GERT BIESTA

BILDUNG AND MODERNITY: THE FUTURE OF BILDUNG IN AWORLD OF DIFFERENCE

ABSTRACT. This paper asks whether there is a future for the age-old educational ideal ofBildung. It is argued that the modern conception of Bildung in terms of “rational autonomy”should be understood as the educational answer that was given to the political questionabout citizenship in an emerging (modern) civil society. Raising the question about thefuture of Bildung therefore means to ask what educational response would be appropriatein our time. It is argued that our time is one in which the idea of a universal or totalperspective has become problematic. We now live in a world of difference in which therational autonomous life is only one of the possible ways to live. Beyond totalisation andisolation, a possible future of Bildung might be found in the experience that we can onlylive our life with others. In a “world of difference” Bildung might follow from a questioningof “one’s right to exist” (Levinas). In this respect Bildung can happen anywhere and notnecessarily in those parts of the “Bildungssystem” that educators are most familiar andcomfortable with (i.e., the school). Bildung becomes a lifelong challenge and a lifelongopportunity.

KEY WORDS: autonomy, Bildung, democracy, learning society, liberal education, multi-culturalism, rationality

INTRODUCTION

To say anything meaningful about Bildung and modernity is quite a diffi-cult task. The concept of Bildung brings together the aspirations of allthose who acknowledge – or hope – that education is more than the simpleacquisition of knowledge and skills, that it is more than simply gettingthings “right,” but that it also has to do with nurturing the human person,that it has to do with individuality, subjectivity, in short, with “becomingand being somebody.” Bildung is a rich, but also a complex concept – aconcept, moreover, with a long history.

The concept of “modernity” is no less complex. It signifies a way inwhich Western culture has tried to understand its own recent history, notonly as a description of that history but also as an evaluation of it. Untilnot so long ago modernity signified improvement, progress, a movementaway from a dark past towards a brighter future. We now live in an era –which some prefer to call “postmodern” – in which we have come to seethat being or becoming modern is no longer simply, straightforwardly and

Studies in Philosophy and Education 21: 343–351, 2002.© 2002 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.

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unproblematically “O.K.” This is not to say that modernity is over, or thatit is always “bad,” but it does indicate that the idea of “modernity” is moreambivalent than we may have assumed it to be (see, e.g., Bauman, 1989,1991).

To say something meaningful, therefore, about these two rich andcomplex concepts and about their relationship is not easy. To do so in thelimited space available here is even more difficult. Yet I do believe thatit is of crucial importance to keep the conversation about Bildung goingeven if we have so little time – and there is, of course, never enough time.I believe that we need to continue to speak about Bildung because thevery concept allows us to say something different about education, or atleast it allows us to explore the ways in which education might be aboutsomething more than simply the transmission of our facts and values to thenext generation.1

This immediately raises the question to what extent and in what waythe idea of Bildung can still make sense for us, here and now. In this paperI will not so much try to answer this question. I will rather present someobservations which, so I wish to argue, should be taken into account whenwe want to investigate the future of Bildung.

A HISTORY OF BILDUNG

It is important to acknowledge that there is no such “thing” as Bildung,that is not as a “thing” on its own. We first of all need to be aware oflanguage and context. Is, so we could ask, the German word “Bildung”the same as the Swedish word “Bildning”? Is that similar to the Dutchword “vorming”? And what would this be in English? Liberal education,?Edification (Rorty)? Cultivation? The key to addressing this issue is to seethat Bildung has a history – or perhaps we should say: that it has several(possible) histories.

A brief look at one possible history of Bildung shows that there is bothan educational and a political dimension to it (see, e.g., Sünker, 1994). Onthe one hand Bildung stands for an educational ideal that emerged in Greeksociety and that, through its adoption in Roman culture, humanism, neo-humanism and the Enlightenment became one of the central notions of themodern Western educational tradition (see Klafki, 1986; Tenorth, 1986).

1 It is for precisely this reason that I have chosen to use the word Bildung in this paperand not an English translation of it – if such a translation would be possible at all. Using theword Bildung in this way is meant to be a reminder of the possibility to think differentlyabout education.

