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Beyond National Sovereignty?The French Republic andMondialisationPierre Joxe

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To cite this article: Pierre Joxe (2008): Beyond National Sovereignty? The FrenchRepublic and Mondialisation , Contemporary French and Francophone Studies, 12:2,161-171

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Contemporary French and Francophone StudiesVol. 12, No. 2, April 2008, pp. 161–171

BEYOND NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY?

THE FRENCH REPUBLIC AND

MONDIALISATION1

Pierre Joxe

When de Gaulle founded the Fifth Republic fifty years ago, the word‘‘globalization’’ did not exist.

Today, globalization (known in French as mondialisation) raises specialchallenges for the French, whose history has not prepared them for thisphenomenon. On the contrary . . .

The history of France stands in contrast with that of the United States and ofthe American people—a federation of states and peoples originating in an earlywave of globalization/mondialisation, initially from Britain (with the PilgrimFathers) then from other lands across the Atlantic (the Netherlands, Germany,Italy, Poland . . .) and elsewhere (the Caribbean, Latin America, Asia . . .)

The history of France is also different from that of most other countries inEurope.

It is different from that of the United Kingdom, which dominated the seasfor centuries.

It is different from that of the Netherlands, of Portugal and Spain, whosepast glories were all founded on trade and navigation on a global scale.

It is also different from that of European states which have achievedrelatively recently their political unity (Italy, Germany) or—more recently—sovereignty (Poland, Hungary, etc . . .). Those two words—unity andsovereignty—have been of special importance in the history of France in both

ISSN 1740-9292 (print)/ISSN 1740-9306 (online)/08/020161–11 � 2008 Taylor & Francis

DOI: 10.1080/17409290802058014

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European and global contexts and were sacrosanct in the eyes of the founder ofthe Fifth Republic, Charles de Gaulle.

The political and territorial unity of France, like its sovereignty, is the resultof a long process of historical construction in the face of external threats fromthe East, the South, and the North and internal divisions linked with feudalismand later with the wars of religion.

Two centuries ago, you, in the USA, with your Constitution and theDeclaration beginning ‘‘We, the People . . .’’ affirmed simultaneously your unityand your sovereignty, your Republic and your democracy, in opposition to theBritish monarchy; you affirmed simultaneously your Constitution andDecolonization, external sovereignty and internal sovereignty.

We (‘‘We, the French people’’) have had neither Pilgrim Fathers nor, twocenturies later, Founding Fathers, but ten long centuries of history: feudal, thenmonarchical, then revolutionary, and finally republican (five successive republicsalready!)—and a dozen different constitutions since yours was adopted. Forthese reasons, globalization is perceived differently in France.

Globalization is not seen in France as it is here in the USA, a country that istrans-Atlantic in its origins, that stretches from coast to coast, from ocean toocean, that is pan-American and now explicitly imperial in its stance(presenting itself as the Empire of Good in opposition to the Empire of Evil).

Globalization is not seen in France as it is in China or Japan, which havebeen global in outlook for twenty and fifty years respectively.

Neither is globalization seen in France as it is in the rich and poor countriesof the Tricontinental Conference which hope to profit one day from a globalNew Deal.

For a country like France, the notion of globalization or mondialisation bringswith it new ideas and new tests: those of comparison, competition and outrightconfrontation with the rest of the planet and with each of the countries andpeoples that make up the world.

For there is an age-old view in France that the nation—our nation—isflawless and exemplary, no doubt because it is built on more than a thousandyears of national history, because of its exceptional cultural homogeneity(in the five centuries that have elapsed since the Renaissance), and because of theperiod during which it exercised leadership in Europe. France, French elites,and to a considerable extent the mass of ordinary French men and women,have long been convinced that they offer an enviable model to the rest ofthe world.

Thus a key reason why mondialisation (globalization) is so difficult for Franceis that the country was for so long assumed to be the center of the world—andwas indeed a central power in Europe, which was in turn the center of theworld. It was. It no longer is.

From a strictly political point of view, French society is also unique byvirtue of the history of its institutions.

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Great Britain, homeland of habeas corpus and mother of Parliaments, hascontributed for centuries to the growth of democracy without ever having awritten constitution.

The United States has seen its historic constitution amended but neverreplaced and, evolving in line with the jurisprudence of your Supreme Court,that constitution is still in operation two centuries later, albeit with a Civil Waralong the way.

France, by contrast, is a veritable museum of constitutional law, containingthe relics of twelve constitutions, five revolutions, three Restorations, and fiveRepublics . . .

