Beyond  Independence    Court  Governance    in  Context  

Prepared  by  Tin  Bunjevac  Sydney,  7  October  2011  

A  member  of:  

Introduction  •  Need  to  firstly  idenCfy  problems,  aims  and  drivers  for  reform  before  choosing  a  “model”  •  What  those  problems  mean  for  the  future  of  the  judicial  system?    

•  Difficulty  of  reaching  consensus    •  OrganisaConal  “atrophy”  due  to  absence  of  common  analyCcal  and  policy  making  infrastructure  

•  There  is  a  structural  deficiency  in  the  organisaConal  design  of  the  execuCve  model  of  court  administraCon  •  Makes  it  difficult  to  strategically  plan  acCviCes  •  Not  opCmal  for  independence,  efficiency  and  quality  

•  Without  common  infrastructure  and  radical  changes  in  the  way  courts  are  managed,  difficult  to  see  how  courts  and  judges  will  tackle  exisCng  (significant)  challenges  •  Let  alone  contemplate  systemaCc  future  improvements  in  the  quality  of  jusCce  

•  Governance  debate  has  shiUed  from  purely  academic  debate  to  aVempts  to  idenCfy  urgently  needed  organisaConal  soluCons  to  protect  judges  and  courts  from  mulCple  external  threats  

Problems  of  delay:  NSW  and  VIC  •  600-­‐page  study  of  Civil  LiCgaCon  in  NSW  vs  Germany  (AneVe  Marfording  2010)  

•  “The  most  comprehensive  and  interesCng  comparaCve  study  in  a  generaCon”  (SMH  2010)  

•  Examined  240  comparable  cases  from  filing  to  disposiCon  •  Similar  causes  of  acCon,  expert  evidence,  type  of  compensaCon,  jurisdicCon  

•  DuraCon  in  months:  

35.12  23.44  

7.68  

District  Court  of  StuVgart    

District  Court  of  NSW    

Supreme  Court  of  NSW    

Surveys  

NSW  -­‐  100  aspects  of  liCgaCon  “in  need  of  reform”  

Germany  -­‐  16  aspects  in  need  of  

reform  

Problems  of  delay:  NSW  and  VIC  

•  In  2010  Victoria  had  the  longest  waiCng  lists  for:  •  Magistrates’  Court  maVers  •  Children’s  Court  maVers  •  County  Court  trials  •  Supreme  Court  appeals      

(AVorney-­‐General  Robert  Clark,  2010)  

Causes  of  delay:  External  •  Increasing  liCgiousness  (>30%  since  2003)  •  Law  more  complex  –  specialisaCon  of  pracCConers  •  New  technologies  –  longer  cases  (forensic  evidence)  •  Average  higher  court  crime  5  days  in  1980s  14  days  in  2000s  

•  MulC-­‐cultural  society  •  Great  asset,  but  need  interpreters,  delay  in  presenCng  evidence  

•  Higher  clients’  service  expectaCons  •  client  friendly,  cost  effecCve,  transparent,  plain  language,  iPhone  •  Pressure  from  commercial  parCes,  government,  media,  police  

•  OrganisaConal  quality  requirements  (CEPEJ,  2003)  •  Efficiency,  systems  integraCon,  permanent  training,  uniform  applicaCon  of  law,  judicial  precision,  correct  treatment  of  parCes    

•  Stop  delay,  “even  if  reasoning  is  not  perfect!”  (Eradus,  2000)  

Judicial  administration  problems  •  Judicial  individualism  and  administraCve  passivity  (McGarvie  J)  •  Maybe  an  asset  for  judicial  independence,  but  a  weakness  when  it  comes  to  responding  to  societal  challenges  (Langbroek,  2010)  

•  “Especially  pronounced  when  backlogs  +  complexity  increased”  (Ng,  2007)  •  Too  much  loyalty  to  “smallest  unit”  in  the  organisaCon  

•  Poorly  defined  rules  of  internal  administraCve  organisaCon  •  Some  aVempts  to  address  problems  through  admin  divisions  h/w  •  Roles  of  chief  judges,  “judges-­‐in-­‐charge”  etc  not  well-­‐defined  •  Unclear  authority  of  chief  judges  over  other  judges  or  admin  staff  

•  Councils  of  judges  parCcularly  ineffecCve  as  a  governing  organ  •  19th  Century  insCtuCon,  consensus-­‐driven,  insular  •  Any  council  with  more  than  15  judges  “inevitably  gives  rise  to  serious  problems  of  administraCon.”  (Hruska  Commission,  USA,  1973)  

Structural  de?iciencies  of  court  governance  •  Far-­‐reaching  administraCve  separaCon  between  judicial  and  administraCve  operaCons  •  Judicial  governance  structures  operate  in  isolaCon  from  court  administraCon  (CEO  has  liVle  or  no  input  in  judicial  governance)  