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Central in this tradition is the question as to what constitutes an educatedor cultivated human being. The answer to this question is not given interms of discipline, socialisation or moralisation, i.e., as the adaptation toan existing “external” order. Bildung refers to the cultivation of the innerlife, i.e., the human mind or human soul.

Initially the question of Bildung was approached in terms of the contentof Bildung. A decisive step in the development of the modern conceptionof Bildung was taken when the acquisition of contents became recognisedas a constitutive aspect of Bildung (Herder, Pestalozzi, Humboldt). Sincethen Bildung has always also been self-Bildung. A further step took placewith the Enlightenment where self-Bildung became defined in terms ofrational autonomy. Kant provided the classical definition of Enlighten-ment as “men’s release from his self-incurred tutelage [Unmundigkeit]through the exercise of his own understanding” (Kant, 1959). Kant alsoargued that men’s “vocation and propensity to free thinking” could onlybe brought about by means of education (see Kant, 1982, p. 701; trans-lation G.B.), thereby giving education a central position in the process ofEnlightenment.

Although for Kant the idea of rational autonomy was a central educa-tional aim and ideal, it was also – and perhaps even primarily – an answerto the question about the role of the subject in the emerging civil society,viz., as a subject who can think for himself (not yet herself; see Rang, 1986,pp. 53–54) and is capable of his (not yet her) own judgements. In doing soKant provided a conception of citizenship, an answer to the question whatit means to be a citizen in a civil – can we say democratic? – society, andat the same time provided a programme and a legitimation for citizenshipeducation.

From this (too brief2) account of the history of the concept of Bildungwe can learn three things. We can first of all see that Bildung is not exclu-sively an educational idea in the sense of being only concerned with theindividual. There is also a social and political dimension to it. We canfurther see that the idea of rational autonomy – which, so it seems to me isstill very influential as an educational ideal today – can, given its history, beidentified as a typically “modern” idea. Thirdly, and most importantly forwhat I wish to say here, it shows that the (modern) conception of Bildungwas a very specific answer to a very specific question – the questionof citizenship in an emerging civil society – and not, therefore, some-thing universal, external or “typically human” (not in the least becauseof what counts as “human” is itself at stake in the different articulations ofBildung).

2 I have discussed this in more detail in Biesta, in press.

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The idea that Bildung is an answer to a question – and we could perhapssay an educational answer to a political question – is of crucial importanceif we want to think about the future of Bildung. It suggests that the firstquestion that we need to ask should not be how much Bildung still ispossible in the world that we live in now. (Such a question would assumethat the meaning of Bildung is itself static and objective.) We rather needto start by asking the question as to what kind of problems we are facedwith today. We need, in other words, to begin with a “diagnosis” of ourtime. It is only on the basis of our answer to that question that we can thenreturn and ask what kind of educational response, what kind of Bildungmight be needed or might make sense for us here and today – and whatkind of Bildung might be possible.

Surely, the question of a diagnosis of our time is a tremendously diffi-cult and complex question. Not only because we can only attempt toidentify the problems we are faced with. But also because we shouldacknowledge that such a diagnosis depends on the position from whichit is given – which immediately shows that it is already problematic tospeak of “our” time, because the “our” suggests a false inclusiveness. We,or better: I, have to be very careful here.

A DIAGNOSIS OF “OUR” TIME

One way to characterise the situation we are in today, is to say that we livein a world in which the general or the universal has been put into question;where, to put it differently, the general or universal has become a problem.The point here is not so much to say that we live in a plural world, becausewhen we look at the history of mankind we can see that there has alwaysbeen plurality. What has changed, however, is the way in which we – or atleast some of us – try to understand what (this) plurality is. What has beenput into question, to be more precise, is the idea that it is possible to see,overview, describe, and conceptualise this plurality from a point outsideof it.

One way to make clear what is at stake here, is by making a distinc-tion between diversity and difference (see Bhabha, 1990). If we think ofplurality in terms of diversity, we look at it as a collection of variationsthat have a similar ground or origin. An example of this can be found inthinking about plurality in terms of cultural variations of human nature.In this case nature provides a common (back)ground against which plur-ality can be seen as a collection of (cultural) variations of nature. What issuggested in this way of thinking is that we are all basically “the same”and that our differences are “merely cultural.”

