisasbarbaricandfarcicalandpossiblystage-managed,andthoseagainst,shockedatthetrivializationandlackofunderstandingofthedepthofsentimentontheissue.Theprimeminister’sappealstostudentstodesistfromviolenceandself-immolationwentunheeded.Whileforamajorpartanti-Mandalprotestremainedfreeofcasteovertones,andinfactitsdominantdiscoursewasagainstcasteasanorganizingprinciple,therediddevelopaverynegativetendency,especiallyinthelaterstages,andpartlyinreactiontobeingcharacterisedasupper-castemotivated,forupper-castestudentstocoalesceintopreviouslyunthinkable‘forwardcaste’associations,andforcaste-flavouredabusestobetradedincollegehostelcorridorsanddininghalls.Whatwasonceamajorforumfordissolvingofcasteidentitiesbecameforsometimethecradleinwhichtheywerere-born.TheprotestendedwhentheSupremeCourtgrantedastayontheimplementationoftheMandalReporton1October1990.7

Meanwhile,BJPhaditsownagendatocompleteandMandalprobablygaveitthepushitneeded.SeeingthestrongpopularreactiontoMandal,BJPhadstartedmakingnoisesaboutwithdrawingsupport.On25September,L.K.Advaniembarkedonhis6000mile-longrathyatraorchariot-ridefromSomnathinGujarattoAyodhya(tolaythefoundationstonefortheRammandir)whichendedon23OctoberatSamastipurinBiharwithhisarrestandthewithdrawalofsupportbyBJP.V.P.SinghcouldnotsatisfytheBJPwithoutalienatinghisownpartyandhisleftalliesandchosethustobreakwiththeBJP.On30October,therewasfiringonthecrowdtryingtoreachthespotinAyodhyachosenfortheshilanyasoftheRamtemple.Therathyatra,Advani’sarrestandthefiringatAyodhyaarousedcommunalpassionsandtheensuingriotsledtomanydeathsinNorthIndia.On5November,theJanataDalsplitandfifty-eightlegislatorselectedChandraShekharastheirleader.On7November,thesecondattemptatrunninganon-Congressgovernmentcametoanendafterelevenstormymonths.

ChandraShekhartoVajpayee:ABriefSurvey

Themajorissuesthatemergedinthisphasehavebeenlargelydiscussedinthethematicchapters;hencewhatisofferedhereismerelyabriefsurveyofbasicpoliticalchangestomaintainthecontinuityofthenarrative.Theshort-livedChandraShekhargovernmentwhichtookofficeon10November1990withthesupport

ofCongresshadonlyoneroletoperform:toholdthebabytillCongressdecideditwantedtogofor

elections.Apretextwasfoundandsupportwithdrawnon5March1991.Theelectionswereannouncedfrom19Mayandoneroundofvotingwasoverwhentragedyagainstrucktheill-fatedfamilyofIndiraGandhi.RajivGandhi,whowasroundingoffonephaseofcampaigningwithalatenightmeetinginSriperumbudur,fortykilometresfromMadras,wasblowntopieceswhenayoungwoman,whocameforwardtogreethim,triggeredoffabombthatshehadstrappedtoherwaist.Widelybelieved,andlaterproven,tobethehandiworkofLTTEmilitants,thekillingoftheforty-six-year-oldRajiv,whowasregainingpopularitywithhissadbhavanayatrasandotherattemptstoreachouttothepeople,generatedasympathywavestrongenoughtogiveCongress232seatsandthestatusofthesinglelargestparty.NarasimhaRaoformedwhatwasinitiallyaminorityCongressgovernmenton21June,butwhichgraduallyachievedamajority,andlastedafullfive-yearterm.Itundertookthemostradicaleconomicreform,andinthefirstyearbroughtdownthecasteandcommunaltemperaturetoagreatextentandwassuccessfulinrestoringnormalcytoPunjab,andimprovingthesituationinKashmirandAssam.ItfailedtosavetheBabriMasjidfromdemolition,andpreventthewidespreadriotingthatfollowed.Allthishasbeendiscussedthematicallyelsewhereinthisvolume.SufficeittosaythatNarasimhaRao’sregime,despiteitsmanyachievementswhicharelikelytobeplacedinamorefavourablelightwithalongerhistoricalperspective,tendedtolosesteaminthelasttwoyears,withaslowingdownofeconomicreforms,surfacingofcorruptionchargesandthe‘hawala’scandalwhichledtocharges,laterfoundtobealmostentirelyunsustainable,ofbribesandforeignexchangeviolationsagainstmanyCongressandoppositionleaders.Theelectionsheldin1996ledtoCongresswinningonly140seatsandBJPincreasingitstallyto161

from120in1991.Ashort-livedBJPgovernmentlastedfrom16Mayto1June,butfailedtogetmajoritysupport.ThiswasfollowedbyaUnitedFrontgovernmentwithH.D.DevaGowdaasprimeministersupportedbyCongressandCPMinwhichCPIjoinedasapartnerandIndiagotherfirstCommunisthomeministerinIndrajitGupta.Congresswithdrewsupporton30March1997,failedtoformagovernment,andagainsupportedaUnitedFrontgovernment,thistimewithI.K.Gujralasprimeminister.ThesupportwaswithdrawnagainandfreshelectionsheldinFebruary1998whichledtotheformationofBJP-ledgovernmentwithAtalBehariVajpayeeasprimeminister,asBJP,thoughitselfgettingonly182seats,managedtosecurethesupportofsecularpartiesliketheTDP,AIADMKandTrinamulCongress.TheCongressgotonly147seats.Thelargenumberofalliespreventedstability,withtheircompetingdemandsandultimatelyJayalalithawithdrewherAIADMKfromtheallianceleadingtothegovernmentlosingthevoteofconfidenceinApril1999.EffortstoformanalternativeCongressorsecularcoalitiongovernmentfailedandelectionswereannouncedonceagain.TheBJP-ledgovernmentcontinuedasacaretakergovernmenttilltheelectionswereheldinSeptemberandOctober1999.TheelectionresultsimprovedthetallyofBJPandalliesto296from253thoughtheBJP’sowntallydidnotchange,andtheCongresswithSoniaGandhiatitshelmwasdownto134withallies.Thediscrepancyinvoteshareswasmuchless,withCongressandalliesholdingonto34.7percent,animprovementof3.4percentover1998,ascomparedtoBJPanditsallies’41.3percent,whichimprovedbyonly1.2percentsince1998.AnewgovernmentwasformedwithVajpayeeagainatthehelm.Asalways,historyhasitsironies,foritappearsthatthemillenniumwillbeusheredinbyagovernmentledbyapartythatforyearsseemedtobemoreinterestedinrevivingandavengingthepastthaninheraldingthefuture!Thecomingmillennium,however,withitsnewhorizons,mayyetgivetheindomitableIndianpeoplethefuturetheydeserve.

ForeignPolicyintheNineties

NewChallenges:TodayandTomorrow

Inrecentyears,IndianforeignpolicyhasfacedabigchallengewiththedemiseoftheSovietUnion,theendoftheColdWar,andtheshifttotheeconomicstrategyofliberalizationandglobalization.ThetwoeventscoincidedinthecaseofIndiaintheyear1991,andtheconsequencesofbothwerenotdissimilar.Indiahadtore-orderherrelationshipwiththeUSandthewesternworld.Sheneededthecapital,thetechnologyandthemarketsforexportandtherewas,inanycase,noSovietUniontofallbackupon.Hersuccessalsocriticallydependeduponhowquicklyandwellshecouldusethenewstrategytoachieverapideconomicdevelopment,becauseultimately,intoday’sworld,itisthosewiththelargesteconomiccloutwhocarrythegreatestpoliticalweightininternationalaffairs.InthewordsofV.P.Dutt:8‘Ifonewereaskedtoidentifyjustonemostnotabletrendintheworld,onewouldsaythattheeconomicstrugglehadtakenprimacyoverthepoliticalstruggle.’WhileitistruethatthegoodolddaysofIndo-Sovietfriendshipareover,therestillexistsatremendous

reservoirofgoodwillandloyaltiesinthecountriesoftheerstwhileSovietUnion.Russiamaybegoingthroughaperiodofcrisis,butsheisagreatpowerwithastrongsenseofherownpositionandisboundtomakeacomeback.ItisinIndia’sinteresttomaintaingoodrelationswithit.OthercountriesofCentralAsiawhohavebrokenoutoftheSovietUnionalsohavetremendouspotentialasfriendsandallies.Theyarerichinnaturalresources,arestrategicallyplacedandarealreadybeingcourtedbytheUSandotherwesternpowers.Fortunately,theytoohaveoldlinkswithIndiadatingbacktotheSovieteraandtheIndiangovernmenthasbeenactivelybuildinguponthem.India’sstockintheMiddleEasthadbeenhighsinceshehadalwayssupportedtheArabstrugglefor

PalestineanddidnothaveanydiplomaticrelationswithIsrael.Inrecentyears,whilemaintainingsupportforthePLO,IndiahasalsoopeneduptieswithIsrael.ShehasalsosucceededinmaintainingfriendlytieswithIranandhasrefusedtofallinlinewithUSpoliciesoftotalostracismofIraqandIran.Asaresult,Pakistan’seffortstousetheOrganisationofIslamicUnity(orStates)againstIndiahavenotbeenverysuccessful.ByrefusingtojoininthehysteriaagainstIraqletlooseduringtheGulfWarbytheUS,Indiahasalsoretainedhergoodwill,builtovermanyyearsofeconomicpartnership,withIraq.Indiandiplomacyalsohastotreadsomenewpaths.Muchoftheworldtodayisgettingorganizedinto

newtradeoreconomicblocs,ASEAN,EEC,NAFTA,etc.Indiahasshowninsufficientinterestandawarenessof.thistrend.ItmadelittleefforttobecomepartofASEANattherighttimeandhasonlylatelybecomeadialoguepartner.SAARCisyettoemergeasaseriouseconomicbloc,thougheffortsinthatdirectionarebeingmade.TherecentmovetobringtogethercountriesoftheIndianOcean,inwhichIndiahasplayedanactivepart,isawelcomeone,especiallyasitincludesSouthAfrica,anoldfriendwithgreatpotentialasaneconomicpartner.Indiahastolearntolookeastwardsaswell.ToJapan,whichisthelargestdonorintheworld,withthe

biggestsurplusesofinvestablecapitalandwithwhomwehavenohistoryofcolonialdominationorborderwarsoreconomicarmtwistingandwhoselong-termstrategicintereststokeepChinaincheckdovetailwithours.WeneedtodevelopclosereconomicandpoliticaltieswithothercountriesofSouth-eastAsiawithwhomwehavehadhistoricallygoodrelations—withIndonesiawhomwesupportedinherstruggleagainstDutchcolonialism,withVietnam,whomwesupportedinherstruggleagainstFrenchand

Americancolonialism,withThailand,CambodiaandMalaysiawithwhomwehaveoldculturalties,withSingaporewhichisthepower-houseofSouth-eastAsiaandhasshownhowmoderntechnologyenablesatinycitystatetobecomeaneconomicsuperpower.ThisisalsonecessaryifIndiaistocontributetothemakingofamultipolarworldandthe

democratizationofinternationalrelations,allofwhichisinherenlightenedself-interest.Thesurewayofpreventingthecrystallizationofaunipolarworldisbygentlyencouragingcountrieswhohaveachievedeconomicstrengthtoassertthemselvesininternationalaffairs.JapanandatleastsomeoftheEastAsiantigerswhohavetoolongbeeninthehabitofsilentlyendorsingUShegemonymaywellbegintowanttoexpresstheirownviewoftheworld.AllbreachesinunipolarityandinfavourofpluralityareinIndia’sandtheworld’sinterestandmustbeencouraged,aswasdonesosuccessfullyviatheNon-alignedMovementinthedaysofthefiftiesColdWar.InthisrespectthestrongsupportreceivedforcontinuationofNAMatitstenthannualsummitinJakartafrommemberstates,despitethemanyproblemsithasbeenfacing,wasveryencouraging.PrimeMinisterMahathirofMalaysia,whohasemergedasastrongindependentvoiceinworldaffairsexpressedhimselfveryfirmlyinfavourofNAM,asdidSuhartoofIndonesiawhowasinthechair.ThesummitdemandeddemocratizationoftheUN,moreopenmultilateraltradingsystems,greaterfinancialflowstodevelopingcountries,andothersuchmeasures.OntheflipsideistheincreasingtendencyoftheUStointerfereinthenameofself-determinationand

humanrights,withKosovobeingtherecentexample.CountrieslikeIndiaandChinaandevenRussiawithlargeethnicallydiversepopulationsarevulnerabletoattentionofthisnature.Nowonderthattheyprotestedagainst.USandNATOroleinKosovo.Thetechnologizationofwarhasalsomadesuchinterferencepossibleasithasreducedthehumancoststotheaggressorstonegligibleproportions.BoththeGulfWarandKosovodemonstratedthistothehilt.Indiahastosuitherforeignpolicytothisnewsituation.Keepingintactitsgoalofretaining

independenceofactionininternationalaffairs,andseekingtofindarespectableplaceforitselfinthecommunityofnations,Indiamustconstantlyevaluatethechangingnatureofinternationalalignmentsandfindthemeanstosecureitsobjectives.Theworldorderisinflux,andlikelytoremainsoforsometime,andinthisfluidsituationIndiashouldevolveacreativeforeignpolicy.Wetakeacloserlookattwoofthemostimportanteventsinrecentyearsthathadinternational

implications:India’snucleartestsin1998andthenear-warwithPakistanin1999.

PokhranII

India’sconductofanotherroundofnucleartestsin11May1998anddeclaringitselfanuclearweaponsstateisacomplexquestionthathastobeexaminedinthecontextofthechangingworldenvironmentandthepositionadoptedbyIndiasinceindependenceonthenuclearissue.FromthedaysofNehru,Indiahadmaintainedaprincipledandsustainedposition,arguingfornuclear

disarmamentandanuclear-weaponsfreeworld.ThispositionwasforcefullyandactivelypursuedinrecentyearsbyRajivGandhiwhenhetriedtoinitiateglobalactiontowardsphasednucleardisarmament.Ontheotherhand,onceagainpioneeredbyNehru,Indialaidgreatemphasisondevelopmentofscienceandtechnology,particularlyonkeepingabreastwithdevelopmentsinthefieldofnuclearscience.Subsequentgovernmentskeptabreastwithdevelopments.ThefirstnucleartestswereconductedsuccessfullyinOctober1974whenIndiraGandhiwastheprimeminister.ThegovernmentsofRajiv

Gandhi,NarasimhaRao,DeveGowdaandI.K.GujralwereinfullreadinessforexercisingthenuclearoptionandinfactitissaidthatNarasimhaRaoin1995wasabouttogivethego-aheadfortestssimilartothe1998onesbuttheAmericansgottoknowofitandputenoughpressureforRaotostayhishand.Thus,IndiatilltheMay1998tests,whilemaintainingherpositioninfavourofnucleardisarmament,hadkeptherselfreadyforexercisingthenuclearoption.Thisdualpositionwasmaintainedforseveralreasons.First,thereexistedaftertheSecondWorldWaranextremelyiniquitousworldorderonthenuclear

front.TheNuclearNon-proliferationTreaty(NPT)wasessentiallyconceivedtoensurethatfourcountries,USA,SovietUnion,BritainandFranceremainedtheonlynuclearweapons-owningcountriesintheworld.Chinaforceditswayintothiseliteclubandjoinedtheotherfourintheclamourtorestrictthenuclearmonopolynowtothe‘BigFive’.TheCTBT(ComprehensiveTestBanTreaty)whichthenuclearpowershavebeenpressurizingnon-nuclearcountriestosignisequallydiscriminatoryasitsaimisagaintokeepothercountriesgoingnuclearwhilerefusinganycommitmentonthepartofthenuclearpowerstowardsnucleardisarmament,notevenwithinafifty-yeartimeframe.India’seffortstogetsuchacommitmentincludedintheCTBTwerebrushedaside,forcinghertorefusetosignCTBTasshedidtheNPT.Themessagewasclear.Non-nuclearcountrieshavenovoice.Second,Indiawassurroundedbynuclearweapons.OnonesidetherewasChina(acountrywhich

invadedIndiain1962)withamajornucleararmouryoffourtofivehundrednuclearwarheadsandasophisticatedlong-distancedeliverysystemincludingICBMs(intercontinentalballisticmissiles),andnuclearbasesinTibet.Ontheother,USnuclearshipscruisedtheseasaroundIndiawithabaseinDiegoGarcia.Also,Kazakhistan,UkraineandRussiahadmajornuclearweapons.Moreover,withopenChinesecollusionandhelp,Pakistan(acountrythatforcedIndiaintowarthriceandmaintainedaconsistentlowintensityhostilityalmostcontinuously)haddevelopednotonlyconsiderablenuclearcapabilitybutalsoasubstantiallong-distancemissileprogramme.Asurface-to-surfaceballisticmissilewitharangeof1500kilometersnamedratherprovocativelyGhauri(presumablyafterthenotoriousinvaderintoIndiacenturiesago)hadbeensuccessfullylaunchedbeforetheIndiannucleartestsofMay1998.SoonaftertheIndiantests,Pakistanconducteditstestsandannouncedtheexplosionoftheirbombwhichiswidelysuspectedtohavebeen‘mothered’byChina.ThegrowingChina-Pakistannuclearaxis,giventheircollusiondiplomaticallyandinwaragainstIndia,wasamatterofseriousconcern.Theiniquitousworldnuclearorderandthesecurityconcernposedbysomeofitsimmediate

neighboursgoalongwayinexplainingwhyallregimesinIndiasawthenecessityofitmaintainingnuclearpreparedness,andwhytherehadbeenforquitesometimeconsiderablesupportwithinthecountryforgoingaheadandexercisingthenuclearoption.ItisinthissituationthattheBJP-ledgovernmentheadedbyAtalBehariVajpayeegavethego-ahead

(ratherhurriedly,withinafewweeksofassumingpower)forthenuclearteststhatwereconductedinMay1998.On11Maythreeundergroundtests,oneofthemthermonuclear(showing,itwasclaimed,ahydrogenbombcapabilitywitha45kilotonyield),wereconductedinPokhran,thesamesiteusedin1974.Twodayslateranothertwotestswereconductedatthesamesite.Theseweretestswithaloweryieldaimedatgeneratingdataforcomputersimulationandthecapacitytocarryoutsub-criticalexperimentsinthefutureifnecessary.Therewasnotalkthistimeoftestsfor‘peacefulpurposes’asIndiraGandhihadmaintainedearlier.Vajpayeedeclared,followingthetests,thatIndiawasnowa

nuclearweaponsstate.TheindigenouslydevelopedPrithviandAgnisurface-to-surfacemissilescouldnowcarrynuclearwarheads.Thecountry,byandlarge,withtheexceptionofsectionsoftheleftandsomesmallanti-nucleargroups,

welcomedthetestsandparticularlytheachievementsofthescientificteamledbyA.P.J.AbdulKalamandR.Chidambaram,theChiefScientificAdviserandtheheadoftheDepartmentofAtomicEnergy.Theoppositionleader,CongresspresidentSoniaGandhipraisedtheachievementofthescientistsandengineers,expressedprideinCongresshavingkeptIndia’snuclearcapabilityup-todateandreiteratedthecommitmentofCongresstoanuclearweapons-freeworldandpeacewithherneighbours.However,themannerinwhichtheBJPgovernmentexercisedthenuclearoptionandparticularlyits

handlingofthesituationafterthetestswaswidelydisapprovedof.Itwassuspectedthatthegovernmenthurriedlywentinforthetestswithoutadequatepreparationwithaneyeonthepoliticaladvantageitcouldreapathome.ThesuspicionappearedtobejustifiedwhenBJPresortedtoopenjingoism,talkingofbuildingatempleatPokhranandmakingthreateningnoisesregardingneighbouringcountries.Infact,oneofthemostimportantnationaldailiesinIndiahadtoeditoriallyexpress‘thestrongestpossiblecondemnation’ofanarticlewhichappearedinPanchjanya,themouthpieceofRSS(themostimportantwingoftheBJPcombine),where‘animplicitcaseforanIndiannuclearattackonPakistan’wasmade.9

HavingdonethetestswhatIndianeededwastoreassuretheworldandparticularlyitsneighboursofherpeacefulintentthroughskilfuldiplomaticmoves,butthegovernmentdidjusttheopposite.Also,seenaspoliticaldisasterswerethedefenceminister,GeorgeFernandes’spronouncement,aweekbeforethetests,namingChinaas‘potentialthreatnumberone’andPrimeMinisterVajpayee’slettertoPresidentClinton,whichwaspublishedintheNewYorkTimes,defendingtheblastsbynamingChinaandPakistanassecuritythreats.Byunnecessarilynamingspecificcountriesandsuggestingthatthenuclearcapabilitywasbeingbuiltagainstthem,thewrongmessagewassentout.China(withwhomIndia’srelationswerebeingimprovedwithsustainedhardworkbypreviousCongressandUnitedFrontgovernments)hadinitiallyreactedmoderatelytothetestsbutnowitadoptedanalmostvicioustone.TheresponsefromtheWestandJapanwas,asexpected,negativeandthetestswerewidely

condemned.TheUSwentfurtherandimmediatelyannouncedtheimpositionofsanctions.Japan,Norway,Sweden,Denmark,theNetherlandsandCanadasuspendedaidtoIndia.TheUS,however,didnotsucceedingettingtheG-8countriestotakecollectiveactionagainstIndia.FranceRussiaandGermanycontinuedtheirnormaleconomiclinkswithIndia.BritainasthecurrentPresidentoftheEuropeanUnionfailedtogettheUniontoadoptastrong,anti-Indiastance.Whilethelong-termfalloutofthesanctionsandhowlongtheywouldlastwasnotclearimmediately,

whatwascertainwasthatIndia’snucleartestsposedamajorchallengetotheiniquitousnuclearworldorderinwhichthenuclearhavesblatantlyresortedtodoublestandards.WitnessthefussmadebytheUSabouttheIndiantestsanditsinsistencethatIndiasigntheCTBTwhennotenoughsupportcouldbegeneratedwithintheirowncountrytoratifytheCTBT.AstheSecretary-GeneraloftheUnitedNations,KofiAnnan,putit,‘Youcannothaveanexclusiveclub(whosemembers)havethenuclearweaponsandarerefusingtodisbanditandtellthem(IndiaandPakistan)nottohavethem.’10

Kargil

AfterPokhran,Pakistancarriedoutitsownnucleartestsandtherewasmuchsabre-rattlingonbothsides.Inearly1999,whentheatmosphereappearedmorecongenial,Vajpayeeinitiatedthe‘busdiplomacy’(ridingthefirstbusservicebetweenIndiaandPakistan),aimedatmakingamajorbreakthroughinimprovingrelationswithPakistan.However,aslatereventsrevealed,fromlongbeforethemuch-hypedbusridetoLahore,soldiersofthePakistanArmyandPakistan-backedMujahideenorreligiousmilitantsandmercenaries,werebusyinfiltratingintoIndianterritory.Infact,byMaywhenthewholecrisisblewupitwasdiscoveredthatPakistaniarmedforceshadintrudeddeepacrossthelineofcontrolinKashmirandhadoccupiedkeystrategicpeaksintheKargilarea.Indiahadtomountamassiveandextremelydifficultcounter-offensivefromadisadvantageousmilitaryposition,whichwasextremelycostlyparticularlyintermsofhumanlives,inordertoevicttheintruders.Picturesofbody-bagsofhundredsofIndiansoldiersandofficerskilledintheKargiloperationsbegantoappearregularlyinIndiannewspapersinamannernotwitnessedbefore.TheinternationalreactiontotheKargilcrisiswas,somewhatunexpectedly,almostunanimousinfavour

ofIndia.EventheUS,BritainandChina—longtimealliesofPakistan—putpressureonPakistantowithdrawfromIndianterritory.Pakistan’sclaimthatithadnoregulararmymenontheIndiansideoftheborderbutonlyprovidedmoralsupporttomilitantswasnottakenseriouslybyanybody.TheUSstancecanbepartlyexplainedbythegrowingfearofinternationalIslamicterrorism.TroopsfromthepersonalbodyguardoftheSaudiIslamicfundamentalist,OsamabinLaden,whowassuspectedtobebehindthebombattacksonUSconsulatesinAfricain1998costingseveral‘Americanlives’,werereportedtobeinvolvedinthePakistanoperationsinKargil.China’sbeingsoftonIndiacouldberelatedtoherfindingIndiaasthesoleally(apartfromRussia)inquestioninggrowingAmericanhegemonism,witnessedstarklyintheKosovocrisisinearlyApril-May1999where,disregardingtheUnitedNations,theUShadtakenuponitselftheroleofplayingtheworld’spoliceman.Thedomesticfalloutwascomplex.Atonelevel,itprovedextremelyusefulforBJPintheelectionsthat

followedafewmonthsaftertheendoftheKargilcrisis.However,thecrisisraisedsomefundamentalquestionsfortheIndianstate.OnceitbecameknownthatinfiltrationbyPakistaniarmedpersonnelwasoccurringfromasearlyastheautumnof1998,thequestionarosewhynothingwasdoneaboutitforsomanymonths.Couldithavebeensuchatotalintelligencefailureinoneofthemostsensitiveareasonourborderorwasitmorethanthat?AveryseniorofficeroftheIndianArmy,BrigadierSurinderSingh,commanderoftheKargil-based121Brigade,alleged,includingincourt,withdocumentaryevidence(partofwhichwaspublishedbythemajorIndianmagazine,Outlook),thatintelligenceaboutintrusionandsettingupbasesinsideIndianterritorywasavailableformanymonthsandrepeatedwarningsweregiven(fromasearlyasAugust1998)andthesewarningswerereachednotonlytothehighestlevelswithinthearmybuteventothegovernment.ThishasraiseddoubtswhethertheBJPgovernmentdeliberatelyallowedthesituationtofestersothatitcouldatanelectorallyopportunetimecomedownwithaheavyhandandprojecta‘victory’againsttheenemy—i.e.,usetheIndiansoldiers’livesascannonfoddertogainpoliticaladvantage.Ifthisweretobeprovedtrue,itwouldcertainlymarkthelowestdepthsIndianpoliticseverreached.Inanycase,thegovernmenthasbeencompelledtoinstituteahigh-levelinquirycommitteetolookintothematter.TheotherdisturbingaspecthasbeenthattheBJP’sactionsupsetthelongcherishedtraditionsof

keepingthearmedforcesinIndiaoutofpolitics.Chiefsofthemilitaryserviceswereaskedbythe

governmenttocometomeetingsofBJPpartymembers.Largecut-outsofseniorofficersofthearmedforcesdecoratedpodiumswhereBJPleadersweretoaddressmeetings.ElementsfromwithintheBJPcombinesuchastheVHPlandedupinthedefenceheadquartersinSouthBlockwiththousandsofrakhisforsoldiersandpriestsweresenttoKargiltoblessthesoldiers—moveswhichcouldnotbeseentobeinnocentinthecontextofthemulti-religiousnatureoftheIndianarmedforces.TheMuslim,SikhandChristiansoldierswhogavetheirlivesinKargiltodefendIndiawereexcluded.Allthis,ontopofthewell-knowneffortsofthepartytowooretiredservicespersonnelintoactivepartypoliticsandtoeventryandinfluenceservingpersonnelwithcommunalideology,hascausedconsiderablealarm.SuchactshavebeensharplycriticizedinIndia,asanymovewhichcouldpoliticizethearmedforcesandthreatenthesecularanddemocratictraditionsnurturedoverthepastfiftyyears(particularlywithinthearmedforces)wouldnotbeacceptable.

22PoliticsintheStates(I):TamilNadu,AndhraPradesh,Assam

FunctioningwithinthepoliticalandeconomicframeworkoftheIndianunion,politicsinvariousstateshaveagreatdealincommon,buttheirpatternandachievementsvaryconsiderably.Eachstatehasadifferentconstellationofclass,caste,socialandculturalforcesandlevelsofsocialandeconomicdevelopment,andwhich,inturn,influencesitspolitics.Itis,therefore,notaccidentalthatchangesinthesocialbasesofpolitics,whetherofcaste,class,tribe,

statusgroups,religion,region,orgender,arefirstreflectedatthestatelevel.Patronagenetworks,extendingintosmalltownsandvillages,arealsoinitiatedandbuiltupatthislevel.Basicnation-buildingandhumanresourcedevelopmentmeasures,relatingtochangesinagrarianstructure,agriculturalandindustrialdevelopment,health,roads,power,irrigation,areimplementedprimarilybystateadministrations.DespitethemanycentralizingfeaturesofIndianpolityasithasdevelopedovertheyearsandtheCentre’sabilitytointerferewithandencroachuponthepowersofthestates,thecentralgovernmentbasicallyreliesonthestategovernmentsforcarryingoutitsimportantdecisions;theeffectivenessofthecentraldevelopmentalprogrammesalsodependsontheperformanceofthestates.EvenwhenthesamepartyrulesintheCentreandthestates,thecapacityofthecentralgovernmenttogetitsplansandpoliciesexecutedisquitelimited.Witness,forexample,thevaryingfateoflandreformsindifferentCongress-ruledstatesinthefifties.Infact,thedifferenceinthecompetenceofvariousstategovernmentsexplainstoalargeextentthewidedivergenceintheirperformanceandtheratesofsocial,culturalandhumanresourcedevelopment.Unfortunately,wedonothavethespacetodiscussmostoftheseaspectsofstatepoliticsorthepolitics

ofeachoneofthestatesastheyhavedevelopedsinceindependence.Instead,wehavechosenascasestudiesafewstates—TamilNadu,AndhraPradesh,Assam,WestBengalandJammuandKashmir—andthattootoillustratesomeaspectoftheirpoliticsthatmakesthesestatesdistinct.WehavediscussedPunjabseparatelyinchapter24asanexampleofbothcommunalpoliticsand

minoritycommunalismultimatelyassumingaseparatistform.ConstraintsofspacealsopreventsusfromtakingupthecaseofBiharwhere,sincethesixties,casteism

bothoftheuppercastes—Bhoomihars,Brahmins,RajputsandKayasthas—andthebackwardcastes—Yadavas,KurmisandKoeris—hasgraduallyerodedandseriouslydamagedtheadministration,economy,educationalsystem,andcultureofthepeople.Thisisparticularlydepressingasthestatehadahoarypast,militanttraditionsofthenational,peasantandtribalmovementsandproducedinrecenttimespoliticalleadersofthecalibreofSachidanandSinha,RajendraPrasad,Mazhar-ul-Haq,JayaprakashNarayanandSwamiSahajanandSaraswati,andintellectualgiantsliketheeconomistGyanChand,historianR.S.Sharma,politicalscientistB.B.Mazumdar,historianphilosopherandwriterRahulSankritayan,novelistPhanishwarNathRenu,andpoetsNagarjunandRamdhariSinghDinkar.

TheDMKinTamilNadu

AstudyoftheDravidaMunnetraKazhagam(DMK)illustrateshowastrongseparatistregionalstraininIndianpolitywasovercomeandcoopted.TheDMKemergedinthefiftiesasapartyandamovementwhichthrivedonstrongcaste,regional,and

evensecessionistsentiments.Itwastheheirtotwostrandsofthepre-independenceperiodmovementsinTamilNadu:thenon-Brahminmovement,whichhadledtotheformationofthepro-BritishJusticepartyin1920,andthestronglyreformistanti-caste,anti-religionSelf-RespectMovementledbyE.V.RamaswamyNaicker,popularlyknownasPeriyar(GreatSage).In1944,NaickerandC.N.AnnaduraiestablishedDravidaKazhagam(Federation)orDKwhichsplit

in1949whenAnnaduraifoundedtheDravidaMunnetra(Progressive)Kazhagam(DMK).But,significantly,incontrasttotheJusticepartyandNaicker,Annaduraihadtakenupastronglyanti-imperialist,pro-nationalistpositionbefore1947.Annaduraiwasabrilliantwriter,askillfuloratorandanexcellentorganizer.AlongwithM.

KarunanidhiandM.G.Ramachandran(MGR)andotherfilmpersonalities—actors,directorsandwriters—Annaduraiuseddramas,films,journals,pamphletsandothermassmediatoreachouttothepeopleandovertimesucceededinbuildingupamassbase,especiallyamongtheyouthwitharuralbackground,andavibrantpoliticalorganization.TheDMKwasstronglyanti-Brahmin,anti-Northandanti-Aryan—southernBrahminsandNorth

IndiansbeingseenasAryans,allotherSouthIndiansasDravidas.Itraisedthesloganofoppositiontothecultural,economicandpoliticaldominationoftheSouthbytheNorth.Naickerandothershadearlierin1938organizedamovementagainstthedecisionoftheCongressministrytointroduceHindiinMadrasschools,labellingittobeanaspectofBrahmanicalNorthIndianculturaldomination.DMKalsodecidedtoopposewhatitdescribedasexpansionofHindi‘imperialism’intheSouth.Itsmaindemand,however,wasforahomelandfortheDravidasintheform

ofaseparateindependentSouthIndianstate—DravidnaduorDravidasthan—consistingofTamilNadu,Andhra,KarnatakaandKerala.Duringthefiftiesandsixties,however,therewereseveraldevelopmentswhichgraduallyledtoa

changeinthebasicpoliticalthrustofDMK.NaickergaveuphisoppositiontoCongresswhenin1954,Kamaraj,anon-Brahmin,displacedC.RajagopalachariasthedominantleaderofCongressinTamilNaduandbecamethechiefminister.DMKleadershiptoograduallylesseneditshostilitytoBrahminsandstartedunderplayingitsanti-Brahminrhetoric.ItalsograduallyshifteditsemphasisfromracetoTamilconsciousness,toprideinTamillanguageandcultureandinbeingaTamil.It,however,retaineditsoppositiontoHindianditsemphasisonradicalsocialreforms,especiallyintermsoftheremovalofallcastedistinctionsandtheinculcationofarationalandcriticalapproachtowardstheclassical‘Hindu’scriptures.TherewasalsoagradualchangeinDMK’ssecessionistplankasitbegantoparticipateinelections

andinparliamentarypolitics,andalsobecausetheothersouthernstatesrefusedtosupportsecessionism.DMKdidnotparticipateinthe1952elections,butittesteditselectoralappealbyhelpingnearly30MLAstowin.Itparticipatedinthe1957and1962elections.Thatachangewascomingbecamevisiblewhen,inthe1962elections,itenteredintoanalliancewithSwatantraandCPIanddidnotmakeaseparateDravidnaduacampaignissuethoughitwasstillapartofitsmanifesto.Laterstill,duringthe

India-Chinawar,itralliedtothenationalcause,fullysupportedthegovernment,andsuspendedallpropagandaforsecession.Afurtherandfinalchangecamewhen,asaresultofNehru’sdeterminationtodealfirmlywithany

secessionistmovement,the16thConstitutionalAmendmentwaspassedin1962declaringtheadvocacyofsecessionacrimeandrequiringeverycandidatetoparliamentorstateassemblytoswear‘allegiancetotheConstitution’andto‘upholdthesovereigntyandintegrityofIndia.’TheDMKimmediatelyamendeditsConstitutionandgaveupthedemandforsecession.Fromsecessionismitnowshiftedtothedemandsforgreaterstateautonomy,morepowerstothestates,whilelimitingthepowersofthecentralgovernment,anendtothedominationandunfairtreatmentoftheSouthbytheHindi-speakingNorth,andallocationofgreatercentraleconomicresourcesforthedevelopmentofTamilNadu.TheDMKgraduallydevelopedasastate-widepartywithappealinurbanaswellasruralareasandwithaprogrammeofradicaleconomicmeasures,socialchangeanddevelopmentofmodernTamillanguageandculture.Italsofurthersofteneditsanti-BrahminstanceanddeclareditselftobeapartyofallTamils,whichwouldaccommodateTamilBrahmins.WitheachelectiontheDMKkeptexpandingitssocialbaseandincreasingitselectoralstrength.In

1962ithadwon50seatsinthestateassemblyand7fortheLokSabha.Twosubsequenteventsenabledittotake-offinthe1967elections.First,aswehaveseeninchapter7,fierceanti-Congresssentimentswerearousedbytheanti-Hindiagitationofearly1965,andDMKwasthemainbeneficiary.Second,DMKfoughtthe1967electionsinalliancewithSwatantra,CPM,PSP,SSP,andMuslimLeague.Consequently,itcaptured138ofthe234seatsintheassembly,withCongressgettingonly49.DMKformedthegovernmentinthestatewithAnnaduraiaschiefminister.Congresswasnevertorecoverfromthisdefeat.DMK,ontheotherhand,begantofollowthetrajectoryofa‘normal’regionalparty.AfterAnnadurai’sdeathinFebruary1969,M.Karunanidhibecamethechiefminister.Later,DMK

supportedIndiraGandhiinherstruggleagainsttheSyndicate.Itssupport,alongwiththatofCPI,enabledIndiraGandhitoremaininpowerafterhavingbeenreducedtoaminorityintheLokSabha.Inthe1971electionstotheLokSabhaandthestateassembly,DMKteamedupwiththeIndira-ledCongress(R),whichsurrenderedallclaimstoassemblyseatsinreturnforDMK’ssupporttoitin9parliamentaryseatswhichitwon.DMKwon183outofthe234assemblyseatsand23LokSabhaseats.In1972,theDMKsplit,withMGRformingtheAll-IndiaAnnaDMK(AIADMK).Thetwo-party

systemnowemergedinTamilNadu,butoperatedbetweenthetwoDravidaparties,withbothpartiesalternatinginpowerinthestatesincethen.Participationinelectoralpolitics,assumptionofoffice,andgreaterintegrationofTamilNaduwiththe

nationaleconomyledtotheDMKbeingtransformedfromasecessionistmovementintoanintegralpartofIndia’ademocraticandsecularpoliticalsystemanda‘politicallymatureandpragmatic’regional,orratherone-stateparty.Justliketheothermainstreamparties,theDMKalsosplitintotwomain,andlater,severalsmall

parties.DMKandAIADMK(andtheiroff-shoots)inturn,atonetimeortheother,alliedwithCongress,CPI,CPM,JanataandJanataDalandotherall-Indiaparties.Inrecentelections,theAIADMKin1998andtheDMKin1999joinedforceswithBJP,thepartytheyhadearlieraccusedofrepresentingtheAryanNorthandHindidominationattheirworst.Thetwoalsograduallydilutedtheiranti-Northandanti-Hindistance.TheyhavegivenuptheideaofDravidnaduorevenoftheunificationofthefoursouthernstates

withintheIndianunion.TheyhaveputthegoaloftheannhilationofthecastesystemincoldstoragewiththeresultthattheScheduledCastesandotherdown-troddencasteshavebeenturningawayfromthem.Infact,theanti-Brahminmovementhas,asawhole,failedtomakemuchofadentintheBrahmaniccasteorderandcastedomination;itsonlysuccesshasbeenindrivingoutBrahminsfromTamilNadutotherestofIndiaandtheUnitedStates,therebyaffectingscienceandtechnology,intellectualandacademiclifeinTamilNadu.Caughtinacleftbetweentherichandmiddlepeasantryandtherurallandless,DMKandAIADMKhavealsovirtuallygivenuptheiragrarianradicalism.Theirsocialradicalismhasinthemaintakentheformofprovidinglarge-scalereservationineducationandgovernmentservicestobackwardcastesandclasses,whichhasresultedinlong-termdamagetoadministration,educationalstandardsanddevelopmentwithoutremovingsignificantlyeconomicdisparitiesbasedoncasteandclass.Ofcourse,themostimportantreasonforthetransformationoftheDravidapartieshasbeenthe

realizationthat(i)secessionwasnotpossibleandtheIndianstatewasstrongenoughtosuppressanymovetowardsit,(ii)therewasnorealcontradictionbetweenaregionalidentityandtheoverallnationalidentity,(iii)India’sfederalanddemocraticsystemofgovernmentprovidedboththestateandtheindividualTamilseconomicopportunities,andagreatdealofpoliticalandadministrativefreedomtodevelopandundertakesocialreforms,(iv)theIndianpoliticalsystemandnationalintegrationwerebasedonacceptanceofculturalpluralism,and(v)thestateshavecompleteculturalautonomy,includingcontroloverlanguageandotherculturalaffairs.Inshort,theDravidapartiesandthepeopleofTamilNaduhavecometorealizeovertimethattheconceptof‘unityindiversity’isquiteworkableandanintegralpartoftheIndianpolityandethos.

TelenganaversusCoastalAndhra

Andhra’sisacaseofasinglelinguisticculturalregionbeingengulfedbypoliticalconflictandsub-regionalmovementsbasedondisparityindevelopmentandpresumedinequalityineconomicopportunities.Aswehaveseeninchapter8,AndhrawascreatedasaseparatestateinOctober1953andin

November1956theTelugu-speakingTelenganaareaofNizam’sHyderabadstatewasmergedwithittocreateAndhraPradesh.ThehopewasthatbeingpartofalargeunilingualstatewouldcementtheTelugupeopleculturally,politicallyandeconomically.EvenatthattimecertainTelenganaCongressleaders,asalsotheStatesReorganizationCommission,hadsomereservationsaboutthemergerbecauseofTelenganabeingrelativelymoreunderdeveloped,itslevelofdevelopmentbeingnearlyhalfthatofthecoastaldistrictsofAndhraPradesh.Telengana’spercapitaincomewasRs188comparedtoRs292inthecoastaldistricts;thenumberofhospitalbedsperlakhofpopulationwas18.6whileitwas55.6inthecoastaldistricts.TheliteracyrateinTelenganawas17.3percentasagainst30.8intherestofAndhraPradesh.Similarly,Telenganahadonly9milesofroadsper100squaremiles,thecomparativefigurebeing37milesforcoastalAndhra.UnlikecoastalAndhra,Telengana’ssourcesofirrigationwerescanty,consistingmostlyofrain-fedtanksandwells.ApowerfulmovementforaseparatestateofTelenganadevelopedin1969basedonthebeliefthat

becausethepoliticsandadministrationofthestateweredominatedbypeoplefromtheAndhraregion(Andhrans),theAndhragovernmenthadneglectedTelengana,haddoneverylittletoremovetheregionaleconomicimbalance,andAndhranswereexploitingtheTelenganaregion.Forexample,itwasbelieved

thatinruralelectrificationtheratiooftheAndhraregionandTelenganawas4:1duringtheSecondPlanand5:1intheThirdPlan.Similarly,inmatterofirrigationschemes,theAndhraregionwasstatedtohavebeenfavouredatthecostofTelengana.Further,therevenuesurplusesbeinggeneratedinTelenganabecauseoffreesaleofliquorweresupposedtobedivertedtoAndhrawhichhadprohibition.AlltheseallegationswererefutedbythespokespersonsofthegovernmentbutthepeopleofTelenganawerenotconvinced.But,aboveall,theseparatistsentimentwasbasedonthenotionofinjusticeanddiscriminationin

employmentinstateinstitutions.Whilethenumberofeducatedjob-seekershadbeengrowingasaresultofsharpincreaseineducation,employment,especiallyinthegovernmentservices,wascontractingalloverthestateasaresultofthedifficultiesintheimplementationoftheThirdPlan.Butthepoliticalleadersandtheunemployedmiddle-classyouthputtheblameforthegrowingunemploymentinTelenganaandHyderabadcityonthegovernmentalbiasinfavourofAndhraregion.ThemajorissueinthiscontextbecametheimplementationofwhatcametobeknownasMulkiRules.

TheNizam’sgovernmentinHyderabadhadacceptedasearlyas1918thatinallstateservicesthosewhowereborninthestateorhadlivedthereforfifteenyears(i.e.,Mulkis)wouldbegivenpreference,whilerestrictionswouldbeimposedontheemploymentofoutsiders.AtthetimeofthemergerofTelenganawithAndhrain1956theleadersofthetworegionshadevolveda‘gentlemen’sagreement’providingfortheretentionoftheMulkiRulesinamodifiedform,afixedshareofplacesintheministryforTelenganaleaders,andpreferenceforstudentsfromTelenganainadmissiontoeducationalinstitutionsincludingtoOsmaniaUniversityinHyderabad.ThediscontentedinTelenganaaccusedthegovernmentofdeliberatelyviolatingtheagreementwhilethegovernmentassertedthatitwastryingitsbesttoimplementit.ThelatterarguedthatsometimesproperlyqualifiedpersonswerenotavailablefromTelenganaregionbecauseofeducationalbackwardnessintheoldHyderabadstate.Forexample,expansionofeducationinTelenganamadeitnecessarytobringinalargenumberofteachersfromAndhraregion.Towardstheendof1968,thestudentsofOsmaniaUniversitywentonastrikeonthequestionof

discriminationinemploymentandeducation.ThestrikesoonspreadtootherpartsofTelengana.FatwasaddedtothefirebyaSupremeCourtjudgementinMarch1969declaringthereservationofpostsunderthe1956agreementtobeconstitutionallyinvalid.Amassive,oftenviolent,agitationdemandingseparationofTelenganafromAndhraPradeshnowspreadalloverTelenganawhereschoolsandcollegesremainedclosedfornearlyninemonths.Theagitationwassoonjoinedbyorganizationsofnon-gazettedgovernmentemployees,whowentonanindefinitestrike,andalargenumberofteachers,lawyers,businessmenandothersectionsofthemiddleclasses.ToleadthemovementforaseparateTelenganastateinanorganizedmanner,theTelenganaPraja

Samiti(TPS)wassoonformed.AlargenumberofdisgruntledanddissidentCongressleadersjoinedtheTPSandoccupiedadominantpositioninit.AllthemajornationalpartiesopposedthedemandforaseparateTelenganastate;thetwoCommunistpartieslookeduponitasaneffortofthevestedintereststomisguideandmisdirectpopularangeragainstthelandlord-bourgeoissystem.AlargenumberoflocalleadersofSwatantra,SamyuktaSocialistPartyandJanSangh,however,supportedthedemand.IndiraGandhiandthecentralCongressleadershipstronglyresistedthedemandthough;tryingtoplayamediatoryrole,theyurgedtheAndhragovernmenttoadoptasympatheticattitudetowardsTelengana’seconomicdemandsandtoredressitsgrievances.

Becauseofthecentralgovernment’sfirmoppositiontothebreak-upofthestate,thefailureofthemovementtomobilizethepeasantry,andtheinevitablefatiguefromwhichanymassmovementsuffersifitisnotabletoachievesuccesswhenitisatitsheight,themovementforseparateTelenganabegantolosesteamandtopeteroutafterthesummerof1969.InJuly,theeconomicallyhard-pressednon-gazettedemployeescalledofftheirstrike.ThestudentstoowentbacktotheirstudiesbeforetheexaminationstobeheldinDecember1969.StilltheTPSsucceededinwinning10outof14Telenganaseatsinthe1971electionstotheLokSabha.Afterthe1971elections,acompromisewasworkedoutundertheaegisofthecentralgovernment,

underwhichtheMulkiRulesweretocontinueandaTelenganaregionalcommitteewithstatutorypowerswastobeformed.Thecompromisesatisfiedthedisgruntledmiddle-classyouth.TheTPSmergedwithCongressinSeptember1971afterBrahmanandReddy,thechiefminister,resignedandwasreplacedbyP.V.NarasimhaRaofromTelengana.Itwas,however,nowtheturnofthemiddleclassesoftheAndhraregiontoexpressanger.Theywere

convincedthattheMulkiRules,however,muchamended,wouldadverselyaffectrecruitmentofAndhranstostateservices.ThepoliticalstormbrokewhentheSupremeCourtgaveajudgementinOctober1972sanctioningthecontinuanceofMulkiRules.And,asinthecaseofTelengana,studentsandnon-gazettedemployeesunionstooktheinitiativeinorganizingmeetings,strikesanddemonstrations,whichsometimesturnedviolent,anddemandedtherepealoftheMulkiRulesandotheractsofallegeddiscriminationagainstAndhrangovernmentemployees.Onceagain,doctors,whoarguedthatmedicalfundswerebeingdivertedtoHydrabadcity,lawyers,whowantedaHighCourtintheAndhraregion,andbusinessmen,whoopposedceilingonurbanwealthproposedbythestategovernmentjoinedtheagitation.AnimportantdifferencefromTelenganaagitationwasthatthebiglandownersandrichpeasants,too,tookanactivepartintheagitationbecausetheywereopposedtothelandceilinglegislationpassedbythestatelegislatureinSeptember1972.Theprimeministerannouncedacompromiseformulaon27November,accordingtowhichtheMulki

RuleswouldbefurthermodifiedandwouldcontinueinHyderabadcitytilltheendof1977andtherestofTelenganatilltheendof1980.TheformulawasseenasfavourabletoTelenganaandtheAndhranagitationnowturnedagainstboththecentralgovernmentandtheconceptofunitedAndhraPradesh.On7December,theAndhranon-gazettedemployeeswentonanindefinitestrike.EncouragedbySwatantra,JanSanghandsomeindependents,theagitatorsnowdemandedthecreationofaseparatestateforAndhraregion.OnceagainthedemandfordivisionofthestatewasfirmlyopposedbytheCommunists,withtheresultthatmostofthetradeunionsandKisanSabhaorganizationsstayedawayfromtheagitation.ManyCongressmen,however,supportedit.NinemembersoftheNarasimhaRaoCabinetresignedfromit,thoughothersremainedintegrationists.Themovementturnedviolentinmanyplaceswithattacksontherailwaysandothercentralgovernmentpropertyandclasheswiththepolice.TheCentralReservePoliceandthearmyhadtobebroughtinatmanyplaces.OnceagainIndiraGandhitookafirmstandinfavourofaunitedAndhraPradesh.On21Decemberthe

LokSabhapassedtheMulkiRulesBill.On17January1973,sheaskedNarasimhaRaotoresignandthenimposedPresident’sRuleinthestate.Thesituationwasgraduallybroughtundercontrol.Facedwithadeterminedcentralgovernmentandas‘agitationfatigue’setin,theseparatistmovementsubsided,especiallyasitcouldnotmobilizethemassofthepeasantryandtheworkingclass.Moreover,the

epicentreofthemovementremainedinthecoastaldistricts.ThoughRayalaseemaregionwasopposedtoMulkiRulesitdidnotfeelstronglyaboutthedemandforaseparatestate.AsinthecaseoftheupsurgeinTelengana,non-gazettedgovernmentemployeescalledofftheirstrikeinMarchandthestudentstooreturnedtotheirclasses.Finally,inSeptember,thecentralgovernmentputforwardasix-pointformulawhichdidawaywithMulkiRulesbutextendedpreferenceinemploymentandeducationtoalldistrictsandregionsofthestateoveroutsiders.The32ndConstitutionalAmendmentwaspassedtoenabletheimplementationoftheformula.ThissatisfiedmostoftheCongressmenofthetworegions.InDecember,President’sRulewasliftedandJ.VengalRao,whobecametheconsensuschiefministerwasaskedtoimplementthenewformula.Thereafter,thedemandfordivisionofthestategraduallypeteredoutinbothpartsofAndhraPradesh,thoughJanSanghandlaterBJPadopteditasapartoftheirprogramme.IncaseofbothTelenganaandAndhraregions,thecentralgovernmentfirmlyandsuccessfullyopposed

thedemandforbifurcationofthestateasitwasapprehensiveofsimilardemandsbeingraisedinotherpartsofthecountry.Atthesametime,whatmadeitpossibleintheendtoaccommodatethetworegionaldemandsinAndhrawasthefactthattheywereentirelyeconomicanddidnotinvolvecommunalorculturaldifferences.Anotherlessonlearntfromthetwomovementswasthatitisnecessarynotonlytoalleviateeconomicdisparitiesbetweendifferentstatesbutalsotopromoteintegrateddevelopmentwithinastateandthatmerelinguisticandculturalunitywasnotenoughtoinculcateafeelingofonenessandsolidarityamongastate’speople.

TurmoilinAssam

IntermsofpopulationAssamisasmallstate.PoliticalturmoilrackedthestateforyearsbecauseitspeoplefearedtheweakeningorlossoftheiridentityasAssamese.Atnostage,however,didtheirpoliticstakeasecessionistturn.Severalcomponentsconstitutedthisfear,shapingthenatureofdemandsmadeandmovementlaunched.(i)TheAssamesehadastrongandpersistentgrievancethatthesevereunderdevelopmentofAssam

wasduetounfairtreatmentbeingmetedouttoitbythecentralgovernment,whichhadnotonlyneglecteditsdevelopmentbutalsodiscriminatedagainstitinallocationofcentralfundsandlocationofindustrialandothereconomicenterprises.Muchworse,theCentrewasseenashavingdeprivedAssamofitsdueshareofrevenuesfromitscrudeoilandteaandplywoodindustries.Assam’srevenueshadbeenpumpedoutandutilizedelsewhereinthecountry.Assam’seconomicbackwardnesswasalsoascribedtocontrolofitseconomyandresources,particularlytheproductionandsaleofitstea,plywoodandothercommoditiesbyoutsiders,mostlyMarwarisandBengalis.Moreover,thelabourforceintea,plywoodandotherindustrieswasalsomostlynon-Assamese.Severaltimessinceindependence,Assamwitnessedprotestmovements.Thereweredemandsfora

greatershareforAssamintherevenuesderivedfromteaandplywoodindustries,ahigherroyaltyforitscrudeoil,largercentralfinancialgrantsandplanallocation,locationofoilrefineriesinAssam,constructionofmorebridgesovertheBrahmaputrariver,upgradingofrailwaylinkbetweenAssamandtherestofIndia,greatereffortatindustrializationofthestatebyboththestateandthecentralgovernments,andgreateremploymentofAssameseincentralgovernmentservicesandpublicsectorenterpriseslocatedinthestate.

(ii)Forhistoricalreasons,whichwedonothavethespacetodiscusshere,throughoutthecolonialperiodandforseveralyearsafterindependence,BengalissettledinAssamoccupiedadominantpositioningovernmentservices,inteachingandothermodernprofessionsandinhigherpostsinpublicandprivatesectors.Beingmorebackwardineducation,theAssamese-speakingyouthfeltdisadvantagedincompetitionwiththeBengali-speakingmiddleclassesforjobs.TherewasalsoastrongfeelingamongtheAssamesespeakersthatBengalipredominanceineducationandmiddle-classjobsalsoposedathreattotheAssameselanguageandculture.Thelackofjobopportunities,the‘outsiders’significantroleinAssam’sindustryandtrade,andthefear

ofbeingculturallydominatedproducedasenseofdeprivationinthemindsofmiddle-classAssamese.TheystartedamovementinthefiftiesdemandingpreferenceforAssamesespeakersinrecruitmenttostategovernmentservicesandmakingAssamesethesoleofficiallanguageandmediumofinstructioninschoolsandcolleges.TheBengaliswhoformedamajorityinCachardistrictandhadalargepresenceintherestofAssamfeltthatthepractice,initiatedin1871,ofhavingbothAssameseandBengaliasofficiallanguagesshouldcontinue.Themovementforachangeintheofficiallanguageledtothegradualbuildingupofhostilitybetween

theBengaliandAssamesespeakers.InJuly1960,iteruptedintragiclanguageriots.Bengaliswereattackedenmasseinbothurbanandruralareas,theirhouseswerelootedandsetonfire.AlargenumberofBengalishadtotakeshelterinCacharandBengal.Thisledtoacounter-agitationinCacharandanangry,sometimeschauvinist,reactioninWestBengal.Verysoon,in1960itself,thestateassemblypassedalaw,againstthewishesofBengalispeakersand

manytribalgroups,makingAssamesethesoleofficiallanguage,thoughBengaliremainedtheadditionalofficiallanguageinCachar.In1972,AssamesewasmadethesolemediumofinstructionalsoincollegesaffiliatedtoGuwahatiUniversity.ThisefforttoimposetheAssameselanguagebecameoneofthefactorswhichhamperedtheprocessof

evolutionoftheAssameseidentity,preventeditfromencompassingtheentirestateandledtomanyofthehilltribestodemandseparationfromAssam.(iii)Overtheyears,thedemographicprofileofAssamunderwentachangeasaresultofmigration

fromotherpartsofIndiaand,aboveall,fromEastBengal-Bangladesh.However,themaingrievancethatwastodevelopintoamassiveanti-foreignersmovementin1979,wasthelargescaleillegalmigrationinarelativelyshortspanoftimefromBangladeshandtosomeextentfromNepal.MigrationofoutsidersintoAssamhasalonghistory.TheBritishadministrationhadencouraged

migrationofthousandsofBiharistoworkonthetea-plantationsandofhundredsofthousandsofBengalipeasantstosettleonthevastuncultivatedtractsofAssam.Tillrecently,AssameselandlordshadwelcomedthehardworkingBengalitenantsinthesparselypopulatedAssam.Between1939and1947MuslimcommunalistsencouragedBengaliMuslimmigrationtocreateabetterbargainingpositionincaseofpartitionofIndia.Partitionledtoalarge-scalerefugeeinfluxfromPakistaniBengalintoAssambesidesWestBengalandTripura.In1971,afterthePakistanicrackdowninEastBengal,morethanonemillionrefugeessoughtshelterinAssam.MostofthemwentbackafterthecreationofBangladesh,butnearly100,000remained.After1971,thereoccurredafresh,continuousandlarge-scaleinfluxofland-hungryBangladeshipeasantsintoAssam.ButlandinAssamhadbynowbecomescarce,andAssamesepeasantsandtribalsfearedlossoftheirholdings.However,thisdemographictransformationgenerated

thefeelingoflinguistic,culturalandpoliticalinsecurity,thatoverwhelmedtheAssameseandimpartedastrongemotionalcontenttotheirmovementagainstillegalmigrantsintheeighties.Sincethelatenineteenthcenturyandespeciallyafterindependence,acertainculturalrenaissancehad

takenplaceenhancingpeople’sprideinlanguage,culture,literature,folkartandmusicinAssam.EvenwhilebecomingapartoftheIndiannation-in-the-making,adistinctAssameselinguisticandculturalidentityhademerged.Theprocesswasacomplexone,giventhestate’scultural,linguisticandreligiousdiversity.ManyAssamesefeltthatthedevelopmentandconsolidationofawiderAssameseidentity,bythegradualassimilationofAssamesetribes,waspreventedbythecentralgovernment’sdecisiontoseparatelargetribalareasfromAssamandcreatesmallnon-viablestatessuchasMeghalaya,Nagaland,MizoramandArunachalPradesh.ThedemographictransformationofAssamcreatedapprehensionamongmanyAssamesethatthe

swampingofAssambyforeignersandnon-AssameseIndianswouldleadtotheAssamesebeingreducedtoaminorityintheirownlandandconsequentlytothesubordinationoftheirlanguageandculture,lossofcontrolovertheireconomyandpolitics,and,intheend,thelossoftheirveryidentityandindividualityasapeople.Therewasundoubtedlyabasisforthesefears.In1971,Assamese-speakingpersonsconstitutedonly59

percentofAssam’spopulation.ThispercentagecoveredalargenumberofBengalispeakers,manyofwhomhadinthecourseoftimeandasaresultofgenerationalchangealsolearntAssameseandhadgiventhecensus-enumeratorsAssameseastheirmothertonguebecauseofpurepoliticalexpediency.Moreover,AssamesespeakerslackedamajorityinGuwahatiandseveralothertowns,whicharethemainhabitatofliterature,thePress,culture,moderneconomyandpolitics.Thoughillegalmigrationhadsurfacedasapoliticalmatterseveraltimessince1950,itburstasamajor

issuein1979whenitbecameclearthatalargenumberofillegalimmigrantsfromBangladeshhadbecomevotersinthestate.AfraidoftheiracquiringadominantroleinAssam’spoliticsthroughthecomingelectionattheendof1979,theAllAssamStudentsUnion(AASU)andtheAssamGanaSangramParishad(AssamPeople’sStruggleCouncil),acoalitionofregionalpolitical,literaryandculturalassociations,startedamassive,anti-illegalmigrationmovement.ThiscampaignwonthesupportofvirtuallyallsectionsofAssamesespeakers,HinduorMuslim,andmanyBengalis.Theleadersofthemovementclaimedthatthenumberofillegalalienswasashighas31to34percent

ofthestate’stotalpopulation.They,therefore,askedthecentralgovernmenttosealAssam’sborderstopreventfurtherinflowofmigrants,toidentifyallillegalaliensanddeletetheirnamesfromthevoterslistandtopostponeelectionstillthiswasdone,andtodeportordispersetootherpartsofIndiaallthosewhohadenteredthestateafter1961.Sostrongwasthepopularsupporttothemovementthatelectionscouldnotbeheldinfourteenoutofsixteenparliamentaryconstituencies.Theyearsfrom1979to1985witnessedpoliticalinstabilityinthestate,collapseofstategovernments,

impositionofPresident’sRule,sustained,oftenviolent,agitation,frequentgeneralstrikes,civildisobediencecampaignswhichparalyzedallnormallifeforprolongedperiods,andunprecedentedethnicviolence.Forseveralyearstherewererepeatedroundsofnegotiationsbetweentheleadersofthemovementandthecentralgovernment,butnoagreementcouldbereached.Itwasnoteasytodeterminewhoweretheillegalaliensor‘foreigners’orhowtogoaboutdetectingordeportingthem.Therewasalsolackofgoodwillandtrustbetweenthetwosides.

Thecentralgovernment’sefforttoholdaconstitutionallymandatedelectiontothestateassemblyin1983ledtoitsneartotalboycott,acompletebreakdownoforder,andtheworstkillingssince1947onthebasisoftriballinguisticandcommunalidentities.Nearly3,000peoplediedinstate-wideviolence.Theelectionprovedtobeacompletefailurewithlessthan2percentofthevoterscastingtheirvotesintheconstituencieswithAssamesemajority.TheCongresspartydidformthegovernment,butithadnolegitimacyatall.The1983violencehadatraumaticeffectonbothsideswhichonceagainresumednegotiationsin

earnest.Finally,theRajivGandhigovernmentwasabletosignanaccordwiththeleadersofthemovementon15August1985.AllthoseforeignerswhohadenteredAssambetween1951and1961weretobegivenfullcitizenship,includingtherighttovote;thosewhohaddonesoafter1971weretobedeported;theentrantsbetween1961and1971weretobedeniedvotingrightsfortenyearsbutwouldenjoyallotherrightsofcitizenship.AparallelpackagefortheeconomicdevelopmentofAssam,includingasecondoilrefinery,apapermillandaninstituteoftechnology,wasalsoworkedout.Thecentralgovernmentalsopromisedtoprovide‘legislativeandadministrativesafeguardstoprotectthecultural,social,andlinguisticidentityandheritage’oftheAssamesepeople.Thetaskofrevisingtheelectoralrollsonthebasisoftheagreementwasnowtakenupinearnest.The

existingassemblywasdissolvedandfreshelectronsheldinDecember1985.Anewparty,AssamGanaParishad(AGP),formedbytheleadersoftheanti-foreignersmovement,waselectedtopower,winning64ofthe126assemblyseats.PrafullaMahanta,anAASUleader,becameattheageofthirty-twotheyoungestchiefministerofindependentIndia.ExtremeandprolongedpoliticalturbulenceinAssamended,thoughfreshinsurgenciesweretocomeuplateron,forexamplethatoftheBodotribesforaseparatestateandofthesecessionistUnitedLiberationFrontofAssam(ULFA).ExperienceinAssamsince1985hasshownthatwhileitwasandisnecessarytostoptheentryof

foreigners,massivedetectionanddeportationoftheexistingillegalentrantshasnotbeeneasyandperhapswasnotpossible.Expulsionofoldorrecentminoritiesofalltypeswasnottheanswer.RathertheirgradualintegrationandassimilationintotheAssameseidentitywastheonlylong-termandrealisticsolution.Chauvinism,whetherintheformoftheirexclusionortheirforcefuleliminationwouldonlydisturbandweakenthehistoricalprocessofAssameseidentity-in-the-making.ItisnoteworthythattheAssamanti-foreignersmovementwasnotcommunalorsecessionistor

disruptiveofthenationinanyotherform.Itwasthereforepossibleforthecentralgovernmentandtheall-Indiapoliticalpartiestonegotiateandaccommodateitsdemands,eventhoughtheyweresometimesexaggeratedandunrealistic.TherewereelementsintheAssammovement,suchasRSS,whichwantedtogiveitacommunaltwist

becausemostoftheillegalalienswereMuslims.Similarly,someotherswantedtogivethemovementachauvinist,xenophobic,Assamesecolour.Themovement,however,succeededinavoidingboththeseeventualitiesbecauseofthenon-communalculturaltraditionoftheAssamese,theroleofthenationalpartiessuchastheCPI,CPMandlargepartsofCongress,andthewidebaseofthemovementandleadershipamongAssameseMuslimsandBengalis.Undoubtedly,themovementsufferedfrommanyweaknesses;but,then,nomovementisgeneratedanddevelopsaccordingtoablue-print.TheconflictinAssamanditsresolutionagainshowedthatwhilecommunalandsecessionist

movementsdisruptiveofthenationcannotbeaccommodatedandhavetobeopposedanddefeated,itis

quitepossibleand,infact,necessarytoaccommodatepoliticsofidentitybasedonlanguageorculture,oreconomicdeprivationandinequality,fortheyarequitecompatiblewithprogressiveandsecularnationalism.

23PoliticsintheStates(II):WestBengalandJammuandKashmir

WestBengalpresentsthecaseofaCommunistgovernmentthatcametopowerthroughtheparliamentaryprocessandhasfunctionedaccordingtotherulesofademocraticandcivillibertarianpolityandunderconditionsofacapitalisteconomy,thoughwiththepresenceofastrongpublicsector.Thisgovernmenthasruledthestateforovertwentyyears,winningfivestateelectionssofarinarow,andgivenpeopleonthewholeaneffective,reformistgovernment.TheCongressgovernmentinBengalhadnotperformedbadlytilltheearlysixties.Despitedislocation

anddisruptionoftheeconomyduetothepartitionofBengalandtherefugeeinfluxofoverfourmillioncomingfromEastBengaltill1965,thegovernmenthadbeenabletoprovideeconomicstability.WestBengalhadmaintaineditspositionforindustryinthehierarchyofstates.Therewasmarkedprogressinthepublichealthprogramme,electricitygenerationandroadconstruction.Thegovernment,however,hadfailedontwomajorfronts;unemploymentamongtheeducatedandtherurallandlessgrewcontinuously,and,whilethezamindarisystemhadbeenabolished,thepoweroftheintermediaryjotedarsandlandlordsoversharecroppersandtenantswasnotcurbed.

PoliticalMobilizationandtheCPI/CPM

Since1930theCommunistpartyhadenjoyedsignificantsupportamongintellectualandworkersinCalcutta,anditemergedasamajorpoliticalforceinBengalby1947.TheunitedCPIinthefiftiesandCPMinthesixtiesandseventiesorganizedalargenumberofmassmovementsandtrade-unionstruggles,includinggheraosduring1967-69,andcombinedthemwithaneffectiveuseofthelegislatureto‘exposethegovernment’smisdeeds.’AsaresulttherewasasteadygrowthoftheunitedCPIandlaterCPM,bothelectorallyandorganizationally.Congresswasdefeatedinthestateelectionsof1967and1969andUnitedFrontgovernmentsledbybreakawaygroupsfromCongressandwithCPMparticipationwereformed.BothUnitedFrontgovernmentsbrokeupbecauseofinternalcontradictionsbuttheyaddedtoCPM’spopularity.DuringtheseyearsCPMwasalsoabletoorganizemassiveagrarianmovementsofthetenantsandsharecroppersandthusextenditspoliticalbasetoruralareas.Duringthedecadeof1967-77,WestBengalwitnessedincreasingviolenceandchaos,acrisisof

governability,heightenedfactionalismandsplitsinCongress,whichruledthestatedirectlyorthroughPresident’sRulefrom1969to1977.Unprecedentedlevelsofstaterepressionwereespeciallydirected-againsttheNaxalitesandthemovementsoftheruralpoor.IntheendCPM’spopularity,combinedwiththemassreactionagainsttheEmergency,wastransformedintoanelectoralvictoryin1977,andCPM,alongwithitsleftallies,wasabletoformthegovernment,SincethenCPMhasfurtherconsolidateditspowerandentrencheditself,especiallyamongthepeasantry.Ithassucceededinmaintainingtheleftcoalitionaswellascontrolofthegovernmentduringthelasttwenty-sevenyears,andthroughfiveassemblyelections.

CPM:RecordofSuccesses

TwosignificantachievementsoftheCPMareworthyofanalysis,intermsofimprovingtheconditionsoftheruralpoor.Thefirstonehasbeeninthefieldoflandreformorrathertenancyreform.ThoughtheCongressgovernmenthaddoneawaywiththezamindarisysteminthefiftiesithadallowedtwoaberrations:jotedars(intermediariesforrentcollectionbetweenzamindarsandsharecropperswhoweretheactualcultivators)werepermittedtostay,andmanylargelandownersallowedtoretainabove-ceilinglandthroughbenamitransactions.AftercomingtopowerCPMlaunchedtheprogrammecalled‘OperationBarga’(discussedindetailin

chapter28)whichreformedthetenancysystemintheinterestsofthebargadars(sharecroppers),whoconstitutednearly25percentoftheruralhouseholds.Fordecades,sharecroppershadsufferedfromthetwoillsof(1)insecurityoftenure,fortheirtenancywasnotregistered,thoughlawprovidedforpermanencyoftenure,and(2)high,illegallevelsoftheshareofthecropstheyhadtogivetojotedarsasrent.ThroughOperationBarga,whichincludedpoliticizationandmobilizationofsharecroppersbythepartyandpeasantorganizations,thegovernmentsecuredlegalregistrationofthesharecroppers,thusgivingthempermanentleaseofthelandtheycultivatedandsecurityoftenure,andenforcedlawsregardingtheshareoftheproducetheycouldretain,thusimprovingtheirincome.Thedecisiontodrasticallyreformthejotedarisystemintheinterestsofthesharecroppersbutnotendit

intotowasabrilliantpoliticaltactic.Jotedarswereofallsizes.Thesmallandmiddle-sizedjotedarswerelargeinnumber.Moreover,manyofthemweresimultaneouslycultivatorsontheirownlandasrichandmiddlepeasants.Someofthemwerepettyshopkeepersinvillagesandteachers,clerks,chaprasis,etc.,intownsandcities.Assuch,intermsofbothsociopoliticalpowerandelectoralcloutandtheinterestsofincreasedagriculturalproductiontheymattered—theycouldnotbetotallyantagonized.Theireconomicpowerandincomecouldbelimitedbyreducingtheircrop-shareandgivingpermanencyoftenuretosharecroppers,buttheirrent-shareandthereforeincomeandownershipoflandcouldnotbecompletelyabolished.Afterall,electionscanbewononlybyabroadcoalition,i.e.,onthebasisofbroad-basedpoliticalsupport,whichwouldhavetoinclude,andatleastnotpermanentlyandcompletelyalienate,asignificantsectionofruralsociety,consistingofsmalljotedars,whoalsohappenedtoberichandmiddlepeasantsandsmallshopkeepers.Thisstratawas,moreover,capableofpoliticallyinfluencingandmobilizingalargenumberofsmallpeasantsandtheruralandurbanlower-middleclasses.Thepartythereforetreatedonlythelargeandabsenteelandownersaspermanent‘class-enemies’.Significantly,reformofthejotedarisystemprovidedtheincentivetoallconcernedtoincrease

production.ItbecameacontributoryfactorintheusheringinoftheGreenRevolutionandmulti-cropping,leadingtoincreaseinincomeofbothsharecroppersandjotedars.Italsoenabledthosejotedarswhowerecultivatorstoconcentrateonincreasingproduction.Forpoliticalandadministrativereasons,theCPMgovernmenttookupthetasksofunearthingbenami

above-ceilinglandanditsdistributiontothelandlesswithgreatcaution,spreadoverseveralyears,lesttherichpeasantswentoverenbloctotheOpposition.Thegovernmentsupplementedtenancyandlandreformmeasureswithprogrammesforprovidingcheapcredittosharecroppersandsmallpeasants,savingtheminthebargainfromtheclutchesofthemoneylenders.TheCongressgovernmentattheCentrehadevolvedseveralschemesforprovidingsubsidizedlowinterestloansthroughnationalizedandcooperativebankstopeasantsandspeciallytolandlesslabourersandsmallpeasantsforinvestmentin

GreenRevolutiontechnologies.TheWestBengalstategovernmentwasoneofthefewwhichsuccessfullyimplementedtheseschemeswiththehelpofpanchayatsandpartyandpeasants’organizations.ThesecondmajorachievementoftheWestBengalgovernmenthasbeenitsrestructuringand

transformationofthePanchayatiRajinstitutions,throughwhichtheruralpoor,themiddlepeasantsandtheruralintelligentsiawereempowered,orenabledtoshareinpoliticalpoweratthelocallevel.ThePanchayatRajexperimentofthesixtieshadfailedinWestBengalasalsoinwholeofIndia

becauseofthedominationofitsvillage,talukaanddistrictinstitutionsbytheeconomicallyorsociallyprivilegedsectionsofruralsocietyandbythelocalanddistrictbureaucracy.Ithadyieldednobenefitstoweakersections.TheCPMgovernmentandthepartyoustedthelargelandownersandotherdominantsocialgroupsfrom

thePanchayatiRajinstitutions—district-levelzillaparishads,block-levelpanchayatisamitisandvillage-levelgrampanchayats—involvedtherurallowerandlower-middleclasses,teachers,andsocialandpoliticalworkers,broughtthebureaucracyundertheircontrol,andstrengthenedtheirauthorityandfinancialresources.Inaddition,theCPMgovernmenttookseveralotherstepstoimprovethesocialconditionofthe

landless.Itsrecordofimplementingcentrallyfinancedanti-povertyandemploymentgeneratingschemeswasnotunblemishedbutwasbetterthanthatofotherstates.The‘FoodforWork’programmeinparticularwasimplementedeffectivelytogeneratejobsforthelandless.Moreover,theWestBengalgovernmenttookupprojects,suchasroadconstruction,drainageandcleansingofirrigationchannelsandvillagetankswhichweremeaningfulfromthepointofviewofthelowerclassesinthevillagesandtriedtoimplementthemthroughthereformedPanchayatiRajinstitutionssothattheopportunitiesforcorruptionweredrasticallyreduced.CPMalsospeededuptheorganizationofagriculturallabourersandregularlyorganizedmassstruggle

forhigherwages.Interestingly,ratherthanconcentrateontakingawaylandfromrichpeasants,anddistributeitamongtheagriculturallabourersandthusequalizelandownership,CPMconcentratedonenhancingthelatter’scapacitytostruggleforhigherwages.ThesuccessoftheGreenRevolutionstrategyandmulti-croppingalsoresultedingreateremploymentaswellasincreaseinwagesinthecountrysidethroughouttheeightiesandnineties.TheCPMgovernment’srecordincontainingcommunalviolencehasbeenoneofthebestinthecountry.

DespitehavingahighratioofMuslimsinthepopulationandthelargeinfluxofHindurefugeesfromEastBengal,WestBengalremainedrelativelyfreeofcommunalviolence.In1984,itsuccessfullycontainedthecommunalfalloutofIndiraGandhi’sassassinationandinDecember1992oftheBabriMosque’sdemolition.TheCPMalsodidnotpermitthegrowthofcasteismandcasteviolenceinWestBengal.In1986,theGorkhaNationalLibrationFront(GNLF)organizedundertheleadershipofSubhash

Gheising,amilitant,oftenviolent,agitationinthehilldistrictofDarjeelinginWestBengalaroundthedemandforaseparateGorkhastate.FollowingnegotiationsbetweenGNLFandthecentralandstategovernments,atripartiteaccordwassignedinCalcuttainAugust1988,underwhichthesemi-autonomousDarjeelingGorkhaHillCouncil,withinthestateofWestBengal,cameintobeing.TheCouncilhadwidecontroloverfinance,education,health,agricultureandeconomicdevelopment.Overall,CPMhassucceededingivingWestBengalamoderatelyeffectiveandonthewholenon-

corrupt,andrelativelyviolence-freegovernment,especiallyinruralareas.Ithasalsohelditsalliance

withothersmallerleftparties,i.e.,CPI,RevolutionarySocialistPartyandForwardBloc.Theworstofpovertyandnakedoppressionbythedominantclassesinruralareashasbeenmitigatedinsomemeasure.CPMhasalsosuccessfullycheckedandevenreversedtheroleofthepoliceandlowerbureaucracyasthetoolsoftheruralrichandastheoppressorsandexploitersoftheruralpoor.ThesupportoftheruralpooristhereasonwhythepartyhasremainedinpowerinWestBengalforaslongasithas.

ProblemAreas

TheurbansectorandthefieldofindustrialdevelopmenthaveemergedasthevulnerableareasoftheCPMgovernment.Unlikeinthecountryside,ithasbeenunabletofindsuitablestructuresorformstoworkproperlytheinstitutionsthroughwhichcivicproblemscouldbesolvedandtheurbanpeopleinvolvedincivicaffairs.TherehasbeennoreplicaofPanchayatiRajinthecities.Before1977,CPMhadorganizedstrugglesofurbancitizensforhigherwagesandsalariesandcheaperurbanfacilitiessuchastransport.ThesestrugglescouldobviouslynotcontinueforlongunderaCPMadministration.Consequently,thedeteriorationintheurbaninfrastructuralfacilitiesaswellasinthequalityoflifethatbeganunderCongressrulehascontinuedunderCPMruleinmostofWestBengal’stownsandcities.ButthemostimportantweaknessoftheCPMgovernmenthasbeenthefailuretodevelopindustryand

tradebecauseoftheabsenceofanytheoryorstrategyofeconomicdevelopment,ofindustrialization,oflarge-scalecreationofjobsinasituationwhereastateisruledbyaCommunistpartywhilethecountryasawholeisnot.Therecanbenoremovalofpoverty,orlong-termimprovementinthelivingconditionsofthemassofrurallandless,orlarge-scaleredistributionofwealth,orameaningfuldentintheburgeoningurbanandruralunemploymentwithoutrapidindustrializationandsignificantoveralleconomicdevelopmentandtheresultantcreationofjobsinindustry,tradeandservices.ThisisparticularlytrueofWestBengalwherethelandlessandmarginalfarmersconstitutenearlyhalf

theruralpopulationwhocannotbeabsorbedonanysignificantscaleinagriculture.Buthowcanthiseconomicdevelopmentbeintegratedwiththesocialistorientationofthegovernmentandtherulingparty?TheCPMdidnotevenundertaketofindananswertothispressingissue,whattospeakoftakingupthetask.Large-scaleflightofcapitalfromWestBengalhadtakenplaceduring1967-1975asaresultofnear

administrativeanarchy,gheraosandbandhsandlabourmilitancy.Aftercomingtopowerin1977,theCPMdidtrytodealwiththeproblemofcapitalistinvestmentinthestateinapragmaticmanner.Itbegantorestrainlabourmilitancy,somuchso,thatinafewyearsWestBengalcametohavemoreindustrialpeacethanmostotherpartsofthecountry.WestBengalunderCPMdisplayedoneofthebestrecordsinthemaintenanceoflawandorder.TheCPMnolongerthreatenedproperty-owners;onthecontrarythegovernmentbeganofferingnumerousincentivestocapitalists,bothIndianandforeign,toinvestinWestBengal.ButthecapitalistsdidnotrespondandwerenotinclinedtocomebacktoWestBengalandtomakefreshinvestmentsthereinthefieldofindustrialactivity.Animportantreasonforthecapitalists’stayingawayfromthestatehasbeenlackofworkcultureand

accountability,amalaisethathasbeendifficulttocure.Therealproblem,however,hasbeenthatthepotentialinvestorsarenotwillingtotrustaCommunistgovernmentandaCommunistparty.Mostofthembelievethattheleopardcandisguiseitsspotsbutnotchangeitsnature.Theproblemisintractableandtheparty’sdilemmaisinherentinasituationwhereitiscommittedtotheabolitionofcapitalism,however

gradually,andhasacquiredpartialandlimitedpowerinastateoftheunion.Thisdifficultycouldhavebeenforeseen.TheCPM,however,failedtotakecognizanceoftheproblemandlookforinnovativesolutionssuitedto

thecircumstancesinwhichtheywererulinginWestBengal.Thiswasinpartbecausethepartyassumedthatitsrulewouldnotlastlong,asitwouldbeoverthrownbythecentralgovernment.Thepartywould,therefore,useitsshort-livedpowerto‘unleash’popular,revolutionaryforcesbyfreeingthemfromthefearofpoliceandbureaucracy,holdthefortinWestBengalandKeralaforashortperiodandwaitfortherestofIndiatocatchupwiththem.Socialdevelopmentingeneral,andeconomicdevelopmentinparticular,wouldhavetowaittillanall-Indiarevolutiontookplace.AsJyotiBasu,chiefministerofWestBengalputitaslateas1985:‘Theaimofourprogrammesistoalleviatethesufferingsoftheruralandurbanpeopleandtoimprovetheirconditionstoacertainextent.Wedonotclaimanythingmore,asweareawarethatwithoutstructuralchangesinthesocio-economicorderitishardlypossibletobringaboutanybasicchangeintheconditionsofthepeople.’1Inotherwords,socialandeconomicdevelopmentwasnotandcouldnotbeontheCPMagendainWestBengal.WhatCPMdidnotforeseewasthatif,bychance,itcontinuedtorulefordecadesthenitwouldhaveto

dealwithproblemsofurbandecay,ruralpoverty,andgrowingunemploymentamongtheeducatedyouth,bothincitiesandvillages,andtherurallandless.Allthiswouldrequirehighratesofeconomicgrowthunderconditionswhereitwouldnotbepossibletorelyuponcapitaliststoundertakethetask.Therealproblemhas,therefore,beenoftheCPM’sfailingtoevolveanalternativestrategyofdevelopmentonthebasisofthestateandcooperativesectors,aidedbysmallandmediumentrepreneurs.ThatitisnotaproblemonlyofWestBengalbutofeconomicdevelopmentunderandbyaCommuniststategovernmentisborneoutbysimilareconomicstagnationinKerala.Perhaps,thefailuretoinnovatetheoreticallyandstrategicallygoesfurther.CPMhasnowfunctionedas

apoliticalpartywithintheframeworkofademocraticpolityandacapitalisteconomicsystemsince1964.IthasheldpoliticalpowerinWestBengalcontinuouslysince1977andoffandoninKeralasince1957.ItalsonolongerlooksuponparliamentarydemocracyasabourgeoisployortheIndianConstitutionasahoaxtobeattackedandexposed.InsteaditdefendstheConstitution,thefundamentalrightsembodiedinit,anditsdemocraticinstitutionsfromattacksbyanti-democraticforces.Itonlyarguesthattheexistingdemocracyshouldbefurtherdeepenedbothpoliticallyandsociallyandeconomically.Itspoliticalpracticehasbeendescribedbyasympatheticpoliticalscientist,AtulKohli,associaldemocraticandreformistinorientation.2

Butperhapsthatiswhereliesthecrunch.CPM’sreformismandsocialdemocratismhavebeenpragmaticandnotarrivedattheoretically.Thepartyhasrefusedtotheoreticallyanalyseitsownpoliticalpracticesandtothenadvancefurtheronthatbasis.CPMhasalsofailedtoanalysetheimplicationsofitspoliticsforitsorganizationalstructureandthen

tomakeinnovationsinthisregard.Undoubtedly,itscentralizedanddisciplineddemocratic-centralismpartystructurehelpeditwithstandstaterepression,toacquirepoliticalpower,and,toacertainextent,implementitsagrarianpolicies.But,clearly,thispartystructurehasnowbecomeadrag.Ittendstopromotemonopolizationofpowerbythepartycadresothatthepeoplestartdependingonittogeteverythingdone.Bureaucratization,patronage,privilege,abuseofpower,andpartisanbehaviourhave

beentakingtollofthepartyanditspopularity.Partycadres,panchayatleadersandtrade-unionfunctionarieshavestarteddevelopingvestedinterestsinperksofpower.Abasicclass-approachandpro-poororientationtogetherwithatightorganizationalstructureenabled

CPMtocometopowerinWestBengalandtoadoptseveralpro-ruralpoormeasures.Butthegovernment’sfailuretoinnovatetheoreticallyandorganizationallyhavecontributedtoitspoliticalstagnation.ItincreasinglyfindsitselfinaCatch-22situation.Asaresultofgrowingunemployment,failuretoarresturbandecay,anddevelopthestate,CPManditsalliedleftpartieshavebeenlosingsupportinthecities,especiallyCalcutta.Thiserosionofsupportisnowspreadingtoruralareas,wherethememoryofOperationBarga,landreformandotherameliorativemeasuresisbeginningtorecede.ForseveralyearsCPMhasbeenwinningelectionsmainlybecauseoftheabsenceofaviablealternativeandthecontinuingloyaltyofthepoor.ButtheOppositionisbeingincreasinglysuccessfulingraduallywhittlingdownitssupport.ThefutureofCPMinWestBengalis,ofcourse,notyetforeclosed.Withitswidepopularityamongthe

commonpeople,especiallyamongtheruralpoor,andastrongbaseinloyalandcommittedpartyworkersandsupporters,ithasthepossibilityofmakingatheoreticalandpoliticalleapforward.Onlytimewilltellwhetheritdoessoornot.ButthereisnodoubtthatitsfutureinWestBengalandtherestofIndiadependsonthishappening.

TheKashmirProblem

KashmirhasbeenanintractableproblemsofarasIndo-Pakrelationsareconcerned.IthasalsoposedaconstantinternalproblemforIndiawithforcesofintegrationwithIndiaandsecessionfromitbeingincontinuousstruggle.AnoverridingfactorinthesituationisthatKashmirhasbecomeovertheyearsasymbolaswellasa

testofIndia’ssecularism.Ifin1947KashmirhadaccededtoPakistan,Indianswouldhaveacceptedthefactwithoutbeingupset.Butonce,asaresultoftheinvasionofKashmirbyPathantribesmenandPakistanitroopsandthepersuasionofitspopularleader,SheikhAbdullah,thestateofJammuandKashmiraccededtoIndia,thesituationbecamedifferent.PakistanclaimedKashmironthegroundthatitwasaMuslim-majoritystate.ThiswasunacceptabletosecularIndia,whichdidnotacceptthetwo-nationtheory.ForIndiathequestionofKashmirbecamenotmerelyoneofretainingasmallpartofitsterritory,itimpingedontheverybasiccharacteroftheIndianstateandsociety.AsNehruandotherIndianleadershadseenclearly,separationofKashmirfromIndiawouldposea

seriousdangertoIndiansecularism.IfKashmirsecededfromIndiaongroundsofreligion,thetwo-nationtheorywouldseemtohavebeenvindicated.ItwouldstrengthentheHinducommunalforcesandposeaseriousthreattomillionsofMuslims,whosenumberinIndiaislargerthaneventhatinPakistan,makingtheirpositioninIndiaquiteuntenable.Thepositionwasgraspedquiteclearlybymanyknowledgeablenon-Indianstoo.Forexample,JosefKorbel,amemberoftheUnitedNationsCommissiononIndiaandPakistan,wrotein1954:

Therealcauseofallthebitternessandbloodshed,allthevenomedspeech,therecalcitranceandthesuspicionthathavecharacterisedtheKashmirdisputeistheuncompromisingandperhapsuncompromisablestruggleoftwowaysoflife,twoconceptsofpoliticalorganization,twoscalesofvalues,twospiritualattitudes,thatfindthemselveslockedindeadlyconflictinwhichKashmirhasbecome

bothsymbolandbattleground.3

ImmediatelyafterKashmir’saccessioninOctober1947,IndiahadofferedaplebisciteunderinternationalauspicesforthepeopleofKashmir,totakeafinaldecisiononit.Buttherewasarider:Pakistan’stroopsmustvacateKashmirbeforeaplebiscitecouldbeheld.Tilltheendof1953,theGovernmentofIndiawaswillingtoabidebytheresultsofaplebisciteifproperconditionswerecreatedforit.Butaplebiscitecouldnotbeheld,partiallybecausePakistanwouldnotwithdrawitsforcesfromPakistan-heldKashmir,andpartiallybecauseIndo-PakrelationsgotenmeshedintheColdWar.During1953-54,theUnitedStatesenteredintoavirtualmilitaryalliancewithPakistan.ThisalsoencouragedPakistantotakeanon-conciliatoryandaggressiveapproachbasedona‘policyofhatred’andanimosity.Bytheendof1956,theIndiangovernmentmadeitcleartoPakistanandtheinternationalcommunity

thatthesituationinKashmirandIndo-PakrelationshiphadchangedsocompletelythatitsearlierofferhadbecomeabsoluteandKashmir’saccessiontoIndiahadbecomeasettledfact.Sincethen,sofarasIndiaisconcerned,Kashmirhasbeenanirrevocablepartofthenation.However,withoutopenlysayingso,Nehruandhissuccessorshavebeenwillingtoacceptthestatusquo,thatis,accepttheceasefirelineorlineofcontrol(LoC)asthepermanentinternationalborder.

SpecialStatusofJammuandKashmir

UndertheInstrumentofAccessionsignedinOctober1947,thestateofJammuandKashmirwasgrantedatemporaryspecialstatusintheIndianunionunderArticle370oftheIndianConstitution.ThestatecededtotheIndianuniononlyindefence,foreignaffairsandcommunications,retainingautonomyinallothermatters.ThestatewaspermittedtohaveaConstituentAssemblyandaConstitutionofitsown,toelectitsownheadofthestatecalledSadr-e-Riyasat,andtoretainitsownflag.Itschiefministerwastobedesignatedasprimeminister.ThisalsomeantthattheIndianConstitution’ssectiononfundamentalrightsdidnotcoverthestate,nordidinstitutionssuchastheSupremeCourt,theElectionCommission,andtheAuditor-Generalhaveanyjurisdictionthere.However,Article370dealtwiththerelationsofthestatewiththeCentreandnotwithitsaccessiontotheunion,whichwascomplete.In1956,theConstituentAssemblyofJammuandKashmirratifiedtheaccessionofthestatetoIndia.

Overtheyears,thestate’sspecialstatuswasconsiderablymodified—onemightevensayliquidated.ThejurisdictionofunioninstitutionssuchastheSupremeCourt,theAuditor-GeneralandtheElectionCommissionandtheconstitutionalprovisionsregardingfundamentalrightshadextendedtothestate.Theparliament’sauthoritytomakelawsforthestateandthePresident’sauthorityoverthestategovernment,includingthepowertoimposePresident’sRule,hadalsobeenextended.Thestate’sserviceswereintegratedwiththecentralandall-Indiaservices.SymbolicofthechangeswerethatinthenomenclatureoftheSadr-e-RiyasattoGovernorandofthestateprimeministertochiefminister.AsizeablesectionofKashmirisresentedthiserosionoftheprovisionsrelatingtothestate’sautonomy.

Ontheotherhand,Article370gavebirthtoapowerfulmovementinJammuregionofthestateforfullaccessiontoIndia,agreatershareforJammuingovernmentservicesandevenforseparationofJammufromKashmir.Themovementsoonacquiredcommunalcolourswiththedangerofthestatebeingdividedonreligiouslines—KashmirbeingMuslimmajorityandJammubeingHindumajority.TheagitationinJammuwasledbyJammuPrajaParishadwhichlatermergedwithJanSangh,whichraisedtheagitationtoall-Indialevel.AnunfortunateeventwasthedeathofJanSanghPresidentShyamaPrasadMookerjee,duetoheartattackinaSrinagarjail,on23June1951.Hehadgonetothestateinviolationofa

governmentorder.ThePrajaParishadagitationplayedintothehandsofcommunalpro-PakistanelementsinKashmir.IttarnishedIndia’ssecularimageandweakenedIndia’scaseonKashmir.ItalsounsettledSheikhAbdullah,andmadehimdoubtthestrengthofIndiansecularism.

