ellen kim is a PhD student in Political Science and International Relations at the University of Southern California and an Adjunct Fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. She can be reached at <ekim@csis.org>.

victor cha is Senior Adviser and inaugural holder of the Korea Chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies as well as a Professor of Government at Georgetown University. He is also the Director of Asian Studies and holds the D.S. Song-KF Chair in the Department of Government and School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University. He can be reached at <vcha@csis.org>.

Between a Rock and a Hard Place:South Korea’s Strategic Dilemmas with

China and the United States

Ellen Kim and Victor Cha

asia policy, number 21 (january 2016), 101–21

• http://asiapolicy.nbr.org •

keywords: south korea; china; united states; strategy; entrapment

© The National Bureau of Asian Research, Seattle, Washington

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executive summary

This essay examines four strategic dilemmas that the Republic of Korea (ROK) faces vis-à-vis China and discusses their implications for regional and U.S.-ROK relations.

main argument

The current bilateral relationship between China and South Korea is the best in the two nations’ modern histories. It is not clear, however, whether the current positive trajectory can be sustained into the future, given the recurring fluctuations in South Korea’s policy toward China. This dynamic results from four strategic dilemmas that South Korea faces in dealing with China: dilemmas over power, economics, North Korea, and entrapment in the U.S. alliance. Recent developments in Sino-ROK relations have led to new opportunities for greater bilateral cooperation but also have important implications for regional relations. In the triangular context of the U.S.-ROK-China relationship, South Korea’s closeness with China has not come at the expense of a diminished relationship with the U.S. This demonstrates that its bilateral relationships with China and the U.S. may not be mutually exclusive but could achieve positive-sum gains. Nevertheless, South Korea still faces significant challenges in managing relations with both countries.

policy implications• Understanding South Korea’s strategic dilemmas vis-à-vis China is critical

for the U.S. in order to successfully manage its alliance with the ROK. The two allies must address a misalignment of their policy priorities regarding China and determine how to sustain a coordinated, if not common, strategy.

• The U.S. must recognize that South Korea’s outreach toward China is not construed as alliance dissonance. Seoul’s active engagement with Beijing can be a strategic opportunity to influence China to adhere to global norms and behave as a responsible stakeholder.

• South Korea’s relationships with the U.S. and China need not be a zero-sum game or mutually exclusive. A deep alliance with the U.S. actually strengthens South Korea’s position as it deals with China, but only if Seoul resists Beijing’s efforts to demarcate the scope of its alliance with Washington.

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O n September 2, 2015, South Korean president Park Geun-hye visited Beijing upon invitation by Chinese president Xi Jinping to attend the

country’s celebration of the 70th anniversary of the end of World War II. Joined by Russian president Vladimir Putin and other foreign guests, Presidents Park and Xi watched a massive military parade at Tiananmen Gate. Absent from the celebration was the current North Korean leader Kim Jong-un. Ironically, 61 years ago it was Mao Zedong and Kim Il-sung, founding fathers of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and North Korea, respectively, who were standing together in the same place to see a military review. Perhaps nothing can better illustrate the current state of affairs in China’s relations with the two Koreas than a juxtaposition of these two contrasting images.

The bilateral relationship between the Republic of Korea (ROK) and China under the current Park and Xi governments is undeniably at its strongest point in modern history, with a series of efforts underway to consolidate and institutionalize their strategic partnership. The first summit between the two leaders in June 2013 led to the establishment of four strategic communication channels to regularize high-level strategic dialogues. Both countries also pledged to move forward on their previous agreement to set up a military hotline between their defense ministers. With respect to the economic relationship, the two countries signed the China-Korea Free Trade Agreement and agreed to establish a direct trading market for the Chinese yuan and Korean won to further boost bilateral trade. All these measures are indicative of a new level of bilateral cooperation unprecedented in the modern history of Sino-ROK relations.

Nonetheless, South Korea’s relations with China remain complex, and it appears unclear whether the current positive dynamic in the relationship will or can be sustained into the future, given a pattern of recurring fluctuations in South Korea’s policy toward China. Some analysts may argue that this pattern has emerged because South Korea’s China policy is determined by the administration in Seoul or the strength of the U.S.-ROK alliance. However, this vacillation actually results from far more fundamental conditions underlying South Korea’s political, economic, and security considerations and geostrategic calculations, which create four strategic dilemmas for South Korea in dealing with China: dilemmas over power, economics, North Korea, and entrapment in the U.S. alliance. Understanding these four dilemmas is important because South Korea’s policy toward China holds important geopolitical and regional implications. South Korea is a key U.S. ally in Asia, yet Seoul’s growing closeness to Beijing amid emerging tensions and competition between the United States and China complicates U.S. strategy as

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it rebalances to the region. This situation also raises concerns about the future direction of the U.S.-ROK alliance. More broadly, South Korea’s geostrategic trajectory could directly affect the balance of power in Asia. Whether South Korea inclines toward a rising China or stays anchored in the traditional alliance relationship with the United States, it could become a marker of Asia’s future direction.

