[People vs. Racho, 626 SCRA 633(2010)]

On May 19, 2003, a confidential agent of the police transacted through cellular phone with appellant for the purchase of shabu. The agent later reported the transaction to the police authorities who immediately formed a team composed of member of the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA), the Intelligence group of the Philippine Army and the local police force to apprehend the appellant.4 The agent gave the police appellant’s name, together with his physical description. He also assured them that appellant would arrive in Baler, Aurora the following day.

On May 20, 2003, at 11:00 a.m., appellant called up the agent and informed him that he was on board a Genesis bus and would arrive in Baler, Aurora, anytime of the day wearing a red and white striped T-shirt. The team members then posted themselves along the national highway in Baler, Aurora. At around 3:00 p.m. of the same day, a Genesis bus arrived in Baler. When appellant alighted from the bus, the confidential agent pointed to him as the person he transacted with earlier. Having alighted from the bus, appellant stood near the highway and waited for a tricycle that would bring him to his final destination. As appellant was about to board a tricycle, the team approached him and invited him to the police station on suspicion of carrying shabu. Appellant immediately denied the accusation, but as he pulled out his hands from his pants’ pocket, a white envelope slipped therefrom which, when opened, yielded a small sachet containing the suspected drug.5 Held:

Recent jurisprudence holds that in searches incident to a lawful arrest, the arrest must precede the search; generally, the process cannot be reversed. Nevertheless, a search substantially contemporaneous with an arrest can precede the arrest if the police have probable cause to make the arrest at the outset of the search. Thus, given the factual milieu of the case, we have to determine whether the police officers had probable cause to arrest appellant. Although probable cause eludes exact and concrete definition, it ordinarily signifies a reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man to believe that the person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is charged.

The long standing rule in this jurisdiction is that “reliable information” alone is not sufficient to justify a warrantless arrest—the rule requires, in addition, that the accused perform some overt act that would indicate that he has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense.—What prompted the police to apprehend appellant, even without a warrant, was the tip given by the informant that appellant would arrive in Baler, Aurora carrying shabu. This circumstance gives rise to another question: whether that information, by itself, is sufficient probable cause to effect a valid warrantless arrest. The long standing rule in this jurisdiction is that “reliable information” alone is not sufficient to justify a warrantless arrest. The rule requires, in addition, that the accused perform some overt act that would indicate that he has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense. We find no cogent reason to depart from this well-established doctrine. [People vs. Racho, 626 SCRA 633(2010)]

[Gacal vs. Infante, 658 SCRA 535(2011)]

On March 18, 2003, Judge Gregorio R. Balanag, Jr. of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Kiamba-Maitum, Sarangani issued a warrant for the arrest of Faustino Ancheta in connection with a murder case. Judge Balanag did not recommend bail. Ancheta, who had meanwhile gone into hiding, was not arrested. Upon review, the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor, acting through Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Alfredo Barcelona, Jr., affirmed the findings and recommendation of Judge Balanag on the offense to be charged, and accordingly filed in the RTC an information for murder on April 21, 2003 (Criminal Case No. 1136-03), but with a recommendation for bail in the amount of P400,000.00. Criminal Case No. 1136-03 was raffled to Judge Infante’s Branch.

On April 23, 2003, Judge Infante issued twin orders, one granting bail to Ancheta, and another releasing Ancheta from custody.

In his motion for inhibition,3 Atty. Gacal insisted that the issue of bail urgently required a resolution that involved a judicial determination and was, for that reason, a judicial function; that Judge Infante failed to resolve the issue of bail, although he should have acted upon it with dispatch, because it was unusual that several persons charged with murder were being detained while Ancheta was let free on bail even without his filing a petition for bail; that such event also put the integrity of Judge Infante’s court in peril; and that although his motion for reconsideration included the alternative relief for Judge Infante to motu proprio correct his apparent error, his refusal to resolve the matter in due time constituted gross ignorance of law.