The latest of these—the Fifth Republic—has seen five successive Presidents,twenty-two constitutional revisions, and three ‘‘cohabitations’’ betweenPresidents and Prime Ministers of opposing political colors. So where doesthe Fifth Republic stand today?

The Fifth Republic was born thanks to—or due to the failure of—theFourth Republic on colonial issues.

The Fifth Republic was the offspring of a crisis arising from the death throesof colonialism. The midwife of the Republic was a military putsch in colonialAlgeria.

By the same token, the Republic was grounded in another era, that of thenineteenth century, the century of European colonial expansion in Africa.

It hoped to perpetuate the ‘‘eternal’’ France of Louis XIV, of 1789, and ofthe Empire.

It has been struggling to hang on in old age, and not to enter a new age, thatof mondialisation in the twenty-first century.

De Gaulle Recovers French Sovereignty

If de Gaulle was able to found the Fifth Republic through the Constitution of1958, it was largely because it was he who, in one of the darkest hours of WorldWar II, founded Free France (la France Libre) with his Appeal of June 18, 1940.Half of France was already under Nazi occupation and a disastrous armistice hadbeen signed by Marshall Petain. De Gaulle had left France and gone to London,where he was welcomed by Winston Churchill. De Gaulle proclaimeda conviction and a slogan.

His conviction was that the Petain government had no legal basis and thatthe armistice it had signed was unacceptable.

His slogan was that ‘‘France has lost a battle but France has not lostthe war.’’

The World War that was then only beginning and into which theUnited States would not enter until December 1941 was not simply a Franco-German war or even a European war but truly a global war.

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De Gaulle created Free France by appealing to the global nature of the war.In his words: ‘‘Nothing is lost because this war is a world war.’’ As the war wasglobal in scale, Free France could become extra-territorial. It could set up itsheadquarters in London and also in the French colonial empire . . .

He first tried to settle Free France in Africa (in Senegal) but failed.In 1943, following the Anglo-American North African landings, de Gaulle

succeeded in establishing himself in Algiers and created the French NationalLiberation Committee, which soon became the Provisional Government of theFrench Republic.

Let me recall here a largely forgotten moment during the Liberationof France. A few days after D-Day, after allied troops had begun the Liberationof Europe in Normandy, de Gaulle went to the city of Bayeux, newly liberatedfrom Nazi occupation, to assert the sovereignty of France and his opposition toland liberated in France being administered by the United States. After deGaulle spoke out in Bayeux, the United States abandoned plans for France to beadministered by the Allied Military Government for Occupied Territories(AMGOT). Liberated France was thus to be governed by a Free France that hadreturned there from Algiers.

To understand the birth of the Fifth Republic we need to remember thespecial relationship between de Gaulle and colonial Africa, especiallyNorth Africa, where Algiers was such an important base for him during thewar. The military putsch of 1958, more or less prepared or at the very leastencouraged by supporters of de Gaulle, took place at a time when France wasnot only bogged down in a long colonial war but also, because of that war, founditself under the spotlight of world opinion every September in the GeneralAssembly of the United Nations in New York.

De Gaulle’s Two Dreams

In 1946, two years after he first spoke in Bayeux, de Gaulle returned there tomake a memorable speech criticizing a draft constitution which had just beenrejected in a referendum and outlining his vision for a new political systemblending parliamentary with presidential powers. At the time, he was littleheeded. In October 1946, a new parliamentary-style Constitution was adoptedand in the elections held the following year the Gaullist RPF party won only 21per cent of the national vote.

Scarcely ten years later, de Gaulle returned to power and traveled toAlgiers, where he made another memorable speech to a huge crowd in June1958. What exactly was in his mind? Was he out to settle scores with thosewho wanted to liquidate France’s colonial empire? Was he out to settle scoreswith the party rivalries which he so detested? Certainly but overall, de Gaulle

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was also motivated by the pursuit of two dreams: National Defense and Frenchleadership in the construction of another Europe, a Europe of Nation-States.

De Gaulle wanted to re-write history, both pre-war and post-war.In his Memoires de guerre, we see how deeply he suffered during the 1930s

when, as a young colonel but a gifted strategist, he saw his plans for armoredtank warfare ignored by the Third Republic but adopted instead by . . . Hitler!In his memoirs we also see him railing against an idea of Europe in which hedoes not believe.

To get the army out of the colonial theatres in which it was bogged down,de Gaulle would create an all-theater nuclear strike force and a defense policyincorporating important scientific and technological pillars. He would thuscreate a new army.