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When, on the other hand, we think about plurality in terms of differ-ence we take the fact that we differ or that there is difference as just weencounter and experience it – which more often than not will mean: asit confronts us. We take plurality, in other words, as it “comes.” What isimplied in the latter approach is the recognition that any attempt to placethe different positions in an overarching framework can only be done fromone of the positions “within” that framework (which already means thatsuch a position is never simply “within”).

What I am trying to say here is one way to express what Lyotard (1979)has referred to as the postmodern condition. The reason why I am notputting this label upfront is because I don’t think that the postmodern is an“objective” condition, i.e., a state we are in. Just as modernity is a way tounderstand our recent history, so is postmodernity (see Biesta, 1995).

The idea that our plural world is not a world of diversity but a world ofdifference can be defended on theoretical grounds. We can, for example,think of this idea as the logical outcome of taking the process of humancommunication seriously (see Biesta, 1999a). The main reason, however,for making the shift from diversity to difference is of an ethical nature.It stems from the recognition that any attempt to describe the plurality interms of one of the positions within that plurality – and in doing so assumethat this tells the “whole” story – does injustice to the other “positions.”Thinking about plurality in terms of difference is, therefore, a way not tomistake the part for the whole. It is a way not to totalise. In this respect wecould say – I will only mention it here – that thinking about plurality interms of difference is one way to take democracy seriously.

A BILDUNG OF THE FUTURE

If we acknowledge that the plural world in which we live today is a worldof difference – or if we are at least willing to explore what such a diagnosiswould mean for the future of Bildung – we can then return to the questionas to what kind of Bildung would be appropriate (or needed) in such aworld, and also what kind of Bildung would be possible.

To begin with the last question: I think that we should give up the ideaof Bildung as a transition – or as some would call it: a liberation – fromthe life of tradition to the rational life, the life of reason (see also Biesta,1998; Biesta, in press). We must at least acknowledge that what is calledthe rational life is itself but one tradition (which doesn’t say anything aboutthe value of that tradition yet, but simply relocates the rational life in theworld of difference itself). Further I think that we must acknowledge that

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there is not just one rational life but that there can be many (see Winch,1958).

If we think of the rational life as the examined life that Socrates hadin mind when he claimed that the unexamined life is not worth living,my point could be read as the claim that we should and can only lead anunexamined life. This is not what I have in mind. What I want to arguehere is primarily that the examined life – in the specific sense of a lifeexclusively based on rational beliefs – is, if possible at all, only one way tolead a meaningful life, and not necessarily the best way. In this respect I aminclined to answer to Socrates that while the unexamined life may not beworth living, the unlived life is definitely not worth examining. We shouldsituate the examined life. We should try to find out where it makes senseand where it doesn’t and not think that it is the uncontestable aim of allBildung. It is for this reason that I want to argue that the modern conceptionof Bildung as “rational liberation” is no longer possible in a world in whichwe take difference seriously and for that reason avoid totalisation.

But besides totalisation there is another danger in such a world, and Iwant to argue that this danger must be avoided too. This is the danger ofisolation.

Isolation is the idea that we can and should lead our different livestotally disconnected from each other. Of course we should not create prob-lems where they do not exist. That is to say: in some situations it canbe wise and it can be possible to create a certain distance between thedifferent lives that people lead. There are historical examples, e.g., theway in which religious plurality was dealt with in the Netherlands, wherethis strategy was wise – at least for some time (see Biesta and Miedema,1995). But there is definitely a limit to such an approach – both in spaceand in time – and the bottom line here has to be a recognition of a basichuman interdependence. Such a recognition can come from the “inside,”for example through empathy or moral imagination. But it can also comefrom the “outside,” for example from the recognition that we are all facingthe same problems (see Dewey, 1929) – which could well be the case inthe current “globalisation” of ecological problems.

