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Ten theses on perception in terms of work:A Rossi-Landian/Wittgensteinian point

of view

JEFF BERNARD

Abstract

This article is concerned with perception. It presents a complex theoretical

schema of sign actions as work. Work, of course, is a central concept in the

semiotic investigations of Ferruccio Rossi-Landi. The essay shows how

work can be translated into sign work to elucidate the idea of percep-

tion (which is so often defined in a vague way, inside and outside psychol-

ogy). It expands on the matter be utilizing the Rossi-Landian perspective

on internal and external signs, the relation of which is the key factor in

social reproduction. The essay pursues this distinction with further reference

to the work of Wittgenstein as a crypto-semiotician. Through Bezzels

inflection of Wittgenstein, the essay draws out the game relations in the

work of looking and seeing.

Keywords: perception; work; internal/external signs; games; Rossi-

Landi; Wittgenstein.

1. Why Rossi-Landian sociosemiotics?

The Italian philosopher Ferruccio Rossi-Landi is the outstanding repre-

sentative of what I want to call the fourth, socio-genetic, and/or

socio-evolutionary, current within modern semiotics. His lifes work

was dedicated to the systematic establishment of an independent and

highly original sign theory in its own right, which goes hand in hand

with an authentic socio-philosophical system of thought, whose essential

aspects were developed in his major work Lideologia (1981 [1978]).

Rossi-Landis sociosemiotics, departing from the modelling of the par-lare comune (common speech) concept (1961), developed through the

conceptualization of linguistic work and sign work into the homol-

ogy model of material and language production, or respectively, sign

Semiotica 1731/4 (2009), 155167 00371998/09/01730155

DOI 10.1515/SEMI.2009.006 6 Walter de Gruyter


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production, all of which are, in the last instance, embedded in collective

social reproduction, i.e., as a central aspect of the distribution sphere

(sign exchange communication). Rossi-Landis discourse about these

topics can be found in most elaborated form in volumes such as Linguis-tics and Economics (1975) and Metodica filosofica e scienza dei segni

(1985). This determination of the integral locus of signs in the general

framework of human performance firstly enabled Rossi-Landis system

to take its place in a paradigmatic sociosemiotics, whose possibilities

were but rudimentarily utilized up to now, and secondly it evades every

immanent danger within idealistic semiotics, i.e., of slipping into bound-

less pan-semioticism. This determination removes, in my view, the mental-

istic tendencies of Saussureanism/structuralism, the sometimes formalis-

tic tendencies of Peircean semiotics, and as to the description ofalready socialized sign systems and processes the shortcomings of the

bio-evolutionary approach, and at the same time points the way to their

propelling synthesis. (For an overview, cf. Bernard 1991.)

2. From work to sign work

As to society, we should speak in terms of the subject matter. Thus, in

drafting the sociosemiotics needed to cover even psychosemiotic issues,

I depart from Rossi-Landi (in particular 1975, 1985) but will switch al-

ready at the end of this point to my own specifications; Theses 3 and 4

will give a readers digest of my expanded versions of Rossi-Landian

models. In the beginning of all self-evolutionary sociality stands work

(an anthropological concept versus labor as its historical specification).

Work needs a sine qua non: materials, instruments, workers, opera-

tions, aims, and products (this can be called the organic composition

of work). The purest formula reads like this: transformation of mate-rial via operation to render a product (i.e., worker, instruments, intent

presupposed), or dialectically: material thesis, operation antithesis,

product synthesis. This is work cycle A. When a second cycle B occurs,

one consequently can enter a third one, C, by using the product of A

as material and the product of B as an instrument to operate on that

material rendering a third product: tools to make tools, the definiens of

the human species. With this, the realm of freedom emerges, despite

all material dependencies. The sign, then, can be described in terms of

materials

signans and signatum, united to a product

signum, united(and the unit maintained), however, by a sign work operation homolo-

gous to those before. Put dialectically, this process can be viewed, on

the phenotypical level, as the transformation of a socially given entity

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(signatum thesis), mediated by a material antithesis ( signans), to a so-

cial result, i.e. the sign itself (signum synthesis). An important point to

be made, then, would be to dierentiate between sign production per se

and sign reproduction (sign use). Another area of discussion is in thedierent kinds of rules governing sign systems and processes (immanent,

i.e., codes; sign use regulating, i.e., programs), etc., but here I cannot go

into such complex matters. To understand the following it is, first of all,

necessary to emphasize that one part of sign production occurs inside in-

dividuals (internal sign work), and another part occurs outside (external

sign work). These two types, though homologous again, have to be corre-

lated on and on by specified types of work, i.e., internalization and exter-

nalization (cf. Bernard and Withalm 1987; Bernard 1994).