•  Judges  are  not  adequately  involved  in  operaConal    planning  (CJC)  •  No  parallel  analyCcal  infrastructure  available  to  undertake  this  task  •  No  control  over  budget,  administraCon,  even  if  infrastructure  available  

•  Courts  don’t  have  sufficient  discreCon  over  expenditures  •  No  fixed  budget,  even  the  allocated  funds  move  around  (AIJA,  2004)  •  Funding  requests  need  approval  from  external  bureaucracy    

•  Different  prioriCes,  hierarchies,  physical  separaCon,  policy  background  •  EffecCvely,  neither  judges  nor  administrators  have  sufficient  control  to  be  responsible  for  outcomes  (who  is  responsible  to  public?)  

•  misalignment  between  authority  and  responsibility  (AIJA,  2004)  •  Bifurcated  system  of  administraCon  (Denham  Report,  1996)  

•  Conclusion:  Fundamental  obstacles  to  strategic  long  term  planning  of  acCviCes.  (CJC,  2006,  AIJA  2004,  CEPEJ  2003)  

Realisation  of  need  for  change  •  Courts’  challenges  significant  in  comparison  with  other  large  organisaCons  •  Increasing  pressures,  delay,  challenging  environment,  higher  expectaCons,  growing  criCcism,  backlogs  -­‐    all  at  the  same  Cme!  

•  RealisaCon  that  the  society  is  becoming  more  complex,  demanding  and  diverse    

•  RealisaCon  that  tradiConally  passive  judicial  approaches  to  court  administraCon  need  to  be  reassessed  •  Judges  have  to  organise  beVer,  delegate  tasks  •  To  do  that,  they  need  the  support  of  an  organisaCon  to  be  able  to  respond  the  future  challenges  

•  RealisaCon  that  the  legislator  has  exhausted  almost  all  opCons  •  Record  investments,  more  judges,  more  tribunals,  procedural  reforms,  substanCve  reforms,  ADR    

•  RealisaCon  that,  despite  all  reforms,  the  problems  are  persistent  and  growing  in  intensity,  complexity  and  scope.  

Rethinking  independence,  ef?iciency  &  quality:  2  sets  of  questions  to  ask:  •  Q1.  Are  the  exisCng  judicial  and  management  arrangements  sCll  appropriate  to  ensure  effecCve  and  efficient  administraCon?    

•  In  view  of  the  problems,  answer  is  overwhelmingly  negaCve:  •  structural  divide,  poorly  defined  structures,  consensus-­‐driven,  strategic  planning  difficult,  funding  cycle  unstable  

•  Interpersonal  divide  between  judges  and  court  staff  •  no  workflow  integraCon,  no  meaningful  professional  support  for  judges,  delegaCon  paVerns  basic,  based  on  individual  professionalism  of  judges,  rather  than  a  “system”  

•  A1:  More  integrated  and  verCcal  administraCve  arrangements  are  needed  to  give  court  managers  more  internal  possibiliCes    •  “ParCcularly  in  financial  and  personnel  maVers”  (CEPEJ,  2003)  

•  So  the  first  answer  is  the  system  of  integrated  management  

Integrated  management  in  courts  

•  Integrated  management  is  the  key  to  more  effecCve  operaCons:  the  Australian  federal  courts  

•  The  court  is  self-­‐responsible  for  financial  and  personnel  maVers  •  More  verCcal  and  central  command  of  administraCve  operaCons  

•  Integrated  courts  successfully  evolving  from  “organisa(ons  of  professionals”  into  “professional  organisa(ons”  

•  Improved  efficency,  self  responsibility,  innovaCon,  task  delegaCon,  insCtuConal  self-­‐confidence  

•  Greatly  enhances  strategic-­‐planning  capacity  (Soden,  2010)  •  Places  judges  in  “appropriate  working  relaConship  with  professional  administrators”  (CJ  Black,  2007)  

Rethinking  independence,  ef?iciency  &  quality:  2nd  type  of  issues  •  Q2.  How  can  courts  contemplate  future  improvements  in  quality?  •  TradiConal  judicial  qualiCes  remain  essenCal,  but  not  sufficient  •  Judges  and  courts  need  to  organise  beVer,  require  support  

•  A2:  A  dedicated  independent  agency  for  the  courts  can  provide  the  funding,  experCse,  technical  and  professional  support.  