If, against this background, there is a task – a future task, a future – forBildung here, it might be to help to create an awareness, or better, perhaps,an experience that the only way in which we can live our lives is withothers. (And the question that follows from there is, of course, what thatwould mean in more detail.3)

At precisely this point I do think that we can make use of the heritage ofthe modern tradition of Bildung, that is of that part in which the importance

3 I have explored this in Biesta, 2000.

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of the encounter with what is other and different is given a central place.But two qualifying remarks should be made here.

First of all it must be stressed that the reason for doing so should notbe to try to make what is strange and other familiar to us. I am morethinking of something which Hannah Arendt has referred to as “visiting.”Visiting is not trying to think the thoughts of someone else, but “being andthinking in one’s own identity where actually one is not” (Arendt, 1977,p. 241), and thereby permitting oneself the disorientation that is necessaryto understand how the world can look different to someone else. Ratherthan making the strange familiar, therefore, we could say that visiting is anapproach to Bildung that aims at making the familiar, that what we thoughtwe knew and understood, strange.

Secondly: by stressing the importance of experiencing that we can onlylead our lives with others, I mean to say that the task of Bildung is not onewhere we should only be with others in our imagination. The point is thatwe should actually be with others, that we should actually experience whator who is different. Bildung should actually make such an encounter withwhat is other, with was is different possible. Being in such a situation canput a challenge to our own “certainties,” which in turn can lead us to recon-sider our own “position.” Another way to reply to Socrates could thereforebe to say that an unchallenged life, a life in which the question about one’s“right to exist” (Levinas), is not worth living (see Biesta, 1999b).

THE PLACE OF BILDUNG

If the foregoing remarks suffice as a very general outline of an answer tothe question as to what Bildung could or should be in a world of difference,the final question that I want to address is where Bildung should take place.

The traditional answer to this question – and definitely the most easyone for “us” educators – would be to say that Bildung should take place anddoes take place in what the Germans call the “Bildungssystem,” and whatwe could translate as the educational system, i.e., the school, the collegeand the university. The immediate reaction here could of course be to say:Yes, let’s try it, let’s do it, let’s see if we can make the educational systeminto a place where we can really encounter what and who is other.

All this is well as long as we can assume that the educational system canbe part of the solution. But if we want to think about the future of Bildungwe need to take into consideration that in some cases in our (post)modernsociety the educational system is not or no longer part of the solutionbut has itself become part of the problem. I am not only thinking hereof those countries with a strong presence of private schools, either for

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reasons of class (e.g., England) or religion (e.g., the United States), whichtremendously restricts the opportunities for experiencing what and who isother (see, e.g. Feinberg, 1998). I am also thinking of the effects that veryrestrictive, outcome-based national curricula have on the opportunities foryoung people to experience difference and otherness.

While we should continue to struggle for the educational system to be aplace or space where a real encounter with who or what is other is possible,we should at the very same time keep our eyes open – optimistically – tosee if there are other places where Bildung happens or might happen. Withan eye to the future of Bildung we should not restrict our attention to theeducational system, because it might well be that more important things arehappening elsewhere. What, for example, about the internet? How muchdifference and otherness can be experienced there? How “real” are thoseexperiences and encounters?

In all cases, and this is my final remark, the “disorientating” encountersthat are central to the future of Bildung which I have outlined here shouldnot be restricted to the early years of life. We should not think of Bildung –let alone a future Bildung, a Bildung of (and for?) the future – as a processin which we create a democratic character or democratic dispositions earlyin life and then leave it all to the individual. Such an individualistic (and ina sense psychological) approach to the question of Bildung forgets that weshould not only focus on the acquisition of the right “habits” (includingreflective habits and habits of reflection), but should be aware that these“habits” also need an appropriate “habitat” in order to endure. Not only,therefore, is the conception of Bildung that I have outlined in this paper alifelong task. It is also a task that should not only focus on the individual,but on society as well. It is, in that sense, at the very same time a thoroughlypolitical task.

What emerges from these reflections on the future of Bildung is, there-fore, an image of a learning society conceived as a society in which thereal encounters with who and what is other are a constant and continuouspossibility. Such a society we could well call a democratic society.

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School of Education and Lifelong LearningUniversity of ExeterExeter EX1 2L4England