8/2/2019 Bin Ali

1/23

British Society for Middle Eastern Studies

Bin Ali's Tunisia: Democracy by Non-Democratic MeansAuthor(s): Larbi SadikiReviewed work(s):Source: British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 29, No. 1 (May, 2002), pp. 57-78Published by: Taylor & Francis, Ltd.Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/826148 .

Accessed: 25/11/2011 10:32

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of

content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms

of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

Taylor & Francis, Ltd. andBritish Society for Middle Eastern Studies are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize,

preserve and extend access toBritish Journal of Middle Eastern Studies.

http://www.jstor.org

http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=taylorfrancishttp://www.jstor.org/stable/826148?origin=JSTOR-pdfhttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/stable/826148?origin=JSTOR-pdfhttp://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=taylorfrancis

8/2/2019 Bin Ali

2/23

British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies (2002), CarfaxPublishingTaylor& Francis Group29(1), 57-78

B i n A l i ' s T u n i s i a : Democracy b yNon-Democratic e a n sLARBI SADIKI*

ABSTRACTThe article tackles one principal question. Can the currentdicingwith democracyin Tunisiaserve as a harbingerfor good governancewhen it isfounded on exclusionarypolitical practices. It argues that Bin Ali's reformsrepresentyet anotherphase in the reproductionof hegemonicpolitical practicewhich is about control not democraticpower sharing.Thearticle's analytical agenda is two-fold.Firstly, it will criticallyassess thenature of Bin Ali's 'electoral democracy'. In so doing, it looks at the tensionbetweenpolitical rhetoric and practice. Whatbecomes clear is that 11 years of'electoralization' and 'parliamentarization'have not put an end to unlawfulexclusion, muzzling of free expression, repression and disenfranchizement.Secondly, it will show that Bin Ali's obsession with hegemonic control mayalready be corrodinghis regime's legitimacyat home and dentingits credibilityabroad, especially in France. In this respect, the analysis will attemptto drawgeneral conclusionsfrom three recent crises. Specifically,can they be read asthefirst cracks in the monolithof singular rule in Tunisia? The article concludeson a negative and a positive note. On the negative side, Bin Ali, as this authorbelieves, is not likely to give up power constitutionally.On thepositive side, theApril-May 2000 crises have placed his regime in the spotlight at home andabroad and may possibly galvanize civil society into pressuring the regime toreverse its returnto a closed society.IntroductionThe expandingof the focus of Middle East studies into issues of democracy,citizenship and humanrights could never be more apposite than at the currenthistorical uncture,when democraticreformsin the Arab world have undergonean apparentlyunprecedentedseachange. Periodic elections are frequent, orga-nized oppositionis on the rise, satelliteTV broadcasting s increasinglyopeningthe way for uncensored nformation,1 nd most ancien regimes areeithergivingway or on the verge of conceding power to a new breedof youngerleaders(e.g.Jordan,Morocco andQatar).2One or more of these trendsarepresent n Tunisia.Bin Ali's meteoric rise to power in the 1986-1987 period culminated in theclosing of a 50-year chapterof 'Bourguibism' n Tunisia's modernhistory. In a* Larbi Sadiki is a Lecturer n Politics in the Departmentof Politics, University of Exeter. Because of theEuropeanization f many propernames in this article,all propernames have been left without diacriticalstomaintainconsistency.i JulianTaylor, 'Satellite Saturation?',The MiddleEast, 293 (September1999), pp. 38-39.2 Formoreonthenewleaderships, ee 'Windsof Change:The New Generation',TheMiddleEast,293 (September1999), pp. 4-6.ISSN 1353-0194 print/ISSN1469-3542 online/02/010057-22 ? 2002 BritishSocietyfor MiddleEasternStudiesDOI: 10.1080/13530190220124061

8/2/2019 Bin Ali

3/23

LARBISADIKITable 1. Elections in the Maghrib:1980-1990s

Country Elections YearAlgeria Parliamentary 1991Presidential 1995

Parliamentary 1997Presidential 1999Mauritania Parliamentary 1992Presidential 1992Parliamentary 1996Presidential 1997Morocco Parliamentary 1984Parliamentary 1993Parliamentary 1997Tunisia Parliamentary 1989Parliamentary 1994Presidential 1994Parliamentary 1999Presidential 1999

matter of a little less than 2 years Bin Ali was promotedfrom Minister of theInterior(April 1986) to the premiership October 1987). The rest was history.Thirty-six days after becoming Prime Minister, the then 51-year old Bin Alientered Tunisia's history books as the country's second president. It was aremarkablepolitical feat from a man whose name at the time was no more thanan inconspicuousfootnote in Tunisia'spublic affairs,mostly in the obscure andunimportantdomain of national security and the military.Bin Ali's advent topower was a breatherat a time when the questionof succession and politicallymotivated trials of Islamist dissidents were pushing the North African countryinto the unknown.A form of 'electoraldemocracy'has taken root since 1989.A carefully 'tailored' and constitutionallymandatedopposition has been inte-grated nto parliament ince the 1994 elections. The torrentof electoral activitiesin the 1980s and 1990s within the ArabMaghribUnion (AMU) is impressive.It seems to signal thattransition o democracy,or at least away from authoritar-ianism, is underway in Tunisia as well as in most AMU member states (Table1).However,after14 yearsin powerand 11 yearsof sustainedperiodicelections,it can be said that many of Bin Ali's promises to democratizeTunisia remainunfulfilled. This is not to detract from the importance of elections as ademocratic institution and an integral component of democraticdevelopment.Rather,what the Tunisianexample demonstrates s that a tailor-made electoraldemocracy' changes very little of the authoritarian tructuresof the Statein theabsence of associational life, law-abiding government, free press and freelyorganized opposition. Elections have to be juxtaposed with other essentialcriteria in order to promote smooth and multileveled democratic transition.Despite greatercontestation(competitiveness)and participation inclusiveness),the two dimensions of Dahls's polyarchy by which he means democracy,3 he3 RobertDahl, Polyarchy:Participationand Opposition(New Havens,CT: Yale UniversityPress, 1971).58

8/2/2019 Bin Ali

4/23

BIN ALI'S TUNISIA

alternationof power is not possible. The democratic initiatives undertaken nTunisia consist of tightly controlled liberalization.Even charity, an arena with lots of potential for the growth ofnon-governmental rganizations NGOs), is taken over by the State.The regimeis takingno chanceswith welfarism. Thus it has absorbed he lessons of the past,from within andwithout,thatStatefailurein this domainopens up space for notonly proactiveIslamist-ledgrassrootssocial engineering,but also for all kinds ofother non-State activism. The regime does not want to tread a route ofliberalization that is forced by pressure from below engendered by acutesocio-economic malaise.4It takes its providentialrole seriously and relies on anexpandingstratumof 'ayshtn (those living comfortably)to reproduce ts powerbase and monopoly. The first section of this article elaborates this inherentcontradiction n Bin Ali's rule.But the regime has not heeded other lessons. Perhapsthe most basic of theselessons is that excessively singularrule that used to make up regimes in the1960s and 1970s is breaking them up in the 1990s and at the turn of thetwenty-firstcentury. Contemporary istory is littered with many examples, withthe downfall of Suharto n Indonesiaand SlobodanMilosevic in Serbiabeingthelatest. The Bin Ali regime has yet to go above thatlearningcurve. Its excessivesingularrule led it to blunderratherbadly duringthe crises of April-May 2000,forcing it to shift into a damage containmentgear. Tunisia may be one of themore stable Arab States. But Bin Ali's regime is not. It is one that is good athiding behind a facade of firm control, aidedby draconianmeasuresthat beliethe veneer of democratic language. It is this veneer of legal and democraticvernacular hat has given the State underBin Ali, as well as underBourguiba,a gloss of rationalism.This veneer lends some credenceto Camau'snotionof theEtat ideal (Rational State) that he takes to characterizethe rulers' officialdiscoursein Tunisia.5The realityof powermonopoly and 'personalistic'politicsdoes not correspond o the rationalState. Today, the Bin Ali regime is not onlycaught within the trappingsof power, but also in the trapof 'over-stating'theState, to use a termfrom Ayubi.6Given Bin Ali's rigid singularity, t is not outof place to speculatethat the trappingsof power may tempthim not to give uphigh office as he is supposedto in 2004. However,his 'over-stating'of the Statemight have unwittinglycreated traps-a broad-basedcoalition of oppositionalforces and internationalbad publicity. In the last section, the article shallelaborate these points when discussing the April-May crises of 2000.Bin Ali: From General to PresidentThe Tunisiabequeathed o Bin Ali was politicallydecayingbecauseBourguiba'scourtiers ran the countrytaking advantageof the then octogenarianpresident'ssenility. This they did accordingto his increasinglyerraticbehaviourand theirwhims, completely undermininghe State's legal-rationalbasis. Bourguiba's astyears in power were times of instability. Confidants and sycophants were4 LarbiSadiki, 'PopularUprisingsand ArabDemocratization', nternationalJournalof MiddleEast Studies,32(2000), pp. 71-95.5 MichelCamau,'Tunisieaupr6sent:Une modernit6 u-dessusde toutsoupcon',in MichelCamau ed.) Tunisieau prdsent(Paris:Centre National de la RechercheScientifique,1987).6 NazihAyubi,Over-Statinghe Arab State: Politics andSociety n theMiddleEast(London: . B. Taurus,1995).