This fundamental transformation of national defense and of the Frencharmed forces had the advantage of killing two birds with one stone, each of themvital for domestic and foreign policy: the first goal was to get France and itsarmy out of colonial wars. The second was to endow the nation’s ‘‘decolonized’’army with a modernizing, patriotic mission that was somehow European andeven . . .‘‘global.’’

The first goal was not attained immediately. After his return to powerin 1958, de Gaulle had to grapple with the ‘‘dirty war’’ in Algeria for almostfour years, until the Evian agreements finally brought a cease-fire inMarch 1962.

Not only did he have to grapple with the death-throes of colonial warfare,he also had to confront those seeking to pursue it.

Many different challenges—some of them well known, such as the Week ofthe Barricades in January 1960, or the military putsch of 1961, some of themless well known and in some cases kept largely secret—arose during this period,in which certain elements within the army considered that de Gaulle hadbetrayed them.

Yet simultaneously a new army was being built and a new national defensestrategy along with it.

A nuclear strike force was put into production not only to cover ‘‘alltheatres’’ (tous azimuts) but also to offer a role to each of the three branches ofour armed forces:

1) The Air Force’s delivery capabilities would of course be mobilized.2) The Navy would eventually find a similar role after a long wait for the supply of nuclear

weapons-carrying submarines.3) The nation’s ground forces were also given the theoretical mission of serving as a

‘‘strategic artillery,’’ which would later be turned into a short-lived tactical variant.

Major scientific and technological policy initiatives were mobilized directlyor indirectly in the service of this defense strategy.

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The nuclear programs already begun under the Fourth Republic wereactively developed, soon leading to the explosion of France’s first atomic bombin the Sahara in 1960.

Space projects first conceived under the Fourth Republic also made greatstrides. Our aeronautical and submarine industries leapt forward, as did ournuclear propulsion systems, radar and sonar technologies, and numerous othersectors connected with the space and electronic industries.

A huge strategically important industrial machine emerged backed by thesenior echelons of an army that was now freed from policing operations inFrance’s former colonies.

De Gaulle was not well disposed towards the creation of a supra-nationalEurope. Initially, European integration appeared technocratic in nature(covering coal, steel, and atomic energy) but then grander dreams were floatedin the shape of the abortive European Defense Community. From 1959onwards, de Gaulle pursued a very different vision of Europe with the aim ofsafeguarding sovereignty in every sphere, internal and external, each supportingthe other.2

With Giscard d’Estaing and Mitterrand: The EuropeanU-Turn

During the presidencies of Valery Giscard d’Estaing and Francois Mitterrand,which were in many ways antagonistic in nature, with each opposing and thenbeating the other in successive elections (held in 1974 and 1981), the FifthRepublic took a major turn.

These two Presidents, one on the right, the other on the left, both leanedtowards the center while in office. And on Europe, both changed the basicdirection of French policy by committing France to play a leading role in themovement to both widen and deepen European integration.

The rapidity and depth of these European developments under Giscardd’Estaing and Mitterrand were quite spectacular.

In the space of twenty years, Europe went from 6 to 15 members andsimultaneously the institutions of European integration were deepened in waysthat were diametrically opposed to what de Gaulle had hoped for.

Giscard d’Estaing opens the way to a Europe of 12 members and to Europeaneconomic and monetary union

After admitting Denmark, Ireland, and most importantly the UnitedKingdom, to which de Gaulle had long refused entry, Europe went on to admitGreece and other Mediterranean countries while simultaneously preparing foreconomic and monetary union, implying a common economic policy as well asa common currency and a common tax regime.

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In adopting this policy, Giscard d’Estaing and his Prime Minister, RaymondBarre, took a veritable U-turn in relation to Gaullist policy and Mitterrandpressed further in the same direction.

Mitterrand saves Maastricht and advances the ‘‘Schengen agreements’’

Mitterrand was probably all the more convinced that he had a true missionin this domain since he had participated immediately after the war in the firstEuropean assemblies, which were already fiercely opposed by de Gaulle.

Despite serious health problems which weakened him physically, Mitterrandvigorously supported the Maastricht Treaty and took the enormous gamble ofsubmitting its ratification to a nationwide referendum in 1992.

After bitterly fought campaigns for and against the treaty, ratification wassecured by a wafer-thin majority in the referendum. Had it not been forMitterrand’s personal leadership in this field, it is quite possible that theMaastricht Treaty might have been rejected, in the same way that the EuropeanConstitution was recently rejected in the referendum of 2005. Not only didMitterrand secure the Maastricht Treaty, he also furthered the symbolic andpractical integration of Europe by launching the negotiations which, through theso-called ‘‘Schengen agreements,’’ made freedom of movement within Europemuch easier, leading finally to the outright abolition of internal borders forcustoms, police, and other purposes.