This essay first will examine each of the four dilemmas identified above and South Korea’s position in them to promote a better understanding of the current trends in PRC-ROK relations and the principles driving South Korea’s China strategy. It will then consider alternative arguments before concluding with a discussion of implications for regional relations and the U.S.-ROK alliance.

south korea’s four strategic dilemmas

There is a basic puzzle with regard to the South Korean view of China. On the one hand, South Korea views China as the second most favorable country among regional powers after the United States.1 On the other hand, South Korea also views China as a major threat. These diverging views mark a clear departure from South Korea’s negative perception of China in the 1950–60s, when China was largely considered a Communist adversary during the Korean War and later North Korea’s staunch ally. Yet South Korea’s perception of China remains complex and ambiguous at best. This complexity is not just limited to public attitudes and perceptions but is also mirrored in the government’s foreign policy toward China. Although South Korea pursues close economic cooperation and a strategic partnership with China, it does so while hedging, if not balancing, against a rising China. How do we then unpack this exceedingly complex relationship?

South Korea’s China policy has a tendency to vacillate because the country’s strategy toward China has been largely a combination of engagement and hedging. A primary driving force behind Seoul’s engagement with Beijing has been the need for Chinese cooperation on North Korea, combined with burgeoning economic ties. By contrast, other political and military issues and concerns make South Korea hedge against China. Of these considerations, the most pertinent is the fact that South Korea is a treaty ally of the United States, which places what one scholar calls “structural and perceptual limits” on its

1 Jiyoon Kim, Karl Friedhoff, Chungku Kang, and Euicheol Lee, “South Korean Attitudes on China,” Asan Institute for Policy Studies, July 2014.

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engagement with China.2 In between these two opposing forces, South Korea also faces a power dilemma with regard to China: smaller countries like South Korea may feel threatened by the presence of a giant neighbor and thus opt to “accommodate” that country.3 In addition to these general trends, South Korea finds itself caught striking the right balance between contrary impulses within each of these four areas. For instance, although strong economic and trade relations draw it closer to China through greater economic cooperation, South Korea is also concerned about its growing economic dependence on China. Overall, the interplay of conflicting and competing forces within, and between, each of the four dilemmas shapes Seoul’s dual hedging and engaging strategy and results in vacillating policies.

The Power Dilemma

South Korea’s power dilemma vis-à-vis China primarily stems from the sheer presence of China as a great power and neighbor in Northeast Asia. Although South Korea has always existed next to China, the latter has and continues to exert significant influence on the Korean Peninsula, stemming from thousands of years of historical relations that Koreans cannot ignore. China is the world’s most populous country (estimated population of nearly 1.4 billion) and one of the largest countries by size, with a land mass of roughly 9.3 million square kilometers (km), or roughly 3.6 million square miles.4 South Korea, in comparison, is approximately 28 times smaller in population (estimated at 49 million people) and 96 times smaller in area (estimated a 96,920 square km, or 37,421 square miles).5 The vast disparity in physical size matters more prominently in South Korea’s security perceptions because of geographic proximity. Although South Korea does not directly adjoin China, the Korean Peninsula is connected to continental Asia via a 1,416 km (880 mile) border with China. This geographic reality will never change and will always directly affect South Korea’s security perceptions—increasingly so as a rising China becomes more assertive in its foreign policy.

2 Jae Ho Chung, Between Ally and Partner: Korea-China Relations and the United States (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), 114.

3 Aaron L. Friedberg, A Contest For Supremacy: China, America, and the Struggle for Mastery in Asia (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2011), 201.

4 “East and Southeast Asia: China,” in World Factbook (Washington, D.C.: Central Intelligence Agency, 2015) u https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ch.html.

5 “East and Southeast Asia: Korea, South,” in ibid. u https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ks.html.

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In addition to population and territory, what also underlies and amplifies South Korea’s power dilemma is China’s economic and military power, which has grown apace over the past decades. For instance, in 2013 China’s economy ($9.240 trillion) was approximately seven times the size of South Korea’s ($1.304 trillion) in terms of GDP.6 Although South Korea spends more on its military as a percentage of GDP, it still trails China in total military spending. China’s defense budget was $112.2 billion in 2013, whereas South Korea’s defense budget was only $31.8 billion.7 Furthermore, China’s military accommodates a greater number of troops than any other country in the world at close to 2.3 million strong in 2012.8 Such gaps in sheer power undoubtedly make South Korea vulnerable to China’s economic influence and potential military aggression. South Korea’s insecurity may also derive from its political and ideological differences with China. Dissonant value systems can breed insecurity and suspicion between democracies and illiberal regimes that share a common border. Political scientist Michael Doyle attributes this to the “perception by liberal states that non-liberal states are in a permanent state of aggression against their own people.”9 South Korea—seen as a successful democracy—cannot but feel uncertain about the implications of the rise of a mammoth Communist state in its neighborhood.

Above all, China’s global rise deepens South Korea’s power dilemma. To South Koreans, China’s rise augurs a resurgence of Sinocentric hierarchical order. In light of their country’s own historical experiences as a tributary state to old Chinese dynasties, and also given Beijing’s increasingly assertive behavior and willingness to project its newfound power, South Koreans are naturally wary and anxious about China’s rise.10 Such apprehension surfaced in 2004 when China claimed ancient Korea’s Koguryo kingdom as part of Chinese provincial history, which immediately invited strong rebukes from South Koreans. Some argued that the action showed “hegemonic

6 “GDP (Current US$),” World Bank, World Development Indicators u http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD.

7 “The Military Balance 2014 Press Statement,” International Institute for Strategic Studies, February 5, 2014 u http://www.iiss.org/en/about%20us/press%20room/press%20releases/press%20releases/archive/2014-dd03/february-0abc/military-balance-2014-press-statement-52d7.

8 Ministry of National Defense (ROK), 2012 Defense White Paper (Seoul, 2012), 350–53 u http://www.mnd.go.kr/user/mnd_eng/upload/pblictn/PBLICTNEBOOK_201308140915094310.pdf.

