30 Behavior Analysis andSocial Action- Volume 7, Numbers 1 & 2, 1989

Beyond the Carrot and the Stick:A Behaviorologfcal Rejoinder to Rakos

Jerome D. UlmanBall State University

Abstract

In a rejoinder to Rakos (1989), I discuss three inter-relatedproblems: scientifically inappropriate reductionism, a culturallybiased concept ofhumannature,anda bourgeois viewofcapitalismand socialism. I argue that these three problems result from theCartesian (positivistic) worldoutlook in whichthepartisheldto beontologically prior to the whole, a pervasive philosophicalperspective which has also retarded the development of a naturalscience of human behavior. In response to Rakos' pronouncementthat socialism is contrary to human nature, I offer as counterevidence the reVolutionary achievements of Cuba's currentreformprogram called rectification.

In his article, "Socialism, Behavior Theory, and theEgalitarian Society", Richard Rakos (1989) continues thetheme he introduced in the preceding issue of this journal(Rakos, 1988a) - that capitalism is consistent with behaviortheory while socialism violates many of its tenets. I (Ulman,1988) argued that his reasoning was irreparably flawed bythe conceptual error of reductionism and that his assess­ments of capitalism and socialism were counterfactual, bas­ing my conclusion on the contrast between the economic re­form programs of the Soviet Union (perestroika) and Cuba(rectification). Immediately following my reply, Rakos(1988b) offered a one-page rebuttal, which he subsequentlyexpanded to article length (Rakos, 1989). In defense of bothsocialism and the natural science of behavior, I submit thepresent rejoinder. I entitle it "Beyond the Carrot and theStick" in reaction to his culturally biased caricature of "hu­man nature" - the inevitable result of his faulty reductionis­tic theorizing.

I wish to make clear at the start, however, that I do notbelieve Rakos' antisocialist arguments to be intentionallymalicious (as we might expect from a propagandist in theU~S. State Department). Rather, noting Rakes' self-reportthat his conclusions caused him personal pain, I hope myrejoinder will alleviate his pain (a) by showing that his anti­socialist conclusion follows quite predictably from his mis­conception of the science of behavior and (b) by offering analternative perspective on socialism grounded on the actual

course of history in today's world - the continuing ad­vances of the Cuban revolution.

The claims Rakos (1989) makes about human behaviorin the name of behavior analysis is precisely why I no longerconsider myself a behavior analyst and why I am now work­ing to help build separate discipline of behaviorology (see Fra­ley, 1987;Fraley &Vargas, 1986). Based on the philosophy ofradical behaviorism, behaviorology may be defined as "thenatural life science of the functional relations that producechanges in the behavior of individuals during their life­times" (Ledoux & Fraley, in press). Behaviorology investi­gates "the effects of physical, biological, behavioral, and cul­tural variables on the behavior of organisms, with selectionby consequences being the most important causal mode re­lating these variable at different levels of organization in thelife sciences" (Statement of Purpose of the International Beha­viorology Association, quoted from the association's bro­chure). From this description, we can see what falls withinthe domain ofbehaviorology (the above stated determinantsof behavior) and what is excluded from that domain (allmentalistic and cognitive variables).

Behavior analysis is an unremittingly ambiguous desig­nation and its domain is pervious to all kinds of constructs. Isbehavior analysis just a methodology, merely a set of proce­dures for analyzing behavior? Is it part of psychology? Doesit include cognitive variables? And what is its underlyingphilosophy - is it radical, methodological, paradigmatic,emergent, cognitive, or inter-behaviorism? A quick glancethrough articles published in The Behavior Analyst ( the offi­cial journal of the Association for Behavior Analysis) willmake obvious the fact that there are sharp differences ofopinion on these matters among those writers who callthemselves behavior analysts. It appears that behavior anal­ysis has become open to all sorts of interpretations concern­ing causes of behavior and that eclecticism has become itsguiding philosophy.