•  Proposed  agency  based  on  non-­‐departmental  public  bodies  (NDPB):  •  DifferenCated  governance  structure,  at  arms  length  from  minister,  different  internal  control  environment,  public  accountability  

•  RaConale  for  NDPBs:  •  “greater  legiCmacy,  transparency  and  experCse  of  decision-­‐making”  •  “Coherence  between  funcCon,  form  and  managerial  authority”  (OECD,  2002;  2007)  

•  Promotes  independence,  efficiency,  specialisaCon,  innovaCon,  client  focus,  service  delivery  (OECD,  2007)  

Northern  European  Model  

•  Sweden,  the  Netherlands,  Norway,  Ireland  (UK?)  •  Belief  that  a  Judicial  Agency  is  best  posiConed  to  protect  independence,  promote  quality,  self-­‐responsibility  and  efficiency  in  courts  (ie.  similar  to  NDPBs):  (CEPEJ,  2003)  1.  An  independent  judicial  agency  with  budgetary  and  

management  support  competences  promotes  self-­‐responsibility,  efficiency  and  administraCve  capacity  of  the  judiciary  at  system  level    

2.  Promotes  self-­‐responsibility,  efficiency  and  quality  in  individual  courts,  due  to  support  offered  by  a  central  service  organisaCon  

3.  Key  is  in  the  combinaCon  of  support  “from  a  distance”  and  “integrated  management”  in  the  courts  Ø  Should  not  “run”  court  administraCon  for  courts  (cf  SA,  Ireland,  UK)  

Agency’s  tasks  and  powers  •  Allocates  budget  to  courts,  provides  general  and  technical  support,  drives  development  and  quality  •  Must  acquaint  itself  with  the  condiCons  in  which  the  courts  operate  

•  Maintains  some  common  systems,  such  as  IT,  security,  payroll,  web,  legal  databases  

•  Responsible  for  training,  educaCon,  recruitment,  competences  •  Key:  it  does  not  manage  budgets  or  employ  staff  for  the  courts  

•  Assists  with  project/technical  know-­‐how,  promotes  best  pracCces  •  Performs  certain  legal  and  policy  tasks  –  evaluaCng  proposed  legislaCon,  drawing  proposals  in  consultaCon  with  courts,  deals  with  external  agencies  

•  Can  play  a  major  role  in  promoCng  legal  quality  and  providing  legal/research  support  to  the  judiciary  to  improve  the  quality  of  legal  outcomes  and  uniform  applicaCon  of  the  law  (the  Netherlands)  

Features  of  the  Northern  European  Judicial  Agency  •  Historical  origin:  Sweden  -­‐  consCtuConal  tradiCon  of  funcConal  decentralisaCon  and  devoluCon  of  govt  funcCons  to  independent  administraCve  agencies  –  small  ministries,  large  independent  agencies  

•  Protected  by  consCtuCon  from  any  interference  by  ministers  •  Possibility  to  address  parliament  if  overall  budget  insufficient?  

•  Broadly  defined  tasks  and  powers  to  allow  flexibility  in  actual  dealings  with  courts  +  others  (general,  technical,  professional)  

•  Governance  based  on  public  accountability  (OECD,  CEPEJ)  •  Broad  stakeholder  representaCon  on  board  •  Fixed  term  appointments,  on  merit  •  ExcepConally  high  level  of  operaConal  transparency  and  public  accountability  to  compensate  for  loss  of  ministerial  responsibility  

•  Strong  emphasis  on  consultaCons  in  all  dealings  

General  directives  from  government  •  Government  and  minister  have  a  very  limited  role  in  operaConal  issues  (other  than  the  budget  and  informaCon)  

•  Government  can  issue  basic  operaConal  direcCves  that  accompany  the  government’s  budget  bill.  

•  Eg.  Government’s  operaConal  direcCves  for  the  Swedish  Agency  include:  (SNCA,  2010)  •  SNCA  shall  create  appropriate  condiCons  for  the  courts  by:  •  Ensuring  an  appropriate  allocaCon  of  resources  •  Providing  administraCve  support  and  services  •  AcCng  as  a  driving  and  supporCng  force  in  developmental  and  quality-­‐enhancement  measures  

•  Striving  to  promote  access  to  courts  •  SupporCng  greater  co-­‐operaCon  between  the  courts  •  SupporCng  cooperaCon  between  the  courts  and  other  bodies.  

Governance:  diverse  composition  of  board  •  DifferenCated  governance  structure  promotes  transparency,  experCse  and  legiCmacy  of  decision-­‐making    (OECD,  2002)  •  Good  balance  of  professional  and  social  perspecCves  •  SubstanCal/majority  judicial  parCcipaCon  is  envisaged  

•  Members  may  include  Judges,  Court  CEOs,  Lawyers,  MPs,  independent  experts  

•  Norway  9  members,  Netherlands  4,  Ireland  17,  Denmark  11,  England  10-­‐11,  Sweden  8  members  •  Uhrig  Report  (2003):  6-­‐9  members  is  about  right  for  public  bodies  •  Hruska  Commission  (1973):  No  more  than  15  on  a  judicial  board  •  CEPEJ  (2003):  overly  extensive  representaCon  is  suscepCble  to  “poliCcisaCon  and  syndicalism”  –  criCcal  of  Irish  board.  