ThePoliticsofAbdullah

India’sinternalproblemsinregardtoKashmirbeganwithSheikhAbdullah,amanofremarkablecourageandintegrity,havingamassappeal,butwhowasalsoautocratic,waywardandarbitrary.PressedbycommunalelementsinKashmirValleydemandingmergerwithPakistanandharassedbycommunalistsinJammudemandingfullintegrationwithIndia,Abdullahbegantoveertowardsseparation.ExaggeratingthestrengthofcommunalforcesandtheweaknessofsecularisminIndia,heincreasinglytalkedofthelimitedcharacteroftheaccessionofthestatetoIndiaandof‘full’autonomyforthestate.HeevenhintedatKashmir’sindependencetobeachievedwiththehelpoftheUSandotherforeignpowers.HealsobegantoappealtocommunalsentimentsamongKashmiriMuslims.Nehrupleadedwithhimforsanityandrestraintbutwithlittleeffect.BythemiddleofJuly1953,AbdullahpubliclydemandedthatKashmirshouldbecomeindependent.ThemajorityofhiscolleaguesinthecabinetandhispartyopposedhisnewpoliticalpositionandaskedtheSadr-e-Riyasattodismisshimonchargesof‘corruption,malpractices,disruptionismanddangerousforeigncontacts.’AbdullahwasconsequentlydismissedandBakshiGhulamMohammedinstalledasprimeminister.ThenewgovernmentimmediatelyputAbdullahunderarrest.He,however,remainedamartyrandaheroformanyKashmiris.Nehruwasunhappywiththeturnofeventsbutwouldnotinterferewiththestategovernment.Abdullah’spoliticalcareer,closelyinterwovenwiththatofKashmir’s,hadachequeredhistoryfrom

1953tillhisdeathin1982.UnderNehru’spressure,hewasreleasedon8January1958butwasrearrestedthreemonthslaterashecontinuedwithhissepartatistcampaignandappealstocommunalsentiments.NehrugotAbdullahreleasedagaininApril1964.Abdullah,however,continuedtoclaimthat

Kashmir’saccessiontoIndiawasnotfinalandthathewouldfighttosecureforthestatetherightofself-determination.Butsincehewasalsoagainstthestate’smergerwithPaskitan,hewasfrontallyopposedbypro-PakistanipoliticalgroupsledbyMoulaviFarooqandtheAwamiActionCommittee.AbdullahwasputunderhousearrestandagaindeprivedofhislibertyinMay1965.Therestrictionsonhimwereremovedonlyin1968.BakshiGhulamMohammedruledJammuandKashmirwithaheavyhandandwithlarge-scale

corruptionandmisuseofpatronageandgovernmentmachinery.HewassucceededbyG.M.SadiqandthenbyMirQasim,whoweremenofintegritybutnoteffectiveadministratorsorskilfulpoliticians.Thestategovernmentundertheseleadersneveracquiredwidepopularity,thoughthepro-Pakistanforcesremainedweak.TheBangladeshwarandthebreak-upofPakistanin1971hadasignificantimpactonKashmir;thePro-

PakistaniAwamiActionCommitteeandthesecessionistPlebisciteFrontsufferedaseverepoliticaljolt.Abdullahnowgotintoabetterframeofmind,didsomerethinkingandadoptedamoreconciliatoryapproachtowardsthecentralgovernment.IndiraGandhi,inturn,extendedahandoffriendship,liftedallrestrictionsandopenedadialoguewithhim.Heinformallyagreednottoraisethequestionofself-determinationorplebisciteandtolimithisdemandstothatofgreaterautonomywithintheIndianunion.

Finally,inFebruary1975,heonceagainbecamechiefministerandtheleaderoftheNationalConference.IntheJuly1977mid-termpollinthestatehewonhandsdown.Hisson,FarooqAbdullah,succeededhimaschiefminister,onhisdeathin1982.

FarooqAbdullah,InsurgencyandTerrorism

Since1982thestatehaseitherbeenruledmostlybyFarooqAbdullahorbeenunderPresident’sRule.Farooqwonacomfortablemajorityinthemid-termelectionsinJune1983;butacrimonysoondevelopedbetweenhimandthecentralgovernment.InJuly1984,inacoupagainstFarooq,hisbrother-in-law,G.M.Shah,splittheNationalConference.Actingatthebehestofthecentralgovernment,theGovernor,Jagmohan,dismissedFarooqaschiefministerandinstalledG.M.Shahinhisplace.G.M.Shahwasbothcorruptandineptand,ashefailedtocontrolcommunalattacksonKashmiri

pundits,hisgovernmentwasdismissedinMarch1986andPresident’sRuleimposedinthestate.Subsequently,RajivGandhienteredintoanalliancewithFarooqAbdullahfortheassemblyelectionsinearly1987.ButFarooq,whowontheelection,wasunabletomanagethestatepoliticallyoradministratively.Thereafter,themovementforsecessionsteppedupintheValley.BothHizbulMujahideenandotherfundamentalist,pro-PakistangroupsandthoseforindependenceledbyJammuandKashmirLiberationFront(JKLF)tooktoviolentagitationsandarmedinsurgency.Allthesegroupswereactivelyfinanced,trainedandarmedbyPakistan,andcarriedonacampaignofmurders,kidnappingsandtortureofpoliticalopponentsandofattacksonpolicestations,governmentofficesandotherpublicbuildings.TheyalsoattackedKashmiripundits,mostofwhomwereforcedtoleavetheirhomesandmovetorefugeecampsinJammuandDelhi.Tocontainterrorismandinsurgency,V.P.SinghattheCentredismissedFarooqAbdullah’sgovernment,whichhadlostcontrolovertheValleytotheterroristgroups,andimposedPresident’sRuleinthestate.Farooq,however,madeanotherpoliticalcomebackbywinningthelong-delayedelectionsin1996.Theall-partyHurriyat(Liberation)ConferenceandJKLFwhichstandsforKashmir’sindependence

andthepro-PakistanMujahideenhaveloststeaminrecentyears,mainlybecauseoftheMujahideenandJKLF’sterroristdepredationsagainstthepeopleofthestate,butPakistani-supportedandorganizedterrorismcontinuestobeamenaceaffectingnormalpoliticsinJammuandKashmir.

TheWayOut

Fromtheearlyfiftiestilldate,Kashmirhasbeenbedevilledbyseveralmajorills,leadingtothealienationofthepeopleofJammuandKashmirfromthestate’srulersasalsoIndiaasawhole.Therehasbeenabsenceofgoodandsoundadministration;thegovernmentanditsvariousdepartmentshavebeenmiredincorruptionandnepotism.Mostelections,startingwiththeveryfirstonein1951,havebeenriggedandmarredbyelectoralfraud,leadingtolossoffaithinthelegitimacyoftheelectoralprocessandthepoliticalsystemasawholeamongthepeople,whohavethereforenothesitatedtotakerecoursetoextra-constitutionalmeans.Evenotherwise,democracyhasfunctionedquiteimperfectlyfromthebeginningandpoliticsandadministrationinthestatehaveassumedanauthoritariancharacter.WiththepassageoftimeandasPakistan-sponsoredinsurgencyandterrorismhavegrown,humanrightshavetakenabeatinginKashmir.AlargeroleforthearmyinKashmirhasbeenanecessityinviewofPakistani

militarythreatandsubversion;butthishasalsomeantahighcostintermsofthefunctioningofacivillibertarianpolity.Kashmirhasalsosufferedfromnear-perpetualinstabilitywhichhasoftenledto,andhasoftenbeen

causedby,repeatedcentralinterventionandpoliticalmanipulation,dismissalofgovernmentsandreplacementofonesetofincompetentandcorruptministersbyanothersimilarset,andimpositionofPresident’sRule.Asaresultthepeopleofthestatehavetendedtoregardcentrally-supportedrulersaspuppetsandgovernorsasmereagentsofthecentralgovernment.JammuandKashmir’saccessiontoIndiaisirreversible,thoughIndiaisnotlikelytoregaincontrol

overPak-occupiedKashmir.Itisclearthatwhileitisnecessarytotakesternactionagainstterrorismandinsurgency,suchactionshouldnotadverselyaffectthecivillibertiesandhumanrightsofthepeople.TheestrangedIndo-PakrelationswillcontinuetocastadeepanddarkshadowoverJammuandKashmir;butthatmakesitevenmorenecessarythatKashmirisgivenaclean,soundanddemocraticgovernment,freeofexcessesbythepoliceandparamilitaryforces.Theextentoflocalautonomyisacontentiousissuethatwillhavetoberesolvedkeepinginviewthe

sentimentsofthepeopleofthestateandthefederalconstitutionalstructureofIndia.Webelieve,however,thatmoresignificantistheissueofhowthedemocraticprocessinthestatedevelopswiththefullerparticipationofthepeople.ItwouldnotbedifficulttoresolvetheKashmirproblemiftwoimportantparametersarekeptinview.Nodemocracywouldeasilypermitsecessionofanyofitsparts,andnodemocracycanaffordtoignoreforlongthewishesofanypartofitspeople.

24ThePunjabCrisis

Duringtheeighties,PunjabwasengulfedbyaseparatistmovementwhichwastransformedintoacampaignofterrorandwhichhasbeenaptlydescribedbysomeasalowintensitywarandadangerouscrisisfortheIndiannation.ThegenesisoftheproblemlayinthegrowthofcommunalisminPunjabinthecourseofthetwentieth

centuryand,inparticular,since1947,andwhicheruptedintoextremism,separatismandterrorismafter1980.Before1947,communalisminPunjabwasatriadwithMuslim,HinduandSikhcommunalism,opposingoneanother,andthelattertwooftenjoiningforcesagainstthefirst.AfterAugust1947,MuslimcommunalismhavingdisappearedfromthePunjab,HinduandSikhcommunalismwerepittedagainsteachother.FromthebeginningtheAkalileadershipadoptedcertaincommunalthemeswhichbecamethe

constitutiveelementsofSikhcommunalisminallitsphases.Wemaydiscussthembriefly,astheyweredevelopedbefore1966whenthepresentPunjabi-speakingstateofPunjabwascreated.Denyingtheidealofasecularpolity,theAkalisassertedthatreligionandpoliticscouldnotbe

separatedasthetwowereessentiallycombinedinSikhism.TheyalsoclaimedthattheAkaliDalwasthesolerepresentativeoftheSikhPanthwhichwasdefinedasacombinationoftheSikhreligionandthepoliticalandothersecularinterestsofallSikhs.AsecondthemeputforthbytheAkaliswasthatSikhswerebeingcontinuouslysubjectedto

discrimination,oppression,persecution,humiliationandvictimization,andthattherewereallsortsofconspiraciesagainstthem.Therewasalsoconstantanti-Hindurhetoric.HinduswereaccusedofdesignstodominateSikhs,ofimposingBrahmanicaltyrannyoverthem,andofthreateningtheir‘Sikhidentity’.TheCongressandthe‘Hindu’Nehru,‘whoruledfromDelhi’,weremadespecialtargetsofAkaliangerforrepresentingtheHinduandBrahmanicalconspiracyagainstSikhs.Aboveall,echoingtheMuslimLeaguecredooftheforties,theAkalisraisedthecryofSikhreligionindanger.WhiletherelativelyextremeAkalileadersweremorevirulent,eventhemoremoderateleaderswere

notfarbehindinarticulatingthesecommunalcomplaints.Moreover,withthepassageoftime,theextremists’influencekeptongrowing,andwasinanycase,metwithlittlecriticismordisavowalfromthemoremoderateAkalis.Forexample,addressingtheAllIndiaAkaliConferencein1953,MasterTaraSinghwhodominatedAkaliDalaswellastheSikhGurudwaraPrabhandhakCommittee(SGPC)atthetime,said:‘Englishmanhasgone(sic),butourlibertyhasnotcome.Forustheso-calledlibertyissimplyachangeofmasters,blackforwhite.UnderthegarbofdemocracyandsecularismourPanth,ourlibertyandourreligionarebeingcrushed.’1

Interestingly,noevidenceotherthanthatofthedenialofPunjabiSubawasofferedforthislonglistofgrievances.TheonlyconcreteallegationregardingdiscriminationagainstSikhsingovernmentservice

wasfoundtobebaselessbyacommissionappointedbyNehruin1961.ThepoliticalscientistBaldevRajNayarwastopointoutin1966thatthoughSikhs‘arelessthan2percentoftheIndianpopulation,theyconstituteabout20percentoftheIndianarmy,havedoubletheirproportionateshareintheIndianadministrativeservices,andthatinthePunjabtheirshareintheservices,asalsointhelegislature,thecabinet,andtheCongressPartyorganization,ishigherthantheirproportioninthepopulation(ofthe

state).’2

AnothersignificantfeatureofAkalipoliticsduringthisperiodwastheuseandmanipulationoftheinstitutionsandsymbolsofSikhreligioninordertoharnessreligioussentimentsandfervourtocommunalappeal.SignificantinthisrespectwastheAkaliuseoftheSGPC,whichcontrolledover700SikhgurudwarastopromoteAkalipoliticsandtoorganizeAkalipoliticalmovements.Inparticular,consistentusewasmadeoftheGoldenTempleatAmritsar.Akalipoliticsalsowitnessedfactionalismresultinginintenserivalryandcompetitionbetween

differentAkaligroupswithregardtocommunalextremism,andalsothecontrolofthegurudwarasandtheGoldenTemple.ThisrivalryalsoledtoconstantmultiplicationandescalationofdemandsandthemoremoderateamongtheAkalisconsistentlyyieldingtotheextremistandemerginggroups.HinducommunalismwasalsoveryactiveinPunjabduringtheNehruyears.Thoughnotasstridentor

weddedtoreligionasSikhcommunalism,itcontinuouslyactedasacounter-pointtothelatter.

SecularResponsetothePunjabproblem

BeforewediscussthetwomajorissuesaroundwhichcommunalpoliticsinPunjabrevolvedtill1966,letusbrieflyconsiderhowthesecularpartiesdealtwithPunjab’scommunalproblem.Aswehavebroughtoutearlier,Nehruadoptedthreebasicrulesfordealingwithmilitantagitationsandtheirdemands:nonegotiationsorpoliticaltransactionswiththeleadersofamovementoracceptanceoftheirdemandsiftheyhadsecessionisttendencies,iftheytookrecoursetoviolence,orbasedtheirmovementordemandsonreligionorcommunalism.Nehruwasmorethanawareofthefascistcharacterofextremecommunalism,includingitsAkalivarietyunderMasterTaraSingh’sleadership.Atthesametime,Nehru,beingverysensitivetothefeelingsoftheminorities,triedtoconciliatethe

Akalisbyaccommodating,asfaraspossible,theirseculardemands.ThisapproachledhimtosignpactswiththeAkaliDaltwicein1948and1956whenitagreedtosheditscommunalcharacter.Theaccommodativestrategyfailed,however,tostemthegrowthofcommunalisminPunjab.NewleaderssoonemergedandresurrectedtheAkaliDalonamoreextremeideologicalandpoliticalbasis,formulatingandputtingforwardnewlistsofdemandsandgrievances.Simultaneously,theCongressaccommodationoftheAkalisstrengthenedHinducommunalforces.NehrugavefullsupporttoPratapSinghKairon,Punjab’schiefminister,ashewasdealingfirmlywith

bothHinduandSikhcommunalisms.NeitherNehruorKairon,however,tookstepstocheckthecommunalizationofPunjabisocietythroughamassideologicalcampaignortoconfrontcommunalismfrontallyatatimewhenitwasnotdifficulttodoso.TheCPIwasquitestronginPunjabandaverystrongforceforsecularism.ItalsoopposedtheHindu

andSikhcommunalisms,politicallyandideologicallythroughoutthefifties.However,after1964,itstwooff-shoots,theCPIandtheCPM,formedallianceswiththeAkaliDalformakingelectoralgains,thusgivingAkalipoliticsacertainlegitimacy.

RootsofPost-1947Communalism

Twomajorissues,whichwereinthemselvessecularbutwerecommunalizedbytheSikhandHinducommunalists,dominatedPunjabpoliticstill1966.Thefirstissuewasthatofstatelanguage:whatwastobethelanguageofadministrationandschoolinginbilingualPunjab.TheHinducommunalistswantedthisstatusforHindiandtheSikhcommunalistsforPunjabiintheGurmukhiscript.ThegovernmenttriedtoresolvetheproblembydividingPunjabintotwo—PunjabiandHindi—linguisticzones.ButtheHinducommunalistsopposedthedecisionstomakethestudyofPunjabi,alongwithHindi,compulsoryinallschoolsandPunjabibeingmadetheonlyofficiallanguagefordistrictadministrationinthePunjabilinguisticzone.EvenmorecontentiouswastheproblemofthescriptforPunjabi.Traditionally,forcenturies,PunjabihadbeenwritteninUrdu,GurmukhiandDevnagari(Hindi)scripts.However,dissociatingPunjabifromitscommonculturalbackground,theAkalisdemandedthatGurmukhialoneshouldbeusedasthescriptforPunjabi.TheHinducommunalorganizationsinsistedonDevnagarialsobeingusedalongwithGurmukhi.TheissuewasgivenastrongcommunalcomplexionbyboththeSikhandHinducommunalists.Thesecondissue—thatofPunjabiSuba—provedtobemoreemotiveanddivisive.AftertheState

ReorganizationCommission(SRC)wassetupin1955,theAkaliDal,theCPI,manyCongressmenandPunjabiintellectualsputbeforeitademandforthereorganizationofthestateonlinguisticlines,whichwouldleadtothecreationofPunjabi-speakingPunjabandaHindi-speakingHaryana.TheSRCrejectedthedemandonthegroundsthattherewasnotmuchdifferencebetweenHindiandPunjabiandthattheminimummeasureofagreementnecessaryformakingachangedidnotexistamongthepeopleofPunjab.Afteragreatdealofhaggling,anagreementwasarrivedatin1956betweentheAkaliDalandtheGovernmentofIndialeadingtothemergerofPunjabandPEPSU.However,theAkaliDalundertheleadershipofMasterTaraSinghsoonorganizedapowerfulagitation

aroundthedemandfortheformationofaPunjabiSuba.Givingthedemandablatantlycommunalcharacter,theAkaliDalallegedthatthenon-acceptanceofthedemandwasanactofdiscriminationagainstSikhs.ItarguedthattheSikhsneededastateoftheirowninwhichtheycoulddominateasareligiousandpoliticalcommunitybecauseoftheirpopulationpreponderance.TheJanSanghandotherHinducommunalorganizationsandindividualsstrenuouslyopposedthisdemandonthegroundthatitrepresentedanefforttoimposeSikhdominationandSikhtheocracyonPunjab.TheydeniedthatPunjabiwasthemothertongueofHindusinthePunjabi-speakingpartofthestateandaskedthelattertoregisterthemselvesasHindi-speakingintheCensusof1961.Interestingly,theHarijanSikhs,knownasMazhabiSikhs,whoweremostlylandlessagricultural

labourers,alsoopposedthedemandforPunjabiSubabecausetheywereafraidthatthenewstatewouldbedominatedbytheirclassopponents,therichpeasants,whoasJatSikhswerethemainsupportersoftheAkaliDal.NehrurefusedtoconcedethedemandforPunjabiSubamainlybecauseofitscommunalunderpinnings.

Hefeltthattheacceptanceofacommunaldemandwouldthreatenthesecularfabricofthestateandsociety.Norwasthereabroadconsensusinthestateonthedemand.ApartfromalargesectionofHindus,twostalwartSikhleadersoftheCongress,PratapSinghKaironandDarbaraSingh,werebitterlyopposedtothedemand,asitwascommunal.Nehrushouldperhapshaveacceptedthedemandasitwas

inherentlyjust,especiallyasitwasalsobeingsupportedonasecularbasisbytheCPI,thePSPandanumberofintellectualsandas,by1960,therestofIndiahadbeenreorganizedonalinguisticbasis.However,thewayforthecreationofPunjabiSubainconsonancewithNehru’scriteriawasclearedby

twolaterdevelopments.Fist,SantFatehSingh,whooustedMasterTaraSinghfromtheleadershipoftheSGPCandtheAkaliDal,declaredthatthedemandforPunjabiSubawasentirelylanguage-based.Second,majorpoliticalandsocialorganizationsinHaryanademandedaseparateHindi-speakingstateandthoseinKangraaskedforitsmergerwithHimachalPradesh.Consequently,inMarch1966,IndiraGandhi,theprimeminister,announcedthatPunjabwouldbesplitintotwostates:Punjabi-speakingPunjabandHindi-speakingHaryana,withKangrabeingmergedwithHimachalPradesh.Butonequestionstillremained:WherewouldChandigarhgo?Tosettlethematter,IndiraGandhi

appointedthePunjabBoundaryCommission,whosetermsofreferencewereacceptedbybothsides.TheCommissionbyamajorityoftwotooneawardedChandigarhalongwiththesurroundingareastoHaryana.TheAkaliDal,however,refusedtoaccepttheaward.IndiraGandhi,notwillingtodispleasetheAkalis,announcedthatChandigarhwouldbemadeaUnionTerritoryandwouldserveasacapitalbothtoPunjabandHaryana.Dissatisfied,theAkaliDallaunched,immediatelyafterthecreationofthenewstateinNovember1966,avigorousagitationfortheinclusionofChandigarhinPunjab.However,aftersometime,itsleadershipagreedtosubmitthequestiontoarbitrationbytheprimeministerandtoabidebyherdecision.OnceagainIndiraGandhiyieldedtoAkalipressureand,in1970,awardedChandigarhtoPunjabwithtwoPunjabtehsils(sub-divisions)FazilkaandAbohar,havingHindumajoritybeingtransferredtoHaryana.Thisdecision,too,wasnotimplementedbecauseoftheAkaliDal’srefusaltoagreetothetransferofthetwotehsils.TheacceptanceofthePunjabiSubademandwas,webelieve,acorrectstep,butitshouldnothave

beenseenasasolutionofthePunjabproblem.Theheartofthatproblemwascommunalismandunlessthatwaseradicatedtheproblemwouldremain,thoughitmighttakeevernewerforms.

AkaliPoliticsandMilitancy

WiththecreationofthePunjabiSuba,alltheconcretemajordemandsthattheAkaliDalhadraisedandagitatedforovertheyearshadbeenacceptedandimplemented;noreal,meaningfuldemandswereleftwhichcouldenthuseitsfollowersforlongandthereforebesustainedforlong.Itwas,therefore,facedwiththeproblemofwheretogopolitically.TheoptionofgivingupcommunalpoliticsandbecomingeitherapurelyreligiousandsocialorganizationorasecularpartyappealingtoallPunjabiswasseenbytheAkalileadersascommittingpoliticalharakiri.AkalicommunalismthereforeinexorablymovedtowardsseparatismaswasthecasewiththeMuslimLeagueafter1937.Thefactisthatthelogicofminoritycommunalism,especiallywhenitisrepeatedly‘satisfied’isseparatism,justasthelogicofmajoritycommunalismisfascism.Anotherproblemwasthatofacquiringpowerthroughdemocraticmeansandtheelectoralprocess.

Eveninthenewly-createdPunjabiSubatheAkaliDalfailedtosecureamajorityinthe1967andlaterelections.Forone,thepopulationarithmeticdidnotfavouritastheSikhsconstitutedlessthan60percentofPunjab’spopulation.Secondly,theScheduledCasteSikhs,constituting25to30percentofSikhpopulation,had,asagriculturallabourers,abasicclasscontradictionwiththerichandmiddlepeasants,whowerethemainsocialbaseoftheAkaliDal.They,therefore,votedfortheCongressandthe

Communiststill1980.Thirdly,andmostimportantofall,Sikhsdidnotvoteexclusivelyalongcommunallines.Mostoften,agoodmajorityofSikhsvotedfortheCongressandtheCommunists.Infact,from1952to1980,theAkalivoteshoveredbetween35to45percentoftheSikhvotes.The

onlytimetheAkaliDalwasabletoformthegovernmentinPunjabwasin1967inalliancewiththeJanSangh,theHinducommunalpartywhichhadbitterlyopposedthedemandforPunjabiSuba,andin1977inalliancewiththeJanataPartywhosemajorconstituentinPunjabwastheJanSangh.Inthe1980electionstothePunjabassembly,justbeforelaunchingitsmostmilitantandcommunalmovement,theAkaliDalsecuredonly26.9percentofthetotalvote.Thismeantthatlessthan50percentofSikhsvotedforitandthatthemajorityofSikhsrejectedtheAkalipoliticsandideology.Havinglosttheelectionsin1980andinordertowidentheirsupportbaseamongSikhs,theAkalis

begantointensifythecommunalcontentoftheirpoliticsandtocontinuouslyescalatetheirdemands,theso-calledmoderateleaderskeepinginstepwiththeextremists.In1981,themainAkaliDal,headedbySantLongowal,submittedtotheprimeministeramemorandumofforty-fivereligious,political,economicandsocialdemandsandgrievances,includingtheissueofthesharingofPunjab’sriverwatersbetweenPunjab,HaryanaandRajasthanandthequestionofthetransferofChandigarhtoPunjab,andlaunchedavirulentcampaignaroundthem.Verysoon,implementationoftheAnandpurSahibResolution(ASR),adoptedin1973,becamethemostprominentdemand.Theresolution,whichhadmanyversions,wasopenlycommunalandseparatistinallitsversions.Simultaneously,theAkalistookupinamoreblatantandstridentmannerallthecommunalthemeswe

havediscussedabove.Therewasamoreopenuseofreligionasamobilizingtool.GurudwaraswerethefocalpointsoftheAkalimovements.Thus,thelogicofthecommunalideologyandpoliticsoftheAkalissince1947wasseparatismandthe

demandforasovereigntheocraticstate.After1981,theterroristsweretofollowthislogictoitsconclusion.ThefailureofAkaliagitations,whichdidnotandcouldnotsucceedtothefull,alongwiththeheightened,unrequitedsenseofdeprivationbeingpreachedforoverthirtyyears,ledtothebeliefamongthemorehonestbelieversthatviolenceofferedtheonlyremedy;andiforganizedmassviolencewasnotpossibleandthemilitantmassmovementhadprovedfutile,thenterroristviolencewastheonlyanswer.Also,clearly,inpractice,theAkaliviewwasthattheAkalidemandshadtobenecessarilymet,

negotiationsbeingonlyamatterofform.Moreover,often,theAkaliswouldacceptanaward,onlytorejectitlateriffoundinconvenient.Afterademandwasmettheywouldmountafreshagitationaroundanewsetofdemands.Anyagreementwiththemprovidedonlyatemporaryandshort-livedrespite.TheirbasicapproachwasthatPunjab,becauseofbeinga‘Sikh’state,andtheAkaliDal,beinga‘Sikh’party,wereabovethepoliticalnormsandstructureofthecountry,ortheinterestsoftheotherneighbouringstates,orademocratic,federalmechanismfortheresolutionofinter-statedisputes.

TerrorisminPunjab

ParalleltoAkalimilitancy,terrorismmadeitsappearanceinPunjabin1981asapartialculminationofcommunalpoliticssince1947andthepolicyofappeasementtowardscommunalismfollowedbythePunjabCongressleadership,especiallysincetheearlyseventies.TheinitiatorofterrorismwasSantJarnailSinghBhindranwale,whoemergedinthelateseventiesasastrongcampaignerofSikhorthodoxy.InthiscampaignhereceivedthetacitsupportofthePunjabCongressledbyGianiZailSingh,whohoped

tousehimtoundercuttheAkalis.Hewas,however,tosoonbecomeaFrankensteinandturnagainsthiserstwhilepatrons.TheterroristcampaignbyBhindranwaleandtheAllIndiaSikhStudentsFederation,headedbyAmrik

Singh,beganon24April1980withtheassassinationoftheheadoftheNirankarisect.ThiswasfollowedbythekillingofmanyNirankaris,dissidentAkalisandCongressworkers.InSeptember1981,LalaJagatNarain,editorofapopularnewspaperandacriticofBhindranwale,waskilled.BhindranwalewasshieldedfromgovernmentactionbyGainiZailSinghwhohadin1980becomethehomeministerattheCentre.Toprotecthimself,BhindranwalemovedinJuly1982tothesanctuaryofGuruNanakNiwas,abuildingwithintheGoldenTemplecomplexfromwherehedirectedthecampaignofterrorisminPunjab.HenowemergedasacentralfigureinPunjabpolitics.TillSeptember1983,terroristkillingswereconfinedtoNirankaris,pettygovernmentofficialsand

SikhswhodisagreedwithBhindranwale.Bhindranwalewas,however,since1981,carryingonaverbalcampaignofhatredagainstHindusand‘fallen’Sikhs,thatismembersofreformistSikhsects,andincitingviolenceagainstthem,especiallythroughwidelycirculatedaudio-cassettes.AnewdimensiontoterroristactivitywasaddedwhenfromSeptember1983hestartedtargetting

Hindusonanincreasingscale,andindiscriminatekillingofHindusbegan;thiscouldbedonewithrelativeimpunityasthePunjabadministrationandpolicewereinarun-downconditionandtheGovernmentofIndiawashesitanttotakeactionagainstterrorism.Healsoorganizedthelootingoflocalbanks,jewelleryshopsandhomeguardarmouries,thekillingofNirankarisandgovernmentofficialsandrandombombexplosions.InApril1983,A.S.Atwal,aSikhdeputyinspector-generalofpolice,waskilledjustashewascomingoutoftheGoldenTempleafterofferinghisprayers.FromnowontherewasamarkedandcontinuousincreaseinterroristoperationsasalsocommunalpassionsamongSikhsandHindus.BhindranwalealsogaveacallforaseparationfromandanarmedstruggleagainsttheIndianstate,emphasizingtheseparatenessandsovereigntyofSikhs.Fearingarrest,inDecember1983,BhindranwalemovedintothesafehavenoftheAkalTakhtwithin

theGoldenTempleandmadeithisheadquartersandarmoury,andasanctuaryforhisterroristfollowers,manyofwhomwerecriminalsandsmugglers.Hesmuggledonalarge-scalelightmachine-gunsandothersophisticatedarmsintotheTemple,andsetupworkshopsthereforfabricatingsten-guns,handgrenadesandotherarms.HeerectedpillboxesinandaroundtheAkalTakhtandotherbuildings,whereheprovidedweaponstrainingtonewrecruitsandfromwherehesentoutdeathsquadsandconductedhiscampaignofmurders,bombingsandloot.Alargenumberofothergurudwaraswerealsousedassanctuariesandbasesforterroristactivities.LedbyBhindranwale,theKhalistanis,theextremists,themilitants,theterrorists—bywhatevername

theymaybecalled—hopedtograduallytransformterrorismintoageneralinsurgencyandanarmeduprising.TheywerefightingforpoliticalandideologicalhegemonyoverthepeopleofPunjab.AlltheiractivitiesweredesignedtoprovethattheIndianstatewasnotcapableofrulinginPunjaband,therefore,separationfromIndiawasarealizableobjective.TheirbullyingofthePressandthejudiciary,theirkillingofpoliceofficials(andtheirfamilies)andthosesuspectedofcooperatingwiththepoliceandadministration,theirsuccessfuldiktatstoadministratorstodotheirbidding,theircollectionof‘paralleltaxes’,theirsilencingofintellectualsandpoliticalworkers,theircoercionofthepeasantsingivingthemshelter,andtheirrandomkillings—allweredesignednotonlytofacilitatetheiractivitiesbutalsoto

convincethepeopleofPunjabthattheyhadthecapacitytochallengetheIndianstateandthattheyweretherulersoftomorrow.Toachievethisobjective,theymadenodistinctionbetweenSikhsandHindus.Nearly55percentofthosekilledfrom1981to3June1984wereSikhs.

TerroristsandtheAkalis

TheattitudeoftheAkalileadershiptowardstheterroristswasambivalent.Whilenotjoiningthemandevenharbouringacertainhostilitytowardsthem,itkeptquietoutoffear,andevensupportedthemoutofexpediency.Themoderationofitsmajoritywingwasalsonotbackedbypoliticalaction,positionsandstatements.TherewasnoopenstandagainsttheterroristsorunequivocalcondemnationoftheiractivitiesorthesenselesskillingsorthevitriolicpropagandaofBhindranwale.Instead,eventhemoderateAkalileadersdefended,directlyorindirectly,thoseaccusedofterroristacts.Theycondemnedeveryconcreteactionofthepoliceagainsttheterrorists.TheyobjectedtoanygovernmentactionagainstBhindranwale.Longowal,forexample,saidin1981:‘EntireSikhcommunitysupportedBhindranwale.’3When,onrareoccasions,theAkalileadersdidcondemnviolenceandindividualkillings,theyputtheblameonthegovernmentandtheCongress,accusingthemoforganizingtheviolenceandkillingsinordertotarnishtheSikhimage.TheytooknoactionagainsttheoccupationanddesecrationofthegurudwarasandtheGoldenTemplebytheterrorists.Infact,feelingthattheirleadershipoftheSikhmasseswasindanger,theytriedtokeepupwithBhindranwale.Astheylostgroundtothelatter,theytookupmoreandmoreextremepositions,competingwithhimindemandsandaggressivepoliticalandideologicalposturing.WhatmadeitdifficultfortheAkalileaderstoopposeBhindranwalewasthefactthattheyshareda

commonpoliticalideologywithhimandtheextremists,eventhoughtheyhadtacticalandstrategicpoliticaldifferences.TheAkalisequallywhippedupcommunalfeelings;andthepublicmanifestationsoftheAkaliideologywereindistinguishablefromthoseofBhindranwaleandtheextremistsand,infact,echoedthem.

IndiraGandhiandTerrorists

InsteadofboldlyconfrontingthecommunalandseparatistchallengetotheIndianpolity,IndiraGandhigavewaytoindecisiveness;herresponse,uncharacteristicofherpoliticalstyle,wastoditherandvacillatebetweenapolicyofappeasementandtacticalmanoeuvringandfirmness.Sherefusedtotakestrongactionagainstterroristkillingsforthreelongyears,from1981to1984,ortofightextremecommunalism,ideologicallyandpolitically,andtocountercommunalpropagandaeffectively.Shealsodidnotrealizethattherewasabasicdifferencebetweenpayingheedtominorityfeelingsandappeasingminoritycommunalism.IndiraGandhicarriedonendlessnegotiationswithG.S.Tohra,PrakashSinghBadalandH.S.

Longowal.KnucklingundertheAkaliandterroristthreats,shefailedtoevolvewhatthesituationdemanded,namely,astrategyofcombatingcommunalism,secessionismandterrorism.ShealsodidnotrealizethatwhenitcametoacrunchshewouldnotbeabletounilaterallyaccepttheAkalidemandsandignorethestrongandunanimousopinionofthepeopleandpoliticalpartiesofHaryanaandRajasthan.Theresultoftheweak-kneedpolicyfollowedbyIndiraGandhiwastosendwrongsignalsto

secessionistsandtheterroristsaswellastothepeopleofPunjab.AsK.P.S.Gill,theex-director-general

ofpoliceinPunjabwhodirectedthesuccessfulphaseoftheanti-terroristcampaignthere,haspointedout:‘Nothingencouragestheterroriststogreateraudacitythanthespectacleofweaknessinthepoliticalleadership,andofconfusioninthesecurityforces.’4

ImportantinthisrespectwasthefailureofthegovernmenttoactatthetimeofAtwal’smurderinApril1983withintheprecinctsoftheGoldenTempleitselfandwhichleftthepeopleofPunjaboutraged.

ThesituationinPunjabdeterioratedrapidlyin1984.Akalimilitancygrewbyleapsandbounds.Theleadershipcalledforafreshroundofmilitantagitationsstartingfrom3June.ItalsoincreasinglyandpubliclyexpressedsolidaritywithBhindranwale.AnincreasinglydangerousfeatureofthesituationwasPakistan’sgrowinginvolvementinPunjab

affairs.AsapartofitsstrategyofwagingalowintensitywarfareagainstIndia,Pakistanhadstartedprovidingtraining,weapons,ideologicalindoctrination,safeareasforhiding,andmilitaryguidancetoterroristorganizations.CertainextremistSikhgroupsabroadwerealsogivingincreasingencouragementtothesecessionistsandhelpingthemwithmoneyandweapons.ByJune1984,thesituationhadreachedanexplosivepointasterroristactivityescalated.Therewasin

Punjabandinthecountryasawholeanintensefeelingofdangertothepeaceandunityofthecountry.FearandpanicwerespreadingamongHindusinPunjabwithanincreasingnumberleavingthestate.Moreandmoregurudwaraswerebeingfortifiedandturnedintoarsenals.Clearly,asituationofinsurgencywasbuildingupinPunjab.Atthesametime,thegovernmentwaslosingitsprestigeandgettingdiscredited.OneofthemostworrisomefeaturesofthesituationwastheincreasingHindu-SikhdivideinPunjaband

thespreadofHinducommunalismintherestofthecountry,especiallyinNorthIndia.AwarningcamefromHaryanawhenanti-SikhriotingbrokeoutinFebruary.BytheendofMay,itwasclearthatdecisiveactionagainstterroristscouldnolongerbeputoffandthat

theuseofdrasticforcetoflushouttheterroristsholedupintheGoldenTempleandothergurudwarashadbecomenecessary.Andso,finallyfacedwithadeadendsofaraspoliticalmanoeuvreswereconcerned,theGovernmentofIndiaundertookthemilitaryaction,code-namedOperationBlueStar.Whiletherewasnoalternativetomilitaryactiononcethesituationhadworsenedtotheextentithad,thereisnodoubt,asthelatereventsweretoshow,thattheOperationwashastilyconceived,undertakenwithoutadequateinformationandproperplanningandpoorlyexecuted,withtheresultthatitspoliticalandemotionalcostprovedtobefarhigherthanitsplannershadanticipated.On3JunethearmysurroundedtheGoldenTemple.ItenteredtheTempleon5June.Thereitfoundthat

theterroristswerefargreaterinnumberandalsofarbetterarmedthanthegovernmentsourceshadassumed.Ratherthanlastinganhourortwo,asasurgicaloperation,themilitaryoperationturnedintoafull-scalebattle,withthearmyhavingtodeploytanksintheend.Whatwasworse,overathousanddevoteesandtemplestaffweretrappedinsidetheTempleandmanyofthemdiedinthecrossfire.Moreover,thebuildingsintheTemplecomplexwereseverelydamaged,withtheAkalTakhtbeingvirtuallyrazedtotheground.HarmandirSahib,themosthallowedoftheSikhshrines,wasriddledwithbulletmarks,eventhoughthearmyhadtakenspecialcareatthecostofthelivesofitssoldiersnottodamageit.AmongthedeadwereBhindranwaleandmanyofhisfollowers.

TheOperationBlueStarproducedadeepsenseofangerandoutrageamongSikhsalloverthecountry.ItwasseenbymostofthemasasacrilegeandanaffronttothecommunityratherthanasanecessarythoughunpleasantefforttodealwithBhindranwaleandtheterrorists.WhilemuchofthehostilereactiontotheOperationrepresentedanemotionaloutburst,therewasagreatdealtobesaidforitscriticswhoheldthatsomeotherwaythanthemilitarystormingoftheTempleshouldhavebeenfound.Later,criticsweretopointtothesuccessoftheskillfullyplannedandexecutedOperationBlackThunderin1988whichforcedtheterrorists,onceagainoccupyingtheTempleinthemannersimilartothatof1984,tosurrendertothepoliceinarelativelybloodlessmanner.However,despiteitsmanynegativerepercussions,OperationBlueStarhadcertainpositivefeatures.It

establishedthattheIndianstatewasstrongenoughtodealwithsecessionandterrorism;itputanendtothecharismaticBhindranwaleandhisgang;anditcreatedthatminimumoflawandorderwhichenabledthesecularpartiessuchastheCongress,CPIandCPMtomoveamongtheangrypeopleandcountercommunalpoliticsbyexplainingtothemthattherealresponsibilityforthePunjabsituationlaywithBhindranwale,theterrorists,andtheAkalicommunalists.

OperationBlueStarandAfter

FollowingOperationBlueStar,theterroristsvowedvengeanceagainstIndiraGandhiandherfamilyforhavingdesecratedtheGoldenTemple.Onthemorningof31October1984,IndiraGandhiwasassassinatedbytwoSikhmembersofhersecurityguard.Earliershehadrejectedhersecuritychief’ssuggestionthatallSikhsberemovedfromhersecuritystaffwiththecomment:‘Aren’tweallsecular.’Theassassinationofthepopularprimeminister,inanatmosphereofheightenedcommunalizationof

NorthIndiaduring1981-1984,ledtoawaveofhorror,fear,angerandcommunaloutrageamongthepeoplealloverthecountry,especiallyamongthepoor.ThisangertookanuglyandcommunalforminDelhiandsomeotherpartsofNorthIndia,whereanti-SikhriotsbrokeoutassoonasthenewsoftheassassinationwasannouncedandthehighlyexaggeratedrumourspreadthatmanySikhswerecelebratingtheevent.Inparticular,forthreedaysfromtheeveningof31OctoberitselfmobstookoverthestreetsofDelhiandmadeSikhstargetsoftheirlootandviolence.TherewascompletefailureofthelawandordermachineryingivingprotectiontoSikhsandtheirproperty.Thethree-dayviolenceinDelhiresultedinthedeathofover2,500people,mostlySikhs,withtheslumsandre-settlementcoloniesofDelhibeingthemainscenesofcarnage.TheNovemberriotsfurtheralienatedalargenumberofSikhsfromthegovernment.

RajivGandhisucceededIndiraGandhiasprimeministeron1November1984.HemovedquicklyafterthegeneralelectionsinDecember1984totacklethePunjabproblem.InJanuary1985,themajorjailedleaders,includingtheAkaliDalPresident,H.S.Longowal,werereleased.AmonthlaterRajivGandhiorderedanindependentjudicialenquiryintotheNovemberriots.ThepoliticaltideinPunjabwasalsoturninginapositivedirectiondespiteOperationBlueStarandtheNovemberriots.TheterroristsweredownandoutandtheAkalishadlostagreatdealoftheircredibility.Moreover,thoughtheAkaliswerenotwillingtofighttheterrorists,theywerenolongerhelpingthem.RajivGandhisooninitiatednegotiationswiththeAkalileadersinthebeliefthatasettlementwiththem

wouldprovidealastingsolutiontothePunjabproblem.Theresultofthispolicy,however,wasthatthe

advantageaccruingfromOperationBlueStarwaslost,thefightagainstterrorismandcommunalismvirtuallyabandoned,andthelattergivenanewleaseoflife.AftertheirreleasetheAkalileadersweredivided,confusedanddisoriented.Ontheonehand,manyof

them,includingLongowal,triedtoconsolidatetheirpositionvis-à-vistheterroristsbytakingrecoursetomilitantrhetoric.Ontheotherhand,itwascleartomostAkalileadersthatmassagitationcouldnolongerberevivednorcouldmilitantpoliticsbecarriedon.Longowal,therefore,evenwhiletalkingtough,enteredintosecretnegotiationswiththegovernment.Finally,inAugust1985,RajivGandhiandLongowalsignedthePunjabAccord.Thegovernment

concededthemajorAkalidemandsandpromisedtohaveothersreviewed.Inparticular,itwasagreedthatChandigarhwouldbetransferredtoPunjab,acommissionwoulddeterminewhatHindi-speakingterritorieswouldbetransferredfromPunjabtoHaryana,andtheriverwaterdisputewouldbeadjudicatedbyanindependenttribunal.ElectionsforthestateassemblyandthenationalparliamentweretobeheldinSeptember1985.On20August,thedayLongowalannouncedthattheAkaliswouldparticipateintheelections,hewas

assassinatedbytheterrorists.Theelectionswere,however,heldontime.Over66percentoftheelectoratevotedascomparedwith64percentin1977and1984.TheAkalissecuredanabsolutemajorityinthestateassemblyforthefirsttimeintheirhistory.TheAkaligovernment,headedbySurjitSinghBarnala,washoweverfromthebeginningrivenwith

factionalismand,consequently,immobilized.Itsmostimportantadministrativestepwasthereleaseofalargenumberofpersonsaccusedofterroristcrimes,mostofwhomrejoinedtheterroristranks,givingterrorismamajorfillip.TheAkaligovernmentfoundthatitcouldnotagreetothetransferofanyofPunjab’sterritoriesto

HaryanaascompensationforthelossofChandigarh;theHaryanagovernment,however,wouldnotagreetothelatterwithouttheformer.TheAkalileadershipalsowentbackinregardtothejudicialadjudicationoftheriverwaterdispute.ThemajortermsoftheAccordwerethusoncemoreunderdispute.ThefactisthattheAccordhadbeen,aswasthecasewiththeOperationBlueStar,preparedinhastewithoutconsideringitsfeasibility.ThemilitantgroupssoonregroupedtakingadvantageofthesoftpoliciesoftheBarnalagovernment.

Therewas,overtime,aresurgenceinterroristactivities,andthestategovernment,rivenwithfactionalism,wasunabletocontainthem.Consequently,thecentralgovernmentdismissedtheBarnalaministryandimposedPresident’sRuleoverPunjabinMay1987.ThefactisthattheAkaliDalandanAkaligovernment,sharingtheideologicalwavelengthofthe

extremistsandtheterrorists,wereincapableofconfrontingorfightingcommunalismandseparatism.Itwas,therefore,astrategicerroronthepartoftheRajivGandhigovernmenttostakeallonBarnalaandhissupportersandseethemasthefrontrunnersinthecampaigntodecommunalizePunjab,separatereligionfrompoliticsandfightcommmunalterrorism.Also,RajivGandhiregardedthePunjabAccordasthesolutionoftheterroristproblemratherthanas

theopeninggambitin,orthegainingofanopportunityforimplementing,along-termstrategyofwhichpolitical-ideologicalstruggleagainstcommunalismwouldformabasicpart.Simultaneously,therehadtobetherealizationthatseparatism,terrorismandviolencehadtobefirmlydealtwith.Besides,eventhemoderatecommunalistshadtobefirstrescuedandprotectedfromtheterroristsbeforetheycouldfunction

politicallyintheirowncommunalmode.ItisquitesignificantinthisrespectthatLongowalspokeopenlyagainstterrorismandthensignedtheAccordwithRajivGandhionlyafterOperationBlueStarhadeliminatedBhindranwale,destroyedthemythoftheinvincibilityoftheterroristsandcheckedterrorismtoalargeextent.Likewise,theAkalisboycottedtheelectionsin1992whenterrorismwasstillravagingPunjab,butagreedtoparticipateinthemin1997whenithadbeenbroughttoavirtualend.

ResolvingTerrorism

DespitePresident’sRule,terrorisminPunjabwentongrowing,goingthroughphasesofwaningandresurgence,especiallyasafter1985ithadbeguntobeopenlyfunded,supportedandevendirectedbyPakistan.Weneednotdiscussatlengththegrowthofterrorismanddespoliationsafter1985sincetheyhavebeen

dealtwithatlengthbyK.P.S.GillinhisPunjab—theKnightsofFalsehood.Increasingly,mostoftheterroristgangstooktoextortion,robbery,smuggling,drugs,abductionandrape,landgrabbing,murderofinnocents,andalavishlifestyle.From1987,theyalsobeganasystematiccampaigntoacquirepoliticalandideologicalhegemonyoverthepeople.Theirbanonmeat,liquor,tobacco,andtheuseofsareesbywomen,theirefforttodeterminethedressofschoolchildren,theirrestrictionsonmarriageritesandpractices,theirhoistingofKhalistaniflagsonpublicbuildings,theircollectionofparalleltaxes,werealldesignedtoconvincethepeoplethattheyweretherulersoftomorrow.Periodicstatementsbywell-meaningpersons,sometimesrepeatedbytheprimeministerhimself,advocatingnegotiations,conditionalorunconditional,betweenthecentralgovernmentandvariousgroupsoftheterroriststendedtohavethesameimpact.ImpositionofPresident’sRuleinPunjabin1987wasashort-termmeasuretosalvagearapidly

deterioratingsituation.Itshouldhavebeenseenasatacticalpartofalong-termstrategywhichhadtobebasedontheunderstanding(i)thatnosoftoptionswereavailableinPunjabsince1982whencommunalismenteredastagewhenithadeithertobeconcededordefeated,(ii)thatmoderatecommunalistscouldnotbedependedupontofightextremecommunalismorterrorism,and(iii)thatapolicyoffirmnesscombinedwithpoliticalideologicalstrugglewouldyieldresultsonlyifitwerefollowedforasufficientlengthoftimeandwerenotinterruptedbyeffortstoappeasetheterroristsandthecommunalists.Theperspectivehadtobeofyearsandnotmonths.After1986,theRajivGandhigovernmentseveraltimescameneargettinganupperhandovertheterrorists,butitlackedthedeterminationtorunthefullcourse;and,misguidedbyweak-kneedadvisers,ittalkedofandeveninitiatednegotiationswithoneortheothersecessionistgroups.It,thus,losttheadvantagegainedbystrongstateaction,andinevitablyledtohigherlevelsofstateviolenceagainstterrorismeverytime.

Thepolicyof‘solving’thePunjabproblemthroughnegotiationswithandappeasementoftheterroristsandextremecommunalistswasfollowedevenmorevigorouslybythegovernmentsofV.P.SinghandChandraShekharduring1990and1991.Inthemeanwhilethenumberofthevictimsofterrorismwentonincreasing.Thestatedidfinallytakestrongaction.ApreviewofsuchactionwastheOperationBlackThunder,

undertakenbythePunjabpoliceandpara-militaryforcesinMay1988,whichsucceededinflushingouttheterroristsfromtheGoldenTemple.

Ahardpolicytowardterrorismwasfollowedfrommid-1991onwardsbytheNarasimhaRaogovernmentattheCentreandaftertheFebruary1992electionsbytheCongressgovernmentledbyBeantSinghinPunjab.Thepolice,oftenaidedbytheruralpeople,becameincreasinglyeffectivethoughalargenumberofpolicemen—over1550from1988to1992alone—losttheirlivesinitsoperations.Also,theleadersandcadresofthetwoCommunistparties,theCPIandCPM,andalargenumberofCongressmenplayedanactiveandcourageousroleinfightingterrorism,oftenpayingaheavypriceintermoflifeandproperty.By1993,Punjabhadbeenvirtuallyfreedofterrorism.

AnAssessment

Despitethedepradationsoftheterroristsforovertenyears,therewereseveralredeemingfeaturesinthesituation.ThoughtherewassomedegreeofapsychologicaldividebetweenHindusandSikhs,especiallyintheurbanareas,andafewincidentsofHindu-Sikhclashes,therewasnotevenonemajorcommunalriotinPunjabthroughouttheyearsoftheterroristsway;onthewholethepeopleofPunjabremainedsecular.ThemassofHindusdidnotsupporttheeffortsoftheShivSenaandotherHinducommunalorganizationstocreateavolunteercorpsofHindusalonetofightterrorism.Similarly,themajorityofSikhsofferedstrongresistancetotheterroristsinmanyareas.TherefusalofthepeopleofPunjabtoimbibethevaluesandideologyoftheterroristsandtheextreme

communalistswasmainlybecausetheseculartraditionwasquitestronginPunjab,thankstotheworkandinfluenceoftheGhadrPartyandtheGhadriBabasBhagatSinghandhiscomrades,KirtiKisangroups,theCommunistsandtheSocialists,themilitantpeasantmovementandtheCongressandthenationalmovement.ThemassofSikhsrefusedtoacceptthattheseparatistsandtheterroristswerefightingindefenceof

SikhreligionandSikhinterests.TomostSikhsitbecamegraduallyclearthattheterroristswereabusingandbetrayingtheirreligion,debasingSikhinstitutionsandtheteachingsoftheSikhgurusanddefilingthegurudwaras.Ofthe11,700killedbytheterroristsinPunjabduring1981-1993,morethan61percentwereSikhs.ThePunjabexperienceisquiterelevanttothecountryasawholeasitcouldfacesimilarproblemsin

thefutureinotherpartsofit.Thereareimportantlessonstobelearnt.First,communalismhastobeconfrontedbothpoliticallyandideologically;separationofreligionfrompoliticshasnecessarilytobeenforced.Inparticular,thePunjabexperienceemphasisesthecentralityofthestruggleagainstcommunalideology.Themajorweaknessofthestruggleagainstterrorismwasthefailuretograspthattherealandthelong-termprobleminPunjabwasnotterrorismbutcommunalism.Therootsoftheformerlayinthelatter.ExtremismandterrorismweredirectlylinkedtotheAkalicommunalideologyandtheblatantuseofreligionbytheAkalisforpoliticalends.Asalreadyindicated,communalismcannotbeappeased,placatedorassuaged—ithastobeopposedanddefeated.Appeasementofcommunalforcescanatthemostprovideatemporaryrespite.Thetimethusgainedhastobeusedtocountercommunalismamongthepeople;otherwisecommunalismgetsstrengthenedandpushedtowardsextremism.Second,communalviolenceinallitsforms,includingasterrorism,hastobehandledfirmlyand

decisivelyandsuppressedasquicklyaspossiblethroughthefullandtimelyuseofthelawandordermachineryofthestate.Noamountofpopularwillandoppositioncandefeatviolenceandterrorismonits

own;itcanplayanimportantroleonlyinsupportofandassupplementtothemeasuresofthestateanditssecurityforces.Third,communalists,howevermoderate,cannotbeexpectedtoordependedupontofightextreme

communalismorcommunalterrorismdespiterealpoliticaldifferencesbetweenthetwobecausethetwoshareacommoncommunalideology.

25IndianEconomy,1947-1965:TheNehruvianLegacy

TheNehruvianConsensus

AmeaningfulappraisalofIndia’sdevelopmentexperienceafterindependencewouldhavetoplaceitbothinahistoricalandcomparativecontext.Thelevelandstagefromwhichthebeginningwasmade,andtheuniquenessoftheefforttoundertakeanindustrialtransformationwithinademocraticframeworkneedtobetakenintoaccount;theachievementsshouldbemeasuredwithothercountriesatacomparablestageofdevelopment.Wehaveseeninchapter2,thepitifulconditionoftheIndiathatweinheritedatindependenceafter

colonialismravagedtheeconomyandsocietyfornearlytwohundredyearsanddepriveditoftheopportunityofparticipatingintheprocessofmodernindustrialtransformationoccurringinotherpartsoftheworld.Apartfromextremepoverty,illiteracy,aruinedagricultureandindustry,thestructuraldistortionscreatedbycolonialismintheIndianeconomyandsociety(suchastheruptureofthelinkbetweenvarioussectorsoftheIndianeconomyandtheirgettingarticulatedwiththemetropolitaneconomyinadependentmanner)madethefuturetransitiontoself-sustainedgrowthmuchmoredifficult.ItisthislegacyofcolonialstructuringwhichindependentIndiahadtoundosothatconditionscouldbe

createdforrapidindustrialdevelopment.Thetaskofattemptingamodernindustrialtransformation,twohundredyearsafterthefirstindustrialrevolutionandnearlyahundredyearsafterseveralothercountrieshadindustrialized,wasastupendousone.Besidesthishandicapcreatedbycolonialismandtheseveralbuilt-indisadvantagesfacedbythelatecomer,Indiahadtoconfrontpoliticalandeconomicconditionswhichhadchangedradically.Newandinnovativestrategieswerecalledforifsuccesswastobeachieved.Whileundertakingthisdifficultandcomplextask,India,unlikemanyotherpost-colonialsocieties,had

certainadvantages.First,asmallbutindependent(Indian-owned-and-controlled)industrialbasehademergedinIndiabetween1914and1947.Thiswasachieved,amongstotherthings,bytheIndiancapitalistclassseizingtheopportunitiescreatedduringthisperiodbytheweakeningoftheimperialiststrangleholdduringthetwoworldwarsandtheGreatDepressionofthethirties.BythetimeIndiagainedpoliticalindependencein1947IndianentrepreneurshadsuccessfullycompetedwithEuropeanenterpriseinIndiaandwithforeignimports,intheprocesscapturingabout75percentofthemarketforindustrialproduceinIndia.Indiancapitalistshadalsoacquireddominanceoverthefinancialsphere,i.e.,banking,lifeinsurance,etc.1

Byindependence,therefore,Indiahad,‘inspiteofandinoppositiontocolonialism,’developedanindependenteconomicbasefromwhichtoattemptatake-offintorapidindependentindustrialisation.2

Shedidnot,likemanyotherpost-colonialcountries,getpushedintoaneo-colonialsituationwhere,while

formalpoliticalindependencewasachieved,theerstwhilecolony’seconomycontinuedtobeessentiallydominatedbymetropolitaninterests.Amatureindigenousentrepreneurialclass,whichcouldserveastheagencyforcarryingouta

substantialpartofthepost-independenceplanneddevelopmentwasanassettoIndia.Further,ahighdegreeofconcentrationandconsolidationhadled,duringthecolonialperioditself,totheemergenceoflargebusinessconglomeratesliketheBirlas,Tatas,Singhanias,Dalmia-Jains,etc.,withinterestsindifferentareasliketrade,banking,transport,industryandsoon.Suchconglomerates,likethezaibatsuinJapanorthechaebolinSouthKorea,wereextremelyimportantinenablingthelateentrantstoworldcapitalismtosuccessfullycompetewiththealreadyestablishedforeigncapitalandespeciallythemultinationalcorporations.Theabsenceoftheagencyofamature,indigenousentrepreneurialclasswassorelyfeltinmanyofthepost-colonialAfricanstatesandcanbeseenasacriticaldrawbackeventoday,forexample,inmostpartsoftheformerSovietUnion.Second,Indiawasfortunatetohaveabroadsocietalconsensusonthenatureandpathofdevelopment

tobefollowedafterindependence.Forexample,theGandhians,theSocialists,thecapitalistsaswellastheCommunists(barringbriefsectarianphases),wereallmoreorlessagreedonthefollowingagenda:amulti-prongedstrategyofeconomicdevelopmentbasedonself-reliance;rapidindustrialisationbasedonimport-substitutionincludingofcapitalgoodsindustries;preventionofimperialistorforeigncapitaldomination;landreformsinvolvingabolitionofzamindari,tenancyreforms,introductionofcooperatives,especiallyservicecooperatives,formarketing,credit,etc;growthtobeattemptedalongwithequity,i.e.,thegrowthmodelwastobereformistwithawelfare,pro-poororientation;positivediscriminationorreservation,foraperiod,infavourofthemostoppressedinIndiansociety,theScheduledCastesandTribes;thestatetoplayacentralroleinpromotingeconomicdevelopment,includingthroughdirectstateparticipationintheproductionprocess,i.e.,throughthepublicsector,andsoon.Mostimportant,therewasagreementthatIndiawastomakethisuniqueattemptatplannedrapid

industrializationwithinademocraticandcivillibertarianframework.Alltheindustrializedcountriesoftheworlddidnothavedemocracyandcivillibertiesduringtheinitialperiodoftheirtransitiontoindustrialismorperiodof‘primitiveaccumulation’.Nehruandothersincludingthecapitalistswereacutelyawarethattheyhadchosenanunchartedpath.Yet,theywerecommittedtoit.NobodyinIndiaeverarguedforavariantofthemodelfollowedinpartsofLatinAmerica,EastAsia,etc.,whereanauthoritariangovernmentinpartnershipwiththecapitalistswouldpushthroughaprocessofrapiddevelopmentinahot-housefashion.Itisthisconsensus,aproductofthenatureofthenationalmovementinIndia,whichenabledIndia,virtuallyaloneamongthepost-colonialdevelopingnations,tobuild,retainandnurtureafunctioningdemocracy.

PlanningandPublicSector

Asearlyasthelatenineteenthcentury,intheeconomicthinkingoftheearlynationalistssuchasM.G.RanadeandDadabhaiNaoroji,thestatewasassignedacriticalroleineconomicdevelopmentofIndia.Thistrendofseekingstateinterventionandnotleavingeconomicforcesentirelytothemarketgotfurthercrystallizedandacquiredwidespreadacceptanceintheinter-warperiod,partlyduetotheinfluenceofKeynesianeconomicideas,theexperienceoftheNewDealintheUSandtheSovietexperiment.In1934,N.R.Sarkar,thePresidentoftheFederationofIndianChambersofCommerceandIndustry(FICCI),the

leadingorganizationofIndiancapitalists,proclaimed:‘Thedaysofundilutedlaissez-fairearegoneforever.’Voicingtheviewsoftheleadershipofthecapitalistclass,headdedthat,forabackwardcountrylikeIndia,acomprehensiveplanofeconomicdevelopmentcoveringallaspectsoftheeconomy,agriculture,industry,power,banking,finance,andsoon,chalkedoutandcoordinatedbyahighpowered‘NationalPlanningCommission’,wasessentialforhertomakeastructuralbreakwiththepastandachieveherfullgrowthpotential.’In1938,undertheleadershipofJawaharlalNehru,thegreatestchampionofplannedeconomicdevelopmentforIndia,theNationalPlanningCommittee(NPC)wassetup,whichthroughitsdeliberationsoverthenextdecade,drewupacomprehensiveplanofdevelopment,itsvarioussub-committeesproducingtwenty-ninevolumesofrecommendations.Apartfromthegeneralrecognitionoftheneedforstateplanning,therewasawideconsensusemerging

aroundthenotionthattheroleofthestatewouldnotonlyinvolvetheproperuseoffiscal,monetaryandotherinstrumentsofeconomicpolicyandstatecontrolandsupervisionoverthegrowthprocess,butwouldalsohavetoincludeacertainamountofdirectparticipationintheproductionprocessthroughthepublicsector.ThefamousKarachiResolutionofCongressin1931(asamendedbytheAICC)envisagedthat‘theStateshallownorcontrolkeyindustriesandservices,mineralresources,railways,waterways,shippingandothermeansofpublictransport.’4Indianbusinessleaderswerealso,alongwithNehruandtheNPC,amongtheearlyproponentsofthepublicsectorandpartialnationalization.ThecriticalreasonforbusinesssupporttothepublicsectorwaselaboratedinthePlanofEconomicDevelopmentforIndia,popularlycalledtheBombayPlan,authoredbybusinessleadersin1945.TheBombayPlansawthekeycauseofIndia’sdependenceontheadvancedcountriestobetheabsenceofanindigenouscapitalgoodsindustry.AnticipatingabasicelementoftheSecondPlanstrategy,theBombayPlandeclared,‘Weconsideritessentialthatthislack(ofcapitalgoodsindustries)shouldberemediedinasshorttimeaspossible.ApartfromitsimportanceasameansofquickeningthepaceofindustrialdevelopmentinIndia,itwouldhavetheeffectofultimatelyreducingourdependenceonforeigncountriesfortheplantandmachineryrequiredbyusand,consequently,ofreducingourrequirementofexternalfinance.’5Itwasfeltthatinthedevelopmentofcapitalgoodsindustriesandotherbasicandheavyindustries,whichrequiredhugefinancesandhadalongtime-lagforreturns,thepublicsectorwouldhavetoplayacriticalrole.WhileNehruandtheleftnationalistsontheonehandandthecapitalists,ontheother,wereagreedonthisissueoftheneedforthepublicsectortoreduceexternaldependence,theydifferedonitsscopeandextent.Theformersawplanningandthepublicsectorasastepinthesocialistdirection,whereasthelattersawitasaninstrumentofpromotingindependentcapitalismandofpre-emptingsocialismbyhelpingcombineequitywithgrowth.Thistensionbetweenthetwoapproacheswastopersistforsometime,particularlyintheearlyyears.In1947,forexample,whentheEconomicProgrammeCommitteeappointedbytheAICCandheaded

byJawaharialNehrunotonlylaiddowntheareas,suchasdefence,keyindustriesandpublicutilitieswhichweretobestartedunderthepublicsectorbutalsoaddedthat‘inrespectofexistingundertakingstheprocessoftransferfromprivatetopublicownershipshouldcommenceafteraperiodoffiveyears,’6thecapitalistswerealarmedandhowlsofprotestensued.Signsofaccommodationwereseeninthe1948IndustrialPolicyResolution(IPR)which,whiledelineatingspecificareasforthepublicandtheprivatesector,addedthatthequestionofnationalizinganyexistingindustrywouldbereviewedaftertenyearsanddealtwithonthebasisofcircumstancesprevailingatthattime.EvenaftertheIndianparliament

inDecember1954accepted‘thesocialistpatternofsocietyastheobjectiveofsocialandeconomicpolicy’7andCongressinitsAvadisession(1955)elaboratedthesharpleftwardswingontheselines,the1956IPRandtheSecondPlan,whileconsiderablyexpandingthescopeofthepublicsector,madenomentionofnationalizingexistingindustries.Infact,themodelprojectedwasofa‘mixedeconomy’wherethepublicandtheprivatesectorswerenotonlytoco-existbutweretobecomplementarytoeachotherandtheprivatesectorwastobeencouragedtogrowwithasmuchfreedomaspossiblewithinthebroadobjectivesofthenationalplan.ItisanothermatterthatthegreatemphasisonheavyandcapitalgoodsindustriesintheSecondPlan,byitselfledtoamajorshifttowardsthepublicsectorasthesewereareaswhich,itwascommonlyagreed,couldbebasicallydevelopedbythissector.ItmaybenotedthatNehrurefusedtopushhisownideologicalpositionsbeyondapoint,muchtothe

disappointmentofsectionsoftheleft,stillundertheinfluenceofaStalinisttypeoforthodoxMarxismor,‘Stalin-Marxism’.IntheevolutionofNehru’sthought,fromasearlyasthelatethirties,socialismhadbecomeinseparablefromdemocracy.Therefore,anystepinthatdirection,suchasplanningandthepublicsector,hadtobeintroducedinademocraticmanner,capableofcarryingsocietyalongintheeffort.PlanningforNehruhadtobeconsensual,andnotacommandperformance,evenifitmeanttoningdownmanyofhisobjectives.ThiswastheperspectivewithwhichthePlanningCommission(establishedon15March1950)

functioned,despitetheenormousdefactopoweritexercisedwithNehruhimselfasitschairperson.TheFirstPlan(1951-56)essentiallytriedtocompleteprojectsathandandtomeettheimmediatecrisissituationfollowingtheendoftheWar.IndependencehadcomealongwiththedislocationcausedbythePartition,includingthemassiveproblemofrefugeesresultingfromthelargestmassmigrationinhistoryinthespaceofafewyears.ItiswiththeSecondPlan(1956-61)thatthecelebratedNehru-Mahalanobis(Prof.P.C.MahalanobisplayedaleadingroleindraftingtheSecondPlan)strategyofdevelopmentwasputintopracticeanditwascontinuedintheThirdPlan(1961-66).AbasicelementofthisstrategywastherapiddevelopmentofheavyandcapitalgoodsindustriesinIndia,mainlyinthepublicsector.(ThreesteelplantsweresetupinthepublicsectorwithintheSecondPlanperiod.)Importsubstitutioninthisareawasseenasanimperativenotonlybecauseitwasseenascriticalforself-relianceandreductionofexternaldependencebutalsobecauseitwasassumedthatIndianexportscouldnotgrowfastenoughtoenabletheimportofthenecessarycapitalgoodsandmachinery—anexportpessimismwhichhasbeencriticizedinlateryears,thoughitwasquitecommonlyacceptedatthattime.Themodelalsosawsomeforeignaidandinvestmentasessentialintheinitialphasetofinancethemassivestep-upininvestmentthoughtheobjectivewastodoawaywiththisneedassoonaspossiblebyrapidlyincreasingdomesticsavings.(Infact,intheinitialyearsafterindependence,NehruhadtriedtowooforeigninvestmentsintoIndia,muchtothechagrinof,asyetnottooconfident,Indiancapitalists.)Theshiftinfavourofheavyindustrywastobecombinedwithpromotinglabour-intensivesmalland

cottageindustriesfortheproductionofconsumergoods.This,aswellaslabour-absorbingandcapital-creatingcommunityprojectsinagriculture,promotedbycommunitydevelopmentprogrammesandagriculturalcooperativeswereseen(toooptimistically,aslatereventsshowed)astheimmediatesolutionstotheescalatingproblemofunemployment,withoutthestatehavingtomakelargeinvestmentsintheseareas.(Seechapter30).

AnothercriticalelementoftheNehru-Mahalanobisstrategywastheemphasisongrowthwithequity.Hence,theissueofconcentrationanddistributioninindustryandagriculturewasgivenalotofattentionthoughperhapsnotwithcommensuratesuccess.Itmaybeaddedthatthestrategydidnotpositequityagainstgrowthbutassumedthathighergrowthenabledhigherlevelsofequityandwascriticalformeetingthechallengeofpoverty;utmostattentionwasthereforegiventorapidgrowth.Statesupervisionofdevelopmentalongplannedlines,dividingactivitybetweenpublicandtheprivate

sector,preventingriseofconcentrationandmonopoly,protectingsmallindustry,ensuringregionalbalance,canalizingresourcesaccordingtoplannedprioritiesandtargets,etc.—allthisinvolvedthesettingupofanelaborateandcomplicatedsystemofcontrolsandindustriallicensing,whichwasdonethroughtheIndustriesDevelopmentandRegulationAct(IDRA)of1951.Further,thebalanceofpayments’crisisandacuteshortageofforeignexchangethatoccurredin1956-7,attheverystartoftheSecondPlan,ledtotheimpositionofstringentimportandforeignexchangecontrols.TheseedsoftheKafkaesqueweboflicence-quotarulesandregulationswerethuslaidandinlateryearsitwasfoundthatitwasnoteasytodismantleasystemthathadacquiredaviciousstrangleholdovertheIndianeconomy.Thebureaucracy-politiciannexusandcertainsectionsofbusinessthatwerebeneficiariesofthesystemresistedsuchachange.

Achievements

WeshallnowbrieflyreviewsomeoftheboldbeginningsmadeintheNehruyearsduringwhichthefirstthreePlanswereconceived,thoughthefullimpactofmanyoftheinitiativeswastobefeltintheyearsfollowinghisdeath.Considerableprogressonseveralfrontswasmadeduringthefirstphaseofthedevelopmenteffort,

spanningthefirstthreeFive-YearPlans,i.e.,bythemid-sixties.Theoveralleconomyperformedimpressivelycomparedtothecolonialperiod.India’snationalincomeorGrossNationalProduct(GNP)grewatanaveragerateofabout4percentperannum,between1951and1964-65(omittingthelastyearoftheThirdPlan,i.e.,1965-66,whichsawanunprecedenteddroughtandawar).Thiswasroughlyfourtimestherateofgrowthachievedduringthelasthalfcenturyofcolonialrule.TherateofgrowthachievedbyIndiaafterindependencecomparedfavourablywiththeratesachievedbytheadvancedcountriesatacomparablestage,i.e.,duringtheirearlydevelopment.ToquotetheeminenteconomistProfK.N.Raj:8

Japanisgenerallybelievedtobeacountrywhichgrewrapidlyinthelatterpartofthe19thandthefirstquarterofthe20thcentury;yettherateofgrowthofnationalincomeinJapanwasslightlylessthan3percentperannumintheperiod1893-1912anddidnotgouptomorethan4percentperannumeveninthefollowingdecade.JudgedbycriteriasuchasthesethegrowthrateachievedinIndiainthelastdecadeandahalf(1950-65)iscertainlyamatterforsomesatisfaction.

Steppinguptherateofgrowthrequiredasubstantialincreaseintheinvestmentrate.Animportantachievementinthisperiodwastheriseinthesavingsandinvestmentrates.Onthebasisofratherrudimentarydata,theDraftOutlineoftheFourthPlanestimatedthatdomesticsavingsandtotalinvestmentintheIndianeconomywereboth5.5percentofnationalincomein1950-51,risingtosavingsof10.5percentandinvestmentof14percentin1965-66.Thegapbetweendomesticsavingsandinvestmentinthelateryearswasmetpartlybyliquidatingtheforeignexchangereserves(mainlythehugesterlingbalances,aboutRs16billion,thatEnglandowedIndiain1947,becauseoftheforcedcreditshehadextractedfromIndiaduringtheWar)andpartlythroughforeignborrowingandaid.Ithasbeenestimatedthatthetotal

investmentin1965-66wasnearlyfivetimesthe1951-52levelinnominaltermsandmorethanthreetimesinrealterms.Ontheagrarianfront,thecomprehensivelandreformmeasuresinitiatedsoonafterindependence,the

settingupofamassivenetworkforagriculturalextensionandcommunitydevelopmentworkatthevillagelevel,thelargeinfrastructuralinvestmentinirrigation,power,agriculturalresearch,andsoon,hadcreatedtheconditionsforconsiderableagriculturalgrowthinthisperiod.DuringthefirstthreePlans(againleavingout1965-66),Indianagriculturegrewatanannualrateofover3percent,agrowthrate7.5timeshigherthanthatachievedduringthelasthalfcenturyorsoofthecolonialperiod.Thegrowthratesachievedcomparedveryfavourablywithwhatwasachievedbyothercountriesinacomparablesituation,sayChinaorJapan.Forexample,Japanachievedagrowthrateoflessthan2.5percentbetween1878-1912andanevenlowergrowthratetill1937.WhatwasparticularlycreditablewasthatIndia,unlikemostothercountries(suchasChina,Japan,Korea,Taiwan,SovietUnion,Britain,etc.)achieveditslandreformsandagriculturalgrowthinthecontextofcivillibertiesandamoderndemocraticstructure.However,thecommendableagriculturalgrowthachievedduringthisperiodwasnotsufficienttomeetthegrowingdemandofagriculturalproduce,necessitatingincreasingimportsoffoodgrainsthroughoutthefirstthreePlans.Since1956,IndiahadtorelyheavilyonfoodimportsfromtheUSunderthecontroversialPL-480scheme.ItwasonlyaftertheprocessoftheGreenRevolutiontookoff,sincethelatesixties,thatthisdependenceonimportsceased.(ThewholeissueoflandreformsandagriculturalgrowthwhichaffectedthelivesofnotonlythevastmajorityoftheIndianpopulationdependentonagriculturebuttheIndianeconomyasawholehasbeendealtwithseparatelyinchapters28,29and30.)Industry,duringthefirstthreePlans,grewevenmorerapidlythanagriculture,atacompoundgrowth

rateof7.1percentperannumbetween1951and1965.Theindustrialgrowthwasbasedonrapidimportsubstitution,initially,ofconsumergoodsandparticularly,sincetheSecondPlan,ofcapitalgoodsandintermediategoods.TheemphasisonthelattersincetheSecondPlanwasreflectedinthefactthat70percentofPlanexpenditureonindustrywenttometal,machineryandchemicalindustriesintheSecondPlanand80percentintheThirdPlan.Consequently,‘thethree-foldincreaseinaggregateindexofindustrialproductionbetween1951and1969wastheresultofa70percentincreaseinconsumergoodsindustries,aquadruplingoftheintermediategoodsproductionandaten-foldincreaseintheoutputofcapitalgoods,’9astupendousgrowthofthecapitalgoodssectorbyanystandards.Tables25.1and25.2reflectthisgrowth-pattern(overalongerperiod)inwhichintermediateand

capitalgoodsindustrieslikebasicmetals,chemicals,transportequipmentandelectricalandnon-electricalmachinerygrewveryrapidlyandmuchfasterthanconsumergoodsindustriesliketextiles,particularlybetween1951and1971.Table25.1:IndicesofIndustrialProductioninIndia:1951-1979

Table25.2:RatesofGrowthinIndianManufacturing:1951-52to1982-83(percent)

ThisgrowthpatternwentalongwayinreducingIndia’sneartotaldependenceontheadvancedcountriesforbasicgoodsandcapitalequipment,whichwasnecessaryforinvestmentorcreationofnewcapacity.Atindependence,tomakeanycapitalinvestment,virtuallytheentireequipmenthadtobeimported.Forexample,in1950,Indiamet89.8percentofitsneedsforevenmachinetoolsthroughimports.Incontrasttothis,theshareofimportedequipmentinthetotalfixedinvestmentintheformofequipmentinIndiahadcomedownto43percentin1960andamere9percentin1974,whereasthevalueofthefixedinvestmentinIndiaincreasedbyabouttwoandahalftimesoverthisperiod.Inotherwords,bythemid-seventies,Indiacouldmeetindigenouslymorethan90percentofherequipmentrequirementsformaintainingherrateofinvestment.Thiswasamajorachievement,anditconsiderablyincreasedIndia’sautonomyfromtheadvancedcountriesindeterminingherownrateofcapitalaccumulationorgrowth.Itwasthis,andthefoodsecurityIndiawasabletoachieveoncetheprocessoftheGreenRevolutiontookoff,whichexplainsIndia’sabilitytoretainanindependentforeignpolicy,bywithstandingenormousexternalpressures.Dependenceonexternalresources,foreignaidorforeignprivateinvestment,waskeptquitelow.Net

aidutilizedbyIndiawasonly0.4percentofNetNationalProductatfactorcostduringtheFirstPlan,risingto2.25and3.17percentduringtheSecondandThirdPlanandagainfallingdrasticallysincetheend-sixties(seechapter26).Also,externalresourcescamemainlyasofficialaid,andaccordingtooneestimatenetaidandnetforeignprivateinvestmentcameintheratioof6:1between1948and1961.Morethan71percentoftheforeignaidintheFirstPlanwasusedforwheatloans,whereasintheSecondandThirdPlansforeignaidwasusedoverwhelmingly,nearly98percent,tofundironandsteelprojectsandgeneralindustrialdevelopment,transportandcommunicationandpower.Overall,inthefirstthreePlans,industry,transportandpowerutilizedabout95percentoftheforeignaid.(ThecounterpartfundsgeneratedbythePL-480foodaidfromUSAwereallocatedtotheaboveareas.)10SovietaidcameintheSecondPlanpriorityareas,i.e.,coreandbasicindustriesandthattoointhepublicsector.Theweightofthepublicsectorintheoveralleconomyincreasedrapidly,anditcapturedthe

‘commandingheights’oftheeconomy,furthermarginalizingthepresenceofanalreadysmallforeignsector.(InIndia,unlikecertainLatinAmericancountries,thepublicsectordidnotgrowincollaborationwithforeignprivatecapitalormultinationalcorporations.)Thetotalpaid-upcapitalingovernmentcompaniesasaproportionofthetotalpaid-upcapitalintheentirecorporatesectorrosefrom3.4percentin1951to30percentin1961.Intheearlyseventiestheproportionhadrisentoabout50percentandby1978ithadreachedawhopping75percent.Apartfromindustryandagriculture,theearlyplannersgaveutmostprioritytothedevelopmentof

infrastructure,includingeducationandhealth,areasgreatlyneglectedinthecolonialpast.TheaverageactualPlanexpenditureduringeachofthefirstthreePlansontransportandcommunicationwasaboutRs13billion,accountingforanaverageofabout26percentofthetotalPlanexpenditureineachplan.Thecorrespondingfiguresforsocial/communityservicesandpowerwereRs9.4billionand19.9percentandRs6.16billionand10.6percentrespectively.Overtime,Planinvestmentintheseareas(andinirrigation)wastoprovecriticalbothinsteppingupprivateinvestmentandimprovingitsproductivity,aswasseensoclearlyinthecaseofagriculturewiththecominginoftheGreenRevolution.

Table25.3:GrowthinInfrastructure,HealthandEducation

Table25.3showstherapidpercapitaincreaseintheavailabilityofsomeoftheinfrastructuralandsocialbenefitsastheygrewseveraltimesfasterthanthepopulation.In1965-66,ascomparedto1950-51,installedcapacityofelectricitywas4.5timeshigher,numberoftownandvillageselectrifiedwas14timeshigher,hospitalbeds2.5timeshigher,enrolmentinschoolswasalittlelessthan3timeshigherandveryimportantlyadmissioncapacityintechnicaleducation(engineeringandtechnology)atthedegreeanddiplomalevelswashigherby6and8.5times,respectively.Thepopulationhadthenincreasedonlybyalittleoverone-thirdduringthesameperiod.JawaharlalNehruandtheearlyIndianplannerswereacutelyawareofIndia’sbackwardnessinscience

andtechnology(anarealeftconsciouslybarreninthecolonialperiod)andthereforemademassiveeffortstoovercomethisshortcoming.Nehru’s‘templesofmodern(secular)India’consistednotonlyofsteelandpowerplants,irrigationdams,etc.,butincludedinstitutionsofhigherlearning,particularlyinthescientificfield.DuringtheFirstPlanitself,high-powerednationallaboratoriesandinstitutesweresetupbytheCouncilofScientificandIndustrialResearchforconductingfundamentalandappliedresearchineachofthefollowingareas:physics,chemistry,fuel,glassandceramics,foodtechnology,drugs,electro-chemistry,roads,leatherandbuilding.In1948theAtomicEnergyCommissionwassetup,layingthefoundationsofthecreditableadvancesIndiawastomakeinthesphereofnuclearscienceandrelatedareas.Thiswasinadditiontotheunprecedentedincreaseintheeducationalopportunitiesinscienceandtechnologyintheuniversitiesandinstitutes.NationalexpenditureonscientificresearchanddevelopmentkeptgrowingrapidlywitheachPlan.Forexample,itincreasedfromRs.10millionin1949toRs.4.5billionin1977.OverroughlythesameperiodIndia’sscientificandtechnicalmanpowerincreasedmorethan12timesfrom190thousandto2.32million.Aspectaculargrowthbyanystandards,placingIndia,afterthedissolutionoftheSovietUnion,asthesecondcountryintheworldintermsoftheabsolutesizeofscientificandtechnicalmanpower.Thiswasamajorachievementdespitethefactthatthequalityofeducationingeneral,andparticularlyintheuniversitysystem,tendedtodeteriorateovertimeandtherewasmassivebraindrain,mainlytotheUS,ofasignificantpartofthebesttalentproducedinthecountry.Yet,itisanachievementofconsiderablesignificance,asincreasinglytoday‘knowledge’isbecomingthekeyfactorofproductionandthereisaglobalawarenessofthenecessitytofocusoneducationandhumanresourcedevelopment.ThatIndiacaneventhinkofparticipatingintheglobalisationprocessintoday’sworldofhightechnology,withanydegreeofcompetitivenessandequality,islargelyduetothespadeworkdonesinceindependence,particularlythegreatemphasislaidonhumanresourcedevelopmentinthesphereofscienceandtechnology.IntheenthusiasmtosupporttheverynecessaryeconomicreformsbeingundertakenbyIndiatoday

(since1991),ithasbecomefashionableinsomecirclestorundowntheeconomicachievementsoftheearlierperiods,particularlytheNehruera.Nothingcouldbemoreshort-sightedandahistorical.ItistheNehruvianerathatcreatedthebasicphysicalandhumaninfrastructure,whichwasapreconditionforindependentmodemdevelopment.Today’spossibilitiesareafunctionoftheachievementsoftheearlierperiod;theyhavenotarisendespitethem.Also,theNehruvianphasehastobeseenintheglobalhistoricalcontextofthatperiod.AsDr

ManmohanSingh,thebrillianteconomistwhoasfinanceministerinauguratedthestructuraladjustmentprogrammeforIndiain1991,wastoacknowledge:‘In1960,ifyouhadaskedanybodywhichcountrywouldbeontopoftheleagueofthethirdworldin1996or1997,Indiawasconsideredtobethe

frontrunner.’11Therewasaconsensusamongawidevarietyofeconomists,includingprominentonesintheWest—W.W.Rostow,Rosenstein-Rodan,WilfredMandelbaum,GeorgeRosen,IanLittle,BrianReddaway,tonamejustafew—thatthedirectionoftheIndianplanningeffortwasaverypositiveonewithgreatpotential.(ItwascommontoeulogisethedemocraticIndianpathasopposedtothemodelfollowedbytotalitarianChina.)Therewas,infact,adialecticalrelationshipbetweentheevolutionofcontemporarydevelopmenttheoryandtheIndianexperience.AsthereputedeconomistSukhamoyChakravartynoted,‘DominantideasofcontemporarydevelopmenteconomicsinfluencedthelogicofIndia’splans,andcorrespondingly,developmenttheorywasforawhilegreatlyinfluencedbytheIndiancase.’12

Surely,overtime,changesneededtobemade,learningfromtheexperienceofthisnovelefforttobringaboutindustrialtransformationinthemodern(mid-20thcentury)environmentofapost-colonialbackwardcountry,whilefullymaintainingafunctioningdemocracy.Clearly,someofthepolicyinstruments—viz.industriallicensing,priceanddistributioncontrols,importrestrictionsshieldinginefficientdomesticproducers,dependenceonanincreasinglyinefficientpublicsector,etc.,neededtobegivenuporamended.Also,changesinthenatureofworldcapitalismcalledfornovelwaysofseekingeconomicopportunity,which,interalia,involvedagreateropeninguptotheworldeconomy.However,thepossibilityofsuchachangegotshort-circuitedbyaseriesofcrisesfacedbyIndiainthemid-sixtiesandchangesintheinternationalandinternalpoliticalsituationwhichforcedhertomovefurtherinaprotectionist,inward-lookinganddirigistedirection.WelookmorecloselyatthisaspectinthenextchapterontheIndianeconomyfrom1965to1991.

26IndianEconomy,1965-1991

TheMid-Sixties:CrisisandResponse

ThesignificantachievementsduringthefirstthreePlansnotwithstanding,theIndianeconomywasinthegripofamassivecrisisinmanyrespectsbythemid-sixties,whichrapidlychangedIndia’simagefromamodeldevelopingcountrytoa‘basketcase’.Twosuccessivemonsoonfailuresof1965and1966,addedtotheburdenonanagriculturewhichwasbeginningtoshowsignsofstagnation,andledtoafallinagriculturaloutputby17percentandfoodgrainoutputby20percent.Therateofinflationwhichwashithertokeptverylow(till1963itdidnotexceed2percentperannum)rosesharplyto12percentperannumbetween1965and1968andfoodpricesrosenearlyattherateof20percentperannum.Theinflationwaspartlyduetothedroughtsandpartlyduetothetwowarsof1962(withChina)and1965(withPakistan)whichhadledtoamassiveincreaseindefenceexpenditure.Thegovernmentconsolidated(stateandcentre)fiscaldeficitpeakedin1966-67at7.3percoatofGDP.Thebalanceofpaymentssituation,fragilesince1956-57,deterioratedfurther,withtheforeign

exchangereserves(excludinggold)averagingabout$340millionbetween1964-65and1966-67,enoughtocoverlessthantwomonthsofimports.Thedependenceonforeignaid,whichhadbeenrisingoverthefirstthreePlans,nowincreasedsharplyduetofoodshortagesaswellastheweaknessofbalanceofpayments.Utilizationofexternalassistance,whichwas0.86percentofNetNationalProduct(NNP)atfactorcostin1951-52,increasedto1.05percentin1956-57,2.37percentin1957-58,2.86in1960-61and3.8percentin1965-66.Amortisationandinterestpaymentsaspercentageofexports(debtserviceratio)rosesharplyfrom0.8uptotheendoftheFirstPlanto3.9duringtheSecondPlan,14.3duringtheThirdPlanto20.6in1966-67andawhopping27.8in1966-67.Giventheoverallsituation,long-termplanninghadtobetemporarilyabandonedandtherewerethreeannualPlansbetween1966to1969beforetheFourthFive-YearPlancouldcommenceinApril1969.ItwasatthismostvulnerabletimefortheIndianeconomy—withhighinflation,averylowforeign

exchangebalance,foodstockssolowastothreatenfamineconditionsinsomeareas,callingforlargeimports,andnearlyhalftheimportshavingtobemetthroughforeignaid—thattheUS,themostimportantdonoratthattime,decidedtosuspenditsaidinresponsetotheIndo-Pakwar(1965)andrefusedtorenewthePL-480(wheatloan)agreementonalong-termbasis.Also,theUS,inPresidentJohnson’swords,wantedtokeepIndia‘onashortleash’sothatshedidnotstraytoomuchfromthepoliciespreferredbyit,whichtheynowsoughttopressurizeIndiatoaccept.TheUS,theWorldBankandtheIMFwantedIndiato(a)liberalizeitstradeandindustrialcontrols,(b)

devaluetherupeeand(c)adoptanewagriculturalstrategy.Whiletherewasconsiderableindigenoussupportforanewinitiativeinagriculture(whichwassuccessfullyimplemented),therewasplentyofsuspicionovertradeandindustrialliberalizationandparticularlyoverdevaluation.Asithappened,the

devaluationoftherupee(nominallyby36.5percentthougheffectivelymuchless)andthetradeliberalizationthatwasinitiatedbyPrimeMinisterIndiraGandhiinthemid-sixtiesgotassociatedwiththecontinuingrecessioninindustry,inflation,andthefailureofexportstopickup,allofwhichwasatleastpartlycausedby‘exogenous’circumstanceslikethesecondmajordroughtof1966-67andpartlybytheinadequatemannerinwhichthesepolicieswereinitiated.Inanycase,thesepolicieswerecondemnedbeforetheirlong-termeffectcouldberealized.Theperceivedfailureofthedevaluationandliberalizationofcontrolsontradeandindustrycombined

withtheresentmentatthe‘arm-twisting’resortedtobyexternalagenciesinfavourofthesepolicies,usingIndia’seconomicvulnerability,ledtoan‘economicnationalist’responsebasedonareversalto(andoftenconsiderableaccentuationof)theearlierpoliciesofcontrolsandstateintervention.TheimmediateimperativewasseentobetherestoringofthehealthofIndia’sbalanceofpaymentssituation,creationofsufficientforeignexchangereservesandtheremovalofdependenceonfoodimportsbyimprovingagriculturalproductionandcreatingfoodreserves.Themethodchosenformeetingthebalanceofpaymentscrisisandreducingthefiscaldeficit(thetwo

beinglinked)wasaseveretighteningofthebelt,involvingdrasticcutsingovernmentexpenditureratherthanincreasesintaxlevels.Thecutfellmainlyongovernmentcapitalexpenditure,whichinrealtermsdecreasedbyaboutfiftypercentbetween1966-67and1970-71.Thiswasanimportantfactorinthecontinuedindustrialrecessioninthisperiod.Theindustrialslowingdowncontinuedtillthemid-seventies,theindustrialgrowthratecomingdownfromanaverageof7.8percentperyearbetween1951and1966to4.99percentperyearbetween1966and1974.Further,thepoliticaldevelopmentsinthisperiodhadimportantimplicationsforeconomicpolicy.In

the1967elections,theCongresspartyreceivedamajorsetbackintheCentreandparticularlyinthestates.TheprimeministerrespondedbyadoptingaradicalstancewhichledtodifferenceswithintheCongressandeventuallyasplitinNovember1969.AfterthesplitMrsGandhicouldretainthegovernmentonlywiththesupportoftheCommunistpartiesandsomeregionalparties,andthisaccentuatedtheradicalleftturninherpolicies.InDecember1970,shecalledforageneralelectionand,campaigningonthesloganofgaribihataoandpromisingradicalsocialistpolicies,sherompedhomewithalandslidevictoryinMarch1971.Thepost-1967periodthereforesawthelaunchingofaseriesofradicaleconomicpolicieswhichwere

tohavelong-termeffectsonIndia’sdevelopmentaleffort.Someofthesepoliciesaccentuatedtheshortcomingsthathadbeguntoemergeduringthefirstphaseofplanningitself,i.e.,inthefiftiesandearlysixties,otherscreatednewdistortions.ThemajorprivatecommercialbanksinIndiawerenationalizedin1969.ThesameyeartheMonopolyandRestrictiveTradePractices(MRTP)Act,severelyrestrictingtheactivitiesoflargebusinesshouses,waspassed.Afterthe1971electionvictory,aseriesoffurthersuchmeasuresincreasinggovernmentcontrolandinterventionwereintroducedwiththeactivesupportofleftradicalintellectualslikeP.N.Haksar,D.P.DharandMohanKumaramangalam,Thus,insurancewasnationalizedin1972andthecoalindustrywasnationalizedin1973.Adisastrouseffortwasmadetonationalizewholesalewheattradethesameyear,whichwasabandonedafterafewmonths.TheForeignExchangeRegulationAct(FERA)waspassedin1973,puttingnumerousrestrictionsonforeigninvestmentandthefunctioningofforeigncompaniesinIndia,makingIndiaoneofthemostdifficultdestinationsforforeigncapitalintheworld.Thegovernmentalsodecidedtotakeoverandrun‘sick’

companies,suchasanumberoftextilemills,ratherthanallowsuchloss-makingcompaniestoclosedown.Thedebilitatinglong-termeffectsofmanyofthesemeasuresontheoveralleconomyhavebeen

discussedlaterinthischapter.Itmustberemembered,though,thatthenewpolicies,whichwerepartiallyaresultofthehistorically

specificeconomicandpoliticalsituation,metmanyofthecriticalproblemsfacedbythecountryatthattime.TheypulledIndiaoutoftheeconomiccrisismostcreditablyandrestoredherindependenceanddignityvis-à-vistheadvancedcountries.Weshallbrieflyreviewtheseachievementsinthenextsection.