Rakos (1989) is a typical member of the behavior ana­lytic community. To illustrate my assessment, I have culledfrom his article several claims that I believe no behaviorolo­gist would endorse: political analysis cannot be scientific,concepts at a lower level of analysis explain phenomena ex­isting at a higher level, short-term consequences are neces-

I thank Stephen Ledoux for his helpful comments. Reprints may be obtained from Jerry Ulman, Department of Special Education, Ball State University,Muncie, Indiana 47306.

sarily more potent than long-term consequences or rules,satiation on primary or conditioned reinforcers functions asan aversive stimulus that prompts escape and avoidance be­havior (a kind of Hullian drive-reduction hypothesis), mod­eling conditions secondary reinforcers, behavior is influ­enced by vicarious/cognitive processes, and psychology isour discipline. Additionally, Rakos reifies operant concepts(e.g., the matching law, metacongingencies, rules, equiva­lence classes), transforming them into things rather than re­lations, and employs them in arbitrary ways in order to sup­port his syllogistic argument (as though they were so manytoy soldiers, all lined up to slay the socialist monster) - apractice that is far removed from a functional analysis of be­havior. What he actually gives us is a view of human behav­ior from the standpoint of positivistic methodological behav­iorism, not radical behaviorism.

Rakos' faulty view of science is paralleled by his misin­formed conception of socialism- or more exactly, socialisminformed bybourgeois ideology. Further, I would argue thatthese two errors are intimately connected, that his faultyconception of science and socialism come from a lifetime ofexposure to capitalist culture.

The corrupting influence of capitalist culture on the de­velopment of science - in particular, the pervasive influ­ence of the bourgeois philosophy known as positivism (es­pecially its more reactionary form, pragmatism) - is mostendemic in the life sciences (see Levins & Lowentin, 1985).The influence of positivism is manifest in Rakos' (1989, also1988aand 1988b) theorizing, most notably in the form of Car­tesian reductionism and its derivative, atomistic individualism.

In the Cartesian world, that is, the world as a clock,phenomena are the consequences of the coming to­gether of individual atomistic bits, each with its ownintrinsic properties, determining the behavior of thesystem as a whole. The lines of causality run from partto whole, from atom to molecule, from molecule to or­ganism, from organism to collectively. As in society, soin all of nature, the part is ontologically prior to thewhole. (Levin, & Lewontin, 1985, pp. 1-2)

The methodology of Cartesian reductionism"entails cuttingit [the subject matter] up into bits and pieces (perhaps onlyconceptually) and reconstructing the properties of the sys­tem from the parts of the parts so produced" (p. 3). Further,"Cartesian reductionism is more than simply a method ofinvestigation; it is a commitment to how things really are"(p. 2); one feeds off of the other. Levins and Lewontin de­scribe the crippling effect this ideology has had on thegrowth of biology. I suggest that it has had an even morepernicious effect on the science of behavior - Rakos' anal­ysis serving as a prime example. The irony is that thosewriters most affected by this ideology are typically the mostvocal in eschewing "political ideology" in defense of theirview of "science." Again, Rakos' scientistic aphorisms serveas a case in point.

BEYOND THE CARROT AND STICK / Jerome D. Ulman / 31

While we may not be able to escape from the hege­mony of bourgeois ideology, we can examine its conse­quences and construct a philosophy that facilitates scientificprogress in spite of its influence. To this end, for severalyears I have explored the relationship between philosophiesof radical behaviorism and dialectical materialism (e.g., Ul­man, 1979, 1986) - perhaps the two most misunderstoodand maligned philosophies ever developed. Although thenumber of people in the world who are committed to bothphilosophies could probably all fit into a mini-van, the moreI continue with this project the more I am convinced that notonly are these two scientific philosophies compatible butone is irremediably handicapped without the other. For ex­ample, without radical behaviorism, dialectical materialistswill never be able to resolve the co-called mind-body prob­lem in a consistently materialistic manner. And withoutdialectical materialism, radical behaviorists will never beable to adequately cope with the multivious harmful effectsof Cartesian reductionism.

What, then, does the philosophy of dialectical materi­alism have to offer students of behavior? I would not pre­sume to give an acceptable account in a paragraph or two(see Kolbe, 1978; Ulman, 1979). For the purpose of this re­joiner, however, perhaps it will suffice to quote Engels'(1877/1972) assessment that "for the first time the wholeworld - natural, historical, intellectual-is represented as aprocess, i.e., as in constant motion, change, transformation,development; and the attempt is made to trace out the inter­nal connections that make a continuous whole of all themovement and development" (p, 41). As it applies to theevolution of human culture (i.e., historical materialism),Engels related that with the dialectical perspective lithe his­tory of mankind no longer appeared as a wild whirl of sense­less deeds of violence... but as the process of evolution ofman himself" (pp. 41-42).