3. Social reproduction, signs included

Signs play a central role in social reproduction. According to Rossi-Landi

(1975: 65, 1985: 38), the latter comprises, in general, the triadic move-

ment of material production, exchange, and consumption. Herein,

exchange appears twofold, i.e., trivial material exchange and sign

exchange communication, the latter as a triadic movement again, com-

prising sign production, exchange in the closer sense, and consumption.

Although this triad is homologous with the first, its locus is the mediation

sphere. It should be mentioned that further triadic movements are co-

constitutive, e.g., the one of basis, intermediary structure, signs included,

and superstructure; or that the sum of movements shows society develop-

ing itself via social practice/instrumentality/history, or, as I would put it:

social practice1 transforming itself to social practice2, leading thus to an

overall triad homologous with the primary one (material/operation/

product). Since this cannot be discussed here, I restrict myself to the tri-ads of material and sign production, to hint at the fact that Rossi-Landi,

though extensively concerned with ideology (1981 [1978]), was not too

explicit about the division introduced above, i.e., between internal and

external sign work. However, to involve brain work, the logic of his

schema must be completed by ideology. Now, if the second triad (pre-

cisely now: external sign production) is derived of and comprised in the

exchange sphere of the first, so must the third triad equally be derived of

and comprised in the exchange sphere of the second. In other words,

sign exchange can be divided into external and internal sign exchange

ideological exchange in general, the latter described by the triad of ideo-

logical production, exchange, and consumption, homologous again with

the others. Internal signs, or ideas, as based on material, bio-energetic

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processes, have to be externalized to become external signs to be commu-

nicated, and for that in the full sense, the latter have to be internalized

and rendered internal ones by the receiver. (Seemingly, a theoretical prob-

lem is posed by the solipsistic stance of thought; but its solution is: whenthinking, person p1 at point t1 in time produces inner signs conveying

messages to p1 at t2, transforming him/herself thus to p2, the receiver of

p1s message. Thinking is self-communication!)

4. The general homology model

The social, focused in its operational-instrumental aspects, rests upon a

vast array of artefacts; artefacts in the trivial sense as well as artefacts inthe significational-communicational sphere, verbal and non-verbal signs

altogether. In Rossi-Landi (cf. 1975: 107), originating via work (and

then on and on work) from level zero, untouched nature, the following

10 levels four dialectical leaps in between rendering four levels of artic-

ulations as well as reservoirs of artefacts developed to form the entire

apparatus of social reproduction:

1. pre-significant elements

2. irreducibly significant elements

3. whole pieces

4. tools and sentences

5. aggregates of tools

6. mechanisms

7. complex and self-sucient mechanisms

8. overall mechanisms or automata

9. unrepeatable (singular) production

10. global production

Rossi-Landi showed the immanent structural-genetic identity of dier-ent production areas in the example of the homology between material

and linguistic production. According to Thesis 3, I want to go further

now, drafting a General homology model rearranging some of his items

slightly, but including, foremost, the division between external and

internal sign work systematically, i.e., ideological production. The model

contains three homologous 10-level-hierarchies (abbreviations: c/a

complex and aggregated; o.p.u. of a productive unit):

A) artefacts (in the closer sense):

1) matteremes, objectemes, c/a objectemes, instruments, c/a instru-

ments, machines, complex machines, automata, prototypesM, all ob-

ject system o.p.u;

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2) signifacts: signemese, signs, c/a signs, supersigns, c/a supersigns,

texts, complex text mechanisms, subcodes/sign inventories, proto-

typesS, all sign systems o.p.u;

3) mentefacts: signemesi, ideemes, c/a ideemes, ideas, c/a ideas, ideolo-gemes, complex ideologematic mechanisms, ideologiesP, ideologiesN,

all ideological systems o.p.u. (in this: signemes e external signemes,

signemesi internal signemes, prototypesM material prototypes,

prototypesS (external) signitive prototypes, ideologiesP ideologies

in pejorative sense, ideologiesN ideologies in neutral sense).

