Bieler and Morton A Critical Theory Route.pdf

8/11/2019 Bieler and Morton A Critical Theory Route.pdf

1/30

http://cnc.sagepub.com/Capital & Class

http://cnc.sagepub.com/content/28/1/85

The online version of this article can be found at:

DOI: 10.1177/0309816804082001062004 28: 85Capital & Class

Andreas Bieler and Adam David Mortonneo-Gramscian perspectives in International Relations

A critical theory route to hegemony, world order and historical change:

Published by:

http://www.sagepublications.com

On behalf of:

Conference of Socialist Economics

can be found at:Capital & ClassAdditional services and information for

http://cnc.sagepub.com/cgi/alertsEmail Alerts:

http://cnc.sagepub.com/subscriptionsSubscriptions:

http://www.sagepub.com/journalsReprints.navReprints:

http://www.sagepub.com/journalsPermissions.navPermissions:

http://cnc.sagepub.com/content/28/1/85.refs.htmlCitations:

at University of Wollongong on February 27, 2011cnc.sagepub.comDownloaded from
http://cnc.sagepub.com/http://cnc.sagepub.com/http://cnc.sagepub.com/http://cnc.sagepub.com/content/28/1/85http://cnc.sagepub.com/content/28/1/85http://www.sagepublications.com/http://www.sagepublications.com/http://www.cseweb.org.uk/http://cnc.sagepub.com/cgi/alertshttp://cnc.sagepub.com/cgi/alertshttp://cnc.sagepub.com/subscriptionshttp://cnc.sagepub.com/subscriptionshttp://www.sagepub.com/journalsReprints.navhttp://www.sagepub.com/journalsReprints.navhttp://www.sagepub.com/journalsPermissions.navhttp://www.sagepub.com/journalsPermissions.navhttp://cnc.sagepub.com/content/28/1/85.refs.htmlhttp://cnc.sagepub.com/http://cnc.sagepub.com/http://cnc.sagepub.com/http://cnc.sagepub.com/content/28/1/85.refs.htmlhttp://www.sagepub.com/journalsPermissions.navhttp://www.sagepub.com/journalsReprints.navhttp://cnc.sagepub.com/subscriptionshttp://cnc.sagepub.com/cgi/alertshttp://www.cseweb.org.uk/http://www.sagepublications.com/http://cnc.sagepub.com/content/28/1/85http://cnc.sagepub.com/


2/30

85Neo-Gramscian perspectives in IR

Situated within a historical materialist problematic

of social transformation that deploys many of the

insights of the Italian Marxist Antonio Gramsci, a

crucial break emerged, in the s, in the work of

Robert Cox from mainstream International Relations

(IR) approaches to hegemony. This article provides a

comprehensive state-of-the-discipline overview of

this critical theory route to hegemony, world order

and historical change. It does so by outlining the

historical context within which various diverse but

related neo-Gramscian perspectives emerged. Atten-

tion subsequently turns to highlight how conditions of

capitalist economic crisis and structural change in the

s have been conceptualised, which inform contem-

porary debates about globalisation. Significantly, the

discussion is also responsive to the various controver-

sies and criticisms that surround the neo-Gramscian

perspectives whilst, in conclusion, directions along

which future research might proceed are elaborated.

Hence providing a thorough survey of this historical

materialist critical theory of hegemony and thus forms

of social power through which conditions of capitalism

are reproduced, mediated and contested.

A critical theory route tohegemony, world order andhistorical change:

neo-Gramscian perspectives inInternational Relations

Andreas Bieler and Adam David Morton

http://cnc.sagepub.com/http://cnc.sagepub.com/http://cnc.sagepub.com/http://cnc.sagepub.com/


3/30

Capital & Class #8286

Situated within a historical materialist problematic of

social transformation and deploying many insights

from the Italian Marxist Antonio Gramsci, a crucial

break with mainstream International Relations ()

approaches emerged by the s in the work of Robert

Cox. In contrast to mainstream routes to hegemony in ,

which develop a static theory of politics, an abstract

ahistorical conception of the state and an appeal to universal

validity (e.g. Keohane and ; Waltz ), debate

shifted towards a critical theory of hegemony, world order

and historical change (for the classic critique, see Ashley

). Rather than a problem-solving preoccupation with

the maintenance of social power relationships, a critical

theory of hegemony directs attention to questioning the

prevailing order of the world.1 It does not take institutions

and social and power relations for granted but calls them

into question by concerning itself with their origins and

whether they might be in the process of changing (Cox

: ). Thus, it is specifically critical in the sense of

asking how existing social or world orders have come into

being, how norms, institutions or practices therefore emerge,

and what forces may have the emancipatory potential to

change or transform the prevailing order. As such, a critical

theory develops a dialectical theory of history concerned

not just with the past but with a continual process of historical

change and with exploring the potential for alternative forms

of development (Cox : , -). Coxs critical theory

of hegemony thus focuses on interaction between particular

processes, notably springing from the dialectical possibilities

of change within the sphere of production and the

exploitative character of social relations, not as unchanging

ahistorical essences but as a continuing creation of new forms

(Cox : ). The first section of this article outlines the

conceptual framework developed by Robert Cox, linking it

back to Gramscis own work. This includes situating the

world economic crisis of the s within more recent debates

about globalisation and how this period of structural change

has been conceptualised. Then, attention will turn to what

has been recognised (see Morton ) as similar, but diverse,

neo-Gramscian perspectives in International Relations ()

that build on Coxs work and constitute a distinct critical

theory route to considering hegemony, world order and

historical change. Finally, various controversies surrounding

the neo-Gramscian perspectives will be traced, before



4/30


elaborating in conclusion the directions along which future

research might proceed.

A critical theory route to hegemony, world order and

historical change

Unlike conventional theory, which reduces hegemony to

a single dimension of dominance based on the economic

and military capabilities of states, a neo-Gramscian perspec-

tive developed by Cox broadens the domain of hegemony. It

appears as an expression of broadly based consent, manifested

in the acceptance of ideas and supported by material

resources and institutions, which is initially established by

social forces occupying a leading role within a state, but is

then projected outwards on a world scale. Within a world

order a situation of hegemony may prevail based on a

coherent conjunction or fit between a configuration of material

power, the prevalent collective image of world order

(including certain norms) and a set of institutions which

administer the order with a certain semblance of universality

(Cox : ). Hegemony is therefore a form of domi-

nance, but it refers more to a consensual order so that

dominance by a powerful state may be a necessary but not

a sufficient condition of hegemony (Cox : ). If

hegemony is understood as an opinion-moulding activity,

rather than brute force or dominance, then consideration

has to turn to how a hegemonic social or world order is

based on values and understandings that permeate the nature

of that order (Cox /: ). Hence it has to be

considered how intersubjective meaningsshared notions

about social relationsshape reality. Reality is not only

the physical environment of human action but also the

institutional, moral and ideological context that shapes

thoughts and actions (Cox : ). The crucial point to

make, then, is that hegemony filters through structures of

society, economy, culture, gender, ethnicity, class and ideology.