59

8/2/2019 Bin Ali

5/23

LARBI SADIKI

runningthe palace with the countryfindingitself in the grip of twin crises. Atthe level of 'high' politics, the hottest item was the question of succession. Atthe level of 'low' politics, the countrywas living amidstBourguiba'sworstyearsin power. The three last years of the thenpresident-for-life's ule were the mostilliberal. All dissidence was proscribedand heavy policing was used. The thenGeneralBin Ali was directingthe bulk of that policing from 1984 to 1987 ashead of National Security, then as ministerof the Interior.Ghannushiand hisfellow Islamists in the then Islamic TendencyMovement (MTI) were targeted.The largest share of regime brutalitywas meted out to them. In a way, theIslamists served as a convenient device to deflect attention from the politicsinside the palace and economic problems, especially high unemploymentamongst graduatesand youth. Impasse and polarizationmarked the country'spolitical climate. In 1987 the political mood within the countrywas tense andpessimistic. Bourguiba,and those runningthe countryon his behalf, seemed tohave completely lost the plot.The 7 November 1987 change led by Bin Ali was welcomed widely amongstTunisiansfrom all walks of life. Those who did entertain cepticismdid so withgood reason.The question many posed regarded he extent to which a militaryand securityman can reverse the personalization,de-institutionalization nd theprivatizationof the State he inheritedfrom his predecessor.Also, Bin Ali'ssecurity backgrounddid not make him a passive actor in Tunisia's bloodyevents. He, on and off, headed the security apparatushe had helped build in1964.7There is little evidence linking Bin Ali to one particularlyviolent eventin Tunisia's modern history: Black Thursday of 26 January 1978. But asDirector-General f National Securitybetween 1977 and April 1980, it can besurmisedthat he played some role in Black Thursday n which the army wasdeployed with brutality.Therewere doubts and questionmarks aboutBin Ali'spolitical credentialsand ability to steer the country away from the impasse andpolarizationof Bourguiba'sTunisiain the mid-1980s.Bourguiba he lawyerand,by any standardsa man of ideas, turned ethnonationalism nto singular rule.Thus there were questionsin many minds aboutthe abilityof Bin Ali, a formerGeneral and a man from Saint-Cyr, to undo his predecessor's legacy byheraldinga new era of pluralism.But why did Tunisiansapproveof Bin Ali? Bin Ali became a fait accomplitoo quickly for any serious oppositionto his bloodless coup to emerge. Insteadof more impasse and polarization,most Tunisians with their usual pragmatism,and currentsfrom all sides of the political spectrumrallied behind the newpresident. Bin Ali was a reality and they had no choice but to deal with itintelligently.Contestingpower is not deeply embedded n the country'shistory.That history is litteredwith uprisings against unjustrule over taxationor foodbut not with rebellionagainst poweras an end in itself. From the time of Ali BinGhadhaham's amous uprisingagainst high taxes in 1864 to the bread riots ofthe 1970s and 1980s,8 the prevailing political culture has been one of payingdeference to political rule so long as it does not impinge on livelihood-con-ditional deference.But politicalculture s not static.Tunisiansmay not be in the7 SadokChaabane,Ben Ali on the Roadto Pluralism n Tunisia Washington,DC: AmericanEducationalTrust,1997), p. 25.8 For more on the 1864 uprisingsee, Ahmad Ibn Abi al-Dhiyaf,ItafAhl al-Zamdn i AkhbarTuniswa Muluk'Ahd al-Aman(Tunis:Al-Dar Al-Tunisiyyali' l-Nashr, 1989), vol. 5.60

8/2/2019 Bin Ali

6/23

BIN ALI'S TUNISIA

habit of contesting rule. But in more recent history they have grown confidentin interrogating he nature of singularand/orsecularrule. This was the case inthe late 1980s underBourguiba.Todaythat contestationcan be expectedto gainmomentum underBin Ali's singularrule. Nonetheless, when TunisiansralliedbehindBin Ali in 1987, it was partlyin keeping with threefeatures of the localpolitical culture.One is of conditionaldeference to political power. This, however, is increas-ingly changing as a result of gains in political awareness and educationand asa result of modernization.Another is the strong tendency to seek and practiseconsensus, as opposed to confrontation.Generally, Tunisians do not stomachconfrontation.A celebrated ocal proverbcaptures he essence of this: 'akhta rasiwu'dhrub'(hitbut not my head).The thirdfeature s that of gradualism.AnotherTunisian proverb sums up this feature: 'shwaya shwayya, wa limbatfi sTdTal-hdn' (one step at a time and [before long] we will reach Sidi al-Hani).9BinAli was thoughtof as an interim eader. Thatis, one who would put the countryback on track and leave at a point where pluralistpolitics assume a life of theirown. Ghannushi onfirmsthis view. In reflectingon his own approvalof Bin Ali,with MTI's broadbacking, in 1989 he states the following:We accepted Bin Ali for the greater sake of national reconciliation. But we treated hispresidency as one step to be followed by other steps, other phases for laying out acomprehensive democratic agenda involving all political forces. We were hoping forgenuine renewal, new leadership and a real chance for Tunisia to develop. Bin Ali hadother plans ... monopolizing power. 0

Thus Bin Ali's advent to power was treated as a first phase to be followed bymultiple sequences, an interim period. In a sense, especially given his murkysecurity background, most Tunisians embraced him-the MTI included. Theidea, at least as understoodby the MTI, was for Bin Ali to head a caretakergovernment or no more than one term. Ghannushiopposedthe militarizationofTunisia'spolity, deemingit unhelpfulto the buildingof an open society. Bin Aliwould be followed by a coalition government representativeof all politicalstreamsin the countryto pave the way for the next phase. That was envisagedby Ghannushi to be the crucial phase of maturationof pluralismthroughtheconstructing over time of a shared normative, institutional and behaviouralcommitment to the rules of the democraticgame and values."1Given his needto boost his legitimacy and the wide acceptanceof his 'coup', Bin Ali had nochoice but to rise to the occasion, decompressingauthoritarianismn his firstthree years in power. He released most political prisoners and nullified thepolitically motivated sentences handed down to MTI members by Bourguiba'ssecurity courts. The 1989 amnesty included thousands of political prisoners. Heengaged in a broadnationaldialogue andsought Ghannushiout as an interlocu-tor on the Islamists' 'dossier'.9 IndependenceromFrench ule s the best manifestation f thisgradualism. ndependence ame in bits andpiecesstartingwith the 1954 autonomyagreementandendingwith the Bizertaevacuationof 1962.In fact,this was onesalient feature that distinguishedBourguibafrom Nasser with regardto the Arab-Israeliconflict. The formersupporteda partition-based lan as early as 1965. The latter advocated an all-or-nothing olution.10 Author's interview with Rashidal-Ghannushi,London(14 April 1993).l Ibid.

61

8/2/2019 Bin Ali

7/23

LARBISADIKIThe pace and content of change was impressive.Thus acceptanceof Bin Alidid not spare Middle East scholars. Their expectations were high. Examplesabound.ChristopherAlexander saw the change as trendsetter or the rest of theregion. 'Bin Ali's November 7, 1987, coup inaugurated he heady period ofpolitical reformthatswept across the MiddleEast and North Africain the 1980s... Along with Algeria, Jordan and Yemen, Tunisia rode the leading edge ofwhat many hoped would be a wave of democratic transitions n the region'.12Mark Tessler capturedthe mood of Bin Ali's early liberalizing initiatives interms of a 'new beginning' in Tunisia.13Another leading analyst on NorthAfrican affairs, Lisa Anderson read too much into the 1988 National Pact, aquasi-constitutional formula for 'manufacturing consensus' and buildingconfidence between the regime and selected non-State actors and forces. In herusual sharpnessandmodesty, and with the hindsightof an extra decade of closeobservationof the Bin Ali regime, Anderson revised her earlierposition that a'pacted' transitionmodelled on the Spanish example was being replicatedinTunisia:In the 1980s, I wrote an article hailing the Tunisian National Pact of 1988 as animportant step on the road to democracy, comparable to the Pact of Moncloa in Spain,on which it was said to have been modelled. By the time my article appearedin print in1991, it was all too obvious that Tunisia was not on its way to a Spanish-style transitionand that the National Pact had played a very different role in Tunisia than its counterpartin Spain ... In Spain the [Pact] brought together political actors with independent basesof power in the society and economy and institutionalized and symbolized the compro-mise that had been brokered among them. In Tunisia, by contrast, virtually all thesignatories of the pact represented dependencies of the perennial ruling party; far froma compromise or bargain among equals, the pact was an effort to create the appearanceof political pluralism in the absence of political actors with autonomous social andeconomic power.'4

