Beyond Lethal Firearms and Sub-National State Building in Mindanao

EdQ19 March 2012

The Puzzle

• It is a fundamental interest of the state to control guns and maintain monopoly of coercion… but – why does the state tolerate accumulation and proliferation of firearms in the hands of civilians?; and,

• Why do civilians participate in the shadow economy of firearms despite the iron hand of the state, threats of penalty and inducement of violence?

• Does firearms accumulation and proliferation strengthen state formation at the sub-national level?

The Argument

• Firearms accumulation and proliferation fulfills a schizophrenic function of supporting patronage-based sub-national state building founded on protection but weakening central authority to promote and ensure fundamentals of administrative, political, economic, social and environmental governance

Evidence (1)

Weakened central authority: • ‘extra-bureaucracy’ in firearms regulation at central level

coupled with corruption that weakens central authority • Porous licit and illicit trade in firearms • High incidence of illicit weapons use in gun related crimes • Unbridled accumulation and proliferation• Multi-functional demand system beyond the purview of

state regulation • State complicity in the supply system and structure of

loose firearms

Evidence (2)

Sub-national state building:• Low trust on central state capacity to protect citizens • Selective horizontal violence as product of informal

discourse between political actors and civilians and the latter’s rational approach to dealing with political actors

• Using extreme-case comparison, gun-powered and state supported clan-dominated local governments fail in the economy, social services, environment, administration and governance fundamentals

Theoretical Lenses• Multi-sited ethnography and life history methodology (MacGaffey

and Bazenguissa-Ganga 2000; Massey 2005; Falzon 2005) and network analysis (Law 1991)in analyzing the system and structure of the illicit trade in firearms

• Kalyvas’ (2006) theory of selective violence within the main cleavages of civil conflict – to analyze the behavior and relationships of civilian gun holders and political actors; also argued by Friman (2009) and Andreas and Wallman (2009) as a tool for market regulation in illicit drugs

• Scott (1972) and Hutchcroft’s (2000) institutional theory to analyze the behavior of the state in regard to firearms accumulation and proliferation; and Tilly’s (1985) formulation of state building as ‘organized crime’ that connects violence, sale of protection and revenue generation

Methodological Approach

• Three steps: ethnographic examination, secondary research and micro extreme cases comparison

• Use of multi-sited ethnography and “mediated conversations” - Storytellers: 4 illicit actors, 4 licit actors, 5 gun users in Talayan and 5 gun users in Naawan

• Secondary research: firearms and socio-economic data

• Extreme case comparison: Talayan (Maguindanao) and Naawan (Misamis Oriental)

The Global Market of Small Arms

• 347 million small arms produced between 1945 and 2000

• Small arms producing companies have grown from 200 in 1980 to 600 in 2001

• Production takes place in 95 countries; illicit production takes place in 25 countries

• Largest producers and exporters: USA, Germany, France, Russia and Britain with US$ 20 billion in global sales of all weapons (10% consisting of small arms)

USA: # 1 in export and import

• In 2006: imports accounted for 59% of global export sales in hand guns and 42% of hunting shotguns

• 270 million handguns in civilian hands; 88 guns per 100 people (in the Philippines: 3 per 100 people)

• In 2006: 10,225 gun homicides out of 17,030 homicides; 5.75 firearms suicides per 100,000

Guns in the Philippines

• Gun policy: American tradition, tolerant, highly centralized, secluded and weakly regulated

• Licensed firearms: from 328,322 in 1993 to 929,034 by 2010; accumulation of around 50,000 per year

• Loose firearms: from 130,042 in 1993 to 1.9 million by 2010

• Total firearms in the hands of civilians: 2.8 million; estimated value @ PHP 141 to PHP 283 billion

• Other estimates: 3.9 million firearms with less than 20% registered

Registered/Licensed Firearms, 1990-2008PNEMO 6= Presidential National Emergency Memorandum Order No. 6 of 1990; PNEMO 6 cancelled licenses of all registered firearms. The 1994 Amnesty Program offered to legitimize all loose firearms.

19901991

19921993

19941995

19961997

19981999

20002001

20022003

20042005

20062007

20080

50,000

100,000

150,000

200,000

250,000

300,000

350,000

400,000

450,000

500,000

Registered Firearms(1990-2008) Registered before PNEMO 6

Licensed under Amnesty Program

Licensed, Purchased from Gun Dealers

Distribution of Loose and Licensed Firearms, Philippines, as of 2010

1.39 million (73%)(1.1 million or 80% in NCR)

148,900 (8%)

358,250 (19%)

Loose Firearms:1,905,679 (67.3%)

Licensed Firearms:929,034 (32.7%)

675,26972.6%( 270,822 or 30% in NCR)

119,747(12.8%)

134,018(14.4%)