Hegemony within a historical structure is constituted on

three spheres of activity: the social relations of production,

encompassing the totality of social relations in material,

institutional and discursive forms that engender particular

social forces; forms of state, consisting of historically

contingent state-civil society complexes; and world orders,

which not only represent phases of stability and conflict but



5/30


also permit scope for thinking about how alternative forms

of world order might emerge (Cox : -). These are

represented schematically (Cox : ):

Figure 1: the dialectical relation of forces

If considered dialectically, in relation to each other, then it

becomes possible to represent the historical process through

the particular configuration of historical structures. Social

forces, as the main collective actors engendered by the social

relations of production, operate within and across all spheres

of activity. Through the rise of contending social forces,

linked to changes in production, there may occur mutually

reinforcing transformations in forms of state and world order.

There is no unilinear relationship between the spheres of

activity and the point of departure to explain the historical

process may equally be that of forms of state or world order

(Cox : n.). Within each of the three main spheres

it is argued that three further elements reciprocally combine

to constitute an historical structure: ideas, understood as

intersubjective meanings as well as collective images of world

order; material capabilities, referring to accumulated resour-

ces; and institutions, which are amalgams of the previous

two elements and are means of stabilising a particular order.

These again are represented schematically (Cox : ):

Figure 2: the dialectical moment of hegemony

The aim is to break down over time coherent historical

structuresconsisting of different patterns of social relations

of production, forms of state and world orderthat have

existed within the capitalist mode of production (Cox :

Social

World

orders

Forms of

state

relations of production

InstitutionsMaterial

ca abilities

Ideas

http://cnc.sagepub.com/http://cnc.sagepub.com/http://cnc.sagepub.com/


6/30


-). In the following, the main characteristics of the three

spheres of activity are outlined.

The social relations of production

According to Cox (: -), patterns of production

relations are the starting point for analysing the operation

and mechanisms of hegemony. Yet, from the start, this should

not be taken as a move that reduces everything to production

in an economistic sense.

Production...is to be understood in the broadest sense. It

is not confined to the production of physical goods used

or consumed. It covers the production and reproduction

of knowledge and of the social relations, morals and

institutions that are prerequisites to the production of

physical goods (Cox : ).

These patterns are referred to as modes of social relations

of production, which encapsulate configurations of social

forces engaged in the process of production. By discerning

different modes of social relations of production it is possible

to consider how changing production relations give rise to

particular social forces that become the bases of power within

and across states and within a specific world order (Cox

: ). The objective of outlining different modes of social

relations of production is to question what promotes the

emergence of particular modes and what might explain the

way in which modes combine or undergo transformation

(Cox : ). It is argued that the reciprocal relationship

between production and power is crucial. To examine this

relationship a framework is developed that focuses on how

power in social relations of productionmay give rise to certain

social forces, how these social forces may become the bases

of power in forms of state and how this might shape world

order. This framework revolves around the social ontology

of historical structures. It refers to persistent social practices,

made by collective human activity and transformed through

collective human activity (Cox : ). An attempt is

therefore made to capture the reciprocal relationship of

structures and actors (Cox a: ; Cox : -; Bieler

and Morton a).

Hegemony is thus understood as a form of class rule

linked to social forces, as the core collective actors, engen-

dered by the social relations of production (Overbeek ).



7/30


For Cox, class is viewed as an historical category and

employed in a heuristic way rather than as a static analytical

category (Cox : -, /: ). This means that

class identity emerges within and through historical processes

of economic exploitation. Bring back exploitation as the

hallmark of class, and at once class struggle is in the forefront,

as it should be (Ste. Croix : ). As such, class-

consciousness emerges out of particular historical contexts

of struggle rather than mechanically deriving from objective

determinations that have an automatic place in production

relations (see Thompson : -; ). Yet the focus on

exploitation and resistance to it ensures that social forces are

not simply reduced to material aspects, but also include other

forms of identity involved in struggle such as ethnic, nationalist,

religious, gender or sexual forms. In short, non-class

issuespeace, ecology, and feminismare not to be set aside

but given a firm and conscious basis in the social realities

shaped through the production process (Cox 1987: 353).

Forms of state

The conceptual framework, outlined so far, considers how

new modes of social relations of production become estab-

lished. Changes in the social relations of production give

rise to new configurations of social forces.State power rests

on these configurations. Therefore, rather than taking the

state as a given or pre-constituted institutional category,

consideration is given to the historical construction of various

forms of state and the social context of political struggle.

This is accomplished by drawing upon the concept of

historical bloc and by widening a theory of the state to include

relations within civil society.

An historical bloc refers to the way in which leading social

forces within a specific national context establish a relationship

over contending social forces. It is more than simply a political

alliance between social forces represented by classes or

fractions of classes. It indicates the integration of a variety of

different class interests that are propagated throughout society

bringing about not only a unison of economic and political

aims, but also intellectual and moral unity...on a universal

plane (Gramsci : -). The very nature of an historical

bloc, as Anne Showstack Sassoon (: ) has outlined,

necessarily implies the existence of hegemony. Indeed, the

universal plane that Gramsci had in mind was the creation

of hegemony by a fundamental social group over subordinate



8/30


groups. Hegemony would therefore be established if the

relationship between intellectuals and people-nation, between

the leaders and the led, the rulers and the ruled, is provided

by an organic cohesion ...Only then can there take place an

exchange of individual elements between the rulers and ruled,

leaders...and led, and can the shared life be realised which

alone is a social forcewith the creation of the historical

bloc (Gramsci : ).

These issues are encompassed within the focus on different

forms of state which, as Cox notes, are principally

distinguished by the characteristics of their historic[al] blocs,

i.e. the configurations of social forces upon which state power

ultimately rests. A particular configuration of social forces

defines in practice the limits or parameters of state purposes,

and the modus operandi of state action, defines, in other

words, the raison dtat for a particular state (Cox :

). In short, by considering different forms of state, it

becomes possible to analyse the social basis of the state or

to conceive of the historical content of different states. The

notion of historical bloc aids this endeavour by directing

attention to which social forces may have been crucial in

the formation of an historical bloc or particular state; what

contradictions may be contained within an historical bloc

upon which a form of state is founded; and what potential

might exist for the formation of a rival historical bloc that

may transform a particular form of state (Cox : n.).

In contrast, therefore, to conventional state-centric

approaches in , a wider theory of the state emerges within

this framework. Instead of underrating state power and

explaining it away, attention is given to social forces and

processes and how these relate to the development of states

(Cox : ) as well as states in alternative conditions of

development (Bilgin and Morton ). Considering diffe-

rent forms of state as the expression of particular historical

blocs and thus relations across state-civil society fulfils this

objective. Overall, this relationship is referred to as the state-

civil society complex that, clearly, owes an intellectual debt

to Gramsci.