Two lessons transpire from the above. One is that there is no single universallyapplicable route to democratization. This is a point that the newly publishedwork edited by MarkTessler, Area Studies and Social Sciences: Strategies orUnderstanding Middle East Politics, elaborate so finely. The contributions byAnderson,Entelis, Norton andNachtwey andTessler are a must for any studentof democratic transitions n the Middle East. The second lesson is conceptual.Whatever the definitional requisites ascribed to the notion of democracy, itremains an essentially contested concept. There is no single definition or practiceof democracy that can be taken as normative.15 However, a set of broadstandards must obtain for genuine transition from authoritarianism to stand agood chance of success. The relevance and significance of proceduralism(periodicelections), legality (independent udiciary; undamental iberties),insti-tutionalism(non-personalistic nstitutions;separate powers) cannot be stressedenough when democracyis under construction.It is, however, the standardofequal opportunityfor organizing and representingdifference that renders a12ChristopherAlexander, Authoritarianismnd Civil Society in Tunisia',Middle EastReport,27(4) (1997), p.34 (34-38).13MarkTessler, 'Tunisia's New Beginning', CurrentHistory,89 (April 1990).14LisaAnderson, Politics n theMiddleEast:Opportunities ndLimits n theQuest orTheory', nMarkTessler,JodiNachtweyandAnne Banda eds)AreaStudiesand Social Science:Strategiesor UnderstandingMiddleEastPolitics (Bloomingtonand Indianapolis: ndianaUniversityPress, 1999), p. 4. (1-10).15 DavidHeld, Modelsof Democracy(Oxford:PolityPress, 1996);GiovanniSartori,TheTheonrof DemocracyRevisited(Chatham,NJ: ChathamHouse, 1987).62

8/2/2019 Bin Ali

8/23

BIN ALI'S TUNISIA

particular iberalizing experiment congenial to or at odds with democracy.It istherefore his standardof tolerationof difference that this paper puts forwardasthe essential test of democraticgovernment.Instead of the singularity ypifyingBin Ali's Tunisia,respect and inclusion of difference can producethe kind ofmultilevelcommunitycapableof deliberation,aggregationof public preferences,their representationand the building of a shared political space. Withoutrecognitionof the political 'other', therecan be no redistribution f power. BinAli's 'electoral democracy' is yet to meet these standardsof recognition andredistribution.The analysis below corroborates his point.Bin Ali's Electoral DemocracyDespite the modest 'democratic'stirringsevident in Bin Ali's Tunisia,exclusiv-ity and singularity are once more intrinsic to the manufacturingof politicalcommunity in Tunisia.The continuity of exclusivity and singularitycontradictthe democraticplans he articulated n his maiden speech.

Our people have reached a degree of [awareness] and maturity where every individualand group is in a position to constructively contribute to the running of its affairs, inconformity with the republicanidea. [This idea] ... gives institutions their full scope andguarantees the conditions for a responsible democracy, fully respecting the sovereigntyof the people as written into the constitution, [which] needs urgent revision. The timesin which we live can no longer admit of life presidency or automatic succession, fromwhich the people [are] excluded. Our people deserve ... an advanced and institutional-ized political life, truly based on the plurality of parties and mass organizations.'6

These plans do in parts bear a striking resemblanceto those his predecessordeclaredin 1981. The democratic magery may be impressive,which is integralto the notion of the 'rationalState'. But the praxis,what Camaucalls 'Etatreel',corresponds very little to the 'rationalState'. The currentregime has not yettranscended the political syndrome of Bourguiba's 'first republic': politicalsingularity. This singularity is the most salient feature of Bin Ali's 'secondrepublic'. Under Bourguiba, State hegemony was embodied in l'Etat-patron(State as tutelary) and I'Etat-parti (State as party).17 Bourguiba's brand ofnationalism eft no room for any free space for non-governmentalor non-partyactors.Rival centres of power were essentializedas fissiparous.There has beensome change. Under Bin Ali, Tunisia gives the impressionof having moved along way from single party rule and exclusivity. Yet the country's latest twoelections have done very little in terms of tilting the balanceof power towardssociety or away from the ruling party.The most recent of these elections washeld on 29, May 2000. The rulingDemocraticConstitutionalRally (RCD) sweptthe board, winning 195 out of 257 municipalities;and sharing power in theremaining62 municipalities.Neither the five opposition partiesnorthe indepen-dentsmanagedto win a single city council. The 228 seats won by the oppositionand the independentsfavour the argumentthat Tunisia's elections continue topromote political singularitynot pluralism.Whereas the regime celebrated theelections as another milestone on the road to democratization, ocal observerswere more sceptical, talking instead of a democratic 'blocage', impasse.'816 Chaabane,Ben Ali on the Road to Pluralismin Tunisia,p. 18.17TaherBelkhodja,Les Trois DdcenniesBourguiba(Paris:Aracanteres/Publisud, 998), p. 131.18See 'Apres les municipales: comment sortir du blocage?', in Realitds, 756 (15-21 June 2000),http://www.tunisieinfo.com/realites/756/sommaire/html,0 June2000.

63

8/2/2019 Bin Ali

9/23

LARBI SADIKIThe oppositionholds 34 seats in the newly expanded182-memberunicameralparliament-15 seats up from the 1994 elections. The expansionof the Chambredes Deputes (Chamberof Deputies)from 163 to 182 can be read in two ways:a gain for the opposition,and a furtherdecreasein the government'sdominationof parliamentary olitics. With 34 seats the oppositionholds nearly 19%of thetotal seats, a 7% increase from the last Chamber.It can be argued that theregime's achievement is a step in the right direction. But the fact remains thatthe ruling party, with 81% of the total seats, still dominates parliamentandpolitical life in general. This embarrassinglydisproportionatedistributionofseats in favour of the regime does not at this stage bode well for democraticdevelopment.Nor can it be equatedwith a democratic mandate.A democraticmandatedoes not precludepower sharing.Electoralpolitics in this case has beenaboutreturning he incumbentsto singularcontrolof political association.Thenew numerical equation in Tunisia's parliamentundermines the principle ofdemocraticmajoritarianismn two ways.The regime continuesto possess the democraticprocess. It has, more or less,appropriated nd deployed all State resources to reproduce tself without muchserious competition. This is one reason why elections are easily won by theRCD. The opposition, being the regime's own creation, has become anotherState resourcethatthe rulingelite uses for legitimationpurposes.The regime iskeento cultivateanimage of sensitivityto democracyandhumanrightsin a newglobal environment in that they have become essential legitimators in thedomestic politics of sovereign States. Domestically, Bin Ali could not repeatwhat the charismaticBourguiba,a nationalist liberator,got away with for 31years: personalisticrule. He has got to earn his leadershipthrough egality andpopularlybased legitimacy. Thus in part, Bin Ali relies on the inputs of aState-funded think tank, the Tunisian Strategic Studies Institute (IEST), toengenderhis own brandof 'democracy'.Internationally, e knows only too wellthatcreepingconditionalityrenders he businessof governancepartly dependenton outside approval.His regime, like most of those in developing countries,iscompelled under globally newly operating norms of governance to meet aminimum threshold of legitimacy in orderto qualify for IMF and World Bank

handoutsas well as sponsorshipby political benefactorsin Europeand NorthAmerica. Hence having a weak coalition of political parties in parliamentwith little or no bearing on the policy-making process is obviously not aboutchecks and balances or power sharingat home. Rather,it is about democraticself-packaging:having the veneer of democracy without having to be demo-cratic. This is akin to Salame's apt descriptionof the searchfor democracyinthe Arab and Muslim world: a case of 'democracywithoutdemocrats'.19To an extent, the strategy of self-packaging works for a tiny countrysandwichedbetween Algeria andLibya.The unrulypopularcommitteesrule theone on its east;anduntilrecently,the foundationof the one on the west has beenthreatenedby an ugly civil war. The ruling party'smouthpiece,Le Renouveau,never tires of producing favourable quotes from the Arab and internationalmedia as evidence of universal endorsement of Bin Ali's democratic andeconomic achievements.20 ut the regime's aversionto criticism,even from the19GhassanSalam6(ed.), DemocracxwithoutDemocrats?Renewalof Politics in the Muslim World London: .B. Tauris, 1994).20 See, forinstance, heJanuary ndFebruary nlineissuesonthefollowingaddress:http://www.tunisieinfo.com/LeRenouveau/index.html64