•  Growing  percepCon  that  chief/judge-­‐only  board  is  too  inward-­‐oriented  •  New  philosophy  of  court  system  as  a  “service”  to  community  (McCutcheon  et  al,  2001)  

Governance:  ?ixed  term  appointments  •  Appointments  made  for  4-­‐6  years  (+  extension?)  •  Promotes  experCse,  based  on  merit  •  Achieves  separaCon  of  “ownership”  from  “management”  •  In  the  long  run  leads  to  depoliCcisaCon  and  professionalisaCon  of  court  administraCon  

•  Even  judicial  nominaCons  are  made  according  to  the  candidates’  perceived  skills,  experience  and  interest  in  court  administraCon  (Sweden,  Netherlands,  Denmark,  Norway)  

•  Permanent  and  facConal  membership,  eg  strictly  based  on  posiCon  in  judicial  hierarchy,  may  not  provide  the  required  skills,  legiCmacy  and  authority  (difficult  to  replace  if  unsuited)  

•  Appropriate  appointments/nominaCons  processes  must  be  established  to  ensure  transparency  and  confidence  of  all  •  Must  be  aVuned  to  the  needs  of  the  courts  and  judges  

Basic  ministerial  responsibility  •  Minister  only  responsible  for  budget  adequacy  and  informaCon,  but  agency  may  make  representaCons  to  parliament  directly  

•  Ministerial  responsibility  is  replaced  and/or  combined  with  public  accountability  

•  In  some  countries,  minister  can  sCll  recommend  dismissal  of  the  board  by  Royal  Decree,  in  excepConal  circumstances:  

•  Manifestly  unlawful  decisions  prejuducial  to  operaCons  of  courts  •  Auditor-­‐General  advises  of  gross  irregulariCes  in  financial  operaCons  

•  Except  in  extreme  cases,  all  operaConal  responsibility  rests  with  the  agency/CEO,  and  the  minister  has  no  control  over  their  operaCons  

•  The  Government  may  provide  general  objecCves  but  not  interfere  •  eg  Irish  Courts  service  is  required  to  take  into  account  govt  policy  

Alternative  forms  of  accountability  •  To  compensate  for  reduced  ministerial  responsibility,  new  forms  of  public  accountability  have  been  developed  •  VerCcal  responsibility  to  minister  has  been  replaced  by  horizontal  mechanisms  of  accountability  between  the  agency  and  the  minister,  and  the  agency  and  the  public  

•  Diverse  composiCon  of  the  board  supports  public  accountability  •  Annual  reports,  Strategic  plans  •  Required  to  provide  specified  and  detailed  informaCon  about  significant  aspects  of  the  agencies’  and  courts  operaCons  

•  Assessments  of  performance  against  own  goals  and  government  general  direcCves  

•  Detailed  informaCon  about  financial  operaCons  and  staCsCcs  •  Far-­‐reaching  rights  of  access  to  informaCon  about  all  aspects  of  internal  operaCons  (decisions,  materials,  correspondence)  

•  Transparent  rules  of  internal  organisaCon,  accessible  to  the  public  •  Ombudsman  can  invesCgate  complaints  •  Auditor-­‐General  performs  annual  audits  

Conclusion  •  There  are  significant  internal  and  external  challenges  impacCng  on  the  courts’  operaCons  and  they  are  growing  in  scope,  intensity  and  complexity.  This  trend  is  not  likely  to  be  reversed.  

•  The  execuCve  model  of  court  governance  makes  it  difficult  for  courts  to  strategically  plan  their  operaCons,  due  to  the  idenCfied  structural  deficiencies  that  are  inherent  in  organisaConal  design.  

•  As  a  result,  more  integrated  management  arrangements  are  required  to  give  the  courts  more  internal  possibiliCes,  parCcularly  in  financial  and  personnel  maVers  (integrated  management).  

•  An  independent  judicial  agency  can  provide  the  necessary  support  to  the  courts  and  promote  their  self-­‐responsibility,  independence,  quality  and  efficiency.  An  independent  judicial  agency  should  be  managed  by  a  professional  board  consisCng  of  fixed-­‐term  appointees,  but  with  significant  judicial  parCcipaCon.  

•  To  compensate  for  the  reducCon  in  ministerial  responsibility,  alternaCve  forms  of  public  accountability  should  be  offered.