TheAchievements

Intheconsiderableeconomicachievementsbetweenthemid-sixtiesandtheend-eighties,IndiraGandhi,(oftentooeasilydismissedaspopulist)playedamajorrole.Allthesearetobeviewedinlightoftheseriesofformidableinternalandexternalshockswitnessedduringthisperiod.Forexample,followingthecrisisofthemid-sixtiesdiscussedabove,therewasthegenocideinEastPakistan(Bangladesh)resultinginthehugeburdenofovertenmillionrefugeesfromthatregion(nearlyhalfthepopulationofacountrylikeAustralia!)takingshelterinIndia,the1971warwithPakistan,twodroughtsof1972and1974,themajoroil-shockof1973leadingtoaquadruplingofinternationaloilpricesandhenceofcostofoilimports,theoil-shockof1979whenoilpricesdoubled,thedisastrousharvestof1979-80causedbytheworstdroughtsinceindependence,andthewidespreadsuccessivedroughtsof1987and1988.Concertedeffortsweremadeafterthemid-sixtiesto,interalia,improvethebalanceofpayments

situation,createfoodsecurity,introduceanti-povertymeasuresandreducedependenceonimportsforcriticalinputslikeoil.TheseenabledIndiatoweathertheimpactofthedroughts,warandtheoil-shockswithoutgettingintoadebtcrisisandarecessionaryspinashappenedinthecaseofanumberofdevelopingcountries,especiallyinLatinAmericaintheeighties,andwithoutseriousfamineconditions,letalonethehugenumberoffaminedeathsthatoccurredinCommunistChinainthelatefifties.Onthefoodfrontthesituationimprovedrapidly.TheadoptionoftheGreenRevolutionstrategyof

introducingapackageofhighyieldvariety(HYV)seeds,fertilisersandotherinputsinaconcentratedmannertosomesuitableselectareaspaidimmediatedividendsincreatingfoodsecurityandpovertyreduction(discussedindetailinchapter31).Between1967-68and1970-71foodgrainproductionroseby35percent.Netfoodimportsfellfrom10.3milliontonnesin1966to3.6millionin1970,whilefoodavailabilityincreasedfrom73.5milliontonnesto89.5milliontonnesoverthesameperiod.Foodavailabilitycontinuedtoincreasesharplyto110.25milliontonnesin1978and128.8milliontonnesin1984andfoodstockshadcrossedthe30milliontonnesmarkbythemid-eighties,puttinganendtoIndia’s‘beggingbowl’imageandcreatingconsiderablefoodsecurityeventomeetextremecrisissituations.Forexample,theeconomywasabletoabsorbthemassivesuccessivedroughtsof1987-88withoutunduepressureonpricesoffoodorimports.Infact,theruralpovertyindexcontinuedtoshowadeclineinthesecrisisyearsasruralemploymentandincomesweremaintainedthroughgovernmentprogrammesusingthesurplusfoodstocks.Thiswasthefirsttimesinceindependencethatruralpovertywasnotexacerbatedduringadroughtorapoorharvest.Apartfromfoodself-sufficiency,certainotherfeaturesemergedthatpointedtowardsagreater

autonomyoftheIndianeconomyandincreasedself-reliance.Thefiscaldeficitwasbroughtdownsharply

from7.3percentofGDPin1966-67to3.8percentin1969-70.Thebalanceofpaymentssituationimprovedconsiderablywithreducedfoodandotherimports,acertainimprovementinexportsandparticularlywiththesurgeinremittancesmadebyIndianworkersfromtheoil-boomrichMiddleEast.By1978-79,theforeignexchangereserveshadrisentoapeakofabout$7.3billion(includinggoldandSDRs),morethanninemonthsofimportscovercomparedtolessthantwomonthscoverin1965-66.Giventhearmtwistingofthedonors,self-reliancewasseenastheneedtoreducedependenceon

foreignaidnotonlyincrisissituationsuchasthosecreatedbydroughtorothernaturaldisasters,butalsoonaidasashort-termmeanstodevelopkeycapabilities,aswasenvisagedintheearlierNehru-Mahalanobisstrategy.Partlyasaresultofthisshiftinperspective,foreignaidbegantodeclinerapidly.NetaidasaproportionofNetNationalProduct(NNP),whichhadpeakedtoanaverageof4.22percentduringtheThirdPlan(thelastfewcrisisyearsofthePlanpartlyaccountingforthishighrate),camedownto0.35in1972-73androseonlyslightlyafterthe1973oilcrisis,butyetaveragednotmorethan1percentofNNPtill1977-78.Thedebt-serviceratio,i.e.,theannualoutflowofinterestandrepatriationofprincipalduetoexistingdebtasaproportionofexportsofgoodsandservices,felltoalowandeasilymanageable10.2percentin1980-81fromanestimated23percentin1970-71and16.5percentin1974-75.Wehavealreadyseen(chapter25)thattherapidexpansionintheindigenouscapitalgoodsindustry,

whichstartedintheNehruyears,hadgreatlyreducedIndia’sdependenceontheexternalworldformaintainingherrateofinvestment(andgrowth)astheshareofequipmentthatneededtobeimportedinthetotalfixedcapitalinvestmentinIndiahadfallenfrom43percentto9percentbetween1960and1974.Privateforeigninvestmentcontinuedtobeverylowinproportiontototalinvestment.Unlikemany

LatinAmericanandsomeEastAsiancountries,foreigncapitalormultinationalcorporationsplayedaveryminorroleinIndia.In1981-82,onlyabout10percentofvalueaddedinthefactorysectorofminingandmanufacturingwasaccountedforbyforeignfirmswhichincludedFERAcompanieswithdilutedforeignshareholding.Tilltheeighties,mostforeigncollaborationsweretechnologicalcollaborationsnotinvolvinganyforeignshareorequitycapital.Forexample,in1977-80,86.5percentoftechnologyimportagreementsdidnotinvolveanyforeignequity.Foreigncapitalwasmarginalinthefinancialsphereaswell.Itwasnegligibleintheinsurancesectorandforeignbanksaccountedforonly8.9percentoftotaldepositsintheorganizedbankingsectorin1970.Between1969(theyearofbanknationalization)and1981,whilethenumberofbranchesofallcommercialbanksinIndiarosefrom8,262to35,707,thenumberofbranchesofforeignbanksrosefrom130to132.By1992,thecorrespondingfigureswere60,601and140.(Itmaybenotedhere,asanaside,thatmorethan60percentofthemassivebranchexpansionoftheIndianbankswasintheruralareas,notonlycreatingamuchwiderbaseformoppingupsavingsbutalsoforextendingcredit,andthusenablingprioritycredittoagriculture,andthattooincreasinglytothepoorerhouseholdsaspartofthesecondwaveoflandreformandthegaribihataocampaign.(Seealso,chapter30.)Thus,whilethevolume,offoreignprivateinvestmentremainedmarginalandforeignaiddeclinedand

theratioofforeignsavingstototalinvestmentfellandremainedlowthroughouttheseventies,theratesofdomesticsavingsandinvestmentincreasedrapidly.AsTable26.1shows,fromanaveragesavingsrateof10.58percentandarateofGrossDomesticCapitalFormationorinvestmentof11.84percentinthe

fifties,thesavingsandinvestmentratesnearlydoubledto21.22percentand20.68percentrespectivelybetween1975-76and1979-80.Theeightiesandninetiessawfurtherincreasesintheratesofdomesticsavingsandcapital-formation,makingthemcomparabletoseveralhighgrowtheconomies.

Table26.1:GrossDomesticSavingsandGrossDomesticCapitalFormation

(AspercentofGDPatcurrentmarketprices)

AnnualAverage GrossDomesticSavings

GrossDomesticCapitalFormation(Adjusted)

1950-51to1959-60 10.58 11.84

1960-61to1969-70 13.53 15.63

1970-71to1979-80 18.92 19.06

1975-76to1979-80 21.22 20.68

1980-81to1989-90 20.03 21.99

1990-91to1995-96 23.80 25.35

Source:CalculatedfromEconomicSurvey,1996,GOI

Anewfeatureoftheeightieswasthephenomenalincreaseinnewstockmarketissues,thestockmarketthusemergingasanimportantsourceoffundsforindustry.Ithasbeenestimatedthatin1981thecapitalmarketaccountedforonly1percentofdomesticsavings,whereasbytheendoftheeightiesthisproportionhadincreasedbyaboutseventimes.Thenewstockissuein1989wasRs.6,500crores,whichwasabout7.25percentofGrossDomesticSavingsof1989-90.Anotherestimateshowsthatin1990IndiancompaniesraisedanunprecedentedRs12,300croresfromtheprimarystockmarket.Theearlyeightiesalsosawahighlysuccessfulbreakthroughintheimportsubstitutionprogrammefor

oilunderthesupervisionoftheONGC(OilandNaturalGasCommission),apublicsectororganization.ThelargeloanreceivedfromtheIMFinthisperiodhelpedthiseffortconsiderably.In1980-81,domesticproductionofoilwas10.5milliontonnesandimports20.6milliontonnes,theoilimportbilltakingup75percentofIndia’sexportearnings!WithnewoilfindsattheBombayHighoilfields,bytheendoftheSixthPlan(1980-85),thetargetofindigenousproductionof29milliontonneswasachieved.Asaresult,in1984-85,thenetimportofoilandoilproductswaslessthanathirdofthedomesticconsumptionandtheoilimportbillwasalsodowntoathirdofexportearnings.Bythemid-seventies,theindustrialgrowthratealsostartedpickingupfromalowofabout3.4percent

between1965-75toabout5.1percentbetween1975-85.Ifthecrisisyearof1979-80wasomitted,thentheindustrialgrowthrateduring1974-75to1978-79and1980-81to1984-85wasabout7.7percentperannum.Intheeightiesasawholetheindustrialgrowthratemaintainedahealthyaverageofabouteightpercentperyear.Againitwasintheeightiesthatthebarrierofthelow,so-called‘Hindurateofgrowth’of3to3.5percentthatIndiahadmaintainedovertheprevioustwodecadeswasbrokenandtheeconomygrewatover5.5percent.ByoneestimatetheaveragerealGDPgrowthratebetween1980to1989wasanimpressive6percent.1

Long-termConstraints:TheNeedforReform

WhileontheonehandtheIndianeconomyintheeightiesseemedtobedoingquitewell,ontheotherhandtherewerecertainlong-termstructuralweaknessesbuildingupwhichweretoadduptoamajorcrisisby1991whenthecountrywasonthevergeofdefaulting.Itisthiscrisiswhichbroughthometothecountrytheimmediatenecessityofbringingaboutstructuraladjustmentandeconomicreform.Broadly,therewerethreesetsofproblemswhichhadgatheredstrengthintheIndianeconomyover

timeandwhichneededurgentreform.Thefirstsetofproblemsrelatedtotheemergenceofstructuralfeaturesthatbredinefficiency.The

import-substitution-industrialisation(ISI)strategybasedonheavyprotectiontoindigenousindustrieswasaswesawearlier,veryeffectiveindeepeningandwideningIndia’sindustrialbaseandgivingtheeconomyalotoffreedomfromforeigndependence.However,overtime,theexcessiveprotectionthroughimportrestrictionsstartedleadingtoinefficiencyandtechnologicalbackwardnessinIndianindustry.Thissituationwasfurtheraccentuatedbytheso-called‘licence-quota’Raj,i.e.,awholeplethoraof

rules,regulationsandrestrictionswhichstifledentrepreneurshipandinnovation.TheMRTPActandthereservationofsectorsforsmall-scaleindustryarecasesinpoint.TheMRTPActwentagainstthebasicprincipleofeconomiesofscale,whichisattheheartofcapitalistdevelopment(orforthatmatterofsocialistproduction).Italsopunishedefficiency,asanycompany,whichexpandedduetoefficientproduction,goodmanagementandresearchanddevelopment(R&D),wouldfacesevererestrictions,includingrefusalofpermissiontoincreasecapacityonceitcrossedaprescribedlimit.IthasbeenpointedoutthatthecombinationoftheISIstrategyfocussingonthedomesticmarkettogetherwithrestrictionsonlargeindustryfromfullyexploitingthedomesticmarketthroughMRTPrestrictionswasparticularlydamagingforgrowth.IndustrycouldneitherexpandinthedomesticmarketnorweretheISIpoliciesencouragingthemtoexploitforeignmarkets.Again,reservingcertainareas(thelistkeptgrowing)forsmall-scaleindustriesmeantexcludingthese

areasfromtheadvantagesofscaleandlargerresourcesforR&Dactivities.Thismadethesectorofteninternationallyuncompetitive,leadingtoIndialosingouttoitscompetitorsinmanyareas.Also,thepolicytowardssmall-scaleindustryforcedentrepreneursinthereservedareastoremainsmall,asanyexpansionasaresultofefficientandprofitablefunctioningwoulddenytheenterprisethespecialincentivesandconcessions.Thisinhibitedefficiencyandinnovationinthissector.Further,industriallicensingcutoffdomesticcompetitionjustasimportcontrolcutoffexternalcompetitionandthetwocombinedleftlittleimpetusforindigenousindustrytobeefficient.ThelargepublicsectorinIndia,whichcontrolled‘thecommandingheights’oftheeconomy,alsobegan

toemergeasamajorsourceofinefficiency.TheearlyemphasisonthepublicsectorwascriticaltoIndia’sindustrialdevelopment.Itisthepublicsectorwhichenteredthecoreareas,diversifiedIndia’sindustrialstructure,particularlywithregardtocapitalgoodsandheavyindustry,andreducedIndia’sdependenceonforeigncapital,foreignequipmentandtechnology.However,overtime,thepoliticalandbureaucraticpressureonthepublicsectorundertakingsgraduallyledtomostofthemrunningataloss.Theywereoverstaffed,oftenheadedbypoliticianswhohadtobegivensinecures,becamevictimsofirresponsibletradeunionismandwereunabletoexercisevirtuallyanyefficiencyaccountabilityontheiremployees.State-runutilitieslikeelectricityboardsandroadtransportcorporationwerenotoriousforincurringenormouslosses.Apartfromrampantcorruptionandlackofaccountability,theseenterprises,

underpopulistpressure,oftenchargedratesthatdidnotcoverevenasmallfractionoftheactualcosts.Theextremecaseofcoursewasoftherecent(1997)Punjabgovernmentdecisiontodistributeelectricityfreetofarmers!Eventhecriticalbankingandinsurancesector,whichafternationalizationhadexpandedphenomenally,moppinguphugeresources,soonbegantosufferfromthepublicsectormalaiseofinefficiencyandpoliticalinterference.Manybanksstartedrunningatalossandtheinsurancesectorremainedinefficientandcoveredonlyafractionofitsenormouspotentialmarket.Whilelicensing,MRTP,small-scalereservationandthelikemadeentryorexpansionofbusinessvery

difficult;sincethemid-seventiesvirtuallynoexitwaspossibleforinefficientloss-makingcompaniesastheycouldnotclosedownorretrenchwithoutgovernmentpermission.Powerfultradeunions,whichhadledtoadramaticincreaseincollectivebargaining,theindexnumberofman-dayslostrisingfrom100in1961(baseyear)to891.6in1980,madesuchclosuresverydifficult.Thegovernmentendeduptakingovermany‘sick’companieswhichotherwiseneededtobecloseddown—theNationalTextileCorporationwhichtookoveranumberof‘sick’textilemillsbecomingamajorcontributortothetotallossesincurredbythepublicsector.AllthisledtotheinvestmentefficiencyinIndiabeingveryloworthecapitaloutputratiobeingvery

high.A1965studyshowsthatthepublicsectorHeavyElectricalsLimitedwassetupinBhopalwithacapitaloutputratioofbetween12to14—withnoquestionsbeingaskedorenquirysetup!Thoughthisisanextremecase,estimatesfortheeconomyasawholeshowthatthecapitalusedperunitofadditionaloutputortheincrementalcapitaloutputratio(ICOR)keptrising,itbeingalittleover2.0duringtheFirstPlanandreaching3.6duringtheThirdPlan.Accordingtooneestimatebetween1971and1976theICORhadtouchedahighof5.76.Thisexplainswhydespitesubstantialincreasesintherateofinvestment(seeTable26.1)therewasanactualdecreaseintheoverallgrowthratesofaggregateoutputorGDPbetweenthefiftiesandseventies.TheICORstarteddecliningintheeightiesthoughitstillremainedaround4inthenineties.Evenduringtheeighties,oneestimateshowsthatthe(simple)averagerateoffinancialreturnonemployedcapitalinpublicsectorenterpriseswasaslowas2.5percent.Actually,therateofreturnwasmuchlowerifthe14petroleumenterpriseswereexcluded,astheseaccountedfor77percentoftheprofitsin1989-90.Thecontrols,restrictions,interventionetc.,discussedabovewereparadoxicallyoftenresortedtointhe

nameofintroducing‘socialist’principlesandequitybutactuallyendedupbuildingadistorted,backwardcapitalism,astheywentagainstthebasiclawsofcapitalismsuchastheneedforcontinuousexpansiononthebasisofinnovationandefficientinvestment.Lowefficiencyorlowproductivitylevelsareofcriticalconsequenceintoday’s‘post-imperialist’world,whereeconomicsuperiorityisestablishedandtransferofsurplusfromonecountrytoanotheroccursnotthroughdirectpoliticaloreconomicdominationbutthroughprocessessuchasunequalexchangeoccurringbetweencountrieswithdifferentproductivitylevels.Economicthinkersoftheleftandtherightareagreedonplacingthequestionofproductivityatthecentreofanynationaldevelopment.Intoday’scontextofrapidglobalization,pursuingexcessivelyautarchicpoliciesinsearchofautonomy(somethingasectionoftheIndianleftandthenewly-discoveredSwadeshipathoftheright,suchastheRSS,stillarguesfor)may,throughfallorstagnationofproductivitylevels,destroypreciselythatautonomyandpushthecountrytowardsperipheralization.ThisbringsustothesecondsetofweaknessesthatemergedintheIndiaeconomyandwhichrelateto

thecontinuationoftheinward-orienteddevelopmentalpathfollowedbyIndiasinceindependence.India

failedtomakeatimelyshiftfromtheexportpessimisminherentinthefirstthreePlans,apessimismwhich,onemustrecognize,wassharedwidelybydevelopmenteconomiststheworldoverinthefifties.ThefailurelaynotinadoptingthepoliciesthatemergedfromthewisdomofthefortiesandfiftiesbutintheinabilitytoquicklyreacttochangesoccurringintheinternationalsituationandtoworldcapitalismafterWorldWarII,particularlysincethesixtiesandseventies.Someoftheimportantchangesthatneededtobetakencognisanceofarementionedhere:first,the

natureofforeigncapitalandmultinationalcorporationswaschanging.Aprocessof‘internationalisationofproduction’hadstarted.Multinationalcorporations,insteadofjustlookingformarketsorsourcesofrawmaterial,nowlookedforcheaperproductionareas,Insteadofcreatingenclavesinthebackwardcountries,whichhadbackwardandforwardlinkageswiththehomecountry(thiswasthetypicalcolonialpattern),theywerenowbringingininvestmentswhichhadmajormultipliereffectsonthelocaleconomy,includingoftechnologytransfer.Itbecamecommonformultinationalcompaniesto‘source’alargepartofthecomponentsthatwentintothefinalproductfromalloverthedevelopingworldandevenshiftentireproductionplantstotheunder-developedcountries.Then,alongwith,andpartiallyasaresultof,theaboveprocess,thereweremassivecapitaltransfersbetweencountries,reminiscentofthecapitaltransfersofthenineteenthcenturyattheheightofcolonialexpansion,butverydifferentincharacter.Theabovetwoprocessescontributedtoanothermajorinternationaldevelopment,thatofanunprecedentedexplosionofworldtrade.Betweenthefiftiesandseventies,worldoutputofmanufacturesincreasedfourtimesbutworldtradeinmanufacturesincreasedtentimes.Thepercentageofworldproducethatwentforexportdoubledbetween1965and1990.Whatismostsignificantisthatwhiletherewasamassiveincreaseinglobalindustrialexports,theThirdWorldwasabletorapidlyincreaseitsshareoftotalindustrialexports,especiallysincetheseventies,fromabout5percentin1970todoublethefigurein1983.2

TheEastAsianMiracle,i.e.,therapidindustrializationoftheEastAsiancountries,beginninginthesixties,whichgraduallyshiftedtheindustrialbaseoftheworldfromtheWesttotheEast,tookadvantagepreciselyofthesekindsofopportunitiesofcapitalandmarketavailability.Japan’sexampleofexplosivepost-WorldWarIIgrowthwasbeingrepeatedbySouthKorea,Taiwan,Singapore,HongKongand,morerecently,Thailand,Malaysia,ChinaandIndonesia.ThefourAsianTigers,SouthKorea,HongKong,SingaporeandTaiwanincreasedtheirshareinworldexportofmanufacturesfrom1.5percentin1965to7.9percentin1990.Eventhenewlyindustrializingeconomies(NICs),Indonesia,MalaysiaandThailandincreasedtheirsharefrom0.1percentto1.5percentoverthesameperiod.3SouthKorea’smanufacturedexports,whichwerenegligiblein1962,amountedtofourtimesthoseofIndiaby1980.AgainSouthKoreawasexporting$41billionworthofmanufacturedgoodstotheOECDcountriesin1990toIndia’smere$9billion.Indiadidreasonablywelltillthemid-sixties,basingherselfonaninward-oriented,import-substitution

basedstrategy.However,shefailedtorespondadequatelytothenewopportunitiesthrownupbythechangingworldsituationdespitetheavailabilityoftheEastAsianexperience.Infact,sincethecrisisofthemid-sixties,shegotpushedbyimmediatecircumstancestotakeatighter‘protectionist’andinward-lookingtuminthelatesixtiesandearlyseventiesinsteadoftakingadvantageoftheglobalizationprocess.Infact,therestrictionsonmultinationalcorporationsandsuspicionofforeigncapitalincreasedinthis

period.Noadvantagecouldbetakenoftheinternationalizationofproductionandoftheincreased

internationalflowoffunds.Asforexports,thoughsuccessfuleffortsweremadetodiversifythem,bothintermsofcommoditycomposition(e.g.,therapidshifttomanufacturedexports,itbeing2/3oftotalexportsin1980-81risingto3/4in1989-90)andintermsofgeographicalspread,thequantitativeexpansionortheincreaseinvolumeofexportslaggedfarbehindthepotentialcreatedbytheworldexpansionoftrade,whichwassuccessfullyexploitedbytheEastAsiancountries.Infact,India’sshareinworldexportsactuallyshrunkfromabout2.4percentin1948to0.42percentin1980,risingtoastillpaltry0.6percentby1994.ThevolumeofIndia’smanufacturedexportsin1980-81washalfthatofChina,one-thirdofBrazilandaquarterofSouthKorea.Indiawasthusunabletousetheopportunitiesprovidedbythechangedworldsituationtorapidly

industrializeandtransformitseconomy,increaseincomelevelsanddrasticallyreducepovertylevels,asdidmanyoftheEastAsiancountries.SouthKorea,forexample,hadapercapitaincomelevelcomparabletoIndiainthesixties(basedonpurchasingpowerparity)andtodaySouthKoreanincomelevelsareknockingatthedoorsoflevelsachievedbyadvancedcountries,whileIndiaisstillprettymuchnearthebottomoftheheap.EvenChinachangedtrackin1978,openingupitseconomy,participatingintheglobalizationprocess,welcomingforeigninvestment,pushingupitsexports,andsoon,leadingtoacurrentgrowthratemuchhigherthanIndia’s.Between1980-89,China!srealGDP,byoneestimate,grewatanaveragerateof9.4percent,considerablyfasterthandidIndia’soverthesameperiod.ThoughthefiguresforChinaarenotfullyreliable,yeteconomistsagreethatChinawaswellaheadofIndiainthisrespect.OnemayaddherethatIndia’spoorgrowthinexportshadimplicationsregardingtheproductivity

levelsachievedinthecountry.Infact,countrieslikeJapanandSouthKoreahaveeffectivelyusedexportobligationonthepartofvariousenterprisesasamechanismofenforcinginternationalcompetitivenessthroughmaintenanceofhighproductivitylevels.Enterprisesorbusinesshouseswhichfailedtomeettheexportobligationbecauseoflackofcompetitivenesswereblacklistedandsufferedseriousconsequences,sometimesleadingtobankruptcy.ThethirdsetofproblemswhichovertooktheIndianeconomywasprimarilytheresultofcertain

politicalimperatives,andwhichwasrelatedtothemannerinwhichtheIndianstatestructureanddemocraticframeworkevolved.Moreandmoresectionsemergedwhichmadestrong,articulatedemandsonstateresources.Governments,however,wereincreasinglyunableeithertomeetthesedemandsfullyordiffusetheclamourforthem,Thisresultedinthegradualabandoningoffiscalprudencefromaboutthemid-seventies.Asituationwascreatedwherethemacroeconomicbalance,whichwasmaintainedinIndia(unlike,manyotherdevelopingcountries)withgreatcautionforthefirsttwenty-fiveyearsorsoafterindependence,wasbeingslowlyeroded.Themacroeconomicimbalancethatnowemergedtendedtobelongtermandstructuralincharacterasdistinctfromtheshort-termimbalancescreatedbyshockssuchasthoseofthemid-sixtiesortheseventies,relatedtooil.Thegradualerosionoffiscalprudencewasreflectedingovernmentexpenditurerisingconsistently,

mainlybecauseoftheproliferationofsubsidiesandgrants,salaryincreaseswithnorelationshiptoefficiencyoroutput,overstaffingandother‘populist’measuressuchasmassiveloanwaivers.Growingpoliticalinstabilityandpoliticalcompetition,astheCongressparty’ssolehegemonybegantoerode,ledtocompetitivepopulismwitheachpartytryingtooutdotheotherindistributinglargesse.Also,ithasbeenarguedthatwiththeprestigeofCongresswaning,itwasnolongerabletostandabovecompetinggroups

pressingforanimmediateincreaseintheirshareofthenationalcakeandreintheminwiththepromiseofrapidgrowthandajustincomedistributioninthefutureifcurrentdemandsweresubdued.Further,withMrsGandhiincreasinglycentralisingpowerinherhands,democraticfunctioningwithintheCongresspartydeclined,withthepartygraduallylosingitsorganizationallinkswithandcontroloverthegrassroots.Politicalbargainingbetweensectionsofsocietywasnownotdonewithinpartystructuresbutthroughbudgetallocations.Lastly,withpartiesclearlyrepresentingsectionalinterests,suchasthatoftherichandmiddlepeasants,comingtopowerinseveralstatesafterthe1967electionsandevenbeginningtohaveasayintheCentresince1977,hugebudgetaryallocationswereoftenmadewhichwereinthenatureofsectionalsubsidiesatthecostofanexpenditurepatternbestsuitedtooveralldevelopment.Howdidthesepoliticalimperativestranslateinrealeconomicterms?Aswesawearlier,the,response

tothemid-sixtiescrisiswasfiscalandbalanceofpaymentscaution.However,acertainrelaxationoffiscaldisciplinebeganafter1975andparticularlyduringtheJanataregimeof1977-79.Thefoodsubsidiesdoubledbetween1975-76and1976-77fromRs.2.5billiontoRs.5billion.ThefertilizersubsidymultipliedtentimesfromRs.0.6billionin1976-77toRs.6.03billionin1979-80.TheexportsubsidymultipliedbyaboutfourandahalftimesfromRs.0.8billiontoRs.3.75billionbetween1974-75to1978-79.During1977-79(theJanataperiod)procurementpricesforfoodgrainswereincreasedwithoutcorrespondingincreasesinissueprices,taxesonawiderangeofagriculturalinputsweredecreasedandbudgetarytransferstoloss-makingpublicsectorunitsincreased.Infact,the1979budgethasbeendescribedbyeminenteconomistsVijayJoshiandI.M.D.Littleasa‘watershedmarkingthechangefrompreviousfiscalconservatism.’4

Thefiscalprofligacycontinuedthroughtheeightiesandparticularlyduringthesecondhalf,reachingabsurdlimitswhere,forexample,theV.P.Singh-ledNationalFrontgovermnentthatcametopowerin1989announcedaloanwaiverforthefarmerswhichwouldcosttheexchequermorethanRs.100billion.Thedirectsubsidiesfromthecentralbudgetononlyfood,fertilizerandexportsin1980-81havebeenestimatedtoexceedRs.15billion,anamountequaltohalfofthetotalgrosscapitalformationinmanufacturinginthepublicsectorthatyear!Whiletherewasthisexplosivegrowthofgovernmentspending,thesavingsgeneratedbythegovernmentorpublicsectorkeptfallingwiththeirgrowinglosses.Theresultoffiscalprofligacywasthattheconsolidatedgovernment(centreandstates)fiscaldeficits

rosesharplyfrom4.1percentofGDPin1974-75to6.5percentin1979-80,9.7percentin1984-85,peakingat10.4percentin1991.Governmentsinthisperiodtendedtoseekwaysandmeansofincreasingtheirdomesticandforeignborrowingtomeetthisdeficitratherthaneithertryingtoincreasegovermnentsavingsorreducegovernmentexpenditure.Infact,thegapbetweenpublic(government)investmentandpublicsavingswidenedthreateningly.Afterthecrisisofmid-sixtiesthegaphadbeenbroughtdownto3.6percentofGDPbetween1968-69and1971-72,butroseto5.3percentin1980-81and9percentby1989-90.Thegrowinggovernmentsaving-investmentgapandthefiscaldeficithadanegativeimpactonthe

balanceofpaymentsanddebtsituation.Fromasituationofbalanceofpaymentssurplusonthecurrentaccountin1977-78of$1.5billion(1.4percentofGDP),by1980-81therewasadeficitinthecurrentaccounttothetuneof$2.9billion(1.7percentofGDP).Thedeficitincreasedto$3.5billion(1.8percentofGDP)in1984-85androseverysharplythereafterto$9.9billion(3.5percentofGDP)in1990-91.Itmustbenotedthattherapidworseningofthebalanceofpaymentssituation,especiallyinthelate

eighties,wasneitherduetoanymajorexternalshocknorduetoimportliberalization.Infact,thesecondhalfoftheeightiessawanactualimprovementintradebalancewithexportsgrowingrapidlyatanaverageofabout14percentperyearindollarterms.Theoveralleconomy’ssaving-investmentgapwhichhadrisentoanaverageofabout2.5percentofGDPbetween1985-90(asthehugepublicsavings-investmentgapcouldnotbefullycompensatedbythesubstantialexcessofhouseholdandprivatecorporatesavingoverprivateinvestment)andtheconsequentnecessityofheavyborrowinghadcausedthebalanceofpaymentsdeficit.Itmustbenotedthattheeightieswereaperiodofhighgrowth.Between1985-90,onanaverage,

India’sGDPgrewatover5.5percentperyear,industryatover7percent,capitalgoodsat10percent,consumerdurablesat12percentandsoon.However,thisgrowthwasnotaresultofanystep-upofsavingsandinvestment;inmanywaysitwasaresultofover-borrowingandover-spending.Thegrowthwasbothdebtled(likeLatinAmericaoftheseventies)andtheresultofanexplosionofdomesticbudgetaryspending.Thiskindofgrowthwasnaturallynotsustainableasthemacrocconomicimbalanceswereboundtoreachapointwhereacrashcouldnolongerbepostponed—ashappenedinLatinAmericaintheeightiesandinIndiaalmostadecadelater.Thedeterioratingfiscalandbalanceofpaymentssituationhadledtoamountingdebtproblem,both

domesticandforeign,reachingcrisisproportionsbytheendoftheeighties.Totalgovermnent(Centreandstate)domesticdebtrosefrom31.8percentofGDPin1974-75to45.7percentin1984-85to54.6percentin1989-90.Theforeigndebtsituationalsobecameveryprecariouswithdebtrisingfrom$23.5billionin1980-81to$37.3billionin1985-86to$83.8billion1990-91.Thedebtserviceratio(i.e.,paymentofprincipalplusinterestasaproportionofexportsofgoodsandservices)whichwasstillamanageable10.2percentin1980-81rosetoadangerous35percentin1990-91.Moreover,theproportionofconcessionaldebttototaldebtalsofellfromover80percenttoabout40percentinthisperiod,i.e.,increasingly,thedebtconsistedofshort-termcommercialborrowing.Theprejudiceagainstforeigndirectinvestment,whichstillremained,ledtothisexcessivedependenceonforeigndebtratherthanforeignequitycapital,andinadequatereturnsontheborrowingsledtoanunsustainabledebtserviceburden.India’sforeignexchangereservesfellfrom$5.85billionin1980-81to$4.1billionin1989-90,andin

thenextyeartheyfelldrasticallybynearlyhalfto$2.24billionin1990-91,enoughonlyforonemonth’simportcover.TheIraqiinvasionofKuwaitinAugust1990,leadingtoanincreaseinoilpricesandafallinIndianexportstotheMddleEastorGulfregion,partlycontributedtothisalarmingforeignexchangesituation.India’sinternationalcreditratingwassharplydowngradedanditwasbecomingextremelydifficulttoraisecreditabroad.Inaddition,NRI(non-residentIndian)depositsinforeignexchangebegantobewithdrawnrapidly.Insuchasituation,whereforeignlendinghadvirtuallydriedup,thegovernmentwasforcedtosell20tonnesofgoldtotheUnionBankofSwitzerlandinMarch1991totideoveritsimmediatetransactions.ByJuly1991foreignexchangereservesweredowntoameretwoweeksimportcoverdespiteloansfromtheIMF.Thecountrywasattheedgeofdefault.Thisisthesituation(June1991)inwhichtheminorityCongressgovernmentofNarasimhaRaotook

overpowerandwithManmohanSinghasfinanceministerattemptedoneofthemostimportanteconomicreformssinceindependence.

27EconomicReformsSince1991

Thelong-termconstraintsthatwerebuildingupoverafewdecadesanddebilitatingtheIndianeconomycombinedwithcertainmorerecentandimmediatefactorsledtoamassivefiscalandbalanceofpaymentscrisisthatclimaxedin1991.(Seechapter26.)ThecrisispushedIndiaintoinitiatingaprocessofeconomicreformandstructuraladjustment.Thereforms,whichintheIndiancontextwerealmostrevolutionaryinnature,wereironicallystartedbyaminoritygovernmentledbyNarasimhaRao,andguidedbyoneofthemostdistinguishedeconomistsofpost-independenceIndia,ManmohanSingh,asfinanceminister.Reformofthedirigiste,controls-riddenandinward-lookingIndianeconomywaslongoverdue.As

earlyastheearlysixties,ManmohanSinghhadargued(quitebravely,giventheintellectualclimateoftheperiod)thatIndia’sexportpessimismatthattimewasunjustified.Headvisedmoreopennessandalesscontrolledeconomy.1OthereminentIndianeconomistssuchasJagdishBhagwatiwereamongthosewhourgedreformintheearlystages.Anattemptatreformwasmadeinthemid-sixtiesbutitgotstymiedforavarietyofreasonsdiscussedelsewhere(seesection1,chapter26),leadingtoafurtherrecoilingintorestrictionistpolicies.Theseventieswitnessedsome,whathasbeendescribedas,‘reformbystealth’,withtherupeebeingallowedtodepreciateinresponsetomarketconditionsnotbyanoutrightdevaluation,whichwasthenpoliticallyunviable,butbypeggingittoadepreciatingsterling.IndiraGandhi,particularlyafterherreturntopowerin1980,triedtobringinliberalizationmeasures,mainlyintheareaofderegulationofindustriallicensingandreductionofrestrictionsonlarge‘monopoly’enterprises.Thoughbythestandardsofthepost-1991reformstheseeffortswouldappearpuny,aglanceatthenewspapersoftheeightieswouldsuggestthattheywereseenasquitepath-breaking(particularlybythecritics)atthattime.RajivGandhi,whenhetookoverin1984,attemptedreformatarelativelyquickerpacetowardsindustrialderegulation,exchangerateflexibilityandpartialliftingofimportcontrols.Themajorissueoftheemergingmacroeconomicimbalance,callingforstabilizationofthefiscalandbalanceofpaymentsdeficits,washoweverleftunattended,despitetheexpressedintentionstothecontrary.Reformsofthefinancialandlabourmarketsandthepublicsectoralsoessentiallyremaineduntouched.EventhesepiecemealattemptsatreformsmadebyRajivGandhigotabandonedaftersometimemainlyduetothepoliticalcrisiscentredaroundtheBoforsallegationsandthedesertionofV.P.Singhandothers.Thoughtheneedforreformhadbeenrecognizedearlyenough,itscomprehensiveimplementationcould

notoccurforvariousreasons.Governments,especiallywheninavulnerablesituation(e.g.,RajivGandhiaftertheBoforsscandal,IndiraGandhiwiththePunjabcrisis,andlaterevenNarasimhaRaofollowingthedestructionoftheBabriMasjid),wereextremelywaryofinitiatingorsustainingreformswhichwouldinvolveintroducingunpopularmeasureslikeattemptstoregainfiscaldiscipline,changeinlabourlaws,stepswhichintheinitialphasewereboundtobepainful.Also,therewas(andstillremains)persistent

oppositiontoreformfromvestedinterestssuchasthebureaucracyandevensectionsofbusinesswhobenefitedfromtheexistingsystemofcontrols,usingthemtoearnasortof‘rent’.Last,andcertainlynottheleast,astrongideologicaloppositionfromtheorthodoxleft,strangelyoblivioustothechangingglobalreality,continuedtoplayaroleinobstructingreform.Thecrisisin1991,withthecountryattheedgeofdefault,enabledtheNarasimhaRaogovernmentto

breakthroughthetraditionalmindsetandattemptanunprecedented,comprehensivechangeatatimewhenboththeideologicaloppositionandtheresistanceofthevestedinterestswasataweakpoint.Thus,thoughlate,nearlythirteenyearsafterChinachangedcourse,aprogrammeofeconomicreformwasinitiatedin1991.Onereasonwhytheshifttooksolongand,evenwhenittookplace,wasnotassharpaturnaroundasitwasinChinain1978ortheSovietUnionafterthemid-eightieswasthatinademocracythechangefromonekindofsocietalconsensus(suchastheNehruvianconsensus)toanewconsensus(sayaroundreforms)hadtobeaprocessandnotanevent,andwhichhaditsowndynamic,verydifferentfromthatoperatinginanon-democraticortotalitariansociety.Theprocessofreformsstartedin1991,involved,interalia,animmediatefiscalcorrection;makingthe

exchangeratemorerealisticallylinkedtothemarketthe(rupeeunderwentabouta20percentdevaluationattheveryoutset);liberalizationoftradeandindustrialcontrolslikefreeraccesstoimports;aconsiderabledismantlingoftheindustriallicensingsystemandtheabolitionofMRTP;reformofthepublicsectorincludinggradualprivatization;reformofthecapitalmarketsandthefinancialsector;removingalargenumberoftherestrictionsonmultinationalcorporationsandforeigninvestmentandwelcomingthem,particularlyforeigndirectinvestment,andsoon.Inshort,itwasanattempttofreetheeconomyfromstiflinginternalcontrolsaswellasequipittoparticipateintheworldwideglobalizationprocesstoitsadvantage.Therecordofthefirstfewyearsofreformwascreditablebyanystandards,thoughalotofproblems

andchallengesstillremained.Indiaperformedoneofthefastestrecoveriesfromadeepmacroeconomiccrisis.Moreover,theprocessofstructuraladjustment,particularlythefiscalreining-in(doneinitially),wasachievedwithrelativelyminimalpain—withoutitsettingoffaprolongedrecessionarycycleleadingtomassiveunemploymentanddeteriorationoftheconditionofthepooraswasfearedandasoccurredinthecaseofseveralothereconomiesinasimilarsituationattemptingstructuraladjustment.Forexample,thegrowthrateofIndia’sGrossDomesticProduct(GDP)whichhadfallentoapaltry0.8

percentinthecrisisyearof1991-92recoveredquicklyto5.3percentby1992-93androsefurtherto6.2percentin1993-94despitethemajordisturbancesin1992-93triggeredoffbytheAyodhyacrisis.Moreimportant,overthenextthreeyears,theIndianeconomyaveragedanunprecedentedgrowthrateofover7.5percent,arateclosertothehighperformersofEastAsiathanithadeverbeenbefore.Despitethecrisisandthenecessarystructuraladjustment,theEighthPlan(1992-1997)averagedagrowthrateofnearly7percent(6.94),higher,andonamoresustainablebasis,thantheSeventhPlan(1985-1990)averageof6percent.GrossDomesticSavingsaveragedover23percentbetween1991and1997,higherthantheSeventhPlanaverageof20.6percent.GrossDomesticCapitalFormation(Investment)andGrossDomesticFixedCapitalFormationbetween1992to1997alsomaintainedarespectableaverageof25.2percentand22.3percentofGDPrespectively,considerablyhigherthantheSeventhPlanaverageof21.8and19.8percent.

Industrialproduction,whichshowedadismal,lessthanonepercent,growthratein1991-92(itwasnegativeinmanufacturing),pickedupto2.3percentin1992-93and6percentin1993-94,peakingatanunprecedented12.8percentduring1995-96.Thecapitalgoodssector,whichdemonstratednegativegrowthratesforafewyears,bouncedbacktonearly25percentgrowthin1994-95,allayingearlyfearsthatimportliberalizationwouldhitthedomesticcapitalgoodsindustryadversely.Thesmall-scalesectortoogrewfasterthanoverallindustrialgrowth,suggestingthatabolitionofMRTPdidnothaveanadverseeffectonitandperhapsencourageditsgrowth.Agriculture,too,afterrecordingafallin1991-92,pickedupthefollowingyearandbyandlargemaintainedtill1996-7thehighrateofgrowthofover3percentwhichithadbeenexperiencingforsomeyears.Thecentralgovernment’sfiscaldeficit,whichhadreached8.3percentofGDPin1990-91,was

reducedandaveragedroughly6percentbetween1992-97.Theimportantthingwasthatoutofthetotalfiscaldeficitof5.2percentin1996-97,4.7percentwasaccountedforbyinterestpaymentswhichwasaliabilityemanatingfrompartfiscallaxity.Theprimarydeficit,i.e.,fiscaldeficitnetofinterestpayments,whichrepresentscurrentfiscalpressuresoroverspendingwasonly0.6percentin1996-97,wassystematicallybroughtdownfrom4.3percentofGDPin1990-91and2.9percentin1993-94.Theexternalsectoralsoshowedconsiderableimprovement.Exports,whichregisteredadeclineof1.5

percentindollartermsduring1991-92,recoveredquicklyandmaintainedanaveragegrowthrateofnearly20percentbetween1993-96.Verysignificantly,India’sself-reliancewasincreasingtotheextentthataconsiderablylargerproportionofimportswerenowpaidforbyexports,withtheratioofexportearningstoimportpaymentsrisingfromanaverageof60percentintheeightiestonearly90percentbythemid-nineties.Thecurrentaccountdeficitinbalanceofpayments,whichhadreachedanunsustainable3.2percentofGDPin1990-91,wasbroughtdownto0.4percentin1993-94androsesincethento1.6percentin1995-96.Yettheaveragedeficitbetween1991-92and1997-98wasabout1.1percent,significantlylowerthantheSeventhPlan(1985-90)averageofabout2.3percent.Theforeignexchangereserves(includinggoldandSDRS)hadgrowntoarespectable$30.4billionattheendofJanuary1999,providingcoverforaboutsevenmonthsofimportsascomparedtoameretwoweeksinJuly1991.Thedebtsituationhadalsostartedmovingawayfromacrisispoint.Theoverallexternaldebt/GDP

ratioforIndiafellfromapeakof41percentin1991-92to28.7percentin1995-96.Thedebtserviceratioalsofellfromthepeakof35.3percentin1990-91to19.5percentin1997-98.Itis,however,stillquitehighcomparedtoChina,MalaysiaandSouthKorea,whoallhad(till1997)debtserviceratiosbelow10percent.Reformsandliberalizationofthestockmarketsincetheeightiesandparticularlyafter1991produced

dramaticresults.ThetotalmarketcapitalizationontheIndianstockmarketsasaproportionofGDProsefromamere5percentin1980to13percentin1990and,followingfurtherreformssince1991,itroserapidlyto60percentofGDPbytheendof1993.By1995,theIndianstockmarketwasthelargestintheworldintermsofthenumberoflistedcompanies—largereventhantheUS.MeasuressuchastherepealoftheCapitalIssuesControlActof1947(throughwhichthegovernmentusedtocontrolnewissuesandtheirprices)andtheexternalliberalisation(whichinteraliaallowedforeigninstitutionalinvestorstobuyIndiancorporatesharesandenabledIndiancompaniestoraisefundsfromforeignmarkets)considerablyincreasedtheIndiancompanies’abilitytoraisefundsfromthestockmarket(includinginforeignexchange)tofinancetheirdevelopmentandgrowth.TheamountofcapitalIndiancompaniescouldraise

intheprimarymarketinIndiaincreasedfromRs929millionin1980toRs2.5billionin1985andRs123billionin1990.By1993-4thefigurehadreachedRs225billion—anearly250timesincreasesince1980.2Asubstantial12.8percentofthecountry’sgrossdomesticsavingswasaccountedforbynewcorporatesecuritiesin1993-4,upfromabout1percentin1981.Also,permissiontoaccesstheinternationalmarketenabledIndiancompanies,during1994-95,toraise$2.03billionthrough29EuroissuesofGlobalDepositoryReceipts(GDRS)andForeignCurrencyConvertibleBonds(FCCBs).UptoDecember1995,Indianfirmshadraised$5.18billionthrough64issuesofGDRsandFCCB.Theencouragementtoforeigninvestmentborefruitwithforeigndirectinvestment(FDI)increasingat

nearly100percentperyearbetween1991to1996,itbeing$129millionin1991-92and$2.1billionin1995-96.Totalforeigninvestmentincludingportfolioinvestmentincreasedfrom$102millionin1990-91to$4.9billionin1995-96.Considerableimprovement,nodoubt,butyetafarcryfromwhatwasbeingachievedbytheEastAsiancountries.Chinaalonehadbeenabsorbingmorethan$30billionofforeigndirectinvestmenteveryyearforsomeyears,thefigurefor1996being$40.8billion.Onepositivesign,however,wasthatoneofthemoststubbornmindsets—thexenophobiaaboutforeigncapital—seemstohavebeeneroded,withtheCommonMinimumProgramme(CMP)ofthecoalitiongovernment(followingthedefeatoftheCongressin1996),towhicheventheCommunistswereaparty,desiringthattheforeigndirectinvestment(FDI)inIndiashouldriseto$10billionperyear.However,thedangeremanatingfromtherelativelyvolatilenatureofforeignportfolioinvestments,withthepossibilityoftheirsuddenwithdrawal(ashappenedinMexicoandmorerecentlyinSouth-eastAsia)duetooftenunpredictableextraneousfactors,wasunderstoodbysuccessivegovernmentsandeffortsmadetocontrolshort-termcapitalinflowsandcapitalflight.Criticsofreform,mainlyfromtheorthodoxleft,madethechargethatreformwasanti-poor,amajor

(andperhapstheonlysomewhatcredible)plankoftheirarguments.However,studiesofalargenumberofcountrieshaveshownthatbarringafewexceptions,rapideconomicgrowthhasbeenassociatedwithfallinpovertylevels.Indiatoowitnessedsignificantfallinpovertylevelswiththerelativelyfastereconomicgrowthoftheeighties.Theproportionofpopulationbelowthepovertyline(thepovertyratio)fellfrom51.3percentin1977-78to38.9percentin1987-88.CountrieslikeChinaandIndonesia,whichhadmuchhigherpovertyratiosof59.5and64.3in1975comparedtoIndia’s54.9in1973-4,wereabletoreducetheirpovertylevelstomuchbelowIndia’sinthespanoftwentyyears.ThesecountriesmaintainedamuchhigherrateofgrowththanIndiaduringthisperiodandtheirpovertyratioshadfallendramaticallyto22.2and11.4respectivelyby1995,whileIndia’shadfallenonlyto36by1993-94.3

Totheextent,therefore,thattheeconomicreformsweredesignedtoputIndiaonahighergrowthpath,itwouldbeexpectedthatpovertylevelswoulddeclineaswell.Thekeyquestionremainingwaswhatwouldbetheimpactonpovertyinthetransitionalphase,especiallywhenthenecessarystabilizationhadtotakeplacewiththeattemptstoimprovethebalanceofpaymentspositionandreducethefiscaldeficit,leadingtoapossiblefallingovermnentexpenditure.India’sinitialstabilizationprogrammewassaidtobe‘extraordinarilysuccessful’causing‘remarkablylittlesuffering’when‘comparedwithmostothercountrieswhichwereforcedtoeffectalargeandrapidreductionintheircurrentexternalaccountdeficits.’4Calculationsbasedonseveraldifferentindicatorsofpovertyshowthatpoverty,mainlyruralpoverty,markedasignificantriseonlyin1992-93anditscausationwaslinkedmainlytoadroughtandfallinfoodgrainoutputin1991-92,leadingtoariseinfoodprices,andveryweaklytothestabilization

programme.Eventhiswasperhapsavoidabletoagreatextent.Thegovernment’sfailureinnotanticipatingthesituationandmaintainingexpenditureonruralemploymentprogrammes,itsnotrefrainingfrommakinganycuts(inrealterms,therebeinganominalincrease)intheanti-povertySocialServicesandRuralDevelopment(SSRD)expenditurein1991-92toachievefiscalstabilization,hasbeencriticisedevenbythesupportersofreform.However,allthepovertyindicatorsshowedthatby1993-94therewasmuchimprovementinthepovertysituation.Thepovertylevels,bothruralandurban,weresignificantlylowerin1993-94thanin1992,bynearlysixpercentagepoints,andwerelowerthanthepre-reformaverageofthefiveyears1986-87to1990-91.5Thus,itmaybenotedthatthestabilizationunderthereformshadlittlenegativeimpact,ifany,onpovertylevels.Otheraspectsofstructuralreform,itisgenerallyagreed,donotthreatenthepoorandinfactwouldimprovetheirconditionbyreleasingthefullgrowthpotentialoftheeconomy.Theimprovementinthepovertysituationwashelpedbythefactthatthegovernmentincreasedthe

overallexpenditureonSocialServicesandRuralDevelopmentsince1993-94—from7.8percentoftotalgovernment(Central)expenditurein1992-93toanaverageofnearly10percentbetween1993and1998.Realagriculturalwages,whichhaddecreasedby6.2percentin1991-92,grewinthenexttwoyearsatover5percentperyearandby1993-4surpassedthepre-reformlevel.Afterthelowof1991-2,additionalemploymentgeneratedinthetotaleconomyroseto7.2millionin1994-95,averagingabout6.3millionjobseveryyearbetween1992-3and1994-95,considerablyhigherthantheaverageannualincreaseof4.8millionintheeighties.Moreover,inflation,whichhurtsthepoorthemost,waskeptundercontrol.Theannualrateofinflation,whichtouchedahighof17percentinAugust1991,wasbroughtdowntobelow5percentinFebruary1996.Butthisdoesnotcompletethepicture.Thoughonthewholethereforminitiativeslookquitesuccessful,

thereisstillalongwaytogo.Continuedpoliticalinstability,aggravatedbynoclearmajorityemerginginparliamentofanypoliticalparty,hasmadeitdifficultforanygovernmenttomoveawayfrompopulistmeasuresandtaketoughbutnecessarydecisions.Thatiswhynoseriouseffortsweremadetoincreasepublicsavingsandreducegovernment

expenditureandtheproblemofhighfiscaldeficitshascontinued.Thepublicsaving-investmentgapremainedataveryhighaverageof7.1percentofGDPbetween1992-96.ThefoodgrainsubsidyactuallyincreasedfromRs.28.5billionin1991-92toRs.61.14billionin1996-97(revisedestimate).ThefertilizersubsidyalsoincreasedfromRs.32.01billionin1988-89to45.42billionin1989-90andRs.62.35billionin1995-96.Thehugesubsidiescontributedtowardsatendencyforrealinvestmentinagriculturetofallbecauseoflackofresources.C.H.HanumanthaRao,theeminentagriculturaleconomist,notedin1992,‘theannualsubsidyonfertiliseraloneamountstonearlyasmuchastheannualoutlayonagriculturebythecentreandstatesputtogether.’6Asimilarexamplewasthegovernmentsubsidyondiesel,keroseneandcookinggasamountingtoRs.93.6billionin1995-96.Theoil-pooldeficit(duesowedtooilcompaniesbygovernmentwhichpartlyenabledthehugesubsidy)in1996-97wasRs.98billionmakingthecumulativedeficitinthatyearaboutRs.155billion.Theresultwasthattheoilcompaniesworeunabletomaketheabsolutelynecessaryinvestmentsintheoilsector.Similarly,littlehasbeenachievedwithregardtoreformofthepublicsector,particularlystate-owned

utilitieslikeelectricity,transport,etc.WhilethePunjabgovernmenthasgonetotheabsurdlimitofactuallydistributingelectricityandwaterfreetothefarmers,severalotherstatesarenotmuchbetteras

theychargerateswhichcoveronlyasmallfractionofthecosts.Therefore,stateelectricityboardsandtransportcorporationsrunathugelossesatatimewhenavailabilityofpowerandpropertransportinfrastructurethreatentobecriticalbottlenecks,slowingdowntheprojectedrateofgrowthoftheeconomy.Also,therehasbeennosignificantmovetowardsreformofthelabourmarketandcreatingpossibilities

ofexitforloss-makingenterprises.Afterthefewyearsofinitialsuccess,thetempoofeconomicreforminIndiaseemstobewaning.Moreover,theeconomyhasbeenwitnessingadownturninrecentyears,since1997.TheGDPgrowthratehasdeceleratedsignificantlyto5percentin1997-98,downfrom7.8percentin1996-97.Exports,whichweregrowingatover20percent,sloweddownforthethirdyearinsuccessionsince1996andwerenegativein1998-99(April-December).Therewasaslowdowninindustrysince1995-6andithasbeengrowingatlessthanhalftherateachievedthatyearoverthenextthreeyears.Veryimportantly,therehasbeenaslowdowninthecriticalinfrastructuresector,whichisemergingasamajorbottleneck.Flowsofexternalcapital,bothFDIandportfolioinvestment,declinedsharply,thelatterturningnegativein1998-99(April-December).Oneofthemostdangerousreversalsisinthesphereoffiscaldeficit,wheretheprimarydeficitwhich

hadbeenbroughtdownto0.6percentofGDPin1996-97(0.5percentinthenewseriesdatausedinEconomicSurveyof1998-99)morethandoubledto1.3percentin1997-98andfortheCentreandstatestogetheritwasestimatedtobe2.4percent(revisedestimate).TheselectiveacceptanceoftheFifthPayCommissionrecommendationsbytheUnitedFront(Gujral)governmentin1997,wherebythegovernmentexpenditureonsalarieswastoincreaseverysharplywithoutanycompensatorysavings,asthemeasuressuggestedbytheCommissiontoachievesuchsavingswerenotaccepted,putfurtherpressureonthefiscaldeficit.Thesituationreachedapointwhere,‘giventheseriousfiscalslippage’,eventheEconomicSurveyoftheGovernmentofIndiaof1998-99wasconstrainedtoargue,‘thetimehasperhapscometoreconsidertheissueofconstitutionallimitsonthedeficit.’7

Theslowingdownoftheeconomysince1996-97waspartlybecauseoftheEastAsiancrisis,withJapaninrecessionandSouthKorea,Indonesia,Thailandandothers,showingnegativegrowthrates.OtherpartsoftheworldsuchasRussiaandBrazilwerealsofacingcrisissituations.Therewasaslowingdownofworldgrowthandparticularlyworldtradegrowthin1998.Thecrisisadverselyaffectedworldflowsofcapital,andexports,partiallyexplainingthefallinIndianreceiptsofforeigninvestmentandIndianexports.However,thefactthatthedecelerationinIndianexportswasgreaterthanthatofthe‘developingcountries’asawholeisindicativeofthefailureofthereformprocessinaddressingsomestructuralfactorswhichinhibitIndianexportssuchaspoorinfrastructure(power,transport,portfacilities,etc.),archaiclabourlaws,continuedtraderestrictionsandsoon.ItisthiswhichhasenabledChinaandnotIndiatooccupythespacevacatedbyKorea,Taiwan,HongKong,etc.,inthesphereofexportsoflabour-intensivegoods,aslabourcostsinthelattercountriesrose.Also,theeconomicsanctionsimposedonIndiabecauseofthenucleartests(whichtheBJPgovernment

hurriedintowithclearlyaneyeonthedomesticpoliticalscene)hadadampeningeffectontheeconomy.Politicalinstability,opportunisticcoalitiongovernmentswithpartnershavingwidelydivergentworldviews,theBJP’s‘doubleface’ineconomicmatters,asinpolitics,withtheRSS,theirmotherorganization,talkingof‘Swadeshi’whichinhibitedIndia’sreformsandparticipationintheglobalizationprocess,whiletheBJPcontinuedtoswearbyreform,allpartiallyexplainthetardyprogressofreform.

Yet,itisapositivedevelopmentofenormoussignificanceinademocracy,thatthereisabroadconsensusamongallpoliticalpartiesfromtherighttotheleft(barringtheextremistsatbothends)thatthereformprocessmustcontinue,aconsensusreminiscentoftheonearoundtheNehruvianprogrammeatindependence.Theconsensusissuggestiveofthefactthateconomicreformorliberalizationdidnotmeanachangeof

goalssetatindependencebytheIndianpeople,suchasrapidgrowth,industrialization,self-reliance,removalofpovertyandsoon.Liberalizationandparticipationintheglobalizationprocesswasnotthe‘finalsurrender’tointernationalcapitalorimperialismortheIMF-WorldBankcombineashasbeenarguedadinfinitumbysectionsoftheorthodoxleft.Onthebasisoftheexperiencewithvariouscontrolsandstateinterventionathome,ofchangesoccurringintheworldsuchasthecollapseoftheSocialistbloc,thenewglobalizationprocessafterWorldWarIIandtheexperienceofvariousfast-growingeconomiesintherecentpast,theaspirationtowardsthesamegoalssetoutatindependencerequiredanalteringofstrategy.However,thisisnottosaythattheearlier‘Nehruvian’strategywaswrong.Thatstrategyhadits

historicalsignificance.Aswesaw,itgavetheIndianeconomyacertaindepthandspread,increaseditsbargainingpowerandindependence,andlenttheIndianeconomyandsocietythedignityitdidnotpossessafterthecolonialexperience.But,overtime,certainnegativefeaturesdeveloped.That,andtheresponsetothechangedworldconditions,requiredashiftinstrategyfortheachievementofthesamegoals.Togivejustoneexample,ifself-relianceandrapidgrowthinthefifties,requiredimportsubstitution,todaycapitalandtechnologyflows,andthroughthat,keepingupefficiencyorproductivitylevelsistheroutetoself-relianceandrapidgrowth.Itisnoaccidentthatsomanyoftheverypeoplewhocreated,outlinedorsubscribedtotheearlier

strategyovertimesawthenecessityofreform.Wehave,forexample,apartfromIndiraGandhiherself,theradicaleconomistoftheNehruvianeraK.N.Raj,theMarxisteconomistLordMeghnadDesai,theNehruvianNarasimhaRao,lefteconomistslateSukhamoyChakravarty,C.H.HanumanthaRao,ArjunSenguptaandNobellaureateAmartyaSen,andpracticingCommunistandchiefministerforthelongesttenuresinceindependence,JyotiBasu,allimplementingorarguingforeconomicreforminvolvingliberalizationandparticipationintheglobalizationprocess,thoughwithdifferentapproachesandinvaryingdegrees.EventheBJP,despitethestrongresistanceoftheRSS-supportedSwadeshiJagranManch,isessentiallycommittedtopressingonwithreforms.Thereis,inotherwords,agrowingrecognitioninIndiaoftheimperativetoberesponsivetothe

externalchangesandinternalexperienceandchangestrategysothatthisgreatcountryisabletocomeintoitsownandrealizeitsenormouspotentialratherthanfritterawaytheconsiderableachievementsmadesinceindependence.ItisthiswhichgiveshopethatIndiashallenterthenewmillenniumreadytomeether‘trystwithdestiny’,strengthenedbythejourneysinceindependencesodramaticallystartedbythepeopleofIndiawithNehruinthelead.

28LandReforms:ZamindariAbolitionandTenancyReforms

Theprocessoflandreformafterindependencebasicallyoccurredintwobroadphases.Thefirstphasewhichstartedsoonafterindependenceandarguablycontinuedtilltheearlysixtiesfocussedonthefollowingfeatures:1)abolitionofintermediaries—zamindars,jagirdars,etc.,2)tenancyreformsinvolvingprovidingsecurityoftenuretothetenants,decreaseinrentsandconfermentofownershiprightstotenants,3)ceilingsonsizeoflandholdings,4)cooperativizationandcommunitydevelopmentprogrammes.Thisphasehasalsobeencalledthephaseofinstitutionalreforms.Thesecondphasebeginningaroundthemid-orlatesixtiessawthegradualusheringinoftheso-calledGreenRevolutionandhasbeenseenasthephaseoftechnologicalreforms.Thetwophasesarenottobedividedinrigidwatertightcompartments.Infact,theywerecomplementarytoeachotherandtherewasafairdegreeofoverlapintheprogrammesfollowedduringthesephases.Inthefollowingchaptersthereforeweshallnotstrictlyfollowthechronologyofthetwophasesandwilloftendiscussprogrammeswhichcutacrossthem.

ZamindariAbolition

Withinayearortwoofindependence,i.e.by1949,zamindariabolitionbillsorlandtenurelegislationwereintroducedinanumberofprovincessuchasU.P.,MadhyaPradesh,Bihar,Madras,AssamandBombaywiththereportoftheU.P.ZamindariAbolitionCommittee(chairedbyG.B.Pant)actingastheinitialmodelformanyothers.Inthemeantime,theConstituentAssemblywasintheprocessofframingIndia’sConstitution.There

was,however,widespreadapprehension,includingamongCongressleadersdeeplycommittedtozamindariabolitionlikeJawaharlalNehru,G.B.PantandSardarPatel,thatthezamindarscouldtrytostymietheacquisitionoftheirestatesbymovingthecourts,raisingissuesliketheviolationofrighttopropertyor‘unjustness’ofthecompensation.AfterprolongeddiscussiontherelevantprovisionsoftheConstitutionwereframedinamannerthattheleadersfeltassuredthatthezamindariabolitionbillspendinginthestateassemblieswouldgothroughonthebasisofcompensationrecommendedbythestatelegislaturesastheserecommendationsweremadenon-justiciable,requiringonlypresidentialassentwhichmeantultimatelythesupportoftheUnionCabinet.Thecompensationrecommendedbythelegislatureswasofcourseexpectedtobesmallandreasonablefromthetenants’pointofview.Itissignificantthattherewasawideconsensusongivingthelegislaturestheauthoritytoprescribeprinciplesofcompensationonexpropriationofthezamindars.Theacquisitionofcommercialorindustrialpropertycontinuedtorequireanentirelydifferentsetofprinciples.However,belyingtheexpectationoftheframersoftheConstitution,thezamindarsinvariouspartsof

thecountrychallengedtheconstitutionalityofthelawpermittingzamindariabolitionandthecourts,asfor

example,thePatnaHighCourtupheldthelandlords’suit.TheCongressgovernmentrespondedbygettingconstitutionalamendmentspassed.The1stAmendmentin1951andthe4thAmendmentin1955,wereaimedatfurtherstrengtheningthehandsofthestatelegislaturesforimplementingzamindariabolition,makingthequestionofviolationofanyfundamentalrightorinsufficiencyofcompensationnotpermissibleinthecourts.ThoughthezamindarscontinuedtomakenumerousappealstotheHighCourtandSupremeCourt,iffornootherpurposebuttodelaytheacquisitionoftheirestates,yet,thebackoftheirresistancewasbrokenbythemid-fifties.Itmaybereiteratedthat,contrarytoaviewoftenputforward,theframersoftheConstitution,includingtheso-called‘rightwing’werenotparticipatinginadesigntostymielandreformsbutwereinfacttryingtocompletetheprocesswithinademocraticframework.Amajordifficultyinimplementingthezamindariabolitionacts,passedinmostprovincesby1956,was

theabsenceofadequatelandrecords.Nevertheless,certainlybytheendofthefifties(thoughessentiallyby1956)theprocessoflandreforminvolvingabolitionofintermediaries(thezamindarsofBritishIndia,andjagirdarsoftheprincelystatesnowmergedwithindependentIndia)canbesaidtohavebeencompleted.Consideringthattheentireprocessoccurredinademocraticframework,withvirtuallynocoercionorviolencebeingused,itwascompletedinaremarkablyshortperiod.Thiswaspossiblepartlybecausethezamindarsasaclasshadbeenisolatedsociallyduringthenationalmovementitselfastheywereseenaspartoftheimperialistcamp.Butreformswhichthreatenedtheinterestsofsectionsoftheupperpeasantrywhowereverymuchpartofthenationalmovementandhadconsiderablesocietalsupportwerefarmoredifficult,andsometimesimpossibletoachieve,asweshallseelater.Theabolitionofzamindarimeantthatabouttwentymillionerstwhiletenantsnowbecamelandowners.

Thefiguresforareaandnumberofhouseholdsundertenancyarehighlyunreliablepartlybecauseinmanyareasaverylargeproportionoftenancywas‘oral’andthereforeunrecorded.Yet,scholarsagreethattherewassomedeclineintenancyafterthereformsstarted,oneroughestimatebeingthatareaundertenancydecreasedfromabout42percentin1950-51tobetween20to25percentbytheearlysixties.However,thedeclineintenancyandtheconsiderableincreaseinself-cultivationwasnotaresultonlyoftenantsbecominglandownersbutalsoofevictionofexistingtenantsbylandowners,asweshallseepresently.Thecompensationactuallypaidtothezamindarsoncetheirestateswereacquiredwasgenerallysmall

andvariedfromstatetostatedependinguponthestrengthofthepeasantmovementandconsequentclassbalancebetweenthelandlordsandthetenantsandtheideologicalcompositionoftheCongressleadershipandofthelegislatureasawhole.InKashmir,forexample,nocompensationwaspaid.InPunjab,theoccupancytenantsofPatialawerepaidnothingandeventheinferiortenantsgivenanegligibleamount,oftenjustthefirstinstallmentofthetotalcompensationtobepaidoveranumberofyears.MoststatesfollowedavariationofthemodelworkedoutinU.P.,where,verysignificantly,thecompensationpaidwasinverselyrelatedtothesizeofthelandwhichcameunderazamindar.Thesmallzamindars(theywereoftenhardlydistinguishablefromthewell-to-dopeasants;landreforminitiativeswerequiteconsciouslynotdirectedagainstthem)whousedtopaylandrevenueofuptoRs25weretoreceiveabouttwentytimestheirnetannualincomeascompensationwhereasthebigzamindarswhopaidlandrevenuerangingbetweenRs2,000toRs10,000weretoreceivemerelytwotofourtimestheirnetannualincome.Moreoverthepaymentofcompensation,wastostretchoveralongperiod,insomecasesfortyyears.Itis

estimatedthatthebigzamindarswhodidreceivecompensationfoundthattheirincomesfromalienatedland,throughcompensation,wouldfetchthemonlyone-fortiethoftheirearlierincome.OutofatotaldueofRs6,700million,thecompensationactuallypaidtill1961wasRs1,642million,a

smallfigureconsideringthatIndiaspent,byoneestimate,morethansixtimestheamount,Rs10,000millioninjustfoodimportsbetween1946-53.

WeaknessesinZamindariAbolition

Therewerehowevercertainimportantweaknessesinthemannerinwhichsomeoftheclausesrelatingtozamindariabolitionwereimplementedinvariouspartsofthecountry.Forexample,inU.P.,thezamindarswerepermittedtoretainlandsthatweredeclaredtobeundertheir‘personalcultivation’.Whatconstituted‘personalcultivation’wasverylooselydefined‘(making)itpossiblefornotonlythosewhotilledthesoil,butalsothosewhosupervisedthelandpersonallyordidsothrougharelative,orprovidedcapitalandcredittotheland,tocallthemselvesacultivator.’1Moreover,instateslikeU.P.,BiharandMadras,tobeginwith(i.e.,tilllandceilinglawswereintroduced)therewasnolimitonthesizeofthelandsthatcouldbedeclaredtobeunderthe‘personalcultivation’ofthezamindar.This,despitethefactthattheCongressAgrarianReformsCommittee(KumarappaCommittee)initsreportof1949hadclearlystipulatedthat‘onlythosewhoputinaminimumamountofphysicallabourandparticipateinactualagriculturaloperations’couldbesaidtobeperforming‘personalcultivation’.Also,thecommitteehadenvisagedalimitorceilingonhowmuchlandcouldbe‘resumed’for‘personalcultivation’,undernocircumstancesleadingtothetenant’sholdingbeingreducedtobelowthe‘economic’level.2

Theresultinactualpractice,however,wasthatevenzamindarswhowereabsenteelandownerscouldnowendupretaininglargetractsofland.Further,inmanyareas,thezamindarsinordertodeclareunder‘personalcultivation’aslargeaproportionoftheirlandsaspossibleoftenresortedtolarge-scaleevictionoftenants,mainlythelesssecuresmalltenants.(Thiswastobefollowedbyfurtherroundsofevictionsoncethelandceilingsandtenancylegislationscameintobeing,cumulativelyleadingtoamajorblotintherecordoflandreformsinIndia.)Manyoftheerstwhileessentiallyrent-receivingzamindarshoweverdidactuallybegintomanagethe

landsdeclaredundertheir‘personalcultivation’.Theyinvestedinthemandmovedtowardsprogressivecapitalistfarmingintheseareas,asthiswasindeedoneoftheobjectivesofthelandreform.Retaininglargetractsunder‘personalcultivation’wasonlyonewaythroughwhichthelandlordstried

toavoidthefullimpactoftheeffortatabolitionofthezamindarisystem.Severalothermethodswereusedtoresistthebringinginofzamindariabolitionlegislationandtheirimplementation.Sincesuchlegislationhadtobepassedbythestatelegislatures,thelandlordsusedeverypossiblemethodofparliamentaryobstructioninthelegislatures.Thedraftbillsweresubjectedtoprolongeddebates,referredtoselectcommitteesandrepeatedamendmentswereproposedsothatinmanystateslikeU.P.andBiharseveralyearspassedbetweentheintroductionofthebillsandthelawsbeingenacted.Evenafterthelawswereenactedthelandlordsusedthejudicialsystemtodefertheimplementationof

thelaws.Aswesawearlier,theyrepeatedlychallengedtheconstitutionallyofthelawsinthecourts,goingrightuptotheSupremeCourt.InBihar,wherethelandlordsputupthemaximumresistance,theytriedtoblocktheimplementationofthelawevenaftertheylosttheircaseintheSupremeCourttwice.

Theynowrefusedtohandoverthelandrecordsintheirpossession,forcingthegovernmenttogothroughthelengthyprocedureofreconstructingtherecords.Further,implementationofthelawwasmadedifficultand,asmuchaspossible,skewedinfavourofthezamindar,bythecollusionbetweenthelandlordsandparticularlythelowerlevelrevenueofficials.Suchcollusionwashelpedbythefactthatinzamindariareasmanyoftherevenueofficialswereformerrent-collectingagentsofthezamindars.Atalllevelsinvolvingthelegislative,judicialandexecutivearmsofthestate,thelandlordsputupresistance.TheCongressrespondedbyrepeatedlyreiteratingitsresolvetocompletetheprocessofzamindari

abolitionasquicklyaspossible.ThisresolvewasseeninAICCresolutions(e.g.thatofJuly1954),intheconferenceofthechiefministersandpresidentsofprovincialcongresscommittees(April1950),intheFirstPlandocumentandmostofallintheCongresselectionmanifestoes.Democracywithadultfranchiseontheonehandreducedthepoliticalweightofthezamindars,andontheotherincreasedtheurgencyofmeetingthelong-standingdemandsofthepeasantry.TheCongressitselfhadovertheyearsmobilizedthepeasantrytomakethesedemands.TheCongressalsotooknecessaryadministrativeandlegislativesteps,suchasgettingtheconstitutionalamendmentsof1951and1955passedbyparliament,whichwouldmeetthechallengeputupbythelandlords.Despitetheresistanceofthelandlords,theprocessofzamindariabolitionwasessentiallycompleted,

asnotedearlier,exceptincertainpocketsofBihar,withinadecadeoftheformationoftheIndianRepublic.Thetypicallylarge‘feudal’estatesweregone.Whilethebiglandlords,wholostthebulkoftheirlands,werethechieflosers,themainbeneficiariesofzamindariabolitionweretheoccupancytenantsortheuppertenants,whohaddirectleasesfromthezamindar,andwhonowbecamelandowners.Suchtenantsweregenerallymiddleorrichpeasantswhosometimeshadsubleasesgivenouttolowertenantswithlittlerights,oftencalled‘tenantsatwill’.

TenancyReforms

Theissueofcontinuingtenancyinzamindariareas,oralandunrecorded,thereforeremainedevenafterabolitionofzamindariwasimplemented.Suchtenancyexistedinthelandsoftheformerzamindarsnowsaidtobeundertheir‘personalcultivation’aswellasinthelandssub-leasedbytheformeroccupancytenantwhonowbecamethelandowner.Moreover,atindependenceonlyabouthalftheareawasunderzamindaritenure.Theotherhalfwasunderryotwariwheretheproblemsoflandlordismandaninsecure,rack-rentedtenantrytoowererampant.Thesecondmajorplankofthelandreformsenvisagedwas,therefore,concernedwithtenancy

legislation.ThepoliticalandeconomicconditionsindifferentpartsofIndiaweresovariedthatthenatureoftenancylegislationpassedbythedifferentstatesandthemanneroftheirimplementationalsovariedagreatdeal.Yet,therewerecertaincommonlysharedobjectivesofthevariouslegislationsandovertimesomecommonbroadfeaturesemergedinthemanneroftheirimplementationinmostpartsofthecountry.Itisanexaminationofonlythesecommonaspectsratherthanofthemyriaddifferencesthatispossiblewithinthescopeofthisstudy.Tenancyreformshadthreebasicobjectives.First,toguaranteesecurityoftenuretotenantswhohad

cultivatedapieceoflandcontinuouslyforafixednumberofyears,saysixyears(theexactnumberofyearsvariedfromregiontoregion).Second,toseekthereductionofrentspaidbytenantstoa‘fair’levelwhichwasgenerallyconsideredtorangebetweenone-fourthtoone-sixthofthevalueofthegross

produceoftheleasedland.Thethirdobjectivewasthatthetenantgaintherighttoacquireownershipofthelandshecultivated,subjecttocertainrestrictions.Thetenantwasexpectedtopayapricemuchbelowthemarketprice,generallyamultipleoftheannualrent,sayeightortenyears’rent.Forexample,inpartsofAndhraPradeshthepricehehadtopaywaseightyears’rent,whichwasroughly40percentofthemarketpriceoftheland.Itneedstobeaddedherethatwhileattemptingtoimprovetheconditionofthetenants,tenancy

legislationinIndiabyandlargesoughttomaintainabalancebetweentheinterestofthelandowner,particularlythesmalllandownerandthetenant.Theabsenteelandowners’rightofresumptionoflandfor‘personalcultivation’,whichwasgrantedinmostpartsofIndia,aswellasthetenants’righttoacquirethelandstheycultivated,wasoperatedthroughacomplexandvariablesystemof‘floors’and‘ceilings’keepingthisbalanceinview.Thelandowners’rightofresumptionwaslimited(thiswasaimedatthelargelandowners)tohistotal

holdingafterresumptionnotexceedingacertainlimitorceilingprescribedbyeachstate.TheFirstPlansuggestedalimitofthreetimesthe‘familyholding’.Afamilyholdinginter-aliawasdefinedasasingleploughunit.Also,whileresuminglandthelandownercouldnotdeprivethetenantofhisentirelands.InsomestateslikeKerala,Orissa,Gujarat,HimachalPradesh,Maharashtra,KarnatakaandTamilNadu,thetenanthadtobeleftwithatleasthalfhisholding.InsomeotherstateslikeBiharthefloorwashalftheholdingofthetenantoraminimumoffiveacres(inWestBengaltwoandahalfacres),whicheverwasless.Conversely(andthiswasaimedatthesmalllandowner),thetenants’righttoacquirethelandowner’s

landswasrestrictedbytheconditionthatthelandownerwasnottobedeprivedofallhislandsandthatthetenants’holdingafteracquisitionwasnottoexceedtheceilingprescribedbyeachstate.Itwasrecognized,astheSecondPlannotedthat,‘Theeconomiccircumstancesofsmallownersarenot

sodifferentfromthoseoftenantsthattenancylegislationshouldoperatetotheirdisadvantage.’3ThePlanthereforeenvisagedthatverysmalllandownerscouldresumetheirentireholdingforself-cultivation.However,theactualexperienceofimplementationofthetenancylawswasmorecomplicated.AsP.S.Appu,whoheadedthePlanningCommissionTaskForceonAgrarianRelations(whichreportedin1973)noted,theprovisionsintroducedtoprotectthesmalllandownersweremisusedbythelargerlandlordswiththeactiveconnivanceoftherevenueofficials.4TheThirdPlanalsopointedouttheabuseofsuchprovisionsbylargelandownerstransferringtheirlandsinnamesofanumberofrelativesandotherssoastoenterthecategoryof‘smalllandowner’andthenevictingtenantsfromsuchlandsbyexercisingtherightofresumptiongiventosmallowners.5

Infact,therightofresumptionandtheloosedefinitionof‘personalcultivation’referredtoearlier(initiallyonlyManipurandTripuramadepersonallabourbythelandowneraconditionofresumptionforpersonalcultivation)wasusedforevictionoftenantsonamassivescale.Theprocessofevictionhadactuallybeguninanticipationoftheimminenttenancylegislations.Theinordinatedelaysinenactingandimplementingthelegislationswereengineeredbyvestedinterestsenablingthemtoevictpotentialbeneficiariesbeforethelawcameintoforce.Evenafterthetenantsgotlegalprotectionagainsteviction,large-scaleevictionsoccurred.For

example,thePlanningCommission’sPanelonLandReformsnotedin1956thatbetween1948and1951thenumberofprotectedtenantsintheStateofBombaydeclinedfrom1.7millionto1.3million,i.e.,by

morethan23percent;intheStateofHyderabadbetween1951and1955thenumberdeclinedbyabout57percent.AnotherdetailedstudyofHyderabadshowedthatoutofevery100protectedtenantscreatedin1951,afterfouryears,i.e.,by1954,only45.4percentmaintainedthatstatus;12.4percentbecamelandownersbyexercisingtheirrighttoacquireland;2.6percentwerelegallyevicted;22.1percentwereillegallyevictedand17.5percent‘voluntarily’surrenderedtheirclaimstotheland.Voluntarysurrendersbytenantswasreallyaneuphemismforillegalevictionasmostoftenthetenantwas‘persuaded’underthreattogiveuphistenancyrights‘voluntarily’.SocommonwasthepracticethattheFourthPlanwasconstrainedtorecommendthatallsurrendersshouldonlybeinfavourofthegovernment,whichcouldallotsuchlandstoeligiblepersons.However,onlyahandfulofstatesacteduponthisrecommendation.Beforeproceedingfurtheronthefailuresoftenancylegislationinprovidingsecurityoftenuretoalarge

sectionoftenants,itisextremelyimportanttoalsorecognizethatasubstantialproportionoftenantsdidacquiresecurityandpermanentoccupancyrights.ThedetailedstudyofHyderabadreferredtointhepreviousparagraphafterallshowsthat45.4percentofthetenantsremainedprotectedtenantsand12.4percentbecameowners,i.e.,insumabout67.8percentofthetenantsbroughtunderthelegislationnolongersufferedfrominsecurity.Thiswasanimportantdevelopmentwithramificationsonlevelsofinvestmentandimprovementinproductivityinthelandsofsuch‘secure’tenantcultivators.Inmanycasestenancylegislationsledtotenancybeingpushedunderground,i.e.,itcontinuedina

concealedform.Thetenantswerenowcalled‘farmservants’thoughtheycontinuedinexactlythesamestatus.Intheearlyyearsoflandreform,tenantswereoftenconvertedtosharecroppers,assurprisinglythelatterwerenottreatedastenantsandthereforewerenotprotectedundertheexistingtenancylegislationinsomestatessuchasinU.P.Onlycashrentpayersweretreatedastenantsandnotthosewhopaidfixedproducerentsorthosewhopaidaproportionoftotalproduceasrent,i.e.,sharecroppers.InWestBengalthesharecroppers,knownasbargadars,receivednoprotectiontillaslateasJuly1970whentheWestBengalLandReformsActwasamendedtoaccordlimitedprotectiontothem.Aspurtinthepracticeofshare-croppingintheimmediateyearsafter1951canpartiallybeexplainedduetothisfactor,thatsharecroppershadnotenancyrights.Perhapswhatcontributedmosttotheinsecurityoftenants,wasthefactthatmosttenancieswereoral

andinformal,i.e.,theywerenotrecordedandthetenantsthereforecouldnotbenefitfromthelegislationintheirfavour.However,goingonlybytherecordedtenanciesthe1971Censusreachedabsurdconclusionssuchasthat91.1percentofcultivatedareainIndiawasowner-operatedandthatBiharhadthelargestpercentageofareaunderownercultivationfor,anystate,i.e.,99.6percentandthatinBihartenanciesconstitutedonly0.22percentofoperationalholdingsand0.17percentoftotalcultivatedarea!This,whenitiscommonlyacceptedthatBiharhadaveryhighproportionoftenancy,the1961Censusquotingafigureof36.65percent.Thediscrepancybetweenthe1961and1971Censusfigureswouldsuggestthattheoverwhelmingmajorityofthetenancieswereunrecordedandconsequentlythetenantsremainedinsecure.The1961Censusestimatedthat82percentofthetenanciesinthecountrywereinsecure!Theabsenceofproperrecords,forexample,wasseenasamajorimpedimentintheimplementationof

theZamindariAbolitionandLandReformActinU.P.intheinitialyearsafterindependence.AmassivedrivehadtobelaunchedbyCharanSingh,thethenrevenueministertogetafewmillionrecordscorrectedornewlyinscribed.

Inlateryears,incertainareas,othersuchdriveswerelaunched,oftenunderthehegemonyofleftforces,andthetargetedbeneficiarieswerenolongeronlytheupperandmiddletenantrybutalsothepoor,totallyinsecureandunprotectedsharecroppersandtenantsatwill.SomecelebratedexamplesofsucheffortswereseeninKeralaandWestBengal.Inthelatesixtiesamassiveprogrammeofconfermentoftitlestolandstohutmentdwellersandtenants

wasundertakeninKerala.Theprogramme,whichachievedconsiderablesuccess,waslaunchedwiththeactiveparticipationofpeasantorganizations.TheLeftFrontgovernmentinWestBengalwhichcametopowerinJune1977launchedthefamous

OperationBargainJuly1978withtheobjectiveof,inatime-boundperiod,achievingtheregistrationofthesharecroppers,sothattheycouldthenproceedtosecureforthemtheirlegalrights,namely,permanentoccupancyandheritablerightsandacropdivisionof1:3betweenlandownerandsharecropper.Outofanestimated2.4millionbargadarsinWestBengalonly0.4millionwererecordedtillJune1978.However,afterthelaunchingofOperationBargathenumberofthoserecordedrosefrom0.7millionbyOctober1979toabout1.4millionbyNovember1990.AsignificantaspectoftheOperationBargaexperimentinWestBengalwasthat,likeinKerala,an

effortwasmadetomobilizethesupportoftheruralpoorandespeciallythetargetedbeneficiaries(thebargadars)andtheiractiveparticipationwassoughtintheimplementationofthereformmeasures.Thiswentalongwayinneutralizingthelowerlevelrevenueofficialslikepatwaris,etc.whooftenactedasmajorimpedimentsinthesuccessfulimplementationofgovernmentprogrammes.AninnovativemoveoftheWestBengalgovernmentaimedatbothgivingavoicetotheruralpoorandchangingtheattitudeoftherevenueofficialswastostartanumberoforientationcampswhilelaunchingOperationBarga,‘where30to40agriculturalworkersandsharecroppersandadozenandahalfofficersofLandReformandotherrelateddepartmentsweremadetostaytogether,eattogetheranddiscusstogetherinthesamepremisesindistantruralareas.’6

ThoughOperationBargadidleadtorecordingofalargenumberofsharecroppersandconsequentlyprovidingthemwithsecurityoftenure,theprocesscouldnotbecompletedanditreachedmoreorlessastalemateafteralittlemorethanhalfthesharecroppershadbeencovered.Thiswasbecauseofsomesignificantreasons.First,itwasfoundpoliticallyunviable,justasitwasethicallyindefensible,toproceedwithOperationBargawhenfacedwith‘landlords’whothemselveswerecultivatorswithholdingsonlymarginallylarger,ifeventhat,thanthatofthesharecroppers;landlordswhowereentitledtoonlyone-fourthoftheproduce,therestbeingthesharecroppers’share.AsithasbeennotedthatinWestBengalwhereovertimetheoverwhelmingmajorityofthecultivatorsweresmallcultivatorscontrollinglessthanfiveacres,afurtherredistributivethrustwasdifficult.‘The“classenemy”haddissolvedintoaseaofsmallholdings.’7ThedilemmawasthesameastheonethatwasfacedinotherpartsofIndia,i.e.,theneedtobalancetheinterestofthesmalllandownerandthetenant.Asmentionedbefore,tenancylegislationinIndiagenerallyanticipatedthisaspectandhadprovisosbuiltintothelegislationwhichaddressedtheproblem.Theotherproblemwasthatsuchwastheland-manratioinBengalthatthelandlordwasoftenableto

rotateapieceofleasedlandamongtwoormoresharecroppersorbargadars,i.e.,foreachpieceoflandtherecouldbemorethanonebargadarclaimingtenancyrights.Registeringanyonewouldpermanentlyousttheother.Also,ifallthebargadarswereregisteredinsuchasituationthesizeoftheholdingsper

cultivatorwouldthreatentogowaybelowtheoptimum.Therewere,thus,politicalandeconomiclimitstohowfarOperationBargacouldbecarried;theobjectivesituationdidnotpermitthefullimplementationofthenotionof‘landtothetiller’oreventheprovisionoffullsecurityoftenuretoeachcultivator.

LimitationsofTenancyReform

Thus,thefirstobjectiveoftenancylegislationinIndia,thatofprovidingsecurityoftenuretoalltenantsmetwithonlylimitedsuccess.Whileasubstantialproportionoftenantsdidacquiresecurity(manyevenbecamelandowners,asweshallseepresently)therewerestilllargenumberswhoremainedunprotected.ThepartialsuccessstoriessuchasthoseofKeralaandWestBengalnotwithstanding,thepracticeofunsecuredtenancy,mostlyoral,whethertakingtheformofshare-croppingorthepaymentoffixedproduceorcashrent,continuedinIndiaonalargescale.Itisthecontinuedexistenceoflargenumberofinsecuretenantswhich,inter-alia,madethesuccessfulimplementationofthesecondmajorobjectiveoftenancylegislation,thatofreducingrentstoa‘fair’level,almostimpossibletoachieve.Themarketcondition,e.g.,theadverseland-manratiothatdevelopedinIndiaduringcolonialrule,pushedtowardshighrents.Legal‘fair’rentsinsuchasituationcouldonlybeenforcedinthecaseoftenantswhoweresecureandhadoccupancyrights;i.e.,theycouldnotberemovedorchanged.Legislationwasenactedinallthestatesregulatingtherentpayablebycultivatingtenants.Moststates

fixedmaximumrentsatlevelssuggestedbytheFirstandSecondPlan,i.e.to20to25percentofgrossproduce.SomestateslikePunjab,Haryana,TamilNadu,AndhraPradesh(coastalareas)fixedmaximumrentssomewhathigher,rangingbetween33.3and40percent.Inpractice,however,themarketratesofrentalmostinallpartsofthecountrytendedtobearound50percentofgrossproduce.Inadditionthetenantoftenendedupbearingthecostoftheproductioninputseitherfullyortoasubstantialextent.Further,theGreenRevolutionwhichstartedinsomepartsofIndiainthelatesixtiesaggravatedtheproblemswithlandvaluesandrentalsrisingfurtherandreaching,forexample,inpartsofPunjab,ratesashighas70percent.Whatmademattersworsewasthefactthatitwasonlythepoorinsecuretenantsorsharecropperswhopaidthemarketratesofrent.Onlytheupperstratumofthetenantry,whichhadsecuredoccupancyrights,andwasoftenindistinguishablefromalandowner,wasabletoenforcethepaymentoflegalratesofrent.AsforthethirdobjectiveoftenancylegislationinIndia,i.e.,theacquisitionofownershiprightsby

tenants,thistoowasachievedonlypartially.Aswesawabove,insomedetail,theuseoftherighttoresumptionbylandowners,legalandillegalevictions,‘voluntary’surrenders,shifttooralandorconcealedtenancy,etc.,erodedthepossibilityofachievingthisobjectiveadequately.Yet,itmustbenotedquiteasubstantialnumberoftenantsdidacquireownershiprights.Unfortunately,detaileddataonthisaspectforthewholecountryisnotavailable.However,certaincase

studiesofspecificregionsmayserveasanindicator.P.S.Appuwrotein1975that,accordingto‘latestinformation’,inGujaratoutofabout1.3milliontenantsownershiprightshadbeenpurchasedbymorethanhalf,namelyabout0.77million;andinMaharashtraoutof2.6milliontenants,againabouthalf,namely,1.1millionhadacquiredownershiprights.Inotherstates,too,asubstantialnumberoftenantsdidbecomeowners,theirnumbersaddinguptoafewmillion.8(Itmustberememberedthatthisisinadditiontothe20millionoddtenantswhobecamelandownersasaresultoftheabolitionofintermediariesin

zamindariareas).Ithasbeenarguedthatonereasonwhyevenalargernumberoftenantsdidnotacquireownershiprightswasthatforalargenumberoftenantswhohadacquiredpermanentoccupancyrightsandachievedrentreduction,therewashardlyanymotivationtotryandacquirefullownershipwhichwouldinvolvenotonlyraisingcapital(albeitonlyafractionofthemarketvalueofland)butlegalandother

complications.Thesesuperiortenantswereforallpracticalpurposesvirtualowners.9

Thecumulativeeffectofabolitionofzamindari,tenancylegislationandceilinglegislation(seethenextchapterforadetaileddiscussionoflandceiling)inthedirectionofmeetingoneofthemajorobjectiveoflandreform,i.e.,creationofprogressivecultivatorsmakinginvestmentsandimprovementinproductivity,wasconsiderable.AveryperceptiveobserverofIndia’slandreforms,theeconomist,DanielThornerhadnoted,asearlyas1968,thatdespitealltheevasions,leakages,loopholes,andsoon,‘manymillionsofcultivatorswhohadpreviouslybeenweaktenantsortenants-at-willwereenabledtobecomesuperiortenantsorvirtualowners.’Ifonelistscertainchangestogether,thecumulativeimpactcanbeeasilyascertained.Abolitionof

zamindariledtoabout20milliontenants,thesuperioroccupancytenants,becominglandownersandmanyabsenteezamindarsactuallyturningtodirectcultivationinthelands‘resumed’for‘personal’cultivation.Intheryotwariareasnearlyhalfthetenants,e.g.,inBombayandGujaratbecomelandowners.Further,abouthalf(inBombayabout70percent)ofthelandsfromwhichtenantswereevictedwereusedbythelandownersfordirectcultivation,i.e.,theywerenotleasedoutagaininaconcealedmanner.Also,averysubstantialnumberofinferiortenantsinformerryotwariareasgotoccupancyrights(abouthalfinGujaratandMaharashtra).EveninformerzamindariareassuchasWestBengal,nearlyhalfthesharecroppersgotoccupancyrights.Tothismaybeaddedbetweenthreetofivemillionlandlesscultivatorswhogotlandwhichwasdeclaredsurplusunderceilinglaws.Nowthetenantsandsharecropperswhogotoccupancyrightsandpaidreducedfixedrents,thetenants

whoacquiredownershiprights,thelandlesswhogotlandwhichwasdeclaredsurplusoverceilinglimits,theabsenteelandownerswhobecamedirectcultivators,allhadthemotivation,andmanythepotential,ofbecomingprogressivefarmersbasedontheirownresourcesoroncreditfrominstitutionalsourceswhichbecameincreasinglyavailableeventothepoorerpeasants.