9 Michael Doyle, “Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs, Part 2,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 12, no. 3 (1983): 325–26.

10 Chung, Between Ally and Partner, 101.

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ambitions,”11 while others saw it as an indication of Chinese strategic intent in the event of contingencies on the Korean Peninsula.12 In the end, China’s revisionist claim was a wake-up call for South Koreans and had a dramatically chilling effect on their increasingly positive view of China.13

This power dilemma is a constant, not a variable, in South Korea’s policy calculations toward China. The sheer differences in various measures of power between the two countries are a source of vulnerability and skepticism while at the same time providing incentive to South Korea not to antagonize its big neighbor.

The Economic Dilemma

If trade was one of the main conduits of limited cooperation and bilateral exchanges in the pre-normalization period of the 1970s and 1980s, it has become an end in itself that provides a major impetus to greater bilateral cooperation between China and South Korea given their current robust trade and commercial ties. This economic logic gained traction in Seoul when China surpassed the United States as South Korea’s largest trading partner in 2004. Ten years later, in 2014, China imported approximately $145 billion worth of products from South Korea, which constituted 25.4% of South Korea’s total exports that year.14 In comparison, the United States, the ROK’s second-largest trade partner, imported only $70 billion worth of South Korean products in 2014—a little less than half of what China imported.15 China has also remained the country with which South Korea has the largest trade surplus, ranging from $62 billion in 2013 to $55 billion in 2014.16 Furthermore, its total trade volume with China dramatically increased to more than $270 billion in 2013, surpassing South Korea’s combined bilateral trade volume with the United States and

11 Dick K. Nanto and Emma Chanlett-Avery, “The Rise of China and Its Effect on Taiwan, Japan, and South Korea: U.S. Policy Choices,” Congressional Research Service, CRS Report for Congress, RL32882, January 13, 2006, 26. See also Jin-sung Chun, “Our Dispute with China Isn’t about Ancient History,” Chosun Ilbo, February 27, 2007 u http://english.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2007/02/27/2007022761035.html.

12 See “ ‘Dulyeoun yeogsa naljo’ Jung-gug-ui Dongbuggongjeong wangyeol” [The “Dreadful History Hoax” of China’s Northeast Project Concludes], dongA.com, January 26, 2007 u http://news.donga.com/3/all/20070126/8400671/1.

13 For South Korean views of China and the United States, see Jae Ho Chung, “Leadership Changes and South Korea’s China Policy,” Korea Economic Institute, Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Series, vol. 23, 2012.

14 “Segyetong-gye: Hangug-ui 10dae muyeongguk” [World Statistics: South Korea’s Ten Major Trading Countries], K-stat u http://stat.kita.net/stat/world/major/KoreaStats06.screen.

15 Ibid. 16 Ibid.

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Japan.17 Naturally, South Koreans understand that their economic future is tied to China, as was shown in a June 2014 survey of regional experts across Asia-Pacific countries, where 86% of South Korean experts selected China as their country’s most important economic partner in ten years.18 Inevitably, these burgeoning economic ties began to influence politics in South Korea: enhancing greater economic cooperation with China—even in times of difficult political relations with Beijing—became a major policy imperative for many South Korean leaders. This led to the emergence of a dual strategy of pursuing a strong economic partnership with China while relying on a military alliance with the United States.

The current Park government is no less insensitive about South Korea’s economic reality. For her first state visit to China in 2013, President Park brought a record 71 business leaders in her delegation, signifying the importance her government places on its economic ties with China. (She brought 159 business leaders for her latest visit to China in September 2015.) In his reciprocal state visit to Seoul in July 2014, President Xi’s delegation included 200 Chinese business leaders, setting a record as the largest foreign business delegation to ever visit South Korea. To further strengthen already robust economic ties, both governments agreed to establish a direct trading market for their currencies and negotiated bilateral and multilateral trade agreements such as the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) and a trilateral free trade agreement (FTA) between China, Japan, and South Korea. These ongoing trade cooperation efforts led to the conclusion of the bilateral China-Korea FTA in November 2014 on the sidelines of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit.

While technical negotiations and legislative ratification of the agreement still must be completed, this bilateral FTA with China is expected to eliminate immediately $8.7 billion in tariffs on Korea’s exports to China when it takes effect, with another $45.8 billion to be eliminated over ten years.19 The FTA will cover 91% and 92% of Chinese and South Korean goods, respectively, within twenty years.20 The conclusion of the agreement also distinguishes

17 Jin Kai, “China’s Charm Offensive Toward South Korea,” Diplomat, July 8, 2014 u http://thediplomat.com/2014/07/chinas-charm-offensive-toward-south-korea.

18 Michael J. Green and Nicholas Szechenyi, Power and Order in Asia: A Survey of Regional Expectations (New York: Rowman and Littlefield, 2014).

19 “Korea, China Strike Free Trade Pact,” Korea.net, November 20, 2014 u http://www.korea.net/NewsFocus/Policies/view?articleId=122781.

20 “Hanjung FTA sangseseolmyeongjalyo” [Detailed Material for the Explanation of Korea-China FTA], Ministry of Trade, Industry, and Energy (ROK), March 2015 u http://www.fta.go.kr/webmodule/_PSD_FTA/cn/doc/1_description.pdf.