8/2/2019 Bin Ali

10/23

BIN ALI'S TUNISIA

signatoriesof the NationalPact, can lead to ostracism and oppression.The caseof MuhammadMuwa'adah, the former Mouvement Democratique Socialisteleader whose party formed the main linchpin in the loyal opposition, isinstructive. His trenchantcriticism in an open letter of the regime's soft-pedal-ling on fundamental reedoms andgenuinedemocratization ost him his freedomand his leadership of the MDS in 1995. The regime must appreciate theimportantrole of information and knowledge in realizing 'sovereignty of thepeople' and 'responsibledemocracy',as stipulated n Bin Ali's firstspeechto thepeople. Especially, as he noted in that speech, his confidence in their maturity.Maturitydemands that the public consumes all informationon public affairs,positive and negative so as to be able to formulate educatedpolitical opinion.Bin Ali took over the reigns of power in order to change the status quo. Upto now his reforms have offered more or less the status quo. The monolithicmachineryof the ruling RCD points to a singular trajectory.It is the DusturSocialist Party (PSD) dressed in the jibba (Tunisiantraditional ong garb) ofdemocracy.The PSD was rebuiltwith a view to makinguse of the DusturianandBourguibistpowerbase. The recyclingdid indeed involve morethansubstitutingthe epithet 'socialist' for 'democratic'.It meant the pouringof huge moneys intoreviving the party's long gone mass mobilizational unction anddynamism.Thepartywas intendedto be a rulingparty not one competitoramongstequalsin theso-called era of tajdid (renewal). In the July 1988 party's inqadh (salvation)conference, Bin Ali lectured his audience on his plans to renouncesingle partypractice and mentality.He stated that 'for all [the PSD's] massive heritage, itsestablished history of resistance, its wide electoral base, cannot claim torepresentall the political forces of the country'.21The 'salvation' conference andthe declarations of renewal signal a quasi-missionary zeal characteristic ofIslamists (e.g. Algeria's Islamic Salvation Front, and al-Turabi's Salvationrevolution in Sudan) that Bin Ali so opposes, not secular Westernizers.In practiceBin Ali has given l'Etat-patronandI'Etat-partia new lease of life.At no stage has he consideredseparatingState andparty.As Bin Ali himself putit to his audiencein that conference 'the Rally is the partyof the Presidentandthe Partyof change'.22Furthermore,he inclusion of the term 'rassemblement'(rally) in the renamingof the PSD was intendedto communicatethe 'unifyingcharacter'of the Neo-PSD.23The partywas from the outset intendedto fulfil twofunctions: to serve both as a unifying force and a vehicle of stability. A thirdfunction which begs detail is what Chaabane,a former advisor to Bin Ali,does not elaborate clearly when stating the following. '[TJhe transition topluralismcannotrun true and innocentof distortion without a robustpartythatguaranteesstability, that mobilizes the necessary political supportto instil theprinciplesof the change and stands vigilant against deviations and slips' (ownemphasis).24What is not clear is the question of deviation from what. Thisvigilante role highlights the patronizing character of the party. It signals atop-down approach o democratization hat belies the 1987 assertions about thepeople's maturityto live up to the challenge of political reform. Worse still,there is a text-bookish understandingof reform as necessitating stages with21 Chaabane,Ben Ali on the Road to Pluralism in Tunisia,p. 79.22 Ibid., p. 80.23 Ibid.24 Ibid.

65

8/2/2019 Bin Ali

11/23

LARBI SADIKIthe partyservingas the agentof thatchange.This was typicalof the PSD whoseself-indulgencein its historical mission to unify, stabilize and edify the massesdownsized all viable political forces and identities.Reform cannotbe conceivedof as a straight-lineprocess;room has to be allowed for deviations,which canbe chastenedby due process anddemocraticdeliberation.The controlledopposi-tion was justified in levelling charges of 'hegemony' against the new party.25The dyads I'Etat-patronand l'Etat-partiare today a massive supportsystemthat hegemonizes and homogenizes politics to the point of stultifying politicallife below the State. The figures below bespeak a reality of one-partyrule nota preparatorytage for 'post one-party'political life, as Chaabane,an establish-ment intellectual,argues.26

Today, in top form for the competition, [the RCD] stands as a force to be reckoned withon majorpoliticaloccasions,significantly oastinga followingof almosta quarter f thecountry'suniversityecturers .. Similarly,studentmembership f the partyhas risenfroma few hundredn 1987 to better han8,000in 1995.In 1993,totalpartymembershipstood at 1,720,374.Thepartyboasts6,713 branches nd 300 associationsdistributedcross heRepublic.Thereare54,870officialsat branchevel, 83,390candidates avingstood nthe electionsfor local cell officials in 1993, i.e. 1.8 candidates erseat. Of thatnumber, ,400 werewomen,of whom2,930 wereelected- that s, 67%of thefemale candidates arried heday over theirmalecounterpartsownemphasis).27

With such visibly inflated figures, any talk of competition, as in the excerptabove, cannot be serious. With Soviet-like party machinery in place, it is verydifficult to imagine genuine political reform moving ahead. That is somethingthat has not escaped even establishment intellectuals. Thus Chaabane observesthat the party's success in representing the people's aspirations and attending totheir concerns, has made the RCD 'the best choice' available to the people and,by implication the only choice, at the risk of 'obviating the need for oppositionmovements'.28 Chaabane, however, takes comfort in two things. First, Bin Ali'sawareness of the problem of a meaningless opposition, thus paternalistically'tak[ing] it upon himself to open up new opportunities before the opposition toenable it to coexist and excel, to ensure at least the equilibrium needed for fairpolitical competition' (emphasis added).29With the hugely exaggerated member-ship figure of 1,720,374, equilibrium is a chimera. The figure suggests, in acountry with a 9.5-million population, that each family has at least two RCDmembers. The average Tunisian family consists of five to six members. Thefigures do not add up. As to presenting the opposition with opportunities, it canhardly be said that it is left to its own devices when it is under the mercy ofpresidential patronage. A democratic and dynamic opposition should operatewithin a framework of legality, freedom and fairness. The appointing of itsleaders as has happened recently with the MDS must not be a State prerogative.Regime hostility against the MDS's elected Muwa'adah led to the appointmentby the State of Ismaeel Bulihyah to the movement's leadership, something thatwas contested in the courts. Second, Chaabane attributes the RCD's strength and25 Ibid.26 Ibid.27 Ibid.28 Ibid.29 Ibid.

66

8/2/2019 Bin Ali

12/23

BIN ALI'S TUNISIA

supposedly 'widerpopularbase' to the following view: 'Tunisianstoday arenotconvinced of the need to belong to, or vote, for anotherpartyas they have foundin the Rally the best guaranteefor the implementationof Bin Ali's project'.30The latest October 1999 presidentialelections, in which Bin Ali won his thirdand theoretically last 5-year term, were an exercise in singularitycouched inplurality.He ran 'opposed', unlike in the two previous presidentialplebiscites,by two handpickedcandidatesfrom the opposition. Neither MuhammadBilhajAmor (leaderof the PopularUnity Party)nor Abd al-RahmanTalili (headof theUnionistDemocraticUnion) were presidential. n theirdefence, however,it mustbe said that neither man volunteeredhis candidacy.Those who did in the pastsuch as Munsif al-Marzuqiof the LTDH or Abd al-Rahmanal-Hani, a knownlawyer, were both preventedfrom standing.This highlights Bin Ali's predilec-tion for omnipresenceand singularityin playing the role of Tunisia's nationalmentor, thus treadingin Bourguiba's footsteps. The presidentialelections thatbrought Butafliqah o power in neighbouringAlgeria were more of an approxi-mation of a democraticallycredible contest thanthose in Tunisia.3' Butafliqah's73.8%victory,regardlessof the army's orchestrating f politics from behind thescenes, was far more acceptable hanBin Ali's 99.4%totalwin. Amor and Taliliscored between them half-a-percentage point. Al-Ghannushi seized on themoment: 'Had Bin Ali been intelligent, he would have today been a hero inTunisia.All he had to do was to win no more than 70 per cent of the vote'.32Similarly, Algeria's newly foundedNational DemocraticRally (RND) had lessof a hegemonizing tendencythan its counterpartn Tunisia.33Bin Ali's Tunisiahas banked on Libya's fireworkpolitics and international solation due to thesanctions, and Algeria's killing fields, to allow it to shine as a rare model ofnation and State building in an area ridden with conflict. But there is oneinherent weakness in such a strategy. As soon as its neighboursrecover, thecontrastno longer works in its favour. This is definitely true of Algeria. Therelativerekindlingof democratizationunderButafliqahexposes the flaws in BinAli's controlled reforms. At home, however, Tunisiansmay be quietistbut theyare not stupid. The impression about the elections of a well-know seculardissident,Mustafa Bin Ja'afar,to Le Monde, sums up the status quo: a climateof verouillage (ossification, mummification)of political life.34On the evidence of the RCD's singularity,the rise of alternative dentities,spatial or political, in the community manufacturedby the regime is not onlyunimaginable,but also carries risks. The questionof physical risks is rehearsedelsewhere and the scope of this article does not permit detail. But suffice it tosay that Tunisia is heavily policed.35 n the words of a Tunisian academic the30 Ibid.31 Most candidateswerepresidentialn termsof experience,historyandautonomy.Of the seven candidates, wowere formerPrimeMinisters AhmadTalibIbrahimi ndMuludHamrush); thirdAit Ahmad s ahistoric eaderfrom the days of anti-French esistance;and anothertwo served in government.32 Author's interview with Rashidal-Ghannushi,London(20 November 1999).33 The RND sharesparliamentaryeats with nine political parties.Its share of the totalvote was 38%.There isample room for the oppositionparties to defeat bills and keep the ruling partyin check. Althougha remotepossibility, a coalition between al-Nahanah'sMovementof the Society for Peace (69 seats), Jaballah'sIslamicRenaissanceMovement (34 seats), and the old rulingparty,the FLN (62 seats), is potentiallya powerfulblocthatcan act as a counterforce to the rulingparty.34 Le Monde, 'Le Pr6sidentBen Ali plebiscit6en Tunisie avec 99,44%des voix', (27 October 1999), p. 6.35 See, for instance,Amnesty International,Tunisia,Rhetoric versus Reality' The Failure of a HumanRightsBureaucracy (London: Amnesty International,1994); Amnesty International,Tunisia: Women Victims of