For Gramsci, the state was not simply understood as an

institution limited to the government of the functionaries

or the top political leaders and personalities with direct

governmental responsibilities. The state presents itself in a

different way beyond the political society of public figures

and top leaders so that the state is the entire complex of



9/30


practical and theoretical activities with which the ruling class

not only justifies and maintains its dominance, but manages

to win the active consent of those over whom it rules

(Gramsci : , ). This alternative conception of

the state is inclusive of the realm of civil society. The state

should be understood, then, not just as the apparatus of

government operating within the public sphere (govern-

ment, political parties, military) but also as part of the private

sphere of civil society (church, media, education) through

which hegemony functions (Gramsci : ). It can there-

fore be argued that the state in this conception is understood

as a social relation. The state is not unquestioningly taken

as a distinct institutional category, or thing in itself, but

conceived as a form of social relations through which

capitalism and hegemony are expressed. It is this combination

of political and civil society that is referred to as the integral

state through which ruling classes organise intellectual and

moral functions as part of the political and cultural struggle

for hegemony in the effort to establish an ethical state

(Gramsci : , ).

Furthermore, different social relations of production

engender different fractions of social forces. This means that

foreign capital, for example, is not simply represented as

an autonomous force beyond the power of the state but instead

is represented by certain classes or fractions of classes within

the constitution of the state apparatus. There are contradictory

and heterogeneous relations internal to the state, which are

induced by class antagonisms between nationally- and

transnationally-based capital and labour. The state, then, is

the condensation of a hegemonic relationship between domi-

nant classes and class fractions. This occurs when a leading

class develops a hegemonic project or comprehensive

concept of control which transcends particular economic-

corporate interests and becomes capable of binding and

cohering the diverse aspirations and general interests of

various social classes and class fractions (van der Pijl, ,

; Overbeek, , ). It is a process that involves

the most purely political phase of class struggle and occurs

on a universal plane to result in the forging of an

historical bloc (Gramsci : ).

Hegemony and world orders

The construction of an historical bloc cannot exist without

a hegemonic social class and is therefore a national



10/30


phenomenon (Cox : , ). This is because the very

nature of an historical bloc is bound up with how various

classes and fractions of classes construct, or contest,

hegemony through national political frameworks. Or, put

another way, how such classes nationalise themselves

through historically specific and peculiar socio-economic

and political structures (Gramsci : ; Showstack

Sassoon : -). Yet the hegemony of a leading class

can manifest itself as an international phenomenon insofar

as it represents the development of a particular form of the

social relations of production. Once hegemony has been

consolidated domestically it may expand beyond a particular

social order to move outward on a world scale and insert

itself through the world order (Cox : , Cox :

-). By doing so it can connect social forces across

different countries. A world hegemony is thus in its

beginnings an outward expansion of the internal (national)

hegemony established by a...social class (Cox : ).

The outward expansion of particular modes of social relations

of production and the interests of a leading class on a world

scale can also become supported by mechanisms of

international organisation. This is what Gramsci (: )

referred to as the internal and international organisational

relations of the state: i.e. movements, voluntary associations

and organisations, such as the Rotary Club, or the Roman

Catholic Church that had an international character whilst

rooted within the state. Social forces may thus achieve

hegemony within a national social order as well as through

world order by ensuring the promotion and expansion of a

mode of production. Hegemony can therefore operate at

two levels: by constructing an historical bloc and establishing

social cohesion withina form of state as well as by expanding

a mode of production internationally and projecting

hegemony through the level of world order. For instance, in

Gramscis time, this was borne by the expansion of Fordist

assembly plant production beyond the which would lead

to the growing world hegemony and power of Americanism

and Fordism from the s and s (Gramsci : -

).

Pax Americana and globalisation

In more recent times, it has been one of Coxs key objectives

to explain additional processes of structural change,

particularly the change from the post-World War order to



11/30


globalisation. Cox argues that a -led hegemonic world

order, labelledpax Americana,prevailed until the early s.

It was maintained through the Bretton Woods system of fixed

exchange rates and institutions like the International Mone-

tary Fund () and the World Bank. Moreover, it was based

on the principle of embedded liberalism, which allowed

the combination of international free trade with the right

for governments to intervene in their national economy in

order to ensure domestic stability via social security and the

partial redistribution of economic wealth (Ruggie ).

The corresponding form of state was the Keynesian welfare

state, characterised by interventionism, a policy of full

employment via budget deficit spending, the mixed economy

and an expansive welfare system (Gill and Law : -

). The underlying social relations of production were

organised around the Fordist accumulation regime,

characterised by mass production and mass consumption,

and tripartite corporatism involving government-business-

labour coalitions (Cox : -).2The forms and

functions of -led hegemony, however, began to alter

following the world economic crisis of the s and the

collapse of the Bretton Woods system during a period of

structural change in the world economy in the s. This

overall crisis, both of the world economy and of social power

within various forms of state, has been explained as the result

of two particular tendencies: the internationalisation of

production and the internationalisation of the state that led

the thrust towards globalisation.

Since the erosion of pax Americana principles of world

order in the s, there has been an increasing international-

isation of production and finance driven, at the apex of an

emerging global class structure, by a transnational manager-

ial class (Cox : ). Taking advantage of differences

between countries, there has been an integration of production

processes on a transnational scale with Transnational

Corporations (s) promoting the operation of different

elements of a single process in different territorial locations.

It is this organisation of production and finance on a trans-

national level, which fundamentally distinguishes globali-

sation from the period ofpax Americana.Following the neo-

Gramscian focus on social forces, engendered by production

as the main actors, it is realised that the transnational

restructuring of capitalism in globalisation has led to the

emergence of new social forces of capital and labour. Besides



12/30


the transnational managerial class, other elements of

productive capital (involved in manufacturing and extrac-

tion), including small- and medium-sized businesses acting

as contractors and suppliers and import-export businesses,

as well elements of financial capital (involved in banking

insurance and finance) have been supportive of this internat-

ionalisation of production. Hence there has been a rise in

the structural power of transnational capital supported and

promoted by forms of elite interaction that have forged

common perspectives, or an emulative uniformity, between

business, state officials and representatives of international

organisations favouring the logic of capitalist market relations

(Cox : ; Gill and Law : ; Gill a: -

). Significant contradictions are likely to exist between

transnational social forces of capital and nationally-based

capital. The latter, engendered by national production

systems, may oppose an open global economy due to their

reliance on national or regional protectionism against global

competition. Parallel to the division between transnational

and national capital, Cox identifies two main lines of division

within the working class. Firstly, workers of s can be in

conflict with workers of national companies, shadowing the

split of capital. Secondly and related to this, there may be a

rift between established workers in secure employment, often

within the core workforce of s, and non-established

workers in temporary and part-time positions at the peri-

phery of the labour market (Cox : ). In other words,

globalisation in the form of the transnationalisation of

production has led to a fractionalisation of capital and labour

into transnational and national social forces alike.