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South Korea as the third country after Chile and Peru, and the largest economy thus far, to have concluded FTAs with the world’s three largest economies: the United States, the European Union, and China. However, the agreement is not as high quality in scope as the Korea-U.S. Free Trade Agreement, and the potential economic benefits are limited. For example, the agreement covers only 70% of agricultural products and also excludes key products such as rice, steel, and auto parts from tariff elimination, which are points of sensitivity for both countries. The conclusion of negotiations acts more as a political boost for ties between Beijing and Seoul because the FTA adheres to the earlier summit agreement of the two countries’ leaders to strike a deal by the end of 2014.

As South Korea becomes increasingly economically dependent on China, however, South Koreans also have begun to perceive China as an economic threat. The number of South Koreans who view China as an economic threat has increased sharply from 52.7% in 2012 to 71.9% in 2014, even though their favorable view of China was consistently high during this period.21 Equally notable is the fact that more South Koreans perceived China as an economic threat than a military threat (66.4%).22 Thus far, this trend has not translated into any sort of action or had any policy implication in South Korea. Yet there are underlying tensions and serious concerns emerging in the country about China as both a major economic competitor and a rising economic influence.23

The North Korea Dilemma

North Korea lies at the heart of South Korea’s strategic engagement with China. Given decades of confrontation and deadlocked negotiations between South Korea and North Korea as well as the latter’s isolation and faltering economy, China’s political ties with North Korea as that country’s only ally and largest trade partner have given Beijing enormous leverage over the North Korean regime. As a result, China’s cooperation has long been regarded as key to resolving the current nuclear standoff with North Korea and achieving Korean reunification. In a public opinion survey in December 2013, almost 50% of South Koreans responded that China is the country

21 Kim et al., “South Korean Attitudes on China,” 22. 22 Ibid. 23 Ibid.

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whose cooperation is the most critical for reunification.24 Another survey found that the South Korean public believed that North Korea’s nuclear program (37.2%) and inter-Korean cooperation for reunification (20.6%) are the two most important issues for PRC-ROK relations.25

Despite decades of diplomacy, however, South Korea’s engagement strategy has not been successful in gaining Chinese cooperation on North Korea. The crux of the problem is that although Beijing publicly supports the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and peaceful Korean unification, its core geostrategic interest lies in maintaining the current status quo with North Korea as a crucial buffer state. China’s greatest fear is a reunification of the North and South, presumably under the governance of South Korea, whereby China loses that buffer zone and faces the U.S. Forces Korea immediately at its border, as well the likely massive inflow of North Korean refugees. Only by supporting the regime in Pyongyang can China avert such a daunting outcome. As a result, these diverging interests have led China to apply pressure on North Korea to rein in its nuclear weapons program and appease other countries, on the one hand, but also provide oil and other political and economic aid to North Korea so as to prevent the regime’s collapse, on the other hand.26 This two-track approach has been successful only in serving China’s interests.

Nonetheless, cracks in what was once called a “lips and teeth” relationship between China and North Korea have slowly begun to emerge, especially after Kim Jong-un took power. The quintessential example is the fact that there has not yet been a summit between Xi and Kim, whereas Xi and Park have held six summits, including two state visits. North Korea’s missile tests in July 2014, a day before Xi’s state visit to Seoul, were a clear sign of vehement protest over China’s increasing closeness with South Korea. To reduce its overwhelming dependence on China, Pyongyang made diplomatic overtures to Japan, Russia, South Korea, and even the United States, but to no avail. Meanwhile, a growing distance between Beijing and Pyongyang has allowed the Park and Xi governments to draw closer than had previously been possible. In Seoul, this is regarded as a window of new opportunity to pull China farther away from North Korea and closer to South Korea. Successful summits, diplomatic

24 “Half of S. Koreans Pick China as Key Help in Korean Unification: Poll,” Yonhap News Agency, February 5, 2014 u http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/national/2014/02/05/36/0301000000AEN20140205007200315F.html.

25 “South Koreans and Their Neighbors,” Asan Institute for Policy Studies, April 19, 2014 u http://en.asaninst.org/contents/south-koreans-and-their-neighbors-2014.

26 Friedberg, A Contest For Supremacy, 191.

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gestures, and expanding bilateral cooperation between South Korea and China have functioned as a means of strengthening their relationship and at the same time causing further erosion in Beijing-Pyongyang ties.

However, South Korea’s strategy has also received close scrutiny from neighboring countries. Although Seoul maintained close communication and cooperation with Washington, concerns and skepticism inevitably emerged among the United States and Japan about South Korea’s intention and its future direction. President Park’s attendance at the Chinese military parade celebrating the end of World War II, in particular, spurred different interpretations abroad. Some people saw her presence as evidence of South Korea’s “ ‘tilting’ toward China at the expense of the U.S.,” while others suggested a “lure” or effort on the part of South Korea to acquire the higher-level strategic cooperation that it desires from China in dealing with North Korea.27

China and North Korea are locked in a “mutual hostage relationship” in which one cannot easily abandon the other. Despite noticeable strains in relations and China’s warm gesture toward the South, Beijing has not changed its North Korea policy and seems highly unlikely to do so until its strategic interests are at stake. One scholar argues that China sees Korean reunification as inevitable and its strategy is only to delay unification as long as possible given its concerns about instability.28 If that claim accurately reflects China’s thinking, building deep strategic ties with Beijing will be essential for Seoul, no matter how limited the influence that such engagement can actually have on Chinese strategic thinking about North Korea. Having a coordination and cooperation mechanism and strategic communication channels between Seoul and Beijing is crucial and is also in U.S. and Japanese interests. Yet one important caveat in South Korea’s North Korea dilemma deserves careful consideration. Just as Seoul tries to peel China away from North Korea and seeks greater cooperation from Beijing, there is also a danger that Beijing could adroitly use this dilemma to its own advantage and cause erosion in Seoul’s alliance with Washington. Ultimately, South Korea’s strategic engagement with China is a double-edged sword that poses a multidimensional challenge. Seoul must exercise diplomatic finesse in furthering its strategic ties with