This perspective provides us with a comprehensiveand viable framework for conducting our scientific work;that is, to follow the evolution of the process of changethrough all of its manifold and convoluted paths, lito tranceout the inner law running through all is apparently acciden­tal phenomena" (Engels, 1877/1972, p. 42). I suggest thatwhen the process of material change arrives at the point ofliving processes - from self-replicating viruses to globe­spanning human cultures - the two philosophies, dialecti­cal materialism and radical behaviorism, begin to fused. Theinner law Engels discussed, when examined within the lifesciences, appears to correspond to the causal mode Skinner(1981)refers to as selection byconsequences. Further, I believethat this perspective is vastly superior to that vacuous worldview called contextualism (as in Hayes, 1988) that Rakos soadmires (cf. Natetov, 1984, pp. 433-448).

Ihave made this brief digression into the philosophyofscience because I think it is crucial in understanding themany errors Rakos has made in his analysis of the relation

32I Jerome D. Ulman / BEYOND THE CARROT AND STICK

between socialism and "behavior theory" (or what I termbehaViorology). Although he does not appear to be aware of ithimself, his world view, founded in Cartesian reductionism,has predictably led him astray from the natural science ap­proach to the study of life processes and to view human na­ture in an extremely culturally biased way (i.e., human ascommodity consumers). Consequently, I am obliged tocounterpose his view to what I hold to be the more scientifi­cally sound perspective, one founded on dialectical materi­alism and radical behaviorism. With these different perspec­tive in mind, we can now consider some of the specificproblems contained in his analysis. I will first consider Ra­kos' advocacy of reductionism and then his conception ofhuman nature.

Citing the logical positivist Ernest Nagel (1961) as hisauthority, Rakos (1988b, 1989) argues that the formal re­quirement for reduction is that all theoretical expressions inthe higher order theory must connect with expressions inthe lower order theory. Concepts at the lower level can thenbeused to explain the higher level phenomena. He contendsthat such an explanation concerns the actual functioning ofthe higher level phenomenon but not necessarily why it ex­ists. Thus, according to Rakos, we can describe the function­ing of the higher level system without referring to the lowerlevel system, but to explain the higher level system requiresreductionism to the lower levels. When Rakos applies thistype of reductionism to socialism, for example, he assertsthat it doesn't ignore the associated social, political, and eco­nomic phenomena; rather, it specifies the behavioral condi­tions under which these phenomena occur.

He gives as justification for the reduction of the social­ist environment to a behavior analysis at the level of individ­uals the supposed critical role that individual behavior playsin the metacontingency (Glenn, 1986). Rakos then jumps tothe conclusion that because the metacontingency conse­quence is weak, the planned metacontingencies in the so­cialist environment have simply failed to increase produc­tive behavior.

The problem with Rakos' conclusion is more seriousthan the obvious logical error of his question begging. AsMaull (1984) points out, such reductionism is limited in atleast two crucial ways: "First, it confines our attention to re­lations between theories and, as a consequence, ... [tends]to blur theories and branches of science" (p. 511). Thus, "Na­gel talks about 'reductionism' of a branch of science as if itwere Simply a matter of reducing the comprehensive theoryof that branch!" (Maull, 1984, p. 511). Anarbitraryconflationindeed! "Second, in Nagel's account, derivation [of one the­ory from another through reductionism] is taken to be theessential relation between theories ... [when] such connec­tions are actually hypotheses about the relationship be­tween different areas of investigation" (p. 511). Nagel's,amd Rakos', kind of reductionism restricts our attention todeductive relations between theories. "Not only does the

[reductive] model fail as an adequate description of particu­lar research developments, but it also fails as a description oflong-term tendencies in science" (p. 512).

If Rakos fully accepts his reductionistic argument, hewould have to agree with Baerend (1984) that such conceptsas contingencies of reinforcement are merely stop-gap termson the way toward a complete physiological account behav­ior. For behaviorologists, however, descriptions of physio­logical processes inform us about physiological processesbut tell us little about the social behavior of humans. And forscientific socialists, descriptions of the behavior of individ­uals inform us about individual behavior but tell us littleabout the revolutionary transformation of societies.

There is one kind of reductionism, however, that is notonly permissible but potentially valuable as a guide for scien­tific work. It applies when dealing with hierarchically orga­nized biological systems: protein molecules, cells, tissues,organs, organisms, population, species, and social systems.Campbell (1974) refers to this reductionistic principle asdownward causation: "Where natural selection operatesthrough the life and death at higher levels of organization,the laws of the higher-level selective system determine inpart the distribution of lower-level events" (p. 180). Thus,for example, the jaws of a soldier ant and the distribution ofRNA protein therein require for their explanation certainlaws of sociology centering on the selective advantage of thedivision of labor within the social organization of army ants(Campbell, 1974). The principle of downward causation ap­plies just as much to the social evolution of human cultures.The behavior of an individual (the lower-level event) is inpart determined by the laws of historical movement of hu­man social formations (the high-level selective system) ­exactly the opposite of Rakos' reductionistic conclusion.