During this period of structural change in the s, then,

the social basis across many forms of state altered as the

logic of capitalist market relations created a crisis of authority

in established institutions and modes of governance. Whilst

some have championed such changes as the retreat of the

state (Strange ), or the emergence of a borderless world

(Ohmae , ), and others have decried the global

proportions of such changes in production (Hirst and Thom-

pson ; Weiss ), it is argued here that the internation-

alisation of production has profoundly restructuredbut not

erodedthe role of the state. The notion of the internation-

alisation of the state captures this dynamic by referring to the

way transnational processes of consensus formation,

underpinned by the internationalisation of production and



13/30


the thrust of globalisation, have been transmitted through the

policy-making channels of governments.3 The network of

control that has maintained the structural power of capital

has also been supported by an axis of influence, consisting

of institutions such as the World Bank, which have ensured

the ideological osmosis and dissemination of policies in favour

of the perceived exigencies of the global political economy.

As a result, those state agencies in close contact with the global

economyoffices of presidents and prime ministers, treasuries,

central bankshave gained precedence over those agencies

closest to domestic public policyministries of labour and

industry or planning offices (Cox : ). Across the different

forms of state in countries of advanced and peripheral

capitalism, the general depiction is that the state became a

transmission belt for neo-liberalism and the logic of capitalist

competition from global to local spheres (Cox : ).4

From the internationalisation of the state to

globalisation: further developments

Although the thesis of the internationalisation of the state

has received much recent criticism, the work of Stephen

Gill has greatly contributed to understanding this process

as part of the changing character of -centred hegemony in

the global political economy, notably in his detailed analysis

of the role of the Trilateral Commission (Gill ). Similar

to Cox, the global restructuring of production is located

within a context of structural change in the s. It was in

this period that there was a transition from what Gill

recognises as an international historical blocof social forces,

established in the post-World War period, towards a trans-

national historical bloc, forging links and a synthesis of

interests and identities not only beyond national boundaries

and classes but also creating the conditions for the hegemony

of transnational capital. Yet Gill departs from Gramsci to

assert that an historical bloc may at times have the potential

to become hegemonic, thereby implying that a historical

bloc can be established without necessarily enjoying hege-

monic rule (Gill : ). For example, Gill argues that

the current transnational historical bloc has a position of

supremacy but not hegemony. Drawing in principle from

Gramsci, it is argued that supremacy prevails, when a situation

of hegemony is notapparent and when dominance is exercised



14/30


through an historical bloc over fragmented opposition (Gill

a: , , ).

This politics of supremacy is organised through two key

processes: the new constitutionalism of disciplinary neo-

liberalism and the concomitant spread of market civilisation.

According to Gill, new constitutionalism involves the

narrowing of the social basis of popular participation within

the world order of disciplinary neo-liberalism. It involves

the hollowing out of democracy and the affirmation, in matters

of political economy, of a set of macro-economic policies

such as market efficiency, discipline and confidence, policy

credibility and competitiveness. It is the move towards

construction of legal or constitutional devices to remove or

insulate substantially the new economic institutions from

popular scrutiny or democratic accountability (Gill ,

: ). Economic and Monetary Union () within

the European Union () is regarded as a good example of

this process (Gill ). New constitutionalism results in

an attempt to make neo-liberalism the sole model of develop-

ment by disseminating the notion of market civilisation

based on an ideology of capitalist progress and exclusionary

or hierarchical patterns of social relations (Gill a: ).

Within the global political economy, mechanisms of

surveillance have supported the market civilisation of new

constitutionalism in something tentatively likened to a global

panopticon of surveillance (Gill b).

The overarching concept of supremacy has also been used

to develop an understanding of the construction of foreign

policy towards the Third World and how challenges were

mounted against the in the s through the New Inter-

national Economic Order () (Augelli and Murphy ).

It is argued that the ideological promotion of American

liberalism, based on individualism and free trade, assured

American supremacy through the s and was reconstructed

in the s. Yet this projection of supremacy did not simply

unfold through domination. Rather than simply equating

supremacy with dominance, Augelli and Murphy argue that

supremacy can be maintained through domination or

hegemony (Augelli and Murphy : ). As Murphy

(: n.) outlines in a separate study of industrial

change and international organisations, supremacy defines

the position of a leading class within an historical bloc and

can be secured by hegemony as well as through domination.

Gramsci (: ) himself states, the supremacy of a social



15/30


16/30


international organisations including the role of gender and

womens movements (Lee ; Stienstra ; Whitworth

). There has also been a recent return to understanding

forms of foreign policy intervention within countries of

peripheral capitalism. This has included analysing the

promotion of polyarchy defined as, a system in which a small

group actually rules and mass participation in decision-

making is confined to leadership choice in elections carefully

managed by elites (Robinson : ). Polyarchy, or low

intensity democracy, is therefore analysed as an adjunct of

hegemony through institutions such as the Agency for

International Development () and the National

Endowment for Democracy () in the particular countries

of the Philippines, Chile, Nicaragua, and Haiti and tenta-

tively extended with reference to the former Soviet bloc and

South Africa. Other recent research has similarly focused

on the promotion of democracy in Southern Africa (Taylor

) as well as the construction and contestation of

hegemony in Mexico (Morton c). Furthermore, aspects

of neo-liberalism and cultural hegemony have been dealt

with in a study of mass communications scholarship in Chile

(Davies ). There are clearly a variety of neo-Gramscian

perspectives dealing with a diversity of issues linked to the

analysis of hegemony in the global political economy. The

next section outlines some of the criticisms levelled against

such perspectives and, in conclusion, indications are given

of what direction future research might proceed.

Welcome debate: controversies surrounding neo-

Gramscian perspectives

In broad outline, neo-Gramscian perspectives have been

criticised as too unfashionably Marxist or, alternatively, too

lacking in Marxist rigour. They are seen as unfashionable

because many retain an essentially historical materialist posi-

tion as central to analysisfocusing on the decisive nucleus

of economic activity (Gramsci, : ). Hence the

accusation that analysis remains caught within modernist

assumptions that take as foundational the structures of

historical processes determining the realms of the possible

(Ashley : ). However, rather than succumbing to

this problem, the fallibility of all knowledge claims is

accepted across neo-Gramscian perspectives. A minimal



17/30


foundationalism is therefore evident based on a cautious,

contingent and transitory universalism that combines

dialogue between universal values and local definitions within

historically specific circumstances (Cox b: ; Cox :

).

Elsewhere, other commentators have alternatively decried

the lack of historical materialist rigour within neo-Gramscian

perspectives. According to Peter Burnham () the neo-

Gramscian treatment of hegemony amounts to a pluralist

empiricism that fails to recognise the central importance of

the capital relation and is therefore preoccupied with the

articulation of ideology. By granting equal weight to ideas

and material capabilities it is argued that the contradictions

of the capital relation are blurred which results in a slide

towards an idealist account of the determination of economic

policy (Burnham : ). Hence, the categories of state

and market are regarded as opposed forms of social

organisation that operate separately in external relationship

to one another. This leads to a supposed reification of the

state as a thing in itself standing outside the relationship

between capital and labour (Burnham ).