27 Shannon Tiezzi, “South Korea’s President and China’s Military Parade,” Diplomat, September 3, 2015 u http://thediplomat.com/2015/09/south-koreas-president-and-chinas-military-parade; and Scott A. Snyder, “Park’s Decision to Join Xi Jinping’s World War II Commemoration,” Council on Foreign Relations, Asia Unbound, September 2, 2015 u http://blogs.cfr.org/asia/2015/09/02/parks-decision-to-join-xi-jinpings-world-war-ii-commemoration.

28 Victor Cha, ed., Korean Unification in a New Era: A Conference Report of the CSIS Korea Chair (New York: Rowman and Littlefield, 2014), 39.

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Beijing while at the same time managing its allies’ and partners’ perceptions to avoid potential pitfalls down the road.

The Entrapment Dilemma

South Korea’s strategies toward China also need to address the entrapment dilemma, which largely stems from the notion that South Korea cannot afford to isolate China even as it remains allied with the United States. South Korea never wants to be in a situation where it will be caught between U.S. and Chinese interests. Nowhere is this fear of entrapment more evident than in debates about strategic flexibility. South Korea is extremely reluctant to allow U.S. forces on the Korean Peninsula to be used for contingencies in the region, especially regarding China. This issue came to a head in the early 2000s when the United States pushed for an explicit commitment, which South Korea was unwilling to give. Even as it remains a U.S. treaty ally, Seoul’s worst nightmare is to be forced to choose between Beijing and Washington. To avoid this entrapment dilemma, South Korea’s China strategies retain the U.S.-ROK alliance as a core component, though with varying degrees of enthusiasm.

South Korean presidents historically have dealt with the entrapment dilemma in one of two ways. One way is by playing a balancing role between the two powers. This strategy operates on the premise that South Korea cannot afford to choose between the United States and China and therefore will seek to position itself between the two, at times siding with the United States and at other times with China. This view retains the U.S. alliance but puts some distance between Seoul and Washington in order for South Korea to be a credible partner to China. This view was formally pronounced and upheld by the late South Korean president Roh Moo-hyun, who in 2005 asserted that South Korea could be a “balancer in Northeast Asia.” As simple as the concept may have sounded, it was not easy to implement, and the policy generated negative perceptions in Washington among pro-alliance constituents that South Korea was tilting away from the United States.

The second strategy is what might be termed “alliance-plus” and is based on the view that South Korea’s relationship with China and the United States need not be a zero-sum game. This strategy rests on an underlying assumption that despite political sensitivities, differences, and the competing natures of these relationships, there are converging areas of interest where both the U.S.-ROK alliance and the PRC-ROK strategic partnership can operate to achieve mutual benefits and greater public goods. This strategy also encompasses the view that there are alternative ways to look at relations with

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China beyond the friend-threat dichotomy. Supporters of this view claim that South Korea’s alliance with the United States and partnership with China are not mutually exclusive; to the contrary, a deep alliance with the United States actually strengthens South Korea’s position as it deals with China.29 Indeed, one high-level South Korean official privately noted this by saying, “If we have a poor relationship with the U.S., China treats us like a province, but if we have a good relationship, then they treat us with respect.”30

The Park administration’s China strategy reflects a delicate balance of the two strategies described above. This was previously demonstrated in January 2013 when President Park, then the president-elect, made an active overture to China by sending her first diplomatic envoy to Beijing instead of the traditional choice of Washington.31 Unlike her predecessors, who often went to Japan for their second trip abroad after the United States, President Park chose to return to China to show her resolve to improve relations. This series of unusual diplomatic moves by the Park administration was welcomed in Beijing and led to a reciprocal state visit by President Xi in July 2014. But President Park’s overtures to Beijing were carefully managed with regard to Washington. In May 2013, she made her first overseas trip to Washington, D.C., to hold a summit with President Barack Obama, demonstrating that South Korea’s center of gravity in its foreign relations remains the alliance with the United States. In addition to celebrating the 60th anniversary of the U.S.-ROK alliance, President Obama publicly supported President Park’s Korean Peninsula trust-building initiative, and President Park was given the honor of addressing a joint session of Congress, all of which shows the strength of bilateral ties. In spring 2015, however, the Park government faced a risk of entrapment between the United States and China over the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and issues surrounding Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD). Amid heightened tensions, a flurry of visits to Seoul by high-ranking government officials in March–April 2015, beginning with Chinese assistant minister of foreign affairs Liu Jianchao, U.S. assistant secretary of state Daniel Russel, and U.S. secretary of defense Ashton Carter, was seen in Seoul as a “tug of war” between the United States and

29 “Dongbug-asin jilseoleul malhada: ‘Hanmi meol-eojimyeon…Jung, ohilyeo Hangug-eul gyeongsihal geos’ ” [Speaking of a Northeast Asian Order: “If the U.S.-ROK Alliance Weakens, China Will Not Take South Korea Seriously”], Chosun Ilbo, July 18, 2014 u http://news.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2014/07/18/2014071800344.html.