The sum of artefacts renders material culture(s), the sum of signifacts

renders expressed culture(s), the sum of mentefacts renders mental cul-

ture(s). Artefacts in the most general sense (Agen) include artefacts (inthe closer sense; Asp), signifacts (S), and mentefacts (M); the latter three

being dialectically interlocked, however, so that their relation would be:

Agen dj(Asp(S(M))). One of the central semiotic tasks resulting there-

of, mostly unnoticed by other semiotic currents, is the investigation

of the co-presence of artefacts including code-switches between the

hierarchies.1

5. Perception, one of the vaguest terms

So much for our basic theory. Perception, now, is doubtlessly not a se-

miotic notion. In Sebeoks (1986) voluminous semiotics encyclopedia, for

instance, one finds no such entry. The terms scientific history is con-

nected foremost with psychology, and herein, in particular, with percep-

tion theory as a central agenda. In this history, roughly discerned and

recapitulated, one can make out two major trends: first, the associationist

on the analytic side, and tending to empiricism; second, the gestalt theo-retic on the synthetic side, and tending to innativism. Whereas the first

describes the way how man perceives (something, whatever) by stressing

how he combines sensational elements to larger units, the second takes a

holistic view: gestalt is grasped in its entirety and in a rather immediate

way. For both stances there is some evidence in observations of human

behavior, and both are still under discussion. Exactly this, however,

shows that both are only partial theories as to the richness and ambiguity

of the subject matter. Interestingly enough, from a semiotic point of view,

the term interpretation appears more often than not, however, in variousdiuse meanings. The same goes for other semiotic notions, such as

sense and meaning. Their status remains unclear. To put it bluntly by

taking a lexicon entry as a kind of summary, sentences appear such as:



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Perception, sensations by which, exceeding the sensual functions, the

meaning contents of an object is grasped by senseful assignment (Duden

1966: 2291; my translation). Sic!? Or take, for instance, Laing, Phillipson,

and Lees otherwise illuminating Interpersonal Perception (1966), inwhich term unfortunately nearly all semiotic instances are tacitly con-

tained and, at the same time, blurred. The situation is even worse, of

course, in everyday language, in which perception has a yet broader

range. Actually, it sometimes covers the most extreme issues, such as in

e.g., German Interessen wahrnehmen (represent, or safeguard, inter-

ests). It seems obvious that a term oscillating, first, between everyday lan-

guage and a certain scientific sociolect, second, between two poles of

meaning, from (extremely) broad to (extremely) narrow, is heavily in

need of semantic as well as, in particular, semiotic clarification. While se-mantic clarification would take an analysis and systematization of what

perception could or should have meant up to now in dierent usage, a

lengthy endeavor not to be carried out here, a thorough consideration

from the viewpoint of dierent semiotic currents has been at least been

countenanced in the past.2 For reasons outlined above, we hold that in

this context a sociosemiotic perspective is indispensable.

6. Why Wittgenstein plus Bezzel as auxiliaries?

Our sociosemiotic view is, in its core, Rossi-Landian. But since Rossi-

Landi focused mainly on sign work in social reproduction, the term per-

ception appears rather incidentally in his writings. We can, however, take

some of his respective lines as a recommendation, e.g., the description of

the identification of hitherto unknown objects in untouched nature (in

Rossi-Landi 1985: 158), where he clearly states that perception is a work-

ing procedure, too, governed by socially induced rules. And from thetheoretical angle, his occupation with Wittgenstein (esp. Rossi-Landi

1966, 1981) gives fruitful hints as to who his principal witness would

have been, had he dealt more extensively with this topic: Rossi-Landi ap-

preciated (in particular the early) Wittgenstein as a materialist philoso-

pher, he drew significantly from Wittgensteins use theory of language

(and of signs, in general), he acknowledged him as a crypto-semiotician

insofar as Wittgensteins concept of language game seems tantamount,

in the end, to sign system, and he celebrated him as the main theorist of

linguistic alienation. From all this, I conclude, it would be appropriate torefer to the early Wittgenstein, especially to his Tractatus (1921, 1922)

which beside the epistemological and language-theoretic main parts

contains (a draft of ) a theory of perception, too. However, I must

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add, we need this draft in a version which allows for direct translation

into sociosemiotic i.e., sign work terminology. This interim version

is already provided by Chris Bezzel in his Wahrnehmungsspiel als

Sprachspiel (1992), which first reconstructs Wittgensteins view on per-ception and then puts it in terms of perception game understood as a

preliminary as well as part of language games (or sign games, in general).

In this connection, one has to mention that Bezzel is indeed the author

who gave, first, perhaps the most authentic picture of Wittgensteins

philosophy (in Bezzel 1988), bridging hereby some apparent inconsis-

tencies between Wittgenstein I and Wittgenstein II, and second, suc-

ceeded in this by rendering the semiotic core in Wittgenstein explicit

Wittgenstein as a semiotician (cf. also Nagl 1989). As to the present task,

however, it seems already obvious that, in comparison with the psy-chologists diuse notion, Wittgensteinian perception theory in terms of

Wittgenstein/Bezzelian perception game theory is close to the pole of a

deliberately reductive understanding of perception insofar as Wittgen-

steins inexorable observation and analysis delivers the phenomenon

actually to use one of Rossi-Landis favorite metaphors pared to

the bones.