In specific response to these criticisms, it was outlined

earlier in this article how the social relations of production

are taken as the starting point for thinking about world order

and the way they engender configurations of social forces.

By thus asking what modes of social relations of production

within capitalism have been prevalent in particular historical

circumstances, the state is not treated as an unquestioned

category. Indeed, rather closer to Burnhams own position

than he might admit, the state is treated as an aspect of the

social relations of production so that questions about the

apparentseparation of politics and economics or states and

markets within capitalism are promoted. Although a fully

developed theory of the state is not evident, there clearly

exists a set of at least implicit assumptions about the state as

a form of social relations through which capitalism and hege-

mony are expressed. Moreover, ideas in the form of inter-

subjective meanings are accepted as part of the global

political economy itself. Yet, in contrast to Burnhams claim,

they are not regarded as an additional independent variable

next to material properties. Rather, the material structure

of ideology is the principal emphasis, which demonstrates

an awareness of the ideological mediations of the state

through libraries, schools, architecture, street names and lay-



18/30


out (Gramsci : -).5 Only those ideas, which are

disseminated through or rooted in such structures, linked to

a particular constellation of social forces engaged in an

ideological struggle for hegemony are considered to be

organic ideas (Bieler ). In Gramscis own words, only

those ideas can be regarded as organic that organise human

masses, and create the terrain on which men move, acquire

consciousness of their position, struggle, etc.. These are

contrasted with ideas that are merely arbitrary, rationalistic,

or willed, based on extemporary polemics (Gramsci :

-). This indicates an appreciation of the links intellec-

tuals may have, or the wider social function they perform, in

relation to the world of production within capitalist society

to offer the basis for a materialist and social class analysis of

intellectuals.6 It is therefore an appreciation of how ideas

and intellectual activity can assume the fanatical granite

compactness of . . . popular beliefs which assume the same

energy as material forces (Gramsci : ).

A different series of criticisms have separately centred on

the thesis of globalisation and the internationalisation of

the state proposed by neo-Gramscian perspectives. In

particular, Leo Panitch has argued that an account unfolds

which is too top down in its expression of power relations

and assumes that globalisation is a process that proceeds

from the global to the national or the outside-in. The point

that globalisation is authored by states is thus overlooked

by developing the metaphor of a transmission belt from the

global to the national within the thesis of the international-

isation of the state (Panitch , ). It has been added

that this is a one-way view of internationalisation that respec-

tively: overlooks reciprocal interaction between the global

and the local; overlooks mutually reinforcing social relations

within the global political economy; or ignores class conflict

within national social formations (Ling ; Baker ;

Moran ). The role of the state, following Panitchs (:

) argument, is still determined by struggles among social

forces located within particular social formations, even

though social forces may be implicated in transnational

structures.

In response, it will be recalled from the above discussion

that the point of departure within a neo-Gramscian approach

could equally be changing social relations of production

within forms of state orworld order (Cox : n.).

Indeed, Coxs focus has been on historical blocs underpinning



19/30


particular states and how these are connected through the

mutual interests of social classes in different countries.

Further, following both Gramsci and Cox, the national context

is the only place where an historical bloc can be founded and

where the task of building new historical blocs, as the basis

for counter-hegemony to change world order, must begin.

Gill too, although he tends to take a slightly different tack

on the application of notions such as historical bloc and

supremacy, is still interested in analysing attempts to

constitutionalise neo-liberalism at the domestic, regional and

global levels (Gill a: ). Therefore, there is a focus

on transnational networks of production and how national

governments have lost much autonomy in policy-making,

but also how states are still an integral part of this process.

Extending these insights (Bieler and Morton ), it

might also be important to recognise that capital is not simply

something that is footloose, beyond the power of the state,

but is represented by classes and fractions of classes within

the very constitution of the state. The phenomenon now recog-

nised as globalisation, represented by the transnationalisation

of production, therefore induces the reproduction of capital

within different states through a process of internalisation

between various fractions of classes within states (Poulantzas

: -). Seen in this way, globalisation and the related

emergence of transnational social forces of capital and labour

has not led to a retreat of the state. Instead, there has unfolded

a restructuring of different forms of state through an

internalisation within the state itself of new configurations

of social forces expressed by class struggle between different

(national and transnational) fractions of capital and labour.

This stress on both internalisation and internationalisation

is somewhat different from assuming that various forms of

state have become simple transmission belts from the global

to the national.

Finally, Cox (: -, : ) has made clear that

the internationalisation of the state and the role of trans-

national elites (or a nbuleuse) in forging consensus within

this process remains to be fully deciphered and needs much

more study. Indeed, the overall argument concerning the

internationalisation of the state was based on a series of linked

hypotheses suggestive for empirical investigation (Cox /

: ). The overall position adopted on the relationship

between the global and the national, or between hegemony,

supremacy and historical bloc, may differ from one neo-



20/30


Gramscian perspective to the next, but it is usually driven

by the purpose and empirical context of the research.

Further criticisms have also focused on how the hegemony

of transnational capital has been over-estimated and how

the possibility for transformation within world order is

thereby diminished by neo-Gramscian perspectives

(Drainville ). For example, the focus on elite agency in

European integration processes by Gill and van Apeldoorn

would indirectly reinforce a negative assessment of labours

potential role in resisting neo-liberalism (Strange ).

Analysis, notes Andr Drainville (: ), must give way

to more active sorties against transnational neo-liberalism,

and the analysis of concepts of control must beget original

concepts of resistance. It is therefore important, as Paul

Cammack () has added, to avoid overstating the

coherence of neo-liberalism and to identify materially

grounded opportunities for counter-hegemonic action. All

too often, a host of questions related to counter-hegemonic

forms of resistance are usually left for future research,

although the demonstrations during the Carnival Against

Capitalism (London, June ), mobilisations against the

World Trade Organisation (Seattle, November ), protests

against the and World Bank (Washington, April

and Prague, September ), and riots during the

European Union summit at Nice (December ), as well

as the G-8 meeting at Genoa (July ), all seemingly

further expose the imperative of analysing globalisation as

a set of highly contested social relations. Overall, while the

point about a lack of empirical investigation into concrete

acts of resistance is correct in many instances, it should not

be exaggerated either. It has to be noted that an analysis of

the current power configuration of social forces does not by

itself strengthen this configuration nor does it exclude an

investigation of possible resistance. Rather, the analysis of

hegemonic practices can be understood as the absolutely

essential first step towards an investigation into potential

alternative developments; and resistance can only be success-

fully mounted if one understands what precisely needs to be

resisted. Moreover, several neo-Gramscian attempts dealing

with issues of resistance have now been formulated and

provide fertile avenues for further exploration (see Cox ;

Gill, ; Morton ). The primary task of critical

scholarship is to therefore clarify resistance to globalisation

(Cox : ).



