Bicknell Parmenides Refutation of Motion and an Implication

8/9/2019 Bicknell Parmenides Refutation of Motion and an Implication

1/6

Parmenides' Refutation of Motion and an Implication

Author(s): P. J. BicknellSource: Phronesis, Vol. 12, No. 1 (1967), pp. 1-5Published by: BRILLStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4181789.

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2/6

Parmenides'efutation

of Motionand an Implication

P. J. BICK

NELL

A

It

is

commonly

maintained that Melissus

was

the

major

forerunner

of

atomism.

This

has been

argued

on a

number

of

grounds,

one

of

these

being

that

Leucippus

reacted to

a

Melissean

rather than

a

Parmenidean refutation of locomotion. In the following short paper I

shall challenge

this view and

point

out that

not

only

is one other

argument

for Melissus'

influence

on

atomism

insecure,

but that Theo-

phrastus,

our

most

important

witness, unequivocally

states that

Leucippus

opposed

a

pre-Melissean

eleaticism.

Discussion

is

preceded by quotation

of

the two relevant

texts.

B.

Parmenides DK.28.B.8.

26. oair(p

CxLvJy7ov

yckxwv ?V

TitlpocaL

e?cv

e(TaLV

aVMpXOV

&rwaMGTov,

e7re

tyeVet

XcOct

6)?SOpoC

TiX

4McX' eTrXxXO7)aV,

oCTaCC

8a

7tratLq

a-0'1

TGUwov

r

v

TOUTC&

E

,U'vov

xOQ'

LxuT6

T

-

XL

30.

XoU'trW;

urcsaov

tOML

l?,vs

xparepn yap

'Avcayxn

7CELporro;

eV

8aeaLoaLtv

9

Ce,

O

[LLV

Oap4

L

?c pyCeL,

o(vxEv

OUx

&X?7X

0-qOv

?r6 0V Oe?C

eZLvOL

33.

Ca'n

yxp oux

ent8eu?4

[

n

EOV

8

&v

7MvTO;

8ez

ro

a.

scanned 'CL8aelt.

ent8s?'

of

some manuscripts

is also possible.

b.

p.'

appears

in

all

manuscripts at

both

Simplicius

Phys. 30.10 and

40.6.

It has

generally

been

expelled.

Melissus DK.30.B.7.7.

O'8a

XeVe'V

'aTt

OU8V- -0

yap xevC?V Ou8?V

CrL oUX

&V

ObV t

-

T6

yE

[I'J8eV.

OV8? LVELtzL

U0ox pCa

yap OUx)K

ou/ao , cxv

atv.

Et p&Vy&p XeVeOV V, u'7reX)PCL&V 4g T0 XeVOV' XeVO5

8?

v

EOVTO4 ox

9XCL

6Xnf

U'pY

a5eL.

1

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3/6

C.

In a fairly recent article G. S. Kirk and Michael C. Stokes jointly

maintained'

that

Parmenides rejected

local motion

on

ontological

grounds alone.

The

main

support

for

this

view was

derived from

fragment

8 lines 26-30.

The

co-authors

took it that lines

29 and

30

guaranteed

that

CXLvTqov

n

line

26 covered locomotion as well as

'starting and

stopping'.

In

their

view,

the

invalidity

of

both

species

of motion

is

deduced

from

Parmenides' previously

argued2

interdiction

of coming-to-be

and passing-away.

Motion is

a

kind

of

change, and

all

change involves

these illegitimate

concepts.

For Kirk (although not for Stokes)3 an important consequence of

this

is

that

Parmenides did not employ

the

physical

argument

against

motion

based upon the

impossibility

of void; this argument

was

added

by

Melissus (fragment

7.7). In

Kirk's view this

affords further

support

for

the

fairly common

view4

that

Melissus

was

the

true

precursor

of

the

atomic

theory of Leucippus.

Leucippus,

he argues,

reacted

to an

argument

against

motion put

forward

not

by

Parmenides but

by

Melissus.

I

believe

that the interpretation

placed upon

the

Parmenidean lines,

and therefore the deduction about Melissus and atomism which is

based

on it are false.

Lines 26-33 do

not, surely,

contain

an

omnibus

ontological disproof

of

two

varieties

of

motion,

followed

by

an

argument

concerned only

with the limitedness

of so owv,

s

Kirk

would

presumably

maintain, but

two arguments

each concerned

with

a different type

of

motion.