Atty. Gacal contended that Judge Infante was not worthy of his position as a judge either because he unjustifiably failed to exercise his judicial power or because he did not at all know how to exercise his judicial power; that his lack of judicial will rendered him utterly incompetent to perform the functions of a judge; that at one time, he ordered the bail issue to be submitted for resolution, with or without the comment of the public prosecutor, but at another time, he directed that the bail issue be submitted for resolution, with his later order denoting that he would resolve the issue only after receiving the comment from the public prosecutor; that he should not be too dependent on the public prosecutor’s comment considering that the resolution of the matter of bail was entirely within his discretion as the judge;4 and that the granting of bail without a petition for bail being filed by the accused or a hearing being held for that purpose constituted gross ignorance of the law and the rules. [Gacal vs. Infante, 658 SCRA 535(2011)]

Held:

EVALUATION: The 1987 Constitution provides that, all persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when the evidence of guilt is strong, shall before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties or be released on recognizance as may be provided by law (Sec. 13, Art. III).

The Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that, no person charged with a capital offense or offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment shall be admitted to bail when the evidence is strong, regardless of the stage of the criminal prosecution (Sec. 7, Rule 114).

With the aforequoted provisions of the Constitution and the Rules of Criminal Procedure as a backdrop, the question is: Can respondent judge in granting bail to the accused dispense with the hearing of Application for Bail?

The preliminary investigation of Criminal Case No. 03-61, entitled Benito M. Occasion vs. Faustino Ancheta for Murder was conducted by Judge Gregorio R. Balanag, Jr., of MCTC, Kiamba-Maitum, Sarangani. Finding the existence of probable cause that an offense of Murder was committed and the accused is probably guilty thereof, he transmitted his resolution to the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor, together with the records of the case, with No Bail Recommended. Upon review of the resolution of the investigating judge by the OIC of the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Sarangani, he filed the information for Murder against accused Faustino Ancheta but a bail of P400,000.00 for the provisional liberty of the latter was recommended. Relying on the recommendation of the Fiscal, respondent judge granted the Application for Bail of the accused.

The offense of Murder is punishable by reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death (Art. 248, RPC). By reason of the penalty prescribed by law, Murder is considered a capital offense and, grant of bail is a matter of discretion which can be exercised only by respondent judge after the evidence is submitted in a hearing. Hearing of the application for bail is absolutely indispensable before a judge can properly determine whether the prosecution’s evidence is weak or strong (People vs. Dacudao, 170 SCRA 489). It becomes, therefore, a ministerial duty of a judge to conduct hearing the moment an

application for bail is filed if the accused is charged with capital offense or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. If doubt can be entertained, it follows that the evidence of guilt is weak and bail shall be recommended. On the other hand, if the evidence is clear and strong, no bail shall be granted.

Verily, respondent judge erred when he issued an order granting the application for bail filed by the accused (Annex “C”) based merely on the order issued by the Fiscal (Annex “A”) recommending bail of P400,000.00 for the provisional liberty of the accused without even bothering to read the affidavits of the witnesses for the prosecution. Respondent judge cannot abdicate his right and authority to determine whether the evidence against the accused who is charged with capital offense is strong or not. [Gacal vs. Infante, 658 SCRA 535(2011)]

[Coalition of Associations of Senior Citizens in the Philippines Inc. [Senior Citizens Party-List] vs. Commission on Elections, 701 SCRA 786(2013)]

On March 16, 2007, the COMELEC En Banc accredited SENIOR CITIZENS as a party-list organization in a Resolution6 issued on even date in SPP No. 06-026 (PL). SENIOR CITIZENS participated in the May 14, 2007 elections. However, the organization failed to get the required two percent (2%) of the total votes cast.7 Thereafter, SENIOR CITIZENS was granted leave to intervene in the case of Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT) v. Commission on Elections.8 In accordance with the procedure set forth in BANAT for the allocation of additional seats under the party-list system, SENIOR CITIZENS was allocated one seat in Congress. Rep. Arquiza, then the organization’s first nominee, served as a member of the House of Representatives.