29LandReforms:CeilingandtheBhoodanMovement

LandCeilings

AmajorplankofthelandreformeffortinIndiawastheimpositionofceilingsonthesizeoflandholdings,withtheobjectiveofmakinglanddistributionmoreequitable.Onthisquestion,however,societalconsensuswasweak,ifnotnon-existent,andthatwasreflectedintheextremedifficultyinimplementingthisprogrammewithevenareasonabledegreeofsuccess.TheAllIndiaKisanSabhahadsupportedthedemandforamaximumlimitoflandownershipof25

acresperlandholderin1946.TheCongress,perhapsforthefirsttime,officiallyintroducedthenotionoflandceilingsoonafterindependence.InNovember1947,theAICCappointedacommittee,whichdrewuptheeconomicprogrammeoftheCongress.ThecommitteeheadedbyJawaharlalNehruhadrecommended,‘Themaximumsizeofholdingsshouldbefixed.Thesurpluslandoversuchamaximumshouldbeacquiredandplacedatthedisposalofthevillagecooperatives.’1Similarly,theCongressAgrarianReformCommittee,chairedbyJ.C.Kumarappa,whichsubmitteditsreportinJuly1949,alsorecommendedaceilingonlandholdingwhichwastobethreetimesthesizeofaneconomicholding.(Aneconomicholdingbeingdefinedasthatwhichwouldgiveareasonablestandardoflivingtothecultivatorandprovidefullemploymenttoafamilyofnormalsizeandatleasttoapairofbullocks.)TheFirstPlan(1951-1956)tooexpresseditself‘infavouroftheprinciplethatthereshouldbean

upperlimittotheamountoflandthatanindividualmayhold.’ThoughthePlanbroadlyacceptedtheupperlimitsuggestedbytheKumarappaCommitteeas‘fair’,itwasneverthelessstatedthattheexactupperlimitwastobe‘fixedbyeachState,havingregardtoitsownagrarianhistoryanditspresentproblems.’Moreover,itwasstated,‘Thecensusoflandholdingandcultivation,whichitisproposedtoholdduring1953,willgivethedatarelevanttothisdecision.’Clearly,therewasnoimmediateprogrammeofimplementingceilingsandtheFirstPlananticipatedthat‘twotothreeyearswouldbenecessary’toevenundertakethenecessarysurveyandsetupamachinerywhichwouldenforceceilinglegislationeffectively.2

Itwasamatterofnosurprise,therefore,thatdespitetheearlystatementsofintentionsandrecommendations,notmuchprogressonthequestionofceilingsoccurredintheinitialyearsafterindependence.ThiswasrecognizedbytheCongress,andtheAICCinitssessioninAgrain1953urged,‘TheStateGovernmentsshouldtakeimmediatestepsinregardtocollectionofrequisitelanddataandthefixationofceilingsonlandholdings,withaviewtoredistributetheland,asfaraspossible,amonglandlessworkers.’3ThispositionwasreiteratedrepeatedlybytheCongressWorkingCommitteeandtheAICCoverthenextfewyears.In1957theStandingCommitteeofNationalDevelopmentCouncil(TheNDCwascreatedin1952.Itwasaforumwhereallthechiefministersofthestateswouldassemble,

underthechairmanshipofNehru,todiscusscriticalissuesrelatingtodevelopment.)adoptedadecisiontocompletetheimpositionofceilingsinthefewstateswheresuchlegislationhadbeenpassedbytheendof1960anddecidedthatotherstatesshouldpasssuchlegislationby1958-59.Inthemeantime,oppositiontoceilingswasbuildingupinlargepartsofthecountry,inthePress,in

parliament,inthestatelegislaturesandevenwithintheCongressparty.Athreattotherighttoprivatepropertywasperceivedbytherurallandownersaswellasurbaninterests.MatterscametoaheadattheNagpursessionoftheIndianNationalCongressinJanuary1959.DespiteoppositionfromprominentCongressmenattheAICCandtheSubjectsCommitteemeetingprecedingtheopensession,theNagpurCongress(January1959)passedaresolutionstatingthat‘inordertoremoveuncertaintyregardinglandreformsandgivestabilitytothefarmer,ceilingsshouldbefixedonexistingandfutureholdingsandlegislationtothiseffect...shouldbecompletedinallStatesbytheendof1959.’Further,thelanddeclaredsurplus,i.e.,aboveceilinglimits,wasto‘vestinthepanchayats...and(be)managedthroughcooperativesconsistingoflandlesslabourers.’4

AwaveofcriticismwastofollowinthemonthsfollowingtheNagpursession.N.G.Ranga,SecretaryoftheCongressparliamentarypartywhohadalready,inDecember1958,senttoNehrualettersignedbyahundredCongressmembersofparliament,critiquingtheideaofceilings,resignedfromtheCongressinFebruary1959.TheNagpurResolutioncontributedconsiderablytowardstheconsolidationoftheright-wingforcesbothintheruralandurbansectorsofthecountry.N.G.RangaandC.Rajagopalachari,alarmedatthemovestowardslandceilingsandthreatsofcompulsorycooperativizationnowjoinedhandswithMinooMasanianimportantleaderoftheForumforFreeEnterprisewhichcampaignedagainstthethreatofnationalizationandthepublicsectorswampingtheprivatesector,toformtheSwatantrapartyinJune1959,withRangaasapresident.Thecampaignersandbeneficiariesofzamindariabolition,thetenantswhohadnowbecomelandowners,alsorangedthemselvesagainstthenextstepinlandreform,anattemptatredistributionoflandownershipthroughimpositionoflandceilings.Theopponentsoftheceilingslegislationwere,however,tohavetheirrealvictoryatthestatelevel,as

itwasthestateswhichhadtoformulateandimplementthelegislation.Thestatelegislatures,whichmetshortlyaftertheNagpursession,showednohasteinimplementingtheNagpurResolution.Theceilingsissuethusdraggedonandmoststatespassedtheenablinglegislationonlybytheendof1961,i.e.,nearlyfourteenyearsaftertheideawasofficiallymooted.

WeaknessesinLandCeilingLegislation

Thelongdelay,aswellasthenatureofthelegislation,ensuredthattheceilingswouldhaveaverymutedimpact,releasinglittlesurpluslandforredistribution.Byandlargetheceilinglawsinmoststateshadcertainmajorshortcomings.First,inasituationwheremorethan70percentoflandholdingsinIndiawereunderfiveacres,theceilingfixedonexistingholdingsbythestateswereveryhigh.Forexample,inAndhraPradesh,itvariedfrom27to312acres(dependingupontheclassofland),Assam50acres,Kerala15to37.5acres,Punjab30to60acres,WestBengal25acres,Maharashtra18to126acresandsoon.Moreover,inmoststates,initially,theceilingswereimposedonindividualsandnotfamilyholdings,enablinglandownerstodivideuptheirholdings‘notionally’inthenamesofrelativesmerelytoavoidtheceiling.Further,inmanystatestheceilingcouldberaised,e.g.,by67percentinKerala,90percentinMadhyaPradesh,100percentinBihar,MadrasandMaharashtra,140percentinTripuraandso

on,ifthesizeofthefamilyofthelandholderexceededfive.AndhraPradeshhadnolimit,allowing6to72acres(dependingonthenatureofland)per‘extra’memberofthefamily.Veryfewlandedfamilieswouldhaveholdingsthatexceededtheseliberallimits.Onlyinsomestates,whereveryfewholdingsexceededtheceilinglimitsuchasJammuandKashmir,WestBengal,HimachalPradeshandPunjab,noallowancewasmadeforthesizeofthefamily.Second,alargenumberofexemptionstotheceilinglimitswerepermittedbymoststatesfollowingthe

SecondPlanrecommendationsthatcertaincategoriesoflandcouldbeexemptedfromceilings.Theseweretea,coffeeandrubberplantations,orchards,specializedfarmsengagedincattlebreeding,dairying,woolraising,etc.,sugarcanefarmsoperatedbysugarfactoriesandefficientlymanagedfarmsonwhichheavyinvestmentshadbeenmade.5Theintentionwasclearlytopromoteandcertainlynothinderprogressiveorcapitalistfarmingdoneonalargescale,whileatthesametimeendingabsenteelandlordismindulgedinbylargelandownersthroughtenantsandsharecroppers.However,theexemptionswereoftencarriedtoabsurdlimitswithTamilNadureportedlypermitting26

kindsofexemptions.Inanycase,criteriasuchas‘efficientlymanagedfarm’weresufficientlyvagueforlargenumberoflandholderstoevadetheceilingsbysimplygettingthemselvesdeclared‘efficient’.Similarly,exemptiontolandheldbycooperatives,asproposedbytheMadrasgovernment,wasopentogreatmisusewithlandlordstransferringtheirlandstoboguscooperatives.Ontheotherhand,however,theceilinglawsledtoatleastsomelandownersshiftingtodirect‘efficient’farminginordertoavoidalienationoftheirlands.Finally,thelongdelayinbringinginceilinglegislationtoalargeextentdefeateditspurpose.Thelarge

landownershadenoughtimetoeitherselltheirexcesslands,ormakemalafidetransfersinthenamesofrelativesandevenmakebenamitransfers.Further,thelandownersalsoresortedtomassevictionoftenants,resumingtheirlandsatleastuptotheceilinglimit,andclaiming,oftenfalsely,tohaveshiftedtoprogressivefarmingundertheirdirectsupervision.Thus,bythetimetheceilinglegislationswereinplace,therewerebarelyanyholdingsleftabovetheceilingandconsequentlylittlesurpluslandbecameavailableforredistribution.ThiswasrecognizedbytheCongressleadershipandtheThirdPlanalsoadmittedit.Infact,despitetheceilinglegislationswhichwerepassedbymoststatesby1961,tilltheendof1970

notasingleacrewasdeclaredsurplusinlargestateslikeBihar,Mysore,Kerala,OrissaandRajasthan.InAndhraPradesh,amere1400acresweredeclaredsurplusbutnolandwasdistributed.OnlyinJammuandKashmirwereceilinglawsfullyimplementedandbythemiddleof1955about230,000acresofsurpluslandwerehandedovertotenantsandlandlesslabourers,thattoowithouthavingtopayanycompensation.However,takingIndiaaswhole,only2.4millionacresweredeclaredsurplusbytheendof1970,andtheareadistributedconstitutedonlyabouthalfthesurplusland,constitutingamere0.3percentofthetotalcultivatedlandofIndia.Thedismalrecordinusingceilinglegislationforamoreequitabledistributionoflandcombinedwitha

sharplyincreasingpolarizationinthecountrysidesincethemid-sixtiescalledforanewinitiativeinlandreform.TheIndiancountrysidesawthegrowingconsolidationoftheownercultivator/richpeasantinterests(similartowhattheRudolphscall‘Bullockcapitalists’)andtheirfindingadistinctpoliticalvoiceinformationssuchastheBKD(formedbyCharanSinghafterhebroughtdowntheC.B.Gupta-ledCongressgovernmentinU.P.in1967).TheBKDlatermergedwithSwatantraandotherpartiestobecome

BLDin1974andtheBLDwastheprincipalcomponentoftheJanataPartywhichcametopowerin1977,aftertheEmergency,bringingthestronginfluence,oftheownercultivator/richpeasantinterests,whichwashithertofeltmainlyatthestatelevel,tothecentralornationallevel.Inthewakeofthepoliticalandeconomiccrisisofthemid-sixties,inflation,devaluation,theIndo-Pak

war,andsoon(seechapter26),thereemergedastrongstrandofagrarianradicalisminlargepartsofthecountry.TheNaxaliteMovementledbytheCPI(ML)peakedinWestBengalandpartsofAndhraPradesh,OrissaandBihartowardstheendofthesixties.Theyear1970,andinsomecaseslikeinWestBengaltheprecedingfewyears,sawawidespread‘landgrab’movementbythelandlessinmanypartsofthecountryundertheleadershipoftheCommunistandSocialistparties.DisturbanceswerereportedfromAssam,AndhraPradesh,Bihar,Gujarat,Punjab,Rajasthan,TamilNadu,U.P.,andWestBengalin1969-70.Thetotalamountoflandseizedwasnotverysignificantandmostofitwasgovernmentwasteland,landtakenoverbythegovernmentbutnotdistributed,andtosomeextenthomesteadland.Themovementwaseffectivelysuppressed.About20,000politicalactivistswerearrested.However,despitetheverylimitedsuccessinlandseizureandthequicksuppressionofthemovement,onthewholethemovementhadasignificantsymboliceffect.Thenation’sattentionwasdrawndramaticallytotheagrarianquestion.Thiswasthecontextinwhichthesecondspurtoflandreformeffortswastooccurinthesixtiesand

earlyseventies.TheLandReformImplementationCommitteeoftheNationalDevelopmentCouncilmetinJune1964andmadesustainedeffortstoputpressureonthechiefministerstoplugtheloopholesinthelandreformlegislationsandimplementthemeffectively.WiththepoliticalshiftofIndiraGandhitotheleftinthelatesixties,particularlyafter1969,theseeffortsreceivedafurthermomentum.AtalandreformconferenceofthechiefministerscalledbyherinSeptember1970,sheforcefullyarguedthatsocialdiscontentandviolenceinthecountrysidehaderuptedbecause:6

Thelandreformmeasuresimplementedhavefailedtomatchthelegitimateexpectationswhichwerefirstfosteredamongmillionsofcultivatorsduringthenationalmovement...Inshort,wehaveyettocreateinstitutionalconditionswhichwouldenablesmallfarmers,tenants,andlandlesslabourerstoshareintheagriculturalNewDeal.

ReductionofceilinglimitswasoneofthemainissuesdiscussedintheConferencewithmostofthechiefministersrejectingsuchaproposaloutright.ThematterwasreferredtotheCentralLandReformsCommittee,whichwastolookintothisandothercontentiousissuesthatemergedintheConference.InAugust1971,theCommitteemadeaseriesofrecommendationsincludingasubstantialreductionintheceilinglimits,withdrawalofexemptionssuchasthoseinfavourof‘efficient’ormechanizedfarmsandmakingceilingsapplicabletothefamilyasaunitandnottoindividualsaswasthecaseinmoststates.TheCongress,nowfurtherstrengthenedaftertheelectoralvictoriesof1971and1972,wasabletoget

thechiefministers’conferenceheldinJuly1972toapprovenewnationalguidelinesfollowingmonthsofbitteropposition.ThenewguidelineswerebasedessentiallyontheAugust1971recommendationsoftheCentralLandReformsCommittee.SomeoftheimportantfeaturesoftheJuly1972guidelines,whichmarkedabreakinthehistoryofceilinglegislationinIndia,were:

1.Theceilingfordouble-croppedperenniallyirrigatedlandwastobewithintherangeoftentoeighteenacres,itwastwenty-sevenacresforsingle-croppedlandandfifty-fouracresforinferiordrylands.

2.Aceilingwastobeapplicabletoafamilyasaunitoffivemembers,(husband,wifeandthreeminorchildren).Additionallandperadditionalmembercouldbepermittedforfamilieswhichexceededthisnumberbutuptoamaximumlimitofdoubletheceilingforthefivememberunit.3.Inthedistributionofsurplusland,prioritywastobegiventolandlessagriculturalworkers,

particularlythosebelongingtotheScheduledCastesandScheduledTribes.4.Compensationpayableforsurpluslandwastobefixedwellbelowmarketpricesoastobewithin

thecapacityofthenewallottees.

Followingthe1972guidelinesmoststates(barringsomenorth-easternstatesandGoawhichhadnoceilinglaws)passedrevisedceilinglegislation,loweringtheceilinglimitswithintherangeprescribedintheguidelines.Resistancetotheceilinglawsandeffortstoevadetheceilingcontinuedinavarietyofways.Acommonmethodwastoseekjudicialinterventiononanumberofgrounds.Hundredsofthousandsofceilingcaseswerefiledinthecourtsalloverthecountry.OneestimatementionsfivehundredthousandpendingcasesinAndhraPradeshalone!Inanattempttostemthismenacethegovernmentgotthe34thAmendmenttotheConstitutionpassedin

parliamentinAugust1974,gettingmostoftherevisedceilinglawsincludedintheNinthScheduleoftheConstitutionsothattheycouldnotbechallengedonconstitutionalgrounds.Whiletherenewedeffortoftheseventiesdidleadtosomeprogressinsurpluslandbeingredistributed,

theoverallresultswerestillfarfromsatisfactory.Asaresultoftheceilinglawsoftheseventies,anadditionalareaofabout2.27millionacresoflandwasdistributedbytheearlyeighties,but,quitesymptomaticoftheentireeffortatceilingreform,anestimated32.25millionacresoflandwaswillfullydispersedtoavoidceilings.Nevertheless,byMarch1985,7.2millionacresweredeclaredsurplusoutofwhich4.3millionacres

weredistributedtoabout3.3millionbeneficiaries.Moreover,morethanhalf,54.6percentofthebeneficiariesweremembersoftheScheduledCastesandScheduledTribeswhoreceivedabout43.6percentoftheareadistributed.Theobjectivesetoutinthe1947economicprogrammeoftheCongress,ofdistributingsurpluslandstovillagecooperativesorofevenusingsuchlandstostartnewcooperativesdidnotachieveanysuccess.Outofthelanddeclaredsurplusbutnotdistributed,nearly1.6millionacreswasunderlitigation.Therewaswideregionalvariationintheimplementationofceilinglaws,withthestates,wheregreater

politicalmobilizationofthetargetedbeneficiariesoccurred,orwheregreaterpoliticalwillwasshownbythegovernment,achievingamuchhigherlevelsofsuccess.Forexample,itisestimatedthatWestBengal,whichhadonlylessthan3percentofthecultivatedareainIndia,contributedaboutaquarterofthetotallanddeclaredsurplusunderceilinglawsalloverIndia.Bythemiddleof1992,theareadeclaredsurpluswas7.3millionacres(itwas2.4millionacresin

1970)andtheareadistributedwasabout5millionacres(itwas1.2millionacresin1970)andthebeneficiariesnumberedabout4.7million.Theincreaseinthenumberofbeneficiariesparticularlybetween1985and1992wasfargreaterthantheriseinareadistributed,1.4millionbeneficiariesand0.1millionacresrespectively.Thissuggeststhatthenewbeneficiarieswouldbereceivingonlytinyplotsorhomesteadlands.Thus,whiletherewasadistinctimprovementafter1972,yet,thetotalareadeclaredsurplusthatcould

bedistributedamongthelandlessconstitutedonlyabout2percentofthecultivatedarea.Again,whileit

istruethatmorethanfourandahalfmillionpeople,mostlylandless,didreceivesomeland(howeverpooritsqualityandhoweversmallthesizeoftheholding),theinequitiesinIndianagriculture,whichtheceilinglawswereintendedtoaddress,persistedtoaverylargeextent.Animportantimpactoftheceilinglaws,andperhapsinthelongrunthemostcriticalone,wasthatit

killedthelandmarketandpreventedanincreasingconcentrationinlandholdingsthroughde-peasantisation.AstheeminentscholarofIndianagricultureandpolicy-maker,C.H.HanumanthaRao,putit,‘Thelawdiscouragedconcentrationoflandownershipbeyondtheceilinglevelandthuspreventedthepossibledispossessionofnumeroussmallandmarginalholderswhichwouldprobablyhaveoccurredthroughacompetitiveprocessinthelandmarketintheabsenceofaceilingonlandholdings.’7

Also,thoughtheopportunitytoacquirelargeareasofsurpluslandsforredistributionwasmissedbecauseofdefectiveanddelayedceilinglaws,inthelongrunthehighpopulationgrowthandtherapidsubdivisionoflargeholdingsoverseveralgenerations(intheabsenceofthepracticeofprimogenitureforinheritanceinIndia)ledautomaticallytolittlelandremainingovertheceilinglimits.Infact,thenumberofholdingsandtheareaoperatedunderthecategoryoflargeholdings,25acresorabove(even15acresandabove)keptfallinginthedecadessinceindependencerightuptothenineties.Exceptincertainsmallpocketsinthecountry,verylargelandholdingsofthesemi-feudaltypearenowthingsofthepast.Inequalityamonglandownerswasnolongerakeyissue,aslandholdingwasnotveryskewedanymore.Byoneestimate,by1976-77nearly97percentoftheoperatedholdingswerebelow25acresand87percentoftheholdingswerebelow10acres.8Theproblemofthelandlessorthenearlandless,whoitisestimatedconstitutednearlyhalftheagriculturalpopulationstillrequiredurgentattention.However,anyfurtherattemptatlandredistributionthroughloweringofceilingsdoesnotappeartobe

politicallyfeasibleoreveneconomicallyviable.Giventheadverseland-manratioinIndiaandparticularlygiven(unlikemanyothercountrieswithsimilarratios)thefactthataveryhighproportionofthepopulationcontinuestobedependentonagriculture(nearly67percentofthetotalworkforcewasengagedinagriculturein1991)andthatconsequentlythenumberofpotentialcompetitorsforlandisverylarge,anyattempttofurtherreduceceilingstoprovidelandforthelandlesslabourerswouldvastlyincreasethenumberofuneconomicandunviableholdings.Also,itwouldrangetheentire,nowpoliticallyveryimportant,landowningclasses,powerfullymobilizedunderthe‘new’farmers’movement,againstanyregimewhichtriedtodoso.Asaneminentradicaljournalistsaidtousrecently,‘OnlyaPolPotcantrytodolandredistributiononthebasisoflandtothetillertoday.’Perhapstheonlyviableprogrammeleftforthelandlesswastheonewhichhasbeentosomeextent

takenupinrecentyears,ofdistributinghomesteadlandsorevenjusthomesites,ensuringthepaymentofminimumwages,aswellasprovidingsecurityoftenureandfairrentstosharecroppersandtenants.9

Otheranswersaretobefoundinincreasingoff-farmemploymentinruralareas,inincreasinganimalhusbandryandotheractivitiesassociatedwithcultivationbutnotrequiringland.

TheBhoodanMovement

Bhoodanwasanattemptatlandreform,atbringingaboutinstitutionalchangesinagriculture,likelandredistributionthroughamovementandnotsimplythroughgovernmentlegislation.EminentGandhianconstructiveworker,AcharyaVinobaBhave,drewuponGandhiantechniquesandideassuchas

constructiveworkandtrusteeshiptolaunchthismovementintheearlyfifties.Unfortunately,itsrevolutionarypotentialhasgenerallybeenmissed.VinobaBhaveorganizedanall-Indiafederationofconstructiveworkers,theSarvodayaSamaj,which

wastotakeupthetaskofanon-violentsocialtransformationinthecountry.Heandhisfollowersweretodopadayatra,walkonfootfromvillagetovillagetopersuadethelargerlandownerstodonateatleastone-sixthoftheirlandsasbhoodanor‘land-gift’fordistributionamongthelandlessandthelandpoor.Thetargetwastogetasdonation50millionacres,whichwasone-sixthofthe300millionacresofcultivablelandinIndia.Theideawasthateachaveragefamilyoffiveshouldgiveupone-sixthoftheirlandacceptingthepoorlandlessmanasamemberofthefamily.Themovement,thoughindependentofthegovernment,hadthesupportoftheCongress,withtheAICC

urgingCongressmentoparticipateinitactively.EminentformerCongressmanandnowaprominentleaderofthePSP(PrajaSocialistParty),JayaprakashNarayan,withdrewfromactivepoliticstojointheBhoodanMovementin1953.Vinobareceivedthefirstdonationoflandon18April1951inthevillageofPochampalliinthe

TelenganaregionofAndhraPradesh,wherethereverberationsoftheCommunistParty-ledarmedpeasantrevoltwerestillbeingfelt.Inlessthanthreemonthshehadcoveredabout200villagesinthisregionandreceived12,200acresasdonation.ThemovementthenspreadtotheNorth,particularlyBiharandUttarPradesh.Intheinitialyearsthemovementachievedaconsiderabledegreeofsuccess,receivingoverfourmillionacresoflandasdonationbyMarch1956.Afterthisthemovementlostmomentumandverylittlenewlandwasreceivedasdonations.Also,asubstantialpartofthelanddonatedwasunfitforcultivationorunderlitigation.Perhapsthis

wasonereasonwhyoutofthenearlyfourandhalfmillionacresofBhoodanlandavailableonlyabout654thousandacreswereactuallydistributedamong200thousandfamiliesbytheendof1957.Byearly1961,about872thousandacresoflandhadbeendistributed.Meanwhile,towardsoftheendof1955,themovementtookanewform,thatofGramdanor‘donation

ofvillage’.AgaintakingofffromtheGandhiannotionthatalllandbelongedto‘GopalorGod,inGramdanvillagesthemovementdeclaredthatalllandwasownedcollectivelyorequally,asitdidnotbelongtoanyoneindividual.ThemovementstartedinOrissaandwasmostsuccessfulthere.Bytheendof1960thereweremorethanfourandahalfthousandGramdanvillagesoutwhich1,946wereinOrissa,603inMaharashtra,543inKerala,483inAndhraPradeshandabout250inMadras.Ithasbeenarguedthatthismovementwassuccessfulmainlyinvillageswhereclassdifferentiationhadnotyetemergedandtherewaslittleifanydisparityinownershipoflandorotherproperty,suchasthoseinhabitedbycertaintribalcommunities.Vinobaissaidtohavepickedsuchvillagesforthismovement.BythesixtiestheBhoodan/GramdanMovementhadlostitselandespiteitsconsiderableinitial

promise.Itscreativepotentialessentiallyremainedunutilized.Theprogramme,however,appearedtodragonindefinitely,essentiallyforgottenbutforrudereminderssuchastheBihargovernmentdecisionofJune1999todissolvetheStateBhoodanCommitteeforitsinabilitytodistributeevenhalftheBhoodanlandavailableoverthepast38years!10

Aproperassessmentofthemovementparticularlyitspotentialisstilltobemade.Ithasbeentooeasilydismissedasnotonly‘utopian’butalsoasbeingreactionary,classcollaborationistandaimedatpreventingclassstruggle.AsonehistorianofagrarianreformsinIndiaputit,itspurposewasto‘serveas

abrakeontherevolutionarystruggleofthepeasants.’11ThisisnotsurprisingasfarmoresuccessfulmovementsledbyGandhijicontinuetobewronglycharacterizedinthisfashionbysomesectionsforhavingbasedthemselvesonsimilarprinciples.TherewerehoweversomeverysignificantaspectsoftheBhoodanMovementthatneedtobenoted.

First,theveryfactthatitwasoneoftheveryfewattemptsafterindependencetobringaboutlandreformthroughamovementandnotthroughgovernmentlegislationfromthetopisinitselfverysignificant.Second,thepotentialofthemovementwasenormous,basedasitwasontheideaoftrusteeshiporthatalllandbelongedtoGod.Ifthelandlordsfailedtobehaveastrusteesoras‘equal’sharersofproperty,thenasatyagraha,intheGandhianmould,couldbelaunchedagainstthem.This,forexample,waspreciselywhattheTamilNaduSarvodayaleadersproposedtodoin1961:‘StartsatyagrahaagainstlandlordswhorefusedtocooperateinGramdanvillagesandwentbackontheirpromisestodonateland.’12ThereweresomeincludingasectionofSocialistsinfluencedbyGandhianthoughtandpractice(manyofthemwereinthePSPintheearlyfifties)whowantedtorealizetherevolutionarypotentialofthenotionoftrusteeshipandofconstructiveworkthroughthetechniqueofsatyagrahabylaunchingmasscivildisobedienceagainstinjustice.TheSarvodayaSamaj,however,onthewholefailedtomakethistransition:tobuildanactivelarge-scalemassmovementthatwouldgenerateirresistiblepressureforsocialtransformationinlargepartsofthecountry.Yet,themovementmadeasignificantcontributionbycreatingamoralambience,anatmosphere,which,

whileputtingpressureonthelandlords,createdconditionsfavourabletothelandless.ThiswasrecognizedevenbythenotedCommunistleaderE.M.S.Namboodiripad.CitinganarticlebyNamboodiripadtitled‘SarvodyaandCommunism,’Kotovskywrote:13

theBhoodanandGramdanmovement...has...toacertainextentstimulatedpoliticalandotheractivitybythepeasantmassesandhascreatedafavourableatmosphereforpoliticalpropagandaandagitationforredistributionoftheland,forabolitionofprivateownershipoflandandforthedevelopmentofagriculturalproducers’cooperatives.

This,ironically,isperhapsthebestappreciationofthesignificanceoftheBhoodanMovementcomingfromthosewhohavebeenitsmajorcritics.

30LandReforms:CooperativesandanOverview

Cooperatives

Awidespectrumofthenationalmovement’sleadersincludingMahatmaGandhi,JawaharlalNehru,theSocialistsandCommunistswasagreedthatcooperativizationwouldleadtomajorimprovementinIndianagricultureandwouldparticularlybenefitthepoor.Cooperativizationwasthereforeseenasanimportantelementintheagendaforinstitutionalchangessoughttobeachievedthroughlandreform.However,asinthecaseofthelandceilingissue,therewasnogeneralconsensus,particularlyamongthepeasantry,onthequestionofcooperatives.Correctlyreflectingthissituation,theCongressatindependencemadeverytentativeproposals—likethestatemakingeffortstoorganize‘pilotschemesforexperimentingwithcooperativefarmingamongsmallholders-ongovernmentunoccupiedbutcultivablelands.’1Further,itwasclarifiedthatanymovetowardscooperativizationwastobethroughpersuasion,bygettingthegoodwillandagreementofthepeasantry.Noforceorcompulsionwasvisualized.TherecommendationsinJuly1949oftheCongressAgrarianReformsCommittee,calledthe

KumarappaCommitteeafteritschairman,showedthefirstsignsthattheCongresscouldpushbeyondtheexistingconsensus.Thecommitteerecommendedthat‘theStateshouldbeempoweredtoenforcetheapplicationofvaryingdegreesofcooperationfordifferenttypesoffarming.Thus,whilethefamilyfarmerwillhavetomakeuseofthemultipurposeco-operativesocietyformarketing,credit,andothermatters,thebelow-basicholder(i.e.,peasantwithsmalluneconomicholding)willhavetocultivatehisfarmjointlywithsuchotherholders.’2Forthefirsttimetherewasasuggestionofcompulsionbeingusedtopromotecooperativesandthecommitteeassumedthe‘gradualnessoftheprogramme,intelligentpropaganda,liberalstate-aidanditsjudiciousimplementationbyaspeciallytrainedcadrewouldtoagreatextentreducethepsychologicalhesitationofthefarmertotaketotheco-operativepatternsrecommendedbythecommittee.’3Thiswasahastyassumption,aslatereventsweretoshow.TheFirstPlanapproachedtheissuemorejudiciouslyandrecommendedthatsmallandmediumfarms

inparticularshouldbeencouragedandassistedtogroupthemselvesintocooperativefarmingsocieties.ThePlandidnottalkofanyenforcingpowerstothestatethoughitdidenvisagesomeamountofcompulsionwhenitsuggestedthatifamajorityoftheownersandoccupancytenantsinavillage,owningatleasthalfthelandofthevillage,wishedtoenteruponcooperativemanagementofthelandofthevillage,thentheirdecisionshouldbebindingonthevillageasawhole.Theearlyplannershadhopedthatthevillagepanchayatactivatedbymotivatedpartyworkersand

aidedbythetrainedworkersofthenewlylaunchedCommunityDevelopmentprogramme(inOctober1952)wouldnotonlyhelpimplementruraldevelopmentprojectsbutwouldhelpbringaboutcriticalinstitutionalchangesinIndianagriculture,forexamplebyassistingintheimplementationofland

reforms,byorganizingvoluntarylabourforcommunityworkandbysettingupofcooperatives.Further,therewasahighandgrowinglevelofexpectation,intheinitialyears,regardinghowmuchsuchinstitutionalchanges,particularlycooperativization,wouldsubstituteforinvestmentoutlayinagriculture,inachievingtheplannedtargetsofrapidincreasesinagriculturalproduction.TheSecondPlanreflectedthisexpectationbydeclaringthat‘themaintaskduringtheSecondFive-

YearPlanistotakesuchessentialstepsaswillprovidesoundfoundationsforthedevelopmentofcooperativefarmingsothatoveraperiodoftenyearsorsoasubstantialproportionofagriculturallandsarecultivatedoncooperativelines.’4However,eventheambitiousplan(consideringthatnocoercionwasenvisaged)ofhavinga‘substantial’proportionofagriculturallandsundercooperativeswithintenyearssoonappearedtobetoomodestonceexaggeratedreportsstartedpouringinofthedramaticincreasesinagriculturaloutputachievedbyChinathroughmeasuressuchascooperativization.(Itwasmanyyearslater,afterMao’sdeathin1976,thatthismythwasdestroyed.Byoneestimate,China’sagriculturalgrowthratebetween1954and1974wasonly2percent,whichwasactuallylowerthanIndia’s,whichwas2.5percent.)Inthemiddleof1956twoIndiandelegations,(oneofthePlanningCommission,theotheroftheUnion

MinistryofFoodandAgriculture),consistingofleadersofthecooperativemovementinIndia,membersofparliament,bureaucratsinvolvedwithcooperatives,technicalexpertsandplanners,weresenttoChinatostudyhowtheyorganizedtheircooperativesandachievedsuchrapidincreasesinagriculturaloutput.UnderlyingthesevisitswasthefeelingthatthetargetsofagriculturalgrowthenvisagedbytheSecondPlanwereinadequateandrequiredanupwardrevisionandtheChineseexperiencecouldshowhowthesetargetscouldbeachievedwithoutsignificantincreasesinoutlay.Thetwodelegationsarrivedatquitesimilarconclusions.ItwasreportedthatChinahadachieved

remarkableincreasesinfoodgrainsproductionandextensionoftheagriculturalinfrastructurethroughcooperativization.Theybothrecommended(barringtheminuteofdissentbytwomembersofonecommittee)aboldprogrammeofextendingcooperativefarminginIndia.JawaharlalNehru,whowasdeeplycommittedtotheideaofcooperativization,startedputtingpressureonthestatestoemulatetheChineseexampleandcommittohigherfoodproductiononthebasisofinstitutionalchangesinagriculture,i.e.,withoutdemandingadditionalfundsforinvestmentinagriculture.TheNationalDevelopmentCouncilandtheAICCnowsettargetsevenhigherthantheoneenvisagedbytheSecondPlan,proposingthatinthenextfiveyearsagriculturalproductionbeincreasedby25to35percentifnotmore,mainlybybringingaboutmajorinstitutionalchangesinagriculturesuchascooperativization.Thestates,however,resistedanylarge-scaleplanforcooperativization,agreeingonlytoexperimentsincooperativefarmingandthattooiftheyremainedstrictlyvoluntary.TheCongressunderNehru’spersuasioncontinuedtomountpressureinfavourofanagricultural

strategybasedcriticallyoninstitutionalchange.TheCongresspressureculminatedinthefamousNagpurResolutionpassedattheparty’sNagpursessioninJanuary1959.TheNagpurResolutionclearlystatedthat‘theorganizationofthevillageshouldbebasedonvillagepanchayatsandvillagecooperatives,bothofwhichshouldhaveadequatepowersandresourcestodischargethefunctionsallottedtothem.’Further,theResolutionstated:5

Thefutureagrarianpatternshouldbethatofcooperativejointfarming,inwhichthelandwouldbepooledforjointcultivation,thefarmerscontinuingtoretaintheirpropertyrights,andgettingashareofthenetproduceinproportiontotheirland.Further,thosewho

actuallyworkontheland,whethertheyownthelandornot,willgetashareinproportiontotheworkputinbythemonthejointfarm.

Asafirststep,priortotheinstitutionofjointfarming,servicecooperativesshouldbeorganisedthroughoutthecountry.Thisstageshouldbecompletedwithinaperiodofthreeyears.Evenwithinthisperiod,however,whereverpossibleandgenerallyagreedtobythefarmers,jointcultivationmaybestarted.

Abigleapwasinvolvedhere.NotonlydidtheNagpurResolutionvisualizeanagrarianpatternbasedonjointcooperativefarminginthefuture,itspecifiedthatsuchapatternwastobeachievedwithinthreeyears.Theproposalforintroducingcooperatives,whichwasbeingmadesincethemid-forties,couldnolongerbetreatedasjustanotherradicalrecommendationwithnoconcreteprogrammeforitsimplementation.Awaveofopposition,bothwithinandoutsidetheCongress,followedthisrecommendation.CriticisingthePressandtheparliament,whichwasconvenedshortlyafter,theNagpursession,argued

thattheResolutionwasthefirststeptowardsendingprivatepropertyandtoeventualexpropriationofthelandedclassesandthatitwouldleadtoforcedcollectivizationontheSovietorChinesepattern.FromwithintheCongresspartyseniorleaderslikeC.Rajagopalachari,N.G.RangaandotherslikeCharanSinghmobilizedopinioninthepartyandoutsideandmountedanopenattacksayingthatatotalitarian,Communistprogrammmewasbeingthrustuponthecountry.Facedwithseriousdivisionwithintheparty,Nehrustruckaconciliatorynote,assuringtheparliament

inFebruary1959thattherewasnoquestionofusinganycoerciontointroducecooperativesandthatnonewlaworactwasgoingtobepassedbyparliamentonthisquestion.Heonlyreiteratedhispersonalconvictionthatcooperativefarmingwasdesirableandthathewouldcontinuetotryandconvincethepeasants,withoutwhoseconsenttheprogrammmecouldnotbeimplemented.TheChineserepressioninTibetinMarch1959,andmoresotheChineseencroachmentsinsidethe

Indianborderafewmonthslater,werenotonlyapersonallossoffaceandprestigeforNehrubutalsomadeanyplanwhichsmackedoftheChinamodelautomaticallysuspectandverydifficulttopushpublicly.AfurtherretreatbecameinevitableandtheCongressputforwardapositioninparliamentwhichessentiallyarguedforsettingup‘servicecooperatives’alloverthecountryoverthenextthreeyearsandlefttheissueofsettingupcooperativefarmssufficientlyvague.Cooperativefarmsweretobesetupvoluntarilywhereverconditionsbecamemature.TheCongresswasawarethateventhetaskofsettingupservicecooperativesalloverthecountryin

threeyearswasagiganticeffortrequiringthesettingupof6000newcooperativeseverymonthforaperiodofthreeyears!TheAICCdecidedtoestablishatrainingcenterforCongressworkerswhowouldplayakeyroleinorganisingservicecooperatives,andtheProvincialCongressCommitteesweredirectedtodothesame.TheprovincialCongressleaderssimplyignoredthedirectiveanddespitetheeffortsoftheCongresspresident,IndiraGandhi,theAICCtrainingprogrammedidnotgetoffthegroundandwaseventuallyaltogetherabandonedafterJune1959.TheThirdPlan,insharpcontrasttotheSecond,reflectedthemellowedpositionregarding

cooperativizationandtookaverypragmaticandcautiousapproach.Asregardscooperativefarming,itacceptedamodesttargetofsettinguptenpilotprojectsperdistrict.Atthesametimeitputinthecaveatthat‘cooperativefarminghastogrowoutofthesuccessofthegeneralagriculturaleffortthroughthecommunitydevelopmentmovement,theprogressofcooperationincredit,marketing,distributionandprocessing,thegrowthofruralindustry,andthefulfillmentoftheobjectivesoflandreform.’6Thissoundedlikeawishfulplatitudenotaplanofaction.

LimitationsofCooperativization

Giventhepolicystalematereached,itisnotsurprisingthattheprogressthatthecooperativemovementmadeinIndiabyandlargefellfarshortofthegoalssetbyitsearlyproponents.MostoftheweaknessesthatDanielThorner,thenotedeconomist,hadobservedduringhissurveyof117ofthe‘best’cooperativesalloverIndiabetweenDecember1958andMay1959remainedlargelytrueintheyearstocome.AnothereconomistandobserverofIndia’slandreforms,WolfLadejinsky,madesimilarobservationsforthesixtiesandseventies.Asforjointfarming,twotypesofcooperativeswereobserved.First,therewerethosethatwere

formedessentiallytoevadelandreformsandaccessincentivesofferedbythestate.Typically,thesecooperativeswereformedbywell-to-do,influentialfamilieswhotookonanumberofagriculturallabourersorex-tenantsasbogusmembers.Formingacooperativehelpedevadetheceilinglawsortenancylaws.Theinfluentialmembersgotthelandstilledbythebogusmemberswhowereessentiallyengagedaswagelabourortenants.Moreover,formingtheseboguscooperativesenabledtheinfluentialfamiliestotakeadvantageofthesubstantialfinancialassistanceofferedbythestateintheformofasubsidy,aswellasgetpriorityforacquiringscarceagriculturalinputslikefertilizers,improvedseedsandeventractors,etc.Second,therewerethestate-sponsoredcooperativefarmsintheformofpilotprojects,wheregenerally

poor,previouslyuncultivatedlandwasmadeavailabletothelandless,Harijans,displacedpersonsandsuchunderprivilegedgroups.Thepoorqualityofland,lackofproperirrigationfacility,etc.,andthefactthatthesefarmswererunlikegovernment-sponsoredprojectsratherthangenuine,motivated,jointeffortsofthecultivatorsledthemtobegenerallyexpensiveunsuccessfulexperiments.Theexpectedriseinproductivityandbenefitsofscale,whichisamajorraisond’êtreofcooperativefarming,wasnotinevidenceinthesefarms.Inanycase,thehopethattheservicecooperativeswouldfacilitatethetransitiontocooperativefarming

wascompletelybelied.Cooperativefarminghadspreadtonegligiblelevelsbeyondthegovernmentprojectsandtheboguscooperatives.Theservicecooperatives,whichfaredmuchbetterthanthefarmingcooperatives,alsosufferedfrom

somemajorshortcomings.Tobeginwith,theservicecooperativesnotonlyreflectedtheiniquitousstructureoftheIndiancountrysidebutalsotendedtoreinforceit.Typically,theleadershipofthecooperatives,i.e.,itspresident,secretaryandtreasurer,consistedoftheleadingfamilyorfamiliesofthevillagewhichnotonlyownedagreatdealoflandbutalsocontrolledtradeandmoneylending.Thesewell-to-dofamilies,the‘bigpeople’orthe‘allinalls’ofthevillage,werethusabletocornerforthemselvesscarceagriculturalinputs,includingcredit.Infact,quiteoften,lowinterestagriculturalcreditmadeavailablethroughcooperativeruralbankswasusedbysuchfamiliesfornon-agriculturalbusinesses,consumptionandevenmoneylending!Itwasacaseofpublicsubsidybeingusedbyanon-targetgroupforprivateinvestment.TotheextentthatCongressandotherpoliticalformationswithsimilarobjectives,viz.,theSocialistsandtheCommunists,failedtousethepoliticalspaceprovidedatthegrassrootslevelbythepanchayats,theCommunityDevelopmentprogrammeandthecooperativesinfavouroftheunderprivilegedinthecountryside,bymobilizingthemintoaction,theseinstitutionsweretakenoverbythedominantsectionsinthevillage,whousedthemtofurtherbuttresstheireconomicandpoliticalinfluence.

Thevillagepoor,thelandless,gotlittleoutoftheseinstitutionsintheearlyyears.AnexampleathandistheconstantrefusaltoimplementtheelaboraterecommendationmadebytheReserveBankofIndiain1954thatruralcreditcooperativesweretogivecredittothecultivatorastheproducerofacropandnotastheownerofland.Thisrefusalofthecooperativestoissue‘croploans’orloansinanticipationofthecropbeingproduced,andtheirinsistingoncreditbeinggivenagainstlandassecurity,meantthatthelandlesswereessentiallyexcludedfromthisscheme.In1969,theReserveBankobservedthattenantcultivators,agriculturallabourersandothers’securedonly4to6percentofthetotalcreditdisbursed.TheReportoftheAll-IndiaCreditReviewCommittee,1969,andtheInterimReportonCreditServicesforSmallandMarginalFarmersproducedbytheNationalCommissiononAgriculture,1971,confirmedthevirtualexclusionofthelandlessandaddedthatthesmallandmarginalfarmerswerealsoataconsiderabledisadvantagevis-à-visthebiggercultivatorsinaccessingcreditfromthecooperativesandevenfromthenationalizedbanks.Asweshallseepresently,itrequiredaspecialtargetingofthesegroupsthroughprogrammesliketheMarginalFarmersandAgriculturalLabourersScheme(MFAL)andtheSmallFarmersDevelopmentAgency(SFDA)underthebroadrubricofthegaribihataocampaignlaunchedbyIndiraGandhi,forthisbiastobeconsiderablymitigated.Acommonshortcomingofthecooperativemovementwasthatinsteadofpromotingpeople’s

participationitsoonbecamelikeahugeoverstaffedgovernmentdepartmentwithofficials,clerks,inspectors,andthelike,replicatedattheblock,district,divisionandstatelevels.Alargebureaucracy,generallynotinsympathywiththeprinciplesofthecooperativemovementandquitegiventobeinginfluencedbylocalvestedinterests,insteadofbecomingtheinstrumentforpromotingcooperatives,typicallybecameahindrance.Yet,overtime,theservicecooperatives,particularlythecreditcooperatives,performedacriticalrole

forIndianagriculture.Afterall,whilein1951-52,thePrimaryAgriculturalCreditSocieties(PACS),whichwerevillagelevelcooperativesocieties,advancedloansworthonlyaboutRs23crores(230million),in1960-61about212thousandsuchsocietiesdisbursednearlyRs200crores(2billion).By1992-93,thesesocietieswerelendingasmuchasRs4,900crores(49billion).AsTable30.1belowshows,in1951-52,cooperativessuppliedonly3.3percentofthecredit

requirementsofthecultivator,whereasby1981theysuppliednearly30percent.Itisfoundthatin1951thecultivatorwasdependentonnon-institutionalandgenerallyrapacioussourcesofcreditsuchasthemoneylender,traderorlandlordfor92.7percentofhiscreditrequirements.By1981,however,lowcostinstitutionalcreditlookedafterover63percentofthecultivator’srequirements.Nearly30percentwasmetbythecooperativesandanothernearly30percentwasmetbythecommercialbankswhich,aftertheirnationalizationinJuly1969byIndiraGandhi,wereprevailedupontoprovidecredittoagricultureonaprioritybasis.Table30.1:DifferentSourcesofCreditfortheCultivator1951-1981

(figuresinpercentages)

Thecooperativecreditsocieties,however,sufferedfromamajordrawback,thatoffailuretorepayloansand,consequently,averylargepercentageofoverdues.Between1960and1970,overduesoftheprimarysocietiesrosefrom20to38percentofthecreditdisbursed.Thesituationcontinuedtodeterioratewiththeall-Indiaaverageofoverduesrisingto45percentinthemid-seventiesandmanyprovincesreachingtotallyunviablefigures,like77percentinBihar.Quitesignificantly,ithasbeenobservedthatthedefaulterswerenotnecessarilythepoorandsmallfarmersbutmoreoftenthewell-to-doones.Withthegrowingpoliticalandeconomiccloutofthewell-to-dopeasant,theproblemofoverdueshadreacheddangerousproportions,affectingtheviabilityandgrowthrateofruralcreditinstitutions.PopulistmeasureslikethedecisionofV.P.Singh’sNationalFrontgovernmentin1990towrite-offallruraldebtsuptoRs10,000notonlyputaheavyburdenonthenationalexchequerbutfurthererodedtheviabilityofruralcreditinstitutions.Asalreadymentioned,alargerproportionofcooperativeandbankcreditstartedbecomingavailable,

particularlytothesmallandmarginalfarmersintheseventies.In1979-80about34percentoftheshort-termloansgivenbyscheduledcommercialbankswenttohouseholdsholdinglessthan2.5acres,whensuchhouseholdsconstitutedonly33percentofthetotalhouseholds.Similarly,57percentofsuchloanswenttohouseholdsowningupto5acres,whiletheproportionofhouseholdsinthatcategorywasonly49percent.Nolongerwasinstitutionalruralcreditthepreserveoftheruralelite.Policyinitiativesweretofollowwhichledtotheruralbanksgivingamuchhigherproportionofthecredittotheweakersections.Asforthecooperatives(PACS),thosewithholdingsupto5acresreceived34percentofthecreditandthoseholdingabove5acresreceived62percent.Thesituationofthelandlesshoweverremainedthesame,only4percentofthecreditwenttothem.7

ItisthusevidentthatservicecooperativeshadstartedtoplayaveryimportantroleinruralIndia.Theirroleinmakingavailableamuchincreasedamountofcheapcredittoawidersectionofthepeasantrywascritical.Theynotonlyhelpedinbringingimprovedseeds,modernimplements,cheapfertilizers,etc.,tothepeasants,theyalsoprovidedthemwiththewherewithaltoaccessthem.And,inmanyareastheyalsohelpedmarkettheirproduce.Infact,inmanywaystheyprovidedanecessaryconditionforthesuccessoftheGreenRevolutionstrategylaunchedinthelatesixties,whichwasbasedonintensiveuseofmoderninputsinagriculture.ItisnotsurprisingthenthatWolfLadejinsky,whowasfullyawareofalltheshortcomingsofthecooperativemovementinIndia,wastorecordinhisannualnotetotheWorldBankinMay1972:‘Millionsoffarmershavebenefitedfromthem(cooperatives)andruralIndiawithoutthislandmarkishardtovisualise.’8

MilkCooperatives:OperationFlood

ThestoryofthecooperativemovementinIndia,however,cannotbecompletewithoutadescriptionofthemostsuccessfulexperimentincooperationinIndia,whichwasaclassapartfromanyothereffortofthekind.Thisexperiment,whichstartedmodestlyinKaira(alsocalledKheda)districtofGujarateventuallybecametheharbingerofthe‘WhiteRevolution’thatspreadalloverIndia.Here,spacepermitsonlyabriefdescriptionoftheAnandexperiment.9

PeasantsoftheKairadistrict,whichsuppliedmilktothecityofBombay,feltcheatedbythemilktradersandapproachedSardarPatel,thepre-eminentnationalistleader,whohailedfromthisdistrict,for

help.AttheinitiativeofPatelandMorarjiDesai,thefarmersorganizedthemselvesintoacooperativeunionandwereabletopressurisetheBombaygovermuent,albeitwiththehelpofa‘milkstrike’,tobuymilkfromtheirunion.Thus,theKairaDistrictCooperativeMilkProducers’UnionLtd.,formallyregisteredinDecember1946,startedmodestlyinAnand,asmalltownonthehighwaybetweenAhmedabedandBaroda,supplying250litresofmilkeveryday.TheGandhianfreedomfighter,TribhuvandasK.Patel,whopatientlyroamedthevillagesonfootto

persuadefarmerstoformmilkcooperatives,becamethefirstchairmanoftheunioninJanuary1947andcontinuedtobeelectedtothispositionforovertwenty-fiveyears.DrVergheseKurien,thebrilliantengineerfromKeralaandlatertheheartandsouloftheWhiteRevolutioninIndia,wasthecelebratedandproudemployeeoftheKairafarmers,andthechiefexecutiveoftheunionfrom1950to1973,thoughhehascontinuedhiscloseassociationwiththeuniontilltoday.Theunion,whichstartedwithtwovillagecooperativesocietieswithlessthanahundredmemberseach,by2000had1,015societieswith574,000members.From250litresofmilkaday,itwasbythenhandlingnearly1millionlitresofmilkadayandhadanannualturnoverofRs.487croresorRs.4.87billion.Intheprocessofthisrapidgrowth,theuniongreatlydiversifieditsactivities.In1955,ithadsetupa

factorytomanufacturemilkpowderandbutter,partlytodealwiththeproblemofthegreateryieldsofmilkinwinternotfindinganadequatemarket.Thesameyeartheunionchosethenameof‘Amul’foritsrangeofproducts.Thiswasabrandnamewhichwastosuccessfullycompetewithsomeoftheworld’smostpowerfulmultinationalslikeGlaxoorNestleandsoonbecomeahouseholdwordalloverIndia.In1960,anewfactorywasaddedwhichwasdesignedtomanufacture600tonnesofcheeseand2500

tonnesofbabyfoodeveryyear—thefirstintheworldtomanufacturetheseproductsonalargecommercialscaleusingbuffalomilk.In1964,amodernplanttomanufacturecattlefeedwascommissioned.Overtime,sophisticatedcomputertechnologywasusedbytheuniontoregularly,evendaily,doacost-benefitanalysisofthepricesofthevariousinputswhichgointothecattlefeedandtheirnutritionalvaluetoarriveatthe‘optimum’mixofthebalancedfeedconcentratewhichwasmadeavailabletothefarmers.In1994-5theunionsold144,181tonnesofcattlefeedthroughitsbranches.Anycommunitydevelopmentworknecessarilyinvolvesanintegratedapproach.TheKaira

CooperativeUnionwasamodelcaseofhowtheunion’sownactivitieskeptexpanding,andhowitspawnedotherorganizations,bringingwithinitsscopewiderandwiderareasofconcerntotheordinarypeasant.Anefficientartificialinseminationservicethroughthevillagesocietyworkerswasintroducedsothattheproducerscouldimprovethequalityoftheirstock.In1994-5,about670,000suchinseminationswereperformedthrough827centres.Atwenty-fourhourmobileveterinaryservicewithtwenty-ninevehiclesfittedwithradiotelephoneswasavailabletothefarmersatnominalcost.Cattleownedbycooperativememberswereprovidedwithinsurancecovershouldanythinghappentothismajorsourceoftheirlivelihood.Highqualityfodderseedsforproducinggreenfodderweremadeavailable.Evenmanufactureofvaccinesforthecattlewasstarted,againtakingonmultinationalpharmaceuticalcompaniesinastruggleoverturfwhichhadalltheingredientsofamodernthriller.Aregularnewsletterwaspublishedinanefforttoeducatethepeasantsaboutmoderndevelopmentsinanimalhusbandry.Aspecialeffortwasmadetoeducatewomenwhogenerallylookedaftertheanimalsinapeasanthousehold.Attheotherendofthespectrum,anInstituteofRuralManagement(IRMA)wasfoundedinAnandfortrainingprofessionalmanagersforruraldevelopmentprojects,usingtheAmulcomplexandtheKaira

Cooperativeasalivelaboratory.Asthe‘Anandpattern’graduallyspreadtootherdistrictsinGujarat,in1974,theGujaratCooperativeMilkMarketingFederationLtd.,Anand,wasformedasanapexorganizationoftheunionsinthedistricttolookafterthemarketing.Theexistenceofthecooperativehadconsiderablyimprovedthestandardoflivingofthevillagersin

Kairadistrict,particularlythepoorfarmersandthelandless.Accordingtooneestimate,asaresultoftheactivitiesofthecooperative,inrecentyearsnearly48percentoftheincomeoftheruralhouseholdsinKairadistrictcamefromdairying.Someoftheprofitsofthecooperativealsowenttoimprovethecommonfacilitiesinthevillageincludingwells,roads,schools,etc.Acrucialfeatureofthecooperativemovementassociatedwiththe‘AnandPattern’wasthedemocratic

modeoffunctioningofthecooperatives,withaconsciouseffortbeingmadebythemanagementtokeepitseartothegroundandnotoverlooktheinterestofthehumblestofthecooperativemembersincludingthe‘low’casteandthelandless.Infact,thestructureofthecooperativewassuchthatitinvolvedthedirectproducerintheplanningandpolicy-makingprocess.Theonlynecessaryconditionformembershipofavillagecooperativesocietywasofbeingagenuineprimarymilkproducerwhoregularlysuppliedmilktothecooperative.Thevillager,irrespectiveofcaste,class,genderorreligionwhoqueuedupatthemilkcollectioncentreofthecooperativeinthevillage,dayafterday,tosellmilkandcollectthepaymentforthesalemadeonthepreviousoccasiontypicallyhadoneortwobuffaloes,notlargeheadsofcattlelikethebiglandlords.Infact,byoneestimate,one-thirdofthemilkproducerswerelandless.ItissuchproducerswhobecamemembersofthecooperativewithanominalentrancefeeofRs1and

thepurchaseofatleastoneshareofRs10.Thememberswouldelectamanagingcommitteebysecretballotwitheachmemberhavingonevoteirrespectiveofthenumberofsharesownedbythehim.Thecommitteewouldelectthechairmanandworkforthecooperativeinanhonorarycapacity.Theworkofthecommitteeinvolvedpolicy-formulationandsupervisionwhilepaidstaffwasemployedfortheroutineworkofthecooperative.Thechairman,alongwithathirdofthecommitteebyrotation,wouldretireeveryyearandfreshelectionswouldbeheld.Theelectionswereeagerlycontestedwithveryhighpollingfigures,reachingevenupto99percent.Thedistrictlevelunionmanagedbyatwelve-memberboardofdirectorshadsixmemberselectedfromamongthechairmenofthevillagesocieties.Theboardwouldelectachairmanannuallyfromamongthevillagerepresentativesandappointamanagingdirectorwhointurnwouldappointsupportingprofessionalsetc.Thiscooperativewasuniqueineffectivelycombiningtheinitiativeandcontrolofthedirectproducerwiththeuseofmoderntechnologyandthehiringofthemostadvancedprofessionalhelp,managerial,technicalorscientificthatwasavailableinthecountry.Thestructureofthecooperativeengenderedsuchacombination.TheKairaCooperativesuccessmadethemovement’sspreadtotherestofthecountryinevitable.In

1964,LalBahadurShastri,thethenprimeministerofIndia,wrotetothechiefministersofallthestatesabouttheproposedlargeprogrammetosetupcooperativedairiesonthe‘AnandPattern’.ToperformthistasktheNationalDairyDevelopmentBoard(NDDB)wascreatedin1965athisinitiative.Kurienwithhisprovendynamismwastobeatitshelmasitshonorarychairman,proudlycontinuingtodrawhissalaryasanemployeeoftheKairamilkproducers.AthisinsistenceNDDBwaslocatedinAnandandnotinNewDelhiandacquiredastructurenotofyetanotherinefficientgovernmentdepartmentbutonewhichwasmoresuitabletoitsobjectives.DrawingheavilyfromtheKairaUnionforpersonnel,expertiseandmuchmore,theNDDBlaunched‘OperationFlood’,aprogrammetoreplicatetheAnandPatterninother

milkshedsofthecountry.By1995therewere69,875villagedairycooperativesspreadover170milkshedsalloverthecountrywithatotalmembershipof8.9millionfarmers.Thoughtheexpansionwasimpressive,yet,byoneestimate,OperationFloodrepresentedonly6.3percentoftotalmilkproductionand22percentofmarketedmilkinIndia.Thepotentialforfurtherexpansionthusremainsimmense.AstudydonebytheWorldBank(evaluationdepartment)ofOperationFlood10detailshowtheeffortto

replicatethe‘AnandPattern’paidrichdividends.Abriefsummaryofthefindingsofthisstudyshowhowthecomplexmulti-prongedbenefits,similartothoseachievedinGujarat,werenowspreadtootherpartsofthecountry.First,theobviousimpactofOperationFloodwastheconsiderableincreaseinmilksupplyand

consequentincreaseinincomeofthemilkproducers,particularlythepoor.Whilenationalmilkproductiongrewat0.7percentperannumtill1969,itgrewatmorethan4percentannuallysincetheinceptionofOperationFlood.‘Inconstant(1995)Rs.,theannualpaymentbythecooperativesystem(to)dairyfarmershasrisenfromRs.2.1billionin1972toRs.34billionin1995.’11Further,villagelevelenquiriesshowedthatdairyingwasincreasinglybecominganimportantactivityofthefarmerandinsomecasesbecomingthemainsourceofincome,particularlyamongthepoor.Itwasestimatedthat‘60percentofthebeneficiariesweremarginalorsmallfarmersandlandless,’anditwasfurtherstatedthat‘theextenttowhichsuchbenefits(were)reachingtheextremelypoorandneedy(destitute,widows,landless,andnearlandless)incertain“spearhead”villages(was)unusuallynoteworthy.’12Milkcooperativesthusprovedtobeasignificantanti-povertymeasure.Inthisconnection,theWorldBankreporthighlightedanimportant‘lesson’learntfromOperation

Flood,alessonwithmajorpolitico-economicimplications.The‘lesson’wasthat‘byfocusingaprojectonapredominantactivityofthepoor,“self-selection”islikelytoresultinamajorportionofthebeneficiariesbeingpoor’thusreaching‘target’groupswhichgenerallyprove‘elusivetoreachinpractice.’13Further,itmaybeaddedtheAnandtypemilkcooperativesreachedthepoorirrespectiveofcaste,religionorgender,withouttargetinganyofthesegroupsspecifically.SimilarobjectivesweremetbytheEmploymentGuaranteeSchemefirstlaunchedinruralMaharashtrainthemid-seventies,followedbyafewotherstatesincludingAndhraPradesh.ThechiefbeneficiariesofthisschemewerethelandlesswhowerepredominantlyfromamongtheScheduledCastesorScheduledTribes,i.e.,theygot‘self-selected’,thoughtheschemedidnotexclusivelytargetthesegroups.Suchprogrammeshadtheimportantadvantageofreachingcertaindeprivedsectionswithoutexclusivelytargetingthem.Thispreventedanalmostinevitableoppositionorevenabacklashamongthegroupsexcluded,whichhassooftenbeenwitnessedinschemesinIndiaaswellasinothercountries,suchastheUS,wherebenefitsweresoughttobegivenexclusivelytoaparticularcommunityorgroup.Second,asinthecaseofAnand,theimpactofthemilkcooperativesandOperationFloodwentway

beyondjustincreaseinmilksupplyandincomes.AstheWorldBankstudyreported,‘Aby-productimpactofOperationFloodandtheaccompanyingdairyexpansionhasbeentheestablishmentofanindigenousdairyequipmentmanufacturingindustry(only7percentofdairyequipmentisnowimported)andanimpressivebodyofindigenousexpertisethatincludesanimalnutrition,animalhealth,artificialinsemination(AI),managementinformationsystems(MIS),dairyengineering,foodtechnologyandthelike.’Theindigenizationoftheinfrastructureandtechnologyandthetrainingofrurallabourfor

performingawiderangeoftechnicalfunctionsissaidtohaveconsiderablyloweredcosts,makingitpossibletoprocureandaccountforminutequantitiesofmilkbroughtinbytheproducers,withoutraisingcoststoanunviablelevel.Third,OperationFloodspreadandevenintensifiedtheimpactofthemilkcooperativesonwomenand

childrenandoneducation.Realizingthepotentialofempoweringwomenthroughthismovement,OperationFloodincooperationwithNGOslikeSEWA(Self-EmployedWomen’sAssociation)establishedabout6,000womendairycooperativesocieties(WDCS)whereonlywomenweremembersandthemanagementcommitteesalsowereconstitutedexclusivelyofwomen.Thesecooperativeswereseentobegenerallymoreefficientlyrunthanthemale-dominatedcooperatives.Theygavewomenagreatercontrolovertheirlivesthroughthemilkincomeaccruingtothemandalsoenabledthemtoparticipateindecision-makingoutsidetheirhomes,givingfullplaytotheirmanagerialandleadershippotential.Further,fieldlevelobservationshowedthatthemilkincomeinthepoorervillagesoftenmadeitpossibleforchildrentoattendschool,whileinbetter-offvillagesitcontributedtochildrenstayinginschoollonger,thatis,itreducedthedropoutrate.Instillwealthiervillages,whereallchildrenwenttoschool,apartoftheearningofthecooperativewasusedtoimprovethefacilitiesinthelocalschool.Thefieldsurveysalsoconfirmedthatincreasedschoolattendanceforgirlswasperceivedasaverycommoneffectofthedairycooperativesocieties.Greaterfamilyincomeandthewomaninvolvedindairyingbeingabletostayathomeinsteadofgoingoutforwagelabourrelievedchildrenfromhavingtoearnawageorlookafterhouseholdchores.Instead,theyattendedschool.Thespreadofthe‘AnandPattern’wasnottobelimitedtomilk.Cooperativesforfruitsandvegetable

producers,oilseedscultivators,small-scalesaltmakersandtreegrowerswerestartedattheinitiativeoftheNDDB.AgaintheKairaUnionprovidedthetechnologyaswellasthetrainedpersonneltohelpthisprocess.Oftentheresistancefromvestedinterests,particularlythepowerfuloilseedstraders,wasvicious.Insomeregionsofthecountry,theNDDBteamwhichtriedtomaketheinitialmovestowardssettingupcooperativeswasthreatenedwithphysicalviolenceandtherewerecaseswhereworkersdiedin‘mysterious’circumstances.Yet,themovementhasprogressed.Inmanypartsofthecountrycooperativeoutletsoffruitsandvegetablesarebeginningtobeascommonasmilkoutlets.The‘Dhara’brandofvegetableoils,achildoftheNDDBeffort,isbeginningtorepresentintheareaofvegetableoilswhat‘Amuldoesintheareaofmilkandmilkproducts.Thishasbeenoneofthemajorachievementsofpost-independenceIndia.Thesearchforcooperatives

ledtoIndiandelegationsgoingtoChinainthemid-fifties;todayscoresofcountriessenddelegationstoIndiatostudyandlearnfromtheAnandexperience.AnindicationoftheimpactthisexperimenthadatthegrassrootslevelwasthestatementmadetothepresentauthorsbyapoorfarmerinavillagenearAnandin1985,‘GujaratisfortunatetohaveoneKurien;ifonlyGodwouldgiveoneKurientoeverystate,manyofIndia’sproblemswouldbesolved.’ThispoorGujaratpeasantwhoinhispersonalizedwaywastryingtoexplaintousthemagnitudeofthe

successofthisexperimentwithreferencetoKurien,aSyrianChristianfromKerala,willsurelyfeeloutoftunewiththeHinducommunalupsurgehisstatewitnessedinearly1999,whereChristianswerehoundedandattacked,theirreligionpresumablymakingthemanti-national!

ConcludingRemarks

Indiawitnessedtheuniquephenomenonofwide-ranginglandreformsbeingimplementedwithinamoderndemocraticstructurewithoutanyviolenceoruseofauthoritarianforce.TherewasnoforcedcollectivizationasintheSovietUnionorforcibleexpropriationoflandandpushingofpeasantsintocommunesasinChina,processesthathadcostmillionsoflives.NorwasthereanyexternalarmyofoccupationundertakingthetaskoflandreformsamongadefeatedpeopleasinJapan.Indiahadtoattemptthistaskwithadultfranchise,fullcivillibertiestotheOppositionandanindependentjudiciary.Yet,basingitselfontheheritageoflong,powerfulnationalandpeasantmovements,independentIndiasuccessfullytransformedthecolonialagriculturalstructure(withallitssemi-feudalcharacteristics)whichithadinherited.Thelegacyofnearlyhalfacenturyofagrarianstagnationwasreversed.Institutionalandinfrastructuralchangeswereputinplace,whichweretoenablethebringinginofmodern,progressiveor‘capitalist’farminginmoreandmorepartsofthecountrywiththeusheringinofthenextphase,thatoftechnologicalreformsassociatedwiththeGreenRevolution.Large,semi-feudal,rapaciouslandlordsrack-rentingthepeasantryaswellasextractingillegalcesses

incash,kindorlabour(begar)hadbyandlargebecomeathingofthepast.Statedemandfromthepeasant,theothermajorburdenontheagriculturist,alsograduallyvirtuallydisappeared.Manystatesscrappedlandrevenue.Elsewheretherealvalueoflandrevenuefellsharplyasagriculturalpricesrosesteeplywhilethelandrevenueratesremainedconstantfordecades.Whileinthecolonialperiodtheburdenoflandrevenuewasveryhigh,oftenaddinguptohalfthenetincomefromagriculture,itgraduallydeclinedtonegligiblelevels,belowonepercentofthenetincomefromagriculture.Thestrangleholdofthemoneylenderoverthepeasantrywasalsoconsiderablyweakenedwiththegrowingavailabilityofcooperativeandinstitutionalcredit.LoansadvancedbysuchinstitutionsincreasedfromRs.0.23billionin1950-51to3.65billionin1965-66and7.75billionin1972-73.Thiscreditwasbecomingincreasinglyavailabletothepoorersections.Gradually,butsurely,democracy,thepooresthavinganequalvote,keptthepressureonthegovernmentaswellastheruralelite(fortheirpoliticalsurvival)totryandreachbenefitstothelowersectionsofthepeasantry.Theresourcesavailabletothepeasantryasawholeforagriculturalimprovementthusincreasedsignificantly.Themotivationorincentiveforagriculturalimprovementwasnowpresentamongamuchwider

sectionoftheagrarianclasses.Largenumbersofzamindarsandjagirdarswhowereformerlyabsenteelandlordsnowtooktomoderncapitalistfarminginthelandsthattheycouldretainforpersonalcultivation.Similarly,thetenantsandsharecropperswhoeithergotownershiprightsorsecurityoftenurewerenowpreparedtomakefargreaterinvestmentandimprovementsintheirlands.Thelandless,whoreceivedceiling-surplusorbhoodanlandsorpreviouslyunoccupiedgovernmentlanddistributedinanti-povertyprogrammes,werereadytoputintheirbestintolandswhichtheycouldnow,typicallyforthefirsttime,calltheirown.Asdiscussedabove(seechapter28),thecumulativeeffectofthevariouslandreformmeasuresincreatingprogressivecultivators,makinginvestmentsandimprovementsinproductivitywasconsiderable,onanationalscale.Further,thestate,insteadofextractingsurplusfromagriculture,asinthecolonialperiod,nowmade

majoreffortsatagriculturalimprovement.CommunityDevelopmentprojectswerestartedinruralareasandBlockDevelopmentOfficers(BDOs),AgriculturalExtensionOfficersandVillageLevelWorkers(VLWs)becamearoutinefeatureinhundredsofthousandsIndianvillages,tryingtoinculcateimprovedfarmingmethods,supplyseedsandimplements,promotesmall-scalepublicworksandsoon.Major

investmentsweremadeinscientificagriculturalresearch,irrigationprojects,electricitygeneration,andgeneralinfrastructure(seechapter25).Availabilityofchemicalfertilizersincreasedfrom73thousandtonnesofnutrientin1950-1to784thousandtonnesin1965-6and2769thousandtonnesin1972-3.Allthishadamajorimpactonagriculture.AsDanielThorner,oneofthekeenestobserversofIndianagriculturesinceindependencenoted:15

Itissometimessaidthatthe(initial)five-yearplansneglectedagriculture.Thischargecannotbetakenseriously.ThefactsarethatinIndia’sfirsttwenty-oneyearsofindependencemorehasbeendonetofosterchangeinagricultureandmorechangehasactuallytakenplacethanintheprecedingtwohundredyears.

Theresultsspeakforthemselves.DuringthefirstthreePlans(leavingout1965-66,thelastyearoftheThirdPlan)Indianagriculturegrewatanannualrateofover3percent.Thiswasagrowthrate7.5timeshigherthanthatachievedduringthelasthalfcenturyorsoofthecolonialperiod—therateofgrowthbetween1891and1946beingestimatedasonly0.4percentperyear.Further,thegrowthrateachievedduringthefirstthreePlanswasafunctionnotonlyofextensionofareabutalsoofincreasesinyieldsperacre,nearlyhalftheagriculturalgrowthwasexplainedbythelatter(seechapter31).Also,theagriculturalgrowthachievedinthisperiodwashigherthanwhatwasachievedbymanyothercountriesinacomparablesituation.Forexample,Japanachievedagrowthrateoflessthan2.5percentbetween1878and1912andanevenlowergrowthrateafterthistill1937.ItisgenerallyagreedthatasaresultoflandreforminIndia,self-cultivationbecamethepredominant

formofcultivationinmostpartsofthecountry.Moreover,overtime,thevastmassofownercultivatorsweresmallandmediumfarmers.Byoneestimate,by1976-77,nearly97percentofthecultivatorshadoperationalholdingsoflessthan25acresandtheyoperated73.6percentofthetotalarea.(86.9percentofthecultivatorshadoperationalholdingsof10acresorlessandtheyoperated43.4percentofthetotalarea.)Ontheotherhand,alongwiththisvastmasstherewerethelargelandownersoperatingabove25acres,thoughtheyconstitutedonly3percentoftheholdingsand26.2percentoftheoperatedarea.Further,theshareofthelargelandowners,bothintheproportionofholdingsandareacontrolled,keptdecliningsteadilyovertime.16Verylargeestatesofoverahundredacreswereveryfewandrare,andtheyweregenerallyrunonmoderncapitalistlines.ThepicturethatemergedwasremarkablysimilartowhatRanadehadenvisagedseveraldecadesearlier.However,theproblemofthelandless(India,unlikemostothercountries,hadthroughthecastesystem

inheritedalargecategoryoflandlesssinceancienttimes)orthenearlandless,constitutingnearlyhalftheagriculturalpopulationhaspersisted.Thehighrateofpopulationgrowthandtheinabilityoftheindustrializationprocesstoabsorbagreaterproportionoftheagriculturalpopulationhasmadeitdifficulttodealwiththissituation.Providingagriculturallandtoallthelandlessisnot,andperhapsneverwas,apoliticallyoreconomicallyviablesolutioninIndianconditions.(Afterall,evenWestBengalwithaCommunistgovernment,fordecadeshasnevertakenupseriouslythequestionoflandtothetiller,themajor‘success’therebeinglimitedtogettingsecurityoftenureforabouthalfthesharecroppersorbargadars.)Effortsatimprovingtheworkingconditionsofthelandlessandprovidingthemwithnon-farmemploymentinruralareashavehadunevenresultsinvariousstatesandhaveleftmuchtobedesiredinlargepartsofthecountry.Theeffortatcooperativejointfarmingfailedasonewayofsolvingtheproblemsofruralpoverty,

inequityandlandlessness.Othereffortsaimedattheunderprivilegedinthecountrysidewereoften

appropriatedbytherelativelybetteroff.DespiteNehru,despitetheAvadisession(1955)adoptionof‘SocialisticPatternofSociety’astheobjectiveoftheCongress(anditsinclusionintheDirectivePrinciplesoftheConstitutionofIndia),despitetheNagpurcongressrecommendations,Indianagriculturedidnotmoveinthedirectionofsocialism.Again,asDanielThornerputitverysuccinctly,‘TotheextentthattheGovernmentofIndiaeverintendedto—(introduce)socialisminthecountryside,wemaysaythatithasbeennomoresuccessfulinthatdirectionthanwastheBritishregimeinintroducingcapitalism.’17

Perhaps,itispossiblenowwithmoreinformationavailableonthefateofthedisastrousSovietandChineseattemptstointroducesocialisminagriculturetoaskwhetherthiswasnotalucky‘failure’ensuredbythedemocraticnatureoftheIndianpoliticalsystem.Yet,independentIndiadidsucceedinessentiallyrootingoutfeudalelementsfromIndianagricultureandputthecolonialagrarianstructurethatitinheritedonthepathofprogressive,owner-cultivatorbasedcapitalistagriculturaldevelopment;adevelopmentthebenefitsofwhichtrickleddowntothepoorersectionsofthepeasantryandtosomeextenteventotheagriculturallabourers.Theconsiderableprogressmadeintheearlyyearswashoweverinadequateforthegrowingneedsof

thecountry.Therapidriseofpopulationatabout2.25percentperannumafterindependence,theriseinpercapitaincome,theattemptatrapidindustrializationinahothousemanner,twomajorwarswithneighbours,allputdemandsonIndianagriculturedifficulttomeet.Importoffoodgrainskeptrising,from12milliontonsduringtheFirstPlanto19.4and32.2milliontonsduringtheSecondandThirdPlanrespectively.Onthebasisoftheinstitutionalreformsalreadycompletedandthemajorinfrastructuralinvestmentsmadethecountrywasbythemid-sixtiespoisedforthenextphaseofagrarianbreakthrough,theGreenRevolution,basedontechnologicalreforms.

31AgricultureGrowthandtheGreenRevolution

Inpopularparlance,thephenomenonoftheGreenRevolutionisidentifiedwithIndia’sbeingcatapultedfromachronicallyfoodshortcountry,withabegging-bowlimage,toonewhichwasself-sufficientandwhichbecameovertimeevensurplusinfood.ThechangefollowsthemajortechnologicalreformsthatoccurredinIndianagriculture,particularlysincethemid-sixties.TherehasbeenmuchdebateonthetimingandthepoliticalandeconomicfactorsbehindtheusheringinoftheNewAgriculturalStrategywhichledtotheGreenRevolution.Itsimpactonthenatureofagriculturalgrowth,onthechangingpositionofvariousagrarianclasses,particularlythepoor,andontheclassbalanceofgovernmentshasalsogeneratedlivelycontroversy.Thebriefoveralldescriptionofthisphenomenon,givenhereisinevitablylacedwithelementsofthiscontroversy.Theviewthatinthe‘Nehruyears’,i.e.,fromindependencetillhisdeathin1964,Indianagriculture

wasneglectedorthatthefocuswasonlyoninstitutionalreformsandnotonthetechnologicalbaseforagriculturehasincreasinglybeenabandoned.Nehruwaswellawareofthecentralityofagriculturaldevelopmentinmeetinghisdreamofrapidindustrialization.TheplanoutlaysonagriculturesincetheFirstPlanitselfweresubstantialbyanystandards.ApartfromtheFirstPlan,wheretheoutlayonagricultureandirrigationwas31percentofthetotal,inallthePlansthatfollowed,theoutlaywasbetween20to24percent,irrespectiveofthechangesinregimes.Itistrue,thatintheinitialyears,duringthefirsttwoPlans,theexpectationsofoutputincreasesonthebasisofinstitutionalreforms,particularlywhenaccompaniedbycooperativefarming,werequitehighandprovedtobemisjudgements.However,simultaneously,withtheeffortsatinstitutionalreforms,Nehrufromtheverybeginningplacedgreatemphasisoncreatingthephysicalandscientificinfrastructurenecessaryformodernagriculture.MassiveirrigationandpowerprojectsliketheBhakra-Nangal,numerousagriculturaluniversitiesandresearchlaboratories,fertilizerplants,etc.,tooktheirdueplacealongwithsteelplantsasthe‘templesofmodernIndia’intheNehruvianvision.Overtime,bythelatefiftiesandearlysixties,asthebenefitsfromthelandreformsthatcouldbe

carriedoutinIndianconditionshadbeguntopeakandthepossibilitiesofagriculturalgrowthbasedonextensionofagriculture,i.e.,bringingmoreareaintocultivation,werealsoreachingtheirlimit,Nehru’sfocusinevitablyshiftedfurthertowardstechnologicalsolutions.(Afterall,countrieslikeJapanandChinawhichhadcarriedoutmorefar-reachinglandreformsalsohadtofollowthepathofmakingmoderntechnologicalimprovementsinagriculturetokeepuptheirgrowthrates.)EventheNewAgriculturalStrategyofpickingoutselectareaswithcertainnaturaladvantagesforintensivedevelopmentwithapackageprogramme(theIADPortheIntensiveAgriculturalDistrictsProgramme)waslaunchedinfifteendistricts,oneforeachstate,onanexperimentalbasisduringtheThirdPlaninNehru’slifetime—a

practicewhichwastobegeneralizedonalargescaleafewyearslater.AsoneofthemajorscholarsoftheGreenRevolution,G.S.Bhalla,says:1

ThequalitativetechnologicaltransformationinIndia—theGreenRevolution...cameaboutnotduringhislifetimebutsoonafterhisdeath.ButthefoundationsforthetechnologicaldevelopmentwerelaidduringNehru’stime.

However,bythemid-sixties,theimpactofcertainlong-termtrends,aswellasseveralimmediateimperativescoincidedwithcriticalscientificbreakthroughstocreateaconjuncturewhichcalledforandenabledabigpushtowardstheNewAgriculturalStrategy.Despitetheverycreditablegrowthofagriculturaloutputbetween1949and1965ofabout3percent

perannum,Indiawasfacingfoodshortagessincethemid-fiftiesandinthemid-sixtiesshewasinthethroesofacrisis.Agriculturalgrowthhadbeguntostagnateintheearlysixties.Themassivejumpinpopulationgrowthratesafterindependence,toabout2.2percentperannumfromabout1percentintheprevioushalfcentury,theslowbutsteadyriseinpercapitaincome,andthehuge(andrisingwitheachPlan)outlaytowardsplannedindustrialization,putlong-termpressuresonIndianagriculture,creating,forexample,ademandforfoodwhichIndianmarketswerenotabletomeetfully.Fromthemid-fifties,foodpricesexperiencedanupwardpush.TomeetthefoodshortageandtostabilizepricesIndiawasforcedtoimportincreasingamountsoffood.Thealternativewastogoinforlarge-scaleforcedprocurementsfromthecountrysideathugehumancost,apathwhichwasunacceptableinIndiabutwasadoptedbyothercountrieslikeRussiaorChinawhichdidnothavedemocracyasasafeguard.ThecontroversialagreementsmadebyIndiatoimportfoodfromtheUSunderthePL-480schemestartedin1956.Nearlythreemilliontonnesoffoodgrainswereimportedunderthisschemeintheveryfirstyearandthevolumeofimportskeptrisingthereafter,reachingmorethanfourandahalfmilliontonnesin1963.InthissituationcamethetwowarswithChina(1962)andPakistan(1965)andtwosuccessivedrought

yearsin1965-66leadingtofallinagriculturaloutputby17percentandfoodoutputby20percent.Foodpricesshotup,risingattherateofnearly20percentperannumbetween1965and1968.Indiawasforcedtoimportmorethantenmilliontonnesoffoodgrainsin1966.Itisinthismomentofcrisis,withfamineconditionsemerginginvariouspartsofthecountry,especiallyinBiharandU.P.,thattheUSthreatenedtorenegeoncommitmentsoffoodexportstoIndia.TheIndo-Pakwar,India’sstandonVietnamandthedesiretoarmtwistIndiaintoacceptinganeconomicpolicypackagefavouredbytheUShadconvincedPresidentJohnsonthatIndiashouldbeput‘onashortleash’andwhatbetterwaytodoitthantocynicallyuseIndia’sdesperatedependenceontheUSforfood!Giventhisscenarioofthemid-sixties,economicself-relianceandparticularlyfoodself-sufficiency

becamethetoppriorityobjectivesofIndianeconomicpolicyandforthatmatterofforeignpolicy.TheNewAgriculturalStrategybegantobeimplementedinrightearnest.Thethenprimeminister,LalBahadurShastri,FoodMinister,C.Subramaniam,andIndiraGandhi,whofollowedShastriin1966afterhisbrieftenure,allgavefullsupporttoandcraftedthisbasictransitioninthestrategyfordevelopingIndianagriculture.TheWorldBank-appointedBellMissionrecommendedsuchatransitionandtheUSpressedinitsfavour,buttheyappeartohavebeen‘leaningonopendoors’,asaconsiderableconsensusinfavourofsuchachangehademergedwithinIndia.CriticalinputslikeHigh-YieldVariety(HYV)seeds(thesuitabilitytoIndianconditionsofthehigh-yieldingMexicandwarfwheatprovedtobeanextremelytimelyscientificbreakthrough),chemicalfertilizersandpesticides,agriculturalmachineryincludingtractors,pumpsets,etc.,soil-testingfacilities,agriculturaleducationprogrammesandinstitutionalcredit

wereconcentratedonareaswhichhadassuredirrigationandothernaturalandinstitutionaladvantages.Some32millionacresofland,about10percentofthetotalcultivatedarea,was,thus,initiallychosenforreceivingthepackageprogrammebenefitsontoppriority.Governmentinvestmentinagriculturerosesignificantly.Institutionalfinancemadeavailableto

agriculturedoubledbetween1968to1973.TheAgriculturalPricesCommissionwassetupin1965andeffortsweremadetoseethatthefarmerwasassuredamarketatsustainedremunerativeprices.Publicinvestment,institutionalcredit,remunerativepricesandtheavailabilityofthenewtechnologyatlowpricesraisedtheprofitabilityofprivateinvestmentbyfarmersandasaresultthetotalgrosscapitalformationinagriculturebegantogrowfaster.Thiswasreflectedin,forexample,therateofincreateinthegrossirrigatedarearisingfromabout1millionhectaresperannuminthepre-GreenRevolutionperiodtoabout2.5millionhectaresperannumduringtheseventies.Also,between1960-61and1970-71thenumberofelectricanddieselpumpsetsincreasedfrom421,000to2.4million,tubewellsincreasedfrom90,000to460,000andtractorsfrom31,000to140,000.Also,consumptionofchemicalfertilizers,nitrogen,phosphorusandpotassium,increasedfrom306,000metrictonnesin1960-61to2,350,000in1970-71.Mostofthisincreaseoccurredinthesecondhalfoftheperiod.Theresultsofthisnewstrategybegantobewitnessedwithinashortperiod.Between1967-68and

1970-71foodgrainproductionroseby35percent.Again,between1964-65and1971-72aggregatefoodproductionincreasedfrom89to112milliontonnes,calculatedtobea10percentpercapitaincrease.Netfoodimportsfellfrom10.3milliontonnes1966to3.6millionin1970,whilefoodavailabilityincreasedfrom73.5milliontonnesto99.5milliontonnesoverthesameperiod.Ithasbeenestimatedthat‘butforthenewagriculturalstrategyIndiawouldhavetoimportaminimumofabout8to10milliontonsofwheatyearlyatacostof$600to800million.’2Foodavailabilitycontinuedtoincreasesharplyto110.25milliontonnesin1978and128.8milliontonnesin1984,puttinganendtoIndia’s‘beggingbowl’image.Bytheeighties,notonlywasIndiaself-sufficientinfoodwithbufferfoodstocksofover30milliontonnes,butitwasevenexportingfoodtopaybackearlierloansorasloanstofood-deficitcountries.ItwasthiscomfortablesituationwhichenabledIndiatosuccessfullydealwiththesevereandwidespreaddroughtsof1987and1988withoutlarge-scaleforeignhelpaswasneededinthemid-sixties.Today,bytheendofnineties,foodgrainproductioninIndiaisnearly200milliontonnes,upfrom51milliontonnesin1950-51,agrowthrateofabout3percent,aheadofthehighpopulationgrowthrateof2.1percent.AmajorimpactoftheGreenRevolutionstrategywasthatthroughincreasesinagriculturalyieldsit

enabledIndiatomaintain,onceagain,thehighrateofagriculturalgrowthachievedsinceindependence.Theaveragerateofgrowthachievedbetween1949-50to1989-90wasabout2.7percentperannum.Inthepre-GreenRevolutionperiod,1949-50to1964-65,about51percentofthegrowthinagriculturaloutputwasaccountedforbyincreaseinarea(whichgrewat1.61percentperyear)and49percentbyincreaseinyield(whichgrewat1.5percentperyear),i.e.,bothareaandyieldincreaseswereequallyimportantinmaintaininggrowthlevels.Oncethepossibilitiesofareaincreasesreachedasaturationpointrapidyieldincreasesbecamenecessaryifasimilargrowthratewastobemaintained.ThisiswhattheGreenRevolutionstrategysucceededindoing.Between1967-68and1989-90about80percentofthegrowthofagriculturaloutputwasexplainedbyincreasesinyieldsperacre(whichgrewat2.5percentperyear)whileincreaseinacreage(whichgrewonlyat0.26percentperyear)explainedonly20per

cent.Infact,inrecentyears,virtuallytheentireoutputgrowthhasbeenattributedtoincreasesinyield,asagriculturalacreagehasremainedstagnantandevenshrunk.Itmustberecognizedthat,apartfromthemaintainingoftheagriculturalgrowthrates,thecritical

impactoftheGreenRevolutionwasthatitgeneratedarapidincreaseinthemarketablesurplusoffoodgrains.Thisaspecthasperhapsnotbeensufficientlyhighlighted.AnumberoffactorsexplainwhytheNewAgriculturalStrategygeneratedlargemarketablesurpluses;thefactthattheinitialbreakthroughinfoodproductionoccurredintherelativelydevelopedregionsinnorth-westernIndiaandpartsofsouthernIndiawherefoodconsumptionlevelswerealreadyhighmeantthatalargeproportionoftheadditionaloutputwasmarketed;theuseoflabourperunitofoutputtendedtodecline,creatingamarketablesurplusfromtheruralareastotheextentthattheproportionoftheoutputwhichhadtosetasideforconsumptionbylabourdeclined;andthefactthatoutputincreasesoccurredmainlyasaresultofyieldincreasesandnotincreasesinacreageledtoafallintheneedforfoodgrainasseedperunitofoutput.ItwasthemarketedsurplusesasaresultoftheGreenRevolution(andnotanyunprecedentedrisein

aggregateallIndiagrowthrates)whichenabledinternalprocurementoffoodbythegovernmentandthebuildingupoflargefoodstocks.Thefoodrequirementsgeneratedbyastrategyofrapidindustrialdevelopment,therapidlygrowingurbanandgeneralpopulationandtheperiodicallyfood-deficitareascouldnowbemetinternally.TheliberationfromdependenceonPL-480orotherimportsfortheabovewasamajorstepinthedirectionofself-reliantindependentdevelopmentforIndia.However,doubtsabouttheNewAgriculturalStrategybegantobeexpressedfromtheveryearlystages

ofitsimplementation.OnepersistentargumenthadbeenthatbyconcentratingresourcesontheregionsthatalreadyhadcertainadvantagestheGreenRevolutionstrategywasfurtheraccentuatingregionalinequality.Clearly,thesolutiontosuchfearslayinspreadingtheGreenRevolutionfurtherandnotopposingitperse.TheresearchofscholarslikeG.S.Bhalla3showthatinsteadofpromotingfurtherinequality,theGreenRevolutionhasovertimeactuallyspreadtolargepartsofthecountrybringingprosperitytotheseregions.InthefirstphaseoftheGreenRevolution,1962-65to1970-73,anall-Indiacompoundgrowthrateof2.08percentperyearwasachievedbutitwasmainlytheresultofsharpincreasesinyieldinwheatinthenorth-westernregionofPunjab,HaryanaandwesternU.P.,whichgrewatamuchfasterratethantheaverage,Punjabregisteringastupendousrateof6.63percent.Inthesecondphase,1970-73to1980-83,withtheextensionofHYVseedtechnologyfromwheattorice,theGreenRevolutionspreadtootherpartsofthecountry,notablyeasternU.P.,AndhraPradesh,particularlythecoastalareas,partsofKarnatakaandTamilNaduandsoon.RegionslikeMaharashtra,Gujarat,AndhraPradeshnowgrewmuchfasterthantheall-Indiagrowthrateof2.38percentperyear.Thethird,andthemostrecentphaseoftheGreenRevolution,1980-83to1992-95,showsverysignificantandencouragingresults.TheGreenRevolutionnowspreadtotheerstwhilelow-growthareasoftheeasternregionofWestBengal,Bihar,AssamandOrissa,withWestBengalachievinganunprecedentedgrowthrateof5.39percentperannum.Otherregions,particularlythesouthernregionandMadhyaPradeshandRajasthanofthecentralregiongrewrapidlyaswell.Infact,forthefirsttime,thesouthernregionregisteredahigherrateofgrowththanthenorth-westernregion.Bytheendofthethirdphase,thecoefficientofvariationoftheoutputgrowthlevelsandyield(perhectare)levelsbetweenthevariousstateshadfallensubstantiallycomparedtoearlierdecades.Thisperiod,therefore,sawnotonlyamarkedoverall(allIndia)accelerationofthegrowthofagriculturaloutputtouchinganunprecedentedgrowthrateof3.4percentperyear,butalsowitnesseda

muchmorediversifiedgrowthpattern,considerablyreducingregionalinequalitybyincreasingthespreadofruralprosperity.IntheearlystagesoftheGreenRevolution,particularlytheearlyseventies,aconsiderableopinion

emergedthattheGreenRevolutionwasleadingtoclasspolarizationinthecountryside.Itwasarguedthattheclassofrichpeasantsandcapitalistfarmersweregettingstrengthenedpartlyattheexpenseofthesmallpeasants,tenants,etc.,who,unabletoaccessthemodeminputs,werebeingpushedintotherankofthelandless,i.e.,aprocessofde-peasantisationwasinprogress.Further,themechanizationofagriculturewasdisplacinglabour,leadingtoincreasingunemploymentandafallinwagesofagriculturallabour.Inotherwords,onthewhole,aprocessofrelativeimmiserisationoftheruralpoorandforsomesectionsevenabsoluteimmiserisationwastakingplace,creatingconditionsforagrarianunrestandrevolt.‘TheGreenRevolutionwillleadtotheRedRevolution’wasthecatchyslogandoingtheroundsinsomecirclesinthelatesixtiesandearlyseventies.Latereventsandrecentscholarshiphasshownmostofthesemisgivingswereunfounded,aswerethe

reservationsaboutregionalinequality.FromtheverybeginningoftheinitiationoftheNewAgriculturalStrategytherewasanawarenessthatstepswouldhavetobetakentoensurethatthepoorfarmerscouldaccessthebenefitsofthenewtechnologyandtheagriculturallabourers’interestswereprotected.(Itmaybenotedthattheimmediate,thoughsomewhatalarmist,warningsignalsputoutbysectionsoftheIndianintelligentsiaregardingthenegativeeffectsofthenewstrategyonthepoorperhapscontributedtotheearlyconsciousnessandeffortstopreventsuchadenouement.)Shortlyafterthestrategywasfullyoncourseaconcertedeffortwasmadeonceagain,aspartofthegaribihataocampaignlaunchedbyIndiraGandhiinthelatesixtiesandseventies,toreachtheruralpoor,smallfarmersandthelandless.AseriesofprogrammessuchastheRuralWorksProgramme(RWP),SmallFarmersDevelopmentAgency(SFDA),MarginalFarmersandAgriculturalLabourersScheme(MFAL),CrashSchemeforRuralEmployment(CSRE),TheEmploymentGuaranteeScheme(EGS)inMaharashtra,werelaunched.TheSFDAandtheMFAL,forexample,identifiedmorethanamillionsmallfarmersandoverhalfamillionmarginalfannerswhoweregivenshort,mediumandlong-termloans.Smallandmarginalfarmerswerealsoassistedbygovernmentsubsidiesof25percentand33.3percentoftheinvestmentsforwhichtheyborrowed,respectively.Millionsofpoorfarmersalsobenefitedfromthemassiveincreaseininstitutionalcreditmadeavailabletoagriculture,throughcooperativesocieties,landdevelopmentbanks,nationalizedcommercialbanks,AgriculturalRefinanceCorporation,etc.,withaspecialeffort,whichwasconsiderablysuccessful,toseethatthecreditreachedthepoorersectionsaswell.(Seechapter30.)Withalltheirweaknessesandloopholestheseprogrammeshadaconsiderablecumulativeeffect.So

muchsothateminenteconomistRajKrishnareportedin1979that‘smallfarmers,asaclass,commandmoreproductiveassetsandinputsperunitoflandthanlargefarmers.’4Thoughthesmallfarmers,withoperationalholdingsoffiveacresorless,cultivatedonly21percentofthetotalcultivatedarea,theirshareofnetirrigatedareawas31.4percent,oftotalfertiliserusewas32percentandoftotalagriculturalcredit33percent.ThenewGreenRevolutiontechnologyprovedtobenotonlyscale-neutralbutappearstohaveevolvedaninverserelationshipbetweenscaleandproductivity.Smallfarmersapplyingmoreinputsperunitoflandcomparedtolargefarmerswereabletoproduce26percentofthevalueofagriculturaloutputwith21percentoftheland.