Lines 26-28

reject alteration,

or passing

from one

quality

to

another, which

certainly does

fall within genesis

and

phthora,

while

lines

29-33 constitute

an entirely separate

disproof

of locomotion.

This

is confirmed

by fragment 8 lines

36-41, which

sum up

the results

of

I

G. S.

Kirk and Michael C. Stokes,

'Parmenides' Refutation of Motion',

Phronesis

5

(1960)

pp.

1-4.

2

DK.28.B.8.

5ff.

3

Kirk and

Stokes, op.

cit., p. 4 note 4.

4

For Melissean

influence on atomism

see most recently D.

McKibbon,

'Melissus

and the Atomists', Mnemosyne

17 (1964)

pp. 248-255. For

an explicitly contrary

view, see H. Diller,

'Die Philosophiegeschichtliche

Stellung

des

Diogenes

von

Apollonia',

Hermes 76 (1941) pp.

359-381. The importance

of

early

Eleaticism

for atomism

is implicit in K. von Fritz,

Philosophie und Sprachlicher

Ausdruck

bei Demokrit,

Platon und Aristoteles,

New York, Stechert,

1938.

C.

Mugler's

('L'isonomie

des atomistes'

R. Ph. 30 (1956)

pp. 231-50) emphasis

on the

atomistic invocation (Simplicius

Phys.

28.10 and 25) of

Parmenides' 'Principe

d'indifference'

(DK.28.B.8.9-10; 22ff.;

44ff.) has similar implications.

2



4/6

the

way

of Truth

so far. According to line 41 it has been

proved both

that change of bright colour is impossible (the most conspicuous

example

of

qualitative change) and that

change of position

cannot

occur. If lines 26-28 were

an

ontological disproof

of locomotion as

well

as

alteration,

so that lines 29-33 constituted

an

argument

in its

own

right for the peiras of what

is,

rather than a

sub-proof,

then

the

summary must

surely

have

included

a

reference to

the

proof

of

peiras,

as to all

the

other

proofs.

The fact is

that until line

33

Parmenides

is

concerned

purely

with

denying

certain attributes

to

what-is,

that

is

with

a

negative part

of the

way

of Truth.

Peiras

and

its

implications

are only dealt on their own account in the constructive, positive part

of

the

way

of Truth

(fragment

8

lines

42-49)

which

is

only commenced

when

the

negative

part

has

been

carefully

summarised.

The argument

of

lines 29-33 can be

paraphrased

as

follows. What-is

could

only change

its

position

if

there were

vacancies

into which

it

could

move.

If, however, there were

such

vacancies

then

what-is

would

be

incomplete.

But

what-is

could

not

be

incomplete

for

if it

were

then

it

would

fall

short of

completenessby

what

is

not

(literally,

'what is

not

would be lacking from

the whole'),

and what is not

is

inconceivable and unutterable.

Simplicius

(Phys.

40.7-9)

constructed

the

last

line

somewhat

differently

and

paraphrased

as

follows:

;

yap

To

tq%

v,

cynatv,

va

7nThv

?cv,

O1

GT)

rO

OV

av6v8Md

xoc t

'rXeLOV. rG%8

XLVOU)LeVOV

CVaeiq

eXeLVOU

8at

O XltVeOC

*

L

O'CppX

v

V xwveZrat.

Ultimately both

explanations

come to

the

same. What

is

most

important

is

that

Simplicius

(40.3)5

recognised,

as

did Plato

before

him

(Theait.

180e3-4) that

fragment

8

lines

29-33 constituted

a

disproof of

locomotion and that Par-

menides'

argument

amounted to

the same

as that of

Melissus. As

Simplicius puts it

(40.9-15) xcd

M?Laaoq

E

&xtv1ov

oC6

&bL8eCEe

xoaEr rv

orr

IV

n&?

tav

ot)

eLv,

rL

XtVOLTO

o'0 6V,

SIVoL

rL

XeV69

TO5 6VTO

to 'C

UO7tOXYWP

'aeL T'0

0V

X

V0V

ae

npoxnkoet;

FIT'

VOL.

?1yCL 8e

oUiE)w; ?v

TXo

piavrow

yypMorL

;

he

then

proceeds to

quote Melissus'

words.

Although, then,

Parmenides,

unlike

Melissus, does not use

the term

xevOv,

his

interdiction

of

locomotion is

hardly less

'physical' than

that

by

Melissus.

This

realised,

it

no

longer

necessarily follows

that

we

must

regard

Leucippus' restitution of

motion as

defiance of

Melissus.