30 Author’s private meeting with senior Korean official, Seoul, South Korea. 31 Lee Ji-seon, “Park Sends First Envoy to China,” Kyunghyang Shinmun, January 17, 2013 u

http://english.khan.co.kr/khan_art_view.html?artid=201301171445397&code=710100.

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China, with pressure mounting on the Park government to make a zero-sum choice between the two great powers.32

President Park is not the first leader to seek an improvement in relations with China. Despite some hiccups and lingering issues, however, there has been no time in the post–Cold War period when South Korea has maintained a good bilateral relationship with both China and the United States. Clearly, this is a unique moment. But it also brings greater risks and confronts South Korea with much more perplexing challenges as the country will need to carefully manage relationships with both the United States and China going forward without being caught between their interests.

New PRC-ROK Relations: Implications for Regional and U.S.-ROK Ties

Recent developments in PRC-ROK relations have led to new opportunities for greater bilateral cooperation but also have had important regional implications by creating new dynamics and uncertainties in Asia. The most direct impact was felt in China–North Korea relations. A growing distance in the relationship deepened North Korea’s isolation and appears to have prompted a change in its external relations strategy. More significantly, closer ties between Beijing and Seoul allegedly undermined China’s influence on North Korea. During a recent U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee hearing, U.S. government officials claimed that China’s influence on North Korea is waning and indicated this was a deep concern for the United States.33 In light of Pyongyang’s provocative behavior, Beijing’s inability to rein in North Korea would entail greater uncertainty and potentially higher risks of conflict on the peninsula. As South Korea continues to cultivate a deeper strategic partnership with China, policymakers in Seoul must be cognizant of Pyongyang’s perception of the changing security environment and how this will affect its future behavior and nuclear strategy.

South Korea’s warming relations with China also created new, complex dynamics in the context of the China-Japan-Korea triangle against the backdrop of resurgent historical and territorial disputes that damaged Japan’s relationship with both countries. In light of the fact that China’s rise and growing assertiveness is largely perceived in Japan as a grave challenge to

32 “Decision to Join China-Led Bank Tests South Korea’s Ties to U.S.,” Wall Street Journal, March 24, 2015 u http://www.wsj.com/articles/decision-to-join-aiib-tests-south-koreas-ties-to-u-s-1427185565.

33 Harry B. Harris Jr., statement to the U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services Hearing to Receive Testimony on Maritime Security Strategy in the Asia-Pacific Region, September 17, 2015 u

http://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/15-72%20-%209-17-15a.pdf.

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Japan’s security and prosperity with the potential to undermine its position in Asia,34 Seoul’s closeness to Beijing appeared to be a shift in the changing balance of power. Although South Korea is a U.S. ally and a democracy that shares common values and many overlapping global interests with Japan, Seoul’s growing tilt toward Beijing amid its constrained relationship with Tokyo has increased Japan’s susceptibility to the changing power transition in the region and spurred serious concern and skepticism about South Korea’s intention and policy direction. Moreover, the fact that this expanding cooperation with China coincided with South Korea’s intense historical and territorial disputes with Japan appears to have sent an unintended signal to Tokyo, creating a perception that China and South Korea were forming a united front against Japan on historical issues. This perception was partly fed by Beijing’s entreaties toward Seoul to rally against Japan based on their shared historical experiences under Japanese aggression.35 However, the Park government’s China policy is not driven by an anti-Japan agenda. Seoul has deflected all invitations by Beijing to join forces in attacking Japan on historical issues, arguing that its grievances with Japan are a bilateral issue. Despite this, bilateral relations between Japan and South Korea have reached the lowest point since the normalization of their ties. Public opinion also significantly dropped in both South Korea and Japan. According to a May 2015 poll conducted by the Genron NPO and East Asia Institute, 72.5% of South Koreans and 52.4% of Japanese have a negative view about each other.36

In the short run, the current adverse dynamic may likely continue among the three countries. Although China, Japan, and South Korea made small progress by holding their first trilateral summit in early November, the trilateral talks left much of their disputes unaddressed over historical grievances and other thorny issues that battered their regional relationships. On the sidelines of the trilateral summit, South Korean president Park Geun-hye and Japanese prime minister Shinzo Abe held their first bilateral talks. While the summit offered an opportunity to reset their strained bilateral relationship between Seoul and Tokyo and the two leaders agreed to resolve comfort women issues, the road ahead remains unclear as the two countries could not narrow

34 Sheila A. Smith, “Disdain in Beijing and Edginess in Tokyo,” Council on Foreign Relations, Asia Unbound, June 30, 2015 u http://blogs.cfr.org/asia/2015/06/30/disdain-in-beijing-and-edginess-in-tokyo.

35 Choe Sang-Hun, “Chinese Leader, Underlining Ties to South Korea, Cites Japan as Onetime Mutual Enemy,” New York Times, July 4, 2014 u http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/05/world/asia/in-south-korea-chinese-leader-cites-japan-as-onetime-mutual-enemy.html.

36 Yasushi Kudo, “Perilous Perception Gaps Surge between Tokyo and Seoul 50 Years after Normalizing Diplomatic Relations,” Genron NPO, May 30, 2015 u http://www.genron-npo.net/en/pp/archives/5184.html.

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down their outstanding differences in their views on wartime issues. Recent developments in Japan also do not bode well. In late September, the Japanese Diet passed security legislation that will allow the country to dispatch its Self-Defense Forces for overseas combat missions. Largely viewing Japan’s policy shift in the framework of the country’s remilitarization, both China and South Korea immediately criticized these moves and will be watching Japan’s new trajectory with great concern.