TheGreenRevolution,farfrompushingthesmallfarmerintotheranksofthelandless,actuallyenabledhimtosurvive.Withtheadoptionofthenewtechnology,improvedseedsandotheragriculturalinputs,thesmallfarmerbecamerelativelymoreviableanddidnothavetosellouttothelargefarmerindistress.StudiessuchasthoseofG.S.’BhallaandG.K.Chadha5haveconfirmedthisphenomenon.Infact,theshareofthelargelandownersoperating25acresormoreinthetotalnumberofholdingsandinthetotalareacultivatedhasconsistentlydeclinedovertheyearssinceindependence.Andthenumberofholdingsandthearea,controlledbythemarginal,smallandmediumlandownershasremainedstableorrisenovertheyears.TheGreenRevolutionnotwithstanding,Indiahasremainedacountrydominatedbysmallandmediumfarmers.In1980-81,cultivatorsoperatingholdingsof25acresorlessconstitutednearly98percentofthetotaloperationalholdings,cultivating77.2percentofthetotalarea,andcultivatorsoperatingholdingsof10acresorlessconstituted88.5percentofthetotaloperationalholdings,cultivating47.5percentofthetotalarea.Tenantsandsharecroppers,whodidnothavesecurityoftenure,wereperhapstheonlylosers.These

sectionscameunderpressureasrentsandlandvaluesroserapidlyinareaswheretheGreenRevolutionspread.Also,intheseareastheownerswouldtendtogetridoftheunprotectedtenantsinordertoresumeself-cultivationwithhiredlabourandmodemequipment.‘Secure’tenantsandsharecropperswerehowever,likeland-owningsmallpeasants,beneficiariesofthenewtechnology.FearsoftheGreenRevolutionleadingtoincreasingruralunemploymentbecauseoflabour-displacing

mechanizationprovedtobebaseless.OnthebasisofafieldtripmadeasearlyasFebruary1969inPunjab,WolfLadejinsky(whoadvisedGeneralMacArthurinplanninglandreformsinJapanduringtheperiodofalliedoccupationaftertheWarandafterthatwascloselyassociatedwithlandreformsinTaiwan,SouthVietnam,Nepal,Indonesia,PhilippinesandIndia)reportedthatwiththespreadofthenewtechnology‘thedemandforcasuallabourhasincreasedandsohavewagesandthelandlesslaborerissomewhatbetteroffthaninthepast.’6The‘victims’oftractorizationwerebullocksnotlabour.Thenetimpactoftractorization,takingintoaccountincreaseincroppingintensityetc.,wasanincreaseddemandforlabour.Thefearthatthatindiscriminatemechanizationinthenext,post-tractorizationphase,suchaslarge-scaleintroductionofcombineharvestersandthresherswouldleadtodisplacementoflabouralsodoesnotappeartohavematerializedonasignificantscaleinanypartofthecountrytilltoday.InPunjab,forexample,thenumberofagriculturallabourersissaidtohavetrebledbetween1961and1981,whilethenumberoflandlessagriculturalhouseholdsdeclined.Theadditionaldemandforlabourwasmetthroughlarge-scalemigrationoflabourfromthepoorerdistrictsofeasternU.P.andBihar.Ithasbeenargued,however,thatinthelaterphasesoftheGreenRevolutiontherateofincreasein

employmentinagriculture,whichaccompaniedagriculturalgrowth,hastendedtoslacken,i.e.,theemploymentelasticityofoutputgrowthwasdeclining.Thecomplaint,however,wasaboutthefailuretogeneratesufficientadditionalemployment.Therewasnoquestionofanydisplacementoflabour.Besides,thegeneralexperienceoftheGreenRevolutioninregionafterregion—Punjab,Haryana,

coastalAndhra,Maharashtra,TamilNadu,etc.,—hasbeenthatapartfromthegrowthinagriculturalemployment,ithasgeneratednon-agriculturalruralandsemi-urbanemployment,throughthedevelopmentofagro-industries,rapidincreaseintradeandwarehousingofagriculturalproduceandagriculturalinputslikefertilizersandpesticides,massivegrowthofthetransportindustry,manufacturingofalargerangeoffarmimplementsandotherinputs,heavydemandforrepairsandservicingoftrucks,tractors,electricand

dieselpumpsandothermodemagriculturalequipmentandmachineryandsoon.Sinceovertimealmostalltheagriculturalmachineryandequipmentwasproducedindigenously,mechanizationinagriculturecreatedurbanfactoryemployment.Also,theincreaseinruralincomesfollowingtheGreenRevolutionledtoincreaseddemandformasons,carpenters,tailors,weavers,etc.,intheruralareasandforfactory-producedconsumerdurablesfromtransistorradios,watches,cycles,fans,televisions,washing-machines,motorcycles,sewingmachinestocarsandairconditioners.Sincetheruraldemandforsomeofthesecommoditiesbegantoexceedtheurbandemand,forcingtheirmanufacturerstoturntowardsthecountryside,itsimpactongeneratingurbanemploymentisnotinconsequential.ItissignificantthatPunjabsawastrikingincreaseofabout50percentinurbanemploymentbetween1971and1981,partlyreflectingtheimpactofdevelopmentinagricultureinthenon-agriculturalsector.However,alltheemploymentgeneratedbytheGreenRevolutionwasstillnotsufficienttomeetthe

employmentrequirementsoftherapidlygrowingpopulation,alargeproportionofwhichlivedinthecountryside.Urgentshort-termandlong-termstepswerethereforenecessarytodealwiththissituation.Here,too,theGreenRevolutionprovedcritical.Thesurplusstocksoffoodgrainthatbecameavailableasaresultoftheagriculturalbreakthroughmadeitpossibletolaunchemployment-generatingpoverty-alleviationprogrammesonaconsiderablescale,particularlyintheagriculturallybackwardareas.Astheagricultureexpertandpolicy-makerC.H.HanumanthaRaoputit:7

Fromabout20millionperson-daysofemploymentgeneratedinthemid-Sixties,theemploymentgeneratedundersuchprogrammesinthecountryasawholeamountedto850millionperson-daysin1988-89.Theseemploymentprogrammes,togetherwiththeincomegeneratedundertheIntegratedRuralDevelopmentProgramme(IRDP),seemtomakeupforabouthalfthedeficiencyinemploymentgenerationinagricultureinthepost-greenrevolutionperiod...Theseprogrammesweremadepossiblebecauseoftheincreasedavailabilityoffoodgrainsfrominternalprocurement.

TheGreenRevolutiondidhowevercontributetoincreaseininequalityinthecountryside.Butthepoortoobenefitedinabsolutetermsthoughtheirwell-to-doneighboursdidrelativelyfarbetter.Yet,pursuingastrategywhichwasmore‘equitable’and‘politicallycorrect’butlefttheruralpoor,alreadylivingattheedgesofsurvival,worseoffwouldbecruel.SomeoftheearliestreportsoftheimpactoftheNewAgriculturalStrategy,suchasthoseofDanielThornerbasedonfieldvisitstocoastalAndhra,ThanjavurinTamilNadu,partsofHaryana,westernU.P.,etc.,in1966and1967-8andthoseofLadejinskyfromPunjabin1969confirmthat,whileinequityincreased,thepoorincludingthesmallpeasantandthelandlessagriculturallabourerbenefitted.RealwagesofagriculturallabourconsistentlyroseinareaswheretheGreenRevolutionspread.Increaseinwagesinthehighgrowthareas,suchasPunjab,wouldhavebeenmuchsharperbutforthemigrationoflabourfromlow-wageareasofBiharandU.P.Butthennotonlywerethemigrantlabourers,beneficiariesofconsiderablyhigherwages,thewagelevelsintheareastheycamefromalsotendedtorise.Inter-statedisparitiesinagriculturalwagesbegantodeclinesincethemid-seventies,partlybecauseofthemigrationoflabourfromthebackwardregionstotheGreenRevolutionareas.Insummary,thentheGreenRevolutionhadamajorimpactonruralpovertylevelsthroughitsimpacton

foodavailability,declineinrelativepricesoffood(themostimportantitemofexpenditureforthepoor),generatingofagriculturalandnon-agriculturalemployment,riseinwagesandsoon.ThelinkbetweenthespreadofagriculturalgrowthortheGreenRevolutioninanareaandthefallinthenumbersoftheruralpopulationlivingbelowthepovertylineinthatareaisnowwidelyacceptedandcanbeseentobeoperatinginalargeandgrowingpartofthecountry.WiththeoverwhelmingproportionoftheIndian

populationstilldependentonagriculture(overtwo-thirdseventoday)thecriticalimportanceofspreadingtheGreenRevolutiontypeofdevelopmentasananti-povertymeasurehasbeenwidelyrecognized.(Theslowingdowninrecentyearsofpublicinvestmentinirrigationandotherinfrastructure,whichiscriticalforthespreadofrapidagriculturalgrowth,hasbeenwidelycriticizedforthisreason.)TheGreenRevolution,therefore,hasnotspawnedany‘RedRevolution’inthecountryside.Peasant

protestandevenpeasantmilitancyhasbeenontherisebutthenthesearenotmovementsoftheloweststratademandingasystemicoverthrowbutofsmall,mediumandlargepeasantswhoarebeneficiariesofthesystemandwantmoreviahigherpricesfortheirproduceandlowerinputcoststhroughstatesubsidy.(Seechapter32.)Infact,overtheyearsthepoliticalcloutofthesesectionshasincreasedandthegovernmentsofthedayhavefeltcompelled,toagreaterorlesserdegree,tomakeconcessionstothem,whichwereoftennoteconomicallyviable.Moststates,forexample,provideelectricalpowerforagriculturalpurposesatpricesfarbelowthecostofproduction,withsomestateslikePunjabprovidingitfree!SuchdevelopmentshaveinthelongrunadverselyaffectedtheoverallhealthoftheIndianeconomyincludingthatofagriculture.(Seechapter24,29and32.)Amajorandpressingissuethathassurfacedinrecentyearsrelatestothequestionofenvironmental

degradationandthelong-termsustainabilityofagriculturalgrowth.Thenegativeenvironmentalimpactofexcessiveuseofchemicalfertilizersandpesticides,aswellastheplateauingoffofthegrowthratesinareasusingsuchtechnologyoveralongperiod,suchasPunjab,hasbeenwell-documented.Theexcessivewithdrawalofgroundwaterforirrigation,whichistakingplaceinmanyGreenRevolutionareaswithoutadequaterechargingofthesub-soilaquafers,isalsoenvironmentallyunsustainable.However,therearenoeasyanswerstothisproblem.Whileagriculturalgrowthwiththistechnologyisthrowingupproblems,absenceofagriculturalgrowththrowsupothercriticalenvironmentalproblemsapartfromtheobviouseconomicandpoliticalones.IthasbeenarguedthatinIndiatheecologicaldegradationoccursmainlyduetotheextensionofcultivationtothemarginalandsub-marginaldrylandandtodeforestationandithasalsobeennotedthat‘acrossdifferentstatesinIndia,theextensionofareasundercultivationandthedenudationofforestsseemstobehighwheretheprogressofyield-increasingtechnologyisslow,’9andthepoorareforcedtodependonmarginallands,villagecommonsandforests,etc.Therenownedagriculturalexpert,M.S.Swaminathan,’10hasestimatedthattoproducethecurrentleveloffoodgrainsoutputwiththepre-GreenRevolutionyieldsperhectareofwheatandricewouldrequireanadditional80millionhectaresofland,i.e.,itwouldrequireanimpossibleincreaseofabout66percentintheexistingcultivablearea!Clearly,yield-increasingtechnologyhasbeencriticalforforest-savinginasituationwhereIndia’sforestcoverhasdepletedtodangerouslevels.Giventhissituation,anyblindoppositiontoagriculturalgrowthwiththeexistingmoderntechnology

wouldbeunsustainableandcounter-productive.However,ithasbecomenecessarytomakeamajoreffortineducatingthefarmerssothatexcessiveandimproperuseofchemicalfertilizersandpesticides,wastefulirrigationpractices,etc.,arecheckedandtheyareacquaintedwiththenecessityofretainingbio-diversityandoflearningfromtraditionalmethodsofretainingtheecologicalbalancewhileusingmoderntechnology.Partly,theanswerliesinthedirectionoffurtherscientificbreakthroughs,particularlyintheareaofbiotechnology.Itisfeltthattoppriorityneedstobegiventoresearchinthisfrontierarea,ifIndiaistoachievesustainablegrowthwithself-relianceintheemergingworldcontexttoday,asshehasbeenabletodointhepastwiththeGreenRevolutiontechnology.

32AgrarianStrugglesSinceIndependence

Theyearssinceindependencehaveseenagrarianstrugglesofenormousvariety,rangingfromthelegendaryTelanganapeasantmovementandthePEPSUtenants’movementwhichcontinuedfromthepre-independenceyears,totheNaxaliteorMaoistmovementinthelatesixtiesandthe‘new’farmers’movementsoftheeighties.Interspersedinbetweenaremanylesser-knownstruggles,suchastheKharwartribale’movementinMadhyaPradeshandBiharin1957-58,theBhils’movementinDhuliainMaharashtrafrom1967-75,ortheWarlis’struggleledbytheKashtakadSanghatnaheadedbytheMarxistJesuitPradeepPrabhusince1978.SSPandPSPlaunchedalandgrabmovementin1970,asdidCPI.InPunjabandAndhraPradesh,peasantsprotestedagainstbettermentleviesimposedforcoveringcostsofirrigationschemes,forbetterpricesforcrops,andothersimilarissues.CPIsetupthefirstnation-wideagriculturallabourorganization,BharatiyaKhetMazdoorUnion,inMogain1968.InTanjoreandKerala,movementsofagriculturallabourandtenantstookplace,asdidnumerousothersalloverthecountry.1

Thetrajectoryofthesemovementsinmanywaysmapstheprocessofagrarianandsocialchangesinceindependence.Ashiftisdiscernedfromimmediatepost-independenceconcernsbequeathedbycolonialismandfeudalismtoissuesarisingoutoftheGreenRevolutionandotherprocessesofagrarianchangeincludingtheaspirationsarousedbythestrugglesforandpolicyoflandreform.Constraintsofspacedonotpermitanexhaustiveaccountofthesestruggles;thechoicehasinevitablyfallenonthemoredramaticones,whilemanyquieterstoriesmustawaittheirturn.Inanticipationofindependenceandtheaccompanyingchangesinagrarianrelations,theperiod

betweentheend1945-47witnessedasharpincreaseinagrarianstrugglesalloverthecountry.Someofthese,suchasTebhagainBengalandtheCanalColoniestenants’movementsinPunjabweredisruptedbytherisingtideofcommunalismthatprecededandaccompaniedPartition.Butintwoareas,bothlocatedinprincelystatesundergoingtheprocessofintegrationintoIndia,themovementscontinuedintothepost-independenceyears.OnewastheTelanganaareaofHyderabadStateandtheotherthePatialaareaofthePEPSUorPatialaandEastPunjabStatesUnion.BothwereledbyCommunistsandprovideimportantinsightsintotheirpoliticsatthetime.

TelanganaPeasantStruggle

TheTelanganaorTelugu-speakingareaofHyderabadStateruledbytheautocraticNizamhadbeenexperiencingpoliticaloppositionsincethelatethirtiesundertheinfluenceofnationalistanddemocraticorganizationssuchastheStateCongressandtheAndhraMahasabha.Fromtheearlyforties,theCommunistsemergedasamajorforceandwhenthebanonCPIwasliftedbytheBritishin1942duetotheirpro-warline,theyquicklyexpandedtheirinfluenceandestablishedtheircontrolontheAndhraMahasabha.ThepeasantsinTelanganasufferedextremefeudal-typeoppressionatthehandsofjagirdars

anddeshmukhs,someofwhomownedthousandsofacresofland.TheCommunistsbegantoorganizethepeasantsagainstthehatedforcedgrainlevyimposedbythegovernment,andvethbegarorforcedlabourextractedbylandlordsandofficials.From1945,helpedalongbyafewincidentsinwhichtheCommunistsheroicallydefendedthepoorpeasants,thepeasantmovementbegantospreadrapidly.TheNizamofHyderabadwasamongtheveryfewrulerswhorefusedtojointheIndianunionat

independenceinthevainhope,encouragedbyPakistanandsomeBritishofficials,thathecouldholdoutandstayapartThepeopleofthestategrewrestlessathisdelayingtacticsandstartedamovementforintegrationundertheleadershipoftheStateCongress.CampsweresetuponthebordersofHyderabadwithMaharashtra,coastalAndhra,etc.,andarmswerealsosentintohelptheresisterswithstandtheattacksoftheRazakars,armedgangsofMuslimmilitialetlooseonthepredominantlyHindupopulation.TheCommunistsparticipatedactivelyintheanti-Nizam,pro-integrationmovement,anditisinthisphase,August1947toSeptember1948,whentheyrodetheanti-Nizampro-Indiawave,thattheyregisteredtheirgreatestsuccesses,establishingafirmbaseintheNalgonda,WarangalandKhammamdistricts.Landlordsandofficialsmostlyranawaytothetowns,leavingthefieldfreefortheCommunistsinthevillages.TheCommunistsorganizedthepeasantsintosabhasandformedguerillabandsordalams,forattackingRazakarcampsandprotectingvillages.Armedmostlywithslings,sticksandstonesandlatercrudecountrygunstheyestablishedcontroloveralargenumberofvillages,(thenumbersmentionedbythemare3000),andusedtheopportunitytoreorderlandrelations.LandsthathadbeentakenoverbylandlordsinlieuofdebtclaimsinlargenumbersduringtheGreatDepressionofthethirtieswerereturnedtotheoriginalowners,government-owneduncultivatedwasteandforestlandwasdistributedtothelandless,wagesofagriculturallabourweresoughttobeincreased,andwomen’sissuessuchaswife-beatingwerealsotakenup.Asconfidencegrew,‘ceilings’onlandlords’landweredeclared,firstat500acresandthenat100acres,andthe‘surplus’landdistributedtolandlessandsmallpeasants.Itwasfoundthatthegreatestenthusiasmwasforrecoveringlandslosttolandlordsinlivingmemory,followedbyoccupationofgovernmentwasteandforestland.Occupationofthelandlords’surplusland,evenwhenitwasofferedinplaceoflandlosttothelandlordbutwhichcouldnotberestoredbecauseithadinthemeantimebeensoldtosomeothersmallpeasant,wasnotreallypopularwithpeasants.Clearly,theybelievedstronglyintheirclaimtotheirownancestrallandandeventouncultivatedlandbutfeltlittleclaimtothelandlords’landevenwhenitwassurplusland.Theyalsoprobablycalculatedquitewiselythattheyhadagreaterchanceofretaininglandtowhichtheyhadsomeclaimortowhichnobodyelsehadaclaim(andtherewasalsoacustomarytraditionalsanctionforclaimofownershipofthepersonwhobroughtuncultivatedwastelandundercultivation).Infact,thisiswhathappenedafterthemovementdeclined.Peasantswereabletobyandlargeholdontothesecategoriesoflands,butnottothe‘surplus’lands.2

On13September1948,afterhavingwaitedformorethanayearfortheNizamtoseethewritingonthewall,andoncetheanti-Nizamresistancemovementhadshownclearlywhatthepeopledesired,theIndianArmymovedintoHyderabad.ThepeoplegreeteditasanarmyofliberationandwithindaystheNizamandhistroopssurrendered.ThearmythenmovedintotheruralareastoclearouttheRazakarsandwasgreetedenthusiasticallybypeasants.However,theCommunistsinthemeantimehaddecidedthattheywerenotgoingtogiveuptheirarmsanddisbandtheirguerillabandsbutweregoingtofightaliberationwarwiththepro-imperialist,bourgeois-landlordNehrugovernment.Asaresult,thedalamorgurerillasquadmembersweretoldtohideintheforestsandattacktheIndianArmyjustastheyhadtheRazakars.

Theyseemedtohavenotnoticedthatthisarmywasamodern,well-equippedforcewithhighmoraleunlikethehatedRazakarsarmedwithmedievalweapons.AnunnecessaryandtragicconflictensuedwiththeArmysuccessfullyflushingoutactivistsfromvillagesinafewmonths,butintheprocesscausinggreatsufferingtothousandsofpeasants.Communistactivistswhohadhiddenintheforestscontinuedtomakeeffortstore-establishlinksandbuildnewbasesamongthetribesintheforests,butwithdiminishingsuccess.Officially,themovementwaswithdrawnonlyin1951,onceCPIchangeditslineafterendlessdebatesandavisitbyitsleaderstoMoscow,butineffectonlyafewcomradesremainedinhidinginforestsbythen.Many,perhapsaround500,haddiedandabout10,000wereinjail.Thegovernmentwasquicktorespondtotheissuesraisedbythemovement.TheJagirdariAbolition

Regulationwaslaiddownin1949itself,andtheHyderabadTenancyandAgriculturalLandsActwaspassedin1950.Over6,00,000tenantscoveringoverone-quarterofthecultivatedareaweredeclared‘protected’tenantswitharighttopurchasethelandoneasyterms.Landceilingswerealsointroducedinthemid-fifties.Itwasalsofoundthatlandreformsweremuchbetterimplementedduetothehighlevelofpoliticalconsciousnessofthepeasants.Landlordswhoreturnedafterthemovementcollapsedwerenotabletogobacktooldways.Theyoftenagreedtoselllandatlowrates,weresubjecttopressureforhigherwages,didnottryveryhardtorecoverpeasants’ownlandsorwastelands,butonlythe‘surplus’lands.ThemovementhadbrokenthebackoflandlordisminTelangana,butthishadalreadybeendoneaspartoftheanti-Nizam,pro-integrationliberationstruggle,whentheirpositionasleadersofthepopularupsurgeprovidedCommuniststheopportunitytoarticulateradicalpeasantdemandsaswell.Thecostlyadventurethereafterwasnotdictatedbytheimperativesofthepeasantmovementbutwasentirelyaconsequenceofmisguidedrevolutionaryromanticism,ofwhichsomeIndianCommunistsappearedtobeenamoured.

PatialaMuzaraMovement

TheMuzaraortenants’movementthatwasgoingoninPatiala(thelargestprincelystateinPunjab,thathadbecomenotoriousforitsrepressiveandrapaciousMaharaja)atindependencehaditsoriginsinthelatenineteenthcentury.Biswedars(thelocaltermforlandlords),whoearlierhadonlysomemaficlaimsorrevenuecollectingrights,duetotheirgrowinginfluenceintheadministration,succeededinclaimingproprietarystatus(imitatingthepatterninBritishIndiawherezamindarsorrevenuecollectorswithcustomaryrightsonlytoretainashareoftherevenuehadbeenmadeintolandowners)andrelegatedtheentirebodyofcultivatingproprietorsofroughly800villages,comprisingone-sixththeareaofthestate,tothepositionofoccupancytenantsandtenants-at-will.Thenewtenantsregardedthenewlandlordsasparvenus,whohadnolegitimaterighttothelandwhichhadbelongedtothetenantsforgenerations,andnotinthemannerinwhichatraditionaltenantrymightregardtheirold,established,feudallandowners,whoserighttothelandhadacquiredacertainsociallegitimacybyvirtueofitsveryantiquity.Thegrievancefestered,buttheopportunityforexpressioncameonlywiththenewwaveofpolitical

awarenessbroughtbythenationalmovementanditsassociatedmovementssuchastheAkaliandthePrajaMandalmovementsinthetwenties.ButtherepressiveatmosphereinPatialamadeanypoliticalactivityextremelydifficult,anditwasonlyinthelatethirtieswiththechangeinthepoliticalatmospherebroughtaboutbytheformationofCongressministriesinmanyprovincesthatitbecamepossiblefora

movementtoemerge.Bythen,CommunistswerequiteactiveinthepeasantmovementintheneighbouringBritishPunjab,andtheysoonemergedastheleadingforceintheMuzaramovementaswell.From1939,apowerfulmovementemergedandfrom1945itescalatedintoanopenconfrontation

betweenmuzarasandbiswedars,withthestateinterveningmainlytoinstitutecasesofnon-paymentofbotai(rent-in-kind)andcriminalassault.Numerousarmedclashestookplaceatdifferentplaces,someoverforciblepossessionofland,othersoverforciblerealizationofbatai.ThePrajaMandal,whichspearheadedtheanti-Maharajademocraticmovement,undertheinfluenceofBrishBhan,whowassympathetictotheCommunistsandthetenants’cause,extendedsupport.ThisgavestrengthtothetenantsasthePrajaMandalhadtheweightoftheCongressbehindit.Withthecomingofindependence,PatialajoinedtheIndianunion,butmadenomovestogrant

responsiblegovernment.TheMaharaja,infact,isolatedbytheoppositionofallpoliticalgroups,launchedsevererepressiononthemuzaras,leadingtoappealstotheMinistryofStatesinDelhibythePrajaMandalonbehalfofthetenants.TherepressiondecreasedaftertheformationofthePatialaandEastPunjabStatesUnion(PEPSU)inJuly1948,anewprovincecomprisingtheerstwhileprincelystatesofPunjab.However,withthestateunabletoassertitsauthority,thesituationwasincreasinglybeginningto

resemblethatofacivilwarinwhichthecontendingclassesorpoliticalgroupswereleft,byandlarge,tosettletheissuebetweenthemselvesasbestastheycould.Increasingly,assomelandlordsbegantousearmedgangs,thenecessityaroseforthemovementtoresistthisarmedonslaughtbyorganizingitsownarmedwing.Thedecisiontoorganizeanarmedvolunteercorpswasgivenaconcreteformbytheformationin1948oftheLalCommunistParty,byTejaSinghSwatantarandabreakawaygroupofPunjabCommunists,mostlybelongingtothe‘Kirti’groupwhichoriginatedintheGhadrMovementandhadalwayshadanuneasyrelationshipwiththeCPI.Thus,bytheendof1948,thissmallbandofarmedmenwasinplace,whosedutywastorushtotheaid

ofmuzaraswhowerethreatenedwithphysical,especiallyarmed,assaultbythebiswedarsandtheirorganizedgangs.Thefearofthe‘armedforce’helpedtokeepbiswedarsincheck.However,quitecontrarytopopularnotions,andCommunistmythology,thesizeofthis‘armedforce’wasnevermorethan30or40people,thelargestestimatebeing100.Thisarmedforcewasalsonotmeanttotakeontheforcesofthestate,aswasclearlyshownbytheKishangarhincidentinJanuary1949,inwhichfourmembersofthearmedforcelosttheirlives.Anticipatinganassaultbythegovernmentforces,sinceapolicemanhaddiedinanearlierclash,theCommunistleadershadwiselydecidedtosendawaythemainbodyoftheforce,maintainingonlyatokenpresencesothatthepeopledidnotfeelabandoned.DharamSinghFakkarandotherswhowerearrestedinthisincidentwereacquittedafteradefencewasorganizedbytheleft-wingCongressmenledbyBrishBhan.Thesituationchangedradicallywiththeformationofanew,purelyCongressministryin1951,in

whichBrishBhanwasdeputychiefministerandhisgrouphadastrongpresence.AnAgrarianReformsEnquiryCommitteewassetuptomakerecommendationsand,tillsuchtimeasthelegislationcouldbeenacted,thePEPSUTenancy(TemporaryProvision)ActwaspromulgatedinJanuary1952whichprotectedtenantsagainsteviction.Inthemeantime,thegeneralelectionsintervened,andtheCongressfailedtosecureamajorityonitsowninPEPSU.NowwasthechanceforthethreeCommunistlegislatorstopaybacksomeofthedebtstheyowedtoBrishBhanandhisgroup,buttheychoseinsteadtosupport

Rarewala,theMaharaja’suncle,onthespeciouspleathattheysecuredsomeminorreductionincompensationtobepaidtobiswedars.OtheraccountssuggestadealbyCPI(withwhomtheLalCommunistPartyhadmerged)withtheAkalisinPunjabforseat-sharingintheelections.Rarewala’sministryalsocollapsedwithoutpassingtheagrarianlegislation,anditwastheintroduction

ofPresident’sRulethatbroughtaboutaqualitativechangeinthesituation,asthePresidentissuedthePEPSUOccupancyTenants(VestingofProprietaryRights)Act(1953).Underthisact,occupancytenantscouldbecomeownersoftheirlandbypayingcompensationamountingtotwelvetimesthelandrevenue,anamountwhich(giventhewar-timeandpost-warinflationandthefactthatlandrevenuecontinuedtobeassessedatthepre-warrates)wasnonetoolarge.Thislegislation,thoughitdidnotmeetfullytheCommunists’demandoftransferofproprietaryrightswithoutcompensation,wasobviouslyfoundacceptablebythetenants,andnofurtherresistancewasreported.TheCommunistscontinued,however,tocondemnthenewagrarianlegislationasinadequatebecause

thebiswedars’landswerenotbeingconfiscatedwithoutcompensation.Thisresultedintheirgrowingisolationfromthepeasants,aprocessthatwasalsofurtheredbytheirdesertionoftheirerstwhilecomrades-in-armsinthemuzaramovementandthePrajaMandal,theleft-wingCongressgroupledbyBrishBhan.Inthelongrun,theCommunistswerealsothelosersinthisgame,becausetheyweretooweaktostruggleeffectivelyontheirownagainstthegradualascendancyoftheAkalisandothercommunalandsemi-communalandright-winggroups.Thiswasmostpoignantlyexpressedbyan85-year-oldgrassrootsCommunistworkertotheauthorsin1981:‘Thesepeopleforwhomwefoughtsoharddonotevenofferusadrinkofwaterthesedays.’3

NaxalitePeasantMovement:Naxalbari,WestBengal

On2March1967,thefirstnon-CongressUnitedFront(UF)governmentwassworninWestBengal,comprisingCPI,CPM,andBanglaCongress,abreakawaygroupfromCongress.Itdecidedtoexpeditetheimplementationoflandreforms.HarekrishnaKonar,theveteranCPMpeasantleader,aslandrevenueministerannouncedtheprogrammeofquickdistributionofsurpluslandamongthelandlessandendtoevictionofsharecroppers.Healsocalledforpeasants’initiativeandorganizedforcetoassisttheprocessofimplementation.Thisraisedexpectationsamongthepoorbutalsofrightenedmanymiddleandsmallownersthattheirlandwouldbegiventosharecroppers.Thereweremanyproblemswithdistributionofland,however,asmuchofitwasunderlitigation,and,onceinoffice,CPMcouldnotignorethelegalconstraints.Besides,verificationofclaims,adjustingofrivalclaims,grantofpattas,wasatime-consumingprocess,whichthepartywasonlynowabouttolearn.Somecomrades,however,hadotherideas,andhadnodesiretolearn.AmongthesewasthegroupinNaxalbari.InNaxalbariareaofDarjeelingdistrictinNorthBengal,Communistshadbeenorganizing

sharecroppersandteaestatelabour,mostlybelongingtotheSanthal,OraonandRajbanshitribalcommunities,sincetheearlyfifties.Thesharecroppersworkedforjotedarsorlandlordsunderthe‘adhiar’system,inwhichthejotedarsprovidedtheploughs,bullocksandseedsandgotashareofthecrop.DisputesoversharesfollowedbyevictionswerecommonplaceandincreasedwiththecomingoftheUnitedFrontgovernmentbecauseofthefearthatsharecropperswouldbegiventheland.Teagardenlabouralsooftenworkedassharecroppersonteagardenowners’paddylands,whichwereshownasteagardenstoescapetheceilinglawsonpaddylands.CharuMazumdarwasamajorleaderofthisareaand

itwasclearforsometime,atleastsince1965,thathisideasaboutagrarianrevolutionandarmedstruggle,apparentlybasedonMaoZe-Dong’sthoughts,weredifferentfromtheofficialCPMposition.Henotonlydidnotbelievethatlandreformwaspossiblethroughlegalmethods,butarguedthispathonlydeadenedtherevolutionaryurgesofthepeasants.Tobepoliticallymeaningful,landhadtobeseizedanddefendedthroughviolentmeans.Toconcretizetheirideas,heandhisassociates,KanuSanyalandthetriballeaderJangalSanthal,organizedapeasants’conferenceundertheauspicesoftheSiligurisub-divisionoftheCPMinDarjeelingdistrictonlysixteendaysaftertheUFgovernmenthadcometopower.Theygaveacallforendingoflandlords’monopolyonland,landdistributionthroughpeasantcommitteesandarmedresistancetolandlords,theUFgovernmentandcentralgovernment.Accordingtosomeclaims,allthevillageswereorganizedbetweenAprilandMay1967.Around15,000to20,000peasantsbecamefull-timeactivists,itissaid,andpeasants’committeesformedinvillagesbecamethenucleiofarmedguards,whooccupiedland,burntlandrecords,declareddebtscancelled,delivereddeathsentencesonhatedlandowners,andsetupaparalleladministration.Bows,arrowsandspearsweresupplementedbywhatevergunscouldbeseizedfromlandlords.Hatigisha,Buraganj,andChowpukhuriaunderNaxalbari,KharibariandPhansidewapolicestationsrespectivelywerethereportedrebelstrongholds.CPMleaderscouldeasilyseethattheNaxalbaripeasantswerebeingledintoasuicidalconfrontation

withthestate,ofwhichCommunistswerenowapart.CPMcouldnotremaininthegovernmentandsanctiontheactionoftheNaxalbaricomrades.Persuasionwastriedfirst,andHarekrishnaKonarwenttoSiliguriand,accordingtohisversion,gottheleaderstoagreetosurrenderallpersonswantedbythepoliceandtostopallunlawfulactivitiesandtocooperateinthelegaldistributionoflandinconsultationwithlocalpeasantorganizations.Thelocalleadersdeniedanyagreementand,anticipatingrepression,begantoincitethepeasantsagainstthepolice.Afterthis,thingstooktheirpredictableandinexorablecourse,withaviciouscircleofattacksonpolice,policereprisals,furtherclashes,andsoon.CPMwasinanunenviableposition,tryingforsometimetosteeramiddlecoursebetweensupportforrebelsandpolicerepression,andmakingfurtherattemptsatconciliationbysendingacabinetmissionoftheUFgovernment.Itappearsfromsomesourcesthatthepeasantsdidwanttonegotiate,butwerebrushedasidebyCharuMazumdar.CPMhadtoultimatelycondemnandexpelthedissidentleadersorresignfromthegovernment.Itchosetheformerandthistriggeredofftheprocessofthecomingtogetheroftheextremeleftforces,firstintoaCommitteetohelptheNaxalbaripeasants,andlaterintheCP(ML).Meanwhile,repressionhaditseffect,andbyJulythepeasantmovementwasoverandmostofits

activistsandleadersincludingJangalSanthalinjail.TheNaxalitemovementthenremainedonlyinthetownswithstudentsasitsmainforce,anditcameincreasinglytobecharacterizedbystreetwarfarebetweenarmedgangsofNaxaliteandCPMorCongressyouthsupporters.Afarcryfromtheromanticvisionsofpeasantrevolution!

Srikakulam,AndhraPradesh

ButinfarawaySrikakulam,anothergroupofromanticrevolutionariesclaimingtobeinspiredbyMaoZe-DongwereabouttoleadanothergroupoftribalsintoasuicidalconfrontationwiththeIndianstate.Strangely,itneveroccurredtothemtoasktheNaxalbaritribalpeasantswhattheythoughtofaleadershipthatusedthemasguineapigsforexperimentswithrevolutionandpushedthem,armedwithonlybowsandarrowsandspears,tofaceamodernpoliceforce.TheSrikakulamtribals,mostlyilliterate,livingdeepin

forests,withlittleexposuretotheoutsideworld,hadnowayofknowingaboutthetragedyofNaxalbariwhentheybegantoenacttheirown.Srikakulamwasthenorthern-mostdistrictinAndhraPradesh,borderingonOrissa,andamongtheleast

developed.Thelocaltribalpopulation,comprisedoftheJatapuandSavaratribes,hadbeenorganizedbyCommunistsworkingintheParvatipuram,Palakonda,PatapatnamandKotturareassincetheearlyfifties.From1957-8to1967,amovementthatorganizedtribalsintoGirijanSanghamsandMahilaSanghamshadsecuredmanygains,includingrestorationoflandillegallytakenoverbynon-tribalmoneylendersandlandlords,wageincreases,betterpricesforforestproduce,reductionofdebts,andfreeaccesstoforestsfortimberforconstructionofhousesandotherdailyneeds,Tribalshadgainedinself-confidenceandparticipatedinralliesinnearbytownswithenthusiasm.ThereisnoevidencethattherewasanypushfromwithinthetribalsorGirijan(forestpeople)towardsgreatermilitancyoruseofviolence.AsinNaxalbari,extremistdissidentCPMleaders,whowereunhappywiththepartyline,decidedto

shiftovertoalineofarmedstruggle,guerillawarfare,andlater,muchmorethaninNaxalbari,annihilationofindividual‘classenemies’.InspiredbyNaxalbari,butignoringitsexperience,themovementbeganwellafterNaxalbarihadbeensuppressed.BeginninginNovember1967,itreachedanintensemassphasebetweenNovember1968andFebruary1969.Girijansarmedwithbowsandarrowsandstonesandsometimescrudecountrygunschasedawaypolicepartiesthatcametoarrestactivists.Communistrevolutionariesroamedthevillagesaskingthepeopletoformvillagedefencesquads(dalams)andgetwhateverarmstheycould.InApril1969,withthedecisionatthenationalleveltoformtheCP(ML),anewpartyofextremeleftactivists,afreshturnwastakenwithemphasisshiftingfrommasslinetoguerillaactionandindividualannihilation.Accordingtogovernmentsources,aboutforty-eightpeoplewereannihilatedbytheextremists;therebelsclaimedaboutdoublethatfigure.Theseincludedlandlords,moneylenders,policeandforestofficials.Inevitably,repressiontoointensifiedfromNovember1969andbyJanuarythirteenleaderswerekilledandseveralarrested.Bymid-June1970,amassivepoliceoperationwaslaunchedinwhich1400werearrested.On10July1970,V.SatyanarayanaandAdibhatlaKailasam,thetwomajorleaderswerekilled,andthatbroughtthemovementtoanend.FeebleattemptsweremadebysomeMaoistfactionstorevivethemovementfrom1971onwardsbut,by1975,theseseemtohavediedout.GroupsofMaoistyouthcontinueeventodayinremote,backwardpockets,ofteninhabitedbytribalsorverypoorlow-castecultivatorsandagriculturallabourers,inAndhraPradesh,Bihar,andMadhyaPradesh,tryingtobuildtheirmodelofrevolution.Butnowthiseffortappearstohavelittlemoretoitthanviolenceasitssolemotif.

‘New’Farmers’Movements

Thefarmers’movementsburstontothenationalpoliticalstagein1980withtheroadandrailrokoagitationinNasikinMaharashtraledbytheShetkariSangathanaofSharadJoshi.TwolakhfarmersblockadedroadandrailtrafficontheBombay-CalcuttaandBombay-DelhirouteonNovember10demandinghigherpricesforonionsandsugarcane.Thousandswerearrested,twokilledinpolicefiring,andpricesofonionsandcaneenhanced.Theleaderwasanex-UNofficial,SharadJoshi,whoarticulatedtheideologyofthemovementintermsofIndiaversusBharatorurban,industrialIndiaversusrural,agriculturalBharat.In1986,inSisaulivillageinMuzaffarnagardistrictofU.P.,MahinderSinghTikait,amiddle-school-educated,medium-sizepeasant,Jatbycaste,andheadoftheJatcastepanchayatorKhap,

presidedoveragatheringoflakhsofvillagersbeforewhichthechiefministerofU.P.hadbeenforcedtoappearinpersontoannouncehisacceptanceoftheirdemandforreductionofelectricitychargestotheoldlevel.Thesewereonlythemoredramaticmomentsinwhathademergedintheeightiesasawidespreadgrassrootsmobilizationofruraldwellers.LedbytheVivasayigalSangaminTamilNadu,theRajyaRyothuSanghainKarnataka,BharatiyaKisanUnioninPunjabandU.P.,KhedutSamajandKisanSanghinGujaratandtheShetkariSangathanainMaharashtra,farmersintheirthousandsandlakhs,atdifferenttimesfordifferentdemands,stoppedtrafficonhighwaysandtrainroutes,withheldsuppliesfromcities,satonindefinitedharnasatgovernmentofficesinlocalandregionalcentres,gheraoedofficials,preventedpoliticalleadersandofficialsfromenteringvillages,especiallyatelectiontime,tilltheyagreedtosupporttheirdemands,refusedtopayenhancedelectricitycharges,andinterestonloans,andcostofirrigationschemes,resistedconfiscationproceedingsinlieuofdebt,andevende-grabbedconfiscatedgoodsandland.Thebasicunderstandingonwhichthemovementsrestedisthatthegovernmentmaintainsagricultural

pricesatanartificiallylowlevelinordertoprovidecheapfoodandrawmaterialstourbanareas,andtheconsequentdisparityinpricesresultsinfarmerspayinghighpricesforindustrialgoodsneededasinputsintoagricultureandreceivinglowreturnsfortheirproduce.Asaresult,farmersareexploitedbyurbaninterests,andarevictimsofinternalcolonialism.Theyneednotpaybackloansorchargesforinfrastructurecostsastheyhavealreadypaidtoomuchandareinfactnetcreditors.Thisbasicphilosophyisarticulatedindifferentformsbyalltheleadersandorganizations;itprovidesthelegitimacyforthemovementinthefarmers’consciousness,alongwiththetraditionalpropensityoftheIndianpeasanttoresistwhattheyperceiveas‘unjust’governmentdemands.(Themostcommonissueonwhichresistancesurfacedamongthelandowningpeasantsinthecolonialperiodwaspaymentofoneoranothergovernmentdemand.Thisisalsotrueofpeasantsinotherpartsoftheworld.4)These‘new’farmers’movementsthathaveattractedmuchmediaandpoliticalattention,especiallyin

theeighties,havefocusedmainlyondemandingremunerativepricesforagriculturalproduce,andloweringoreliminationofgovernmentduessuchascanalwatercharges,electricitycharges,interestratesandprincipalofloans,etc.Thishasbroughtonthemthechargethattheyaremainlyvehiclesfordemandsofrichorwell-to-doagriculturistsmostofwhomarebeneficiariesofpost-independenceagrariandevelopment,includingtheGreenRevolution,andhavelittleornoroomfortheconcernsoftheruralpoor.Thisishotlydeniedbytheleadersandideologuesofthemovement,whopointasprooftothediversesocialbaseofthemovementamongmediumandsmallpeasants,aswellassomeotherfeaturessuchasinclusionofdemandsforhigherminimumwagesforagriculturallabourandtheinsertionofwomen’sanddalits’issues,forexample,bytheShetkariSangathanaofMaharashtra.Thefact,however,remainsthat,apartfromtheShetkariSangathana,nootherorganizationhasreallygonebeyondwhatcanbedescribedaslandowningpeasants’issues.Theseorganizationshaveshownscantconcernforthelandlessruralpoororruralwomen.Itis,however,truethattheyarebroad-basedamongthepeasantryandnotconfinedtotheuppersections,asallegedbysomecritics,forsmaller-holdingpeasantsareasmuchinterestedinhigherpricesandlowerratesofgovernmentduessincetheytooproduceforthemarketandpaygovernmentdues.Whilethereisoftenjusticeinthedemandsforhigherpricesandbetterfacilities,thebasicruralversus

urbanorBharatversusIndiaideologyisessentiallyflawed,andcanonlyleadthefarmersintoablind

alleyofmindlessresistanceandstaterepressionofwhichinevitablythesmallerpeasantsarelikelytobethechiefvictims.Infact,thisiswhathappenedinTamilNaduin1981whereaverystrongmovementwaskilledbystaterepressionbroughtonbyrefusaltorepayloansandconsequentforcibleconfiscationbygoverrunent.AlleffortsbyNaidutorevivethemovementhehadnursedforalmosttwodecades,includingthefoundingoftheToilersandPeasantsPartyin1982,cametonoughtandhediedadisappointedmanin1984.ItappearsthatthelessonsoftheTamilNadumovementwerenotlearntbyothers,elseonewouldnothavecomeacrosssuicidaldecisionssuchastheonetakenin1984toaskthePunjabpeasantstoreducefoodgrainproduction,inordertoholdthecountrytoransom,adecisionmercifullyneverimplementedforotherreasons.Leadingmovementsisasmuchaboutknowingwhenandwheretostopasitisaboutknowingwhenandhowtobegin,asGandhijiknewsowell.ButdespitemanyclaimsbytheleaderstobefollowinginGandhianfootsteps,thereislittleevidenceoflessonslearntfromhim,especiallyabouttheawesomeresponsibilityofleadership.Thesemovementsareoftenreferredtoas‘new’,thesuggestionbeingthattheyarepartofthe

worldwidetrendof‘new’non-classorsupra-classsocialmovementswhichhaveemergedoutsidetheformalpoliticalpartystructures,examplesbeingthewomen’sandenvironmentalmovements.5Letusexaminetheclaim.Asstatedabove,apartfromtheShetkariSangathana,nootherorganizationhasshownsignsofreallytryinghardtobecomeasocietalmovement.TheKarnatakamovementhasbeenconcernedwiththeenvironment,andTikaittosomeextentwithsocialreform,butlittleelse.Thisdoesnotbringthemintothecategoryof‘new’socialmovementsdefinedasnon-classmovements,concernedwithwomen’sissuesorchildlabourorenvironmentalissuesthatareoutsidetheframeworkofthetraditionalpartystructure.The‘new’farmers’movementsarenotallthatnewassimilardemandsweremadebypeasantorganizationsearlieraswell,butwithouttheregressiveruralversusurbanideology.InPunjab,forexample,abigmovementwaslaunchedbytheKisanSabhaunderCPI’sdirectionagainsttheimpositionofabettermentlevyorirrigationtaxin1958.Demandsforremunerativepricesweremadebyallpeasantorganizationsandmostpoliticalpartiesorpeasantlobbieswithinparties.TheemergenceofCharanSinghandBLDinU.P.in1967waswidelyregardedasthecomingofageofalandowningpeasantrythathadbenefitedfrompost-independenceagrarianchange.MovementsofBackwardCasteswerealsoseenaspartofthesameprocess.Theothergroundonwhich‘newness’isassertedisthatthesemovementsarenotlinkedtopolitical

parties,whereasearlierorganizationswerewingsofparties.Thisisonlypartiallycorrect.Whileitistruethatnoneoftheorganizationswerestartedbypoliticalparties,itisalsotruethatovertimetheyhaveinexorablygotlinkedtopolitics.TheTamilNaduorganizationwasthefirsttoopenlybecomeapartyandthisledtothedisarrayintheAll-IndiaBKUwhichNaidu,theTamilNaduleader,hadhelpedfound,asdistancefrompoliticalpartieshadbeenenunciatedasabasicprincipleoftheorganization.TheKarnatakaRyothuSangha(KRS)putupcandidatesinelections.ThePunjabBKUhasretainedthecharacterofafarmers’lobbymorethananyother,butdidlinkupwithAkaliswhenitsuitedthem.TheShetkariSangathanawasinvolvedinpoliticsfromthe1984LokSabhaelectionswhenitputoutalistofforty-eightcandidates,oneforeachconstituencyinMaharashtra,whoweremostlikelytodefeattheCongresscandidates.Itaskeditsfollowerstovoteforthem.From1987,SharadJoshiopenlyalliedwithV.P.Singhinhisanti-Congressmobilizationandin1989wasrewardedwithaCabinetlevelposttoformulateanewagriculturalpolicy.Joshi’slinkswithV.P.SinghledtohisestrangementfromTikait,and

hopesofanall-Indiaunityoffarmersweredashedon2October1989whenTikaitandhismenalmostdraggedJoshiandotherleadersoffthestageattheBoatClublawnsaftermakingthemwaitfortwohoursinfrontofacrowdoflakhsthathadcollectedforwhatwastobeajointrally.ButTikait’sloudprotestationsaboutstayingoffpoliticsbegantosoundhollowoncehisnotsoclandestinesupporttotheBJPinthewakeofthehottingupoftheAyodhyaissuein1990becameapparent.TheGujaratKisanSangh’slinkstotheBJParewellknown.Ideologicallyaswell,themovementisdeeplydivided.SharadJoshinowfavoursliberalization,with

thefarmerbeinglinkedtotheworldmarket.KRSisdeadagainstmultinationalsandhasbeencarryingonprotestsagainsttheirentry.Organizationalandideologicalunityhavethuseludedthemovement.Also,thereisadistinctlossofmomentumintheninetiesand,bytheindexoflongevity,themovementmayberankedquitelow,thoughitisearlydaysyet.Themovementnodoubttouchedavitalchordamongpeasantsbydrawingattentiontotheneglectandbackwardnessofruralareas,itsproblemremainedthatinsteadoffocusingonredressal,itbegantopitpeasantsandvillagersagainsttown-dwellersinafratricidalwar.

33RevivalandGrowthofCommunalism

Communalismandcommunalpartiesandorganizationsareverymuchapartoftoday’spoliticalenvironment.Thecommunalappealisusedonalargescaleforelectoralmobilization.Forthelasttwodecadesthecountryhasbeenregularlyrackedbyaspateofcommunalriots.CommunalismistodaythemostseriousdangerfacingIndiansocietyandpolity.Itisunderminingsecularism,hasbecomeamenacetothehard-wonunityoftheIndianpeopleandthreatenstounleashtheforcesofbarbarism.TodiscusstheproblemofcommunalisminindependentIndia,thetermssecularismandcommunalism

firstneedtobedefined.Secularism,basically,meansseparationofreligionfromthestateandpoliticsanditsbeingtreatedasaprivate,personalaffair.Italsorequiresthatthestateshouldnotdiscriminateagainstacitizenongroundsofhisorherreligionorcaste.CommunalismisanideologybasedonthebeliefthattheIndiansocietyisdividedintoreligious

communities,whoseeconomic,political,socialandculturalinterestsdivergeandareevenhostiletoeachotherbecauseoftheirreligiousdifferences.Communalismis,aboveall,abeliefsystemthroughwhichasociety,economyandpolityareviewedandexplainedandaroundwhicheffortismadetoorganizepolitics.Asanideologyitisakintoracialism,anti-Semitismandfascism.Infact,itcanbeconsideredtheIndianformoffascism.Further,therelationshipbetweencommunalideologyandcommunalviolenceneedstoclarified.Thebasicthrustofcommunalismasanideologyisthespreadofcommunalideasandmodesofthought.Thoughcommunalviolencedrawsourattentiontothecommunalsituationinadramaticmanner,itisnotthecruxoftheproblem.Theunderlyingandlong-termcauseofcommunalviolenceisthespreadofthecommunalideologyorbelief-system.Communalviolenceusuallyoccurswhencommunalthinkingthatprecedesitreachesacertainlevelof

intensityandtheatmosphereisvitiatedbythebuildingupofcommunalfear,suspicionandhatred.Communalideologycanthusprevailwithoutviolencebutcommunalviolencecannotexistwithoutcommunalideology.Inotherwords,communalideologyandpoliticsarethedisease,communalviolenceonlyitsexternalsymptom.Unfortunately,thepresenceofcommunalideologyasapreludeorprologuetocommunalviolenceisgenerallyignored;awarenessofcommunalismregistersonlywhenviolencebreaksout.Thecommunalistsarealso,therefore,primarilyinterestedinspreadingthecommunalbelief-systemandnotnecessarilycommunalviolence.Infact,themajorpurposeofthosewhoinspireandorganizecommunalviolenceisnotgenocidebuttocreateasituationwhichcommunalizesthemasses.

Secularism:ItsRoots

ItwasoneofthegreattriumphsoftheIndiannationalmovementthatdespitethePartitionofIndiaandthebarbaricriotsthataccompaniedit,theIndianpeopleacceptedsecularismasabasicvalue,enshrineditintheConstitution,andsetouttobuildasecularstateandsociety.Thelegacyofthefreedomstruggle,

Gandhiji’smartyrdom,Nehru’stotalcommitmenttosecularismandtheactivesupportextendedtoNehrubySardarPatel,MaulanaAzad,C.Rajagopalachariandotherleadersinthestruggleagainstcommunalism,ledtoitsbecomingdominantinthefifties.Communalpartiesmadeapoorshowingintheelectionsof1952,1957and1962andforyearsremainedamarginalforceinIndianpolitics.Consequently,peoplebecamecomplacentandcametobelievethateconomicdevelopmentandspreadofeducation,scienceandtechnologywouldautomaticallyweakenandextinguishcommunalthinking.Communalism,theybelieved,wouldgraduallydisappearfromtheIndianscene.Itwasnotrealizedby

thepeopleortheirleadersthatcommunalismcanhavepassiveandactivephases,dependingoncircumstances,butthatitwouldnotdisappearwithoutanactivestruggle.Moreover,evenwhilecommunalpoliticslaydormant,communalideologuescontinuedtheirworkandcommunalorganizationssuchasRSS,JanSangh,Jamaat-e-Islami,MuslimLeague,AkaliDalandvariousChristiancommunalgroupsinKeralacontinuedtofunction.Communalismbecameactiveinthesixties,gaininginstrengthasseenintherisingcommunalizationofIndiansociety.Inthelatefiftiesitself,therewasaseriesofcommunalriots.Thenumberofpersonskilledinriotsincreasedfrom7in1958to41in1959and108in1961.Inparticular,theriotinJabalpurin1961shookthewholenation.NehrureactedbyimmediatelyformingtheNationalIntegrationCouncil.TheChineseaggressionin1962arousedfeelingsofnationalunityamongallsectionsofthepeopleandcommunalsentimentshadtoretreat.Butthisinterludeprovedtobeshort-lived.Onceagain,inthemid-sixties,thedisruptiveforcesofcommunalismwereontheupswinginIndian

politicsandlargesectionsofthecommonpeoplebecamesusceptibletocommunalismandcasteism.TheJanSanghincreaseditsstrengthinparliamentfrom14in1962to35inthegeneralelectionsof1967.ItparticipatedincoalitionministriesinseveralNorthIndianstatesandbegantoattractconsiderablesupportintheruralareasofU.P.,MadhyaPradeshandRajasthan.Theincidenceandseverityofcommunalriotsalsoincreased,thenumberofriotsbeing1,070in1964,520in1969and521in1970;thenumberofthosekilledbeing1919,673and298respectively.Therewassomerespitefromcommunalismandcommunalriotsfrom1971to1977.Thenumberofcommunalriotsdidnotexceed250inanyofthoseyearsandthenumberofkilleddidnotexceed1,000,asIndiraGandhiconsolidatedherpowerintheparliamentaryelectionof1971.Inelections,JanSangh’sstrengthintheparliamentwasreducedfrom35in1967to22.TheBangladeshwarattheendof1971alsogaveamajorblowtobothHinduandMuslimcommunalisms.However,communalismandcommunalviolencebegantoonceagainincreasefrom1978andhavebecomeendemicsincethen,assumingalarmingproportions.Aworrisomeaspectofthegrowthofcommunalismandcommunalviolencehasbeentheirwidespread

character.Theyhavecoveredalmostallpartsofthecountryandallthemajorcities,embracingevenareassuchasKerala,TamilNadu,AndhraPradesh,WestBengal,andOrissawhichwereearlierbelievedtobeimmunetoriots.Communalriotshavealsospreadtovillagesandinvolvedallreligiousgroups.Increasingly,communalviolencehasbeenpre-plannedandwell-organizedandoflongerduration.Someofthecommunalriotshavelastedweeksandevenmonths.Alsotheriotershavebeenprovidedwithamplefunds,firearmsandotherdestructivematerials.Itisinterestingthatwhen,duringtheEmergencyfrom1975to1977,allthemajorleadersandmostoftheactivistsofRSS,JanSanghandJamaat-e-Islamiwerearrested,communalviolence,aswellasthelevelofcommunalpropaganda,camedowndrastically,forfewwerelefttoorganizeriotsortopromotecommunalhatred.Ontheotherhand,duringtheperiodof

theJanatagovernment,therewasanincreaseincommunalismandcommunalviolencebecauseofthestronginfluenceofRSSandJanSanghintheJanatapartyandthegovernment.SostrongwasthemomentumgiventocommunalismduringthisperiodthateventhereturnofIndiraGandhitopowerin1980failedtocheckitsgrowth.

CharacteristicsofCommunalism

Likeallideologiesandpolitics,communalismhasaconcretesocialbaseorroots;itistheproductofandreflectstheoverallsocio-economicandpoliticalconditions.Butthishappensinadistortedmanner,defeatinganyaccuratediagnosisofthesituation,itscausesandremedies.Thus,communalismdoesnotreflectanysocialtruth:whatitdeclarestobethesocialrealityisnotthesocialreality;whatitdeclarestobethecausesofsocialdiscontentarenotthecauses;andwhatitdeclarestobethesolutionsofthesocialmaladyarenotthesolutions—infactitisitselfasocialmalady.Communalismis,thus,noanswertoanyoftheproblemsleadingtoitsgenerationandgrowth.Instead,itunderminestherealstruggleforchangingsocialconditions.WhilethesocietyandpolityofIndiaafterindependencehavebeensecular,thelogicofthesocio-economicsystemhascontinuedtoprovidefavourablesoilforthespreadofcommunalism.Especiallyimportantinthisrespecthavebeenthesocialstrainswhichhavearisenoutofthepatternofeconomicdevelopment.Indianeconomicdevelopmentafter1947hasbeenimpressivebuttheproblemsofpoverty,unemployment,andinequalityarisingoutofcolonialunderdevelopmenthavebeenonlypartiallytackled,especiallyinthecontextofthepopulationexplosion.Theseproblemsbreedfrustrationandpersonalandsocialanxietyamongthepeopleandgenerateunhealthycompetitionfortheinadequateeconomicandsocialopportunities.Infact,capitalistdevelopmenthasgeneratedsharpandvisibleeconomicinequalityandthepositioninthisregardhasbeenworseningovertheyears.Though,overall,therearegreatereconomicopportunitiesavailableforthepeople,thereisfargreaterinequalitythanbeforeinregardtoaccesstothem.Alsotheaspirationsofthepeoplearerisingfasterthantheirpossiblefulfilment.Thesoilforthegrowthofcommunalism(andcasteism)isthusalwaysready.Thesocialdilemmadescribedabovehasaffectedthemiddleclassesorthepettybourgeoisiewith

particularforce.Inrecentyears,thepettybourgeoisiehasbeenfacedwiththeconstantthreatofunemploymentandadversesocio-economicconditions.Moreover,itsgrowthhasconstantlyoutpacedeconomicdevelopment.Thesituationisfurtheraggravatedbythefactthatafterindependencethespreadofeducation,thepatternofsocialchangeandrapidpopulationgrowthhaveledmillionsofpeasantandworkingclassyouthtolookforjobsinthecitiesandinadministrationandtojoiningtheranksofthepettybourgeoisie,atleastasfarasaspirationsareconcerned.Thislineofanalysisalsoexplainswhycommunalismremainedrelativelydormanttilltheearlysixties.IndependenceandthethreeFiveYearPlansdidopenupawiderangeofopportunitiesforthemiddleclassesbecauseoftheIndianizationandexpansionoftheofficerrungsofthearmedforcesandprivatefirms,immenseexpansionoftheadministrativeapparatus,therapiddevelopmentofbanking,tradingandindustrialcompanies,thegrowthofschoolandcollegeeducationandothersocialservices,andthephenomenalexpansioninthetrainingandrecruitmentofengineers,doctorsandscientists.Butthisinitialpushtomiddle-classemploymentwasexhaustedbythemid-sixties.Besides,thepatternandrateofeconomicdevelopmentweresuchthattheyfailedtogeneratelarge-scaleemploymentintheindustrialandcommercialsectorsandalsoplacedlimitsontheexpansionofsocialservices.Thepettybourgeoisiewasnowbacktoasituationofjobscarcity,

competition,rivalryanddiscontent.Moreover,changesinagrarianrelationsthrewupnewstrataofrichandmiddlepeasantsandcapitalistfarmers,thatis,ruralbourgeoisieandpettybourgeoisie,whoprovidedafertilegroundforthegerminationandspreadofcommunalandcasteistideologies,movementsandparties.Communalismwas,however,noanswertotheeconomicproblemsofthepettybourgeoisie;itdidnot

servetheinterestsofthissocialstratuminanyway.Unabletounderstandthereasonsfortheireconomicorsocialdistress,growingsocialandeconomicdisparityandinsecurity,theiranxietytendedtotakeacommunalorcasteistform.Theotherreligiousorcastegroupswereseenasthecauseoftheirproblems.Thecommunalproblemdidnot,however,liemerelyintheeconomicrealm.Forseveralgenerations

Indianshavebeenundergoingasocialtransition;theyhavebeenlosingtheiroldworldwithoutgainingthenew.Theprocessacceleratedafterindependence.Old,traditionalsocialinstitutions,solidaritiesandsupportsystems—ofcaste,jointfamily,villageandurbanneighbourhood—havebeenrapidlybreakingdown.Thenewinstitutionsandsolidaritiesofclass,tradeunions,KisanSabhas,youthorganizations,socialclubs,politicalpartiesandothervoluntaryassociationshave,ontheotherhand,madetardyprogressandhavenotbeenabletotaketheirplacetoasignificantextent.Inthissituation,manyturntocommunalorganizationsasanalternativefocusofunityandsolidarity.Also,oldvaluesandsocialmores,whichcementedtogetherdifferentsegmentsofsocietyhavebeendisappearingunderthehammerblowsoftheprofitmotive,capitalistcompetitiveness,careerism,andthephilosophyofthewinnertakesallandletthedeviltakecareofthehindmost.Theresulthasbeenamoralandculturalvacuumwhichishighlyconducivetoideologiesbasedonfearandhate.Individuals,groupsandpartiesaretakingthequickandeasyroutetopoliticalpowerbyarousingcommunalsentimentsandpassions.Anotheraspectofthecommunalproblemhasbeentheinevitableexhaustionofthepoliticalidealism

generatedbythenationalmovementwhichinspiredthepeople,particularlytheyouth,andgaveimpetustosecularideas.After1947,peopleneededanewunifying,anti-divisivegoalorvisionwhichcouldgeneratehopeforthefuture,kindlehealthynationalfeelings,inspireandunitetheminacommonnation-wideendeavour,andstrengthenthesecularcontentofsociety.Unfortunately,suchavisionhasbeenlacking,especiallyaftertheseventies.Thereis,thus,everydangerthatwithoutradicalsocialchangeandtheswayofaninspiringdevelopmentalandegalitarianideal,communalismandcommunal-typemovementsmaysucceedindestroyingIndia’sunityandhamperingalleffortsatsocialandeconomicdevelopment.Itis,therefore,necessarytoeliminatethesocialconditionswhichfavourthegrowthofcommunalism.Awarningmay,however,besoundedinthiscontext.Greatcarehastobeexercisedinmakingasocial

analysisofcommunalism,whichshouldbebasedonseriousempericalandtheoreticalresearch.Atpresent,itisnoteasytoassigncommunalmotivestovariousclassesexceptinthecaseofthepettybourgeoisie.Thereis,forexample,sofarnoevidencethatthecapitalistclassinIndiabackscommunalism.But,ofcourse,itcannotbeassertedthatitwouldneverdosointhefuture.

Long-TermandShort-TermCauses

Justaswedistinguishbetweencommunalismasanideologyandcommunalviolence,wehavetodistinguishbetweenthelong-termcausesofcommunalismandtheimmediateandshort-termcausesofcommunalriotsandotherformsofcommunalviolence.Thecausesofcommunalviolencehaveoftenbeen

conjunctural;theyhavebeenlocal,specificandaccidental,suchassomeminorreligiousissueordispute,orteasingofagirl,orevenaviolentquarrelbetweentwopersonsbelongingtodifferentreligiousgroups.Thesecauseshaveinvariablybecomeoperativeonlywhentherehasbeenpriorcommunalizationoftheareaconcerned.Theseconjuncturalcausesatthemostactassparkswhichlightthecommunalfireforwhichgroundhadalreadybeenpreparedbythecommunalgroups,partiesandideologues.Therearealsoafewotherfactorswhichhavebeenimportantincommunalviolence.Communalviolencehasoftenactivelyinvolvedtheurbanpoorandlumpenelementswhosenumberhasgrownrapidlyasaresultoflopsidedeconomicdevelopmentandlarge-scalemigrationintotownsandcitiesfromruralareas.Rootless,impoverishedandoftenunemployed,millionsliveinovercrowdedareaswithoutanycivicfacilitiesintermsofhealth,education,sanitation,anddrinkingwater.Theirsocialangerandfrustration,fedbyhorridlivingconditions,makesthemeasyvictimsofthepurveyorsofcommunalhatredandfindsexpressioninspontaneousviolenceandlootandplunderwheneveracommunalriotprovidestheopportunity.Inmorerecentyears,criminalgangsengagedinlucrativeillegalactivities,suchassmuggling,illicitdistillationandsaleofliquor,gambling,drugpushingandkidnappinghaveusedcommunalriotstosettlescoreswiththeirrivals.AnimportantfeatureofIndianpoliticsandadministrationinthelastfewdecadeshasbeenthegrowing

laxityofthestateapparatuses,especiallythepolice,intheirtreatmentofcommunalviolence.Afterallthestatealonepossessestheinstrumentstosuccessfullycountercommunalviolence,andimmediateandeffectivestateactionistheonlyviablewayofdealingwithit.However,inrecentyears,theadministrationhasseldomactedfirmlyanddecisivelyandintimeandwiththefullforceofthelawandordermachinery.Communalviolenceis,moreover,invariablyprecededbytheintensivespreadofdifferentformsofinflammatorypropaganda.Yet,seldomhasactionbeentakenevenundertheexistinglawsagainsttheinstigatorsofcommunalhatredandorganizersofcommunalviolence.Also,communalistsandcommunalideologyhavebeenmakingseriousinroadsintothestateapparatusesovertheyears.Consequently,manyoftheofficialsatdifferentlevelshavebetrayedcommunaltendenciesandencouraged,overtlyorcovertly,communalforces.Inparticular,communalizedsectionsofthepoliceforcehaveoftenmadethesituationworsebytheirinactionandsometimesevenpartisanshipindealingwithcommunalriots.Anothermajorfactorinthegrowthofcommunalismsincethesixtieshasbeenthepoliticalopportunism

towardscommunalismpractisedbysecularparties,groupsandindividuals.Theyhaveoftenpermittedtheintrusionofreligionintopoliticsandhavetendedtovacillateandretreatinthefaceofthecommunalonslaught.Theyhavecompromisedwithandaccommodatedcommunalforcesforshort-termelectoralgainsorasapartofthepolicyofanti-Congressism.And,farworse,theyhavesometimesassociatedandenteredintoalliancewithcommunalparties.CongresswasthefirsttodosobyallyingwithMuslimLeagueinKeralaintheearlysixties.Inturn,CommunistpartiesalliedwithMuslimLeagueinKeralaandAkaliDalinPunjabinthelatesixties,justifyingtheiractionbydeclaringthatminoritycommunalismwasunderstandableanddemocratic,andevenjustifiable,andinanycasenotasbadanddangerousasmajoritycommunalism.In1967,theSocialistsandothersecularpartiesandgroupsdidnothesitatetojointhecommunalJanSanghfirstinseatadjustmentinelectionsandtheninformingnon-CongressgovernmentsinseveralstatesinNorthIndia.In1974-75,JayaprakashNararyanpermittedRSS,JanSanghandJamaat-e-Islamitobecomethebackboneofhismovementof‘TotalRevolution’againstCongressandIndira

Gandhi.In1977,JanSanghbecameapartofJanataparty.InNovember1989elections,JanataDal,undertheleadershipofV.P.Singh,formedanindirectelectoralalliancewithBJPandthenformedagovernmentattheCentrewithitssupport.TheCommunistpartiessanctionedbothsteps,thoughindirectly.Thesoftapproachtowardscommunalpartiesandgroupshashadtheextremelynegativeconsequence

ofmakingthemrespectableandlegitimizingcommunalism.ThispolicyhastendedtowhittledownoneofthemajorcontributionsofthenationalmovementandtheNehruera,ofmakingcommunalismadirtywordevenwhenfailingtorootitout.Thesecularistshavealsoinrecentyearstendedtopandertocommunalsentimentsthroughalltypesofconcessions.Forexample,RajivGaiidhididsobyreversingtheSupremeCourtjudgementintheShahBanocase,throughaconstitutionalamendment,andbyopeningthegatesofthedisputedAyodhyamosque-templein1986.V.P.SinghdidsobydeclaringtheProphet’sbirthdayaholidayinhisRedFortspeechonIndependenceDayin1990.TheseconcessionstoMuslimandHinducommunalismsdidnotlessencommunaltensionsbutonlyaggravatedthem.Itis,however,significantthat,despitetheircrassopportunism,mostoftheIndianpoliticalpartiesand

intellectuals—whetheroftheright,leftorCentre—havethemselvesnotbeencommunal.ThishassofarpreventedtherapidgrowthofcommunalismandhaskeptIndiabasicallysecular.TheIndianstatehasalsobeenbasicallysecularandopposedtocommunalismsofar.However,thequalityofthesecularismoftheIndianstateandmostofthepoliticalpartieshashadmanyweaknessesandhas,infact,seldombeenverysturdy.Still,amajorsavingfeatureoftheIndiansocialandpoliticalsituationhasbeentheabsenceofactivestatesupporttocommunalideologyandcommunalforces.Though,duringrecentyears,thestatehasbeenlackinginpoliticalwilltodealfirmlywithcommunalismandcommunalviolence,ithasnotthroughitsmyriadchannels,fromtextbooksandmassmediatoadministrativemeasures,promotedcommunalideology.Ourexperienceinthecolonialperiod,theexperienceofPakistanandBangladesh,andtheexperienceoffascistmovementsinItaly,Germany,JapanandSpain(wheretheysucceeded),ontheonehand,andFranceandtheUS(wheretheyfailed)ontheother,clearlyindicatethatcommunalandcommunal-typemovementscannotprevailwithoutstatesupportoratleasttheneutralityandpassivityofstatepower.Afewpointsmaybemadeparentheticallyatthisstage.First,asharpdistinctionhastobemadebetweencommunalpartiesandpartieswhicharebasicallysecularbutadoptanopportunisticattitudetowardscommunalism.Acommunalpartyisonewhichisstructuredaroundcommunalideology.Suchpartieshavesincetheirinceptionpromotedcommunalthinkingandoftenwhippedupcommunalpassions.Thoughthesecular-opportunistpartieshavetendedtovacillateandretreatinthefaceofthecommunalonslaught,itisstillveryimportantthattheyhavethemselvesnotbeencommunal.Thisfacthasbeenamajorobstacleintheburgeoningforthofcommunalism.Second,itistobenotedthatthereisnodifferencebetweenmajority(Hindu)communalismandminority(Muslim,Sikh,Christian)communalisms—theyaremerelyvariantsofthesamecommunalideologyandareequallydangerous.However,whileminoritycommunalismscanendupinseparatism,asMuslimcommunalismdidbefore1947andSikhcommunalismdidinPunjabinrecentyears,majoritycommunalismcantaketheformoffascism.Also,inrecentyears,asalsointhepast,differentcommunalismshavefedonandsupportedandstrengthenedeachotherwithdangerousimplications.

HinduandMuslimCommunalism

Sincetheearlysixties,thecommunalistsinIndiahavebeentakingrecoursetoreligiousissuestoimpartpassionandintensitytotheirpolitics.MuslimcommunalismflourishedinthefortiesincolonialIndiaonthebasisofthecryofIslamindanger,butHinducommunalismremainedweakinIndiaandamarginalforceinIndianpoliticsasithadnotbeenabletoappealtoreligionorarousereligiouspassion.HinducommunalistsraisedthecriesofHindusortheirculturebeingindangerbutwerenotabletoarouseHindusemotionallyaseffectivelyasMuslimcommunalists.Thiswasbecauseofseveralreasons:Hinduismisnotanorganizedreligion—itisnotbasedonthesanctityandauthorityofasinglesacredbookorahierarchicalpriestlyclass.HindusdonothaveoneGodoronesetofbeliefs—consequentlythereisimmensereligiousdiversityamongthem—infact,therearenostrictrulesdeterminingwhoisaHindu.Hindusalsohavealongtraditionofreligioustoleranceandbroad-mindedness.ItwasalsonoteasytoconvinceHindus,whoconstitutedthelargereligiousmajorityinIndia,thattheirreligionwasinanydanger.Hinducommunalistsfoundthatwithoutthestrongemotionalappealtoreligionorareligiousissuetheprogressofcommunalpoliticswastardy.Takingaleafoutofthepre-1947MuslimLeaguepolitics,theybeganfromthelateseventiestogropeforareligiousissuearoundwhichtodeveloptheirpolitics.SuchanopportunitywaspresentedtothemintheearlyeightiesintheBabriMasjid(mosque)-RamJanambhoomi(birthplaceofRam)issue,whichcouldinflameHindus,forRamoccupiesauniqueplaceinIndia.HeistheincarnationofthevaluesthataHindu,infactanIndian,cherishes.Hisnametouchestheheartsandmindsofmillions.Overtheyears,theBJPanditssisterorganizations,VishwaHinduParishadandBajrangDal,allcarefullynursedbyRSS,succeededinusingthisissueanditsreligiousappealtogaininfluencewithalargenumberofHindusalloverthecountryandtoweakentheirresistancetocommunalism.Abriefhistoryofthecontroversyfollows.AmosquewasbuiltbyagovernorofBaburatAyodhya(inU.P.)intheearlysixteenthcentury.Some

HindusclaimedinthenineteenthcenturythatitwasbuiltoverasitewhichwastheplacewhereRamwasbornandwhereaRamtemplehadexisted.ButtheissuedidnottakeaseriousturntillDecember1949whenacommunal-mindeddistrictmagistratepermittedafewHindustoenterthemosqueandinstalidolsofSitaandRamthere.SardarPatel,asthehomeminister,andJawaharlalNehrucondemnedthedistrictmagistrate’saction,buttheU.P.governmentfeltthatitcouldnotreversethedecision.However,itlockedthemosqueandbarredittobothHindusandMuslims.Thesituationwasmoreorlessacceptedbyallasatemporarysolutionfortheperiodofthedisputeinthecourt.Theresultingquietlastedtill1983whentheVishwaHinduParishadstartedawhirlwindcampaigndemandingthe‘liberation’oftheRamJanambhoomi,whichwouldentailthedemolitionofthemosqueandtheerectionofaRamtempleinitsplace.Thesecularpartiesandgroupsdidnotdoanythingtocounterthecampaign;theyjustignoredit.Suddenly,on1February1986,thedistrictjudge,probablyatthepromptingoftheCongresschiefministerofU.P.,reopenedthemosque,gaveHindupriestsitspossession,andpermittedHindustoworshipthere.Asaresult,religiousandcommunalpassionswerearousedleadingtocommunalriotsalloverthecountry;sixty-fivepersonswerekilledinU.P.townsalone.Soon,powerfulHinduandMuslimcommunalgroupsledbytheVHPandtheBabriMasjidActionCommitteewererangedagainsteachother.TheHinducommunalistsdemandedthedemolitionofthemosqueandtheconstructionofaRamtempleonitssite;theMuslimcommunalistsdemandedtherestorationofthemosquetoMuslims.Thesecularandnationalist-mindedpersons,partiesandgroupsnowsuddenlywokeuptotheenormityoftheproblem.Eventhentheissuewasallowedtofestersothatbothcommunalismsgotconsolidated.Clearly,overthe

years,certainnecessarystepsshouldhavebeentaken.Inacountrywithcenturiesofhistorythereareboundtobeproblemsofthisnature—thereareboundtobeprolongedperceivedperiodsandinstances,realorotherwise,ofinjustice,oppression,suppression,discrimination,andsoon,justasthereistheimmensetraditionoftolerance,ofthedevelopmentofacompositeculture,ofhappycommonliving.But,clearly,thepresentcannotbeusedtosetrightwhatwentwronginthepast.TheinitiativesoonpassedintothehandsoftheHinducommunalists.In1989,VHP,keepinginviewthe

impendingLokSabhaelections,organizedamassivemovementtostarttheconstructionofaRamtempleatthesitewheretheBabrimosquestood.Asapartofthatobjective,itgaveacallforthecollectionofbricks,sanctifiedbywaterfromtheriverGanges,fromalloverthecountry—villages,townsandcities—tobetakentoAyodhya.TheLokSabhaelectionstookplaceinanheightenedcommunalatmosphere.TherewasalsoanindirectallianceofJanataDalanditsleftallieswithBJP,whichincreaseditsstrengthfromtwoin1984toeighty-six.Moreover,thenewgovernmentattheCentreformedbyV.P.Singhreliedontheoutsidesupport,oftheCPIandCPMaswellastheBJP.Toconsolidateitsincreasedpopularsupport,BJPnowofficiallyadoptedasitsobjectivetheconstructionoftheRamTempleatAyodhya.Topopularizetheobjective,itorganizedin1990anall-Indiarathyatraheadedbyitspresident,L.K.Advani.Theyatraarousedfiercecommunalpassionsandwasfollowedbycommunalriotsinlargenumbersofplaces.ThousandsofBJP-VHPvolunteersgatheredatAyodhyaattheendofOctober1990,despitetheU.P.government,headedbyMulayamSinghYadav,banningtherally.Todispersethevolunteersandtopreventthemfromharmingthemosque,thepoliceopenedfireonthem,killingandinjuringoverahundredpersons.TheBJPthereafterwithdrewitssupporttotheV.P.Singhgovernment,resultinginitsfall.Electionsto

anewLokSabhawereheldin1991.BJPwith119MPsemergedasthemainoppositiontoCongress.Italsoformedgovernmentsinfourstates—U.P.,MadhyaPradesh,RajasthanandHimachalPradesh.Toconsolidateandfurtherenhanceitspoliticalgains,BJP-VHPorganizedahugerallyofover200,000volunteersatthesiteofthemosqueon6December1992,withthemajorleadersofthetwoorganizationsbeingpresent.Toallaythefearsofinjurytothemosque,theBJPchiefministerofU.P.,KalyanSingh,hadgivenanassurancetotheSupremeCourtthatthemosquewouldbeprotected.TheassuranceshadbeenrepeatedbytheBJPleadersintheparliament.Inspiteoftheseassurances,theBJP-VHPvolunteerssetouttodemolishthemosquewithhammerblows,whileBJPleaderslookedon.Thecentralgovernmentalsolayparalyzed.Theentirecountrywasshockedbythiseventwhichhadotherdisastrousconsequences.Communalriots,theworstandthemostwidespreadsince1947,brokeoutinmanypartsofthecountry,theworsthitbeingBombay,CalcuttaandBhopal.TheriotsinBombaylastedfornearlyamonth.InallmorethanthreethousandpeoplewerekilledintheriotsalloverIndia.EventhoughthegoodsenseoftheIndianpeoplehassinceasserteditselfandcommunalpassionshaveabated,theBabriMasjid-RamJanambhoomiissuehascontinuedtofesterlikearunningsoreinthecountry,andthecommunalforceshavecontinuedtogrowpolitically.Inthe1996electionstotheLokSabha,BJPwonseats,while,in1998,itsucceededinwinningseatsandformingagovernmentwiththehelpofitsallies.ThissectionmaybeconcludedbypointingoutthatthoughonthesurfacetheBabriMasjid-Ram

Janambhoomiissueappearstobeareligiousone,inrealitythisisnotso.Infact,thecommunalistsarenotinterestedinreligion;theyareinterestedonlyinthemanipulationandexploitationofreligionandreligiousidentityforthecommunalizationofthepeopleforpoliticalends.Religiousdifferencesassuch

arenotresponsibleforcommunalismorareitsrootcause.Communalismisnotthesameasreligious-mindedness.Infact,themoralandspiritualvaluesofallreligionsgoagainstcommunalvalues.Itistheintrusionofreligionintopoliticsandaffairsofthestatewhichisundesirable.AsGandhijiputitin1942:‘Religionisapersonalmatterwhichshouldhavenoplaceinpolitics.’1

Conclusion

Despitethegrowthofcommunalismandcommunalpartiesandgroupsinrecentyears,Indiastillhasabasicallyhealthysecularsociety.EventhoughcommunalismisperhapsthemostseriouschallengefacingIndiansocietyandpolity,itisnotyetthedominantmodeofthoughtoftheIndianpeople.Evenwhenthecommunalistshavesucceededinutilizingcommunalismasthequickandeasyroutetopoliticalpowerandhavewonelections,thepeoplewhohavevotedforthemhavedonesotoexpresstheirdiscontentwiththeexistingstateofpoliticalandeconomicaffairs.Theyhavenotyetimbibedcommunalideologysignificantly.TheIndianpeoplearestillbasicallysecular,andthebelieversincommunalideologyconstituteafringe.Eveninareaswherecommunalriotshaveoccurred,theredoesnotexistapermanentdividebetweenHindusandMuslimsorHindusandotherminorities.Innopartofthecountryis‘anaggressivemajorityarrangedagainstabeleagueredminority.’Infact,popularconsciousnesshasposedamajorbarriertothespreadofcommunalismtoasignificantextentintheruralareasandtolargepartsofurbanIndia.Thisalsoexplainswhycommunalism,makingabeginninginthelastquarterofthenineteenthcentury,hasstillfailedtostrikedeeprootsinlargepartsofthecountryandhastakensuchalongtimeto.acquireevenitspresentstrength.

34Caste,Untouchability,Anti-castePoliticsandStrategies

ThecastesysteminIndiaoriginatedabouttwothousandandfivehundredyearsago.ItisprevalentnotonlyamongHindusbutalsoamongSikhs,ChristiansandMuslims.Whileithasmanyaspects,hereweareconcernedwiththeaspectofhierarchy,ofhighandlow,oftouchableanduntouchable,whichhasprovidedlegitimationfortheunequalaccesstoresources,andtotheexploitationandoppressionoflowercastes,besidesthediscriminationagainstlowercastesbyhighercastes.Themostobnoxiouspartofthecastesystemwasthatitdesignatedcertaingroupsasuntouchablesand

outcastes,andthenusedthistodenythemaccesstoownershipofland,entryintotemples,accesstocommonresourcessuchaswaterfromthevillagetankorwell.Non-untouchablecastes,includingthelowestamongthem,werenottohaveanyphysicalcontactwithuntouchables.Theycouldnotacceptwaterorfoodfromtheirhands.Inthevillages,theuntouchablecastesperformedallthemenialjobssuchasthoseofscavengers,

water-carriers,skinnersofhidesofdeadanimals,leather-workers,aswellas,ofcourse,agriculturallabour.Undermejajmanisystem,theyreceivedafixedshareoftheproducefromthelandowningfamiliesaspaymentfortheirservices.Fromthemiddleandlatenineteenthcenturyonwards,breachesbegantoappearinthesystemdescribed

above.Economicchanges,especiallythecommercializationofagriculturalproductionandagrarianrelations,emergenceofcontractualrelations,newemploymentopportunitiesoutsidethevillageinfactories,mandis,governmentservice,thearmy(aidedbyeducation),allcontributedtoashiftinthepositionoftheuntouchables.Socialreformmovements,suchasthoseofJyotibaPhuleinMaharashtraandSriNarayanaGuruinKerala,alsobegantoquestionthecastesystemandcasteinequality.From1920onwards,Gandhijiintegratedtheissueofabolitionofuntouchabilityintothenationalmovementandmajorcampaignsandstruggles,suchastheVaikom(1924-25)andGuruvayursatyagrahas(1931-32)wereorganized.1Gandhiji’seffortwastomaketheuppercastesrealizetileenormityoftheinjusticedoneviathepracticeofuntouchabilityandtopersuadethemtoatoneforthiswrong.HeopposedtheBritishattempttotreattheDepressedClasses,asuntouchableswerethencalledinofficialparlance,asseparatefrom,Hindus,andgrantthemreservedseatsinlegislatures,basedonseparateelectoratesintheCommunalAwardof1932,becauseoncetheywereseparatedfromtheHindus,therewouldbenogroundformakingHindusocietychangeitsattitudetowardsthem.DrB.R.Ambedkar,abrilliantlawyer,educatedintheUnitedStateswiththehelpofascholarship

givenbytheMaharajaofBaroda,emergedasamajorleaderoftheDepressedClassesbythelatetwenties.HewasaMahar,amajoruntouchablecasteofMaharashtra.In1932,afterGandhijiwentonafastagainsttheCommunalAward,heagreedtothePoonaPactbywhichtheDepressedClasses(laterScheduledCastes)weregivenreservedseatsfromwithinthegeneralHinducategory.Butby1936,he

arguedthatconversiontoanotherreligionwasnecessaryandevenchoseSikhism.ButtheconversionwasdeferredsincetheBritishgovernmentwouldnotpromisethatthebenefitsofreservationwouldbecontinuedinthecaseofconversion.In1936,heformedtheIndependentLabourPartywhichsoughttocombinewithpeasantsandworkersandcontestedandwonafewseatsinthe1937electionstotheBombayLegislativeAssembly.Bytheearlyforties,AmbedkarrealizedthathisefforttobuildanallianceagainsttheCongresswasnotmakingmuchheadway,andhedecidedtofocusontheScheduledCastes(SCs)aloneandformedtheScheduledCastesFederationin1942.Healsocooperated,politically,withthecolonialgovernmentontheunderstandingthathecouldgetmorebenefitsfortheSCs.HisloyaltywonhimaseatontheViceroy’sExecutiveCouncil(theequivalentoftheCabinet)intheforties.Otherstrandsalsoemergedindifferentregions;inPunjab,theAd-Dharm,inU.P.theAdi-Hinduandin

BengaltheNamashudras.Interestingly,inbothPunjabandBengal,theyalliedwiththepro-BritishUnionistandKrishakPrajapartiesrespectively.InBihar,JagjivanRam,whoemergedasthemostimportantHarijanCongressleader,formedtheKhetmajoorSabhaandtheDepressedClassesLeague.ThemaindemandsofHarijanorganizationsbeforeindependencewerefreedomfromthebegarorcaste-specificimposedlabour,grantofforestorwastelandsforcultivation,andremovaloflegaldisabilitiesfromowningland,suchasthoseimposedbythePunjabLandAlienationAct1900,whichdidnotincludeSCsamongagriculturistcastes.ManyindividualGandhiansandGandhianorganizationswereveryactiveinthisrespect.Withindependence,majorinitiativesintheareaofremovingcasteinjusticeandinequalityweretobe

attempted.TheConstitutionextendedpoliticalrightstoallcitizensirrespectiveofreligion,caste,sex,language,raceandthisincludedtheScheduledCastes.ButitalsospecificallyinArticle17declaredthat:‘untouchability’isabolishedanditspracticeinanyformisforbidden.Theenforcementofanydisabilityarisingoutof‘untouchabilityshallbeanoffencepunishablewithlaw.’In1955,parliamentpassedtheUntouchability(Offences)Actwhichfurtherspecifiedthatanyoffenceswerepunishablewithafine,cancellationoflicencesandpublicgrants.In1976,theprotectionofCivilRights(Amendment)Actwaspassedwhichprovidedforenhancedandstringentpunishment,appointmentofofficersandspecialcourtstodealwithoffenders,legalaidforvictims,etc.TheConstitutionalsomadeprovisionsforreservationofseatsinlegislaturesandeducationalinstitutionsandofgovernmentjobsforScheduledCastes.Thereservationswereinitiallymadeforaperiodoftenyearsbuthavebeenextendedcontinuouslysincethen.DrAmbedkarwasapartytotheconstitutionalandlegalinitiativesas,despitetheirdifferencesinthe

pre-independencedays,hewaschosenbytheCongressastheChairmanoftheDraftingCommitteeoftheConstitutionandwasthelawministerinNehru’sCabinet.However,differencesemerged,andheleftthegovermnenttoformtheAllIndiaScheduledCastesFederation,whichcontestedelectionsbutitscandidatesmostlylosttoCongresscandidatesinreservedseats.In1956,herevertedtohispositionofconversionbeingnecessaryand,withhimselfatthehead,ledhalfamillionpeople(somesay6million),mainlyMahars,hisowncommunity,tobecomeBuddhists.HecouldprobablydothisbecausereservationswerenotdeniedtoBuddhistconvertsastheyweretoSCswhoconvertedtoChristianityandIslam.Someotheruntouchablegroups,suchastheJatavsofAgra,alsofollowedhim,butmanyothersdidnot.Ambedkardiedsoonafter,in1956,leavingnosecondlineofleadership.However,onthebasisofa

letterbyhim,publishedposthumously,theRepublicanPartywasfoundedin1957anditfoughtthe

electionstotheBombayLegislativeAssemblyinthesameyearandwonafewseats.ClashesoverpersonalityandotherissuessoonledtosplitsandinafewyearstimemostfactionsjoinedoralliedwiththeCongress,whichunderY.B.Chavanmadespecialeffortstoaccommodatethem.2

Intheearlyseventies,anewtrendidentifiedastheDalitPanthers(Dalit,meaningdowntrodden,beingthenamebywhichtheScheduledCastesnowprefertocallthemselvesinvariousparts),emergedinMaharashtraaspartofthecountry-widewaveofradicalpolitics.Itwasfirstreflectedincreativeliteratureandtheninpolitics.Establishedasapoliticalorganizationin1972,theDalitPanthersleanedideologicallyonAmbedkar’sthought,andhadtheirbasemainlyamongyouthandstudentsinurbancentres.Theytalkedaboutrevolution,butthereislittleevidenceofanyconcretestrategybeingevolved.TheagitationforrenamingMarathwadaUniversityasAmbedkarUniversityresultedintheanti-Dalitriotsin1978intheruralareasofMaharashtrainwhichthemainaggressorswerethemiddle-casteMarathaKunbinon-Brahminpeasants.Bytheeighties,theDalitPanthershaddevelopedseriousdifferencesoverissuessuchaswhetheror

nottoinclude,non-Dalitpoor,non-BuddhistDalits,primacyofculturalversuseconomicstruggle,aswellasoverpersonalities,forexample,RajaDhaleversusNamdeoDhasal.Splitsbegantooccurandmostfactions,asinthecaseoftheRepublicanPartytwentyyearsearlier,joinedoralliedwithCongressovertime.PrakashAmbedkar,grandsonofB.R.Ambedkar,in1990madeanefforttouniteallDalitorganizationsforcontestingtheMaharashtraStateAssemblyelectionsandahugemorchaof500,000peoplewasorganizedinBombaybutlaterdifferencescroppedupagain.InNorthIndia,anewparty,theBahujanSamajParty(BSP)emergedintheeightiesunderthe

leadershipofKanshiRam(andlaterMayawati,whobecamechiefministerofU.P.)whichdeclaredelectoralpowerasitsbasicaimandstrategy.ThoughinitiallytherewastalkofDalitandBackwardCastesandminoritiescomingtogetherasabahujansamaj,inpracticetheBSPhasbecomeaDalit-basedpartywillingtoallywithanypoliticalforce,BJP,Congress,Janata,SamajwadiParty,aslongasitadvancesitsvoteshareandgetspoliticalpower.SuchadealwiththeBJPgotMayawatiherchiefministershipinU.P.in1995and,muchtotheannoyanceofthosewhoregardedV.P.Singhasthemessiahofsocialjustice,theBSPhappilydroppedhimtosupportDeviLalandChandraShekharin1990.TheBSPhassucceededinsecuringasufficientbaseamongtheSCsinU.P.,Punjab,andMadhyaPradeshforittobecomeasignificantfactorinelectoralcalculationsofotherpartiesandthelackofdominanceofanyonepartyhasgivenitanimportanceitmightnothavehadotherwise.Amarkedfeatureofitsideologyhasbeenastridentandoftenabusivestancetowardsuppercastesingeneral,thoughproximitytopowerappearstobealreadyexercisingitsmellowingeffect.Non-DalitpartiesandgroupstakingupissuesofconcerntoDalits,havealsoplayedasignificantrole

intheirempowerment.TheagriculturallabourunionssetupbydifferentpartiesandNGOsthathavetakenupagriculturallabourissuessuchaswagedemands,demandsforemploymentguaranteeschemes,righttowork,house-sites,abolitionofchildlabour,righttoeducation,etc.,haveallcontributedtoanewDalitself-confidence.ExclusivelyDalitorganizationshavealsomushroomed.DalityouthinruralareashaveorganizedAmbedkarSanghams.Inurbanareas,students,teachers,youth,andofficeworkershavebeenorganizedintoassociations,butthesearemoreconcernedwithadvancingtheinterestsoftheirmembersandhavelittlelinkwithruralareasortheurbanpoor.