Simultaneously, as soon as the Berlin wall fell, Mitterrand decided to workvigorously in favor of opening Europe to the new democracies which were thenbeing built on the ruins of the Soviet bloc. Systematically, he not only organizedcooperation with Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia (now divided into theCzech Republic and Slovenia) but he also worked to make that cooperationthe basis for rapid admission into the European Union, and active preparationfor others.

During this twenty-year period, French policy on Europe thus went inexactly the opposite direction from that pursued by de Gaulle during his yearsin office.

With Chirac: The end of Napoleonic France and theDissolution of Gaullism in Globalization

The constitution which de Gaulle designed for the Fifth Republic wasintended to correct the flaws which he saw in both the Fourth and theThird Republics.3

The constitution of 1958, like de Gaulle’s 1946 Bayeux speech, and like theprogram advanced by the Resistance movement during the war, envisioned astrong central state with extensive economic powers reminiscent of thoseassociated since the seventeenth century with Colbertism.

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Much of this was to disappear under de Gaulle’s immediate successors andthis trend was further accentuated during the presidency of Jacques Chirac, whosucceeded Mitterrand in 1995 and remained in office until 2007.

These changes were very apparent in the growing number of constitutionalreforms which, slowly but steadily, significantly altered the institutionalframework inherited from de Gaulle. During an initial 35-year period, therewere just seven reforms of this nature, compared with twice that number(fourteen) carried out by Chirac over a period of 12 years (a third of the time).

At the geo-strategic level, France became greatly down-scaled incomparison with the Gaullist dream.

The down-scaling was apparent both politically and militarily.European integration was pursued enthusiastically under the presidencies

of Giscard d’Estaing and Mitterrand and was taken further still by Chirac, whodefinitively broke with the old Gaullist notion of a ‘‘Europe of nation-states.’’

During the twelve years Chirac spent in office, the pace of constitutionalreforms quickened vertiginously, with revisions in 1999, 2003, 2005, and(under Sarkozy) 2008, so as to adapt the French constitution to European lawand in the attempt to establish a ‘‘European constitution.’’

While some of these reforms might appear technocratic, they were also ofenormous symbolic importance in such matters as freedom of movement andthe judicial sphere. They were also hugely important because they led towardsan attempt to endow Europe with a constitution.

It was this that was a stake in the 2005 referendum on a so-called‘‘Constitution for Europe,’’ which was spectacularly rejected by French voters.

After the failure of the 2005 referendum and the election of Sarkozy in2007, a new European treaty was drafted in Lisbon and has just been ratified byFrance, not through a popular referendum but by a parliamentary vote. Despiteappearances and the change of name, the new Treaty differs little from what wasrejected in 2005.

This takes France even further away from de Gaulle’s vision of fifty yearsago and the changes are even more spectacular in military policy.

France is today engaged in a veritable process of unilateral disarmament.Where de Gaulle simultaneously decided to build a self-sufficient national

defense system, equipped France with an independent nuclear deterrent, andtook France out of NATO’s integrated military command, French policybegan to move in the opposite direction twenty years ago and this trend hasbeen accelerating.

Not only has the operational integration of French armed forces beenaccelerating since the first Gulf War in 1991, military integration has also beengathering pace psychologically, technologically and, soon, institutionally.

Our armed forces have now become the French fraction of a vast,multi-formed international police force of varying shapes and sizes. And ourarmed forces have been even more shaken by the end—officially termed

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the ‘‘suspension’’—of compulsory military service for all young men, which hadbeen the norm for more than a century.

In place of a truly autonomous and truly national defense system, we nowhave a professional army that is not at all what de Gaulle envisioned in 1930.

There has also been a down-scaling in two aspects of French society inheritedfrom monarchy and empire and which were jealously guarded by the Third andFourth Republics as well as by the Fifth Republic during its early Gaullist phase.

Nationalizations carried out when the left was in power have now beenmassively reversed.

Under a tradition inherited from Colbert, industries linked withtechnologies of strategic national importance were under the protection ofthe state. De Gaulle, through the National Resistance Council, and Mitterrand,on behalf of the Left, extended this sector. In recent years, it has been almostcompletely privatized.

The economic liberalism which dissolved important instruments ofeconomic and social policy has gone hand in hand with another major pieceof down-scaling: that of the central state.