The strained relationship between Seoul and Tokyo has had adverse impacts on the U.S. rebalancing strategy toward Asia by weakening U.S.-ROK-Japan trilateral cooperation. Revamping the trilateral relationship thus has become essential for Washington to effectively deal with challenges in the region such as North Korea’s nuclear weapons program and China’s growing assertiveness in the South China Sea. As part of such efforts, President Obama brokered a trilateral summit in 2014 with President Park and Prime Minister Shinzo Abe with the goal of paving the way for a breakthrough in the relationship between the two U.S. allies. In this regard, South Korea and Japan made a small positive step forward at the end of December 2014 by reaching a new information-sharing agreement on North Korea, with the United States serving as an intermediary. Washington’s active role and deep involvement to ensure the stability of relations between Seoul and Tokyo are vital for regional security in Asia.37

Meanwhile, South Korea’s inclination to prioritize Korean Peninsula issues over off-peninsula or other regional security issues with China does not bode well for U.S.-ROK-Japan trilateral cooperation. This was evident in November 2013 when South Korea attempted to negotiate with China directly, rather than taking a united position with Japan and the United States on China’s newly declared air defense identification zone (ADIZ), which overlapped with South Korea’s ADIZ. In retrospect, had Beijing accepted Seoul’s request to rewrite the ADIZ to remove the overlap, this could have led to a critical breakdown in U.S.-ROK-Japan trilateral coordination.38

In the context of the U.S.-ROK-China relationship, South Korea’s closeness with China has not come at the expense of a diminished relationship with the United States. Nevertheless, challenges remain ahead as to how South Korea will manage its bilateral relationships with both the United States and China. One of the immediate concerns is the disagreement over deploying the

37 Victor Cha, “Lessons from Reischauer,” Joongang Ilbo, June 28, 2015. 38 Victor Cha, “Korea’s Mistake on China’s ADIZ Controversy,” Center for Strategic and International

Studies, Korea Chair Platform, December 2, 2013.

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U.S. anti-missile system THAAD to South Korea. Beijing repeatedly called on Seoul to reject the deployment of THAAD, arguing that such a move is aimed at China and would seriously damage PRC-ROK ties. In the face of China’s vehement objections, the Park administration has been extremely careful, and even strategically ambiguous, in order to avert a likely backlash from Beijing. The question of Seoul’s political or strategic choice between the two great powers still remains a focal point in the national debate over THAAD, but South Korea must prioritize national security interests over any efforts by China to delimit or demarcate the geographic scope of Seoul’s alliance with Washington. For the United States and China, a policy that forces South Korea, or any other country, to choose one over the other is not going to be in the interest of either great power; this situation will only undermine the regional stability and peace in Asia. In the end, THAAD is a top national security issue that the South Korean government cannot afford to compromise on in the face of external pressure. Just as Seoul prioritized its economic interests in joining the AIIB (over U.S. entreaties to the contrary), its decision on security issues should be determined by the extent of the missile threat emanating from North Korea rather than a misplaced desire to please China.

alternative arguments

Other analysts may argue that South Korea’s policy fluctuations toward China are induced by factors other than the aforementioned strategic dilemmas, such as domestic politics and changes of government in South Korea. That is, South Korea under a progressive government would tilt more toward China due to the popular anti-American sentiments more prevalently shared among progressives. Conversely, the same argument posits that South Korea under a conservative government would tilt more toward its traditional alliance relationship with the United States. On the surface, this argument appears to make a compelling case because historically it is more or less consistent with political trends in South Korea. For over six decades, the U.S.-ROK alliance has been the backbone of South Korea’s foreign policy under conservative governments in office. But the relationship began to drift during the progressive Kim Dae-jung (1998–2003) and Roh Moo-hyun (2003–8) administrations, and even became precarious during the latter. The PRC-ROK relationship was upgraded from a “cooperative partnership”

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in 1998 to the level of a “full-scale cooperative partnership” in 2000 and a “comprehensive cooperative partnership” in 2003.39

Nevertheless, the domestic politics argument does not adequately explain South Korea’s policy fluctuation because it does not hold in the case of the current conservative Park government. What this indicates is that a much more complex interaction of various forces drives South Korea’s China policy. How, then, can we better understand South Korea’s tilt toward China under the progressive governments? One plausible explanation can be provided by South Korea’s North Korea dilemma. Under the Kim Dae-jung administration, South Korea actively engaged China because earning greater Chinese cooperation for Korean reunification was an integral part of Kim’s Sunshine Policy toward North Korea.40 Unlike the Roh administration, the Kim administration did not exhibit an ideological drive in its engagement toward China to balance South Korea’s relations with the United States.41 Another counterexample is the fact that other conservative governments also sought to improve bilateral ties with China. For instance, it was under the conservative Roh Tae-woo administration that South Korea promoted Nordpolitik to engage China and the Soviet Union after the end of the Korean War, which led to a PRC-ROK détente in 1982. Even the conservative Lee Myung-bak administration, which bolstered the U.S.-ROK alliance as a top priority, wanted to deepen strategic ties with China. President Lee publicly noted that “it is not desirable for Korea to lean toward a South Korea–U.S. alliance, particularly from the perspective of a power balance in Northeast Asia. South Korea–U.S. relations and South Korea–China relations should be complementary to each other.”42 In May 2008, he and Chinese president Hu Jintao agreed to further strengthen the PRC-ROK relationship by upgrading it to a “strategic partnership.”