Itmust,however,berecognizedthatdespitealltheeffortsofDalitpartiesandotherpoliticalgroups,themajorityofDalitsstillvotefortheCongress.ItisthissimplebutoverwhelminggroundrealitythathaspropelledDalitleadersovertheyearstowardstheCongressandnotsimplisticexplanationsbasedontheoriesofco-optionorbetrayal.Iftheiraimistochangethis,Dalitideologueswillhavetounderstandtheunderlyingcauses.SociologistshavefoundthatdespitetheclaimsoftheleadersoftheDalits,theBuddhistconvertsinthe

villageshavenotgivenuptheiroldHindugodsandgoddesses,buthaveonlyaddedphotographsofAmbedkarandBuddha,inthatorder,tothepantheon.Buddhistconvertsinvillagesshowtheirnew-foundconfidencebycelebratingHindufestivals,especiallyonesearlierbarredtothem,suchasGautipujaandGanapathipuja,withgreatgustoandpublicdisplay,bycookingprohibitedreligiousfoods,etc.TheuppercastesareangerednotbytheirhavingbecomeBuddhists—theyareabletoaccommodatethatquiteeasily—butpreciselybytheirdefianceoftraditionalHindunormsandemulationofHindureligiouspractices.Thus,despiteconversion,we,findthatDalitsfeelequalitywithcasteHindusonlywhentheyareabletopracticethatsamereligiousritesandcustomswhichtheuppercasteshaddeniedtothem.Gandhiji’sunderstandingandstrategyofstruggleagainsttheDalitproblem,whichemphasizedgainingreligiousequalityviatempleentry,standsvalidated.ThefateofconvertstoChristianity,whocontinuetohaveseparateDalitchurches,orseparateplaceswithinchurches,whofacediscrimination,includingdenialofpromotionswithinChurchhierarchy,denialofrighttoperformceremonies,refusalbyprieststoacceptwaterfromtheirhands,etc.,alsoprovesthatconversionhasonlytransferredtheproblemofcaste-baseddiscriminationfromHinduismtoChristianity,ThesameistrueofMuslims,withlow-casteMuslimsconvertsbeingtreatedbyhigh-casteAshrafsinasimilarmanner.Similarly,reservationofjobandseatsineducationalinstitutionsatahigherlevelcouldonlymakea

marginaldifference.Giventhat,inthetotalpopulation,onlyabout3percentgetahighereducationandcanhaveaccesstogovermnentjobs,thepercentageofScheduledCastesthatcouldpossiblybenefitismuchsmaller,astheyaremostlypoorer,morerural,etc.ReservationofseatsforScheduledCastesinlegislatureshashadsomeeffect,withelectoralimperativesforcingrepresentativestotakeupissuesofconcerntotheirconstituents,butthetendencyforco-optionandpersonalaggrandizementamongrepresentativesofScheduledCasteoriginhasnotbeenanylowerthanthatamongthosebelongingtohighercastegroups.AmorerecentproblemisthecompetitionbetweendifferentSCcastes,suchasMaharsandMangsinMaharashra,MalasandMadigasinAndhraPradesh,ChamarsandChuhrasinnorthIndia.Asthebenefitsofreservationareinevitablyavailedofbythebetter-offcastesamongthe,SCs,thedisadvantagedonesbegintodemandquotaswithinquotas,andintra-SChostilityisbecomingincreasinglypoliticallyvisible.Thisisthelogicofreservation—oncereservationissecured,theonlywayoffurtherimprovingyourprospectsisbytryingtosecurealargersliceoftheapportionedcakeforyourgroup.TheoverallpositionofScheduledCasteshasimprovedconsiderably,nevertheless.Butthecausesare

nottobefoundmainlyineitherconversionorreservation,thetwohighlyvisiblestrategies.Themoreinvisibleprocessesofsocialandeconomicchange,ofindustrialization,ofagriculturalgrowthleadingtogrowthofruralemployment,ofurbanization,haveallhelped.Theextensionofprimaryeducationandhealthfacilities,theanti-povertyprogramme,theruralemploymentguaranteeschemes,ruralincome-generatingschemessuchassubsidiesandloansfordairyingandgoat-rearing,theliteracycampaign,thecampaignforabolitionofchildlabour,haveallbeencrucial.Theprovisionofhousesitesinvillages,

begunbyIndiraGandhi,hasbeenparticularlyimportantsinceithasremovedamajorinstrumentofcoercionfromthehandsoftheuppercasteswhocouldearlierthreatentothrowouttherecalcitrantmembersfromthevillageland.Adultfranchise,whichmakesthevoteofeventhepoorestandthelowestcastevaluable,hashaditsownconsequences.Distributionofland,whereithasoccurred,hasalsohelpedinimprovingstatus,byremovingthestigmaoflandlessness,andraisinglivingstandards.AninnovativenewschemestartedinAndhraPradeshenablesScheduledCastestopurchaselandonthemarketwiththehelpofgrantsandloansprovidedbythegovernment.Thebreakdownofthejajmanisystem,andtheincreasingdelinkingofcastefromtraditionaloccupation,hasalsobeencritical.Asaresultofalltheseandmanyothersimilarprocesses,untouchabilityinurbanareashasvirtually

disappearedandinruralareashasdeclineddrastically.Inthemoreprosperousruralareas,whereemploymentopportunitiesforlowcasteshaveexpandedsharply,ithasdecreasedsharply.Whenemployershavetoseekoutlabour,theycanill-affordtoflaunttheirhighercastestatus.Infactoriesandoffices,caste-baseddiscriminationisrare,thougholdcasteistprejudicesmaylinger.AtrocitiesonScheduledCastescontinuetooccur,buttheyareusuallyareactiontoopendefianceofupper-castenorms,suchasalowercasteboyelopingwithanupper-castegirl,orlower-castesallyingwithextremistpoliticalgroups,asinBihar,tochallengeupper-casteauthority.Assuch,theatrocities,thoughcondemnableinthestrongestterms,aretobeunderstoodasproofofincreasingassertionbylowercastes.However,greatinequalitiesstillremaininaccesstoeducation,toemployment,toothereconomicand

socialopportunities.Thelinkbetweencasteandliteracyisstrong,withstudiesshowingthatinvillageswhereuppercasteshavehadnear-universaladultliteracyforseveraldecades,lowercastescouldhaveratesclosetozero,particularlyforwomen.3In1991,inIndiaasawhole,whileliteracyratesformenwere64percentandforwomen39percent,forSCmentheywere46andforSCwomenonly19.InU.P.,thecomparablefigureswere56/25and39/8.InKerala,however,thegapismuchnarrower,withthegeneralfiguresbeing94/86andSCfiguresbeing85/73.4Theregionalcontrastshowshowitispossibletoreduceinequalitythroughpositivesocialmeasuressuchasprovisionofelementaryeducation.Eventhe,benefitsofthepolicyofreservationcannotbeutilizedwithouteducationasisshownbythegeneralinabilitytofillquotasreservedforSCsateverylevel.Inthefuture,too,theemphasisonanti-povertystrategiessuchasrapideconomicdevelopmentand

employment,andincomeexpansionviaemploymentguaranteeschemesandothersimilarmeasuresneedstocontinue.Educationhasbeenfoundtobeamajorvehicleforsocialmobilityandthereforeemphasisonprovidinguniversalprimaryandevensecondaryeducationisamust.Thismustincludeaspecialemphasisonfemaleeducation,giventhedirectimpactobservedonfertilityrates.Thisalsoshowstheneedforgreateremphasisonequalopportunitiesforqualityeducationfromtheprimarylevelitselfaseducationhasbeenfoundtobeacriticalvehicleforsocialmobility.TheissueoftheBackwardClassesorCastes,whichcametoaheadwiththeMandalreportintheanti-

Mandalagitationin1990,isquitedifferentfromthatoftheSCs,thougheffortsaremadeatthepoliticalleveltoequateorcollapsethetwo.5Theso-calledBackwardCastesarereallytheintermediatecasteswhosepositionintheritualhierarchywasbelowthatoftheBrahminsandthekshatriyasandabovethatoftheuntouchables.Theydidsufferfromcertainritualdisabilitiesascomparedtotheuppercastes,buttheywereinnowaycomparabletotheSCssincetheyoftenhadaccesstolandandothereconomicresources.Nordidtheysufferfromuntouchability.Besides,thecategoryincludesgreatdisparities,withsomecastes

orsectionsofcastesbeingverypowerfuleconomicallyandsociallyandothersbeingquitedisadvantagedwitharitualpositionjustabovethatoftheSCs.SociologistshaveshownthattheBackwardCastessuchasAhirs,Yadavas,Kurmis,Vokkaligas,

Lingayats,Lodhas,etc.havegainedconsiderableeconomicadvantageviapost-independencelandreformwhichgavelandrightstoex-tenantsofzamindars.Thisnew-foundstrengthincreasedtheirpoliticalcloutandrepresentationandtheyarenowseekingtousethisclouttosecuregreateradvantagesforthemselvesinjobs,education,etc.Inruralareas,theyarethebiggestexploitersoftheSCswhoareagriculturallabourersandthereislittleincommonbetweenthem.TheMandalreporthasbeenshownbyscholarstobebasedonfaultymethodologyandaweakdatabase.TheMandaljudgementshavealsobeensubjectedtoseverecriticismbysociologistswhohavearguedthatcastehasundergonesuchdrasticchangessinceindependencebutthejudiciaryisstillworkingonthebasisofout-datedandill-informedwesternnotionsofcaste.Infact,thepoliticsofreservationsforBackwardCasteshasmoretodowithsharingtheloavesandfishesofofficeandpowerthanwithastruggleforsocialjustice.

35IndianWomenSinceIndependence

Beginnings

Dramaticchangeshavetakenplaceinthelegal,political,educationalandsocialstatusofwomensinceindependence.ThiswasnotunexpectedsincethequestionoftheimprovementofthepositionofwomenhadbeenattheheartofthesocialreformmovementfromthefirstquarterofthenineteenthcenturywhenRamMohanRoystartedhisquestioningofsocialorthodoxy.Besides,thefreedomstrugglesincethetwentiesandespeciallysincethethirtieshadpartakenamplyofthecreativeenergiesofIndianwomen.Gandhiji’sstatementinthemid-thirtiestoMridulaSarabhai,avaliantfighterforhiscausesofwomenandfreedom,‘IhavebroughttheIndianwomenoutofthekitchen,itisuptoyou(thewomenactivists)toseethattheydon’tgoback,’1wasnoemptyboastandnothoughtlessexhortation.Thenationalmovementbytreatingwomenaspoliticalbeingscapableofnationalistfeelingsandas,ifnotmore,capableofstruggleandsacrificethanmenresolvedmanydoctrinaldebatesaboutthedesirabilityofwomen’sroleinthepublicsphere.Ifwomencouldmarchinprocessions,defythelaws,gotojail—allunescortedbymalefamilymembers—thentheycouldalsoaspiretotakeupjobs,havetherighttovote,andmaybeeveninheritparentalproperty.Politicalparticipationbywomeninthemassivepopularstrugglesfromthetwentiesonwardsopenedupnewvistasofpossibilitiesthatacenturyofsocialreformcouldnot.Theimageofthewomanchangedfromarecipientofjusticeinthenineteenthcentury,toanardentsupporterofnationalistmenintheearlytwentieth,toacomradebythethirtiesandforties.Womenhadparticipatedinallstreamsofthenationalmovement—fromGandhiantoSocialisttoCommunisttorevolutionaryterrorist.Theyhadbeeninpeasantmovementsandintradeunionstruggles.Theyhadfoundedseparatewomen’sorganizationsaswell;theAllIndiaWomen’sConference,foundedin1926,beingthemostimportantofthese.Afterindependence,whenthetimecametoconsolidatethegainsofthehard-foughtstruggle,the

attentionnaturallyturnedtosecuringlegalandconstitutionalrights.TheConstitutionpromisedcompleteequalitytowomen.Itfulfilledthepromisemademanyyearsagobythenationalmovement:womengotthevote,alongwithmen,withoutanyqualificationofeducationorpropertyorincome.ArightforwhichwomensuffragettesfoughtlongandhardinmanywesterncountrieswaswonatonestrokebyIndianwomen!Intheearlyfifties,NehruinitiatedtheprocessoftheenactmentoftheHinduCodeBill,ameasure

demandedbywomensincethethirties.ACommitteeundertheChairmanshipofB.N.Rau,theconstitutionalexpertwhopreparedthefirstdraftoftheConstitutionofIndia,hadalreadygoneintothematterandsubmittedadraftcodein1944.Anothercommittee,chairedbyB.R.Ambedkar,thelawministerafterindependence,submittedabillwhichraisedtheageofconsentandmarriage,upheldmonogamy,gavewomentherightstodivorce,maintenanceandinheritance,andtreateddowryasstridhan,

orwomen’sproperty.Strongoppositionfromconservativesectionsofsociety,andhesitationonthepartofsomeseniorCongressleaders,includingPresidentRajendraPrasad,ledtothebillbeingpostponed,despitestrongsupportfromamajorityofCongressmenandfromwomenactivistsandsocialreformers.Ultimately,sectionsofthebillwerepassedasfourseparateacts:TheHinduMarriageAct,theHinduSuccessionAct,theHinduMinorityandGuardianshipAct,andtheHinduAdoptionandMaintenanceAct.TheextensionoflegalrightstoHinduwomenwasnotsufficientbutitwasabigstepforward.Thisis

seenfromthestiffoppositionencounteredbythegovernmentinitsattemptstoextendlegalrightsinthecaseofotherreligiouscommunities.TheShahBanocaseisagoodexample.In1985,aboutfortyyearsafterHindulawwasreformed,theSupremeCourtgrantedapittanceasmaintenancetoShahBano,adivorcedMuslimwoman.TherewasafuroreamongtheconservativeMuslimsectionsandsufficientpressurewasputontheRajivGandhigovernmentforittowiltandintroduceabilltonegatetheSupremeCourtjudgement.ItisnodoubteasyandevennecessarytocastigatethegovernmentforitscowardicebutitshouldberememberedthatwhiletheOppositionbroughtlakhsintothestreets,thesupportersofShahBanocouldmusteronlyhundreds.WhilecriticizingNehrufornotpushingthroughamoreradicalcivilcodeforHindusandfornotpassingauniformcivilcodeapplicabletoallcitizens,itshouldberememberedthatwhileNehrudidfaceopposition,hecouldalsomusterconsiderablesupportbecauseamongHindustheprocessofsocialreformhadgonemuchfurtherthanamongMuslims,asevidencedbytheShahBanocasethirtyyearslater.Whilesomelegalrightshavebeenexercised,othershaveremainedonpaper.Therighttovotehasbeen

takenveryseriouslyandwomenarekeenvoters,acutelyconsciousofthepowerofthevote.Thisisparticularlytrueofruralwomen.Butinotherrespects,especiallywithregardtorighttoinheritanceofparentalproperty,legalrightsarebyandlargenotclaimed.Itisstillcommoninmostpartsofthecountryforwomen,bothruralandurban,toforgotheirrightsinparentalproperty.Thecustomofpartilocalresidence(residenceinhusband’shome)isverylargelyresponsibleforthis.Thisisalsoonereasonwomenhaverefusedtogiveupdowrybecauseitistheironlychanceofgettingashareoftheirparentalproperty.Thelegalrighttodivorcehasbeenincreasinglyusedinurbanareas,thoughthestigmaattachedtodivorceisstillprevalent,andthedifficultiesofsetting-upasasinglewomanimmense.

Women’sMovements:Post-1947

Apositivedevelopmentisthatwomen’sissueshavebeentakenupbywomen’sorganizationsaswellasbymainstreampoliticalpartiesandgrassrootsmovements.Asexpected,attentionhasbeenfocussedonthemorevisibleformsofgenderinjusticesuchasdowrydeaths,rape,andalchohol-relateddomesticviolence.Fromtheseventiesonwards,throughthenineties,variousmovementshavebeenlaunched,sometimeslocalized,sometimeswithabiggerspatialreach,ontheseissues,andpublicawarenessofthesehasthereforeheightened.2

Afterindependence,withdifferentpoliticalforcesinthenationalmovementgoingtheirownways,thewomen’smovementtoodiversified.Manywomenleadersbecameinvolvedingovernment-initiatedandotherinstitutionalactivitiesforwomen’swelfare,includingrehabilitationandrecoveryofwomenlostorabandonedasaresultofthemassmigrationandriotsaccompanyingPartition,settingupworkingwomen’shostelsincities,andwomen’svocationalcentres.In1954,CommunistwomenlefttheAllIndiaWomen’sConferencetoformtheNationalFederationofIndianWomen,whichbecame,apartyforumand

notabroadunitedplatformforwomen.Perhapsinevitably,therewasnotmuchevidenceofwomen’s‘struggles’inthefiftiesandsixties,whichledtoaviewthattherewasnowomen’smovementafterindependencetillthenewinitiativeintheseventies.Butsuchaperceptionfailstocomprehendtheinevitablephasesofconsolidationandquietconstructiveworkthatfollowphasesofintensestrugglesasbeingintegralpartsofthemovement.TheIndianwomen’smovementwentthroughpreciselysuchaphaseafterindependence.Womenhavealsoplayedanimportantroleinpeasant,tribal,farmers’,tradeunionandenvironment

movementsandthishasalsoenabledthemtoraisewomen’sissueswithinthem.IntheTebhagapeasantmovementinBengalin1946-47,womenhadorganizedthemselvesonaseparateplatformoftheNariBahiniandtheyransheltersandmaintainedlinesofcommunication.Communistwomenactivistsalsomobilizedruralwomenonspecificallywomen’sissuessuchasrightstofinanceandproperty,andvillage-levelMahilaAtmaRakshaSamitis(women’sself-defencecommittees)wereformedwhichalsotookuptheissueofdomesticviolenceorwife-beating.InanothermajorCommunistpeasantstruggleofthattimeintheTelanganaareaofHyderabadStatefrom1946-1950,women’sparticipationwasalsoquitesignificant,andtheleadershipdidpayattentiontowomen’sissuessuchaswife-beating.Butthereisnoevidenceofwomen’sorganizationsemerging.Itisalsosaidthatwomenwerediscouragedfromjoiningtheguerillaforceand,whentheydidsucceedinjoining,felttheywerenottotallyaccepted.Communistwomeninotherareasalsocomplainedlaterthattheywerestronglyencouragedtomarrymencomradesandedgedintoworkingonthe‘women’sfront’,radierthanintegratedintotheleadershipasmembersintheirownright.3

Inthelatesixtiesandearlyseventies,therewasanewpoliticalfermentinthecountrywhichgaverisetoahostofnewpoliticaltrendsandmovements,suchastheNaxalitemovement,theJPmovement,theChipkomovement,andtheanti-pricerisemovement.Intheanti-pricerisemovementof1973-75,whichwasorganizedbyCommunistandSocialistwomenintheurbanareasofMaharashtra,thousandsofhousewivesjoinedinpublicralliesandthosewhocouldnotleavetheirhousesjoinedbybeatingthalis(metalplates)withlathas(rollingpins).ThemovementspreadtoGujaratwhereitmeshedintotheNavNirmanmovementinfluencedbyJayaprakashNarayan’s‘TotalRevolution’.Thoughneitherofthesedirectlyaddressedwhatarecalledwomen’sissues,theveryfactofmassparticipationofwomenhadaliberatingeffectandenabledwomentogaintheself-confidenceneededformovingontomorecomplexissuesofpatriarchyandwomen’soppression.Meanwhile,inGujarat,averyimportantnewdevelopmentwasthefoundingofawomen’swingoftheTextileLabourAssociation(TLA),anoldGandhianorganization,calledSEWAorSelf-EmployedWomen’sAssociation,whicheventuallybecameindependentoftheTLA.Itwasuniqueinthatittookupwomenintheunorganizedsectorwhoworkedasvendorsandhawkersandathomeintheputting-outsystemandorganizedthemintoaunionwhichalongwithcollectivebargainingprovidedtraining,creditandtechnicalhelp.SEWAspreadtoIndore,Bhopal,DelhiandLucknowandeventodayundertheableleadershipofElaBhattisamongthetopsuccessstoriesofIndianwomen.AverydifferentkindofmovementemergedintheShahadatribalareaofDhuliadistrictinMaharashtra

in1972.LedinitiallybyGandhianSarvodyaworkersandlateralsobyMaoistactivists,themovementfordroughtreliefandlandinwhichtheBhiltribalwomenwereveryprominentculminatedinamilitantanti-liquorcampaigninwhichwomen,whosawliquorasthemaincauseofwife-beating,brokeliquorpotsin

drinkingdensandmarchedtopunishinpublic,menwhobeattheirwives.InUttarakhand,inthehillareasofU.P.intheearlysixties,asimilarmovementhadtakenplaceundertheinfluenceofGandhianssuchasVinobaBhave,Gandhiji’sfollowersSarlaBehnandMiraBen,whohadsetupashramsinKumaonafterindependence,andthelocalGandhianleaderSunderlalBahuguna,whobecamefamousintheChipkoagitation.Womenhadcomeoutinlargenumberstopicketliquorvendorsanddemandprohibitionofsaleofliquor.Anti-liquormovementshavecontinuedtoeruptfromtimetotimeindifferentparts,themostrecentbeinginAndhraPradeshinthemid-nineties,whenapowerfulwaveofanti-liquorprotestbypoorruralwomenledtoapolicyofprohibitionandlaterrestrictionofliquorsales.Clearly,Gandhijihadunderstoodaveryimportantaspectofwomen’sconsciousnesswhenhemadeliquorboycottanintegralpartofthenationalistprogrammeandentrusteditsimplementationtowomen.From1974,womeninUttarakhandwereagainveryactiveintheChipkomovementwhichgotitsname

fromtheactionsofwomenwhohuggedtreesinordertopreventthemfrombeingcutdownbytimbercontractors.Itbecamefamousasthefirstmajormovementforsavingtheenvironmentandgaverisetotheunderstandingthatwomenhadaspecialnurturingroletowardsnature,andthatenvironmentissueswereveryoftenwomen’sissuesbecausetheysufferedmostfromitsdeterioration,aswhenforestsdisappearedandtheyhadtowalkformilestocollectfuelwood,fodderandwater.4

InChattisgarhinMadhyaPradesh,womenwereverymilitantintheChattisgarhMinesShramikSanghwhichwassetupin1977inthetribalbelttoprotestagainsttheBhilaisteelplant’spolicyofmechanization,whichwasseenasbeingspeciallydetrimentaltowomen’semployment;theMahilaMuktiMorchadevelopedasanewplatform.In1979,theChhatraYuvaSangharshVahini,anorganizationinfluencedbytheideasofJayaprakashNarayan,whichwasleadingastruggleofagriculturallabourersagainsttemplepriestsinBodhGayainBihar,andinwhichwomenactivistsandordinarywomenwereplayingamajorrole,raisedthedemandthatlandshouldberegisteredinthenamesofwomenaswell.Thisideacaughtoninlateryearsandinsomestatespattasortitledeedsforlanddistributedbygovernmentandeventreepattasweregivenonlyinthenameofwomen.TheBhopalGasPeeditMahilaUdyogSangathanplayedtheleadingroleintheefforttosecurejustice

forthevictimsofthechemicalgasleakintheUnionCarbidefactoryinBhopalin1984.Inthemid-eighties,theSamagraMahilaAghadiemergedasthewomen’swingoftheShetkariSangathana,whichwasspearheadingthefarmer’smovementinMaharashtrafrom1980.OveronelakhwomenattendeditssessioninNovember1986andtookastandagainstbrutalizationofpoliticswhichaffectswomenmorethanothersectionsofsocietyandalsodecidedtoputupall-womenpanelsforthepanchayatandzillaparishadelections.Anotherstreamofthewomen’smovementtooktheformofwhathavebeencalled‘autonomous’

women’sgroups.Thesemushroomedintheurbancentresfromaroundthemid-seventies.ManyoftheseconsistedofwomenwhohadbeenactiveinorinfluencedbytheMaoistorNaxalitemovement,anditsdeclineintheearlyseventiestriggeredoffaprocessofdebateandrethinkinginwhichtheissuesofgenderrelationsandtheplaceofwomeninpoliticalorganizationswereprominent.AmongtheearliestofthesewastheProgressiveWomen’sOrganizationinOsmaniaUniversityinHyderabadin1974,andthePurogamiStreeSangathanainPuneandtheStreeMuktiSangathanainBombayin1975.ThedeclarationbytheUNof1975astheInternationalWomen’sYearprobablycontributedtoaflurryofactivityinMaharashtrain1975withparty-basedandautonomousorganizationscelebratingMarch8asInternational

Women’sDayforthefirsttimeandawomen’sconferencebeingattendedinOctoberinPunebywomenfromalloverthestatebelongingtoMaoistgroups,theSocialistandRepublicanparties,CPM,andLalNishanParty.AftertheEmergencyin1977,anotherspurtofactivitybegan.Awomen’sgroupinDelhibeganwhat

turnedouttobeoneofthemostenduringinstitutionsofthewomen’smovement.Manushi,ajournalwhichhasdocumentedandanalyzedthewomen’smovement,tolditshistory,presentedliteraturebywomen,andmuchelse,hascontinuedtilltodayundertheableleadershipofMadhuKishwar,undoubtedlyamongthemostoriginal,self-reflectiveandfearlessvoicesinthewomen’smovement.ThewomenintheJanataParty,mostlySocialists,formedtheMahilaDakshataSamitiandplayeda

majorroleininitiatingthecampaignagainstdowryinwhichtheDelhi-basedStriSangharshwasalsoveryactive.5Theissueofdowryharassmentanddowrydeathswastakenupfrom1979inabigwaythroughstreetralliesandplays,demonstrationsoutsidehousesofdowryvictims,anddemandsforlegalreform.TheJanwadiMahilaSamiti,awingoftheCPMwomen’swing,theAllIndiaDemocraticWomen’sAssociationsetupin1981,conductedadoor-to-doorcampaignontheissue.AbilltoamendtheDowryProhibitionAct(1961)wassenttoaJointSelectCommitteeoftheparliamentandthroughout1981and1982,women’sorganizationsandotheractivistspresentedevidencebeforethecommitteeasittouredthecountry.Theamendmentsstrengtheningthelawagainstperpetratorsofdowry-relatedcrimeswerepassedin1984;afewminoronesfollowedlater.Themovementdeclinedafterthis,leavingbehindafeelingthatthevictorieshavenotmeantmuch,giventhepersistenceofdowryanddifficultyinsecuringconvictionsofoffenders.Theothermajorcampaignissuethatemergedwasrape,especiallypolicerape.Anumberofcases,the

RameezaBeecasein1978inHyderabad,theMathuracaseinMaharashtraandtheMayaTyagicaseinwesternU.P.in1980,broughtthewholeissuetopublicattention.Women’sgroupsandorganizations,alongwithmainstreampoliticalparties,tookuptheissueinabigwayandabillwasintroducedin1980itselftoamendtheexistinglawonrape.Passedin1983,themainchangethatitbroughtaboutwasthatcustodialrapewastreatedasamoreheinouscrimethanotherformsofrapeandtheburdenofproofwasshiftedfromthevictimtotheaccusedandthismadeaseachangeinthepossibilityofbringingaboutconvictionsofoffenders.Thecampaignhadsubsidedinthemeantime,havingshownupinitscoursethesharpdivisionsinthewomen’smovement,whichwerecausedasmuchbystrugglesoverturfasbydifferencesofideologyandstrategy.Thepromptresponseofthegovernmentalsoleftmanyactivistsfeelingthattheiragendahadbeenhijackedor‘appropiated’bythegovernment.Theinherentweaknessinastrategythatdoesnothaveroomforabsorbingreformistgainswasrevealedstarkly.Theanti-dowryandanti-rapeagitationsseemedtohavespenttheenergiesofthemovementforsome

time,andwhiletherewereprotestsaroundtheShahBanocasein1985-86,therewasnotthesameenthusiasmorunity.Theissuewasalsolessclear,beingcomplicatedbytheoverallcommunalatmosphereinwhichissuesofMuslimidentitygotentangledwiththesimplerissueofwomen’srights,andtheHinducommunalists’enthusiasmforMuslimwomen’srightsoftenleftwomen’srightsactivistsconfusedandhelpless.TheagitationagainstwhatwascalledthesatibutlookedlikethemurderofRoopKanwar,ayoung

womaninDeoralainRajasthan,wasalsoonthesamelines,withtheissuesbeingmuddledbyHinducommunalgroupsportrayingitasanattackonIndiantraditionandputtingwomenontothestreetsto

defendtheirrighttosati.Interestingly,someofthemoreeffectiveoppositiontosaticamefromAryaSamajistslikeSwamiAgnivesh,whotouredtheruralareasofRajasthanandHaryanamobilizingopinionagainstsati,andalsochallengedtheheadpriestsofthePuriandBenarestemplestoadebateontheirclaimforascripturalsanctionforsati.InOrissa,Gandhiansorganizedarallyof10,000womentogheraotheheadpriestoftheFluritemple,challenginghimtoprovehisclaim,whichhecouldnot.Oppositionalsocamefromtheanti-castemovementinMaharashtraandruralwomeninRajasthan.Amongthe‘autonomous’women’sgroups,bytheeightiestherewasaclearshiftawayfrommass

campaignstolessdramaticworksuchassettingupofwomen’scentresforlegalaid,counselling,documentation,research,publicationandthelike,atleastpartlybecauseitwasfeltthatthemasscampaignswiththeirfocusonlegalreformhadnotreallysucceededinsolvingtheproblemstheyhadsetouttoaddress.Manywomen’sgroupssuchasSaheliinDelhifeltitwasimportantnotonlytofocusonwomen’sproblemsbutalsoontheirjoys,andencouragedwomentoexpressthemselvesthroughmusic,danceandart.Othersbroughtoutmagazines,actedaswatchdogsonthemediaforscanningadvertisementsandfilmsderogatorytowomen,raisedissuesrelatedtowomen’shealth,orcampaignedagainstfoeticide,fortherightsofthegirlchild,orforwaterandhousingforwomenintheslums.Manygroupswhoworkedwithcommunitiesandnotexclusivelywithwomenalsobroughtagreaterfocusonwomen’sissuesintotheirwork.InHyderabad,Anveshiwassetupasaplatformfortheoreticalstudiesofwomen’sissuesandinDelhi

theCentreforWomen’sDevelopmentStudiespromotedresearchanddocumentation,includinginlateryearsthelaunchingofaJournalforGenderStudies.Manymoreuniversity-basedcentresalsocameupinthenineties,andenoughresearchandwritingwasavailableforcoursesonWomen’sStudiestobegintoappearinuniversitycurricula.Clearly,themovementhadenteredanotherphaseofinstitutionalisationandconsolidationasithadin

theearlyfifties,andwhatappearedtosomeactivistsasawateringdownofthemovementwasmorelikelydiffusionofitsideasintothewidersocietywhichwasboundtobeaccompaniedbysomedilutionofitssharpideologicalcontent.Itisalsotruethatthemovementsufferedfromalackofunityaboutgoals,strategies,andmethods,fromsectarianismwhichwasprobablythecontributionoftheleft,andatendencyforreactingtoimmediatecrisesratherthanbuildingaconsensusonanagendaforaction.IthasalsobeenallegedthatsomesectionswereswayedbythemoneyreceivedfromforeignorganizationsintotakingupissuesthatconcernedthedonorsbuthadlittlerelevancetothemovementinIndia,andatleastsomeofthemoreconvoluteddebatesontheoreticalissuesthatabsorbedtheenergiesofsomefeministssuggestthatthechargeisnotwithoutsubstance.Thegapbetweenurbaneducatedwomen’sgroupsandruralorpoorurbanwomen’sconcernsalsoremained,thoughitnarrowedinsomeinstances.Thesenseofachievementthatwassopalpableinthethirtiesandforties,whentheleapsinempowermentandconsciousnesswerehuge,wasmissingasonelookedatthewomen’smovementsincetheseventies.Thisisnottosaythattheeffortswereinvain.Governmentpolicywascertainlyaffected,anditcame

upwithaNationalPerspectivePlanforWomenin1988,whichdetailedplansforwomen’shealth,educationandpoliticalparticipation.In1989,thePanchayatiRajbillwasintroduced(thoughitwaspassedonlyin1993)whichinstitutedone-thirdoftheseatsinthepanchayatstobereservedforwomen.TheSchemeforDevelopmentofWomenandChildreninRuralAreas(DWACRA)wasintroducedwhichsponsoredMahilaMandalsorSanghamsinruralareasanditenabledmanypoorwomenwhohadno

otheraccesstoorganizeandexpressthemselves,oftenhelpedbylocallevelvoluntarygroupsandpoliticalactivists.AnotherinnovativeschemecalledtheMahilaKoshwasalsostartedwhichextendedcredittoMahilaMandalstoenabletheirmemberstoimprovetheirskillsandstandardsofliving.Theeffectivityofthesedependedonthecapacityoftheirutilizationatthelocallevel,andthisvariedwiththelevelofpoliticizationandawarenessofwomen’sissues.Butlargenumbersofgroupswereabletousethelegitimacyorprotectivecoverofagovernmentschemeasasteppingstonetoreachpoorruralwomenwhomotherwisetheywouldfinddifficulttotouch.Attemptstoincreasewomen’sroleinlocalandnationalpoliticsarestillbeingmade.Sinceone-third

oftheseatsinthepanchayatsarenowreservedforwomen,womenpanchayatmembersandvillagepradhansarenowbeinggivenspecialtrainingtoperformtheirnewroles.Aseriousmovetoreserveone-thirdoftheseatsinparliamentforwomenhasbeengoingonforsometimeandhasreceivedconsiderablesupportfromwomenpoliticiansandwomen’sgroupsandsomepoliticalparties,andgeneratedagreatdealofdebate.

HealthandEducation:ARecord

TheflipsideofthecoinisthatfemaleliteracyinBarmer,theworstdistrictinthemostbackwardstate(Rajasthan),is8percent,lowerthanBurkinaFaso,theworstcountryinsub-SaharanAfrica,whereitis10percent.TheinfantmortalityrateinGanjam,theworstdistrictofIndiainthisrespect,is164perthousandlivebirths,whichisworsethanMali,theworstcountryinsub-SaharanAfrica,whereitis161.ThefertilityrateinU.P.is5.1,whichishigherthantheaverageforalllow-incomecountriesandmuchhigherthanevenBurmaandBangladesh.Thefemale/maleratio,i.e.numberofwomenper1000malesinHaryanais865,alevellowerthanthatofanycountryintheworld.Amongelderlywidows,themortalityfiguresaregenerally86percenthigherthanformarriedwomanofthesameage.6

Thepopulationofruralfemalesaged12-14whohaveneverbeenenrolledinanyschoolisone-halfinIndiaasawhole,abovetwo-thirdsinU.P.,MPandBihar,andashighas82percentinRajasthan.Only42percentofruralfemalesinthe10-14agegroup,and40percentinthe5-9agegrouparereportedtobeattendingschool.Thedropoutrateisalsoveryhigh.Averagenumberofyearsofschoolingforpersonsaged25andaboveis2.4inIndiaasawhole,whileitisonly1.2forfemalesand3.5formales.InIndia,halfofallfemalesinthe15-19groupareilliterate,inChinalessthan10percent.Theall-Indiaaveragesandthefocusondarkareas,however,hidesthebrightspotsthatholdouta

candleofhope.ThestateofKeralahasarecordthatwouldbetheenvyofanydevelopingcountryandinsomerespectsevenequaltothatofthedevelopedcountries.Theadultliteracyrateforwomenin1990-91was86percent(and94percentformen).ThiswasfarhigherthanChina’swhichwas68percentforwomenand86percentformen.ItwasevenhigherthananyindividualChineseprovince.By1987-88,Keralahadafemaleruralliteracyrateinthe10-14agegroupof98percent.By1992-93,60percentoffemalesaged6andabovehadcompletedprimaryeducation,theall-Indiaaveragebeingonly28.1.Thetotalfertilityratein1992was1.8,whichisbelowthereplacementlevelof2.1,andwhichistherateintheUSandSweden.Theall-Indiaaverageforfertilityrateis3.7.Theinfantmortalityrate,whichiscloselytied,asiswellknown,tothepositionofwomen,wasonly17per1000livebirthsinKeralain1992,comparedwith31inChinaand79inIndiaasawhole.Thefemale-maleratioimprovedfrom1004

to1036between1901-1991,whereasattheall-Indialevelithasdeclinedfrom972to927overthesameperiod.Fortunately,Keralaisnottheonlyglowingexample.Itwouldappearthatitisuniquebecauseofthe

historicaladvantageofhavingaveryearlystartinthefieldofeducation,andbecauseofthematrilinealcustomsofasignificantpartofitspopulation.Whileboththeseadvantagesareafact—theerstwhileprincelystatesofTravancoreandCochinwhichconstitutethebulkofmodemKerala,didgiveaverystrongemphasistoeducationfromthefirstquarterofthenineteenthcenturyandthematrilinealsystem,whichincludesmatrilocalresidence,inheritancethroughfemales,etc.isastrongpositivefactor—otherfactorssuchasanactivistandparticipatorypoliticalculture,itselfhelpedbyhighliteracylevels,positivepublicpoliciesintheareasofhealth,publicdistributionsystem,andprimaryeducation,havebeenextremelyimportant.Andthesearereplicable,asshownbyothersuccessstories,notablyHimachalPradeshandTamilNadu.Asrecentlyas1961,thecrudeliteracyratesinHimachalwere9percentforfemales(and21percent

formales),whichwerebelowtheall-Indiaaverages.By1987-88,literacyratesinthe10-14agegroupwereashighas81forfemalesinruralareasandevenhigherat97percentintheurban(thecorresponding,figuresformalesbeing95and96percent).Thus,inurbanareaswomenhadoutstrippedmen.HimachalPradeshinthisrespectwassecondonlytoKerala.Intermsofnumberofgirlsinurbanareasattendingschool,HimachalevendidbetterthanKerala:95percentversus94percent.Inruralareas,Keralahadtheleadwith91percentversusHimachal’s73percent,butHimachal’sfigureswerestillhigherthanthoseofanyotherstate.Otherindicatorsfollowedsuit.Thefemale/maleratioinHimachalincreasedfrom884:976between1901-1991,thebiggestincrease(+92)inthewholeofIndia.Keralahadincreasedonlyfrom1004to1036,thoughinabsolutenumbersitwaswayahead.Theratiooffemaledeathratetomaledeathratein0-4agegroupwasonly88.2percentin1991,evenlowerthanKerala’sfigureof91.1percentandwaybelowtheall-Indiaaverageof107.4percent.However,theinfantmortalityratewasstillquitehighat70per1000livebirthsin1990-92,aswasthefertilityrateat3.1in1991,thoughbothwerebelowtheall-Indiaaverage.InTamilNaduaswell,therehavebeendramaticimprovementsinvariousgender-relatedindicators.It

standssecondonlytoKeralainitsfertilityrate,whichwas2.2in1991.Theinfantmortalityrateis58per1000livebirthsin1990-92,whichisthethirdlowestinthecountry,onlyKeralaandPunjabhavinglowerrates.Thefemaleliteracyrateinthe10-14agegroupin1987-88was85.6percentinurbanand70.8percentinruralareas.Theratiooffemaledeathratetomaledeathrateinagegroupof0-4was90.5percentin1991,theall-Indiaaveragebeing107.4.About97percentofchildrenbetweentheagesof12-23monthshadreceivedsomevaccinationby1992-93,thehighestpercentageinthecountry.Theextremediversitythatwehaveencounteredenablesustoanalysethefactorsthatfacilitateand

inhibitpositivetrendsingenderjustice.Whilehistoryandtraditionareimportantandthesouthofthecountry,historically,hasabetterrecordthanthenorth,astrongcommitmentinpublicpolicycanbringaboutrapidchange,asshownbyHimachalPradesh.Thediversityalsoshowsthateconomicprosperityorgrowthdoesnotautomaticallyleadtogreatergenderjustice;Punjab,andevenmoreHaryana,twoprosperousstates,performprettypoorlyonthegenderfront.Thefactorswhichfacilitateimprovementinwomen’spositionalsoemergequiteclearly.Femaleliteracyandeducationareunambiguouswinners,

withthelinkswithimprovementinallotherindicatorscomingoutverysharply.Conversely,lowliteracyandeducationlevelsleadtonegativetrendsinotherindicators.Women,therefore,havebeenthemainvictimsofIndia’sfailuresontheelementaryeducationand

literacyfronts.Whenprimaryschoolsinvillagesdonotfunction,boysaresenttoneighbouringvillagesortownsoreventoprivateschools,butgirlsareusuallyjustkeptathome.Socialconservatism,combinedwiththenotionthatinvestingmoneyinagirl’seducationislikewateringaplantinanotherman’shouse,sincethebenefitswillaccruetothegirl’sin-laws’family,leadtothisdecision.Butifschoolsareavailable,andteachersareregular,andclassesareheld,alargeproportionofgirlsdogetsenttoschoolinmostpartsofthecountry.Theconsciousnessofthevalueofeducationhasspreadtothisextentevenamongthepoorestsections.Infact,thepooraremoreawarethateducationistheironeroutetoupwardsocialmobility.Butinasituationwhensingle-teacherschoolsaccountedforone-thirdofallschools(in1986)andwhere,asrecentsurveyshaveshown,two-thirdsofteacherswerefoundtobeabsentduringinspections,wheretherearefifty-eightchildrenforeachteacheratthe6-10agegrouplevel,whereIndiaranks82ndintermsoftheproportionofpublicexpenditureoneducationtoGNPamong116countriesforwhichdataisavailable,itissmallwonderthattherateoffemaleliteracyisaslowas39percent(1990-91).Anotherfactorthatisveryimportantinimprovinggenderjusticeistheprovisionoffreeprimaryhealth

facilitiesatthegrassrootslevel.Asinthecaseofeducation,ifhealthfacilitiesarenoteasilyaccessibleorareexpensive,thelossisunequallythatofwomenandfemalechildren.Infact,unequalaccesstoimprovedfacilitiesaswellastoimprovedlivingstandardsisthemajorcauseofthesharpdeclineinthefemale-maleratioinIndiafrom972to927between1901-1991.Itisnotthatthesurvivalchancesofwomenhavedecreasedinabsoluteterms—onthecontrary.Butrelativetomen,womenhavegainedlessfromtheimprovedaccesstohealthfacilitiesandbetterlivingstandardsandthereforetheirproportionhasdeclined.Tocorrectthisimbalance,healthfacilitieshavetobebroughtwithinthereachofwomen.Wherethishasbeendone,asinKerala,whereover90percentofwomendelivertheirbabiesinmedicalinstitutions,theresultsaredramatic.Thus,ifthelegalandpoliticalrightsgrantedtowomenintheConstitution,whicharetheirsbyvirtueof

theirowneffortsaswellasbyallnormsofsocialjustice,aretoberealizedanddemocratized,millionsofwomenhavetobecomecapableofunderstandingandexercisingthem.Kerala,andHimachal,attwopolesofthecountry,haveshowntheway:theheartlandhastofollow.Thewomen’smovementalsoneedstoincorporateeducationandhealthasprioritiesintoitsstrategyforwomen’sempowerment.

36ThePost-ColonialIndianStateandthePoliticalEconomyof

Development:AnOverview1

ThenationalliberationstrugglethatgavebirthtoanindependentIndiain1947leftadeepimprintonthenatureofthepost-colonialIndianstate.Itslegacyhasseenthenationthroughformorethanhalfacentury,thoughnow,asitentersthenewmillennium,someoftheforcesagainstwhichthemovementhadstoodsosteadfastlyhavesurfaced,andthreatenthenation’sdelicatefabric.Thenationalmovementortheliberationstrugglewasamulti-classpopularmovementoftheIndianpeople.Thiscentury-longstruggleledtoa‘nationalrevolution’;arevolutionthatwasnationalinthesensethatitcutacrossclass,caste,religiouscommunity,gender,age,representingthemall,evenifdifferentially.Seldomhasarevolutioninanycountryattractedthefinestofitspeoplefromsuchdiversespheres.Socialandreligiousreformers,poets,writers,musicians,philosophers,traders,industrialists,politicalthinkers,statesmen,alljoinedhandswiththecommonpeople,gavedirectiontoandlearntfromtheirinitiativetobringaboutoneofthebiggestmassmovementsinhumanhistory.ItisthischaracterofthemovementthatlenttheIndiannationstate,‘new’thatitwasinrelationtomanyothers,adeeplegitimacyandresilience.Apartfromtheall-embracing,masscharacterofthenationalmovement,therewerecertainotherbasic

featuresofthisremarkableoccurrencewhichnotonlyexplainthesurvivalofthenationstatebutitsdistinctcharacter.Thesewereitsdeepanti-imperialism,totalcommitmenttoseculardemocracyandanegalitarian,pro-poororientation.Beingamassmovement,asdistinctfromacadre-basedrevolutionarymovement,meantthattheseideaswerecarriedtothedeepestlayersofIndiansociety,makinganyreversalfromthesebasicfeaturesanextremelydifficultprocess.ThekindofstrongresistancegovernmentsinIndiafacedinanymovetodistancethemselvesfromtheseprinciples(witnesstheresponsetothetemporaryrestrictionondemocraticrightsduringtheEmergency,1975-77)makesaninterestingcomparisonwiththeeasewithwhichtheSovietUnionandChinawereabletodoavirtualabout-turnfromthelegacyoftheirsocialistrevolutions.TheextenttowhichthebasicideasoftheIndianliberationstruggleornationalmovementpermeated

intoorimpacteduponthegovernmentsorregimesthatcametopowerafterindependenceandonotherstateapparatusessuchasthebureaucracy,police,judiciary,legislature,educationsystem,media,politicalparties,etc.,aswellasoncivilsociety,oramongthepeopleingeneral,wastoplayacriticalroleindeterminingthenatureofthepost-colonialIndianstate.Itisimportanttoclarifyatthisstagethat‘government’isnottobeconfusedforthestate,asitisdoneoftenincommon,day-to-day,usage,though‘government’isanimportant,evencritical,apparatusororganofthestate.Soleemphasisonthegovernmentmayleadtohastyandinaccuratecharacterizations.Forexample,agovernmentmaybeheadedbyastaunchsocialistlikeJawaharlalNehru,itmaygettheparliamentandeventheConstitutiontodeclaresocialismasanobjective,itmayhavethemostradicallawsfortheprotectionofthepoor,the

landless,oppressedcastes,tribals,bondedlabourandothersuchsections,andyetthestatemaycloserfitthedefinitionofabourgeoisratherthansayasocialistone,becausethepowerbalanceintheotherstateapparatusesandinsocietyasawholemaybeverydifferentfromthatreflectedintheleadershipofthegovernment.Itmaydeterminehowthelaws,theConstitutionandotherinstitutionsareinterpreted,implementedorused.Buildingortransformingastatestructureinvolvesmuchmorethanjustthegovernment.Gandhiji

understoodthecomplexnatureofthestate.Inhissuccessfulattempttooverthrowthecolonialstatehedidnotfocusonlyoncritiquingandchangingthecolonialgovernmentbutongraduallycorrodingthepowerofthecolonialstate.Thishesoughttodobycounteringthecolonialinfluenceintheeducationsystem,media,bureaucracy,policeandmostimportantlyamongthepeople.Itissuchanunderstanding,weshallsee,whichwasmissingamongmanywhowantedtogiveanalternativedirectiontothepost-colonialIndianstate,ifnottotransformoroverthrowit.

TheNationalistLegacyandthePost-ColonialState

Thelegacyofthenationalmovementresultedintheformationofapopular-democratic,sovereign,multi-class‘nationalstate’after1947.Thepreciseclassbalanceinthestateoritsclasscharacterwastobemouldedbythestrategiesofpoliticalmobilizationandgarneringofsocialsupportevolvedbytheconstituentclasses.Justastheopen-endednatureofthenationalmovementmadeitpossibleforitsclass-orientationtobealteredinfavouroforagainstanyclassorgroupofclasses,sowasthisthecaseinthepopular-democraticnationalstatethatitgavebirthto.Moreonthislater.Second,afundamentallegacyofthenationalmovementwasanti-imperialismandmaintenanceof

nationalsovereignty.ThefoundingfathersoftheIndiannationalmovementhadalreadybythelastquarterofthenineteenthcenturydevelopedacomprehensiveandsophisticatedcritiqueofimperialismandthecolonialstructure.Theywereperhapsamongthefirst,world-wide,todoso.Theymadeanimportantshiftintheunderstandingofhowmodernimperialismwasunderdevelopingthecoloniesratherthandeepeningorcreatingtheconditionsforthedevelopmentofcapitalism,roughlyatthesametimeasdidMarx;evenbeforeHobsonandLenintheyworkedoutadetailedeconomiccritiqueofcolonialism.Thelongstruggleagainstimperialism,thecontinuousupdatingandrefiningofitscritiqueandthecarryingoftheseideastothemasseshashadalastingimpactanditisperhapsinthisspherethatthepost-colonialstatehasstoodmostfirm.Themodelofarulingcoalitionconsistingofa‘triplealliance’betweeninternationalcapital,state(i.e.,

theindigenousgovernment)andlocalcapital,whichwasseenascentraltodependentcapitalistdevelopmentinLatinAmericaandeventopartsofEastAsia,thoughtheroleofinternationalcapitaltherewasseentoberelativelyless,2didnotapplytoIndia.InIndia,aforeignbourgeoisieorinternationalcapital,didnotconstituteapartoftherulingclasscoalitionortheIndianstateafterindependence.Thebargainingwithinternationalcapitaldidnotoccurwithinthestateortherulingcoalitionofwhichinternationalcapitalwasapart,asisarguedtobethecaseinmanyotherpost-colonialcountries,butbetweenanindependentstate,withanentirelyindigenousrulingclasscoalition,andinternationalcapital—animportantdifferenceintermsofautonomy.AnIndianvariantofthe‘triplealliance’model,i.e.,thattheIndianstateafterindependenceis

dominatedbythebourgeoisie/bigbourgeoisieandlandlordswhoareincreasinglycollaboratingwith

foreignfinancecapital/imperialism/TNCsassubordinatepartners,hasbeensupportedforalongtimebyasectionoftheorthodoxleft.ItisalsoarguedthattheIndianbourgeoisieorthecapitalistclass‘whichcametopower’atindependencewascompradororcompromisingwithimperialismandconsequentlythepost-independenceIndianstatewasneo-colonialordependent.Infact,havingassumedthedependentnatureofthecolonialbourgeoisie,ithasbeenarguedthatpost-colonialcountrieslikeIndiacannotdevelopindependentlyunlesstheyoverthrowtheirbourgeoisieandthecapitalistsysteminfavourof

socialism.Theseviewshavebeenchallenged3andtheoverwhelmingevidencetothecontraryhasbyandlargepushedsuchviewstothefringesthoughthereareafewloyaladherentssurvivingeveninmainstreamleftscholarship.WehavedemonstratedatlengthelsewherethepoliticalandeconomicindependenceoftheIndian

capitalistclassandhowitnotonlyimbibedtheanti-imperialistethosofthenationalmovementbutwasattheforefrontofevolvinganeconomiccritiqueofimperialismsincethetwenties.4ThecapitalistswereverymuchpartoftheNehruvianconsensusatindependencewhichwastoputIndiaonthepathofplanned,self-relianteconomicdevelopmentwithoutsuccumbingtoimperialistorforeigncapitaldomination.Infact,oneofthecentralobjectivesoftheNehru-MahalanobisstrategywastofreetheIndianeconomyofforeigndominationanddependence—anobjectivewhichwasrealizedtoamuchgreaterdegreeundertheleadershipofIndiraGandhiwhen,interalia,theroleofforeigncapitalinIndiawasbroughtdowntonegligiblelevels.(Seechapter25and26.)Also,itmaybenotedthatthoughtheworkingclasshasbeenunionizedonalargescaleitincreasinglymovedinacorporatistdirection.Theleftasanpoliticalalternativesufferedadeclineevenamongtheworkingclass.Inotherwords,itnevercameclosetoposingaseriousenoughthreattothesystem,leadingtothecreationoftheoften-predictedclassicsituationwherethebourgeoisiewouldgoovertoimperialismorseekexternalhelpforitssurvival.Asforthefeudallandlords,theirpowerhadbeenmuchweakenedduringthenationalmovementitselfandthelandreformsafterindependencemarginalizedthemcompletelyexceptinafewpockets.Criticsbelongingtotheorthodoxleft,withsomeinfluenceinIndianacademia,haveonlygrudgingly

acceptedthat1947didnotmeanatransferofpowerfromacolonialtoaneo-colonialstatewithNehruas‘therunningdogofimperialism’(aviewheldbyasectionofCommunistsatindependence).Theyperiodicallyseeinanymovetowardsliberalizationoropeninguptotheoutsideworldthe‘inherent’pro-imperialist,dependentnatureoftheIndianstate‘finally’and‘inevitably’comingtothesurface.Thiswastheargumentused,forexample,duringthemid-sixtieswhen,facedwithamajoreconomiccrisis,therupeewasdevaluedandsometradeliberalizationwasbrieflyattempted.ThiscriticismremainedburiedforsomeyearswithIndiraGandhi’ssharpturntowardseconomicnationalisminthelatesixtiesandseventies,onlytoresurface(forexample,inastatementsignedbyanumberoflefteconomists)withtheattemptsatliberalizationandthelargeIMFloantakenbyIndiaintheearlyeighties(aloanwhichwaseventuallynotevenfullydrawnandwentalongwayinhelpingIndiareducehercriticaldependenceonoilimportsbymassiveincreasesinindigenousoilproduction).Againtherecent,post-1991,effortsatreformsinvolvingliberalizationandamoreactiveparticipationintheglobalizationprocesshavebeenseenas‘areversalinthedirectionofpolicysincedecolonisation’,apolicywhichhad‘pointedtowardrelativeautonomyfrommetropolitancapital.’Ithasbeenseenasvirtuallyanimperialistprojectwhere‘thepoliciesofthenation-state,insteadofhavingtheautonomythatdecolonisationpromised—aredictatedbythecapricesofabunchofinternationalrentiers.’5

ThebroadconsensusthathasemergedinIndiainrecentyears,however,doesnottakesuchadimviewofthereforms.Thecommonlyperceivedneedforashiftawayfromtheexcessivelydirigiste,inward-lookingandprotectioniststrategy,whichwasleadingtoadangerousfallinefficiencyandproductivitylevelsandtheurgetoparticipateintheglobalizationprocessinthealteredcircumstancesofworldcapitalisminrecentdecades,wheremajorpossibilitieshaveemergedofutilizingglobalcapitalandglobalmarketsforindigenousdevelopment,hasledtotheemergenceofabroadconsensusinfavourofreform.ThiswasaconsensusreminiscentoftheearlierNehruvianphase,bothintermsoftheobjectivesandwidthofsupport.Thedesiretoachievethesamegoalssetoutatindependence—ofself-reliance,rapidgrowthandremovalofpoverty—andnottheirabandonment,nowdrewsupportforreformandtheadoptionofthenewstrategy.(Seechapter26,sectionon‘Long-termconstraints:theneedforreform’andchapter27,)Inthiscontext,itisinterestingtoseethemajorshiftmadebytheformerLeftDependencythinkerF.H.

Cordoso(asPresidentofBrazilheisguidingthecountrythrougheconomicreformandparticipationintheglobalizationprocess)fromhisearlierposition.Hehaspointedouthowthenatureofforeigncapitalhaschangedandcanbeusedforindigenousdevelopmentofunderdevelopedcountries.Hearguesthatglobalizationisafactthatcannotbeignored,andthustheissueisnotwhethertoglobalize,buthowtoglobalizesothatabetterbargainisachievedforthebackwardcountriesandapropercushionprovidedtothepoorsothattheyarenotmadetobearthecostoftheinitialtransition.AviewwhichthesupportersofreformfromtheleftinIndiaaswellasthemoresagaciousbusinessleadershavegenerallyaccepted.Verysignificantly,Cordosoaddsthatpopularmobilizationandcommunityworkwouldbenecessarytoensurethatthepoorwillbefullyprotected.HefeelsthatthetraditionscreatedbyMahatmaGandhiinthisrespectgiveIndiaaclearadvantageovermanyotherunderdevelopedcountries.6

ThethirdmajorlegacyofthenationalmovementhasbeentheadoptionofdemocracyasafundamentalvaluebytheIndianstate.Byanyinternationalstandards,Indiahasafullythrivingdemocracy,andnotmerelya‘formal’or‘partial’one,asarguedbysome.Itisnota‘topdown’democracywhichisa‘giftofitselitetothemasses’,norisitagiftoftheBritish.Itisaproductofalong-drawnstruggleoftheIndianpeopleduringthenationalmovementandhencehasfirmrootsinIndiansociety.Thedemocraticbasehasbeenenlargedwitharelativelyhighpercentageofpopularparticipationinelectionsandnewergroupsandclassesgettingactivelyinvolvedindemocraticinstitutions.Infact,thestruggleforexpandingthedemocraticspacecontinues—witnessthecurrentvigorouscampaignforgreatertransparencyingovernmentandotherinstitutionsandthepeople’srighttoinformation.ItiscreditablethatIndiahasattempteditsindustrialtransformationwithinademocraticframework,a

uniqueexperimentforwhichthereisnoprecedent.Theinitialphaseof‘primitiveaccumulation’,(i.e.,raisingofsurplusforinvestmentandreleasingoflabourforindustry)whichwascriticalfortheindustrialtransformationofalltheindustrializedcountries,whethertheadvancedcapitalistcountriesoftheWest,thesocialistcountriesorthenewlyindustrializedcountriesofEastAsia,occurredincircumstancesbereftoffulldemocraticrights.Thepaths,forexample,ofenclosuremovements(Britain),forcedcollectivization(SovietUnion),highlandtax(Japan),slavery(USA),totalsuppressionoftrade-unionrights(EastAsiaandothers),andcolonialsurplusextraction(severalcountries;Britain,forexample,receivedasunilateraltransfersfromcoloniesinAsiaandWestIndiesastupendous85percentofitsGrossDomesticCapitalformationin1801),etc.,werenotopentodemocraticIndia.

DemocracyensuredthatinIndiathetransitiontoindustrialismwasnottobeonthebackoftheworkingclassandthepeasantry,drawingsurplusforinvestmentfromthem.Theworkingclassmademajoradvancesthroughcollectivebargainingandtherewasbyandlargeanettransferofresourcestoagricultureafterindependenceratherthanvice-versa.DemocracyandafreePressmadeinconceivable,whathappenedinChina,wheretheworldcametoknowmanyyearslaterofanestimated16to23millionfaminedeathsbetween1959and1961.InIndiaafreePress(with8,600dailynewspapersand33,000periodicalstoday)haskeptgovernmentsontheirtoestohelpavertanyscarcitysituationandmajorfamines,aregularfeatureincolonialtimes.Democracyhasgivenavoicetothepoorintheprocessofdevelopment.Theirinterestcannotbe

bypassed.Democracyhas,forexample,madeitunviableforanygovernmentsinceindependencetopursueaninflationarystrategywhichhitsthepoorthehardest.Theearlyfiftiessawfallingpricesandthetrendrateofinflationdidnotexceed8percentperyearbetween1956and1990despitetwooil-shocksandseveraldroughts.Evenwhennecessarystabilizationandstructuraladjustmentswereundertakenduringthepost-1991reforms,thesebeingmeasureswhichmakethepoorparticularlyvulnerablethroughcontractionofpublicexpenditure,democracyensuredthattheywerenotlefthighanddry.Anti-povertymeasureswereexpandedandaquickreversaloftheriseinpovertythatoccurredduringthefirsttwoyearsofreformswasachieved.Inthedilemmabetweenfiscalprudenceandegalitariancommitment(adilemmawhich,asAmartyaSenpointsout,isnotachoicebetweengoodandbadbutagenuinedilemmabetweentwogoods7),democracyensuresthatitdoesnotgetresolvedwithoutadequateweighttothelatter.Thefourthmajorlegacyofthenationalmovementhasbeenitsequityandpro-poororientation.The

Indianstatewascertainlyinfluencedbythislegacy,thoughitsfullpotentialwasfarfromrealized.TheimpactofthislegacycanbeseeninthefactthateachofthenineFiveYearPlanssinceindependencetreatedremovalofpovertyasakeyobjectivethoughtheextentoffocusonpovertyremovalvariedasbetweenplans.Itisnotaccidentalthateventheright-wingpoliticalformationshaverepeatedlyfounditnecessarytoswearbythepoor.WitnesstheBJP,inoneofitsincarnationsintheearlyeighties,wishingtobringaboutGandhiansocialism.TheIndianstatewascommittedtowide-ranginglandreformsatindependence.Thepeasantrywas

essentiallyfreed(exceptinsomepockets)fromthepoweranddominationofthefeudal-typelandlords.ThoughitwasindeedverycreditablethatIndiaachievedherlandreformswithintheframeworkofdemocracy,neverthelessthereformsoccurredinamannerthatinitiallytherelativelybetter-offsectionsofthepeasantrygotunequaladvantagefromitcomparedtothepoorersections.Thishappenedpartiallybecausetheclassbalanceatthegroundlevelandintheperspectivesofmanystateapparatusessuchasthejudiciary,thepoliceandbureaucracy,particularlyatthelowerlevels,wasnotintunewiththatofthegovernment.Itwasfarlessfavourabletothepoor,andthegovernmentinademocracycouldnotforceitsway.Overtime,variousgovernments,however,persistedwiththesemeasuresandfromtheearlyseventiestherewasasecondwaveoflandreformsaccompaniedbyseveraltargettedeffortstoreachthebenefitsoftheGreenRevolutionstrategytothepoor.Theresultswerecommendablethoughmuchstillremainedtobedone.Thereisnocomparisonbetweentheabjectpovertyfacedbytheruralpooralloverthecountrywhereeventwomealsadaywerenotguaranteedandwhatprevailstodayinmostpartsofthecountry.RadicalscholarslikeDanielThornerandotherobserversreported,onthebasisoffieldsurveys,

aqualitativechangeinthelivesoftheruralpoor.Thelandreforms,thespreadoftheGreenRevolutiontomostpartsofthecountry,andtargettedanti-povertyprogrammes,particularlysincethelatesixties,haveprovidedsuccourtovastmassesoftheruralpoorinIndia.(Seechapters28to31.)Evenusingtheratherinadequateindicesavailableformeasuringpoverty,itisseenthattheproportion

oftheruralpopulationbelowthepovertylinedeclinedfrom58.75percentin1970-71(estimatesforthefiftieswhenitwouldbemuchhigherarenotavailabletous)to37.3percentin1993-94.Thecorrespondingfiguresforthetotalpopulation,includingbothurbanandrural,were56.25and36.Theaveragelifeexpectancy,whichwasamiserable32yearsin1950-51,morethandoubled,toover63yearsby1993-94.Theper-capitaincomein1996-97wastwoandahalftimeshigherthanwhatitwasin1950-51eventhoughthepopulationtoohadmultipliedrapidly,showinganincreaseofmorethan158percentoverthesameperiod.Theliteracyratehadrisenfromanabysmal18.3percentin1951to62percentin1997.Infantmortalityhadcomedownfrom146to71perthousandbetween1951and1997.Foodself-sufficiencyandpublicactionhavemadefaminesathingofthepast.

Poverty,DemocracyandtheIndianState

Considerableachievementsthese—yetdespiteallthisprogressIndiastillfacestheintolerablesituationwheremorethanthreehundredmillionofitspeoplecontinuetoremainbelowthepovertylineandnearlyhalfthepopulationisilliterate.Thecontinuationofpovertydespiteconsiderableadvancesispartlyaresultofrelativelyslowergrowth(EastAsia,particularlyIndonesiaandChina,aregoodexamplesofhighgrowthenablingdramaticreductioninpoverty)andispartlyreflectiveofthenatureoftheIndianstateandthefailuretosufficientlyalteritsclassbalanceinfavourofthepoorthroughpopularmobilization.Thesovereign,democraticnationalstatethatcameintoexistenceatindependencewasmulti-classin

natureandwasopen-endedinthesensethattheclass-balanceamongtheconstituentclassescouldbealtered.TheIndiannationalstateinotherwordsconstitutedthearenainwhichseveralclassescontendedforinfluence,thecapitalistsintrade,industryandfinance,theuppersectionsofthepeasantry,abroadmiddleclassconsistingofprofessionals,clericalandmanagerialstaffor‘knowledgeworkers’,theorganizedworkingclassandtheruralandurbanpoorconsistingofagriculturalworkers,poorpeasants,pettyartisans,unorganizedurbanworkersandsoon.(Asarguedabove,thefeudallandlordsandthemetropolitanbourgeoisieorinternationalcapitalwerenotcontendersinthisinternalstruggleforhegemonyoverthestate.)Themannerinwhichthiscompetitionforinfluencewouldgetresolvedwastodependonhowthevariousclasseswerepoliticallymobilizedandwhichclassperspectivewasabletoexerciseagreaterideologicalhegemonyorinfluenceoversocietyasawhole.FromtheverybeginningtheNehru-Mahalanobisstrategyofgrowthwithequityhadassumedthat

popularmobilizationfrombelowwouldbenecessarytoeffectivelyimplementradicalmeasuresinfavourofthepoor(suchaslandreforms,cooperativization,universaleducation,andsoon)initiatedbythegovernmentledbyNehru.Theproblem,however,wasinlocatingan‘agency’whichwasgoingtoperformthistask.Withindependence,theCongresspartywithNehruatitsheadgottransformedfromapartyofstruggleandmovementtoapartyofgovernance.EffortstomakeCongressworkersperformtheformerrole,ratherthantrytolearntheropesofthelatter,provedessentiallyunsuccessful.(GandhijianticipatingthisdenouementhadunsuccessfullycalledforthedisbandingofCongressatindependence

andformingofaseparateorganizationtostruggleforpeople’scauses,tohedistinctfromtheonewhichgoverned.)Nehrutriedtofillthevoidbycreatingadevelopmentalbureaucracyfromthelocalvillageworkertothehighestlevel,andunwittinglycreatedabyzantineinstitutionwhosemainpurposeincreasinglyappearedtobethatofmultiplyingandfeedingitself.Thetaskwasessentiallypoliticalandthebureaucracycouldnotbeexpectedtoactasasubstitute.In

fact,Nehruhadexpectedtheleftwouldperformthistaskandhetriedrepeatedly,thoughunsuccessfully,togarneritssupportsothatradicalgovernmentprogrammescouldbeimplementedandagradualsocialtransformationandanalteringofthenatureofstatecouldtakeplace.ThelefthadhoweverinitiallycharacterisedNehruas‘therunningdogofimperialism’andhencenaturallytobeopposedandoverthrown.Later,aftertheleftgaveupthisposition,itstillrefusedtocooperateasitsawsuchataskas‘reformist’,whichwouldonlystrengthenthe‘bourgeois’state,whiletheirrolewastosharpenthecontradictionsandprepareforitsoverthrow.Theleftthusabandonedthespaceprovidedbytheopen-endeddemocraticstructureoftheIndianstate(dismissingitas‘bourgeois’democracy),anddidlittletoeithertryandaltertheclassbalanceinvariousstateapparatusessuchasinthebureaucracy,media(dismissedasthebourgeoispress),judiciary,educationsystemetc.,ortomobilizethepoorsothattheyhadagreatersaywithintheexistingstatestructure.NotrecognizingthetransformativepossibilitiesoftheIndianmulti-classnationalstate,itwaitedandstillwaits,atleastintheory,endlesslyforthematuringofthecontradictionssothataninsurrectionaryoverthrowofthestatecanoccur.Thisfailureoftheleft,andasuperiorunderstandingofthenatureofthedemocraticstatebyotherforcessuchastheIndianbusinessleaders,hasledtoacapitalistdevelopmentalperspectivewithaninadequatepro-poor,welfareorientationprevailingoverthestateapparatusesandsocietyasawhole.Ithasalsoledtothedemocraticspaceincreasinglygettingoccupiedbycasteistandcommunaltendencieswhichhurtthepoor,eventhoughthelatterisoftenmobilizedbythem.Thepoliticalspaceformobilizationinfavourofthepoorhasthuslargelyremaineduntapped—though

simpledemocraticarithmetichassecuredthepoorseveralconcessionsasallpoliticalformationshavetoseektheirvotes.Sporadicandscatterednon-governmentalorganizationshaveoftenprovidedidealisticyouthforaforsuchactivitybuttheseefforts,intheabsenceoftheirgeneralizationthroughwiderpoliticalintervention,canhaveonlylimitedresults.Therecenteffortstoempowerthelocalself-governinginstitutionswiththePanchayatiRajamendmentstotheconstitutionoffermuchpromise.Howfarthatpromisegetsrealizedwilldependonwhatextenttheprogressivepoliticalforcestrytooccupythisdemocraticspaceavailableatthegrassrootslevel.WhilepersistingpovertyhasbeenthemostimportantfailureinIndia’spost-independence

development,thesurvivalofthedemocraticstructurehasbeenitsgrandestsuccess.Thefurtherdeepeningandmaturingofthisdemocraticstructureisanimportantstepinthedirectionofmeetingtheneedsoftheunderprivileged.However,amajorpoliticaldevelopmentthatthreatensthepursuanceofaviabledevelopmentalpath

maybehighlighted.TheverysuccessofIndia’sdemocracyhasledtogrowingdemandsonthestatebyvariousclassesandgroupsincludingthepoor.Toaccommodatethesedemandsallpoliticalformations,sincethelateseventies,begantoindulgeincompetitivepopulismusingstateresourcestodistributelargessetothevariousconstituentclassesoftheIndianstateincludingthepoor.Subsidies(oftenreducing

coststotheconsumertozero)forfood,fertilizer,diesel,exports,electricity,tonamejustafew,proliferatedtounsustainablelevelspushingthecountrytothebrinkofdefaultandeconomicchaos.Thesurvivalandgrowthofthesovereign,democraticIndianstate,requiresa‘strong’state.Strongnot

‘ascounterpoisedtodemocracy,decentralizationandempowermentofthepeople’8butstronginthesensethatitcan,whileaccommodatingmoderatedeviations,suppressforcesthatthreatendemocracybyoperatingoutsideitslimits—viz.,terrorists,separatistinsurgencies,fanatical,fundamentalistandviolentcasteistorreligiouscommunalforcesandsoon.Astrongstatecandisciplinecapitalwhichdoesnotperformcompetitively(asJapanandotherEastAsianstateshavesuccessfullydone)aswellasdisciplinesectionsoflabourwhichdonotperformatallorperformbelowsocietallyacceptedstandardsofproductivity.Astrongstate,withoutresorttopopulismbutkeepingsocialjusticeasoneofit’scentralobjectives,canguidetheeconomyontoapathofrapiddevelopmentandmodernization,basedontheadvancedscientificbreakthroughsofthecontemporaryworld.Astrongstatecanparticipateintheglobalizationprocessinamannerwhichnotonlydoesnotdiminishitssovereigntybutincreasesit.AtallorderbutcertainlynotbeyondthegeniusoftheIndianpeoplewhohavecrossedsomeofthemostdifficultmilestonescreditablyoverthepastfiftyyears.

37DisarrayinInstitutionsofGovernance

AmongthemostsignificantfeaturesofIndia’spoliticaldevelopmenthasbeenthecommitmentofitsleaderstodemocracy,nationalunityandeconomicdevelopment,accompaniedbytheirabilitytoestablishthenecessarypoliticalinstitutions,bothofthestateandcivilsociety,andtoroottheminIndiansociety—inotherwords,tocreateandmaintainthestructureofademocraticstate.Theseinstitutionshavebeensustaineddespiterapidsocialchange,withnewsocialgroupsregularlyenteringthepoliticalarenaandassertingtheirrights.TherepeatedsuccessionsofgovernmentsattheCentre,thathavebeenbroughtaboutpeacefullyandconstitutionally,havebeenasignofthebasicinnerstrengthofthisdemocraticstructure.Forthelasttwenty-fiveyearsorso,however,thepoliticalsystemhasbeenunderstrain,facingan

increasinglossofvitality.Therehasbeenacertaindisarray,adeteriorationinpoliticalinstitutions.Thesearenotabletorespondadequatelytothechallengesposedbyeconomicdevelopmentandsocialchange;thegrowingpoliticalawakeningamongthepeopleandtheirarousedandrisingexpectations,therefusaloftheoppressedandthedisadvantagedtoaccepttheirsocialcondition,andthegrowingclassandcasteconflictamongcontendingsocialgroups,especiallyinthecountryside,foralargershareofpoliticalpowerandgainsofeconomicdevelopment.Mostofthepoliticalinstitutions,asaconsequence,havebeenlosingtheirmoralauthorityandthe

countryhasbeendifficulttogovern—atleast,difficulttogovernwell.This‘crisisofgovernability’takesmultipleforms:unstablegovernments,frequentelectionsandchangesofelectoralmoods,inabilitytoaccommodateandreconcilecontendingdemandsandneedsofdifferentsocialgroupsandclasses,weakeningoflawandorder,growingcivildiscordanddisturbance,sometimesreachingtheproportionsofinsurgency,communalviolence,increasingrecourseofpeopletoviolentandextra-constitutionalagitations,growingcorruption,and,aboveall,thefailureofthegovernmentsattheCentreandthestatestoimplementtheirpoliciesortoprovideeffectivegovernance.Atthesametime,itwouldbewrongtosuggestthatthepoliticalsystemoritsinstitutionshavebeen

crumblingorthatIndiahasbeenundergoingacrisisofthestate.Inspiteofalltheirweaknesses,thepoliticalsystemanditsinstitutionshaveprovedtobequiteresilientandhavemanagedtofunction,eventhoughinadequately;theyhavealsoretainedtheirlegitimacy,inpartbecauseoftheirverylongevity,butmuchmorebecauseofthegreaterparticipationbythepeopleinthepoliticalprocess,especiallyinelections.Undoubtedly,apartfromtheskewedsocio-economicstructure,themajorculpritfortheweakeningof

thepoliticalinstitutionshasbeenthequalityofpoliticalleadership.Itisthequalityofpoliticalleadershipwhichplaysacriticalroleinnationbuildingandthedevelopmentofpoliticalinstitutions.Morethanacrisisofthestateorthepoliticalsystem,therehadcertainlybeenacrisisofleadershipasthecalibreofleadersbothattheCentreandinthestateshasbeengoingdownovertheyears.

Forseveraldecadesnow,thepoliticalleadershiphasfunctionedwithoutanystrategicdesignorperspective,ideologyorwellthoughtabouttacticsformanagingthepoliticalsystem.Ithasreliedinsteadonadhocismandgimmickryformeetingthechallengesinthepolityandonpopulism,personalappeal,anduseofbigandblackmoneytomaintainitselfinpower.Atbest,ithastakenrecoursetosuchtacticalmeasuresasopportunisticcoalitionsofideologicallyandprogrammaticallydisparatepoliticalpartiesandgroups,orputtingtogetherofcasteandcommunalcoalitionsorthecentralizationofthepartyandgovernmentprocessesthroughcoteries.Consequently,evenmajorpartiesandpoliticalleadershavebeenlivingfromhandtomouth;theyareabletowinelectionsbutthereafterareneitherabletogovernnormaintaintheirauthority.EvensuchatallleaderasIndiraGandhiwasnotabletochecktheerosionininstitutionsliketheparty,theparliamentandthebureaucracy.

TheDownslideofParliament

Nexttoelectionsandcivilliberties,theparliamentoccupiesapivotalpositioninaparliamentarydemocracy.InIndia,theparliamentandthestatelegislaturesnotonlylegitimizeagovernment,buttheyarealsothesupremeorgansforformulationofpolicies,overseeingtheirimplementation,andingeneralactingas‘watchdogs’overthefunctioningofthegovernment.Unfortunately,overtheyears,therehasbeenageneraldownslideinitsperformance,andsignsofdecayintheinstitutionhavesetin.JawaharlalNehruworkedincessantlytoinstalrespectfortheparliamentandensuredthatitfunctioned

withdecorumandresponsibility.Heattendeditssettingsregularly,howeverbusyhewasotherwise.Hepaidfullattentiontotheviewsoftheoppositionparties,treatedthemwithrespectasanintegralpartofthedemocraticprocess,andoftenlettheminfluenceandevenchangegovernmentpolicies.Theoppositionparties,inturn,actedresponsibly,abidingbytheparliamentaryrulesofthegame.ThesystemcontinuedtofunctionquitewellintheNehruandimmediatepost-Nehruyears.However,gradually,overtheyears,theparliamentstartedbecomingineffective.Itsrolebegantodiminishanditspolicy-makingpowerstoatrophy.Itsproceedingsbegantodegenerateinthelatesixties.Fromthenon,parliamentaryprocedureshavebeenroutinelyignoredandparliament’sandstatelegislatures’sessionshavebeenmarkedbyshoutingandabuseandrowdybehaviour,eventowardstheprimeminister.Also,frequentwalk-outs,unruly,scenes,disgracefuldisorderliness,demonstrationsbythemembersinsideparliamentandlegislaturesandotherdisruptivetactics,includingthestagingofdharnas(sit-ins),haveprogressivelytakentheplaceofreasonedargumentsandparliamentarygiveandtake.Inrecentyears,quiteoftentheparliamenthasnotbeenabletotransactanybusinessfordaysbecauseofthedisruptionofitssittingsbyonepartyortheother.UnlikeintheNehruperiod,inrecentyears,ingeneralitisobservedthatonceagovernmentgetsa

majorityinthelegislatureitformulatesandtriestoimplementitspolicies,irrespectiveoftheviewsoftheOpposition,andthelatter,inturn,opposesgovernmentpoliciesandactionsirrespectiveoftheirmerit.Parliamentandstatelegislaturesseldomwitnessaconfrontationbetweenwell-workedoutalternatives.Thereoccursagreatdealofdenunciationbutlittlemeaningfuldebatetakesplace.Often,theworthandefficacyofagovernmentdecisionisnottestedinparliamentorastatelegislaturebutinthestreetsandinthemedia.TheQuestionHour,onceaprideoftheparliament,hasdegeneratedintoashoutingslug-festandisoftensuspended.

Defectors,whocrossedfloors,changedparties,andtoppledgovernments,notforpoliticalorideologicalreasonsbutforpersonalgain,leadingtorapidchangesofgovernments,becamecommoninthestatesafter1967.AttheCentre,themaladywasreflectedinthetopplingoftheJanatagovernmentin1977.ItappearedatonestagethattheentireparliamentarysystemwouldbeturnedintoamockerywhenafewdefectingMLAsorMPscouldmakeorunmakegovernments.Thesituationwas,however,savedandthegovernmentsgivengreaterstabilityandlongevitybytheanti-defectionlawof1985.Butinrecentyearsdefectionsandbreak-upofalliancesandcoalitionshaveagainbecomecommonwiththedefectorssmartlyremainingwithintheambit,thoughnotthespirit,oftheanti-defectionlaw.Overall,asaresultoftheinefficientfunctioningofstatelegislaturesandparliamentsincethelate

sixties,parliamentaryinstitutionshavebeenbroughtintodisrepute,havedeclinedinauthorityamongthepeopleandhavebeenplayingadiminishingroleinpolicy-formulationandgovernance.Evenso,theyhavenotbecometotallyineffectual.Theycontinuetoperform,thoughinadequately,theroleassignedtothemundertheConstitution;theystillgivesomevoicetopublicopinionandreflectthepopularmood.Thegovernmentstilldreadstheopeningofaparliamentaryorassemblysession.AboveallagovernmentcancontinuetoholdpoweronlyifitretainstheconfidenceoftheHouse—since1977,sevengovernmentsattheCentrehavefallenbecauseoftheirlosingamajorityintheLokSabha.

TheCabinet

TheCabinet,chosenandheadedbytheprimeministerandconstitutedbytheseniorministersformstheeffectiveexecutivebranchoftheIndianpoliticalsystemandfunctionsontheprincipleofcollectiveresponsibility.ThestrengthofagovernmentismeasuredbythestrengthofitsCabinet.Unfortunately,theroleandsignificanceoftheCabinetasapolicyanddecision-makinginstitutionhasalsobeendecliningsince1969,thatis,withthebeginningofIndiraGandhi’sgovernment.SincethentheCabinethasmostoftenbeenbypassedandignoredbytheprimeminister,especiallyinpolicy-making.Thecabinetministers,owingtheirofficetotheprimeminister’spleasure,haveoftenacceptedthisposition,expressingtheirdissentatthemostonsomeminorissues.Moreover,therehashardlybeenreversalofprimeministerialdominanceovertheCabinetunderthemuchweakerpoliticalpersonalitiesthathaveoccupiedtheprimeminister’schairsubsequenttoIndiraGandhi.Individualcabinetministershavecontinuedtohavesomedegreeofinfluencedependingontheirpersonalcalibre,theextentoftheirownpoliticalsupportbaseandtheextentofpopularsupporttheybringtothepartyinpower.ThisdeclineintheroleoftheCabinetisbecauseoftheincreasingcentralizationofpowerinboth

governmentandpartyinthehandsoftheprimeministers,whichisinitsturnduetotherelianceoftherulingpartiesonthemforwinningelections.Asecondfactorcontributingtotheerosionintheauthorityofthecabinethasbeentheemergenceofthe

PrimeMinister’sSecretariat,knownpopularlyasthePMO,asanindependentandvirtuallyparallelexecutivethatencroachesonandusurpsthepowersandfunctionsofindividualministriesandtheCabinet.ThePMOgathersinformation,givesadvice,initiatespolicies—eveneconomicandforeignpolicies—overseestheirimplementation,andtakesahandindecidingappointmentsandpromotionsofhighadministrativeofficials.ThedomineeringroleofthePMO,startingwithShastriandIndiraGandhihascontinuedthroughtheJanataperiodtotheBJP-ledgovernment,headedbyAtalBehariVajpayee.

Thisconcentrationofpowerinthehandsoftheprimeministerhasbeenratherunhealthyandhashadadeleteriouseffectonpolicy-makingaswellasgovernanceingeneral.Whileitisnecessarythatthecountryandthegovernmentisprovidedwithastrongleadership,suchstrongleadershipisnottobeequatedwiththeconcentrationofpowerinthehandsofoneindividual.Astrongcabinetalsoenablesamultiplicityofinterestsandregionsandculturalzonestosharepowerandtakeaneffectivepartindecision-making.

Judiciary

Onepoliticalinstitutionthathashelditsgroundinallessentialsisthejudiciary.Thehighjudiciary,especiallytheSupremeCourt,hasfullyutilizeditsrightandobligationtoenforceandinterprettheConstitution.Ithassetuphighstandardsofindependencefromtheexecutiveandlegislativearmsofthegovernment.Ithasalsobeenintheforefrontofthedefenceoffundamentalrights.Forthesereasons,itenjoyshighlegitimacyandrespectamongthepeople.AnimportantcriticismoftheIndianjudiciaryhasbeenwithregardtoitssociallyconservativeand

statusquoistcharacter.This,itisargued,hasmadeitinsensitivetosocialissuesandmovementsandresultedinitsstandinginthewayofradicalsocio-economiclegislationinthenameofthedefenceofindividualrights.Forexample,foryearstheSupremeCourtinterpretedtherightofpropertytonegatelandreforms,nationalizationofbanks,etc.ItalsotendedtoignoretheDirectivePrinciplesofStatePolicylaiddownintheConstitution.ButtheseconservativerulingsoftheSupremeCourtwerelargelyrectifiedbecauseoftheeasyprocedureprovidedintheConstitutionforamendmentofitsprovisions.Aswehaveseenintheearlierchapters,thisprocedurewasrepeatedlyusedbyNehruandIndiraGandhitobendthesticktheotherway.Moreover,inrecentyears,theSupremeCourtitselfhasbecomemoresensitivetosocialissues,from

therightsofwomen,workersandminoritiestoecology,humanrights,socialjusticeandequityandsocialdiscrimination.AnexampleofitssocialactivismhasbeentheintroductionofpublicinterestlitigationunderwhichevenapostcarddroppedbyavictimizedcitizentotheChiefJusticeistreatedasawritpetition.Thisdoesnotmeanthatthepoorandthedisadvantagedhaveactuallyacquiredaneasyaccesstothehighercourts.Butithasopenedawindowthatwascompletelyshutearlier.PerhapsthetwomostnegativefeaturesoftheIndianjudicialsystemtodayare(i)theinordinatedelays

inthedispensationofjusticeasacasecandragonforyearsandevendecades—thebacklogofthecasesintheHighCourtsaloneamountingtoseverallakhs,and(ii)thehighcostsofgettingjustice,thuslimitingaccesstothecourtsonlytothewell-off.Inrecentyears,theSupremeCourthasalsobeenaccusedof‘judicialdepotism’byarrogatingtoitself

powerswhicharevestedintheexecutiveorthelegislaturebytheConstitution.Judicial‘activism’,somehavesuggested,cangotoofar.Twootherconstitutionalinstitutions,namely,thePresidentandtheElectionComission,havealso

performedquitewellinindependentIndia.ThePresidentshavefunctionedwithdignityandinanon-controversialmannerandwithinthewidelyacceptedinterpretationofpresidentialpowersasprovidedintheConstitution.Similarly,theElectionCommissionshaveonthewholefulfilledwithcredittheirconstitutionalobligationtoholdfreeandfairelectionsinvolvingmillionsofvoters,nearlyamillionpollingbooths,andthousandsofcandidatesinstateandcentralelections.

PublicAdministrationandBureaucracy

PerhapsthemostimportantinstitutionalcrisisIndiafacesisthatofthequalityofpublicadministrationandthebureaucracy.Thedeteriorationofadministration,evenwhileitsroleinthelifeofthecitizenhasgrownmanifold,liesatthecoreofthe‘crisisofgovernability’inIndia,includingthebreakdownoflawandorderandgrowthofcrimeinseveralstatesandlargecities.Eventhebestofsocialanddevelopmentallegislationandpolicymeasuresarenullifiedinthecourseoftheirimplementation.TheIndianbureaucracyis,moreover,rigid,basicallyconservative,pro-statusquo,andresistantto

socialchange,especiallyinregardtoempowermentofthepoororredistributivemeasures.Itfavoursthedominantsocialgroupsandinfluentialpersons,especiallyinruralareas.Withitsnon-performancecharacterand‘file-pushing’procedures,itisalsonotgearedtotake,onthenewtaskofeconomicdevelopmentandinvolvingthepeopleinitsprocesses.Moreover,evenforroutineworktheadministrativesystemhashardlyanymechanismforenforcingdisciplineandpunishinginefficiencyandpoorperformanceorcheckingcorruptionandrewardingmeritoriousworkandhonesty.PerhapstheworstfeatureofIndianadministrationisrevealedinitsdealingswithcommonpeople.

Governmentservants,especiallypolicemen,aregenerallydiscourteous,domineering,unhelpful,corrupt,inefficientandarbitraryintheirapproachtowardstheordinarycitizen.And,ofcourse,thequestionoftheiraccountabilitytothecitizencannotevenberaised.Thisrelationshipofthegovernmentservantwiththecitizensgoessomewayinexplainingtheanti-incumbencyvotinginrecentyears.Usingdemocracyandtheirvotingpower,thepeople,intheirdesperatequestforafriendly,honest,cooperativeandminimallyefficientadministration,havebeenchanginggovernmentsateveryelection.Evenatthemiddleandhigherlevelsofbureaucracy,becauseofcomplexrules,regulationsand

procedures,especiallyunderthelicence-quotasystem,andtheincreasedpersonalanddiscretionarypowers,thereprevailsinefficiency,unduedelays,lowstandardsofintegrityandcorruption.Thenumberofcapableefficientandhonestofficialsmay,however,belargerthanpopularlybelieved.Atthesametime,therehasbeenaninordinateexpansionofbureaucracy,whichiscompletelyoutof

proportiontoitsusefulnessorproductivity.Consequently,thecentral,stateandlocalgovernmentbureaucracieshavecometoclaimtoolargeashareofpublicexpenditureandgovernmentresources,leadingtotheneglectofdevelopmentalandwelfareactivities.OnepositivefeatureofIndianbureaucracythatstillholdsisitstraditionofpoliticalneutrality,with

bureaucratsimplementingpoliciesofthegovernmentinpowerirrespectiveoftheirownopinions.ItisnoteworthythattheCommunistgovernmentsinWestBengalandKeralahavenotcomplainedofthehigherbureaucracyobstructingorsabotagingtheirpoliciesonpolitical,ideologicalorclassgrounds.Thepartisanshipthathasbeenincreasinglybetrayedbythebureaucracyinrecentyearshasnotbeenon

ideologicalorpoliticalgroundsbuthasbeen‘functional’incharacter.Becauseoftheirdependenceonministers,MLAsandMPsfortheirappointmenttoplumpostings,promotions,transfers,extensionsinservice,post-retirementemployment,protectionfromdisciplinaryactionagainstmisuseofauthorityandcorruption,and,inthecaseoflowerlevelsofbureaucracy,forrecruitmentinthefirstplace,manyinthebureaucracyandthepolicehavebeenincreasinglyenmeshedinpoliticalintrigueandinimplementingthepersonalorpoliticalagendaoftheirpoliticalmasters.Politicalinterferencewithbureaucracyandthepolicehasledtotheunderminingoftheirdisciplineandeffectivenessandthepromotionofcorruptionamongthem.Aresultofthisisthat‘thevaunted“steelframe”hascometoresembleporousfoamrubber.’