21/30


The final and most recent criticisms arise from the call for

a much needed engagement by neo-Gramscian perspectives

with the writings of Gramsci and thus the complex

methodological, ontological, epistemological and contextual

issues that embroiled the Italian thinker (Germain and Kenny

). This emphasis was presaged in an earlier argument

warning that the incorporation of Gramscian insights into

and ran the risk of denuding the borrowed concepts of

the theoretical significance in which they cohere (Smith :

). To commit the latter error could reduce scholars to the

accusation of searching for gems in the Prison Notebooksin

order to save from a pervasive economism (Gareau :

). To be sure, such criticisms and warnings have rightly

drawn attention to the importance of remaining engaged with

Gramscis own writings. Germain and Kenny also rightly call

for greater sensitivity to the problems of meaning and

understanding in the history of ideas when appropriating

Gramsci for contemporary application. In such ways, then,

the demand to remain (re)engaged with Gramscis thought

and practice was a necessary one to make and well overdue.

Yet the demand to return Gramsci to his historical context

need not prevent the possibility of appreciating ideas both in

and beyondtheir context. Rather than the seemingly austere

historicism of Germain and Kennys demands, which limit

the relevance of past ideas in the present, it is possible to

acknowledge the role played by both past forms of thought

and previous historical conditions in shaping subsequent ideas

and existing social relations (Morton a). This method

pushes one to consider what might be historically relevant as

well as limited in a theoretical and practical translation of

past ideas in relation to alternative conditions.

Conclusion

To summarise, it has been shown how an alternative critical

theory route to hegemony improves on mainstream routes.

Notably a case was made for a critical theory of hegemony

that directs attention to relations between social interests in

the struggle for consensual leadership rather than concen-

trating solely on state dominance. With a particular historical

materialist focus and critique of capitalism it was therefore

shown how various neo-Gramscian perspectives provide an

alternative critical theory route to hegemony.



22/30


As a result it was argued that the conceptual framework

developed by such neo-Gramscian perspectives rethinks preva-

lent ontological assumptions in due to a theory of hegemony

that focuses on social forces engendered by changes in the

social relations of production, forms of state and world order.

It was highlighted how this route to hegemony opens up

questions about the social processes that create and transform

different forms of state. Attention is thus drawn towards the

raison dtat, or the basis of state power, that includes the

social basis of hegemony or the configuration of social forces

upon which power rests across the terrain of state-civil society

relations. With an appreciation of how ideas, institutions and

material capabilities interact in the construction and

contestation of hegemony it was also possible to pay attention

to issues of intersubjectivity. Therefore a critical theory of

hegemony was developed that was not equated with dominance

and thus went beyond a theory of the state-as-force. Finally,

by recognising the different social purpose behind a critical

theory, committed to historical change, this route to hegemony

poses an epistemological challenge to knowledge claims

associated with positivist social science.

In a separate section, further developments by diverse,

yet related, neo-Gramscian perspectives were outlined.

Subsequently, a series of criticisms of the neo-Gramscian

perspectives were discussed. Analysis can be pushed into

further theoretical and empirical areas by addressing some

of these criticisms. For example, in terms of further research

directions, benefit could be gained by directly considering

the role of organised labour in contesting the latest agenda

of neoliberal globalisation (Bieler a and b, Strange

).7It is also important to problematise the tactics and

strategies of resistances to neo-liberalism by giving further

thought to new social movements, such as forms of peasant

mobilisation in Latin America like the Movimento (dos

Trabalhadores Rurais) Sem Terra(: Movement of Landless

Rural Workers) in Brazil and the Ejrcito Zapatista de Liberacin

Nacional (: Zapatista Army of National Liberation) in

Chiapas, Mexico (Morton ). At a more explicitly theore-

tical level, additional work could also be conducted in

revealing Gramscis theory of the state and then situating this

within a wider discussion of state theory (Bieler and Morton

). Overall, though, what matters is the way in which

Gramscis legacy gets interpreted, transmitted and used so

that it [can] remain an effective tool not only for the critical



23/30


analysis of hegemony but also for the development of an

alternative politics and culture (Buttigieg : ).

Notes

* We would like to thank Robert Cox and Kees van der Pijl for their

comments on this article in draft as well as two anonymous referees

of this journal, and Gerard Strange, for their supportive criticisms.

Adam David Morton also acknowledges the financial support of an

Economic and Social Research Council () Postdoctoral

Fellowship (Ref.: ).

1. Although overlaps may exist, the critical impetus bears a less than

direct affiliation with the constellation of social thought known as

the Frankfurt School represented by, among others, the work of Max

Horkheimer, Theodor Adorno or, more recently, Jrgen Habermas

(Cox a: ). Hence, Cox may not explicitly understand himself

to be working within the fold of the Frankfurt School (Schecter

: ). For a useful discussion of the contradictory strands and

influences between Frankfurt School critical theory and critical

theory see Wyn Jones ().

2. It is worth noting that, whilst the Keynesian welfare state form is

referred to by Cox as the neoliberal state, this precedent is not

followed. This is because confusion can result when using his term

and distinguishing it from the more conventional understanding of

neo-liberalism related to processes in the late s and s,

which he calls hyperliberalism.

3. At first sight, this understanding of a restructured, but not eroded

role of the state, resembles Cernys conceptualisation of the

competition state in globalisation (Cerny a, b). Rather

than withering away, Cerny argues that states play a crucial role as

stabilisers and enforcers of the rules and practices of global society

(Cerny b: ). In contrast to neo-Gramscian perspectives,

however, the state is not understood as resting on and being

constituted by a particular configuration of social forces. Rather,

the state is understood as an independent actor intervening in the

market in different ways. As a result, competition state analysis

falls into the trap of separating economics from politics and the

market from the state, resulting in an ahistoric analysis of different

social forms specific to capitalism (see Burnham ). In contrast

to competition state analysis, regulation theory places an emphasis

on how a particular mode of regulation, constituted by the institu-

tional ensemble of the state, is related to a specific accumulation

regime, i.e. the way production is organised (for an overview of



24/30


regulation theory approaches, see Jessop ). The problem here,

however, is that theories of regulation are founded on a division of

the world into a system of states and of multiple sovereignties and

an identification of national modes of regulation (Dunford :

). As a result, the transnational dimension of globalisation and

the related emergence of new social forces cannot be conceptualised.

4. It is noteworthy that the metaphor of a transmission belt has been

withdrawn from more recent work (Cox : ).

5. James Scott () has extended this awareness in an interesting

way by encompassing a variety of state naming practices, or state

simplifications, that enhance the legibility of society.

6. One way in which such enquiry has proceeded is through a detailed

focus on the social function of the intellectual within conditions of

socio-economic modernisation to highlight the mixture of critical

opposition and accommodation that has confronted intellectuals in

Latin America, with a specific focus on the Mexican novelist Carlos

Fuentes (see Morton b).

7. Many of Gramscis own insights on the conflict between capital and

labour, arising from political action within new workers organisations

known as Factory Councils in Turin during the biennio rosso(-

), might have relevance here and can be found in Gramsci (,

, ).