7. Perception, precisely

According to Bezzels (1992) reconstruction, Wittgenstein, departing from

an initially undierentiated field of vision, discerns between seeingas a

however activated state of passive awareness versus looking as an act

of focused grasping of the relevant part of that which can be or is per-

ceived, or seeing of something as something, an active construction of

what is seen, with the result of the nameless concept (the percept). There

are, however, three main steps (or let us call them here positions P1, P2,

and P3) on this corridor to reach the level of signs proper, namely:

P1, the primary input of the object in the space of vision, or of perception

in general;

then P2, i.e., the objects (maybe involuntary, however selected) imprint

on the margin between image and imagination not yet a sign but

capable of becoming a sign, in other words a potential sign, or a sign

residue in Rossi-Landis (1979) sense, which can be included by mentalsign work into internal signs;

finally P3, the semiosic imprint (expression) in the proper sense, i.e., the

inclusion in a sign game.



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The signitive expression P3 is the point of departure of the language

game, the language game a reaction upon acts of perception. In sum,

however, the process, says Wittgenstein, is an interplay of movements,

embedded in the forms of life (or in social practice, as Rossi-Landiwould say). Perception is now, according to Bezzel, a kind of movement,

which he calls a perception game, to be doubly analyzed: as a to and fro

between activated passivity (state of aairs state of awareness) and act-

ing itself with the result of a nameless concept, on the one hand, and as

a to and fro between positions P1, P2, and P3 (I perceive, I perceive ex-

pressive motions, I perceive a signitive expression), on the other hand.

The perception game can be defined as the praxeological fine-structure

contained in the language game, and also founding it (Bezzel 1992: 27;

my translation). That is: perception is perception-action embedded in the(dialectical) sum of perception game plus language game, embedded once

again in social practice:

One could call the perception game a cyclic one, but not in the sense of a free-

floating autonomous perception cycle as in perception physiology . . . because

perception-action cannot be isolated from everyday life practice. It is dependent

on the whole form of life which retroacts upon each of our perception acts, co-

influencing it as soon as we have learnt language. Insofar, only the cycle percep-

tion game language game is a real cycle. (Bezzel 1992: 28; my translation)

And in the end, the games build a however analyzable unit:

That perception game and language game can, in the final analysis, not be sepa-

rated from one another, is an expression of our never static relation to the world.

A fixed (metaphysical) relationship world-sign would be an absurdity. (Bezzel

1992: 30; my translation)

8. Anthropocentric work triads

To approach now the perception game in terms of work asks first for a

step back again to Rossi-Landi, whose reductive description of work-as-

such by the fundamental triad material, operation, product was already

quoted above. But it is also possible to formulate situational or anthro-

pocentric triads to depict particular work cycles in particular work situa-

tions. Rossi-Landi described these triads as follows: The six elements of

the organic composition of work, in the first case,

constitute more than others a realistic articulation of the central moment of the

triad, that of [dialectical] negation, i.e., of the work operations. In reality there is,

in general, a worker, with a result he wants to achieve, who selects materials and

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carries out work operations on them by means of instruments, and, in this way, he

obtains products. So we can conceive another triad showing the articulation of the

work situation: a triad with the work itself, the materials and instruments, the

products. This scheme indicates the factual situation from the necessarily anthro-pocentric viewpoint of the worker. (Rossi-Landi 1985: 15; my translation)

This is the so-called triad of productive work done by the worker. Sec-

ond, there is another variant from the workers perspective, to which

Rossi-Landi explained, his point was

that even the six-moment articulation could be reduced to three items: the

Worker, the Operations, and the Product. To come to these three basic elements

it would be enough to place the Aim within the Worker, the Instruments both

with the Worker and the Operations (they are, in fact, the link between the two);

and the Materials again with the Operations which would have no sense unless

they were Operations on something. It is clear that the six moments and their

reduction to three represent, so to speak, the point of view of the worker. This

is quite legitimate: each of us, as a worker, can say I am working to produce a

determinate product . . . [T]his is an anthropocentric stance according to which a

human being who wants to work, and to work with a certain aim in his head and

certain instruments at hand, must be there already. (Rossi-Landi 1995: 142)

The first triad can be formulated Wpr,M/I,P (productive work carriedout by the worker, materials/instruments, products), the second one Wr

OwP (worker, workers operations, products). These two triads can be

applied, as a matter of course, to sign work, too; for instance, on the

working activities of (sine qua non sign-using) communication workers

(as has been demonstrated by Bernard and Withalm 1987), the first triad

representing the senders, the second one the receivers point of view (in-

deed with changing roles in full, i.e., two-way, communication).