The pace of public decentralization has been so rapid and so deep in recentyears that one can imagine at some point in the future a federal France, but notat all of the type that was projected in de Gaulle’s first Bayeux speech, when theempire still seemed assured.

A federal scenario, which was inconceivable in nineteenth century France, isnow the norm in Europe: Spain is now as federalized as Germany, Italy now hasvery little unity, and the ‘‘United’’ Kingdom is increasingly dis-united.

Curiously, de Gaulle had organized in 1969 his own political suicide byorganizing an unsuccessful referendum on decentralization, and one of his self-styled successors, Chirac, organized a major referendum on this matter in 2003.

Under Mitterrand, the left had put in place important laws providing foradministrative decentralization and to improve local government.

Paradoxically, it was Chirac, on the right, who enshrined the autonomy oflocal authorities constitutionally and put into place financial constraints whichwould have made de Gaulle turn in his grave.

At this pace, we could even be heading towards a situation where theprinciple of subsidiarity, which already exists between the European Union andits member-states, becomes adopted in relations between the central state andlocal government in France.

Conclusion: A French Dilemma?

It is apparent that after so many changes to the institutions of the Fifth Republic,the additional changes planned by the current President will clearly mark theend of an era.

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That said, regimes have often changed in mid-stream. After Louis XIV, theSun King in Versailles, there was the very different figure of Louis XVI. Afterthe leftist Convention of the Montagnards came the centrist Convention ofThermidor. After a trio of Consuls came the First Consul and Emperor. Afterthe Restoration, the July Monarchy. After the authoritarian Second Empire, the‘‘liberal’’ Second Empire. After the Third Republic of ‘‘notables,’’ the ThirdRepublic of ‘‘professors’’.

After the Fifth Republic of de Gaulle—adapted by Giscard, used to his ownends by Mitterrand, and largely stripped of its mystique by Chirac—can theFifth Republic now be globalized and Europeanized by an ultra-liberal Sarkozy,admirer of George W. Bush?

That is, alas, a possible scenario, but fortunately there are others too.France is still at the center of Europe, at the crossroads of the eastern plains

and the Mediterranean, of Anglo-Saxons and Scandinavians and of the waters ofthe Atlantic.

France mayyetplay a leading role in hithertounexplored domains. France couldbecome the first European country to fully embrace a multicultural and multi-racialfuture. France could become the first rich country to really help in thedevelopment of poor countries. France could become the first industrializedcountry to throwoverboard theecologicallydisastrous model of over-development.

There are currents and forces leaning in such a direction. It is not impossiblethat they may succeed, but if so this will certainly not come overnight.

I remember being a student 50 years ago and reading the report GunnarMyrdal had published on the USA in 1944, An American Dilemma.

At that time Kennedy was not yet President and Johnson had yet to beginhis work on behalf of civil rights.

Myrdal had written: ‘‘White prejudice and discrimination keep the Negrolow in standards of living, health, education, manners, and morals. This, in itsturn, gives support to white prejudice. White prejudice and Negro standardsthus mutually ‘cause’ each other.’’

Fifty years later, I now see Barak Obama running for the Democraticnomination to the presidency and that is no dream.

To understand or imagine what might happen in France during the next 50years, there is much to be gained by reading the articles by Phil Dine and HelenDrake on ‘‘Decolonizing the Republic’’ and the ‘‘European Fifth Republic,’’focusing as they do on two of the major issues facing the Republic today.

Translated by Alec Hargreaves

Notes

1 This text is a revised version of the keynote paper delivered at theconference on ‘‘The Fifth Republic at Fifty: France 1958–2008’’ hosted by

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the Winthrop-King Institute for Contemporary French and FrancophoneStudies at Florida State University on February 18–19, 2008.

2 How and why this aim was not achieved is discussed by Helen Drake in hercontribution to the present collection.

3 Alistair Cole’s article in the present collection gives an excellent accountof these changes.

Works Cited

De Gaulle, Charles. Memoires de guerre. Volume 1: L’Appel, 1940–1942. Paris:Plon, 1954.

Mrydal, Gunnar. An American Dilemma: The Negro Problem and Modern Democracy.New York: Harper, 1944.

Pierre Joxe served as French Interior Minister from 1984 to 1986 and from 1988 to

1991 and as Defense Minister from 1991 to 1993. From 1993 until 2001, he was

President of the Cour des Comptes, auditor of the nation’s public expenditures. He has

been a member of France’s Constitutional Council since 2001.

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