5

His preoccupation at Phys. 30. 5ff. with the introduction by Parmenides of

the

idea of

peiras

does not of

course mean

that

at

this

point

Simplicius

failed

to

realise that

the peiras

argument is

only part

of

the disproof

of

locomotion.

3



5/6

In fact,

I

believe

that

the view of

Melissus

as

atomistic

precursor par

excellence requires urgent reappraisal. Theophrastus, it must be re-

called, most

clearly

and

unequivocally

connected

Leucippus with Par-

menides himself.

The

crucial passage

is

the following:

Simplicius

Phys.

28.4ff

(a

virtual

transcript

of

Theophrastus,

either

direct or

through

Alexander

of

Aphrodisias):

Aei)XL7TCTOq

?

6

'EXe4

i

M&X'cnoq

&

ot6po)

y&p xys-

tp.

(cU-oi5) oLvOv'aGOC

floppsvLta-8

xs

YLoaGOpLocq,

o'u -rv

oci)-xv &Lcatae

ROppLeVfa- ZOL 1'=VOYO'VeL

7Cept T&V O'V'r(OV

O8OV) X

OXLT VcVlTolMV.

pivL~

xo

sopvr

iv0-o

68v,&?

coq

aoxez

'rv

~ovro

exeLov

yoxp

eV

xOCL&xLVTnTOVXOCL

&y6v-yTov xoci 7CS?pSOCC VOQV TCOLOUVrCOV

tO 7raV,

XOCL To

Vn

OV

pLYae\

(eYCWV

C

@pOU VT@V

OUTo4

O C7CS&OC

OaL

OeL

ZLVO

)evoc

U to

? oca

asos...

Not

only

does

Theophrastus

emphasize personal6

contact between Parmenides

and an

Eleate

Leucippus,

he states that

Leucippus responded

to an

Eleatic who

held that

ro-

nFv

was

nwenpaa0tievov

not

aS

pOV as

Melissus

proposed.7

The only

ancient

witness,

in

fact,

to

any sort

of

connection

between

Leucippus and Melissus

is

Tzetzes8

who,

even

if

he did

not

contradict

Theophrastus,

could

hardly

be

regarded

as

trustworthy.

If

Melissean influence

on

atomism

is

to be

maintained in the teeth

of

Theophrastus'

implications

it must

obviously

be

supported by

far

more

cogent arguments

than that

proposed

by

Kirk.

The

favourite

passage cited

in

support

of it

is Melissus

fragment

8,9

which

is

supposed

to

foreshadow

an

atomistic

plurality

of Eleatic

ones.

Even

here the

deduction

seems

far

from

obvious. Melissus

argues

that if

the com-

ponents

of the

phenomenal world,

air, fire,

iron

and

gold,

and

so

forth,

were

real,

they

each

of

them

must be of

the same

kind that he

maintains

the one to

be,

that

is

immutable.

However,

we

perceive

that each

of

these constituents

is

subject

to alteration

and

disintegration,

so

that

it

is

apparent that we neither see nor

know

realities. It

is

not easy to

see

how

this

conception

of

a

domain

composed

of a

contiguous

multiplicity

of

sensible

but

immutable constituents

like, air, fire, gold

etc. could

6

When

no personal contact is

involved, Theophrastus employs a

different

construction. Note Simplicius

Phys. 27. 2-3

(again from Theophrastus);

Avococy6pocq...

otvco,v-amc

ic

'Avocai'vouq

cptXoao(pLcc4;

nd see J. Burnet, Early

Greek

Philosophy 4,

Macmillan

1930, p. 332, note

2.

7

DK.30.B.1.

and

B.2.

8

Tzetzes Chil. 2-980 (at DK. 6.7.A.5.).

9

See,

for

example, Kirk-Raven,

The

Presocratic

Philosophers, Cambridge 1957,

pp.

304-6.

4



6/6

have suggested the atomists'

plurality

of

separated,

sub-visible,

homogeneous corpuscles.

To return to motion and the void, it

seems to me most likely that

Leucippus in replying to

Parmenides

made explicit To

xevov

implicit

in Parmenides' gaps

of what is not in what

is and

that Melissus

attempted to refute

Leucippus using atomism's

own physical

terminology.10

Monash University

10

Finally,

I

wish to record

my gratitude to

Mr.

D. J. Furley

for

a

crucial

suggestion and

for

criticism

of some of

the

material in an earlier draft.

5


Documents

Bicknell Parmenides Refutation of Motion and an Implication