Thebureaucracynolongerpossessesthatoldprideinitsserviceandanespritdecorpsorasenseofsolidarity,derivedfromcommoninterestsandresponsibilities.Itistruethattheoverthrowoftheexistinginflexiblebureaucraticadministrativesystemisnotpossible;

toberidofbureaucracyisutopian.Nevertheless,theneedforitsradicalreform,regenerationandrestructuring,soastomakeitasuitableinstrumentforgoodgovernmentanddevelopmentandchangehasnowacquiredanurgencywhichcannolongerbeignored.Interestingly,theillsoftheadministrativestructure,aswellastherequiredremedialmeasureshavebeenrepeatedlystudiedbyseveraladministrativereformcommissionsandagalaxyofpublicadministrationexpertsandexperiencedandknowledgeablebureaucrats.Onlythepoliticalwilltoundertakethesemeasureshasbeenlackingsofar.Twootheraspectsoftheroleandimpactofbureaucracymaybereferredtohere.Thebureaucraticvalues,mentalityandstructureshavespreadtonearlyallspheres.TheypervadeIndia’sacademicandscientificinstitutionsandarelargelyresponsiblefortheincapacityofourscientistsandacademicstorealizealargepartoftheirpotential.Similarly,bureaucratizationandbureaucraticcontrolofthepublicsectorundertakings,combinedwithpoliticalinterference,hascomeinthewayoftheirhealthydevelopmentandfunctioning.

ThePolice

TheIndianpolice,showingalltheweaknessesofthebureaucracy,suffersfromcertainadditionalmaladies.Byanycriteria,itisinabadshape.Itsdegenerationislargelyresponsibleforthemarkeddeteriorationinthelawandordersituation.Thisisdespiteamorethanhundred-foldincreaseinexpenditureonthepoliceanditssisterpara-militaryforcesoverthelastfiftyyears.Asaresultthestatehasroutinelytorelyonthelatterorsometimesevencallinthearmyformaintainingcivilorder.TheIndianpolicedoesnotadequatelyperformitsconventionalroleofcrimepreventionandinvestigationandthepunishmentofcriminals,whoreadilyassumethattheywillnotbeapprehendedandifapprehendedwillnotbesuccessfullyprosecutedandpunished;inmanycasesevencomplaintsagainstthemwillnotberegistered.Allthishappenspartlybecauseofpoliceinefficiency,poortrainingofpolicemenandtheirostensibleconnivancewiththecriminalsandpartlybecauseoftheslow-movingcourtsandthereluctanceoftheordinarycitizentogiveevidenceagainstcriminalsbecauseofthefearofuncheckedreprisals.OneoftheworstfeaturesoftheIndianpoliceisthenegativeattitudetowardsthecommonpeople

whichithasinheritedfromthecolonialperiod.Thepoornotonlygetlittlehelpfromthepolicewhentheyneedorseekit,butareoftenmetwithacertaininhumanity,ruthlessness,violenceandbrutality.Peopleencounteringthelawandordermachineryinthecourseoftheirstrugglesforsocialjusticeandenforcementoflawsandpoliciesexistingforredressaloftheirgrievancesarefrequentlysubjectedtolathi-charges,tear-gasattacksandattimesunprovokedfiring.Moreover,becauseofthespreadofcommunalisminitsranks,thepolicebiasagainsttheminoritiesgetsreflectedinpartisanshipduringcommunalriots.TheIndianpolicehasalsogainednotorietyforbrutalityagainstundertrialsleadingsometimeseventodeaths—thenumberofreportedcustodialdeathsin1997wasover800.Theoverallresultisthatpeopleviewthepolicewithfear,resentmentandhostility.Politicalinterferenceandmanipulationanduseofthepolicebypoliticianshasmademattersworseand

hasledtoitscorruptionanddemoralizationandthespreadofindisciplineinitsranks.

Ontheirpart,ordinarypolicemenandpolicewomenarequitediscontentedbecausetheirpayandserviceconditions,promotionalchancesandsocialstatusarequitepoor.Thenecessitytorescuethepoliceasacrucialinstitutionofthestatefromutterdegeneration,andtorestrain,reformandrestructureit,besidesalteringitsattitudetowardsthecommonpeoplehasperhapsbeenperceivedbysuccessivegovernmentsasthemosturgentadministrativetaskforthelastseveraldecades.Yet,tillnow,nogovernmenthasmadeevenanattemptinthatdirection.OneexampleofthisneglecthasbeenthefailureofallthecentralandstategovernmentstoimplementorevenpayseriousconsiderationtotheNationalPoliceCommissionReportof1979.

TheArmedForces

TheIndianmilitaryhascontinuedtobeahighlydisciplinedandprofessionalnon-politicalforceandhasmaintainedthetraditionofrespectingdemocraticinstitutionsandfunctioningunderciviliansupremacyandcontrol.Whilethemilitaryadvisesondefencepolicyandhasfulloperationalauthorityduringanarmedconflict,thebasiccontoursofdefencepolicyaredeterminedbythecivilauthority.Thisdevelopmentofmilitary-civilauthorityrelationshipwasnotfortuitous;itwascarefullythoughtout

bythenationalleadershipofindependentIndiafromthebeginning,worriedasitwasthatIndiamightalsogothewayofmostoftheThirdWorldcountriesinfallingpreytosomeformofmilitarydomination.This,alongwiththedesireofnotwantingtodivertresourcesfromtheurgenttaskofeconomicdevelopment,wasamajorreasonwhyNehruandotherleaderskeptthesizeasalsotheprofileofthearmedforcesquitelowtill1962.AftertheIndia-Chinawar.thesizeofthemilitarywasincreasedthoughintermsofthecountry’spopulationitcontinuestobesmallerthanthatofChinaandPakistanorevenSouthKorea,Indonesia,theUSandmostoftheEuropeancountries.Indiahasalsokeptitsdefencebudgetlowintermsofitsratiotothenationalincome.TheaimhasbeentoensurethatIndia’sdefenceforcesareadequatetomeetthreatstoitssecuritywhilenotlettingthembecomeanintolerabledragoneconomicdevelopment.Indianpoliticalpartieshavealsokeptupthetraditionofnotlettingdefenceaffairsandthemilitary

becomeamatterofpartisanpoliticaldebateorinter-partystruggle.TheapoliticalroleofthemilitaryhasalsobeenstrengthenedbythestabilityofIndia’sdemocraticinstitutionsandthehighleveloflegitimacytheyenjoyamongthepeople,includingthearmedforces.Moreover,sinceimmediatelyafterindependence,theclassandregionalbiasfromcolonialtimesinthe

recruitmentofboththeranksandofficersofthearmedforceshasbeengivenup.Theyhavebeenrecruitedfromdiversesocialstrataandcastes,religionsandregions.ThishasgiventheIndianmilitaryaheterogeneous,all-Indiacharacter,andalongwithitstraininghasimparteditanall-India,nationalperspective,andmadeitaforcefornationalunityandintegrity.Thishasalsomadeitdifficultforanysectionofthemilitaryoritsofficercorpstothinkofstagingacoupbymobilizingandconsolidatingthearmedforcesbehindasingleunconstitutionalpoliticalcentre.Whilethereislittledangerofmilitaryinterventioninpoliticalaffairs,adisquietingfeaturethathas

emergedrecentlyisthatoftheglorificationofthemilitaryandthemilitaryethosbycertainpoliticalforcesandinthemedia.

Centre-StateRelations

Inthelongview,IndianfederalismwithitsfinebalancebetweenthepowersoftheCentreandthestates,asenvisagedintheConstitution,hasstoodupwelldespiteoccasionalhiccups.Ithassucceededinconformingto,aswellasprotectingthediversityoftheIndianpeople.Itis,ofcourse,truethatfromthebeginningIndia’sfederalsystemhasbeenbasedonastrongCentreas

carefullyprovidedforintheConstitution.Intheactualworkingofthesystem,thecentralgovernmentgraduallyacquiredgreaterinfluenceoverthestatesbecauseofthepatternofeconomicdevelopmentadopted,whichwasbasedonplanning,publicsector,centralfundingofanti-povertyprogrammes,andcentralfinancialdisbursementtothestatesfromitsgreatertaxresources.Besides,inthefirstdecadesafterindependence,thesamepartycontrolledthecentralandthestategovernments,whichgavetheprimeministerandthecentralCongressleadershipacertainleverageoverthestategovernments.Thisleveragewas,however,notusedsufficientlybyNehru,especiallytopushthroughlandreforms,andwasusedoften,butnotwiselybyIndiraGandhiandRajivGandhi.Ontheotherhand,asovertheyearsthestatesincreasinglycametoberuledbypartiesotherthanCongress,centralinfluenceoverstategovernmentshasdeclined.Thedismantlingofthelicence-quotasystemandthelesserroleofcentralplanninghavealsohadasimilareffect.Overtheyears,theneedforastrongcentralgovernmentwithgreaterauthoritytoinfluencestate

administrationshasbeenfeltincertaincrucialareas.Inamulti-religious,multilingualandmulti-ethniccountrylikeIndia,theCentrehasthecriticalroleofprotectingminoritiesofallkindsasalsothedisadvantagedgroupssuchastheScheduledCastesandScheduledTribes,womenandthelandless.AstrongCentreisalsorequiredtomitigateoratleastpreventthegrowthofacuteregionaldisparitiesbyuseofdifferentmeans.AstrongCentrehasalsobeenfoundnecessarytodealwithdivisivecaste,communalandregionalforcesandinter-regionalconflicts.Atthesametime,itwouldbewrongtosaythatthefederalcharacteroftheIndianpoliticalsystemhas

sufferederosionovertime.ThestateshavecontinuedtoenjoytheautonomyprovidedbytheConstitution,asisevidentfromthefunctioningofthestatesruledbypartiesotherthantheonerulingattheCentre.Thestategovernmentshavecontinuedtoenjoyfullautonomyinthefieldsofculture,education,landreforms,agriculturaldevelopment,irrigation,healthcareandwatersupplyandotherareasofpublicwelfare,localgovernmentandindustrialdevelopment,exceptincaseofbigindustriesandforeigninvestmentforwhichcentrallicenceswereneededtillrecently.Moreover,nearlyallthecentralgovernmentplansandschemesofeconomicandsocialdevelopmentandwelfarehavebeenimplemented—wellorbadly—throughthestates’administrativemachinery.Unfortunately,certainstatesareorhavebeenmisruledandarelaggingbehindineconomic

developmentandwelfareactivities,includingmaintenanceofapeacefulenvironmentfortheircitizens.Butthisissonotbecauseofcentralinterventionorlackofstateautonomybutbecauseofmaladministrationbythestategovernmentsconcerned.Forexample,landreformswerestymiedordidnotbenefitthelandlessinsomeofthestatesbecauseoftheobduracyoftheirstateadministrationsanddespitepressurefromthecentralgovernment.Ontheotherhand,theKeralaandWestBengalgovernmentsdidnothavemuchdifficultyinintroducingpro-peasantlandreformsdespitetheirrulingpartieshavinglittlesayinthecentralgovernment.TheonlyrealencroachmentbytheCentreonthestates’constitutionally-guaranteedautonomyhasbeen

thefrequentuseoftheConstitutionalprovisionunderArticle356toimposecentralruleintheformofthe

President’sRuleinastate.Thispowerwasdesignedtobeexercisedrarelyandinextraordinarycircumstancessuchasthebreakdownofadministrationorconstitutionalgovernmentinastate.Itwas,however,frequentlyusedduringtheseventiestodismissinconvenientopposition-ruledstategovernmentsortodisciplinethestateunitsoftherulingparty.Fortunately,thismisusewaslargelycheckedlater.Itwould,however,bewrongtosaythatthemisuseofArticle356hadreducedtheautonomyofthestates‘toafarce’.Wemaypointoutintheendthatafederationisnotaweakerformofunion;itisaformofstrongunion

suitabletoadiversesociety.Similarly,astrongCentreandstrongstatesarenotantitheticaltoeachotherinafederation.ThiswasalsotheconclusionoftheSarkariaCommission,appointedin1980toexamineCentre-staterelations.ThefederalprinciplerequiresthatboththeCentreandthestatesshouldbestrongenoughtoperformtheirfunctionsandtodeliverontheirprogrammesandpromises.Noristhereanycontradictionbetweenastrongnation-stateanddecentralizationofpower.Democracy,nationalcohesionanddevelopmentinadiversesocietylikeIndia’srequirenotgreatercentralizationbutgreaterdevolutionofpoweranddecentralizationofdecision-makinganddecision-implementation.Infact,greaterdecentralizationanddevolutionofpowertothethirdtierofgovernment,i.e.,localself-

government,wasabasicpartofthenationalmovement’spolitical-administrativeagendaasalsooftheconstitutionaldesignofindependentIndia.Consequently,anattemptwasmadeinthelatefiftiestotransferagreatdealoflocaladministrativepowertoelectedzilla(district)parishadsandvillagepanchayats,withaviewtodevelopgrassrootsdemocracyandenableeffectivepoliticalparticipationbythepeopleandinvolvethemintheplanningandimplementationofvariousdevelopmentalschemes.Theresultsofthisattemptwere,however,utterlydisappointingbecausethesethird-tierinstitutionsweresoondowngradedandstifledbythebureaucracyandusedbythelandedelitetoenhancethepowertheyalreadyexercisedthroughcontroloverlandandgreateraccesstostateadministrationandlocalbureaucracy.Furthermore,thestategovernmentswereadversetopartingwithanyoftheirpowerstoinstitutionsoflocalself-government.TheonlystateswherethePanchayatiRaj(rule)experimentborefruitintheeightieswereKarnatakaandWestBengal.Thepanchayatshave,however,beenrestructuredonasounderfootingalloverthecountryinrecentyearsandarebeginningtoshowbetterresults.Onemillionoftheirthreemillionmembersarewomen.Ontheotherhand,themunicipalgovernmentinmostofIndia’scitiesandtownscontinuestobeinefficientandcorruptandlackingineffectiveadministrativepower;andtherehasbeenacontinuousdeclineinurbanfacilitiessuchasroads,parks,streetlighting,waterandelectricsupply,sewage,healthcareandsanitation,schoolingandcontrolofcrimeandpollution.

PoliticalParties

Politicalparties,whicharethekingpinsofademocraticpoliticalstructure,havegraduallybecometheweakestlinkinIndia’spoliticalsystem.Politicalpartiesandthepartysystemhavebeendecayingandsufferfromseveralmaladies.Amongtheseare:inter-andintra-partyinstability;intenseinfightingandfactionalismwithinparties;weakandinefficientorganizationinmanyofthem,resultingintheirfragmentation;thecontinuousproliferationofparties,leadingtotheformationofunstablecoalitions;continuousshiftingofloyaltiesofpoliticalleadersandworkersfromonepartytoanother;lackofdemocracyanddebatewithinmostparties;failuretomobilizeandprovidesupporttodevelopmental,welfareandsocialjusticepolicies,withnon-participationandlackofmobilizationoflargesegmentsof

disadvantagedgroupsexceptduringelections.Mostpoliticalpartiesfunctionwithoutanylong-termpoliticalprogrammeordevelopmentaldesignandincreasinglylivefromhandtomouth,divertingpoliticaldebatefromprogrammesandpoliciestoperipheralorpersonalizedissues.Manyofthemrelyuponappealtocaste,religionorregionalchauvinism.Forexample,since1989,all-Indiaelectionshavebeenfoughtoversuchnon-issuesastheBoforsandhawalascandals,thereconstructionofanon-existingtemple,reservationsofafewthousandjobsingovernmentservice,themeritsofaVajpayeeoveraforeign-bornSoniaGandhi,orvictoryoverafewhundredintrudersinKargil.Toretainoracquirepower,politicalpartieshavebeenindulginginunlimitedpopulism,placatingthe

voterswithproliferatinggrantsandsubsidies,promisesoffreeelectricity,cheapriceandsoon.Manypartiesandpoliticalleadershavebeenweakeningpoliticalinstitutionsbyemphasizingtheirpersonalroleandrule.OnesymptomofIndia’spoliticalmalaiseistherefusalofpoliticalleaderstoretire,howeveroldordiscreditedtheymightbe.TheyfirmlybelieveintheoldSanskritproverb:‘Trishnanajeernavayemeshjeenam.’(Itiswewhohavebecomeoldandnotourdesires).Animportantconsequenceisthatthepoliticalleadershiphasbeenlosingauthorityamongthepeople

andis,therefore,unabletomakethenecessaryinstitutionalimprovementsandchangesinsocietyevenifitwantstoandevenwhenitisbackedbytherequiredelectoralmajority.Themoredangerousresultisthattheentirerealmofpoliticshasbeengettingdevalued.Thereisamongthepeopleagrowingdistrustofandacynicismtowardspoliticiansandpoliticalparties.Mostpeopletendtoassociatepoliticsandpubliclifewithhypocrisyandcorruption.Becausepubliclifehasthusbecomesodiscredited,idealisticyoungpeoplehavenotbeenenteringpolitics;thosewhodosoregardpoliticsprimarilyasanavenuefortheirsocialandeconomicmobility.Yet,politicalworkers,leadersandpartiesarecriticaltothefunctioningofpoliticaldemocracyand

goodgovernance.Tosneeratthemortodenigratepoliticsisasurerecipeforpoliticaldisasterandaninvitationtoauthoritarianism,fascismandmilitarism.ThedecayofCongressorganizationhasbeenserioussincethedemocraticpolityhasdevelopedsofar

underitsbroadumbrellaordominance.Foryearsnow,theflabbyCongresspartyorganizationhasdonelittlesystematicpoliticalworkatthegrassrootsandhasbeenlittlemorethananelectoralmachine,thoughithasbecomeincreasinglyineffectiveevenassuch.Aswehaveseenearlier,thoughIndiraGandhisucceededinreplenishingtheparty’ssocialsupport

base,sheweakeneditsorganizationalstructurefurtherbycentralizingitsfunctioningandincreasingitsdependenceonasingleleader.Unfortunately,noalternativepoliticalformationhasemergedtoperformthepoliticalfunctionsCongresshasperformedas‘thecentralintegrativeinstitutionofthesystem.’Congressisstilltheonlynationalpartywhichhasapresenceinallpartsofthecountryandwhichiscommittedtoseculardemocracywithaleft-of-centrepoliticalcharacter.WhenintheOpposition,non-Congresspartieshavefailedtoprovideresponsible,rationaland

effectivecriticism.Wheninpower,asin1977,1989or1998,theyhavenotbeenabletoputforwardanalternativenationaldevelopmentalprogrammeoragenda.Moreover,mostoftenfrom1967tillthisday,withrareexceptionsasinKeralaandWestBengal,theyhaveformedunprincipled,opportunisticalliancestogetintopower,ignoringallideological,programmaticorpolicydifferences.Amongtheoppositionparties,onlyCPMandBJPhavebeenpartialexceptionstotheprocessofthe

decayandinsomecasesdisintegrationanddisappearanceofpoliticalparties.CPM,too,hasbeen

stagnatingforsometime.Ithasbeenrigidanddogmaticbothinitsorganizationalstructureandpoliticalprogrammeandpolicies.Eventhoughithasacceptedthelogicoftheparliamentarydemocraticsystem,itsprogrammefailstoreflectthisrecognitionfully.WhileitspoliticalpracticefollowsEuro-Communismorissocialdemocratic,itsguidingtheoreticalframeworkcontinuestobeStalinist,basedonthenotionoftheviolentoverthrowofthecapitalistsystem.Moreover,ittoohasnonationaldevelopmentalperspectivewithinaparliamentarydemocraticframework.Theonlychoiceitoffersthepeopleisthatofanalternativesocialsystem.BJPistheonlypoliticalpartywhichhasgrowncontinuouslyinrecentyears.ThegrowthofBJPis,

however,ominousnotonlybecauseofitsappealtoreligiousandcommunalsentimentsbutevenmoresobecauseoftheRSSdominationoverit.Itsbasiccadre,leadershipandideologicalframeworkisprovidedbytheRSSwhichseekstoestablishHinduRashtrabasedontheexclusionoftheminorities.Organizationallyandideologicallyundemocratic,theRSSideologyrepresentstheIndianversionoffascism.WithoutRSS,BJPwouldbecome,despiteitscommunaloutlook,justanotherright-wingparty—aright-wingversionofCongress—whichemphasizesHindunessorhasaparticularappealtosomesectionsofHindusinthemanneroftheChristianDemocraticpartiesofItalyandGermanyortheUSRepublicanparty.Thepartyhasgrowninrecentyearsbecauseofthegradualdisappearanceofallotherright-wing

parties,declineofCongress,andthesupportoftheburgeoningmiddleclasses,whichhave,however,hardlyanycommitmenttoequityandsocialjustice.ButBJP,too,isbeginningtosufferfrommanyoftheailmentsofCongressasitgrowselectorallyasanalternativetoitonanall-Indiascale.Inrecentyears,alargenumberofregionalorone-state,one-leaderpartieshavecomeintoexistenceas

aresultofspecificlocalfactors,thedeclineofCongress,andtheimmensepossibilitiesofmakingeconomicgainsthroughpolitics.

Corruption

Theprevalenceoflarge-scalecorruption,growthofcrimeandcriminalizationofpoliticsandpolicehavebecomemajorthreatstoIndia’sdevelopment,democracyandmoralhealth.Thecolonialadministrationwasfromthebeginninginaccessibletothecommonpeopleandriddenwith

corruptionexceptatthetopwheresalarieswereveryhigh.Butbecauseoftheunderdevelopedcharacteroftheeconomyandthelimitedcharacterofthecolonialstate’sfunctioningcorruptionaffectedonlyasmallsegmentofthepeople.However,withtheintroductionofthepermit-licence-quotaregime,shortagesofconsumergoods,andhightaxationduringtheSecondWorldWar,blackmarketing,andtaxevasionbecamewidespread.Butcorruptionhadnotyetpervadedtheadministrationortouchedthepoliticalsystem.Economicdevelopment,arapidandlargeincreaseinthedevelopmentandregulatoryfunctionsofthe

stateopenedupvastareasoftheeconomyandadministrationtocorruption.Politicalpatronagecouldalsonowbeusedtogainaccesstotheeconomicresourcesofthestateandtoacquirepermits,licencesandquotas.ThereweremajorsignalsintheNehruerathatpoliticalandadministrativecorruption,includinglarge-

scaletaxevasion,wasbeginningtoburgeon.Strongandtimelystepscould,however,havecheckedfurthererosionofthesystemasalsoreversedthetrend.Inthefifties,thetentaclesofcorruptionwerenot

yetfar-reachingandmajorbarrierstoitexistedintheformofapoliticalleadershipandcadrewiththeirrootsinthefreedomstruggleandGandhianethos,alargelyhonestbureaucracy,especiallyinitsmiddleandhigherreaches,andajudiciarywithhighintegrity.Butlittlewasdoneinthematter.Nehrudidtakeupindividualcasesofcorruptionbutnostrategywasevolvedtodealwiththerootsoftheproblemandtoactexpeditiously.Asaresult,thescaleofcorruptionwentonincreasingasthegovernmentbegantoassumealargerrole

inthelifeofthepeople.Overtime,thepoliticalsystemtoobegantofallpreytocorruption.Nottackledatthelowerlevels,corruptiongraduallyreachedthehigherlevelsofadministrationandpolitics.Withaddedfillipprovidedbypoliticalpatronage,rampantandall-pervadingcorruptionbegantoengulfandcorrodetheadministration.Corruptionis,however,nolongerthepreserveofthebureaucratsandthepoliticians.Nosectionofsocietyisfreefromit;themedia,academia,theprofessionsandthejudiciaryhavealsogottaintedbyit.Today,sofarasthecommoncitizensareconcerned,corruption,alongwithadministrativedelaysandinefficiency,hasbecomethebaneoftheirlives.Thesavinggrace,however,isthattherearestillalargenumberofhonestofficialsandpolitical

workersandleaders,buttheyareneitherrewardednorgivenrecognitionforbeinghonestandareovershadowedbytheconstantdenunciation,andevenexaggerationofcorruptioninadministrationandpubliclife.AmajorsourceofcorruptionintheIndianpoliticalsystemsincethelatesixtiesisthefundingof

elections.Electionshavebeenbecomingcostlierbythedaygivingunfairadvantagetothosebackedbymoneybagsandblackmoney.Foryears,communalandcasteriotshavebeeninitiatinghooligansintopolitics.Asaresultof

communalismandcasteism,laxityinenforcementoflawandorder,corruption,andtheuseofmoneyandmusclepowerinelectionstherehasbeenthecriminalizationofpoliticsinsomepartsofthecountry,withanexusdevelopingbetweenpoliticians,businessmen,bureaucracy,policeandcriminals.Thetwonakedexpressionofthisunhealthyphenomenonarethelargescaleonwhichmoney,criminalgangsandcivilservantsareusedfor‘booth-capturing’andtorigelectionsinsomestatesandthecriminalrecordsofsomeofthoseelectedtotheparliamentandthestatelegislatures.Onepositivedevelopmentinthisrespect,however,isthegrowingdebateinthecountryonthewaysandmeans—ideological,political,andinstitutional—neededtodealwiththetwinevilsofcorruptionandtheroleofcriminalelementsandmoneypowerinpolitics.

Conclusion

DespiteacertaindisarrayanddeteriorationinsomeofIndia’spoliticalinstitutionstheyhavecontinuedtofunctionandshownaresiliencethathassurprisedmanypoliticalscientistsanddismayedtheprophetsofdoom.Despiteineffectivegovernment,unstablecentralgovernmentsinrecentyears,greaterviolenceinsociety,corruptioninadministrationandpoliticallife,decayinpoliticalpartiesandpartysystem,theprevalenceofwidespreadcynicismregardingpoliticsandpoliticalinstitutions,India’sdemocracyhasshownremarkablevitalityandcontinuestoflourish,anditsinstitutionshavetakendeeproot.Theauthorityoftheelectoralsystemhasgoneunchallengedsofar.Elections,conductedunderthewatchfuleyesofanindependentElectionCommission,stillvalidateleadersandparties.Theweaponofthevoteischerishedandfreelyusedbythepeople,especiallythepoorandtheintelligentsia,toexpresstheir

desires,toshowtheirpreferenceforparticularpoliciesandtopunishattheballot-boxthosewhopromisebutdonotdeliver.Theonlyunfortunatepartisthatasinotherdemocracies,theIndianpoliticalsystemlacksamechanism

throughwhichthedirectionandimplementationofthepoliciespreferredbytheelectoratecanbeenforced.Thereis,therefore,astrongneedtoreformandreinvigoratebothpoliticalandadministrativeinstitutionstomeetthechangedneedsofthetime,especiallythedemandsofthepoorandthedisadvantagedforgreatershareinthefruitsofdevelopmentandforthelesseningoftheiroppression.Theinstitutionsastheyhavefunctionedsofarhavebeengearedtothemaintenanceofthesocialstatusquoandstability;andtheyhavenotperformedthattaskbadly.Buttheyhavetobereshapedfurthertoundertakethenewtwintasksofeconomicdevelopmentandsocialtransformation,mandatedbytheimmensepoliticizationofthepeoplebroughtaboutbythenationalmovementandthefunctioningofdemocracy.Simultaneously,therewasandisalsotheneedtocreatefreshstructuresandinstitutionsthroughwhichthepeople’senergiesareharnessedforthesetwintasks.Clearly,theroleofpoliticalpartiesandpoliticalleadersiscriticalinthisrespect.Whilepoliticalleadersofthetypeandcalibrethrownupbythefreedomstrugglecanperhapsnolongerbeexpected,thefutureoftheIndianpeopledependsagreatdealontheircapacitytoproduceandreproduceleaderswithabasicsocialandpoliticalcommitmenttotheidealsembodiedinthefreedomstruggleandtheConstitution.

38OntheEveoftheNewMillenniumAchievements,ProblemsandProspects

Aswepeerintothefirstdecadeofthenewmillennium,fundamentalquestionsconfrontus.WhathasIndiaachievedsofar?Whatproblemsdoesitface?Andwhatarethetasksandprospectsforthefuture?Today,ournewspapers,weekliesandbooksoncurrentaffairs,besidesmanyintellectuals,tendtosee

Indiasinceindependenceasanareaofdarkness.In1993,awriter,C.Thomas,pithilysummarized,the‘torrentofwretchedness’,thoughnotsharingit,asfollows:

...languageriots,casteriots,communalbloodshed,theassassinationofIndiraGandhiandRajivGandhi,warswithPakistanandChina,secessionisminPunjab,anuprisinginKashmir,bloodshedinAssam,anti-Hindimovementsinthesouth,starvation,corruption,pollution,environmentalcatastrophe,disparitiesofwealthandpoverty,casteprejudice,burningbrides,sati,killinggirlbabies,bondedlabour,child

labour,criminalizationofpolitics,discriminationagainstwomen,humanrightsabuses.1

ThisrancontrarytotheoptimismwhichmanyintellectualsmaintainedtillNehruwasalive.But,asS.Gopal,oneofourtallesthistorians,putitin1984,withthepassageoftime,theNehruerabeganto

...appearmoreandmoreofafadedgoldenage...Itisasif,whenhedied,hetookawholeepochwithhim.TheNehruage,ofconfidentassumptions,highaspirationsandconsiderableachievements,seemstodayavanishedworld.Thereisasickeningsenseoflostidealsandmissedopportunities.Publicserviceisnolongeraselflesspursuit,politicsinIndiahasbecomedispiritedandtheobjectiveswhichhegavehispeople,thensochallenging,nowseemtiredandmuddled...Thecollectiveself-confidenceofIndiahas

receivedseverejolts,makingthepeoplelessoptimisticandeconomicallyself-assuredandmorefragmentedsociallyandpolitically.2

Thereis,ofcourse,muchinIndiaofyesterdayandtodaywhichgivesrisetodespairanddespondencyamongmany,forwhocandenytheexistenceofmasspoverty,grossinequality,intolerableilliteracy,socialinjustice,genderdiscrimination,socialoppression,corruption,casteismandcommunalismandpoorqualityoflifeingeneral.Buttheseandmanyotherweaknessesshouldnotcloudourvision.Thereisnotenoughreasonforustoallowourselvestobestifledinapallofgloom,tobedrownedinaseaofdepression.Certainly,wehavebynomeanssolvedallourproblems—somequiteserious—evenafterfiftyyearsof

independence.NotallthattheIndianpeoplehadhopedtoachieveduringtheheadydaysofthefreedomstruggleorsetouttoaccomplishontheeveofindependencehasbeenachieved.Undoubtedly,seriousdeficiencieshaveremained;freshweaknesseshaveemerged;newdangershavearisen.Still,itwouldbewrongnottoacknowledgethatIndiahasmadesubstantialall-roundprogress;its

achievementsinthelastfifty-twoyearshavebeenconsiderablebyanyhistoricalstandards,especiallyifwekeepinviewthelevelfromwhichitstartedand‘howdifficultwastheterrainalongwhichwehadtotread.’3Vastpolitical,economicandsocialchangeshavetakenplace.Intheprocess,alotofscum,gatheredoverthecenturies,hasalsocometothetop.Butthelegacyofthefreedomstrugglehasheld—andnotgotdilutedsignificantly.ThequalitativeadvancemadebyIndiainmanyareashasbeenignoredby

manybecauseithasoccurredgraduallyandwithoutanyostentationordrama.Indiaisnowpoisedtomakeabreakthroughinmanyareas.Theadvancealreadymadeinthepolitical,economicandsocialspheres,whentakeninitsentirety,shouldgivetheIndianpeoplefaithintheircapacitytofindsolutionstothemanyremainingproblemsandillsoftheirsociety.

NationalUnity

AmajorIndiansuccesshasbeenscoredinthestrengtheningofIndianunitypolitically,economicallyandemotionallyandthepushingforwardofthecomplexprocessofnation-in-the-making.India’simmensediversityhasnothamperedtheprocess,evenwhilethisdiversityhasbeensustainedandhas,infact,flowered.AlsotensionsgeneratedbyimmensesocialchurninghavenotcomeinthewayoffurtherdevelopingthesenseandsentimentofIndianness,ofIndiansbeingonepeople.Therehave,ofcourse,beenseveralchallengestoIndianunitybuttheyhavemostlybeenovercome.The

solutionofthedivisiveofficiallanguageissue,reorganizationoflinguisticstates,refusaltocounterposeregional-culturalidentitiestoIndianidentity,sympathetichandlingoftheproblemsofthetribalsandtheirintegrationintothenationalmainstream,firmtreatmentofseparatistmovementsevenwhenshowinganunderstandingofthefeelingsunderlyingthem,genuineefforts,evenwhennotverysuccessful,toreduceregionalinequality,havegonealongwayinensuringthatIndianunityisnolongerfragileandthattheexistenceofIndiaasaviableandassuredpoliticalentityisunderlittlethreat.Disparitiesbetweenstatesstillremain,buttheydonotthreatenIndianunity,fortheyareoftencaused

byinfirmitiesinternaltoastateandarenottheresultofinternalcolonialismorsub-colonialismwhereabackwardregionissubjectedtoeconomicsubordinationandexploitationbyanothermoreadvancedregionorbytherestofthecountry.Alargenumberofregionalorone-statepartieshavecomeintoexistenceovertheyears.Theyhave

freelyassumedpowerinthestatesandhaveevensharedpowerattheCentrebyallyingwithoneortheothernationalpartyorbecomingpartofanallianceonanall-Indiabasis.Thesepartiesfightforgreateraccesstocentralresourcesandnotfortheirownseparateandfullercontrolovertheregion’sresourcesfortheyalreadyenjoythat.Moreover,Indianpolitics,bothelectoralandnon-electoral,hasincreasinglybecomenationalinnature.

Asaresultofregularcountry-widegeneralelections,thedominantpresenceofall-Indiapoliticalparties,especiallyCongress,nation-widecampaignsoneconomicandpoliticalissues,andtheoperationofall-Indiatransportandcommunicationnetworks,includingradio,TV,newspapersandfilms,asinglepoliticalculture—aunitary‘languageofpolitics’—pervadesallpartsofthecountry.Ithas,therefore,notbeenaccidentalthatevenaftertheendoftheNehruera,theelectoralwavesaffectingthe1971,1977,1980and1984generalelectionswerenationalincharacter,ashasbeenthevictoryoftheBJP-ledNationalDemocraticAllianceinthegeneralelectionof1999.However,regionaleconomicanddevelopmentaldisparitiesstillposeseriousproblemsalongwiththe

communalandcastedivide.Communalism,inparticular,continuestostalktheland.Fordecades,communalforceswerebeingcontainedelectorally,andtheirideologicalspreadwasalsorestricted.Butinthelasttwodecadesorso,therehasbeenaweakeningoftheanti-communalconsensusamongsecularforces.Quiteoften,asin1989,andmorerecentlyin1998and1999,theyhavedirectlyorindirectlyalliedwithcommunalforces,thusgivingthelattercredibilityandrespectability.Communalismistodaythe

chiefthreattoIndianunityforIndiacannotremainastrongandunitednationexceptonthebasisofsecularism.Wehaveseeninchapter24,onPunjab,whatcanhappenifcommunalismisnotdealtwithfirmlyandsquarelyintime,ifreligionisnotcompletelyseparatedfrompoliticsandif,instead,aneffortismadetocompromisewithandconciliatecommunalforces.Inthisrespect,anareaneedingparticularattentionandinnovationisthatofcultureandtradition.Indigenousculturesandtraditionsandpopularreligionsplayanimportantpartinthelifeofapeople.IfthecommunalandobscurantistforcesarenottobepermittedtoappropriateIndia’sculturalheritage,itisnecessaryformodernandsecularforcestoestablishcreativeandcriticallinkswiththecountry’sculturalheritageandtradition.Theyhave,unfortunately,notfullyexploredthisareaofpubliclife.Inparticular,secular,democraticelementsmustdistinguishbetweenreligionasphilosophy,spiritualexperience,guidetomoralityandpsychologicalsolaceandreligionasdogma,bigotryandavehicleforcommunalism.Inanycase,itisverynecessarytocarefullynurturetheprocessofnation-in-the-makingasitisnota

unilinearprocessandcanthereforesuffersetbacksandinterruptionsasitfacesnewchallenges.

DemocraticPoliticalSystems

ThegreatsuccessstoryofindependentIndiahasbeenitssecular,federalandmulti-partypoliticalsystem.Thenationhashadtofacetasksofimmensemagnitudeandconfrontnumerousproblems,e.g.,havingtofunctioninabackwardeconomywithanimpoverishedcitizenry,beingtornbyviolentsocialconflicts,havingtowagethreemajorwarsandfacehighcostsofnationaldefencesince1947,gradualweakeningofmanyofitsinstitutionsandbeingconstantlyunderinternationalpressure.Despiteallthis,thepoliticalsystemhas,however,shownremarkableresilienceandflexibilityandhasstoodthetestoftimeandexhibitedanabilitytoovercomeseveralcrises,forexamplethoseof1967-69andof1974-77.IndiraGandhiwastoputitpithilyinAugust1972whenaskedtolistIndia’sachievementssince1947:‘Iwouldsayourgreatestachievementistohavesurvivedasafreeanddemocraticnation.’4

PoliticalstabilityhasbeenanimportantcharacteristicofindependentIndia’spoliticalsystem.Therehavebeensince1967,rapidchangesofgovernmentsinthestatesandsince1989,attheCentre,butpoliticalstabilityhaspersisted.Differentpoliticalforcesandformationshave,wagedtheirpoliticalbattlesinthepoliticalarenaprescribedbytheConstitution.Changesingovernmentshavetakenplaceaccordingtoconstitutionalanddemocraticrulesandhaveinvariablybeenquietlyandoftengracefullyacceptedbythosevotedoutofpowerbytheparliamentortheelectorate.Peoplehavetakenitforgrantedthatelections,largelyfreeandfairandheldregularly,woulddecidewhowouldrulethecountry,astateorapanchayat.Greaterpoliticalparticipationbythepeople,includinginitsagitationalforms,hasnotledtopoliticalinstability.Thepoliticalsystemhasalsoacquiredmoreorlessunquestionedlegitimacy,thefewwhohave

questioneditsbasictenetshavingfalleninlineintheend.Thus,theCommunistsforseveraldecadeschallenged,thoughonlyintheory,thebasicconstitutionalstructureasbeinggearedtodominationbytheruling,exploitingclasses.ButtodaytheyareamongthemorevocaldefendersoftheConstitution.ThecommunalistshavebeentryingfromtheoutsettounderminethesecularcharacterofIndiansocietyandpolitybuteventheypayverbalobeisancetosecularismthoughtheytrytodistortitscharacterthroughredefinition.Similarly,thoughJayaprakashNarayanquestionedthemulti-partyparliamentarysystemduringthesixtiesandtheearlyseventies,intheendhetooaccepteditaftertheliftingoftheEmergencyin

1977.Itisalsosignificantthatnewaspiringgroupshavebeenincreasinglyfunctioningwithinthebroadparametersofthepoliticalsystemtoadvancetheirinterests.Infact,theverylongevityofthesystem,itscontinuedfunctioningforoverfivedecadeshasgivenitstrengthandenabledittostrikedeeproots.WhatW.H.Morris-Joneswrotein1966isequallyvalidtoday:‘Thecombinationofpoliticalstabilitywiththeestablishmentofafree,andfreelymoving,politicalsystemiswhatweareentitledtocallIndia’spolitical

miracle.’5

EntrenchmentofDemocracy

PerhapsthemostsignificantofIndia’sachievementssince1947isthefirmentrenchmentofpoliticaldemocracyandcivillibertieswhichhavebecomeabasicfeatureofIndianlife.IndiansenjoytodayafreePress,thefreedomtospeak,travelandformassociations,therighttofreelycriticizethegovernment;theyhavecompetitiveelections,unrestrictedworkingofpoliticalparties,anindependentjudiciary,therighttoparticipateinpoliticallifeandtochangethegovernmentthroughtheballot-box,andfreedomfromfearofarbitraryarrest.Indiaaloneamongthepost-colonialcountrieshassustainedademocraticandcivillibertarianpolity

sinceitsinception.CommitmenttodemocraticvalueshasdeepenedovertheyearsamongmostIndians.Paradoxically,eventheexperienceoftheEmergencyunderlinedthisattachment.Thebeliefhasalsotakenrootthatsocialtransformationthroughademocraticpoliticalframeworkispossible.Nationalizationofbanksandseveralindustries,landreforms—evenquiteradicalasinKeralaandWestBengal—andeffectivefunctioningofPanchayatiRaj,withitsprovisionfor30percentreservationofseatsforwomen,andsuccessfulandunopposedworkingofthesystemofreservationsfortheScheduledCastesandTribesinseveralstates,hasshownthatpoliticaldemocracyassuchisnotanobstacletosocialtransformationandsocio-economicreformsinthedirectionofequityandequality.AprominentandpositivefeatureofIndianpoliticaldevelopmentinthepost-independenceperiodhas

beenthesteadilygrowingpoliticalawarenessamongthepeopleandtheirgreaterdirectandindirectparticipationinthepoliticalprocess.Thefreedomstrugglehadalreadypoliticizedlargesectionsofthepeople.Popularagitationaland

electoralpoliticshavepushedthisprocessfurther.Indiahascertainlybecomeovertimeapoliticallymoreactivesocietywithaneverlargernumberofpeopleandsocialgroupsbeingpoliticallymobilizedand‘incorporatedintothebodypolitic’.Thedisadvantaged—women,agriculturallabourers,smallpeasants,theurbanpoor—haveincreasingly

cometobelievethattheirsocialconditionisunjustandiscapableofbeingchangedandthatthedesiredchangecanbebroughtaboutthroughpoliticsandbytheassertionoftheirpoliticalrights.Thepeopleingeneralwantashareinpoliticalpowerandagreatershareofthewealththeyproduce.Theyarealsonolongerwilling.totoleratecertainnakedformsofoppression,discrimination,deprivationandneglect.Forexample,agovernmentwhichwouldletalargenumberofpeopledieinafamine,ashappenedduringthedroughtsinthecolonialperiod,wouldnotlastevenafewweeks.Peoplehavealsobecomeawareofthepowerandvalueoftheirrighttovoteatvariouslevelsfromthe

panchayatstotheparliamentandofthebenefitstobederivedfromitsexercise.Thepoliticsofbooth-capturing,saleandpurchaseofvotes,vote-banksandpatronagehavebeengraduallyrecedingandthevoter’schoicebecomingmoreautonomous.Oneexampleistheincreasingrefusalofwomentovote

accordingtothewishesofthemalemembersofthefamily.Moreover,thepoorandtheoppressednolongeracceptdictatesinregardtotheirchoiceofpartiesandcandidates.Thoughtheyarestillopentopopulistappealsorappealsongroundsofcaste,regionorreligiouscommunity,theycannolongerbeeasilybulliedorbought.Peoplenowtendtovoteaccordingtoissues,policies,ideologiesorgroupinterestssoastogarnergreateradvantagefromthegovernment’sdevelopmentandwelfareschemes.Itistruethattheroleofcasteinelectoralpoliticshasincreasedinrecentyears,butquiteoftencasteas

apoliticalfactorhascomeinprimarilywhenothersocial,economicandpoliticalissueshavebeenabsentintheelectoralarenaorwhensuchissueshavegotgroupedaroundcasteasinthecaseofjobsandeducationalopportunities.However,casteasafactorinpoliticshasinvariablyrecededwhenbroadernationalissueshavecometooccupycentre-stageasinthegaribihataoelectionof1971,theJPMovementof1974-75,theanti-Emergencyelectionof1977andthe1984election,aftertheassassinationofIndiraGandhi,whenthecountrywasseentobeindanger.Thevotershavenotonlybecomemoresensitivetothelargersocial,economicandpoliticalissuesbut

arealsomoreassertiveanddemanding—thepeopletheyvoteforhavetorespondmoreactivelytotheirneedsanddemands.Amajorreasonforthevolatilityofthevoters’behaviourinrecenttimes,resultinginwideswingsinelectoralmandatesistheheightenedvoterexpectationfromtheelectoralprocessandthepressingdemandbythevotersforperformanceandfulfilmentofthepromisesmadeduringelections.Interestingly,electionsatalllevelshaverepeatedlyshownthatpeoplehavelittlehesitationinvotingagainstthoseinpowerbecausetheyarenolongerinaweorfearofpeopleinauthority.Politicizationandmobilizationofthehithertounpoliticized,whichhasbeenacontinuousandongoing

process,hassometimestakentheformofpopularagitations,whichhaveinvolvedmanyoftheurbanandsomeoftheruralsectionsofsociety.Theyhave,however,sofarlefttheruralpooruntouchedinlargepartsofthecountry.Thepoliticsofprotesthasfedondemandsforsocialjustice,ashareinthegainsofdevelopmentandparticipationindecision-making.Ithasgrownasthemoredisadvantagedandoppressedclassesandgroupshavecomeonthepoliticalstage.Powerstruggleandpopularmobilizationinruralareashas,however,oftentakenacasteist-formintheabsenceofmobilizationaroundclassandofstruggleagainstthecastesystemandcasteoppressionanddiscrimination.Amajorsteptowardsfurtherdemocratizationofthepoliticalsystemandgreaterpeople’sparticipation

asalsogreatercontrolovertheirownliveshasbeenrecentlytakenwiththeinaugurationofthefreshlydesignedPanchayatiRaj.

PopularParticipationinPoliticalProcess

Perhapsthemostimportantpoliticaltasktodayistodeependemocracyandmakeitmoremeaningfulforthemassofthepeoplebyenablingtheirgreaterparticipationinthepoliticalprocess.Votinginperiodicelectionsshouldnotberegardedastheformofsuchparticipation.Sofartherehasbeenageneralfailuretopoliticallymobilizethepoorandthedisadvantagedandto

shiftthebalanceofsocialandpoliticalpowerintheirfavour.Thecapitalists,whoaremajorbeneficiariesofeconomicdevelopment,thelandedpeasants,whohavegainedmostfromlandreformsandtheGreenRevolution,theintelligentsia,theprofessionals,andthemiddleclasses,forwhomimmenseopportunitieshaveopenedupafter1947,thegovernmentandpublicsectoremployees,theorganizedworkingclassandtheupperlayersoftheScheduledCastesandScheduledTribes,allhavebeenableto

findvariousmeansofprotectingandpromotingtheirinterests.Theyhavethusbeenabletotiltdemocracyintheirfavour.Butthepoorhavebeenunabletodosotoanygreatextent.Theyhavebeenleftoutofthelargerdecision-makingprocessandhavehadlittlevoiceintheday-to-daydecisionsaffectingtheirlives.Theiraccesstoresourcesbeinggeneratedintheeconomyandthesocialsystemhasremainedlimited.Theyhavebeenunabletoturnthestrengthofnumbersintoeffectivepowerbecausetheleveloftheirmobilizationhasbeenlow.Theirpoliticalself-activityhaslaindormant.Eventheradicalparties,groupsandorganizationshavetendedtoneglecttheirorganizationandmobilization.Thepoordo,ofcourse,attimesriseupinprotestandsometimesevenrevolt,andatelectionsexercise,oftenenthusiastically,theirvotingrightinthehopethatthepersonselectedwouldhelpimprovetheirsocialandeconomiccondition.Butmuchmoreaccountabilitytotheagendaofthepoorisneeded.Thewidestmobilizationofthebottommillionsisalsonecessarybecauseneitherdevelopmentnor

socialchangeandnotevennationalunitycanbefullypromotedwithouttheiractiveinvolvement.Thatthisshouldhavebeenforgottenbytheheirstothefreedomstruggleisironical,forwasnotahallmarkofthatstruggletheactiveroleofthemassesinit?AnddidnotGandhi’sgreatnessliepreciselyinpromotingthenon-violentmobilizationofthecommonpeople,thusmakingIndia’sfreedomstruggleperhapsthegreatestmassmovementinworldhistory.JawaharlalNehru’sdesignfordevelopmentandsocialtransformationtoodependedonactivepressurefrombelow;thathefailedtoimplementhisowndesignisanothermatter.

FormsofPoliticalProtest

Politicalprotest,alongwiththerighttovote,isoneofthebasicingredientsandanormalpartofdemocraticpolitics.Fortheoppressedsectionsofsociety,itisacriticalpartoftheireffectiveparticipationinpoliticsandisessentialfortheexpressionoftheirdemandsandgrievances.Indiais,therefore,goingtohavemore,notless,protestasdifferentsectionsofsocietyawakentopoliticallifeandworkforfasterchangesintheirsocialcondition.Protestmovementsarealsoveryimportantmeansforthepeopletoforcethoseinauthority,particularlythosewieldingpoliticalpower,torespondtotheirdemands.Forthepoor,perhapsthisistheonlymeansofdoingso.Allthisshouldbetakenforgranted.Theimportantquestion,therefore,iswhataretobetheformsofprotestinacivillibertarianrepresentativedemocracy?Asofnow,Indianshave,however,failedtoevolveappropriateformsofprotestoraconsensusonwhattheycanorcannotdo.Popularprotestmovementsbypoliticalparties,students,workers,farmers,governmentemployeesand

commoncitizenshavemostoftentakentheformofdemonstrations,hungerstrikes,hartals,strikesintheworkplaceoreducationalinstitutions,dharnas,bandhs,gheraos,blockagesofroads(rastaroko),satyagraha,civildisobedienceordisobedienceoflaws,leadingtomassarrests,andrioting.Whilesomeoftheseformsofprotestareinherentlycoercive,othersmoreoftenthannotculminateinviolenceandbreakdownoflawandorderandwantonviolationoflawsdulyenactedbyelectedlegislaturesorruleslaiddownbythoseauthorizedtodoso.Inmanycasestheprotesterscoerceintojoiningtheiractionstheverypeopletheyaresupposedtorepresent.Theprotest,especiallyintheformofdemonstrations,quiteoftenendsupinattacksoncars,buses,trains,goveriunentandprivateproperty,collegebuildingsandsoon.Thesituationisquiteoftenworsenedbyanover-reactionandanequallyandoftengreaterviolentresponsebytheauthoritiesandthepolice,leadingoftentoaviciouscircle.

Thepurposeofsuchprotestmovementsis,however,nottoconvincetheconcernedauthorityofthejustnessoftheirdemands,ortowinitoverby‘changinghisheart’,touseaGandhianphrase,buttoerodeitsauthorityandtocoerceittoaccepttheirdemands.Theblameis,ofcourse,nottobeputonlyononeside,viz.,theprotesters.Onereasonwhymanytaketoviolentprotestisbecausethoseinpowerturnadeafeartopeacefulprotestandrespondonlytoviolentagitations.Inthisrespect,whatMyronWeinerwrotein1962continuestohaverelevance:

Onlywhenpublicorderisendangeredbyamassmovementisthegovernmentwillingtomakeaconcession,notbecausetheyconsiderthedemandlegitimate,butbecausetheythenrecognizethestrengthofthegroupmakingthedemandanditscapacityfordestructiveness.Thus,thegovernmentoftenalternatesbetweenunresponsivenesstothedemandsoflargebutpeacefulgroupsandtotal

concessiontogroupsthatpresstheirdemandsviolently.6

Inotherwordsnotonlytheorganizersofpopularagitationsmustnotcoercetheauthoritiesbuttrytochangetheirhearts,thelattertoomustbewillingtoundergoachangeofheartwhenevertheprotestors’demandsarejustified.Webelievethatjustastheefforttopreventorsuppresspeacefulprotestisundemocratic,violent

protesttooposesathreattothefunctioningofdemocracy.Wemayraiseanotherquestioninthiscontext.Isevensatyagrahaornon-violentdisobeyingoflaws

legitimateinademocraticsystem,and,ifso,underwhatconditionsorcircumstances?Forsomeinsightsonthis,wemayturnforguidancetoGandhiji,theoriginatorofsatyagrahaandinwhosenameprotestmovementshaveoftenbeenlaunchedafterindependence.OntheeveofindependenceGandhijiwarnedthepeoplethatsatyagrahaandcivildisobediencewouldnolongerbetheappropriatetechniqueinfreeIndiaagainstagovernmentelectedbythepeoplethemselves.EvenagainsttheBritish,heinsistedonsatyagrahaandcivildisobediencebeingcompletelynon-violentinwordanddeed.Inanycase,theyweretobe‘theweaponoflastresort’wheregrossinjusticeorimmoralactionbythegovernmentorotherauthoritieswasinvolvedandallothermethodsofredressalhadbeentriedandfailed.TheformsofprotesttriedoutinindependentIndiainimitationofGandhiji’smethodsare,infact,moreakintowhathedescribedasduragraha.WemaygivealongquotationfromtheConquestofViolencebytheGandhianscholar,JoanV.Bondurant,tomakethecleardifferencebetweensatyagrahaandduragrahaasGandhijiperceivedit:Intherefinementoflanguagefordescribingtechniquesofsocialaction,duragrahaservestodistinguish

thosetechniquesinwhichtheuseofharassmentobscuresorprecludessupportiveactsaimedatwinningovertheopponent...Inthoseinstanceswheredemocraticprocedureshavebeendamagedthroughdefaultordesign,andwherethelegalmachineryhasbeenturnedtowardsatravestyofjustice,civildisobediencemaybecalledintoplay...Butifcivildisobedienceiscarriedoutinthestyleofduragraha,andnotwithintheframeworkofsatyagraha,itmaywellleadtowidespreadindifferencetolegalityandlenditselftothosewhowoulduseillegaltacticstounderminefaithindemocraticprocesses.7

Gandhijiwouldneverhaveadvisedgivingupofprotestwhichwastohimthebreathofthelifeofacitizen.ButhewouldalsonothavefollowedtheroutewhichsomeoftheGandhiansandmostofthenon-Gandhianshavefollowedsincehisdeath.Smallermencouldonlyimitatehim.Hewould,however,have,ashedidpromise,innovatedand

evolvednewformsofprotestasalsopoliticalactivismsuitedtoaself-governing,democraticandcivillibertarianpolity.Thatisalsothetaskwhichleadersandorganizersofpopularprotestshouldundertake

today.ThatthiscanbedoneisshownbytheCivilRightsMovementinUSAandtheanti-nuclearpeacemovementinBritain.

EconomicPerformance

IndependentIndia’seconomyhasbeenquitevibrantanditsperformanceonthewholesatisfactory,aschapters25to31bringout.Ithasmadelongstridesinalmostallitsdifferentaspectsthoughtheextentofachievementisnotwhatwaspossibleandwhatwasneeded.Indiahasovercomeeconomicstagnationandbrokenthroughtheviciouscircleofpoverty-

underdevelopment-poverty.Ithasalsobrokenfromthecolonialeconomicstructureandhasbeensuccessfulinlayingthefoundationsofaself-reliant,independenteconomy.IthasthusfulfilledthedesignofthefoundersoftheRepublic,togofrompoliticalindependencetoeconomicindependence.Indiahasnotbeenautarchicorself-sufficientorbasedonnationalseclusion,livingwithinitsownshell

likeacocoon.Thatwasinanycasenotpossible.Itcouldonlydevelopasanintegralpartoftheworldeconomy.ButindependentIndia’sintegrationwiththeworldeconomyhasbeendifferentfromthatofthecolonialperiod;itisbasedontheneedsofIndia’sautonomousdevelopmentandfreeofsubordinationtotheeconomiesoftheadvancedcapitalistcountriesofwesternEuropeandNorthAmerica.NorhasforeigncapitalanylongerastrangleholdonIndianeconomy.Infact,dependenceofindependentIndiaonforeigncapitalandforeignaidhasbeenquitelow.Today,neitherfinancenoranymajororeconomicallystrategicindustryisunderthecontrolofforeigncapital.MultinationalcorporationshavealsoplayedarelativelyminorroleintheIndianeconomy.However,foradvancedtechnologyIndiastillcontinuestobedependentonsomeindustrializedcountries.Immediatelyafterindependence,Indiasuccessfullydevelopedaneconomicpatternofitsown,namely,

amixedeconomy,whichplacedequalemphasisontheactiveeconomicroleofthestateandthemarketanddevelopedacomplementaryrelationshipbetweenthepublicandtheprivatesectors.Inthelastdecadeofthemillennium,Indiahasalsobeenabletocarrythrougheconomicreforms;dismantlingbureaucraticcontrolsandthelicence-quotarajanddevelopingacloserintegrationwiththeworldeconomy,throughagradualprocess,withouthurtingtheeconomyorthepeople’slivingstandards.Indiahasalsobeenabletotransformitslandlord-ridden,semi-feudalagrarianstructure,thoughwith

manyweaknessesandnottothebenefitofthelandless.Indiahashadconsistentgrowthovertheyearsinagricultureandindustryandinnationalincome.Indian

economyhasbeenremarkablystableandlittlesusceptibletoworldcyclicalswings.Itwasabletowithstandwithoutseriousdamagethreemajoradversitiesintheworldeconomy:theoil-shockoftheseventies,thecollapseofthesocialistcountriesofEuropewithwhichIndiahadcloseandsignificanteconomicties,andtheEastandSouth-eastAsianeconomiccrisisof1997.Itwasalsoabletorecoverfromthe1991fiscalandforeignexchangecrisiswithoutseriouscostordislocation.Stagnationofthecolonialperiodinagriculturalproductionandproductivityhascometoanendwith

agriculturegrowingmorethanthreeandahalftimessince1950.Indiahasachievedself-sufficiencyinfoodwithfoodgrainsproductionhavinggrownat3percentperyear.Famineshavebecomeadistantmemory,despiteperiodicdroughts.Theeffectofthemonsoonsonagriculturalproductionlessenswiththepassageoftime.

Industryhasgrownmorethanseventeentimessince1950.Ithas,moreover,undergonestructuraltransformationandconsiderablediversification.Theweaknessinthebasicandcapitalgoodssectorhasbeenovercometoaconsiderable,thoughnottothedesirableextent.Theshareofthissectorintotalindustrialproductionhasgoneupsharply,andIndia’sdependenceontheadvancedcountriesforbasicgoodsandcapitalequipmenthasbeengreatlyreduced.Therehasalsobeenamassiveexpansionofpower,transportandbankingsectors.Indiahasalso

becomemoreorlessself-sufficientindefenceproductionwithcapacitytoproducelong-rangemissilesandatomicweapons,thoughitstillhastopurchasesomeitemsofhighlysophisticateddefenceequipmentfromabroad.Ithasalsoacquiredalargetrainedscientificandtechnicalforce.India’snationalincomehasgrownmorethanseven-foldsince1950anditspercapitaincomebytwo

andahalftimesdespiteaveryhighrateofpopulationgrowth.ReferringtotheIndianeconomy,asympatheticscholar,FrancineR.Frankel,hadwrittenin1978:

‘Duringmuchofthelater1960sandintothe1970s,therewerechronicfoodshortages,sharpinflationarypricespirals,lowavailabilityofdomesticrawmaterials,shortfallsinindustrialoutput,underutilizedcapacityinconsumergoodsindustries,stagnantordecliningratesofpublicinvestment,anddiversionofscarceforeignexchangeforimportsoffoodgrainsandrawmaterials.’8Suchasituationisnoteasytoconceivetoday.AndherpredictionthatIndiawaslikelyto‘returntoalow-levelequilibriuminwhichgrowthratesdidnotsignificantlyexceedtherateofpopulationincrease’9wasprovedfalseintheeightiesitself.Indiahasduringthelastfewyearsenteredaperiodofhigheconomicgrowthandisonthewayto

becominganimportantglobaleconomicpower.Assuchitisboundtoplayamajorroleintheworldeconomyofthetwenty-firstcentury.

EconomicProblemsandDangers

AllthesametheeconomicproblemsthatIndiaisyettosolveareenormous.Itislikelytofacemajornewchallengesinthefirstfewyearsofthenewmillennium.Indiaisstillapoorandbackwardcountrybyworldstandards,andtheeconomicgapvis-à-vistheadvancedcapitalistcountrieshaswidenedinsteadofgettingnarrowed.Thisisespeciallytrueofthetechnologicalgapbetweenthetwo.DespitethelongstridesIndianeconomyhastaken,itstilldoesnotmanagetofullysatisfythebasicneedsofallofitspeople,whattospeakoftheiraspirations,inpartbecauseoftheskewedincomedistribution.NorisIndia’seconomicindependenceirreversible.Wearelivinginaworldcapitalistsystemwhichis

utterlyunequalandstilldividedintocoreandperipheralcountries.Theworldsystemevennowconsistsofcompetingsovereignstatesandnationaleconomies;andthecore,developedcountriesdoeverythingtomaintaintheirprivilegedpositionintheworldeconomywhiletryingtoweakenstillfurthertherelativepositionofthestatesandeconomiesoftheperiphery.India’seconomicdevelopment,thoughindependentsofar,hasnotreachedthatstagewhereitseconomybecauseofbeingincorporatedintoandintegratedwiththeworldcapitalistsystem,nolongerfacesthedangerofre-peripheralization,thatis,subordinationandsubserviencetothecoreeconomies.UnderNehruandIndiraGandhiitwasattemptedtobridgethegapbetweenIndiaandtheadvanced

countriesbyconcentrationonheavyindustryandelectricitygeneration.Thiswasanecessarytaskfor

IndiahadtocompressinafewdecadeswhatEuropehadachievedinmorethan150years.Butwhilewewererunningtocatchupwiththepast,thepresentwasmovingintothefutureintheadvancedpartsoftheworld.WhilethevisionandtheobjectivesoftheNehruera—thatofcatchingupwiththewesternworldwhilebeingself-reliantandretainingeconomicindependenceandonthatbasisbuildingamoreegalitarianandjustsociety—havetocontinuetoinspiretheIndianpeople,themeansandgoalsoftechnologicaltransformationhavetoundergoachange.Theworldeconomyhasenteredanew,momentousphase.Applicationofsciencetoindustry,agriculture,tradeandcommunicationhastakenanotherleapforward.Today,economicdevelopmentorthefourthindustrialrevolutionisbasedonmicro-chip,bio-

technology,informationtechnology,newsourcesofenergyandadvancedmanagerialtechniques.Alltheserelyoverwhelminglyonthedevelopmentofintellectorwhatmaybedescribedas‘brain-power’orthedevelopedscientific,technical,managerialandotherintellectualcapacitiesofthecitizens.Thereiseverydangerthattheremaybeanewinternationaldivisionoflabourwhereadvancedtechnology,researchanddevelopmentandother‘brain’activitieswouldgetconcentratedincurrentlyadvancedorcorecountrieswhileIndiaandotherunderdevelopedanddevelopingcountrieswouldbeconfinedtoproductionoftraditionalconsumerandproducers’goodsandto‘muscleandnerves’activities.Thedangerofperipheralizationalsotakestheformofdominationthroughtheinvestmentoffinancialor

industrialcapital.But,obviously,notallforeigncapitalinvestmentposesthisdanger.Indianeconomy,theIndiancapitalistclassandtheIndianstatehavereachedastagewheretheycandefinitelytakeinacertainquantumofforeigncapital,especiallytoservethedualpurposesofabsorptionoftechnologyandorganizationalstructuresandskillsandprovideadegreeofcompetitiontoindigenousentrepreneurs,privateorstate.WhatIndiahastoavoidisthepatternofLatinAmericanstyledependentdevelopmentwherethemultinationalcorporationscontrolkeyeconomicsectorsandpositionsanddeterminethepredominantpatternsofinternalproductionandinternationalexchange.Thereisthegreatdangerthatthoughforeigncapitalinvestmentwouldresultinindustrialdevelopmentitwouldsimultaneouslyperpetuatetechnologicalbackwardnessrelativetotheadvancedcapitalistcountries.WhilesomeindustriesoftheearlierphasesorevenofthelatestphaseofindustrialrevolutionwouldbetransferredtoIndia,theadvanced‘brain’activitieswouldlargelycontinuetobekeptoutofitandwouldremainthemonopolyofthecore,thatis,advancedcountries.Whilethereisaneedtomoderateourformerhostilitytoforeigncapital,thepolicyofcontrollingitsdirectionandrolehastobecontinued.BecausethelatestphaseoftheIndustrialRevolutionisbasedonbrain-activity,education,especially

highereducation,acquiresgreatsignificance.However,itsqualityandnotmerelyitsspreadisimportant.Thefactthattheeducationimpartedtotheoverwhelmingmajorityofstudentsinruralaswellasurbanareasisofextremelylowqualitymeansthatthecountryisdeprivedofthevastpotentialofitsbrain-power.Infact,thisweaknessmaybedescribedasinternalbraindrain.Thetaskofrenovatingtheutterlyinsufficientanddefectiveeducationalsystem,therefore,acquiresaddedurgency.Anypopulisteffort,initsmanyguises,toneglectthequalityofeducationhastobeopposed,forthecostofneglectinthissphereisasgreatastheneglectofmachine-makingandothercapitalgoodsindustriesintheearlierperiods.Forvariousreasons,Indiahasbeensubjectedtolarge-scalebraindraintotheUnitedStatesand

Europe.Waysandmeanshavetobefoundtopreventandreversethistrend.MorethanNRI(Non-

ResidentIndian)capitalweneedtheNRIsphysicallybackinIndia;andwehavetofindwaystosomehowcheckthecontinuingoutflow.Planningandanactiveroleofthestateineconomicdevelopment,includingtheroleofthepublicsector

inproduction,stillretaintheirgreatsignificanceforwithoutthemIndiacannothopetocompeteinthenewtechnologysector.However,thepublicsectorhastobenotonlymaintainedbutalsomademoreproductivethroughthemoreefficientuseofresourcesandcompetitionwiththeprivatesector.Italsoneedstobefreedfromthestrangleholdofpoliticalpatronageandtheill-fittingandincompetentbureaucracy.

TheAreasofDarkness

Wideprevalenceofpoverty,inequalityandsocialinjusticeandthepoorqualityoflifeofthevastmajorityofthepeoplearethemajorareasofdarknessinIndia’ssocialandeconomicdevelopment.TheIndianpeopleenterthetwenty-firstcenturywithalowpercapitaincome,anintolerablelevelofilliteracyandalowlypositionontheworldindexofhumanresourcesdevelopment,despitecommendableachievementsintermsofeconomicgrowthandpoliticaldemocracy.Achangeinthesocialandeconomicconditionofthepeoplehasoccurredsinceindependencebutattooslowarate.Puttingforwardthesocialobjectivesofplanningbeforetheparliamentin1954,JawaharlalNehruhad

said:Wearestartingplanningforthe360millionhumanbeingsinIndia...Whatdothe360millionpeoplewant?...itisobviousenoughthattheywantfood;itisobviousenoughthattheywantclothing,thattheywantshelter,thattheywanthealth...Isuggestthattheonlypolicythatweshouldhaveinmindisthatwehavetoworkforthe360millionpeople;notforafew,notforagroupbutthewholelot,

andtobringthemuponanequalbasis.10

WhenplacingtheSecondFiveYearPlanbeforetheparliament,Nehrudefinedsocialistsocietyasa‘societyinwhichthereisequalityofopportunityandthepossibilityforeveryonetoliveagoodlife.’11

Theseobjectiveshavebeenonlypartiallyfulfilled.Ahumane,egalitarianandjustsocialorderhasstilltocomeintoexistence.Fortoomany,‘agoodlife’isstillapieinthesky.Wehavedealtwithsocialinjusticeandtheeffortstoovercomeitinchapters34and35.Inthenexttwo

sectionswewilldealwiththeproblemsofpovertyandthequalityoflife.

Poverty

Inoverfiftyyears,independentIndiahasfailedtoeradicatepovertydespiteconsistenteconomicgrowth.Thisisamajorblotonitsrecord.Yet,itisalsotruethatthoughpovertyremains,ithasbeenlessened.Intheearlysixties,thePlanningCommissionformulatedtheconceptofthepovertyline.Belowthis

linewerepeoplewhoseconsumption,especiallyoffoodgrains,didnotcomeuptoaminimumlevelintermsofcalories.Whilenofigureswereavailableforthecolonialperiodortheearlyyearsafterindependence,itwascalculatedthatin1970-71nearly59percentofthepopulationwaslivingbelowthepovertyline.Sincethen,thisfigurehasbeensteadilygoingdown.Ithaddeclinedto51.3in1977-78,44.5in1983,and36in1993-94.Theobversesideofthesefiguresisthatover300millionpeople,equaltothepopulationofIndiaatthemomentoffreedom,arestillbelowthepovertyline.Moreover,povertyvariesacrossdifferentstates,beingashighas63percentinBihar,and20percentinPunjabandHaryanain

1993-94.Themainbruntofpovertyisbornebylandlessagriculturallabourers,smallandmarginalfarmersandtheurbanpoor.Thereductioninpovertylevelswaslargelytheresultofvariousanti-poverty,mostlyemployment

generating,programmesinitiatedinthemid-seventiesbytheIndiraGandhigovernmentundertheguidanceofoneofIndia’sfinestandsociallycommittedeconomists,SukhamoyChakravarty.Theseprogrammeshavebeenpursuedmorevigorously,thoughstillinadequatelyfinanced,since1984-85.Asthefiguresshow,theyhavehadasignificantimpactdespitecorruptionandthefailuretoalwaysreachthetargettedgroups.ParticularlyeffectivehasbeentheEmploymentGuaranteeScheme(EGS)inMaharashtra.Inthiscontext,itmaybepertinenttopointoutthatwhatmadepossiblethetaking-upandimplementationoftheanti-povertyprogrammes,wastheradicalrestructuringoftheIndianeconomybroughtaboutbytheNehruvianplanningstrategyduringthefiftiesandsixties.Evenapartfromtheproofofthepovertylinestatistics,itisobservedthatIndiansnolongerlivein

abysmalpovertyastheydidundercolonialism.Themassstarvationofthatperiodhasbeenconquered.IndiahasnothadamajorfaminesincetheBengalfamineof1943.Intheworstdroughtofthecenturyin1987-88veryfewdiedofhungerordisease.Thesamewastheexperienceoftheseriousdroughtsof1965-67and1972-73.Similarly,inthecolonialperiodandtheimmediatepost-independenceyearsavastnumberofIndians

wentwithouttwomealsaday,severalmonthsinayear,andsometimeswithoutevenonemeal.Arecentstudyhasshownthatthenumberofpeoplewhocouldnotobtaintwosquaremealsadayhaddroppedto19percentofthehouseholdsin1983andtolessthan5percentin1994.12

Thereductionintheincidenceofpovertyisalsoindicatedbythegreateravailabilityoffoodgrainsandotherfooditemsovertheyears.Forexample,whilepercapitafoodgrainsconsumptionfellbyover24percentbetween1901and1941,itincreasedfrom394.9gramsperdayin1951to468.8gramsperdayin1971and507.7gramsperdayin1995—anoverallincreaseof28percent.Thisgrowthinavailabilityisalsoevidentinthecaseofseveralotheritemsofconsumption.Theannualavailabilityofclothperheadwas9metresin1950,15metresin1960and29.3metresin1995.Thechartbelowpresentsthepictureofannualperheadavailabilityofcertainotherimportantarticlesofconsumption.

Similarly,from1950to1996,productionofmilkhasincreasedfourtimes,from17milliontonsto68.3milliontons,ofeggsmorethanfifteentimes,from1,832millionto28,400million,andfishmorethanseventimes,from752thousandtonsto5388thousandtons.Wehavealreadypointedoutearlier,thatpercapitaincome,acrucialaspectofstandardofliving,has

increasedby250percentfrom1950to1995.From1975to1995,ithasgrownattherateof2.8percentperyear,whichcomparesfavourablywiththeratesofincreaseinpercapitaincomeinadvancedcountriesatacomparativestageofdevelopment:Britain(1.34percentfrom1855to1967),France(1.7percentfrom1861to1966),Germany(1.83percentfrom1850to1967),andtheUSA(1.75percentfrom1834to1967).Still,theincidenceofpovertyandespeciallyendemicundernourishment,particularlyamongchildren,

isverymuchthere,thoughnotstarkhungerorutterdestitution,exceptamongtheveryoldandthehandicapped.Adentinpovertyhasbeenmade,thoughitisnotdeepenough.Theproblemofpovertyhasbeenfurthercompoundedbytheexistenceofglaringinequality,socialand

economic.Whilethepoorhavenotbecomepoorerandhavederivedsomebenefitfromeconomicgrowth,thegapbetweenthemandtherichhasgrownbeforeourveryeyes.Thefruitsofthisgrowthandtheresultingsignificantriseinnationalincomehavebeendisproportionatelygatheredbyafewbelongingtotheupperandtoacertainextentmiddlelayersofsociety.Maldistributionofincome,opportunitiesandpowerhasbeen,moreover,builtintotheverysocialandclassstructureofthecountry.Withtheonsetofliberalizationoftheeconomyandeconomicdevelopmentonthebasisof‘theanimalspiritsofthecapitalists’,inequalityislikelytogrowunlesscounter-stepsaretaken,evenifeconomicdevelopmentissomewhathurt.

TheQualityofLife

Evenapartfromtheproblemofpoverty,thequalityoflifeofthemassesinIndiaisanothermajorareaofneglectastheirphysicalandsocialneedshavenotbeenmetevenataminimallydesiredlevel.Someprogresshasbeenmadeinthisrespectbutithasbeentardyandinadequate.Indiahasbeenquiteweakintheall-roundtransformationofhumancondition.Itsrecordisquitedismalwhencomparedevenwiththatoftheotherdevelopingcountries.Inthelatestindexofhumandevelopment,anothernameforthemeasurablepartsofthequalityoflife,compiledbytheUnitedNationsDevelopmentProgramme(UNDP)in1999,Indiaoccupiesthe132ndpositionamongthe174nationscovered.Qualityoflifeencompassescertainimmeasurablecomponents,suchaslove,humanrelationships,

appreciationofarts,music,literature.Butprogressorlackofitinsomeofitsothercomponentscanbemeasured.Wewillfirsttakeupthreeofthesepertainingtohealthandeducation-lifeexpectancyatbirth,infantmortalityrate(MR)andliteracy—whicharemostcommonlyusedindiscussionsonthesubject.Acomparisonofthepost-independencerecordinthesefieldswiththatofthecolonialperiodshows

thatIndia’sperformancehasbeenquitecreditableduringthelastthreedecades.This,despitethefactthathealthandeducationaretwoareaswhichhavereceivedlowpriorityfromsuccessivecentralandstategovernmentsinIndia.However,averybriefcomparisonofthestatisticalprogressmadebysomeothercountriessuchasChinaandSriLanka,revealshowfarwearelaggingbehindinregardtotheseimportantareasandwhatwestillhavetoachieve.

AnIndian’slifeexpectancyatbirthwhichwas32yearsin1950roseto45.6yearsin1970andto63yearsin1998—verycreditableindeed.Butitwasalready69.8and73.1yearsin1997inChinaandSriLankarespectively.TheriseinlifeexpectancyinIndiawasbasicallytheresultofthesteepfallindeathrateperthousandfrom27.4in1940to14.9in1970and8.9in1997.Infantmortalityrateper1,000livebirthswhichwas227in1941hadfallento130in1970andto71in

1997.However,itwasmuchlowerforChina(38)andSriLanka(17)in1997.AnothersadfactobservedisthattoomanywomenstilldieinIndiaduringchildbirth.ThecurrentmaternitymortalityrateperhundredthousandlivebirthsinIndiaisashighas507comparedto95inChinaand140inSriLanka.Onereasonforthisisthat60percentofallchildbirthsinruralIndiaarestillattendedtoonlybyuntrainedpersons.PerhapsIndia’sbiggestfailureisthecontinuationofhighilliteracyamongitspeople.In1950,nearly

82percentIndianswereilliterate;thisfigurewasstillashighas38percentin1997.ThecomparativefiguresforChinaandSriLankawereaslowas17.1and9.3percentrespectively.Moreover,thegendergapincaseofliteracywasastonishinglyhighinIndia,nearlytwiceasmanywomenbeingilliterateasmen.Ashasbeenshowninearlierchapters,India’srecordinhigherandtechnicaleducationisfarbetter.

Also,therehasbeenrapidexpansionofschooleducationinthelastdecadewithincreaseinthepercentageofschool-agechildrengoingtoschoolandover88percentvillagesbeingprovidedwithprimaryschools.Theflipsideisthedeteriorationinthequalityofeducationbothinthecaseofschoolsandinstitutionsofhighereducationinrecentyears.Withrareexceptionsthesystemofpubliceducationhasbecomevirtuallydysfunctionalwiththe‘cooperation’ofallconcerned—thegovernment,politicalparties,educationaladministrators,teachers,parentsandstudents.Thestandardofruralschoolshasfallensolowthatquiteoftenachild,whohasspentfiveyearsinschool,isnotabletoreadorwriteatallandis,atthemost,abletowriteonlyhisname,ifeventhat.Healthcare,especiallyinruralareas,isanotherareaofhumandevelopmentthathasbeengrossly

neglectedinthelastfiftyyears.Forexample,duringthelastdecade,19percentofIndianshadnoaccesstosafewater,25percenttohealthservices,71percenttosanitation.53percentofIndianchildrenunderfiveareunderweight,thoughthisratiohasbeendeclininginthelastfewyears.Thebrightspotinthisrespectisthegreatsuccessoftheprogrammesfortheimmunizationofchildrenagainstpolio,smallpox,tuberculosis,diphtheria,tetanusandwhoopingcough.Asinthecaseofeducation,inthefieldofpublichealthtoo,thequalityofservicesprovidedisquite

poorinmoststates,especiallyoftheHindibelt.ThehousingsituationshowsimprovementinruralareasofIndiawherethenumberofpuccahouseshas

increaseddramatically,butithasbeendeterioratinginurbanareas,withmillionsbeinghomelessandlivingonpavementsorinjhuggis(shanties),unprotectedfromsun,rainorcoldandwithhardlyanyprovisionforwater,electricityorsanitation.Evenotherwise,Indiancitieshavebeendeclininginregardtomanyaspectsofthequalityoflife—sanitation,housing,transport,electricsupply,schooling.Alsothereisverylowconsumption,especiallyinruralareas,ofgoodswhichmakelifeeasierand

morejoyful:scootersandmotorcycles,radios,electricfans,room-coolers,telephones,televisions,electricorgasorevencoalchullahs,refrigerators,washingmachines,thoughtheiruseiswayabovethatatthetimeofindependence.

Ontheotherhand,thenumberoftownsandvillageselectrifiedhasexpandedrapidlysince1950.Inthenineties,nearly43percentoftheruralandalmostalltheurbanhouseholds,exceptthejhuggis,haveacquiredelectricconnections.Electricitygenerationhasgoneupfrom5.1billionkilowatthours(kWh)in1950to434billionKWhin1996.Indians,bothruralandurban,havealsoacquiredgreateraccesstomediaandentertainment:newspapers,magazines,films,musicandtelevision.Theprevalenceoflarge-scaleunder-andunemploymentinIndiaalsohasahighlyadverseimpacton

thequalityoflifeandnotonlyatthelevelofphysicalexistence.Economicdevelopmenthasfailedtocreateenoughjobsinindustryandservicestomakeaseriousimpactontheunemploymentofthelandlessandtheruralandurbaneducated,thusintroducingseriouspsychological,socialandeconomicdisequilibriumintheirlives.Wemaymakeafewotherobservations.Bothintermsofdevelopmentandpovertyandthequalityof

life,thereexistsagreatdealofdisparitybetweendifferentstatesandamongtheirsub-regionswhichhastoberectified.Animprovementinthequalityoflifeorintheindicesofhumandevelopmentwouldinvariablyrequirethestatetoplayamoreactiveroleinthesocialsectorthanbefore.Agriculturallabourersandmarginalandsmallpeasants,withnoorsmallpatchesoflandand

increasinglyunabletogetemployment,arethemostdeprivedsectionofIndiansocietyinallaspectsofthequalityoflifeandstandardofliving.Theysuffermorethanothersfrompovertyanddiseaseandlackofeducation,housing,healthfacilities,protectedwatersupply,sanitation,electricity,andculturalandentertainmentfacilities.Theyarealsolikelytobethegreatestvictimsofcastediscriminationandcasteoppression.Theyarealsoleastorganized,inclassorganizationsandleastinvolvedinpoliticalprocesses.

PromisesToKeep

Nodoubtwestillhave‘promisestokeepandmilestogo...’Westillfacethechallengesofpoverty,disease,illiteracy,inequality,socialbackwardness,andgenderandcastediscriminationandoppression.Butthereisnogroundforpessimismorresignation,forfrustrationorlackofpride.Manyofourcurrentproblemsaretheoutcomeofthetremendouschangeswehaveundergoneandnotbecauseofregressionorstagnation.Despitemanymaladiesandshortfalls,Indiahasimpressiveachievementstoitscreditintheeconomicand,politicalarena.Ithasmadesignificantprogresstowardssocialjustice.Asaresultofeconomicdevelopmentandtransformationoftheagriculturalandindustrialproductionbaseofsocietyduringthelasthalfcentury,Indiahasnowtheresourcestofurtheritssocialagenda.Theearlierdebatewhetherapoorsocietycouldpursuesocialjusticeisnolongerrelevant.Thereisnolongeranyneedtocounterposeincreaseinproductionandproductivitytotheremovalofpovertyandbetterdistributionofwealthandopportunities.Nehru’sdilemmaastohowtocombinedevelopmentwithequityhasalsodisappeared,forwecannowachievethis.Itwould,therefore,notbewrongtoexpectandtopredictthatinthenextdecadeorsoIndiaislikelytomakeimmenseprogress,toalmosttakealeapforward,intransformingthelivesofthemassofthepeopleandgivethemadecentstandardofliving.Themajorreasonforouroptimismliesinourbeliefthatavibrantdemocracycanfindasolutionfor

theseproblems.Women,theruralpoorandtheoppressedcasteshaveincreasinglycometobelievethatabetter,morehumanelifeispossible.Theyhavewokenuptothepoliticalpowerthatinheresinthem.India’sdemocraticpoliticalsystem,despitemanyweaknesses,providesthemtheframeworkinwhichto

exercisethatpower.Thepowerofthepeopleinademocracyisthe‘liberatingdeluge’thatcan,andwearesurewill,sweepawaytheaccumulateddirtoftheages.Thisis,ofcourse,allthemorereasonforthepreservationanddeepeningofdemocracyinIndia.

Notes

1.Introduction1.SeligS.Harrison,India—TheMostDangerousDecades,Madras,1960,p.338.2.QuotedinNormanD.Palmer,‘India’sFourthGeneralElection,’AsianSurvey,Vol.7,No.5,May1967,p.277.

3.W.H.Morris-Jones,PoliticsMainlyIndian,Bombay,1978,pp.131-2.4.TheCollectedWorksofMahatmaGandhi,NewDelhi,1958-84,(hereafterreferredtoasGandhi,CW),Vol.88,p.2.

5.Nehru,LetterstoChiefMinisters,1947-64,5Volumes,NewDelhi,(hereafterreferredtoasLCM),Vol.4,p.124.

6.Ibid.,p.188.7.S.Gopal,JawaharlalNehru—ABiography,3Volumes,Vol.2,London,1975,p.317.8.VerrierElwin,TheTribalWorldofVerrierElwin,Bombay,1964,p.327.9.G.K.Gokhale,Speeches,Madras,1916,p.1113.

3.TheNationalMovementanditsLegacy

1.Kesari,16June1908,quotedinAshisKumarDhuliya,‘AspectsofTilak’sStrategyandHisStruggleforCivilLiberties,’M.Phil,dissertation,CentreforHistoricalStudies,JawaharlalNehruUniversity,NewDelhi,1984,p.269.

2.Gandhi,CW,Vol.22,p.142,andVol.69,p.356respectively.3.SelectedWorksofJawaharlalNehru,generaleditor,S.Gopal,15volumes,NewDelhi,1972-1982,Gandhi,CW,Vol.76,Vol.7,p.414,(hereafterreferredtoasNehru,SW).

4.NationalPlanningCommitteeReport,(NPC)editedbyK.T.Shah,Bombay,1949.p.47.5.PattabhiSitaramayya,TheHistoryoftheIndianNationalCongress(1885-1935),noplace,1935,p.782.

6.NPC,p.40.7.PattabhiSitaramayya,TheHistoryoftheIndianNationalCongress(1885-1935),p.779.8.Gandhi,CW,Vol.76,p.3679.PattabhiSitaramayya,TheHistoryoftheIndianNationalCongress(1885-1935),p.780.10.Gandhi,SW,Vol.76.11.Gandhi,TheWaytoCommunalHarmony,compiledandeditedbyU.R.Rao,Ahmedabad,1963,p.398.

12.Gandhi,CW,Vol.68,p.138.13.Nehru,SW,Vol.7,p.173.

4.TheEvolutionoftheConstitutionandMainProvisions

1.MahatmaGandhi,inanarticletitled‘Independence’publishedinYoungIndia,5January1922,inGandhi,CW,Vol.22,pp.140-2.

2.Editor’sNoteto‘TheConstitutionofIndiaBill,1925,’inB.ShivaRao,ed.,TheFramingofIndia’sConstitution:SelectDocuments,Vol.1.NewDelhi,1966,p.5.

3.TextofCongress-LeagueScheme,inIbid.,p.26.4.TextofResolution,inIbid.,p.31.5.TextofauthenticsummaryoftheBillissuedbytheNationalConventionin1925,inIbid.,p.44.6.TextofIndianLeaders’MemorandumtotheGovernmentofBritainontheCommonwealthofIndiaBill,inIbid.,p.50.

7.TextofResolution,inIbid.,p.35.8.IndianQuarterlyRegister,1925,Vol.1,p.344,citedinB.ShivaRao,ed.,TheFramingofIndia’sConstitution:AStudy,NewDelhi,1968,p.12.

9.CitedinEditor’sIntroductiontotheNehruReport,inB.ShivaRao,ed.,TheFramingofIndia’sConstitution:SelectDocuments,Vol.1,p.58.

10.ForthetextoftheNehruReportandthequotesinthispara,seeIbid.,pp.59-75.11.TextofResolution,inIbid.,p.7712.AllquotesinthisparagrapharefromNehru’sPresidentialAddresstotheNationalConventionofCongressLegislators,March1937,inIbid.,pp.86-91.

13.TextofResolutionIbid.,p.93.14.TextofSpeech,inIbid.,p.101.15.Thearticle,writtenon19NovemberatAllahabad,waspublishedintheHarijanweeklyof25November,1939.SeeGandhi,CW,Vol.70,pp.362-65.

16.Forafullreportonthediscussions,seeGandhi,CW,Vol.72,pp.4-7.17.ForthetextofViceroyLinlithgow’sstatementmakingthe‘AugustOffer’,seeSirMauriceGwyerandA.Appadorai,ed.,SpeechesandDocumentsonTheIndianConstitution:1921-47,London,1957,Vol.11,pp.504-5.

18.CrippsMission,DraftDeclaration,publishedon30March1942,inIbid.,pp.520-1.19.StatementofTheCabinetMissionandtheViceroy,16May1946,inV.P.Menon,TheTransferofPowerinIndia,Princeton,1957,AppendixIV,p.471.

20.JawaharlalNehru,inConstituentAssemblyDebates(CAD)11,3,p.326,citedinGranvilleAustin,TheIndianConstitution:CornerstoneofANation,Oxford,1966,p.26.

21.Austin,TheIndianConstitution,p.13.22.Austin,TheIndianConstitution,p.22.23.Ibid.,pp.8-9.24.Austin,TheIndianConstitution,p.43.25.ConstituentAssemblyDebates,XI,9,835,citedinIbid.,p.46.26.Ibid.,p.46.27.K.M.Panikkar,HinduSocietyatCrossRoads,Bombay,3rdedition,1961,p.96.28.Austin,TheIndianConstitution,p.144.29.SubhashC.Kashyap,‘TheFramingoftheConstitutionandtheProcessofInstitutionBuilding,’inB.N.Pande,GeneralEditor,ACentenaryHistoryofTheIndianNationalCongress:Vol.IV1947-1964,editor,IqbalNarain,NewDelhi,1990,p.85.

30.Austin,TheIndianConstitution,p.50.31.W.H.Morris-Jones,TheGovernmentandPoliticsofIndia,NewYork,1967,Firstpublishedin1964,p.72.

32.VallabhbhaiPatel’sSpeechatthefirstmeetingoftheAdvisoryCommitteeonFundamentalRights,27February1947,inB.ShivaRao,ed.,TheFramingofIndia’sConstitution:SelectDocuments,Vol.II,

p.66.33.JawaharlalNehru,whilemovingforreferenceofConstitution(First)AmendmentBill,1951,toSelectCommittee,ParliamentaryDebates(16May1951)Vol.XII,cols.8820-22,citedinKashyap,‘FramingoftheConstitution,’inPande,ACentenaryHistory,p.94.

34.Austin,TheIndianConstitution,p.50.35.JawaharlalNehru,citedinMahajan,SelectModernGovernments,p.61.36.S.Radhakrishnan,citedinIbid.

5.TheArchitectureoftheConstitution:BasicFeaturesandInstitutions1.AllIndiaReporter(AIR)1973SupremeCourt(SC)1461.2.D.D.Basu,IntroductiontoTheConstitutionofIndia,p.151.3.InthecaseofIndiraNehruGandhivs.RajNarain,AIR1975SC2299.4.D.D.Basu,IntroductiontoTheConstitutionofIndia,p.153.5.AIR1980SC1789.6.D.D.Basu,IntroductiontoTheConstitutionofIndia,p.152.7.Austin,TheIndianConstitution,p.186.8.Ibid.,p.187.9.Ambedkar,citedinS.C.Kashyap,OurConstitution,NewDelhi,1994,p.44.10.Basu,IntroductiontotheConstitutionofIndia,p.62.11.Ambedkar,inConstituentAssemblyDebates,VII,p.32,citedinM.V.Pylee,ConstitutionalGovernmentinIndia,NewDelhi,4thedition,1984,p.265.

12.RajendraPrasad,inConstituentAssemblyDebates,X,p.956,citedinPylee,ConstitutionalGovernmentinIndia,p.265.

13.CitedinRobertL.HardgraveandStanleyA.Kochanek,India:GovernmentandPoliticsinaDevelopingNation,SanDiego,1993,p.84.

14.JawaharlalNehruinConstituentAssemblyDebates,citedinMahajan,SelectModernGovernments,Part1,p.383.

15.CitedinMahajan,SelectModernGovernments,p.327.16.Austin,TheIndianConstitution,p.49.17.AIR1986SC180.

6.TheInitialYears

1.Nehru,Speeches,5Volumes,NewDelhi,(hereafterreferredtoasSpeeches),Vol.1,p.25.2.Ibid.,pp.25-63.Nehru,SelectedWorksofJawaharlalNehru,SecondSeries,Generaleditor,S.Gopal,NewDelhi,1984,(hereafterreferredtoasNehru,SW,S.S.),Vol.4,p.530

4.W.H.Morris-Jones,TheGovernmentandPoliticsofIndia,Wistow(England),1987reprint,firstpublishedin1964,p.72.

5.Nehru,LCM,Vol.4,p.366.6.Ibid.,p.383.7.QuotedinV.P.Menon,IntegrationoftheIndianStates,Madras,1985reprint,firstpublishedin1956,p.73.

8.Ibid.,p.91.9.QuotedinNormanD.Palmer,TheIndianPoliticalSystem,London,1961,p.88.10.V.P.Menon,op.cit.,p.94.

11.QuotedinS.Gopal,JawaharlalNehru—ABiography,Vol.2,London,1979,pp.27-8.12.QuotedinV.P.Menon,op.cit.,p.354.13.SardarPatel’sCorrespondence(in10volumes),editedbyDurgaDas,Ahmedabad,Vol.7,pp.211-2.14.Ibid.,p.254.15.Nehru,LCM,Vol.2,p.508.16.Nehru,SW,S.S.,Vol.4,p.118.17.NehruonCommunalism,editedbyN.L.Gupta,NewDelhi,1965,p.217.18.QuotedinS.Gopal,JawaharlalNehru:ABiography,vol.2,p.155.19.QuotedinRajmohanGandhi,Patel:ALife,Ahmedabad,1990,p.493andp.497.20.SardarPatelinTunewiththeMillions,BirthCentenaryVol.3,G.M.Nandurkar,editor,Ahmedabad,1976,pp.166,169.