Let us now move on to consider Rakos' conception ofhuman nature. He endows an atomistic individual with anessentially nonhuman behavioral repertoire, again the inev­itable result of his Cartesian reductionisrn. His conception ofhuman nature conforms to the dictum of that classical indi­vidualist philosopher, John Stuart Mill: "Men are not, whenbrought together, converted into another kind of substance"(cited in Carr, 1961, p. 36). To which the historian E.H. Carrreplies,

Of course not. But the fallacy is to suppose that theyexisted or had any kind of substance before 'beingbrought together.' As soon as we are born, the worldgets to work on us and transforms us from merely bio­logical into social units. Every human being at everystage of history or pre-history is born into a society andfrom his earliest years is molded by that society. Thelanguage he speaks is not an individual inheritance,but a social acquisition from the group in which hegrows up. Both language and environment help deter­mine the character of his thought; his earliest ideascome to him from others. (pp. 36-37)

Carr states that it is a serious error to suppose an antithesisbetween the individual and society. The development of theindividual and the development of society condition eachother. Consequently, "that elusive entity 'human nature'has varied so much from country to country and from cen­tury to century that it is difficult not to regard it as a historicalphenomenon shaped by prevailing social conditions andconventions" (p. 38). Carr concludes that these very obviousfacts have been obscured from us by the remarkable and ex­ceptional period of history in which we live, one in which"the cult of individualism is one of the most pervasive ofmodem myths" (p. 39).

Rakos' bourgeois conception of human nature exem­plifies the pervasiveness of that myth. According to his "be­havior analysis," humans are essentially consuming organ­isms under the total control of the immediate consequencesof the carrot and the stick. He gives us the Madison Avenueadvertising executive's view of human nature: an individualwho cares only about getting ahead of others, making moreand more money, conspicuously displaying status symbolswhich make him the envy of the neighborhood, and becom­ming transfixed by the television tube which tells him aboutthe latest commodity he should run out and buy. At thesame time, he overlooks the use of the stick in capitalist cul­ture - motivating worker productivity by the continualthreat of unemployment (and where "freedom" - to bor­row a lyric from the late Janis Joplin - "means nothing elseto lose"). In short, Rakos reduces the human being to that ofa mediator between the exchange of commodities andmoney. Social relationships become relationships betweenthing - the bourgeois orientation to the world that Marxaptly described as commodity fetishism (see Ulman, 1988).Certainly, few anthropologists would subscribe to Rakos'culturally biased view of human nature.

For behaviorologists, "human nature" is the syn­thetized product of the interactions of cultural, environmen­tal, and biological determinants of human behavior. Beha­viorologists reject the two extremes of environmentaldeterminism and biological determinism. The individual isessentially the locus of these biological, environmental, andcultural variables. What most distinguishes humans fromnonhumans is our IIsocial nature" which we acquire througha lifetime of participation in a particular verbal community.Our evolved biological capacity for verbal behavior (i.e., thestructure of our vocal apparatus) made possible (and at thesame time resulted from) another kind of evolution, that ofcultural evolution, both being caused by the process of selec­tion (Skinner, 1981). And as I previously suggested, "themost remarkable feature of the social component of "humannature' is its incompleteness, its being an unfinished andmalliable product of culture and at the same time the locus ofall cultural transformations" (Ulman, 1988, p. 26).

BEYOND THE CARROT AND STICK / Jerome D. Ulman / 33

I will complete this rejoinder by shifting the focus frommy concern about the science of behavior to a polemical de­fense of the Cuban revolution against Rako's (1988a, 1988b,1989) unsubstantiated charges. While many of his criticismsof socialist countries are valid, Cuba is the exception to Ra­kos' rule. It only takes one black swan to prove that not allswans are white.

Celebrating the accomplishments of 30 years of the Cu­ban revolution, Fidel Castro (1989) reports that in Cuba illit­eracy has been eliminated, infant mortality rate is similar tothat of the U.S., tuberculosis rate is below that of the U.S.,and by the end of 1989 Cuba will have met its needs for poly­clinics and special education. Additionally, the Cuban econ­omy over the past 30 years has grown at a rate higher than 4percent per year - in spite of the aggressive U.S. economicblockade. Castro cities many other accomplishments of theCuban revolution too numerous to list here. "But the [U.S.]empire tries to deny everything," Castro observes. "It's in itsinterest to say that the revolution is not prospering . . .in order to promote the idea that socialism is a failure"(p. 71).