References

van Apeldoorn, Bastiaan () Transnational Capitalism and the

Struggle over European Integration. London: Routledge.

Ashley, Richard K. () The Poverty of Neorealism, International

Organisation, (): -.

_______ () Living on Border Lines: Man, Poststructuralism

and War, in James Der Derian and Michael Shapiro (eds)

International/Intertextual Relations: Postmodern Readings of World

Politics.Toronto: Lexington Books.

Augelli, Enrico and Craig Murphy ()Americas Quest for Supremacy

and the Third World: A Gramscian Analysis. London: Pinter.

Baker, Andrew () Nbuleuseand the Internationalisation of the

State in the ?, Review of International Political Economy, ():

-.

Bieler, Andreas () Globalisation and Enlargement of the EU: Austrian

and Swedish Social Forces in the Struggle over Membership.London:

Routledge.



25/30


_______ () Questioning Cognitivism and Constructivism in

Theory: Reflections on the Material Structure of Ideas, Politics,

(): -.

_______ (a) Labour, Neoliberalism and the Conflict Over

Economic and Monetary Union: A Comparative Analysis of British

and German Trade Unions, German Politics, (): -.

_______ (b) Swedish Trade Unions and Economic and

Monetary Union: The European Union Membership Debate

Revisited? Cooperation and Conflict, (): -

Bieler, Andreas and Adam David Morton (a) The Gordian Knot

of Agency-Structure in International Relations: A Neo-Gramscian

Perspective, European Journal of International Relations,(): -.

_______ (eds) (b) Social Forces in the Making of the New Europe:

The Restructuring of European Social Relations in the Global Political

Economy. London: Palgrave.

_______ () Globalisation, the State and Class Struggle: A

Critical Economy Engagement with Open Marxism, British

Journal of Politics and International Relations, (): -.

Bieling, Hans-Jrgen and Jochen Steinhilber (eds) Die Konfiguration

Europas: Dimension einer kritischen Integrationstheorie. Mnster:

Westflisches Dampfboot.

Bilgin, Pinar and Adam David Morton () Historicising Represen-

tations of Failed States: Beyond the Cold War Annexation of the

Social Sciences?, Third World Quarterly, (): -.

Burnham, Peter () Neo-Gramscian Hegemony and the

International Order, Capital & Class,: -.

_______ () Open Marxism and Vulgar International Political

Economy, Review of International Political Economy, (): -.

Buttigieg, Joseph A. () The Legacy of Antonio Gramsci,Boundary

,():-.

Cammack, Paul () Interpreting : Interregionalism and the

New Materialism,Journal of the Asia Pacific Economy, (): -.

Cerny, Philip G. (a) Restructuring the Political Arena:

Globalisation and the Paradoxes of the Competition State, in

Randall D. Germain (ed.) Globalisation and its Critics: Perspectives

from Political Economy.Basingstoke: Palgrave.

_______ (b) Political Globalisation and the Competition

State, in Richard Stubbs and Geoffrey R.D. Underhill (eds.) Political

Economy and the Changing Global Order(second edition). Oxford:

Oxford University Press.

Cox, Robert W. () Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond

International Relations Theory,Millennium: Journal of International

Studies, (): -.



26/30


_______ () Gramsci, Hegemony and International Relations:

An Essay in Method,Millennium: Journal of International Studies,

(): -.

_______ (/) Realism, Positivism, Historicism, in Robert

W. Cox and Timothy J. Sinclair, Approaches to World Order.

Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

_______ () Production, Power and World Order: Social Forces in

the Making of History. New York: Columbia University Press.

_______ () Production, the State and Change in World Order,

in Ernst-Otto Czempiel and James N. Rosenau (eds) Global Changes

and Theoretical Challenges: Approaches to World Politics for the s.

Toronto: Lexington Books.

_______ () Globalperestroika, in Ralph Miliband and Leo Panitch

(eds) The Socialist Register: NewWorld Order?London: Merlin Press.

_______ (/) Towards a Posthegemonic Conceptualisation

of World Order: Reflections on the Relevancy of Ibn Khaldun, in

Robert W. Cox and Timothy J. Sinclair,Approaches to World Order.


_______ (/) Production and Security, in Robert W. Cox

and Timothy J. Sinclair, Approaches to World Order. Cambridge:

Cambridge University Press.

_______ () The Forum: Hegemony and Social Change,

Mershon International Studies Review, (): -.

_______ (a) Critical Political Economy, in Bjrn Hettne (ed.)

International Political Economy: Understanding Global Disorder.

London: Zed Books.

_______ (b) Civilisations: Encounters and Transformations,

Studies in Political Economy, : -.

_______ () Reconsiderations, in Robert W. Cox (ed.) The New

Realism: Perspectives on Multilateralism and World Order. London:

Macmillan.

_______ () Civil Society at the Turn of the Millennium:

Prospects for an Alternative World Order, Review of International

Studies,(): -.

_______ () The Way Ahead: Towards a New Ontology of World

Order, in Richard Wyn Jones (ed.) Critical Theory and World Politics.

Boulder: Lynne Rienner.

_______ () Reflections and Transitions in Robert W. Cox with

Michael G. Schecter, The Political Economy of a PluralWorld: Critical

Reflections on Power, Morals and Civilisation. London: Routledge.

Davies, Matt () International Political Economy and Mass

Communication in Chile: National Intellectuals and Transnational

Hegemony. London: Macmillan.



27/30


Drainville, Andr () International Political economy in the Age of

Open Marxism, Review of International Political Economy, (): -

.

_______ () Of Social Spaces, Citizenship and the Nature of

Power in the World Economy,Alternatives, (): -.

Dunford, Michael () Theories of Regulation, Environment and

Planning D: Society and Space, : -.

Gareau, Frederick H. () A Gramscian Analysis of the Social

Sciences, International Social Science Journal, (): -.

Germain, Randall D. and Michael Kenny () Engaging Gramsci:

International Relations Theory and the New Gramscians, Review

of International Studies, (): -.

Gill, Stephen ()American Hegemony and the Trilateral Commission.


_______ () Reflections on Global Order and Sociohistorical

Time,Alternatives,():-.

_______ () The Emerging World Order and European Change:

The Political Economy of European Union, in Ralph Miliband and

Leo Panitch (eds) The Socialist Register: New World Order?London:

Merlin Press.

_______ () Epistemology, Ontology and the Italian School,

in Stephen Gill (ed.) Gramsci, Historical Materialism and

International Relations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

_______ (a) Globalisation, Market Civilisation and Disciplinary

Neoliberalism,Millennium: Journal of International Studies, ():

-.

_______ (b) The Global Panopticon? The Neoliberal State, Economic

Life and Democratic Surveillance,Alternatives,():-.

_______ () Toward a Postmodern Prince? The Battle in Seattle

as a Moment in the New Politics of Globalisation,Millennium:

Journal of International Studies, ():-.