21.Gandhi,SW,Vol.89,p.286.22.Nehru,Speeches,Vol.1,p.42.23.Nehru,LCM,Vol.1,p.33.24.Nehru,SW,S.S.,Vol.12,NewDelhi,1991,p.453.25.GyaneshKudaisya,‘TheDemographicUpheavalofPartition:RefugeesandAgriculturalResettlementinIndia,1947-67,’SouthAsia,Vol.XVIII,SpecialIssue,Armidale(Australia),1995,p.94.

26.Nehru,SW,S.S.,Vol.14,PartII,p.95.27.R.K.Karanjia,ThePhilosophyofMrNehru,London,1966,pp.159-60.

7.ConsolidationofIndiaAsANation1.Nehru,Speeches,Vol.3,p.193.2.QuotedinS.Gopal,JawaharlalNehru—ABiography,Vol.3,p.22.3.Nehru,LCM,Vol.2,p.352.4.Ibid.,p.598.5.Nehru,SW,Vol.8,p.831.6.Gandhi,CW.,Vol.19,pp.314-5.7.Ibid.,Vol.37,p.22.8.Ibid.,Vol.85,p.88.9.QuotedinS.MohanKumaramangalam,India’sLanguageCrisis,Madras,1965,pp.11-2.10.Nehru,Speeches,Vol.4,p.60.11.JyotirindraDasGupta,LanguageConflictandNationalDevelopment,Bombay,1970,p.162.12.Quotedinibid.,p.192.13.Quotedinibid.,p.232.14.Nehru,Speeches,Vol.4,pp.54,55,60.15.Ibid.,p.64.

8.ConsolidationofIndiaAsANation:TheLinguisticReorganizationoftheStates

1.QuotedinS.MohanKumaramangalam,India’sLanguageCrisis,Madras,1965,p.21.2.JawaharlalNehru,SW,S.S.,Vol.4,p.530.3.S.Gopal,JawaharlalNehru—ABiography,Vol.2,pp.259-60.4.QuotedinGeoffreyTyson,Nehru—TheYearsofPower,London,1966,p.149.5.W.H.Morris-Jones,TheGovernmentandPoliticsofIndia,London,1987edition,p.100.6.Ibid,p.100.7.RajniKothari,PoliticsinIndia,NewDelhi,1986reprint,pp.114-5.

8.Seminar,July1960.9.Nehru,Speeches,Vol.4,p.63.10.Nehru,LCM,Vol.3,p.342.

9.ConsolidationofIndiaAsANation:IntegrationoftheTribals1.Verrier,Elwin,TheTribalWorldofVerrierElwin,Bombay,1964,p.103.2.Verrier,Elwin,APhilosophyforNEFA,Shillong,1959,p.46.3.Nehru,LCM,Vol.3,p.151.4.Nehru,Speeches,Vol.5,p.582.5.Nehru,‘Forewordtothe1steditionofVerrierElwin’sAPhilosophyforNEFA’.6.Ibid.7.Nehru,Speeches,Vol.2,p.582.8.Nehru,‘Forewordtothe1steditionofVerrierElwin’sAPhilosophyforNEFA’.9.JawaharlalNehru,Speeches,Vol.3,pp.460,461.10.Nehru,‘Forewordtothe1steditionofVerrierElwin’sAPhilosophyforNEFA’.11.Nehru,Speeches,Vol.2,p.581.12.Ibid.,p.579.13.Nehru,LCM,Vol.III,p.150.14.Ibid.,p.16315.ChristoffvonFurer-Haimendorf,‘ThePositionoftheTribalPopulationinModernIndia,’inPhilipMason,(ed.),IndiaandCeylon:UnityandDiversity,London,1967,p.208.

16.QuotedinS.Gopal,JawaharlalNehru—ABiography,Vol.2,p.212.

10.ConsolidationofIndiaAsANation:RegionalismandRegionalInequality

1.Gandhi,CW,NewDelhi,1958-1984,Vol.9,p.458.2.QuotedinJollyMohanKaul,ProblemsofNationalIntegration,NewDelhi,1963,p.76.3.GovernmentofIndia,PlanningCommission,ThirdFiveYearPlan,NewDelhi,1961,p.1424.AjitMozoomdar,‘ThePoliticalEconomyofModernFederalism,’inBalveerAroraandDouglasV.Verney,ed.,MultipleIdentitiesinaSingleState,Delhi,1995,pp.230-1.

11.TheYearsofHopeandAchievement,1951-641.Nehru,SW,S.S.,Vol.22,pp.122-3.2.Nehru,LCM,Vol.4,p.188.3.S.Gopal,JawaharlalNehru—ABiography,Vol.2,p.162.4.Quotedinibid.,pp.164-65.5.Nehru,LCM,Vol.2,p.508.6.NehruonCommunalism,editedbyN.L.Gupta,NewDelhi,1965,p.216.7.CD.Deshmukh,TheCourseofMyLife,Delhi,1974,p.205.8.QuotedinS.Gopal.,op.cit.,Vol.3,p.65.9.Nehru,Speeches,Vol.1,p.2.10.QuotedinW.H.Morris-Jones,TheGovernmentandPoliticsinIndia,Wistow,1987,p.26,andinRajmohanGandhi,Patel,p.501.

11.QuotedinS.Gopal,op.cit.,Vol.2,pp.158-59.12.Mende,Tibor,ConversationswithMrNehru,pp.54-5.13.Nehru,Jawaharlal,LCM,Vol.1,p.123.

14.Ibid.,Vol.5,p.601.15.Nehru,SW,OldSeries,Vol.8,p.807.16.Nehru,LCM,Vol.4,p.369.17.Nehru,SW,OldSeries,Vol.3,p.361.18.QuotedinS.Gopal,op.cit.,Vol.2,p.169.19.Nehru,LCM,Vol.5,pp.601and590respectively.20.Nehru,Speeches,Vol.2,pp.50-2,54,56.21.Ibid.,Vol.3,pp.22,25.22.Ibid.,Vol.5,p.83.

12.ForeignPolicy:TheNehruEra1.JawaharlalNehru,citedinV.P.Dutt,IndiaandtheWorld,NewDelhi,1990,pp.28-9.2.K.Subrahmanyam‘EvolutionofIndianDefencePolicy(1947-1964),’inB.N.Pande,ed.,ACentenaryHistoryoftheIndianNationalCongress,Vol.IV,NewDelhi,1990,pp.512-13.

3.K.P.S.Menon,‘IndiaandtheSovietUnion,’inB.R.Nanda,ed.,IndianForeignPolicy:TheNehruYears,Delhi,1976,p.136.

4.HindustanTimes,21July1954,citedinD.R.Sardesai,‘IndiaandSoutheastAsia,’inIbid.,p.87.5.CitedinRikhiJaipal,‘IdeasandIssuesinIndianForeignPolicy,’inPande,ed.,ACentenaryHistory,p.434.

6.K.Subrahmanyam,‘EvolutionofIndianDefencePolicy(1947-1964),’inPande,ed.,ACentenaryHistory,pp.546-7.

7.K.P.S.Menon,op.cit.,inB.R.Nanda,ed.,IndianForeignPolicy,p.135.8.Ibid.,p.142.9.K.Subrahmanyam,op.cit.,inPande,ed.,ACentenaryHistory,p.550.10.‘Op.cit.,inNanda,ed.,IndianForeignPolicy,p.148.11.SpeechinLokSabha,November27,1959,citedinV.P.Dutt,IndiaandtheWorld,pp.42-4.12.K.Subrahmanyam,op.cit.,inPande,ed.,ACentenaryHistory,p.516.13.IndiaandtheWorld,pp.53-4.14.Forhisviews,seeChinaandtheWorld,NewYork,1966,India’sForeignPolicy,NewDelhi,1984,IndiaandtheWorld,NewDelhi,1990,andIndia’sForeignPolicyinaChangingWorld,NewDelhi,1999.

15.K.Subrahmanyam,op.cit.,inPande,ed.,ACentenaryHistory,p.567.16.CitedinA.K.Damodaran,‘ForeignPolicyinAction,’inPande,ed.,ACentenaryHistory,p.469.

13.JawaharlalNehruinHistoricalPerspective

1.Nehru,LetterstoChiefMinisters,Vol.3,pp.380-81.2.HughTinker,‘IsThereAnIndianNation,’inIndiaandCeylon:UnityandDiversity,ed.PhilipMason,London,1967,p.287.

3.Nehru,LCM,Vol.4,p.256.4.Ibid.,Vol.2,p.598.5.Ibid.,Vol.3,p.368.6.R.K.Karanjia,ThePhilosophyofMrNehru,London,1966,p.123.7.QuotedinS.Gopal,JawaharlalNehru—ABiography,Vol.3,London,1984,p.170.8.Nehru,LCM,Vol.2,p.368.9.QuotedinS.Gopal,JawaharlalNehru—ABiography,Vol.3,p.278.

10.R.K.Karanjia,TheMindofMrNehru,London,1960,p.48.11.TiborMende,ConversationswithMr.Nehru,London,1956,pp.37,108and105.12.QuotedinS.Gopal,JawaharlalNehru—ABiography,Vol.2,London,1979,pp.192-93.13.SW,S.S.,GeneralEditor,S.Gopal,Vol.7,NewDelhi,1988,p.384.14.R.K.Karanjia,ThePhilosophyofMrNehru,p.139.15.GovernmentofIndia,PlanningCommission;ThirdFiveYearPlan,NewDelhi,1961,p.9.16.Nehru,Speeches,Vol.3,NewDelhi,1970reprint,pp.17-8.17.BimalJalan,‘Introduction’,TheIndianEconomy,ProblemsandProspects,ed.BimalJalan,NewDelhi,1992,p.xiii.

18.Nehru,LCM,Vol.2,p.84.19.Nehru,Speeches,Vol.3,p.37.20.GeoffreyTyson,Nehru:TheYearsofPower,London,1966,p.173.

14.PoliticalParties,1947-64:TheCongress1.QuotedinMyronWeiner,PartyPoliticsinIndia,Princeton,1957,p.69.2.SardarPatel,SardarPatelinTuneWiththeMillions,Vol.3,editedbyG.M.Nandurkar,Ahmedabad,1976,pp.164-169.

3.QuotedinRajmohanGandhi,Patel:ALife,Ahmedabad,1990,p.490.4.Nehru,SW,S.S.,Vol.8,p.438.5.QuotedinS.Gopal,JawaharlalNehru—ABiography,Vol.2,pp.154-5.6.StanleyA.Kochanek,TheCongressPartyofIndia,Princeton,1968,p.51.7.KrishanBhatia,TheOrdealofNationhood,NewYork,1971,p.120.8.MyronWeiner,op.cit.,p.17.9.Nehru,SelectedWorks,S.S.,Vol.6,p.438.10.QuotedinS.Gopal,op.cit.,Vol.2,pp.74,81,92respectively.11.QuotedinNormanD.Palmer,TheIndianPoliticalSystem,London,1961,p.193.12.Nehru,SelectedWorks,S.S.,Vol.7,p.382.13.QuotedinAllanandWendyScarfe,J.P:HisBiography,NewDelhi,1975,p.237.14.QuotedinS.Gopal,op.cit.,Vol.2,p.67.15.Nehru,SelectedWorks,S.S.,Vol.12,p.455.16.QuotedinAllanandWendyScarfe,op.cit.,pp.245and246.17.QuotedinS.Gopal,op.cit.,Vol.2,p.205.18.Quotedinibid.,Vol.3,pp.21-2.19.Ibid.,p.22.20.AllIndiaCongressCommittee,ResolutionsonEconomicPolicyandProgramme1955-56,NewDelhi,1956,p.1.

21.JawaharlalNehru,Speeches,Vol.3,1953-1957,NewDelhi,1970,p.96.22.GovernmentofIndia,PlanningCommission,ThirdFiveYearPlan,NewDelhi,1961,p.5.

15.PoliticalParties,1947-65:TheOpposition

1.QuotedinMyronWeiner,PartyPoliticsinIndia,Princeton,1957,p.61.2.Quotedinibid.,p.106.3.LewisP.Fickett,Jr.,‘ThePrajaSocialistPartyofIndia—1952-1972:AFinalAssessment,’AsianSurvey,Berkeley,Vol.13,No.9,September1973,p.829.

4.CPMProgramme,1964,p.25.

5.M.S.Golwalkar,WeorOurNationhoodDefined,Nagpur,1947edition,firstpublishedin1939,p.6.6.Ibid.,pp.52-6,62f.n.7.Ibid.,p.19.8.Organiser,17November1991,p.9.9.KrishanBhatia,TheOrdealofNationhood,NewYork,1971,p.103.10.QuotedinMyronWeiner,op.cit.,p.193.11.QuotedinDonaldE.Smith,IndiaasaSecularState,Princeton,1963,p.471.12.ResolutionpassedbyBharatiyaJanSanghatitssessionheldatLucknowfrom30December1960to1January1961,quotedinMotilalA.Jhangiani,JanaSanghandSwatantra:AProfileoftheRightistPartiesinIndia,Bombay,1967,p.48.

13.BharatiyaJanSanghElectionManifesto,1962,p.18,quotedinJhangiani,op.cit.,p.77.14.QuotedinNormanD.Palmer,TheIndianPoliticalSystem,London,1961,p.200.

16.FromShastritoIndiraGandhi,1964-691.KrishanBhatia,TheOrdealofNationhood,NewYork,1971,p.150.2.QuotedinGeoffreyTyson,Nehru:TheYearsofPower,London,1966,p.191.3.IndiraGandhi,MyTruth,NewDelhi,1982,p.116.4.PresidentJohnson.quotedinLloydI.RudolphandSusanneHoeberRudolph,TheRegionalImperative,Delhi,1980,p.38.

5.QuotedinZareerMasani,IndiraGandhi—ABiography,London,1975,p.168.6.Ibid.,pp.179-80.7.W.H.Morris-Jones,PoliticsMainlyIndian,Madras,1978,p.xii.8.RajniKothari,PoliticsinIndia,NewDelhi,1986reprint,p.183.

17.TheIndiraGandhiYears,1969-73

1.KuldipNayar,India:TheCriticalYears,RevisedandEnlargedEdition,Delhi,1971,pp.31-2.2.ZareerMasani,IndiraGandhi—ABiography,London,1975,p.181.3.QuotedinIbid.,p.209.4.QuotedinIbid.,p.241.5.QuotedinLloydI.Rudolph,SusanneHoeberRudolph,et.al.,TheRegionalImperative,Delhi,1980,p.46.

6.IndiraGandhi,TheYearsofEndeavour,NewDelhi,1975,p.654-6.

18.TheJ.P.MovementandEmergency:IndianDemocracyTested1.QuotedinStatesman,10April1974,citedinFrancineR.Frankel,India’sPoliticalEconomy,1947-1977,Delhi,1978,p.528.

2.QuotedinInderMalhotra,IndiraGandhi,London,1989,p.165.3.MorarjiDesaitoOrianaFallaciNewRepublic,quotedinFrancineR.Frankel,op.cit.,p.544.4.InderMalhotra,op.cit.,pp.173and182.5.MaryC.Carras,IndiraGandhi—IntheCrucibleofLeadership,Bombay,1980,p.100.6.TariqAli,TheNehrusandtheGandhis—AnIndianDynasty,London,1985p.194.7.QuotedinFrancineR.Frankel,op.cit.,p.576.

19.TheJanataInterregnumandIndiraGandhi’sSecondComing,1977-1984

1.QuotedinPupulJayakar,IndiraGandhi—ABiography,NewDelhi,1992,p.474.

20.TheRajivYears1.QuotedinNicholasNugent,RajivGandhi:SonofaDynasty,NewDelhi,1991,p.54.2.Theofficialfigureis2733,butunofficialfiguresareashighas3870.3.QuotedinS.S.Gill,TheDynasty;APoliticalBiographyofthePremierRulingFamilyofIndia,NewDelhi,1996,p.401.

4.S.S.Gill,whoservedasSecretary,InformationandBroadcasting,inRajivGandhi’sgovernment,testifiestothis.SeeIbid.,pp.406-7.

21.TheRun-uptotheMillennium

1.SeemaMustafa,TheLonelyProphet:V.P.Singh,APoliticalBiography,NewDelhi,1995,p.120.2.Ibid.,p.1293.Seechapter34onCasteandDalitPoliticsinthisvolume.4.AveryusefulrecentcollectionofstudiesoncasteinwhichanumberofscholarsaddresstheissueisM.N.Srinivas,ed.,Caste:ItsTwentiethCenturyAvatar,Viking,NewDelhi,1996.SeeparticularlytheessaybyA.M.Shah.

5.DrezeandSen,forexample,showthestronglinkbetweendisparitiesineducationandsocialinequalityandarguethatapolicyofuniversalandcompulsoryeducationislikelytoleadtoeliminationofsocialinequalities.TheystressthatleadersofthefreedomstrugglewerewellawareofthisandDrAmbedkarhimselfsaweducationasthecornerstoneofhisstrategyforliberationofoppressedcastes,ashewasconscioushowinhisowncasehisscholarshipenabledhimtoovercomethestigmaofuntouchability.Theyalsopointtoacommonfindingofvillagestudiesandhouseholdsurveysthateducationiswidelyperceivedbymembersofsociallyoreconomicallydisadvantagedgroupsasthemostpromisingchanceofupwardmobilityfortheirchildren.JeanDrezeandAmartyaSen,India:EconomicDevelopmentandSocialOpportunity,Delhi,1996,especiallypp.96-7,and109-10.

6.InSouthIndia,therewasnostrongreactionbecausestategovernmentshadbeenimplementingdifferentlevelsofreservationsforBackwardCastesformanyyears.ThecastestructureinSouthIndia,withfarmoreextremeformsofBrahmindomination,wasquitedifferent.Also,therewasalonghistoryofcaste-basedreservationswhichwereintroducedbytheBritishinthe1920sandalsobytheprincelystates,aswellasalongtraditionofthenon-Brahminmovementsincethe1910s.

8.In1993theCongressgovernmentimplementedtheMandalreport,withoutmuchfuroretakingplace,asbythenpeoplehadgotmoreusedtotheidea,thusprovingthepointthatinademocracyyoucannotramdecisionsdownpeople’sthroatsbuthavetoworkthroughconsensus.

9.V.P.Dutt,India’sForeignPolicyinaChangingWorld,NewDelhi,1999,p.1510.TimesofIndia,23June1999.11.QuotedinV.P.Dutt,op.cit.,pp.368-369.

23.PoliticsintheStates(II):WestBengalandJammuandKashmir1.QuotedinAtulKohli,DemocracyandDiscontent:India’sGrowingCrisisofGovernability,NewDelhi,1992,p.289.

2.Ibid.,p.288;AtulKohli,‘ParliamentaryCommunismandAgrarianReform—TheEvidencefromIndia’sBengal,’AsianSurvey,Berkeley,Vol.23,No.7,July1983,p.780andp.800.

3.QuotedinGeoffreyTyson,Nehru—TheYearsofPower,London,1966,p.79.

24.ThePunjabCrisis1.QuotedinK.P.S.Gill,TheKnightsofFalsehood,NewDelhi,1997,p.35.2.BaldevRajNayar,‘SikhSeparatisminthePunjab,’inSouthAsianPoliticsandReligion,ed.byDonaldE.Smith,Princeton,1966,p.168.

3.QuotedinK.P.S.Gill,p.81.4.Ibid.,p.12

25.IndianEconomy,1947-1965:TheNehruvianLegacy1.SeefordetailsBipanChandra,et.al.,India’sStruggleforIndependence,NewDelhi,1989,chapter29.

2.AdityaMukherjee,Imperialism,NationalismandtheDevelopmentofIndianCapitalisin:TheMakingoftheIndianCapitalistClass1920-47,(forthcoming)andAdityaMukherjeeandMridulaMukherjee,‘ImperialismandthegrowthofIndiancapitalisminthetwentiethcentury,’EPW,12March1988.

3.N.R.Sarkar,Presidentialspeech,FICCI,AnnualReport,1934,NewDelhi,pp.3-67.M.Visveswarayyawasamongthefirsttogiveacallforplanneddevelopmentinthetwenties.

4.IndianNationalCongress(INC),Economic.Resolutions,p.8.5.APlanofEconomicDevelopmentforIndia,Pt.1&2,London,1945,pp.9-10.TheauthorsofthisplanwerePurshottamdasThakurdas,J.R.D.Tata,G.D.Birla,ArdeshirDalal,SriRam,KasturbhaiLalbhai,A.D.Shroff,andJohnMathai.

6.INCEconomic.Resolutions,p.29.Emphasismine.7.SecondFiveYearPlan,1956,p.44.8.K.N.Raj,IndianEconomicGrowth:PerformanceandProspects,NewDelhi,1965,p.2.9.A.Vaidyanathan,‘TheIndianEconomySinceIndependence(1947-70),’inDharmaKumar,ed.,TheCambridgeEconomicHistoryofIndia,Delhi,1983,p.961.Emphasismine.

10.J.BhagwatiandP.Desai,India:PlanningforIndustrialisation,London,1970,table10.6,pp.185-87.

11.BusinessStandard,9January1998.12.SukhamoyChakravarty,DevelopmentPlanning:TheIndianExperience,Oxford,1987,pp.4,81.

26.IndianEconomy,1965-19911.C.Rangarajan,‘Development,InflationandMonetaryPolicy,’inIsherJ.AhluwaliaandI.M.D.Little,eds.,India’sEconomicReformsandDevelopment:EssaysforManmohanSingh,Delhi,1998,p.59.

2.SeeE.J.Hobsbawm,AgeofExtremes:TheShortTwentiethCentury,Harmondsworth,1994,forabrilliantanalysisofthechangesinworldcapitalismsinceWorldWarIIandpp.261,277and280forthestatisticsinthisparagraph.

3.TheEastAsianMiracle:EconomicGrowthandPublicPolicy,WorldBank,NewYork,1993,p.38.4.VijayJoshiandI.M.D.Little,India:MacroeconomicsandPoliticalEconomy1964-1991,Washington,1994,p.58.

27.EconomicReformsSince1991

1.Forexample,inhisD.Phil,dissertationatOxfordin1961andhisbookIndia’sExportTrends,London,1964.

2.AjitSingh,‘Liberalisation,theStockMarket,andtheMarketforCapitalControl,’inIsherAhluwaliaandI.M.D.Little,eds.,India’sEconomicReformsandDevelopment,Delhi,1998.

3.SeeEconomicSurvey1998-99,GovernmentofIndia,tables10.6and10.7,p.146,4.VijayJoshiandI.M.D.Little,India’sEconomicReforms,1991-2001,Oxford,1996,pp.222,225.5.SureshD.Tendulkar,‘IndianEconomicPolicyReformsandPoverty:AnAssessment,’inAhluwaliaandLittle,India’sEconomicReforms,1998,tables12.1,12.2,12.3,pp.290-294.

6.C.H.HanumanthaRao,‘Agriculture:PolicyandPerformance,’inBimalJalan,ed.,TheIndianEconomy,NewDelhi,1992,p.132.

7.EconomicSurvey,pp.11,18.Emphasismine.

28.LandReforms:ZamindariAbolitionandTenancyReforms1.A.M.Khusro,inV.B.Singh,ed.,EconomicHistoryofIndia1857-1956,Delhi,1965,p.189.2.INCEcon.Resolutions,p.38.3.PlanningCommission,SecondFiveYearPlan,1956,p.188.4.SeeP.S.Appu,‘TenancyReforminIndia,’EPW,SpecialNumber,August1975,p.1345.5.See,ibid.p.1347.6.D’.Bandyopadhyay,‘LandReforminIndia:AnAnalysis,’EPW,ReviewofAgriculture,June,1986.7.L.I.RudolphandS.H.Rudolph,InPursuitofLakshmi:ThePoliticalEconomyoftheIndianState,Chicago,1987,p.363.

8.P.S.Appu,(1975),pp.1354-5,1375.9.DanielThorner,TheShapingofModernIndia,NewDelhi,1980,p.245.

29.LandReforms:CeilingandtheBhoodanMovement

1.INCEcon.Resolutions,p.232.PlanningCommission,FirstFiveYearPlan,NewDelhi,1953,pp.188-191.3.IndianNationalCongress,ResolutiononEconomicPolicyandProgramme,1924-54,NewDelhi,1954,p.75.

4.Ibid.,p.121.Emphasismine.5.PlanningCommission,SecondFiveYearPlan,NewDelhi1956,pp.196-7.6.QuotedinLadejinskyPapers,p.4837.C.H.HanumanthaRao,‘Agriculture:PolicyandPerformance,’inBimalJalan,ed.,TheIndianEconomy:ProblemsandProspects,NewDelhi,p.118.

8.D.Bandyopadhyay,‘LandReformsinIndia:AnAnalysis,’EPW,ReviewofAgriculture,June1986.9.WolfLadejinsky,otherwiseanavidsupporterofceilingsandlanddistribution,cametoasimilarconclusioninMay1972.LadejinskyPapers,p.513.

10.IndianExpress,16June1999.11.G.Kotovsky,AgrarianReformsinIndia,NewDelhi,1964,p.119.See,forsimilarviews,D.Bandopadhyay,‘ReflectionsonLandReformsinIndiaSinceIndependence,’inT.V.Sathyamurthy,ed.,IndustryandAgricultureinIndiaSinceIndependence,Delhi,1995.

12.TheHindustanTimes,4and9January1961,citedinKotovsky,1964,p.125.13.Kotovsky,1964,p.126,hecitesE.M.S.Namboodiripad,‘SarvodayaandCommunism,’NewAge,vol.vii,No.1,January1958,pp.46-55.

30.LandReforms:CooperativesandanOverview

1.RecommendationsoftheEconomicProgrammeCommitteeoftheAICC,November1947,INCEcon.Resolutions,p.22.Emphasismine.

2.INCEcon.Resolutions,pp.41-42.Emphasismine.3.Ibid.4.SecondFive-YearPlan,p.201.Emphasismine.5.INCEcon.Resolutions,pp.120ff.Emphasismine.6.ThirdFive-YearPlan,p.209.(QuotedinLadejinskyPapers,p.388)7.ThefiguresinthisparagrapharefromRudolphandRudolph,InPursuitofLakshmi,table42,p.373.8.LadejinskyPapers,pp.505-6.9.ThedescriptionbelowoftheKairaexperimentisbasedoninterviewswithVergheseKurien,TribhuvandasPatelandothersandastudyoftheexperimentmadebytheauthorsinAnandanditsneighbouringvillagesinJuly1985.MaterialsprovidedbytheNDDB,courtesyitspresentManagingDirector,DrAmritaPatel,(whoseowncontributiontothemovementisconsiderable),andRuthHeredia,TheAmulIndiaStory,TataMcGraw-Hill,NewDelhi,1997havealsobeenusedfreely.

10.WilfredCandlerandNaliniKumar,India:TheDairyRevolution,WorldBank,Washington,199811.Ibid.p.4812.Ibid.pp.xxi,6and60.Emphasismine.13.Ibid.pp.xxiand6.Emphasismine.14.Ibid.p.xv.15.DanielThorner,TheShapingofModernIndia,Allied,NewDelhi,1980,p.245.Additioninparenthesismine.

16.TheabovefiguresarecalculatedfromD.Bandyopadhay,‘LandReformsinIndia:AnAnalysis,’EPW,ReviewofAgriculture,June1986.

17.Ibid,p.253.

31.AgricultureGrowthandtheGreenRevolution1.G.S.Bhalla,‘NehruandPlanning—ChoicesinAgriculture,’WorkingPaperSeries,SchoolofSocialSciences,JawaharlalNehruUniversity,NewDelhi,1990,p.29.

2.LadejinskyPapers,p.494.3.Seeforexample,G.S.BhallaandGurmailSingh,‘RecentDevelopmentsinIndianAgriculture:AStateLevelAnalysis,’EPW,29March1997.Thestatisticsintherestoftheparagrapharetakenfromthissource.

4.RajKrishna,‘SmallFarmersDevelopment,’EPW,26May1979,p.913.5.G.S.BhallaandG.K.Chadha,‘GreenRevolutionandtheSmallPeasant—AStudyofIncomeDistributioninPunjabAgriculture,’EPW,15and22May1982.

6.LadejinskyPapers,pp.436-4407.SeeC.H.HanumanthaRao,‘Agriculture:PolicyandPerformance,’inBimalJalan,ed.,TheIndianEconomy:ProblemsandProspects,NewDelhi,1992,pp.128-29.

8.SeeDanielThomer,TheShapingofModernIndia,pp.202ff.and224ff.9.C.H.HanumanthaRao,op.cit.,129-30.Emphasismine.10.M.S.Swaminathan,‘GrowthandSustainability,’Frontline,9-22August1997.

32.AgrarianStrugglesSinceIndependence

1.ThebestcollectionofessaysonthesubjectremainsA.R.Desai,ed.,AgrarianStrugglesinIndiaafterIndependence,Delhi,1986.

2.P.Sundarayya,TelanganaPeople’sStruggleandItsLessons,CommunistPartyofIndia(Marxist),Calcutta,1972,pp.115-6,239-40,and424.

3.InterviewwithBabaBachhitarSingh,citedinMridulaMukherjee,‘CommunistsandPeasantsinPunjab:AFocusontheMuzaraMovementinPatiala,1937-53,’inBipanChandra,ed.,TheIndianLeft:CriticalAppraisals,NewDelhi,1983.

4.SeeMridulaMukherjee,‘PeasantResistanceandPeasantConsciousnessinColonialIndia:“Subalterns”andBeyond,’EPW,1988,October8and15.

5.SeeStaffanLindberg,‘NewFarmers’MovementsinIndiaasStructuralResponseandCollectiveIdentityFormation:TheCasesoftheShetkariSangathanaandtheBKU,’inTomBrass,ed.,NewFarmers’MovementsinIndia,Ilford,1995,pp.95-125andotherarticlesinthisvolumeforaconsiderationofthisissue.

33.RevivalandGrowthofCommunalism1.Gandhi,CW,Vol.76,p.402.

34.Caste,Untouchability,andAnti-castePoliticsandStrategies

1.Forthese,seeBipanChandra,etal,India’sStruggleforIndependence,1857-1947,Viking1998,Penguin1989,chapter18.

2.ForausefuloverviewofDalitpolitics,especiallyfrom1957onwards,seeV.Suresh,‘TheDalitMovementinIndia,’inT.V.Sathyamurthy,SocialChangeandPoliticalDiscourseinIndia,Volume3,Region,Religion,Caste,Gender,andCultureinContemporaryIndia,1996,pp.355-87.

3.SeeJeanDrezeandAmartyaSen,India:EconomicDevelopmentandSocialOpportunity,Delhi,1995,p.97.

4.Ibid.,table6.1,p.112.5.ForaninterestingrecentattempttoargueforDalit-BCunity,especiallyinthecontextoftheattempttoforgelinkswiththeShetkariSangathanainMaharashtra,seeGailOmvedt,‘TheAnti-CasteMovementandtheDiscourseofPower,’inT.V.Sathyamurthy,op.cit.,pp.334-54,andGailOmvedt,‘WeWanttheReturnofOurSweat:TheNewPeasantMovementinIndiaandtheFormationofaNewAgriculturalPolicy,’inTomBrass,ed.,NewFarmers’MovementsinIndia,Ilford,1995,pp.126-64.

35.IndianWomenSinceIndependence1.BasedonMridulaMukherjee’sinterviewwithProfUshaMehta.2.Themostcomprehensiveaccountofwomen’smovementsistobefoundinRadhaKumar,TheHistoryofDoing,NewDelhi,1993,andIhaveuseditextensively.

3.See,forexample,MridulaMukherjee,‘InterviewwithSushilaChain,’inManushi.4.Foradetailedaccountofthisveryinterestingmovement,seeRamachandraGuha,TheUnquietWoods:EcologicalChangeandPeasantResistanceintheHimalaya,Delhi,1989.

5.Foradetailedstudyoftheagitationsagainstdowry,theMuslimWomen’sBillandsati,seeRajniPalriwalaandInduAgnihotri,‘Tradition,theFamilyandtheState:PoliticsofTheContemporaryWomen’sMovement,’inT.Y.Sathyamurthy,ed.,SocialChangeandPoliticalDiscourseinIndia,Vol.3,Region,Religon,Caste,GenderandCultureinContemporaryIndia,Delhi,1996,pp.503-32.

6.Forthedataandmuchoftheconclusionsinthisandthefollowingparagraphss,IhavereliedgreatlyonthepathbreakingworkofJeanDrezeandAmartyaK.Sen.See,forexample,theirIndia:EconomicDevelopmentandSocialOpportunity,Delhi,1995.

36.ThePost-ColonialIndianStateandthePoliticalEconomy1.ForthebroadtheoreticalframeworkadoptedinthischaptersomeoftheworksIhavebeenmostinfluencedbyarelistedbelow.BipanChandra,IndianNationalMovement,TheLongTermDynamic,NewDelhi,1988,firstdeliveredasthePresidentialAddress,IndianHistoryCongress,1985,Amritsar,RalphMiliband,MarxismandPolitics,1977,ErnestoLaclau,PoliticsandIdeologyinMarxistTheory,London,1977,NicosPoulantzas,ClassesinContemporaryCapitalism,London,1975andtherecentwritingsofMohitSentheleadingleftintellectualwhohasbeencloselyassociatedwithleftpoliticsfornearlyhalfacentury.

2.Seeforexample,PeterEvans,DependentDevelopment:TheAllianceofMultinational,StateandLocalCapitalinBrazil,Princeton,1979,pp.31-34,52andGaryGereffiandDonaldWyman,‘DevelopmentStrategiesinLatinAmericaandEastAsia,’1985,mimeo.

3.SeeforexampleBipanChandra,NationalismandColonialisminModernIndia,NewDelhi,1979,and‘TheColonialLegacy,’inBimalJalan,ed.,TheIndianEconomy:ProblemsandProspects,NewDelhi,1992;K.N.Raj,‘ThePoliticsandEconomicsofIntermediateRegimes,’EPW,7July1973;SudiptoMundle‘StateCharacterandEconomicPolicy,’SocialScientist..May1974;PranabBardhan,ThePoliticalEconomyofDevelopmentinIndia,Delhi,1998(expandededition)andAdityaMukherjeeandMridulaMukherjee,‘ImperialismandtheGrowthofIndianCapitalismintheTwentiethCentury,’EPW,12March1988.

4.SeeforexampleAdityaMukherjee,‘TheIndianCapitalistClass:AspectsofitsEconomic,PoliticalandIdeologicalDevelopmentintheColonialPeriod,’inS.BhattacharyaandRomilaThapar,eds.,SituatingIndianHistory,Delhi,1986andImperialism,NationalismandtheDevelopmentofIndianCapitalism:TheMakingoftheIndianCapitalistClass,NewDelhi,(forthcoming).

5.PrabhatPatnaik,‘PoliticalStrategiesofEconomicDevelopment,’inParthaChatterjee,ed.,WagesofFreedom:FiftyYearsoftheIndianNation-State,Delhi,1998,pp.58-59.Emphasismine.

6.F.H.Cordoso,‘SocialConsequencesofGlobalisation,’LectureatIndiaInternationalCentre,NewDelhi,27January1996.

7.AmartyaSen,‘SocialCommitmentandDemocracy,’NewThinkingCommunist,1November1998.8.BipanChandra,‘TheRealDangerofForeignDomination:Peripheralization’,inhisEssaysonContemporaryIndia,Revisededition,NewDelhi,1999.

38.OntheEveoftheNewMillennium:Achievements,ProblemsandProspects1.C.ThomasinGeetiSen,ed.,ReceivingIndia,NewDelhi,1993,p.266.2.S.Gopal,JawaharlalNehru—ABiography,Vol.3,London,1984,p.301.3.MohitSen,‘EnteringtheFiftiethYear’,NewThinkingCommunist,15August1996,p.2.4.QuotedinZareerMasani,IndiraGandhi—ABiography,London,1975,p.299.5.W.H.Morris-Jones,PoliticsMainlyIndian,Bombay,1978,p.131.6.MyronWeiner,ThePoliticsofScarcity,Bombay,1963,p.216.7.JoanV.Bondurant,ConquestofViolence:TheGandhianPhilosophyofConflict,RevisedEdition,Berkeley,USA,1971,pp.viii-ix.

8.FrancineR.Frankel,India’sPoliticalEconomy,1947-1977,Delhi,1978,p.4.9.Ibid.10.Ibid.,pp.4-6.11.Nehru,Speeches,Vol.3,p.96.12.IndiaDevelopmentReport1999-2000,ed.,KiritS.Parikh,NewDelhi,1999,p.5.Mostofthestatisticsinthisandthenextsectionaretakenfromthiswork,EconomicSurvey1998-99,UNDP’s

HumanDevelopmentReport1999,andNationalCouncilofAppliedEconomicResearch’sIndiaHumanDevelopmentReport,1999.

SelectBibliography

General

1.KrishanBhatia,TheOrdealofNationhood,NewYork,1971.2.RajniKothari,PoliticsinIndia,NewDelhi,1970.3.AchinVanaik,ThePainfulTransition:BourgeoisDemocracyinIndia,London,1990.4.FrancineR.Frankel,India’sPoliticalEconomy,1947-1977,Delhi,1978.5.L.I.RudolphandS.H.Rudolph,InPursuitofLakshmi:ThePoliticalEconomyoftheIndianState,Bombay,1987.

6.AtulKohli,ed.,India’sDemocracy,Princeton,1988.7.ShashiTharoor,IndiaFromMidnighttotheMillennium,NewDelhi,1997.8.SunilKhilnani,TheIdeaofIndia,London,1997.9.PaulR.Brass,ThePoliticsofIndiaSinceIndependence,Indianedition,NewDelhi,1992.10.W.H.Morris-Jones,PoliticsMainlyIndian,NewDelhi,1978.11.W.H.Morris-Jones,TheGovernmentandPoliticsofIndia,Wistow,Huntingdon,1987edition.12.RobertL.Hardgrave,Jr.andStanleyA.Kochanek,India:GovernmentandPoliticsinaDevelopingNation,Fifthedition,SanDiego,1993.

13.DanielThorner,TheShapingofModernIndia,Delhi,1980.14.YogendraSingh,SocialChangeinIndia,NewDelhi,1993.15.BipanChandra,EssaysOnContemporaryIndia,Revisededition,NewDelhi,1999.16.UpendraBaxiandBhikhuParekh,eds.,CrisisandChangeinContemporaryIndia,NewDelhi,1995.

17.MyronWeiner,TheIndianParadox:EssaysinIndianPolitics,NewDelhi,1989.18.ParthaChatterjee,ed.,WagesofFreedom:FiftyYearsoftheIndianNation-State,Delhi,1998.19.JeanDrezeandAmartyaSen,India:EconomicDevelopmentandSocialOpportunity,Delhi,1996.20.VijayJoshiandI.M.D.Little,India:MacroeconomicsandPoliticalEconomy1964-1991,Washington,1994.

21.BimalJalan,ed.,TheIndianEconomy:ProblemsandProspects,NewDelhi,1992.22.E.J.Hobsbawm,AgeofExtremes:TheShortTwentiethCentury,Harmondsworth,1994.23.HiranmayKarlekar,IndependentIndia:TheFirstFiftyYears,Delhi,1998.

Chapter2

1.BipanChandra,(i)EssaysonColonialism,NewDelhi,1999.(ii)NationalismandColonialisminModernIndia,NewDelhi,1979.(iii)‘TheColonialLegacy,’inBimalJalan,ed.,TheIndian

Economy:ProblemsandProspects,NewDelhi,1992.(iv)ModernIndia,atextbook,NewDelhi,1990.

2.AdityaMukherjeeandMridulaMukherjee,‘ImperialismandtheGrowthofIndianCapitalisminTwentiethCentury,’EconomicandPoliticalWeekly(hereafterEPW),12March1988,ReprintedinCapitalistDevelopment:CriticalEssays,ed.,GhanshyamShah,Bombay,1990.

3.IrfanHabib,‘ColonializationofIndianEconomy,’SocialScientist,March1975.4.AngusMaddison,ClassStructureandEconomicGrowth:IndiaandPakistansincetheMoghuls,London,1971.

5.V.B.Singh,EconomicHistoryofIndia,1857-1956,Bombay,1965.6.R.PalmeDutt,IndiaToday,Bombay,1949.7.A.R.Desai,SocialBackgroundofIndianNationalism,Bombay,1959.

Chapter3

1.BipanChandra,et.al.,India’sStruggleforIndependence1857-1947,NewDelhi,1988.2.BipanChandra,(i)EpicStruggle,NewDelhi,(ii)IndianNationalMovement:TheLong-termDynamics,NewDelhi,1988.(iii)EssaysinIndianNationalism,NewDelhi,1993.

3.W.H.Morris-Jones,TheGovernmentandPoliticsofIndia,Wistow,England,1987edition.

Chapters4-5

ConstitutionandGovernment

1.B.ShivaRao,ed.,TheFramingofIndia’sConstitution:AStudy,NewDelhi,1968.2.VidyaDharMahajan,SelectModernGovernments,NewDelhi,17thedition,1995.3.V.P.Menon,TheTransferofPowerinIndia,Princeton,1957.4.GranvilleAustin,TheIndianConstitution:CornerstoneofANation,Oxford1966.5.SubhashC.Kashyap,‘TheFramingoftheConstitutionandtheProcessofInstitutionBuilding,’inACentenaryHistoryofTheIndianNationalCongress,GeneralEditor,B.N.Pande,Vol.IV,NewDelhi1990.

6.W.H.Morris-Jones,TheGovernmentandPoliticsofIndia,NewYork,1967,Firstpublished,London,1964.

7.S.C.Kashyap,OurConstitution,NewDelhi,1994.8.S.K.Chaube,ConstituentAssemblyofIndia:SpringboardofRevolution,NewDelhi,1973.9.D.D.Basu,IntroductiontotheConstitutionofIndia,NewDelhi,8thedition,1984.10.M.V.Pylee,ConstitutionalGovernmentinIndia,NewDelhi,4thedition,1984.11.DavidPotter,India’sPoliticalAdministrators1918-83,Oxford,1986.

Chapter6

1.SarvepalliGopal,JawaharlalNehru—ABiography,Vol.2(1947-1956),LondonandDelhi,1979.2.RajmohanGandhi,Patel:ALife,Ahmedabad,1990.3.V.P.Menon,IntegrationoftheIndianStates,Madras,1985,reprint1985.

4.SisirK.Gupta,Kashmir:AStudyinIndian-PakistanRelations,London,1967.5.P.Mishra,‘ConsolidationofIndependence:ChallengeandResponse,’ACentenaryHistoryoftheIndianNationalCongress,GeneralEditor,B.N.Pande,Vol.IV,ed.,IqbalNarain,NewDelhi,1990.

Chapter7

1.BipanChandra,‘IndianNationalism—Redefined,’and‘WillIndianNationHold,’inBipanChandra,EssaysonContemporaryIndia,NewDelhi,1993.

2.BorisI.Kluev,India:NationalandLanguageProblem,NewDelhi,1981.3.S.MohanKumaramangalam,India’sLanguageCrisis,Madras,1965.4.HughTinker,‘IsThereanIndianNation,’inPhilipMason,ed.,IndiaandCeylon:UnityandDiversity,London,1967.

5.JyotirindraDasGupta,LanguageConflictandNationalDevelopment:GroupPoliticsandNationalLanguagePolicyinIndia,BerkeleyandBombay,1970.

6.NirmalKumarBose,‘ProblemsofNationalIntegration,’ScienceandCulture,Vol.30,no.4,April1964.

7.ZoyaHasan,‘Introduction:StateandIdentityinModernIndia,’inZoyaHasan,S.N.Jha,RasheeduddinKhan,eds.,TheState,PoliticalProcessesandIdentity,NewDelhi,1989.

8.RajniKothari,PoliticsinIndia,ChapterVIII,NewDelhi,1970.

Chapter8

1.JollyMohanKaul,ProblemsofNationalIntegration,NewDelhi,1963.2.BorisI.Kluev,India:NationalandLanguageProblem,NewDelhi,1981.3.JosephE.Schwartzberg,‘FactorsintheLinguisticReorganizationofIndia,’inPaulWallace,ed.,RegionandNationinIndia,NewDelhi,1985.

4.AtherFarouqi,‘TheEmergingDilemmaoftheUrduPressinIndia,’SouthAsia,Vol.XVIII,no.2,1995.5.RalphRussell,‘UrduinIndiaSinceIndependence,’EPW,9January1999.

Chapter9

1.VerrierElwin,(i)APhilosophyforNEFA,Shillong,1959.(ii)TheTribalWorldofVerrierElwin,Bombay,1964.

2.ChristophvonFurer-Haimendorf(i)‘ThePositionoftheTribalPopulationsinModernIndia,’inPhilipMason,ed.,IndiaandCeylon:UnityandDiversity,London,1967.(ii)‘TheChangingPositionofTribalPopulationinIndia,’inD.TaylorandM.Yapp,PoliticalIdentityinSouthAsia,London,1979.

3.K.S.Singh,ed.,TribalMovementsinIndia,2Vols,NewDelhi,1982.4.StuartCorbridge,‘TheIdeologyofTribalEconomyandSociety:PoliticsintheJharkhand,1950-1980,’ModernAsianStudies,Vol.22,no.1,1988.

5.NirmalKumarBose,(i)‘ChangeinTribalCultureBeforeandAfterIndependence,’ManinIndia,Vol.44,no.1,Jan.-March1964.(ii)‘IntegrationofTribesinAndhraPradesh,’ManinIndia,Vol.44,no.2,April-June1964.

6.JollyM.Kaul,ProblemsofNationalIntegration,NewDelhi,1963.

7.UrmilaPhadnis,EthnicityandNation-BuildinginSouthAsia,NewDelhi,1989.8.B.K.Roy-Burman,IndigenousandTribalPeoples,NewDelhi,1994.

Chapter10

1.BalveerAroraandDouglasV.Verney,MultipleIdentitiesinaSingleState,Delhi,1993.2.N.MukerjiandBalveerArora,FederalisminIndia,NewDelhi,1991.3.C.N.Vakil,‘NationalIntegration,’inJ.C.Daruvala,ed.,TensionsinEconomicDevelopmentinSouthEastAsia,Bombay,1961.

4.AshokMathur,‘TheCharacterofIndustrializationintheIndianEconomy,’unpublishedpaper,JNU,NewDelhi,May1998.

5.JollyM.Kaul,ProblemsofNationalIntegration,NewDelhi,1963.6.MyronWeiner,SonsoftheSoil:MigrationandEthnicConflictinIndia,Princeton,1978.7.DipankarGupta,NationalisminaMetropolis:TheShivSenainBombay,NewDelhi,1982.

Chapters11and13

1.S.Gopal,JawaharlalNehru—ABiography,Vols.2and3,LondonandDelhi,1979and1984.2.BipanChandra,‘JawaharlalNehruinHistoricalPerspective,’and‘NehruandCommunalism,’inBipanChandra,IdeologyandPoliticsinModernIndia,NewDelhi,1994.

3.B.R.Nanda,JawaharhalNehru:RebelandStatesman,Delhi,1995.4.B.R.Nanda,P.C.JoshiandRajKrishna,GandhiandNehru,Delhi,1979.5.SudiptoKaviraj,‘ApparentParadoxesofJawaharlalNehru,’Mainstream,15November-13December1980.

6.GeoffreyTyson,Nehru:TheYearsofPower,London,1966.7.BagenduGanguliandMiraGanguly,‘ElectoralPoliticsandPartisanChoice,’ACentenaryHistoryoftheIndianNationalCongress,GeneralEditor,B.N.Pande,Vol.IV,ed.,IqbalNarain,NewDelhi,1990.

8.BimalPrasad,Gandhi,NehruandJ.P.:StudiesinLeadership,Delhi,1985.9.E.M.S.Namboodiripad,EconomicsandPoliticsofIndia’sSocialistPattern,NewDelhi,1966.10.W.H.Morris-Jones,ParliamentinIndia,London,1957.11.B.N.Pande,GeneralEditor,ACentenaryHistoryoftheIndianNationalCongress,Vol.IV,ed.,IqbalNarain,NewDelhi,1990.

Chapter12

1.V.P.Dutt,IndiaandtheWorld,NewDelhi,1990.2.K.Subrahmanyam,‘EvolutionofIndianDefencePolicy(1947-1964),’inB.N.Pande,GeneralEditor,ACentenaryHistoryofTheIndianNationalCongress.,Vol.IV,NewDelhi1990.

3.B.R.Nanda,ed.,IndianForeignPolicy:TheNehruYears,Delhi,1976.4.RikhiJaipal,‘IdeasandIssuesinIndianForeignPolicy,’inB.N.Pande,ed.,ACentenaryHistory.5.V.P.Dutt,India’sForeignPolicy,NewDelhi,1984.6.A.K.Damodaran,‘ForeignPolicyinAction,’inB.N.Pande,ed.,ACentenaryHistory.

7.S.Gopal,JawaharlalNehru:ABiography,Volumes2and3,London,1979and1984.8.NevilleGeorgeAnthonyMaxwell,India’sChinaWar,London,1970.9.M.S.Rajan,IndiainWorldAffairs,NewYork,1964.10.W.NormanBrown,TheUnitedStatesandIndia,Pakistan,Bangladesh,Cambridge,Massachusets,1972.

11.SisirK.Gupta,Kashmir:AStudyinIndo-PakRelations,Bombay,1966.

Chapter14

1.RajniKothari,(i)‘TheCongress‘System’inIndia,’AsianSurvey,Vol.IV,no.12,December1964.(ii)PoliticsinIndia,ChapterV,NewDelhi,1970.

2.S.Gopal,JawaharlalNehru—ABibliography,Vols.2and3,LondonandDelhi,1979and1984.3.StanleyA.Kochanek,TheCongressPartyofIndia,Princeton,1968.4.V.M.SiriskarandL.Fernandes,IndianPoliticalParties,Meerut,1984.5.AllIndiaCongressCommittee,AContemporaryHistoryoftheIndianNationalCongress,GeneralEditor,B.N.Pande,Vol.IV,ed.,IqbalNarain,NewDelhi,1990.

6.W.H.Morris-Jones,(i)‘Congress,DeadorAlive,’PacificAffairs,Vol.42,No.2,1969.(ii)‘TheIndianCongressParty:aDilemmaofDominance,’inPoliticsMainlyIndian,Bombay,1978.AlsoinModernAsianStudies,Vol.I,no.2,April1967.(iii)TheGovernmentandPoliticsofIndia,Chapter5,Wistow,England,1987edition.

Chapter15

1.MyronWeiner,PartyPoliticsinIndia,Princeton,1957,Delhi,1990.2.LewisP.Fickett,Jr.,(i)TheMajorSocialistPartiesofIndia,Syracuse,NewYork,1976.(ii)‘ThePrajaSocialistPartyofIndia—1952-1972:AFinalAssessment,’AsianSurvey,Vol.13,no.9,September1973.

3.HowardL.Erdman,(i)TheSwatantraPartyandIndianConservatism,Cambridge,1967.(ii)‘India’sSwatantraParty,’PacificAffairs,Vol.36,no.4,Winter1963-64.

4.BhabaniSengupta,CommunisminIndianPolitics,NewYork,1971.5.MohitSen,GlimpsesoftheHistoryoftheIndianCommunistMovement,Madras,1997.6.B.D.Graham,HinduNationalismandIndianPolitics:TheOriginsandDevelopmentoftheBharatiyaJanSangh,Cambridge,1990.

7.HariKishoreSingh,AHistoryofthePrajaSocialistParty,Lucknow,1959.8.MohanRam,IndianCommunism,Delhi,1969.9.D.R.Goyal,RashtriyaSwayamSewakSangh,NewDelhi,1979.10.CraigBaxter,TheJanSangh,Philadelphia,1969.11.AchinVanaik,‘TheIndianLeft,’NewLeftReview,no.159.12.MadhuDandavate,EvolutionofSocialistPoliciesandPerspective1934-1984,Bombay,1986.13.E.M.S.Namboodiripad,ConflictsandCrisis:PoliticalIndia—1974,Bombay,1974.14.HaridevSharma,et.al.,FiftyYearsofSocialistMovementinIndia,NewDelhi,1984.

Chapters16to19

1.InderMalhotra,IndiraGandhi:APersonalandPoliticalBiography,London,1989.2.ZareerMasani,IndiraGandhi—ABiography,London,1975.3.PupulJayakar,IndiraGandhi—ABiography,NewDelhi,1992.4.MaryC.Carras,IndiaGandhi:IntheCrucibleofLeadership,Bombay,1979.5.MorarjiDesai,TheStoryofMyLife,Vol.2,Delhi,1974.6.C.P.Srivastava,LalBahadurShastri,Delhi,1995.7.TariqAli,TheNehrusandtheGandhis,London,1985.8.S.S.Gill,TheDynasty;APoliticalBiographyofthePremierRulingFamilyofModernIndia,NewDelhi,1996.

9.SudiptoKaviraj,‘IndiraGandhiandIndianPolitics,’EPW,20-27September1986.10.RajniKothari,PoliticsinIndia,ChapterV,NewDelhi,1970.11.RabindraRay,TheNaxalitesandTheirIdeology,Delhi,1988.12.MahendraPrasadSingh,SplitinaPredominantParty:TheIndianNationalCongressin1969,NewDelhi,1981.

13.KrishanBhatia,Indira:ABiographyofPrimeMinisterGandhi,London,1974.14.W.H.Morris-Jones,‘IndiaElectsforChange—andStability,’AsianSurvey,Vol.XI,no.8,August1971,Berkeley.AlsoinhisPoliticsMainlyIndian,Bombay,1978.

15.NormanD.Palmer,‘India’sFourthGeneralElections,’AsianSurvey,Vol.VII,no.5,May1967.16.AshisNandy,‘IndiraGandhiandtheCultureofIndianPolitics,’inhisAttheEdgeofPsychology:EssaysinPoliticsandCulture,Delhi,1980.

17.HarryW.Blair,‘Mrs.Gandhi’sEmergency,TheIndianElectionsof1977,PluralismandMarxism:ProblemswithParadigms,’ModernAsianStudies,Vol.14,no.2,1980.

Chapter18

A.J.P.Movement

1.GhanshyamShah,ProtestMovementsinTwoIndianStates:AStudyoftheGujaratandBiharMovements,Delhi,1977.

2.BimalPrasad,Gandhi,NehruandJ.P.:StudiesinLeadership,Delhi,1985.3.MinooMasani,IsJ.P.TheAnswer,Delhi,1975.4.JohnR.Wood,‘Extra-ParliamentaryOppositioninIndia:AnAnalysisofPopulistAgitationsinGujaratandBihar,’PacificAffairs,Vol.XLVIII,no.3,Fall1975.

5.AjitBhattacharjea,JayaprakashNarayan:APoliticalBiography,Delhi,1975.

B.TheEmergency

1.HenryC.Hart,ed.,IndiraGandhi’sIndia,Boulder(Colorado),1976.2.MaxZins,StrainsonIndianDemocracy,NewDelhi,1988.AlsoinZoyaHasan,S.N.Jha,RasheeduddinKhan,TheState,PoliticalProcessesandIdentity,NewDelhi,1989.

3.V.P.Dutt,‘TheEmergencyinIndia:BackgroundandRationale,’AsianSurvey,Vol.XVI,no.12,December1976,Berkeley.

4.Seminar,March1977,NewDelhi.

5.BalrajPuri,‘FullerViewsofEmergency,’EPW,15July1995.6.KuldipNayar,TheJudgement:InsideStoryoftheEmergencyinIndia,NewDelhi,1977.7.W.H.Morris-Jones,‘CreepingbutUneasyAuthoritarianism:India1975-6,’GovernmentandOpposition,Vol.12,no.1,Winter1977.

8.DavidSelbourne,AnEyetoIndia:TheUnmaskingofaTyranny,London,1977.

C.JanataGovernment

1.C.P.Bhambri,TheJanataParty:AProfile,NewDelhi,1980.2.JanardanThakur,AlltheJanataMen,NewDelhi,1978.3.J.DasGupta,‘TheJanataPhase:ReorganizationandRedirectioninIndianPolitics,’AsianSurvey,Vol.XIX,no.4,April1979.

4.IqbalNarain,‘India1977:FromPromisetoDisenchantment,’AsianSurvey,Vol.XVIII,no.2,February1978.

5.RobertL.Hardgrave,Jr.andStanleyA.Kochanek,India:GovernmentandPoliticsinaDevelopingNation,FifthEdition,pp.276-82.

6.L.I.RudolphandS.H.Rudolph,InPursuitofLakshmi:ThePoliticalEconomyoftheIndianState,Chapter5,Bombay,1987.

Chapter20

1.BhabaniSenGupta,RajivGandhi:aPoliticalStudy,NewDelhi,1989.2.MohanRam,SriLanka:TheFracturedIsland,NewDelhi,1989.3.MinhazMerchant,RajivGandhi:TheEndofaDream,NewDelhi,1991.4.NicholasNugent,RajivGandhi:SonofaDynasty,NewDelhi,1991.5.VedMehta,RajivGandhiandRama’sKingdom,NewHavenandLondon,1994.6.S.S.Gill,TheDynasty:APoliticalBiographyofthePremierRulingFamilyofIndia,NewDelhi,1996.

7.RajuG.C.Thomas,IndianSecurityPolicy,Princeton,1986.8.R.Venkataraman,MyPresidentialYears,NewDelhi,1994.9.RameshThakur,ThePoliticsandEconomicsofIndia’sForeignPolicy,London,1994.

Chapter21

1.SeemaMustafa,TheLonelyProphet:V.P.Singh,APoliticalBiography,NewDelhi,1995.2.DavidButler,AshokLahiriandPrannoyRoy,IndiaDecides:Elections1952-1995,NewDelhi,3rdedition,1995.

3.PaulR.Brass,TheNewCambridgeHistoryofIndia,IV.I,ThePoliticsofIndiaSinceIndependence,Cambridge,2nd.edition,1994.

4.R.Venkataraman,MyPresidentialYears,NewDelhi,1994.5.M.N.Srinivas,ed.,Caste:ItsTwentiethCenturyAvatar,NewDelhi,1996.6.YogendraYadav,etal,‘TheMaturingofaDemocracy,’inIndiaToday,vol.xxi,No.16,1996.

7.YogendraYadav,‘ReconfigurationinIndianPolitics:StateAssemblyElections,1993-96,’inEPW,Vol.32Nos.2-3,1996.

8.ThomasBlomHansenandChristopher,Jaffrelot,TheBJPandtheCompulsionsofPoliticsinIndia,Delhi,1998.

9.V.P.Dutt,India’sForeignPolicyinaChangingWorld,NewDelhi,1999.10.LalitMansingh,etal,IndianForeignPolicy:Agendaforthe21stCentury,NewDelhi,1997.11.AirCommodoreJasjitSingh,ed.,NuclearIndia,NewDelhi,1998.12.AmitabhMattoo,ed.,India’sNuclearDeterrent:PokhranIIandBeyond,NewDelhi,1999.

Chapter22

A.TamilNadu

1.S.N.Balasundaram,‘TheDravidian(Non-Brahmin)MovementsinMadras,’andC.Annadurai,‘D.M.K.AsISeeIt,’inIqbalNarain,ed.,StatePoliticsinIndia,Meerut,1967.

2.PandavNayak,‘PoliticsofPragmatism,’inIqbalNarain,ed.,StatePoliticsinIndia,Meerut,1976.3.MargueriteRossBarnett,ThePoliticsofCulturalNationalisminSouthIndia,Princeton,1976.4.DavidWashbrook,‘Caste,ClassandDominanceinModernTamilNadu:Non-Brahmanism,DravidianismandTamilNationalism,’inFrancineR.FrankelandM.S.A.Rao,editors,DominanceandStatePowerinModernIndia:DeclineofaSocialOrder,Vol.I,Delhi,1989.

5.UrmilaPhadnis,‘TheDravidianMovementandTamilEthnicityinIndia,’inherEthnicityandNation-BuildinginSouthAsia,NewDelhi,1989.

B.AndhraPradesh

1.HughGray,(i)‘TheDemandforaSeparateTelenganaStateinIndia,’AsianSurvey,Vol.XI,no.5,May1971.(ii)‘TheFailureoftheDemandforaSeparateAndhraState,’AsianSurvey,Vol.XIV,no.4,April1974.

2.G.RamReddy,‘AndhraPradesh:TheCitadeloftheCongress,’IqbalNarain,ed.,StatePolitcsinIndia,Meerut,1976.

3.MohitSen,‘ShowdowninAndhra’,EPW,23December1972.4.DagmarBernstorff,‘RegionandNation:TheTelenganaMovement’sDualIdentity,’inTaylorandYapp,PoliticalIdentityinSouthAsia,London,1979.

D.Assam

1.SanjibBaruah,(i)‘Immigration,EthnicConflict,andPoliticalTurmoil-Assam,1979-1985,’AsianSurvey,Vol.XXVI,no.11,November1986.(ii)‘EthnicConflictorState-SocietyStruggle,’ModernAsianStudies,Vol.28,no.3,1994.

2.MyronWeiner,SonsoftheSoil:MigrationandEthnicConflictinIndia,Princeton,1978.3.HirenGohain,‘EthnicUnrestintheNorth-East,’EPW,22February1997.4.J.DasGupta,‘Ethnicity,DemocracyandDevelopmentinIndia:AssaminaGeneralPerspective,’inAtulKohli,ed.,India’sDemocracy,Princeton,1988.

Chapter23

A.WestBengal

1.AtulKohli,(i)‘WestBengal:ParliamentaryCommunismandReformfromabove,’inAtulKohli,TheStateandPovertyinIndia,Cambridge,1987.

(ii)DemocracyandDiscontent,Chapters6,10,13,Cambridge,1991.(iii)‘ParliamentaryCommunismandAgrarianReform:TheevidencefromIndia’sBengal,’AsianSurvey,Vol.23,no.7,July1983.

(iv)‘FromEliteActivismtoDemocraticConsolidation:TheRiseofReformCommunisminWestBengal,’inFrancineR.FrankelandM.S.A.Rao,eds.,DominanceandStatePowerinModernIndia:DeclineofaSocialOrder,Vols.IandII,Delhi,1989,1990.

B.JammuandKashmir

1.S.Gopal,JawaharlalNehru—ABiography,Vols.2and3,LondonandNewDelhi,1979and1984.2.BalrajPuri,‘JammuandKashmir,’inMyronWeiner,StatePoliticsinIndia,Princeton,1968.3.AjitBhattacharjea,Kashmir—TheWoundedValley,NewDelhi,1994.4.B.G.Verghese,‘FourthOption:TowardsaSettlementinJammuandKashmir,’inUpendraBaxi,AliceJacobandTarlokSingh,ReconstructingtheRepublic,NewDelhi,1999.

5.RoopKrishenBhatt,‘PoliticsofIntegration,’inIqbalNarain,ed.,StatePoliticsinIndia,Meerut,1976.

Chapter24

1.BaldevRajNayar,(i)MinorityPoliticsinthePunjab,Princeton,1966.(ii)‘SikhSeparatisminthePunjab,’inDonaldE.Smith,ed.,SouthAsianPoliticsandReligion,Princeton,1966.

2.RajniA.Kapur,SikhSeparatism:ThePoliticsofFaith,London,1986.3.K.P.S.Gill,TheKnightsofFalsehood,NewDelhi,1997.4.AmarjitKaur,et.al.,ThePunjabStory,NewDelhi,1984.5.SatyapalDang,GenesisofTerrorism:AnAnalyticalStudyofPunjabTerrorists,NewDelhi,1988.6.AmrikSingh,ed.,PunjabinIndianPolitics,Delhi,1985.7.Seminar,February,1984.8.PramodKumar,et.al.,PunjabCrisis:ContextandTrends,Chandigarh,1984.9.SuchaSinghGillandK.C.Singhal,‘ThePunjabProblem:ItsHistoricalRoots,’EPW,April1984.10.BikashChandra,PunjabCrisis—PerceptionsandPerspectivesoftheIndianIntelligentsia,NewDelhi,1993.

Chapters25-31

1.A.M.Khusro,‘LandReformssinceIndependence,’inV.B.Singh,ed.,TheEconomicHistoryofIndia,1857-1956,Delhi,1965.

2.A.Vaidyanathan,‘TheIndianEconomySinceIndependence(1947-70),’inDharmaKumar,ed.,TheCambridgeEconomicHistoryofIndia,Delhi,1984,reprint.

3.AdityaMukherjee,Imperialism,NationalismandtheDevelopmentofIndianCapitalism:TheMakingoftheIndianCapitalistClass1920-47,NewDelhi,forthcoming.

4.AdityaMukherjeeandMridulaMukherjee.‘ImperialismandthegrowthofIndiancapitalismintheTwentiethCentury,’EPW,12March1988.

5.AmartyaSen,‘HowisIndiaDoing?,’NewYorkReviewofBooks,1982,reprintedinMainstream,26January1983.

6.AmartyaSen,‘SocialCommitmentandDemocracy,’NewThinkingCommunist,1November1998.7.AtulKohli,‘PoliticsofEconomicLiberalizationinIndia,’WorldDevelopment,Vol.17,No.3,1989.8.AtulKohli,DemocracyandDiscontent,Cambridge,1990.9.B.R.Tomlinson,TheEconomyofModernIndia,1860-1970,Cambridge,1993.10.BimalJalan,ed,TheIndianEconomy:ProblemsandProspects,NewDelhi,1992.11.BipanChandra,EssaysonColonialism,NewDelhi,1999.12.AmitBhaduriandDeepakNayyar,TheIntelligentPerson’sGuidetoLiberalization,NewDelhi,1996.

13.JeffreyD.Sachs,AshutoshVarshney,NirupamBajpai,ed.IndiaintheEraofEconomicReforms,NewDelhi,1999.

14.KyokoInoue,IndustrialDevelopmentPolicyofIndia,Tokyo,1992.15.K.N.Raj,IndianEconomicGrowth:PerformanceandProspects,NewDelhi,1965.16.L.I.RudolphandS.H.Rudolph,InPursuitofLakshmi:ThePoliticalEconomyoftheIndianState,Chicago,1987.

17.LouisJ.Walinsky,ed.,AgrarianReformasUnfinishedBusiness,TheSelectedPapersofWolfLadejinsky,NewYork,1977.

18.NariakiNakazato,‘TheOriginsofDevelopmentPlanninginIndia,’inFumikoOshikawa,ed.,SouthAsiaundertheEconomicReforms,Osaka,1999.

19.NationalPlanningCommitteeReport,Bombay,1949.20.NitinDesai,‘DevelopmentPlanninginIndia:AReview,’inIndiaSinceIndependence,VolumeI,ProceedingsofNationalSeminar,IndianCouncilofSocialScienceResearch,NewDelhi.1988.

21.P.C.Joshi,LandReforminIndiaandPakistan,EPW,26December1970.22.P.S.Appu,‘TenancyReforminIndia,’EPW,SpecialNumber,August1975.23.PrabhatPatnaik,‘PoliticalStrategiesofEconomicDevelopment,’inParthaChatterjee,ed.,WagesofFreedom:FiftyYearsoftheIndianNation-State,Delhi,1998.

24.PranabBardhan,ThePoliticalEconomyofDevelopmentinIndia,Delhi,1998(expandededition).25.PurshottamdasThakurdas,et.al.,APlanofEconomicDevelopmentforIndia,Pt.1&2,Harmondsworth1945.

26.RuthHeredia,TheAmulIndiaStory,NewDelhi,1997.27.S.J.Patel,EssaysonEconomicTransition.,Bombay,1965.28.SukhamoyChakravarty,DevelopmentPlanning:TheIndianExperience,Oxford1987.29.TV.Sathyamurthyed.,IndustryandAgricultureinIndiaSinceIndependence,Delhi,1995.30.C.H.HanumanthaRao,‘Agriculture:PolicyandPerformance,’inBimalJalan,ed.,TheIndianEconomy:ProblemsandProspects,NewDelhi,1992.

31.D.Bandyopadhyay,‘LandReforminIndia:AnAnalysis,’EPW,ReviewofAgriculture,June,1986.

32.DanielThorner,TheShapingofModernIndia,NewDelhi,1980.33.EconomicSurvey,GovernmentofIndia,variousyears.34.FiveYearPlans,ItoIX,PlanningCommission,GovernmentofIndia,variousdates.35.FrancineR.Frankel,India’sPoliticalEconomy1947-77,Delhi.36.G.Kotovsky,AgrarianReformsinIndia,NewDelhi,1964.37.G.S.Bhalla,‘NehruandPlanning—ChoicesinAgriculture,’WorkingPaperSeries,SchoolofSocialSciences,JawaharlalNehruUniversity,NewDelhi,1990.

38.G.S.BhallaandG.K.Chadha,‘GreenRevolutionandtheSmallPeasant—AStudyofIncomeDistributioninPunjabAgriculture,’EPW,15and22May1982.

39.G.S.BhallaandGurmailSingh,‘RecentDevelopmentsinIndianAgriculture:AStateLevelAnalysis,’EPW,29March1997.

40.GhanshyamShah,ed.,CapitalistDevelopment:CriticalEssays,Bombay,1990.41.IndianNahonalCongress,ResolutionsonEconomicPolicyProgrammeandAlliedMatters1924-1969,NewDelhi,1969.

42.IsherJ.Ahluwalia,IndustrialGrowthinIndia,Delhi,1985.43.IsherJ.AhluwaliaandI.M.D.Littleeds.,India’sEconomicReformsandDevelopment:EssaysforManmohanSingh,Delhi,1998.

44.J.C.Sandesara,‘IndianIndustrialisation:Tendencies,InterpretationsandIssues,’inIndiaSinceIndependence,Volume1,ProceedingsofNationalSeminar,IndianCouncilofSocialScienceResearch.NewDelhi,1988.

45.JagdishBhagwati,IndiainTransition:FreeingtheEconomy,Delhi,1994.46.JagdishBhagwatiandT.N.Srinivasan,India’sEconomicReforms,1993,AReportpreparedattherequestofManmohanSingh,FinanceMinsterofIndia,reprintedbyAssociatedChamberofCommerceandIndustryofIndia,NewDelhi.

47.JagdishN.BhagwatiandPadmaDesai,India:PlanningforIndustrialisation,IndustrialisationandTradePoliciesSince1951,London,1970.

48.JeanDrezeandAmartyaSen,India:EconomicDevelopmentandSocialOpportunity,Delhi,1996.49.TheEastAsianMiracle:EconomicGrowthandPublicPolicy,WorldBank,NewYork,1993.50.V.B.Singh,ed.,EconomicHistoryofIndia:1857-1956,Bombay,1965.51.VijayJoshiandI.M.D.Little,India’s:MacroeconomicsandPoliticalEconomy1964-1991,Washington,1994

52.VijayJoshiandI.M.D.Little,India’sEconomicReforms1991-2001,Oxford,1996.53.WilfredCandlerandNaliniKumar,India:TheDairyRevolution,Washington,1998.54.ArjunSengupta,‘FiftyYearsofDevelopmentPolicyinIndia,’inHiranmayKarlekar,ed.,IndependentIndia:TheFirstFiftyYears,Delhi,1988.

Chapter32

1.A.R.Desai,editor,AgrarianStrugglesinIndiaafterIndependence,Delhi,1986.2.P.Sundarayya,TelanganaPeople’sStruggleandItsLessons,Calcutta,1972.3.RaviNarayanReddy,HeroicTelangana:ReminiscencesandExperiences,NewDelhi,1973.4.BarryPavier,TheTelanganaMovement:1944-51,NewDelhi,1981.

5.MridulaMukherjee,‘CommunistsandPeasantsinPunjab:AFocusontheMuzaraMovementinPatiala,1937-53,’inBipanChandra,ed.,TheIndianLeft:CriticalAppraisals,NewDelhi,1983.

6.MridulaMukhejee,‘PeasantResistanceandPeasantConsciousnessinColonialIndia:‘SubalternsandBeyond,’EPW,1988,8and15October.

7.MarcusF.Franda,RadicalPoliticsinWestBengal,Cambridge,Massachusets,1971.8.SumantaBanerjee,IntheWakeofNaxalbari:AHistoryoftheNaxaliteMovementinIndia,Calcutta,1980.

9.ShanthaSinha,MaoistsinAndhraPradesh,Delhi,1989.10.SunilSahasrabudhey,PeasantMovementinModernIndia,Allahabad,1989.11.TomBrass,ed.,NewFarmers’MovementsinIndia,Ilford,1995.12.GailOmvedt,ReinventingRevolution:NewSocialMovementsandtheSocialistTraditioninIndia,London,1993.

13.ManoranjanMohantyandParthaNathMukherji,eds.,People’sRightsandtheStateintheThirdWorld,NewDelhi,1998.

Chapter33

1.BipanChandra,(i)CommunalisminModernIndia,(ii)IdeologyandPoliticsinModernIndia,Chapters4,5,6,7,NewDelhi,1994.(iii)EssaysinContemporaryIndia,PartII,NewDelhi,1993.

2.PramodKumar,ed.,(i)TowardsUnderstandingCommunalism,Chandigarh,1992.(ii)PollutingSacredFaith:AStudyonCommunalismandViolence,Delhi,1992.

3.AsgharAliEngineer,(i)CommunalisminIndia:AHistoricalEmpiricalStudy.(ii)CommunalismandCommunalViolenceinIndia,Delhi,1989.

4.AchinVanaik,CommunalismContested:Religion,ModernityandSecularization,NewDelhi,1997.5.P.N.Rajagopal,CommunalViolenceinIndia,NewDelhi,1987.6.S.K.Ghosh,CommunalRiotsinIndia,NewDelhi,1987.7.ChristopheJaffrelot,TheHinduNationalistMovementandIndianPolitics,1925tothe1990s,London,1996.

8.S.Gopal,ed.,AnatomyofaConfrontation:TheBabriMasjid-RamjanambhoomiIssue,NewDelhi,1991.

9.RandhirSingh,‘TheorisingCommunalism,’EPW,23July1988.10.ParveenPatel,‘CommunalRiotsinContemporaryIndia:TowardsaSociologicalExplanation,’inUpendraBaxiandBhikhuParekh,eds.,CrisisandChangeinContemporaryIndia,NewDelhi,1995.

11.GyanendraPandey,HindusandOthers:TheQuestionofIdentityinIndiaToday,NewDelhi,1993.12.D.R.Goyal,RashtriyaSwayamsewakSangh,NewDelhi,1979.13.SubrataKumarMitra,‘DesecularisingtheState:ReligionandPoliticsinIndiaafterIndependence,’ComparativeStudyofSocietyandHistory,Vol.33,1991.

Chapter34

1.EleanorZelliot,FromUntouchabletoDalit:EssaysontheAmbedkarMovement,NewDelhi,1992.2.M.N.Srinivas,TheCohesiveRoleofSanskritizationandOtherEssays,Delhi,1989.3.BipanChandra,etal,India’sStruggleforIndependence,1857-1947,NewDelhi,Chapter18.

4.JeanDrezeandAmartyaSen,India:EconomicDevelopmentandSocialOpportunity,Delhi,1995.5.V.Suresh,‘TheDalitMovementinIndia,’inT.V.Sathyamurthy,SocialChangeandPoliticalDiscourseinIndia,Vol.3,Region,Religion,Caste,Gender,andCultureinContemporaryIndia,1996.

6.GailOmvedt,‘TheAnti-CasteMovementandtheDiscourseofPower,’inIbid.7.GailOmvedt,‘“WeWanttheReturnofOurSweat”:TheNewPeasantMovementinIndiaandtheFormationofaNewAgriculturalPolicy,’inTomBrass,ed.,NewFarmers’MovementsinIndia,Ilford,1995.

8.GailOmvedt,DalitsandtheDemocraticRevolution:DrAmbedkarandtheDalitMovementinColonialIndia,NewDelhi,1994.

9.M.S.Gore,TheSocialContentofanIdeology:Ambedkar’sPoliticalandSocialThought,Bombay,1993.

10.Francine,R.FrankelandM.S.A.Rao,eds.,DominanceandStatePowerinModernIndia:DeclineofaSocialOrder,2volumes,Delhi,1989,1990.

Chapter35

1.CommitteeontheStatusofWomeninIndia,TowardsEquality,NewDelhi,1974.2.M.Chaudhuri,IndianWomen’sMovement,NewDelhi,1993.3.KarunaChanana,ed.,Socialisation,EducationandWomen:ExplorationsinGenderIdentity,NewDelhi,1988.

4.RadhaKumar,TheHistoryofDoing:AnIllustratedAccountofMovementsforWomen’sRightsandFeminisminIndia,1800-1990,NewDelhi,1993.

5.JoannaLiddleandRamaJoshi,DaughtersofIndependence,Delhi,1986.6.KumkumSanghariandSudeshVaid,eds.,RecastingWomen,Delhi,1989.7.MadhuKishwarandRuthVanita,eds.,InSearchofAnswers:IndianWomen’sVoicesfromManushi,London,1984.

8.Manushi,variousissues.9.RamachandraGuha,TheUnquietWoods:EcologicalChangeandPeasantResistanceintheHimalaya,Delhi,1989.

10.RajniPalriwalaandInduAgnihotri,‘Tradition,theFamilyandtheState:PoliticsofTheContemporaryWomen’sMovement,’inT.V.Sathyamurthy,ed.,SocialChangeandPoliticalDiscourseinIndia,Vol.3.Region,Religion,Caste,GenderandCultureinContemporaryIndia,Delhi,1996.

11.IlinaSen,‘Women’sPoliticsinIndia,’inIbid.12.JeanDrezeandAmartyaSen,India:EconomicDevelopmentandSocialOpportunity,Delhi,1995.

Chapter36

1.AchinVanaik,ThePainfulTransition:BourgeoisDemocracyinIndia,Verso,London,1990.2.AdityaMukherjee,Imperialism,NationalismandtheDevelopmentofIndianCapitalism:TheMakingoftheIndianCapitalistClass1920-47,NewDelhi,forthcoming.

3.AdityaMukherjeeandMridulaMukherjee,‘ImperialismandthegrowthofIndiancapitalismintheTwentiethCentury,’EPW,12March1988.

4.AtulKohli,DemocracyandDiscontent,Cambridge,1990.

5.ErnestoLaclau,PoliticsandIdeologyinMarxistTheory,London,1977.6.FrancineR.Frankel,India’sPoliticalEconomy1947-77,Delhi.7.K.N.Raj,‘ThePoliticsandEconomicsofIntermediateRegimes,’EPW,7July1973.8.L.I.RudolphandS.H.Rudolph,InPursuitofLakshmi:ThePoliticalEconomyoftheIndianState,Chicago,1987.

9.MyronWeiner,IndianParadox:EssaysinIndianPolitics,ed.,byAshutoshVarshney,NewDelhi,1989.

10.NicosPoulantzas,ClassesinContemporaryCapitalism,London,1975.11.PeterEvans,DependentDevelopment:TheAllianceofLocalCapitalinBrazil,Princeton,1979.12.PrabhatPatnaik,‘PoliticalStrategiesofEconomicDevelopment,’inParthaChatterjee,ed.,WagesofFreedom:FiftyYearsoftheIndianNation-State,Delhi,1998.

13.PranabBardhan:(i)ThePoliticalEconomyofDevelopmentinIndia,Delhi,1998(expandededition).(ii)DominantProprietoryClassesandIndia’sDemocracy,inAtulKohli,ed.,India’sDemocracy,Princeton,1988.

14.RalphMiliband,MarxismandPolitics,Oxford,1977.15.SudiptoMundle,‘StateCharactersandEconomicPolicy,’SocialScientist,May1974.16.AjitRay,PoliticalPowerinIndia,Calcutta,1981edition.17.B.Berberoghi,Class,StateandDevelopmentinIndia,NewDelhi,1992.

Chapter37(InadditiontobooksintheGeneralList)

1.SudiptoKaviraj,‘OntheCrisisofPoliticalInstitutionsinIndia,’ContributionstoIndianSociology,N.S.,Vol.18,no.2,1984.

2.RajniKothari,(i)‘TheCrisisoftheModerateStateandtheDeclineofDemocracy,’inPeterLyonandJamesManor,eds.,TransferandTransformation,Leicester,1983.(ii)StateAgainstDemocracy:InSearchofHumaneGovernance,Delhi,1988.

3.C.P.Bhambri,TheIndianState:FiftyYears,Delhi,1997.4.AtulKohli,DemocracyandDiscontent:India’sCrisisofGovernability,Cambridge,1991.5.MyronWeiner,(i)TheIndianParadox:EssaysinIndianPolitics,Chapter3,NewDelhi,1988.(ii)‘TheWoundedTiger:MaintainingIndia’sDemocraticInstitutions,’inPeterLyonandJamesManor,eds.,TransferandTransformation,Leicester,1983.

6.HenryC.Hart,‘TheIndianConstitution:PoliticalDevelopmentandDecay,’AsianSurvey,Vol.XX,no.4,April1980.

7.A.SuryaPrakash,WhatAilsIndianParliament,NewDelhi,1995.8.S.C.Kashyap,‘Parliament:AMixedBalanceSheet,’inHiranmayKarlekar,IndependentIndia:TheFirstFiftyYears,Delhi,1998.

9.N.S.Saxena,LawandOrderinIndia,NewDelhi,1987.10.P.C.Alexander,‘CivilService:ContinuityandChange,’inHiranmayKarlekar,ed.,IndependentIndia:TheFirstFiftyYears,Delhi,1998.

11.DavidH.Bayley,‘ThePoliceandPoliticalOrderinIndia,’AsianSurvey,Vol.XXIII,no.4,April1983.

12.IndianPoliceJournal,SpecialIssueonPoliceReforms,Vol.XLVI,no.1,January-March1999.

13.StephenP.Cohen,‘TheMilitaryandIndianDemocracy,’inAtulKohli,ed.,India’sDemocracy:AnAnalysisofChangingState-SocietyRelations,Princeton,1988.

14.Lt.GeneralS.L.Menezes,FidelityandHonour:TheIndianArmyfromthe17thto21stCentury,NewDelhi,1993.

Chapter38

1.RajniKothari,(i)PoliticsinIndia,ChapterIX,NewDelhi,1970.(ii)DemocraticPolityandSocialChangeinIndia,Bombay,1976.

2.ArendLipjhart,‘ThePuzzleofIndianDemocracy:AConsociationalInterpretation,’AmericanPoliticalScienceReview,Vol.90,no.2,June1996.

3.DanielThorner,TheShapingofModernIndia,pp.138-147.4.TarlokSingh,‘PathsofSocialChangeinaPeriodofTransition,’inUpendraBaxi,AliceJacobandTarlokSingh,eds.,ReconstructingtheRepublic,NewDelhi,1999.

5.AtulKohli,TheStateandPovertyinIndia:ThePoliticsofReform,CambridgeandBombay,1987.6.MyronWeiner,TheIndianParadox:EssaysinIndianPolitics,Chapter12,NewDelhi,1989.7.GhanshyamShah,‘Grass-RootsMobilizationinIndianPolitics,’inAtulKohli,ed.,India’sDemocracy,Princeton,1988.

8.BipanChandra,(i)‘TransformationfromaColonialtoanIndependentEconomy:ACaseStudyofIndia,’inhisEssaysonColonialism,NewDelhi,1999.(ii)‘Indiafrom1947tothe1990’sandTheRealDangerofForeignDomination:Peripheralization,’inhisEssaysonContemporaryIndia,Revisededition,NewDelhi,1999.

9.AdityaMukherjeeandMridulaMukherjee,‘ImperialismandtheGrowthofIndianCapitalismintheTwentiethCentury,’EPW,Vol.XXIII,no.11,12March1988.

10.V.M.DandekarandN.Rath,‘PovertyinIndia:DimensionsandTrends,’EPW,2and9January1971.11.S.D.Tendulkar,‘EconomicInequalityinanIndianPerspective,’inA.Beteilleed.,EqualityandInequality,Delhi,1983.

12.AmartyaSen,(i)‘IndianDevelopment:LessonsandNon-Lessons,’Daedalus,Vol.118,1989.(ii)‘HowisIndiaDoing,’NewYorkReviewofBooks,reprintedinMainstream,26January1983.

13.AmartyaSen,‘TheDoingandUndoingofIndia,’EPW,12February1983.14.JeanDrezeandAmartyaSen,India:EconomicDevelopmentandSocialOpportunity,Delhi,1995.15.KiritS.Parekh,ed.,IndiaDevelopmentReport1999-2000,NewDelhi,1999.16.UnitedNationsDevelopmentProgramme(UNDP),HumanDevelopmentReport1999,NewDelhi,1999.

17.AbusalehShariff,NationalCouncilofAppliedEconomicResearch,IndiaHumanDevelopmentReport,NewDelhi,1999.

18.GovernmentofIndia,MinistryofFinance,EconomicSurvey1998-99,NewDelhi,1999.19.AshutoshVarshney,‘TheSelf-CorrectingMechanismsofIndianDemocracy,’Seminar,425,January1995.

20.TapasMajumdar,‘Education:UnevenProgress,DifficultChoices,’inHiranmayKarlekar,IndependentIndia:TheFirstFiftyYears,Delhi,1998.

ANoteonStyle

Inordertoensurethecontinuityofthebook’snarrative,theauthorsofthevariouschaptersarementionedhereandnowhereelseinthevolume.Chapters1-3,6-11,13-19,22-24,33,37and38havebeenwrittenbyBipanChandra,Chapters4,5,12,20,21,32,34,35byMridulaMukherjee,andChapters25-31,and36byAdityaMukherjee.

Acknowledgements

Inthemakingofthisbook,wehavebenefittedimmenselyfromourlongterminteractionwithandsupportofourcolleaguesattheCentreforHistoricalStudiesattheJawaharlalNehruUniversity,NewDelhi.Manyfriends—MohitSen,KewalVarma,V.P.Dutt,BarunDe,GirishMathur,GirishMishra,GopiArora,S.Gopal,RomilaThapar,IrfanHabib,V.N.Datta,RavinderKumar,C.P.Bhambri,DarshanandShielaBhalla,AmitBhaduri,ArjunSengupta,ShireenMooswi,ArunKumar,ArjunDev,K.P.Jain,G.M.Telang,SwadeshMahajan,MadhuKishwar,ShekharSingh,ShanthaSinha,NarinderBediandBodhPrakash—haveovertheyearshelpedusgrapplewiththecontemporaryworld,oftenthroughagreatdealofpolemicsandmanyheateddiscussionsanddisagreements.Alargenumberofcolleaguesandstudents—D.N.Gupta,MohinderSingh,SuchetaMahajan,Visalakshi

Menon,AntonyThomas,SudhirMathur,NeerjaSingh,SalilMishra,RakeshBatabyal,BikashChandra,VikramMenon,GyaneshKudaisya,JohnZavos,AmitMishra,TulikaSharan,KalyaniandAmmanMadan—havecontributedtoevolvingourideasandhavealsobeenofassistanceinseveralotherways,andhavehelpeduskeepouroptimismalive.TheJapanFoundationenabledus(AdityaMukherjeeandMridulaMukherjee)tobeattheInstituteof

OrientalCulture,UniversityofTokyo,forayearsinceMarch1999.AconsiderablepartofthedraftingandresearchforthebookwasdoneinJapan.ProfessorAsisDatta,ViceChancellor,JNU,verykindlymadeitpossibleforustoavailofthisopportunitytocompleteourbook.AlargenumberoffriendsandcolleaguesmadeourvisitinJapanextremelyfruitfulintellectuallyandotherwise.TheyincludeProfessorsNariakiNakazato,HarukaYanagisawa,TsukasaMizushima,ShingoEinoo,ToruMatsui,NobukoNagasaki,TakakoHirose,HirokoHara,ShigeruAkita,FumikoOshikawa,MrTakashiOishi,DrShujiUchikawa,MrShusakuMatsumoto,ProfessorandMrsHisashiNakamura,MrsEmikoKothari,DrKyokoInoue,UmeshandRubyPawankar,DrMalavikaKarlekar,ChiekoMizushima,DrJaishankarandProfessorB.R.Tomlinson,MrShin’ichiroHorieofJapanFoundation,Tokyo,enabledustotaketimeofffromJapanandpresentmanyaspectsofthisbookinseveraluniversitiesintheUS.ManuelaAlbuquerque,CatherineHarned,AbhaandAnilPandya,MohanSood,TomMetcalfe,VasudhaDalmia,BlairKling,ArjunAppadurai,BernardCohnandCarolBreckenridgewerecriticalinmakingtheUSvisitveryrewarding.WewouldliketothankthestaffoftheNehruMemorialMuseumandLibrary,JawaharlalNehru

UniversityLibrary,IndiaInternationalCentreLibraryinNewDelhiandtheInstituteofOrientalCultureLibraryandInstituteofDevelopingEconomiesLibraryinTokyo.LuxmiandOmPrakashsharedagreatdealoftheburdenoftypingalargepartofthemanuscript.

ColleaguesattheAcademicStaffCollege,JNU,particularlySavitriBisht,AjaySharmaandS.C.Sharma

wentbeyondthecallofdutytohelptheauthorswritethebooksituatedthousandsofmilesfromeachother,usinginformationtechnology.AsusualUshaChandrahascontributedinmultiplewaystothemakingofthisbook.WeareverythankfultoRajKaminiMahadevanofPenguinIndiaforundertakingthearduoustaskof

editingthemanuscriptandthusvastlyimprovingitandalsoforseeingtoitthatwedidn’tfalltoofarbehindschedule.WearealsoverythankfultoDavidDavidarforencouragingustoundertakethewritingofthisworkandthengivingusgreatdealoflatitudeintermsoftime.

PENGUINBOOKSPublishedbythePenguinGroupPenguinBooksIndiaPvt.Ltd,11CommunityCentre,PanchsheelPark,NewDelhi110017,IndiaPenguinGroup(USA)Inc.,375HudsonStreet,NewYork,NewYork10014,USAPenguinGroup(Canada),90EglintonAvenueEast,Suite700,Toronto,Ontario,M4P2Y3,Canada(adivisionofPearsonPenguinCanadaInc.)PenguinBooksLtd,80Strand,LondonWC2R0RL,EnglandPenguinIreland,25StStephen’sGreen,Dublin2,Ireland(adivisionofPenguinBooksLtd)PenguinGroup(Australia),707CollinsStreet,Melbourne,Victoria3008,Australia(adivisionofPearsonAustraliaGroupPtyLtd)PenguinGroup(NZ),67ApolloDrive,Rosedale,Auckland0632,NewZealand(adivisionofPearsonNewZealandLtd)PenguinGroup(SouthAfrica)(Pty)Ltd,BlockD,RosebankOfficePark,181JanSmutsAvenue,ParktownNorth,Johannesburg2193,SouthAfrica

PenguinBooksLtd,RegisteredOffices:80Strand,LondonWC2R0RL,England

FirstpublishedinVikingbyPenguinBooksIndia1999PublishedinPenguinBooks2000

Copyright©BipinChandra,MridulaMukherjee,AdityaMukherjee1999

CoverphotographbyAshitParikh

CoverdesignbyNandiniVarma

Themoralrightoftheauthorshasbeenasserted

Allrightsreserved

ISBN:978-01-4027-825-5

Thisdigitaleditionpublishedin2013.e-ISBN:978-93-5118-120-0

Thisbookissoldsubjecttotheconditionthatitshallnot,bywayoftradeorotherwise,belent,resold,hiredout,orotherwisecirculatedwithoutthepublisher’spriorwrittenconsentinanyformofbindingorcoverotherthanthatinwhichitispublishedandwithoutasimilarconditionincludingthisconditionbeingimposedonthesubsequentpurchaserandwithoutlimitingtherightsundercopyrightreservedabove,nopartofthispublicationmaybereproduced,storedinorintroducedintoaretrievalsystem,ortransmittedinanyformorbyanymeans(electronic,mechanical,photocopying,recordingorotherwise),withoutthepriorwrittenpermissionofboththecopyrightownerandtheabove-mentionedpublisherofthisbook.