67

8/2/2019 Bin Ali

13/23

LARBI SADIKI

country is akin to 'un commissariat' (a police station), quintessentially amukhabarat tate;one that became very extensive underBin Ali. The exagger-ated paranoiaand fear of a 'fundamentalist hreat' have justified this 'commis-sariat'.36Bin Ali has used the Islamist threat to justify excessive policing. Hisreference to Iran or Algeria as cases where 'greaterdemocracydoes not lead togreater liberalism, because it leaves the way open to the rule of Islamicfundamentalism'37 oes not square with both countries' encouragingreforms.The economic risks are, however, the more daunting or most Tunisians.Theregime has, by any standards,more success storiesto tell on the economic thanthe political front.38With an averageannualgrowthrate of 6% over the last 3years, 3% inflation, and a rising per capita growth national product (GNP),Tunisia seems to be getting praise by the majorinternational inancialinstitu-tions and aid donors. Even Le Monde, whose trenchantcriticism of Bin Ali's'police machinery'has not subsided,refers to the country's satisfactoryecon-omic performanceas the 'Tunisianexception', especially in comparisonwith itsMaghribineighbours.39 ut the economy is increasinglybecoming an additionaltool to tighten the regime's control over people's lives and political choice.Economic opportunity s being linked to political choice; and in Tunisia thatchoice is betweenBin Ali andBin Ali. Thatis moreso, especially when a simpleeconomic transactionof applyingfor an economic loan can turninto a test ofloyalty to Bin Ali. A Tunisian,speakingto Le Monde about his support or BinAli, states: 'I do not supporthim. I vote for him;thatis different.The otherday... one of my friends went to the bankto applyfor a loan. He was askedfor hisvoting card;and you want us to have [political] choice'.40In one sense the State's control of the economy is being used to furtherentrenchpolitical quietism,wherebyso-called 'khubistes' have no choice but topay political deferenceto Bin Ali. It is a quasi-tacitcontractbetween State andsociety wherebyeconomic goods are exchanged for political deference. It is aquintessential example of economic reformism being put to the service ofpolitical particularism.As anotherTunisianremarks, in this countrythe "deal"is simple.We leave politics for the president,andhe, in exchange, leaves us toeat. We have even a term for this: "khubzism".. You eat andyou keep quiet'.41It is an unmistakablerajectoryowardsa 'strong'State at the expense of society.This 'over-stated' State has since the mid-1990s confiscated a major socialwelfare initiative project, Caisse 26-26 (Fund 26-26), officially known as theNationalSolidarityFund(NSF). It is now fully run andcontrolledby theregime.But to the regime's credit, the projecthas been dynamic in alleviating povertyand improvingliving conditions in the so-called 'shadow zones', especially inFootnote continuedHarassment,Torture ndImprisonmentLondon:AmnestyInternational, 993);AmnestyInternational, unisia:HeavySentencesAfterUnfairTrials (London:AmnestyInternational, 992);Article 19 Organization,Tunisia:Attacks on the Press and GovernmentCritics (London:Article 19 Organization,1991).36 C. Simon, 'La Tunisie sous Ben Ali: Une MachinePoliciere', Le Monde,(21 October1999), p. 14.37 Chaabane,Ben Ali on the Road to Pluralism in Tunisia,p. 90.38 See, for instance, Economist Intelligence Unit, Tunisia: CountryProfile 1997-98 (London: EconomistIntelligenceUnit, 1997); GeneralAgreementon Tariffs and TradeOrganisation,TradePolicy Review: Tunisia(Geneva: GATT, 1994); World Bank, Tunisia's Global Integrationand SustainableDevelopment:- trategicChoicesfor the 21st Century Washington,DC: WorldBank, 1996).39 Editorial,'L'exceptiontunisienne',Le Monde,(21 October1999), p. 15.40 C. Simon, 'La Tunisie sous Ben Ali: Un bonheurambigu',Le Monde,(23 October1999), p. 14.41 Ibid.,p. 14. Formore detailson the notion of 'khubzism'and'khubziste',see LarbiSadiki,'PopularUprisingsand ArabDemocratization',pp. 79-84.68

8/2/2019 Bin Ali

14/23

BIN ALI'S TUNISIAthe large cities. Society, the privatesector and governmentare the main donors.Another initiative building on the NSF is the creation in 1999 of the TunisianSolidarityBank (BTS). The BTS, foundedon ideas of communitydevelopmentbanking, procuressmall credits for the purposesof establishingsmall businessesor improving iving conditions.A new fund,Caisse 21-21, was establishedearlyin 2000 to deal with unemployment.This kind of State-led andgrassrootsbased financing s aimed at boostingBinAli's popularityas well as reducing inequalityand nipping in the bud the riseof NGOs that could utilize charityas a springboardor politicalrecruitment.Butthere is an emerging nepotism and clan-type bourgeoisie closely related to thepalace that appearsto be illegally spreadingits tentacles throughout he econ-omy. Under the title 'The families thatpillage Tunisia',circulatedanonymouslyin 1997 in Tunis, Bin Ali's in-laws have all been linked to corruptactivities,including the illegal appropriationof prime real estate, and acquisitions offormerly State-owned companies at substantiallydepreciatedprices.42Regard-less, the process of economic liberalization s occurringwithoutparallelpoliticaldemocratization.Even Emma Murphy'senthusiasm about the success story ofTunisia's economic liberalization,has reservationsabout the prospectsof demo-craticconsolidationunderBin Ali, notinghow he alone has been 'determin ing]the pace, scope and spheresof reform'.43After 13 years in power, the Bin Aliregime shows all of the 'performative acts' which at face value suggestsubstantive liberalization s under way. However, proceduralismhas not beencoupledwith principledcommitment o democraticconsolidation.All indicationsare that a return to singularityratherthan pluralityis underway.This almostamounts to a reverse of the democratic initiatives of Bin Ali's first 3 years inpower. Tunisia's 'deliberalization', o borrow a term from EberhardKienle, istoday conspicuously obvious.44Cracks in the Hegemon: Three Crises that Shook the Bin Ali RegimeThreevery recent crises are instructive.All have shaken the regime which untilrecently looked firmlyin control.These crises exposed it to be too miscalculat-ing to be able to reinventits rule over a sophisticatedsociety withoutembarkingon majorsubstantivedemocraticreforms.Without such reforms,the alternativewould be to go back to the impasse and polarizationthat markedBourguiba'slast years in power.The Bin Brik AffairThe 'Bin Brik Affair' relates to the hunger strike in April and May 2000by Tawfiq Bin Brik, the Tunisian journalist whose courageous stand hasspawned unprecedenteddebatewithin andoutside Tunisia over Bin Ali's policeState. The ordeal of the 39-year-old Bin Brik, a correspondent or the FrenchnewspaperLa Croix, began when he wrote critical articles on the punishment42 C. Simon, 'La Tunisie sous Ben Ali: les appetitsd'un clan', Le Monde, (22 October1999), p. 14.43 Emma C. Murphy,Economic and Political Change in Tunisia: From Bourguiba to Ben Ali (London:Macmillan, 1999), p. 223.44 EberhardKienle, 'Morethana Responseto Islamism:The PoliticalDeliberalizationof Egypt in the 1990s',Middle East Journal, 52(2) (1998), pp. 219-235.

69

8/2/2019 Bin Ali

15/23

LARBI SADIKI

meted out to human rights activists in Tunisia. But more seriously, was thereview article he wrote on a recent book, Notre ami Ben Ali, an eloquent andrevealing indictmentby two Frenchjournalistsof 'Binalism'. The book docu-ments corruption, orture,the silencing of the media, the emasculationof civilsociety, singularrule and the revision of history underBin Ali.45Bin Brik hadpreviously broken the code of silence imposed on local journalists, includingTunisiancorrespondents or Frenchnewspapers ike him. So he was no strangerto regime harassment.46 he straw that broke the camel's back in Bin Brik'slatest stand-offwith the regime was the confiscationof his passport,cuttingoffhis home telephone line, open surveillanceof his abode, and the extension ofpolice harassmentto his immediate family members. In late April, Jalal BinBrik, Tawfiq's younger brother,along with threefellow humanrights militantswere detained following open scuffles with the secret police who weresurveillingBin Brik's home.47WhatBin Brikfailed to publicizewith his articlesin La Croix, he achieved by the wide media coverage of his strike and openchallenge to the regime by sympatheticfellow journalists from all over theworld. Never before had any Tunisian dissident become a 'cause celebre' in theinternationalmedia as did Tawfiq Bin Brik.48Thus he has joined the ranks ofthe regime's betes noires amongst the country's known dissidents (e.g.al-Ghannushi, Mazali, Mua'adah, Marzuqi, Radia Nasrawi, Najib al-Hosni,HabibMukni, Salah Karkar,etc.).Bin Brik's 'victory' against the regime was two-fold. Bad publicityabroad,especially in France,eventuallyforcedBin Ali andhis henchmen o cede to mostof Bin Brik's demands.49He got his passportback;his phone line was restored;andpolice surveillanceof his abode was lifted. In earlyMay, all charges evelledagainst him on the basis of one of the Arab world's most illiberal Press Codeswere dropped.The chargeshad to do with Articles 49, 50, 51, 68, 72 and99 ofthe Code, all of which make it a crime for journalists to circulate 'falseinformation' ikely to disturb'publicorder'.50However,anothercourtupheldthecharge against his brother of assaulting a police officer. The reasoning at thetime must have been that impunitycould leave the way open for other citizensto challengeor confrontthe securityforces. Eventually,JalalBin Brik was freedin mid-May.51Neither verdict was indicative of judicial autonomy. They wereboth political decisions taken at the top in order to close the Bin Brik file, onethat shook the regime like no other duringBin Ali's 13 years in office.Above all else, the Bin Brik affair shattered he silence imposed on Tunisiaby Bin Ali. Not only is the media governed by a Press Code threatening'punishment'and 'imprisonment',but also the press in its entirety has been45 See Nicolas Beau and Jean-PierreTuquoi, Notre ami Ben Ali: L'envers du 'miracle tunisien' (Paris:LaDecouverte, 1999).46 Ibid.,pp. 220-221.47 See, 'Journalist esumeshunger trike,"I'llgo onuntilI die" ', Summary f WorldBroadcasts,ME/3827 MED(29 April 2000), pp. 9-10.48 See, 'CauseCelebre', Middle East International,624 (5 May 2000), p. 8.49 For more details on the badpublicitycausedby theBin Brikaffair,see the article n al-.Hayat27 April2000),p. 5. Entitled,'France:The Bin Brikaffair eft a bad image on Tunisia',the articledescribesthe reaction o theaffair withinthe Frenchgovernment.50 See, 'Courtdropsaccusationsagainst ournalists,his brother',Summary f WorldBroadcasts,ME/3832MED(5 May 2000), p. 14.51 See, 'Brotherof formerhunger-strikingournalist reedby court',Summary f WorldBroadcasts,ME/3842MED (17 May 2000), p. 16.70