Total Firearms:2,834,713

2.06 million

268,647

492,268

Licensed Purchases of Firearms, Philippines: 1990-2008

Guns and Civil Conflict:Guns Purchases (National), 2002-2008 - AFP-MILF Skirmishes (Mindanao)

2002-2010

Gun Crimes, Philippines 2008-2010

Guns in Mindanao

• 492,268; 70% unlicensed • Largest concentrations: ARMM (32%) and

central Mindanao (17%)• Lower concentrations in other regions like

Region 10 (12% of Mindanao total)

Mindanao: Gun Crimes and Civil Conflict

Distribution of Loose and Licensed Firearms in Mindanao, as of 2010

32%

17%

14%

12%13%

12%

20,203 FAs

42,231 Fas(61% of total in the region)

62,718 Fas(74% of total in the region)

Philippines: 1 Loose Firearm per 49 persons

Licensed:134,018(27%)

Loose:358,250(73%)

Total:492,268

114,189 Fas(85% of total in the region)

26,514 FAs

22, 210 FAs

R10 Total:68,745

ARMM Total:134,392

R12 Total:84,928

44.5% of all firearms in Mindanao are in ARMM and Central Mindanao

Distribution of Loose Firearms in Mindanao

Who has the guns and what for? • 20% as tools for the coercive power of the state • 1% in the hands of rebels as tools in challenging the state

and proto-state formation • Unknown number in the hands of organized non-state actors• The bulk in the hands of civilians • 6,075 firearms (0.2% of total) used in 5,779 gun-related

crimes in 2010; 99% illicit firearms• Inverse proportion of FA use in main cleavages and crime • Indicative high in gun purchases when the main cleavage is in

the low

Legal and Illegal Structures of Protection

Legal Inventory

Illegal Inventory

Illegal Supply Black &

GreyMarkets

Brokers

MILF

Politicians

Business Elites

Crime Syndicates

CPP-NPA

Conflict Fields

Private Individuals

Security Agencies

System of the Illegal Trade in Firearms

(Gathered from Life Histories)

Financial Incentives

Profit Margins and Rents from Protection

Multifunctional and Multi-directional Demand Structure

The Function-Based Incentive Structure in Illegal Firearms Trade

(Gathered from Life Histories)

Black & Grey Markets

Supply Side

Demand Side

Rents from protectionCash conversion of inventoryRecycling of recovered loose firearmsForce multiplier for state security functionsStrengthen power of local elitesIncremental price gains in transactions

private protectionPower projection Leverage in political bargainingEnhancement of belligerency claim Economic protectionMilitary (force) multiplierFill gaps in state protection

Case Study Areas: Talayan (Mag.) and Naawan (Mis. Or)

Extreme case comparison: Talayan and NaawanTalayan Naawan

What they have in common

4th class municipality

IRA a little less than PHP 40 million per annum

Households, a little less than 5,000 each

Where they differ

Established in 1976 (36 years old) Established in 1957 (55 years old)

One clan in power since1976; same clan in power in two adjacent municipalities

Succession of professionals; no single dominant clan

Land area: 14,000 hectares Land area: 900 hectares

Local revenues (2010): PHP 840,000 Local revenues (2010): PHP 6.3 million

Total income: PHP 55 million (from IRA and non-IRA transfers such as donor programs and national government programs)

Total income: PHP 41 million

Firearms in civilian hands: 5,000 to 15,000 Firearms in civilian hands: 16

Registered enterprise: 1 (based on anecdotal evidence)

Registered enterprise: 238 in 2010, 282 in 2011 (based on actual records)

People die early, men at 58 and women at 62 (regional average)

People live relatively longer; men at 65 and women at 70 (regional average)

Grade VI NAT MPS (2010): 50% (regional data) Grade VI NAT MPS (2010): 70% (regional data)

Performance in Fundamentals of Governance: Naawan and Talayan

Performance in Administrative Governance: Naawan and Talayan

Performance in Economic Governance: Naawan and Talayan

Performance in Social Governance: Naawan and Talayan

Performance in Environmental Governance: Naawan and Talayan

Conclusions

• Evidence suggests the schizophrenic function of firearms accumulation and proliferation in the hands of civilians

• Where firearms support clan-based patronage, the element of protection tends to undermine other fundamentals of state

• Extra-bureaucratic complicity in illegal firearms accumulation and proliferation weakens the coercive power of the state and creates incentives for sustained proliferation

• Civilian gun holders selectively use violence for their own interest and protection including evasion of state authority

Possible Recommendations

• GPH accession to the UN Program of Action on tracing, marking and reporting.

• Public decommissioning of confiscated weapons to reduce leakage back to the black and grey markets.

• Legislative oversight of the FED and promotion of transparency in firearms trading and registration.

• Explicit inclusion of firearms regulation in the campaign against corruption.

• Strengthening law enforcement and deterrence against crime

Thank You!