Another alternative explanation suggests that South Korea’s policy fluctuation is correlated with the strength of the U.S.-ROK alliance.43 That is, the status of the alliance may influence South Korea’s foreign policy stance, drawing the country closer to China when the alliance is weak while distancing it from China when the alliance is strong. A quintessential example would be the Roh and Lee administrations, which both shared an off-balance

39 Scott Snyder, “China-Korea Relations: Establishing a ‘Strategic Cooperative Partnership,’ ” Pacific Forum, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Comparative Connections, July 2008.

40 Chung, “Leadership Changes.” 41 Ibid. 42 Snyder, “China-Korea Relations.” 43 Chung, Between Ally and Partner, 102–3.

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relationship with China and the United States. In particular, in navigating the geopolitics in Northeast Asia, President Roh’s proclamation of South Korea as a regional balancer was widely interpreted as Seoul distancing itself from the United States and moving toward China. Nevertheless, this argument fails to acknowledge the notable bilateral cooperation that the United States and South Korea achieved under the Roh administration. Indeed, the Roh and George W. Bush administrations pushed to open new areas of bilateral alliance cooperation—including the deployment of troops to Iraq, visa waivers, physical readiness training deployments in Afghanistan, and negotiations for the Korea-U.S. FTA. The last of these became a strong foundation of the U.S.-ROK comprehensive alliance after its successful conclusion and ratification in 2012.44

Thus, there does not always appear to be an inverse correlation between the state of the U.S.-ROK alliance and the state of Sino-ROK relations. Although during the Lee administration strong ties with Washington correlated with bad ties toward China, the intervening factor was China’s failure in 2010 to respond to North Korea’s sinking of the ROK corvette Cheonan and the shelling of Yeonpyeong Island. The Park government also seems to disprove the correlation as President Park appears to have good relations currently with both the United States and China.

concluding thoughts

There is no country in Asia that has a more complex and nuanced relationship with China than South Korea. This complexity derives from the convergence of South Korea’s power, economic, and North Korea dilemmas as well as its deep fear of entrapment in escalating U.S.-China competition. As a result, the interplay of these factors causes South Korea’s China policy to vacillate, more so than do domestic politics alone or the state of the U.S.-ROK alliance. Given the fluctuating nature of South Korea’s China policy, understanding these strategic dilemmas vis-à-vis China is critical for U.S.-ROK alliance management. The two allies must address a misalignment of their policy priorities regarding China and determine how to sustain a coordinated, if not common, strategy. For the United States, understanding Seoul’s outreach toward Beijing is important; Washington should view this not as an alliance disruption but rather as a strategic opportunity for a U.S.

44 Katrin Katz and Victor Cha, “Holding Ground as the Region’s Linchpin,” Asian Survey 52, no. 1 (2012): 52–64.

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ally to influence China to adhere to global norms and behave as a responsible stakeholder. The AIIB will be a good test case for this approach. South Korea and other like-minded countries could come together and play a critical role in ensuring that the China-led bank operates according to global standards of governance and transparency. Instead of impeding Seoul’s cooperation with Beijing, Washington should instead support such engagement, especially if it helps South Korea gain insight into Chinese intentions and strategic views on North Korea, and also promotes quiet U.S.-ROK-China dialogue on North Korean contingencies. All these steps would help mitigate Seoul’s North Korea and entrapment dilemmas.

The management of U.S. alliances in Northeast Asia should also be in tandem with bilateral or multilateral efforts to enhance the U.S.-ROK alliance and U.S.-ROK-Japan trilateral relations, as well as to promote regional stability and cooperation. As a balancing act against South Korea’s growing economic dependence on China, particularly following the conclusion of the China-Korea FTA and ongoing negotiations of the RCEP, Washington would do well to bring South Korea in as one of the first post-agreement countries of the recently concluded Trans-Pacific Partnership negotiations. The United States should also play a more active role in managing ROK-Japan relations. In particular, it should work to prevent historical disputes from undermining bilateral relations between its two allies while facilitating a positive environment for constructive dialogue and also promoting and enhancing cooperation on functional issue areas of common interest, such as cybersecurity and disaster relief. Any misperceptions or misunderstandings by South Korea and Japan of each other’s actions should be managed through confidence-building measures among these three countries to prevent further deterioration of bilateral relations. As part of these efforts, holding regular U.S.-ROK-Japan summits or reinvigorating trilateral ministerial meetings and other consultative mechanisms would be helpful. In addition, the United States, Japan, and South Korea should make concerted efforts to slowly build consensus for a collective security statement regarding North Korean threats. Upgrading current information-sharing into a general security of military information agreement and an acquisition and cross-servicing agreement would be a logical next step.

Seoul certainly hopes that it can continue to operate strategically in a space in which it can reap security benefits from the United States and economic benefits from China, while maintaining good relations with both. As argued above, this is the optimal path for South Korea to circumvent the four dilemmas of power, economics, unification, and entrapment. However,

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the degree to which this strategic space remains open for Seoul is not fully within its control. Indeed, the size of this space will depend greatly on the actions of South Korea’s great-power ally and its giant neighbor. Given Chinese complaints about THAAD, Seoul may be finding that Beijing is willing to afford South Korea little space to finesse the issue and that it instead may have to make a choice. And with U.S. complaints about Chinese land reclamation activities in the South China Sea, the space for South Korea to say nothing about freedom of navigation may be shrinking. It would behoove strategic thinkers in both Seoul and Washington to begin a serious discussion of how the alliance should prepare for such contingencies.