8/2/2019 Bin Ali

16/23

BIN ALI'S TUNISIA

recruited into the service of the State. The relationship between the mediaand the State-party s one of clientelism-patronage.At the core of this clien-telism-patronage re the twin strategiesof punitiveaction threatenedby the PressCode, anddependenceon State subsidies.52Criticismof Statepolicies is equatedwith either 'defamation'or disturbanceof 'public order'. The interpretation fthese two-Articles 73 and 75-is the prerogativeof the InteriorMinister.53Furthermore,because of the regime's cultivation of what Lise Garondescribesas a 'patriarchaldependence', the media in general has been condemned tofailurein its role to live up to the profession's standardsof informingthe publictruthfully.Thus newsworthinesshas become negligible, with a complete black-out on a numberof 'taboo' items. The Islamists and the Tunisian CommunistWorkers'Party(POCT)do not get mentioned at all. Nor do the press releasesof the LTDH and of the Conseil National des Libertesen Tunisie(CNLT), thehumanrightswatchdogcreatedby Marzuqiand his comradeswho split from theoriginal Human Rights League after State intervention in its management.54What is, however, very serious is the fact that for a whole decade lots of newswent unnoticed by the local media. As a consequence, two 'Tunisias' haveemerged. One reads and knows nothing of Muwa'adah's 1995 open letter inwhich he criticized Bin Ali's hegemonic rule55or the 1995 Algerian Islamists'attack on a borderpost which left six Tunisiansdead, to mention two exam-ples.56 Similarly, there was no mention in the local press of the hungerstrikeobserved by one thousandIslamist prisoners during May 2000. The second'Tunisia',mostly in the Diaspora,relies for its informationon the foreign press.Most media outlets have been turned into 'junk mail boxes', recruited tocirculate State propagandaagainst Islamists or inventing 'Benalism'.57Mediaproducts,with very few qualified exceptions (e.g. Realites), aredull, unreadableand unreliablefor information.Hence the local press practiseseithertasftq (theact of deferentially applaudingthe authorities'deeds) or self-censorship. BinAli's pledge in his maiden speech to give the press more freedom remainslargely unfulfilled. In an age of information, the regime, it seems, cannotstomach criticismfindingits way to the people. This is one reasonwhy Bin Alihas placed himself and his regime above the media's scrutiny, with strictdefamationand libel laws making it very difficult to report,much less investi-gate, ministerialmalpracticeor corruption, ncludingconfirmedcases. Not eventhe opposition press was meant to voice criticism of the regime. The media'sstate of limbo and neutralization pitomize the singularityof rule under Bin Aliwhose activities, footage, picturesand pronouncements onstitutenearlyhalf ofdaily printand broadcastnews. In comparisonthe loyal opposition hardly gets5% coverage.58 n essence, this is a returnto Bourguiba's years of personalitycult. As eloquentlyput by Lise Garon,the univocal media scene in Tunisia is afar cry from anything that approximatespluralismwith its public debates andcontests.Instead, ts standardizingharacteristics re hollow rhetoricandslogans52 Lise Garon,Le Silence Tunisien:Les alliances dangereusesau Maghreb(Montreal:Harmattan, 998),p. 74.53 Ibid., p. 71.54 Ibid., p. 76.55 Beau and Tuquoi,Notre ami Ben Ali, p. 74.56 Ibid., p. 125.57 Garon,Le Silence Tunisien,p. 72.58 Beau and Tuquoi,Notre ami Ben Ali, p. 135.

71

8/2/2019 Bin Ali

17/23

LARBI SADIKI

aboutthe 'New Deal', a referenceto Bin Ali's era of change. Applause,anotherfeaturereminiscentof the Bourguibayears, precedesthe speechesof Bin Ali, theGeneral-President, founder' and 'saviour' of 'Tunisiandemocracy'.5More importantly,however, is the political victory in the Bin Brik affair,placing Bin Ali and his regime under close scrutiny.From this perspective,theaffair is politically significant in three ways. It has highlighted the fact thatexclusion is no longer confined to Islamists.In fact, over the yearsBin Ali grewmore and more contemptuous of all dissidence. Muwa'adah and Shammari,formerMDS leaders,Marzuqi,Mazali, former Prime MinisterRadiyaNasrawi,just to mention a few, are not Islamists. All underwent all kinds of regimeharassment angingfrom characterassassination o police surveillance,passportconfiscationandinterferencewith family members.This in itself shows that BinAli seeks his own intermediaries,keeping a tight grip on the manufacturing fpolitical community. Political society in Tunisia is today a dummy society.Selected intermediaries are not there to negotiate, aggregate and representsociety's interests andpreferences.They serve as a democraticdecor thatmaskssingular rule. From this perspective, 'electoral democracy' rubber-stamps heselection of intermediarieswhose participationentrenches authoritarianorpo-ratismnot democraticpluralism.In his first threeyears of power consolidation,Bin Ali deployed the grammarof democracy and human rights, co-optingleftists, human rights activists, Islamists and intellectuals. In so doing heoutsmartedall those who gave him the benefitof the doubt. He recruited hemas allies in orderto legitimize his take-over,buy time and build a power base.Not even the signatories of the 1991 National Pact have been safe from hisdownsizing of political society.Anothersignificant developmentstemmingfrom the Bin Brik affair consistsin the politics of protestfrom within the emasculatedandbesieged civil society.The CNLT, the Bar Association, the Democratic Women's Association, theLTDH andthe TunisianAssociationof Young Lawyerscoalesced in theirprotestagainstthe regime's draconianmeasures n supportof Bin Brik andhis family.60Bin Ali appeared o have done a good job of reducingcivil society into a shadowof its former self. This applies to the UGTT as much as to the LTDH.61Whatis noteworthy,however, is how the crisis has forcedthe NGOsmentionedearlierto strikeback. Theirresponsetook a varietyof forms.They staged hungerstrikesof their own in supportof Bin Brik. This was done more systematicallyby theexiled Nahdah party in both France and England with al-Ghannushihimselfjoining dozens of fellow partisanswho observed a 2-week-long hungerstrikeinthe second halfof April.The strikewas sustained or muchlonger by Nur al-Dinal-'Awididi, whose sister was preventedfrom leaving Tunisia2 years ago, thenjailed and torturedfor no crime other than being related to an Islamist.62The Bar Associationobserved a half-dayworkstoppage.Also, coalitionbuilding59 Garon,Le Silence Tunisien,p. 77.60 RashidKhashana, Nahwa hall li-qadiyyatBin Brik', Al .Haydt 28 April 2000), p. 5.61 See the interview n which theLTDH'spresident,TawfiqBu-Dirbalah, ssesses theupsanddowns of theleaguewith the regimein Realitis, 757 (22-28 June2000), http://www.tunisieinfo.com/realites/757/sommaire/html,0June 2000.62 For more details on Al-'Awididi' sisterand the incarceration f womenrelated o politicalactivists nTunisia,ingeneral,see thereport LesFemmesa 1'Honneur...De laRepression'bytheComit6pour e RespectdesLiberteset les Droits de l'Homme en Tunisie,http://homme.worldcom.ch:80/jijra/detenus_france.html#crdht,8 June2000.72

8/2/2019 Bin Ali

18/23

BIN ALI'S TUNISIA

within civil society translated nto a jointly issued press release condemningregime brutalityand expressing concern for associationallife in the country.63Lastly, the affair showed the regime to be clumsy, puttingitself in unneces-sarydifficulties caused by heavy relianceon coercion. The regime never lookedmore shakenthanduringthe Bin Brik affair.The affair not only put the regimein the spotlight, but it also forced debates about the function of the media inTunisia.64Thatlangue de bois, the muzzled media,boomerangedon the regime.The absence of any kind of criticism was evidence of the regime's intoleranceof dissident opinion. Bin Ali moved quickly to contain the damage. He metrepresentativesof the media who were State employees in a countrywhere themedia are 90% State-owned. The highlight of the meeting was the bombshellBin Ali dropped when he blamed the media for self-censorship. It was anexample par excellence of passing the buck on to regime 'clients'. He saidnothingof the code of journalisticconduct,a document that threatens mprison-ment and suspension from the profession for the disseminationof informationthat threatenssocial peace and public order. Nor did they raise this issue withhim when confrontedso openly on nationalTV. The resultingcommittee set upby the president to promote freedom of the press was a typically politicalsolution.65A similarmeeting in 1996 with the Tunisian Association of Publish-ers, mostly made up of the proprietorsof the private press, changed nothing ofthe languede bois.66The mission of the media of reporting he news, as opposedto making it, and informing the public as objectively as possible is almostirreconcilablewith its role in Tunisia as the transmitter f the 'officialtranscript'.Accordingto this latter role the media, as understoodby Bin Ali himself, are to'serve Tunisia's image abroad and highlight its achievementsin all sectors.'67Thus understood, his role implied promotingthe regime's image abroadand athome. Predictably,when quizzedby the foreign media, Bin Ali was defensive,denying he was presiding over a country where the press was muzzled andliberties were missing.68The regime was also defensive on the question ofconfiscating passports, a common punishmentmeted out to dissidents of allstripes.Heretoo, the regimeunderplayed he seriousnessof this practice,makingthis commonplace violation of civil rights look like a rarity.69