______ () Constitutionalising Capital: and Disciplinary

Neoliberalism, in Andreas Bieler and Adam David Morton (eds)

Social Forces in the Making of the New Europe: The Restructuring of

European Social Relations in the Global Political Economy. London:

Palgrave.

Gill, Stephen and David Law () The Global Political Economy:

Perspectives, Problems and Policies. London: Harvester and

Wheatsheaf.

_______ () Global Hegemony and the Structural Power of

Capital, International Studies Quarterly, ():-.

Gramsci, Antonio () Selections from the Prison Notebooks, ed. and

trans. Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell-Smith. London: Lawrence

and Wishart.



28/30


_______ () Selections from Political Writings, -, ed.

Quintin Hoare, trans. John Matthews. London: Lawrence and Wishart.

_______ () Selections from Political Writings, -, ed. and

trans. Quintin Hoare. London: Lawrence and Wishart.

_______ () Pre-Prison Writings, ed. Richard Bellamy, trans.

Virginia Cox. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

_______ ()Further Selections from the Prison Notebooks,ed. and

trans. Derek Boothman. London: Lawrence and Wishart.

Hirst, Paul and Graham Thompson () Globalisation in Question:

The International Economy and the Possibilities of Governance.

Cambridge: Polity Press nd edition.

Holman, Otto () Integrating Southern Europe: ECExpansion and

the Transnationalisation of Spain. London: Routledge.

Holman, Otto, Henk Overbeek and Magnus Ryner (ed.) ()

Neoliberal Hegemony and European Restructuring, International

Journal of Political Economy, (-): Special Issues.

Jessop, Bob (ed) () Regulation Theory and the Crisis of Capitalism,

vols. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.

Keohane, Robert O. ()After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in

the World Political Economy. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

_______ () International Institutions and State Power.Boulder:

Westview Press.

Lee, Kelly () A neo-Gramscian Approach to International Organi-

sation: An Expanded Analysis of Current Reforms to Development

Activities, in John Macmillan and Andrew Linklater (eds) Boundaries

in Question: New Directions in International Relations. London: Pinter.

Ling, L.H.M () Hegemony and the Internationalising State: A

Post-colonial Analysis of Chinas Integration into Asian

Corporatism, Review of International Political Economy, (): -.

Moran, Jonathan () The Dynamics of Class Politics and National

Economies in Globalisation: The Marginalisation of the Unaccep-

table, Capital & Class, : -.

Morton, Adam David () The Sociology of Theorising and Neo-

Gramscian Perspectives: The Problems of School Formation in

, in Andreas Bieler and Adam David Morton (eds) Social Forces

in the Making of the New Europe: The Restructuring of European

Social Relations in the Global Political Economy. London: Palgrave.

_______ () La Resurreccin del Maz: Globalisation,

Resistance and the Zapatistas,Millennium: Journal of International

Studies,(): -.

_______ (a) Historicising Gramsci: situating ideas in and

beyond their context, Review of International Political Economy,

(): -.



29/30


_______ (b) The Social Function of Carlos Fuentes: A Critical

Intellectual or in the Shadow of the State?, Bulletin of Latin

American Research,(), -.

_______ (c) Structural Change and Neoliberalism in Mexico:

Passive Revolution in the Global Political Economy, ThirdWorld

Quarterly, ():-.

Murphy, Craig N. () International Organisation and Industrial

Change. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Ohmae, Kenichi () The Borderless World. New York: Fontana.

_______ () The End of the Nation State: The Rise of Regional

Economies. New York: Free Press.

Overbeek, Henk () Global Capitalism and National Decline: The

Thatcher Decade in Historical Perspective. London: Routledge.

_______ (ed.) () Restructuring Hegemony in the Global Political

Economy: The Rise of Transnational Neoliberalism in thes. London:

Routledge.

_______ () The Forum: Hegemony and Social Change,

Mershon International Studies Review, (): -.

Panitch, Leo () Globalisation and the State, in Leo Panitch and

Ralph Miliband (eds) The Socialist Register: Between Globalism and

Nationalism. London: Merlin Press.

_______ () The New Imperial State,New Left Review (II),

(March-April): -.

van der Pijl, Kees () The Making of an Atlantic Ruling Class.

London: Verso.

______. () Transnational Classes and International Relations.

London: Routledge.

Poulantzas, Nicos () Classes in Contemporary Capitalism, trans.

David Fernbach. London: New Left Books.

Robinson, William I. () Promoting Polyarchy: Globalisation, US

Intervention and Hegemony. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Ruggie, John G. () International Regimes, Transactions and

change: Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Order,

International Organisation, (): -.

Rupert, Mark (a) Producing Hegemony: The Politics of Mass

Production and American Global Power. Cambridge: Cambridge

University Press.

______. (b) (Re)Politicising the Global Economy: Liberal

Common Sense and Ideological Struggle in the US NAFTA

Debate, Review of International Political Economy,(): -.

______. () Ideologies of Globalisation: Contending Visions of a New

World Order. London: Routledge.



30/30


Ryner, Magnus () Capitalist Restructuring, Globalisation and the

Third Way: Lessons from the Swedish Model. London: Routledge.

Schecter, Michael G. () Critiques of Coxian Theory: Background

to a Conversation, in Robert W. Cox with Michael G. Schecter,

The Political Economy of a Plural World: Critical Reflections on Power,

Morals and Civilisation. London: Routledge.

Scott, James C. () Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to

Improve the Human Condition Have Failed. New Haven: Yale

University Press.

Shields, Stuart () The Charge of the Right Brigade:

Transnational Social Forces and the Neoliberal Configuration of

Polands Transition,New Political Economy,(): -.

Showstack Sassoon, Anne () Gramscis Politics. nd edition.

Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Smith, Hazel () Marxism and International Relations Theory, in

A. J. R. Groom and Margot Light (eds) Contemporary International

Relations: A Guide to Theory. London: Pinter.

Ste. Croix, G.E.M. de () The Class Struggle in the Ancient Greek

World from the Archaic Age to the Arab Conquests. London: Duckworth.

Stienstra, Deborah () Womens Movements and International

Organisations. London: Macmillan.

Strange, Gerard () Globalisation, Regionalism and Labour

Interests in the New ,New Political Economy, ():-.

Strange, Susan () The Retreat of the State: The Diffusion of Power in

the World Economy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Taylor, Ian () Stuck in Middle GEAR: South Africas Post-Apartheid

Foreign Relations. Westport, .: Praeger Publishers.

Thompson, E.P. () The Making of the English Working Class.

Harmondsworth: Penguin.

Waltz, Kenneth N. () Theory of International Politics. Reading,

Mass.: Addison-Wesley.

Weiss, Linda () The Myth of the Powerless State: Governing the

Economy in a Global Era. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Whitworth, Sandrah () Feminism and International Relations:

Towards a Political Economy of Gender in Interstate and Non-

Governmental Institutions.London: Macmillan.

Wyn Jones, Richard () Critical Theory and World Politics. Boulder:

Lynne Rienner.

Documents

Bieler and Morton A Critical Theory Route.pdf