Another attack on Cuba commonly found in the U.S.media is to denigrate its government as being totalitarian.Rakos has fallen into this trap. For him, "behavioral free­dom" (which he never adequately defines) can only existin capitalist countries; all socialist governments must ex­ercise complete control over their citizens' lives. Notnecessarily.

In fact, Cuba's electoral system is unique amongworker states. Based on the mass organizations, delegatesare nominated in electoral districts, not by the party but bythe people. And there must be more than one candidate foreach office. Every five years the Cubans have two grass rootselections and delegates can be recalled by the voters. But theultimate test of democracy in Cuba results from its defensesystem. The entire people - millions of ordinary citizen ­are armed and actively involved in national defense. As Cas­tro says, "there can be no democracy superior to that wherethe workers, the peasants, and the students have theweapons" (p. 81). Imagine that test being tried in Beijing,Moscow, London, or Washington, D.C.!

What is most creative about the Cuban revolution ­and, unfortunately, unique to that revolution - is the mas­sive amount of voluntary work contributed to Cuban soci­ety. Volunteerism is the heart of the rectification process.Previously (Ulman, 1988), I described the beginning phasesof Cuba's economic reform; in particular, the formation ofminibrigades of office and factory workers who volunteer towork for a year on construction projects such as buildingnew daycare centers, hospitals, schools, and housing. Therectification program continues to grow, transforming Cu­ban society in a genuinely revolutionary manner, on a scalenever before witnessed in any country.

34 I Jerome D. UlmanI BEYOND THE CARROT AND STICK

Commenting on the multitude of historic achievements ofthe Cuban revolution, Castro (1989) states:

This shows what man can do ... when there is faith inman, trust in man, when you don't start from thepremise that man is like a little animal who only moveswhen you dangle a carrot in front of him or whip himwith a stick. The minibrigades, contingent[s of]workers, and ... hundreds of thousands of groups ofworkers, don't act or do what they do because of a car­rot or a stick. (p. 1989)

Castro continues, asking rhetorically, "What carrot or stickled thousands of senior high school and technological stu­dents to put in millions of hours of voluntary work on socialprojects?" (p. 118). "What carrot or stick motivated manythousands of teachers, doctors, or workers who have ren­dered international service? What carrot or stick motivatedthe 50,000 Cuban fighters in Angola who made possible thevictory [over the invading army of racist South Africa]?" (p.119). The list could go on forever, he adds; concluding,

So are we or are we not right in feeling that ... peoplecan live in a society that is more humane, more just,and more based on solidarity than is capitalism, wherethe law of the jungle prevails? Could a society edu­cated in the selfish ideas of capitalism carry out a singleone of these things we've mentioned" (p. 119).

Castro admits that over the course of 30 years of the Cubanrevolution, they made some serious errors. "We made twotypes of errors: during one phase we committed errors ofidealism [an over-reliance on volunteer work while rejectingall material incentive] and in another phase, while trying tocorrect our errors of idealism, we committed errors ofeconomism and commercialism" (pp. 71-72) or, using hisstronger term., market mania. "We are now rectifying thoseerrors . . . without falling into the previous errors of ideal­ism. We are moving slowly, but the results have started tobecome evident everywhere" (p. 71).

As I have already related (Ulman, 1988), the currentapproach is analogous to that of the appropriate employ­ment of token reinforcement systems in classrooms. Theyshould be used when necessary to motivate students; butjust as importantly, token systems should also be phasedout as soon as possible so that desired behaviorwill maintainwithout such intrusive interventions. The Cubans treat theuse of material incentives for promoting productive behav­ior in exactly the same empirical manner; they use themwhen necessary but phase them out as soon as possible.

There are several other assertions Rakos makes con­cerning human behavior and socialism about which I takestrong issue. But I promised to keep the length of my rejoin­der to less than half of the size of his article (a limit I am afraidI have already far exceeded). So I will end with one final

criticism and a challenge. My criticism is that Rakos' dis­paraging remarks about rectification in Cuba are totally irrel­evant because the rectification process did not begin until1986 (Castro, 1989) and the sources he cities about Cubawere all published prior to that date. My challenge is for Ra­kos to set aside his political prejudice, travel to Cuba as aprofessional researcher (the U.S., that bastion of Western"freedom," prohibits us from visiting Cuba as tourists), anddraw his own conclusions based on his own observations oflife in that country of revolutionary communists.

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