63 Khashana, Nahwa hall li-qadiyyatBin Brik'.64 For furtherdetails on the debate, see the articles 'La presse tunisiennepeut-elle relever le defi?'; 'Apraslarencontredu Chef de 1Etat avec des responsablesde m6dias:Quels changementsdansle paysage m6diatique?',Realitds,751 (11-17 May2000), http://www.tunisieinfo.com/realites/751/sommaire/html,0June2000. See alsothe articles 'Les professionnels de 1'informationd6signent les obstacles a lever', Le Temps, http://www.tunisie.com/Assabah, June2000; and 'Pourune informationmeilleure', La Presse, (3 June2000), p. 2.See also the article in the RCD's mouthpiece, 'Assurer le droit du citoyen a une informationcomplete', LeRenouveau(3 June 2000), p. 4, http://www.tunisieinfo.com/LeRenouveau/index.html,June 2000.65 See 'President et upbodyto "promote"mediaperformance',Summanr f WorldBroadcasts,ME/3833MED(6 May 2000), p. 15.66 Beau and Tuquoi,Notre ami Ben Ali, p. 135.67 See 'President et up bodyto "promote"mediaperformance',Summary f WorldBroadcasts,ME/3833 MED(6 May 2000), p. 15.68 See, for instance, 'Presidentcomments on economic growth,humanrights, elections', Summaryof WorldBroadcasts,ME/3839 MED (13 May 2000), p. 10;and, 'PresidentBen Ali talks to Portuguesereportersaboutpress freedom', Summaryof WorldBroadcasts,ME/3838 MED (12 May 2000), pp. 16-17.See 'PresidentBen Ali criticises behaviourof civil service andemphasises"inalienable ight"of citizens topassports',TunisiaOnlineNews Updates,http://www.tunisiaonline.com/news/news.html,June 2000. See also,'Le passeport,un droit inalienable de chaquecitoyen, protege par la loi', Le Temps,(13 May 2000), p. 2.

73

8/2/2019 Bin Ali

19/23

LARBI SADIKI

Bourguiba's FuneralOn 6 April 2000, HabibBourguiba,the man who dominatedTunisia's politicsfor 50 years, died. Having been ill for a long time, his deathdid not come as asurprise. Nonetheless, it shocked a nation whose reverence for the popularBourguibawas beyond question.This was despitethe fact thatmany Tunisianshad qualms about a few of the late leader's controversial deas, especially, hisirreverent hinkingon the fast of the Muslimholy monthof Ramadanandon theIslamic law of inheritance.There was reciprocalaffection between Bourguibaand most Tunisians. Theirs was in gratitude or his devotion of the greaterpartof his youthto the liberationmovement that he profoundly nfluenced,organizedand led up to independence n 1956. After independencehe engineerednationand State building, turning the impoverished North African country into anoutpostof stabilityandmoderation.Bourguiba'saffection was in recognitionofthe people's unquestioningendorsementof his leadership,especially duringthefirst 20 years of his rule. Therefore it did come as a shock to most Tunisianswhen his funeralon 8 Aprilwas not televised live. This was despitethe fact thatthe datewas declareda day off work. The only glimpsepeople hadof the funeralwas a several-minute ootage on the evening main news bulletin.In responsetopublic displeasure, the regime moved swiftly to contain the fallout from itsmishandlingof the funeralby organizingcommemorationservices around thecountryon the 40th day of Bourguiba'sdeath.The mishandlingof the funeralsuggestedtwo things:insensitivityto millionsof Tunisians who were still enamouredwith Bourguiba's achievements anddisrespectto one of the leading foundingfathers of modern Tunisia. Even theFrenchmediacriticized the fact thatBourguiba's uneral was not commensuratewith his status in the country's history.70Bin Ali, it seems, is not comfortablewith being comparedwith Bourguiba.It is a contest he could never win. Theblue-eyed, eloquent,charismaticand hugely popularBourguibawas largerthanlife. This Bin Ali knew very well. He accordedhis predecessormany privileges(e.g. he lived in his Monastirpalace; got special medical care;enjoyedtelevisedpresidentialvisits showing Bin Ali in the role of the carer to the old leader;andstreetsnamed afterBourguibaremained ntact).However,there was a systematiceffort to exclude Bourguiba from the corporate memory with many of hisachievements appropriatedby Bin Ali (e.g. the Personal Status Code, therenamedparty).71The decision not to televise the funeralpanderedto impera-tives of raison d'etat. The regime did not wish to takerisks, fearingthe funeralcould triggereither unrest or unnecessary ests of popularitybetween Bourguibaand Bin Ali. Regardless,both the unrestand the popularity est were temporarilymanifestin Bourguiba'sbirthtown, Monastir,on the day of the funeral.Duringthe unrestpro-Bourguiba ndanti-Bin Ali slogans were sung.One slogan stated:'Bourguiba ya awwal batal; Bin 'AlI, ya akbar baghal' (Bourguiba, a hero of thefirstclass; Bin Ali, the biggest jack ass). Accordingto sources from within theexiled opposition, cited by Le Monde, the failureof the police to deal with theunrest led to purges and arrests within the hierarchyof the security forces.70 See mention of this in the article'Troisans de d6gradation ccelereedu regimeBen Ali', Le Monde,(3 May2000), p. 2.71 For furtherdetails of how Bin Ali went about re-writingTunisia's history in his favour and condemningBourguiba'sto oblivion see Beau and Tuquoi,Notre ami Ben Ali, p. 22-28.74

8/2/2019 Bin Ali

20/23

BIN ALI'S TUNISIA

Apparently, similar measures were taken against security officers who werecritical of the heavy-handedapproach n the Bin Brik affair.72These instancesof divisions within the authoritarian tructuresrepresentthe first cracks in themonolith of the State Bin Ali presides over. But this is not to suggest that theBin Ali regime faces an immediate threat of falling.Strained Relations with France and the French MediaThe Bin Brik affair strengthened he French resolve that Tunis could no longertake the supportof Parisfor granted.Underboth Mitterandand Chirac,Bin Alienjoyed unconditionalmaterial and political backingto the detrimentof humanrights in Tunisia. Beau andTuquoidetail, amongstotherthings,the collusion ofthe two countries'intelligence services in dealingwith the Islamist 'dossier'.TheFrencheventuallyhadto withdraw heircooperation or two reasons.Firstly,theIslamist 'threat' was no longer visible or plausible to the French to warrantsurveillance or extradition of Islamists living in France. Secondly, it becameclear to the French services that the accusations of terrorismagainst exiledIslamists wanted by Tunis were fabrications that could not be substantiated.73Certainly,French leaders were increasinglymore forthcoming n their concernsover the lack of substantive democratic reform. Relations between the twocountries are somewhat strained, with Jospin delaying indefinitely a visit toTunis that is now more than 1 year overdue.74 ospinis of the view thatTunisia,which signed in 1995 an associationagreementwith Europe,has chosen Europe,a path requiringa minimum of democratic standards.75 ut Tunisia is neithershort of friends withinthe Frenchgovernmentandparliamentnor of admirationfor its economic performanceandstability.76 renchtop officials worked hard todefuse the Bin Brik affair.They issued Bin Brik a visa to visit France. But theFrench Minister for Foreign Affairs qualified the issue of the visa as ahumanitarian esture,not in supportof the dissident ournalist'sstandagainsttheTunisianregime.77What is certain s thatthe irritantsn bilateralrelationsdo notsignal a shift of support from the current secular rulers to their Islamistadversaries. Ghannushidraws one important esson from the Bin Brik affair:'Bin Ali is not authorisedby his Westernsponsorsto victimise secularists .. thestory would have been different had Bin Brik been an Islamist'.78The biggest irritant n Franco-Tunisian elationsregardsthe criticalreportingof the Bin Ali regime by the Frenchmedia. Criticismby the internationalpress,such as Le Monde and Liberation,is met with censorship.A ban on both hasbeen in force since late 1999. In AprilandMay 2000, in particular, he Bin Brikaffair got lots of attentionby Frenchjournalists.79The violent and unlawful72 Jean-PierreTuquoi,'Rumeurd'arrestations armi es forcesde securit6 unisiennes',LeMonde,(2 May2000),p. 4.