Subsequently, SENIOR CITIZENS was allowed to participate in the May 10, 2010 elections.

On May 5, 2010, the nominees of SENIOR CITIZENS signed an agreement, entitled Irrevocable Covenant, the relevant terms of which we quote:

ARTICLE IV

SHARING OF POWER

The Nominees agreed and pledged on their legal and personal honor and interest as well as the legal privileges and rights of the respective party-list offices, under the following circumstances and events:

On December 4, 2012, the COMELEC En Banc issued a Resolution29 in SPP Nos. 12-157 (PLM) and 12-191 (PLM). By a vote of 4-3, the COMELEC En Banc ordered the cancellation of the registration of SENIOR CITIZENS. The resolution explained that:

It shall be recalled that on June 27, 2012, this Commission promulgated its resolution in a petition that involved SENIOR CITIZENS titled “In Re: Petition for Confirmation of Replacement of Resigned Party-List Nominee” and docketed as EM No. 12-040. In the process of resolving the issues of said case, this Commission found that SENIOR CITIZENS nominees specifically nominees David L. Kho and Francisco G. Datol, Jr. have entered into a term-sharing agreement. x x x.

Nominee David Kho’s term as party-list congressman is three (3) years which starts on June 30, 2010 and to end on June 30, 2013 as directed no less than by the Constitution of the Philippines. Section 7, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution states:

But following the term-sharing agreement entered into by SENIOR CITIZENS, David Kho’s term starts on June 30, 2010 and ends on December 31, 2011, the date of effectivity of Kho’ s resignation. By virtue of the term-sharing agreement, the term of Kho as member of the House of Representatives is cut short to one year and six months which is merely half of [the] three-year term. This is totally opposed to the prescription of the Constitution on the term of a Member of the House of Representatives. Hence, when confronted with this issue on term sharing done by SENIOR CITIZENS, this Commission made a categorical pronouncement that such term-sharing agreement must be rejected.

(5) It violates or fails to comply with laws, rules or regulations relating to elections;

x x x x

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, to CANCEL the registration of Coalition of Associations of Senior Citizens in the Philippines (SENIOR CITIZENS) under the Party-List System of Representation.

Held:

Unquestionably, the twin requirements of due notice and hearing are indispensable before the COMELEC may properly order the cancellation of the registration and accreditation of a party-list organization. In connection with this, the Court lengthily discussed in Mendoza v. Commission on Elections47 the concept of due process as applied to the COMELEC. We emphasized therein that:

The appropriate due process standards that apply to the COMELEC, as an administrative or quasi-judicial tribunal, are those outlined in the seminal case of Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations, quoted below:

These are now commonly referred to as cardinal primary rights in administrative proceedings.

The first of the enumerated rights pertain to the substantive rights of a party at hearing stage of the proceedings. The essence of this aspect of due process, we have consistently held, is simply the opportunity to be heard, or as applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one’s side or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. A formal or trial-type hearing is not at all times and in all instances essential; in the case of COMELEC, Rule 17 of its Rules of Procedure defines the requirements for a hearing and these serve as the standards in the determination of the presence or denial of due process.

In the instant case, the review of the registration of SENIOR CITIZENS was made pursuant to COMELEC Resolution No. 9513 through a summary evidentiary hearing carried out on August 24, 2012 in SPP No. 12-157 (PLM) and SPP No. 12-191 (PLM). In this hearing, both the Arquiza Group and the Datol Group were indeed given the opportunity to adduce evidence as to their continuing compliance with the requirements for party-list accreditation. Nevertheless, the due process violation was committed when they were not apprised of the fact that the term-sharing agreement entered into by the nominees of SENIOR CITIZENS in 2010 would be a material consideration in the evaluation of the organization’s qualifications as a party-list group for the May 13, 2013 elections. As it were, both factions of SENIOR CITIZENS were not able to answer this issue squarely. In other words, they were deprived of the opportunity to adequately explain their side regarding the term-sharing agreement and/or to adduce evidence, accordingly, in support of their position.