Beau andTuquoi,Notre ami Ben Ali, pp. 183-198.74 F. Beaug6, 'Aucune date n'est fixee pour a visite de LionelJospinen Tunisie', LeMonde,(9 February 000);Jean-PierreTuquoi, 'La visite de M. Jospinen Tunisie est report6e',Le Monde(7 January2000).75 Beau and Tuquoi,Notre ami Ben Ali, p. 220.76 Ibid., pp. 165-182.77 See, 'Un visa pour"apaiser a tension",'Le Monde,(6 May 2000), p. 6.78 Author's interview with RashidGhannushi,25 May 2000.79 See, for instance, 'Tunisie:ce journalistequi accuse'; 'L'affrontement e durcitentre Taoufik Ben Brik et lepouvoirtunisien'; and 'La Tunisie humili6e', Le Monde, (3 May 2000), respectively, pp. 1, 2 and 17. RobertBelleret, 'Taoufik Ben Brik veut parlera M. Chirac de la Tunisie martyre',Le Monde,(6 May 2000), p. 6.75

8/2/2019 Bin Ali

21/23

LARBI SADIKI

approachtaken by the Tunisian police provided them with ammunitionforvalidatingtheir earlierreportingof the singularnatureof the Bin Ali regime.That approachwas not confined to Bin Brik. Frenchjournalists covering theaffair were handledin ways that drewprotestfrom Paris.80Given the obsessionof the Bin Ali regime with the country's 'image abroad' and at home, it isvehemently hostile to the slightest criticism, especially of the president.Thisover-sensitivityto criticism has meant sour relations between Paris and Tunis,especially that the Frenchgovernmentcannot interfere n how its mediago abouttheirjob. But this did not stop Tunis from seeking the French government'sintervention.This happenedduringa visit to Tunisiaby the FrenchMinisterforForeignAffairs, HubertVedrine, an idea at odds with the notion of freedomofthe press.81Only a regime not well used to democracywould have the audacityto enlist the supportof a governmentMinister n a democraticState to intervenewith his country's media so that they tone down their criticism of it. Nodemocratwould entertain he illusion that a regime intolerantof its criticismbythe international resswould be hospitable o freedomof speechand informationat home.Bin Ali emerged almost unscathed by the confrontation with the Frenchmedia. He manipulatedpublic opinion by turningthe debate within the Frenchmedia of humanrightsviolation, corruption,and authoritarianule into an issueof nationalsovereignty.The RCD's mouthpiece,Le Renouveau, ook the lead inthis campaign publishing dozens of reports of rallies organized around thecountry pledging support for Bin Ali's leadership. The mass mobilizationincludedall the mainprofessionalorganizations,unions andpolitical parties.Theparties' leaders were given audience with Bin Ali in order to reaffirm theirloyalty to his regime and garner supportfor the anti-Frenchcampaign.82Thelargest trade union, L 'Union Generale des Travailleurs Tunisiens (UGTT)played a big role in the anti-Frenchmedia campaign. Its secretary general,Isma'il Sahbani,spoke of hands with a 'colonialistpast' and intentionsgoadingthe French media with the 'aim of tarnishingTunisia's image'.83In the samevein, the Tunisian Association of Newspaper Editors issued a statement con-demningthe French media reportingof the Bin Brik affair,describingit to be'motivatedby prejudiceand nostalgia for the era of dominationof peoples'.84The regime succeeded in drummingup much public hysteriaabout 'nationalsovereignty' being threatened by foreign tutelage. Thus it succeeded indeflectingpublicattention romthe Bin Brikaffair,the issue of the thousandsofexiled dissidents whose rightto a passport s deniedby the regime,the draconiantactics used againstactivists andtheir families and fromBin Ali's own singularrule. Althoughthey variedin intensityandgravity,all threecrises presentedBinAli and his regime with a crisis of confidence and posed questions about the80

See, 'Francedeploresassaultsonjournalists overingBen Brik'shunger trike',Summary f WorldBroadcasts,ME/3839 MED (1 May 2000), p. 23.81 F. Beauge, 'Lapressefrancaise, ourced'incomprehension ntreTuniset Paris',LeMonde,(8 February 000),.4.'PoliticalpartiesdenounceFrenchmediacampaign',Summary f WorldBroadcasts,ME/3827MED(29 April2000), p. 11.83 See, 'Trade Union leader says country targetof "neo-colonialist"envy', Summaryof WorldBroadcasts,ME/3831 MED (4 May 2000), p. 13.84 'Editors ondemn"fallacies" f Frenchpress',Summary f WorldBroadcasts,ME/3817MED(17 April2000),p. 18.

76

8/2/2019 Bin Ali

22/23

BIN ALI'S TUNISIA

rulers' democraticcredentials.Bin Ali was forced to make concessions to BinBrik and his brother,absolve himself of the media's own inadequaciesand todeploy the ultimateweapon of colonial tutelagein managingthe crisis with theFrench media. Thus he turnedhis battle with local dissidents into one pittingnationalist Tunisians against French neo-colonialists. The issue of citizenshipwas successfully obfuscated nto one of nationalsovereignty.Thenthere was thespectacular diversion when news broke out of a shootout on the Algerian-Tunisianborderbetween borderguardsand Islamistterrorists, eportedly ormerArab 'Afghans', three of whom were killed.85Whatis puzzlingin all of this wasthe inconsistency of the regime. Its wide advertisementof the incident in May2000 contrastedwith its choice to keep the public in the dark about the similarincident of February1995. If the 1995 blackout was motivatedby the concernover the adverse effects of such an incident on Tunisia's status as a sunny andpeaceful touristhaven, that would equally apply today. However, and assumingthe second incidentdid indeed takeplace, in both incidentsthe motivationsmusthave been political. In 1995 the civil war in Algeriawas ragingunabatedly,withIslamiststhreatening he embattledState with collapse. The regimein neighbour-ing Tunisiamost probably earedthe infectiousnessof the conflict. The blackoutwas intendedto minimize the significance of the incident and prevent the warnext door from inspiringlocal Islamists. In May 2000, however, the regime notonly needed a deflectionfrom its troublesat home andabroad,but it also neededa common 'enemy' or 'threat' on which to refocus public attention.ConclusionElections by themselves cannot be considered an adequate test of Bin Ali'scommitment to democracy. They have been merely a superficial badge oflegitimacy noted for the absence of popularlybased active citizenry. Despitesteadfastness on the electoral front, right now the verdict is that Bin Ali'sTunisia remains a non-democracy.Inclusion is conferredupon those willing towork within the straightjacket f either political deference or loyal opposition.As such inclusion is read as co-option. Bin Ali is a paternalisticself-appointednational mentor par excellence. His acquisition of the veneer of democraticlanguage has led to new forms of oppression and denial (e.g. Islamists). Thepolity is mired in polarity: singularity versus pluralism; loyalty instead ofautonomy;the presence of co-optationnot contestation;and regime preferencefor indifferencenot difference. The Ben Brick affair of April-May 2000 exposedthe regime's blatanttramplingof citizenship rights and continuous policy ofkeeping a lid on free media reporting.One positive outcome is the emergingpolitics of protest and coalition building within the emasculated civil society.The deepening of this kind of politics will, at least in the long term, hardenthe resolve of civil society to carve out a margin of existence in the publicspherein its struggle to engender citizenship. However, dissidents' talk at thisjuncture about the coming fall of Bin Ali following the April-May crises ispremature.Bin Ali's possession of the democraticprocess has cast a shadow85 See 'Borderguards reportedlykill three "terrorists"oming from Algeria', Summarn f WorldBroadcasts,ME/3845 MED (20 May 2000), p. 13. Also see, 'FrontiereTuniso-algerienne: chec au terrorisme',La Presse,(19 May 2000), p. 4.

77

8/2/2019 Bin Ali

23/23

LARBI SADIKI

over genuine politicalreform in the foreseeable future. Such a possession of thedemocraticprocess does not suggest he will give up power voluntarily.The moment of reckoningwill come in October2004 when Bin Ali's secondand last term as head of State comes to an end. In accordancewith Article 39of the constitutionthe president may hold office for two consecutive terms. Ifone is to be guidedby his presenthegemonizingandhomogenizingpractices,hecan be expectedto hold on to the presidencybeyond 2004. The questionis overthe modalities and the justifications he will use to keep the occupancy ofCarthage.Will it be a shootout at the Algerian-Tunisianborder with former'Afghanterrorists'?Or is it going to be a Nahdah-led attempt'on Bin Ali's life?Or, will Bin Ali amend the constitutionto stay on, as the Syrianand Egyptianexamplesshowed in the recentpast?If Bin Ali is indeedplanningto prolonghisstay at the helm, a probablescenario,then the springof Tunisiandemocracy sstill a long way off.In the coffee-houses of Tunis,wherehis veiled authoritarianism,s referred oas 'Bin Ali "Baba"democracy', many wager that Ben Ali will not bow to theconstitution and relinquish power. He has turned it into his reserved domain.Tunisia today is an over-stated State or another Arab 'fagade democracy', asMilton-Edwards ppliesthe conceptto Jordan's iberalization.86hatis, a systemwhere the trappingsof democracyare manipulatedby a rulingelite, preventinggenuine deepening (contestation) and widening (participation).Without thestandardof tolerationof difference,put forward n this article's introductionasan essential test for good government, he deepeningandwideningof democra-tization will remainintangibles in Bin Ali's Tunisia.

86 Beverley Milton-Edwards, FacadeDemocracy', British Journal of MiddleEastern Studies,20 (1993), pp.191-203.78