9. External and internal sign work, precisely

The next intermediate step should be to describe sign work in terms of its

organic composition. It has to have, as in the case of trivially material

work, at least six indispensable components, and not more than six. For

external sign work, these are:

1) the sign worker; he already disposes about2) instruments, i.e., codes, programs, and inventories, plus all knowledge

and means to use and select appropriate sign carriers; and he has

certain aims, namely knows already about the



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3) functions of sign use in social environs, i.e., signification, communica-

tion, and in the end, social exchange in social practice; with his in-

struments he has to work on

4) materials, i.e., the sum of (external) signantia and signata; and he hasnot only to work but to do specific work, i.e.,

5) sign work operations to render a product, exactly the

6) product which is the external sign which then can be communicated.

On the part of the internal sign work, or ideological work, or brain work

in a broad sense, the six components are:

1) the ideology worker (brain worker); he already disposes about

2) instruments, once again codes, programs, and inventories, however

not entirely the same as before, plus his entire bio-energetic equip-ment; and he has certain aims, namely knows already about the

3) functions of internal sign use, or thought, i.e., internal and external

signification, plus internalization and externalization, and finally,

communication (be it even self-communication; see the parenthesized

ending of point 4.); with his instruments he has to work on

4) materials, i.e., the sum of (internal) signantia and signata; and he has

not only to work but to do specific work, i.e.,

5) ideology work operations to render a product, exactly the

6) product which is the internal sign which he needs for thinking as well

as, in consequence, for producing and communicating external signs.

It goes without saying that ideology has to be understood here not in the

more recent pejorative sense, but in the classical comprehensive one,

as for example in Rossi-Landis Ideologia (1981 [1978]), covering, on the

one hand, philosophy, systematic and intuitive world-views, behavioural

patterns, sentiments and feelings, as well as, on the other hand, false

thinking, fraud and deception, lies and obscurantism, common sense,

illusions and mythology, etc., i.e., all forms of false consciousness, too.Ideology, in this broadest understanding, is then, of course, elaborated

in all kinds of internal signs, symbols, icons, indexes, which not necessar-

ily correspond directly with the external ones. There is, more often than

not, also translation (translation work) to be fulfilled between the two

realms of signs.

10. Perception as signal work

Based on all these kits, it is possible now to model perception work as

signal work, since it has become clear that in perception, as observed

and analyzed by Wittgenstein, there is a steady interplay between pre-

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signitive and signitive states of aairs. For the pre-signitive ones, I argue

for classifying them as belonging to the realm of the signaletic, reach-

ing from primary nothing-but-signals in the technical sense, to more

complex ones, up to pre-signs of dierent gradation (as, for example,in Benteles 1984 strata model of signal evolution; cf., for a short de-

scription, Bernard 1996: 27). As to the organic composition of this type

of work, the worker is the perception worker (who later on indeed be-

comes a sign worker stricto sensu), using instruments, i.e., his entire

psycho-physiological and cognitive equipment, including culturally codi-

fied rules of perception; his aims are the identification plus internalization

of certain outward objects (thus, he is in the position of a receiver), and

finally, their cognitive integration (in the broadest sense); he works on

materials, i.e., signals, namely signals to be(come) sign residues, in Rossi-Landis sense, and afterwards proto-signantia and proto-signata, and

signs, in the end; his signaletic operations (1, 2, 3) are to render products,

i.e., first, the state of awareness including the primary, unspecified imprint

(of the object), second, the percept, or specified imprint (Wittgensteins

nameless concept), third, its inclusion in the sign game, i.e., rendering it

a sign, as the final act of perception. Since he is, as to all this, a receiver

(doubtlessly an active receiver) facing a sender actually being his um-

welt, the triadic model to describe what happens is the second one ac-

cording to point 9., i.e., the situational triad Wr-Ow-P. Due to the fact

that at least three phases are involved in the whole process, we have to

depict them by means of three triads, that is, Wr1-Ow1-P1, with P1 as the

state of awareness plus first unspecified imprint, then Wr2-Ow2-P2, with

P2 as the percept, or specified imprint, and finally, Wr3-Ow3-P3, with P3 as

the sign included in the sign game, i.e., internal sign system (see figure 1).

In these three steps, the product of the first work cycle (state of aware-

ness with, in particular, the unspecified imprint) enters the operations of

the second work cycle as material (sign residue to become proto-signansand/or proto-signatum), and once again the product of the second work

cycle (the percept) enters the operations of the third work cycle as material

(proto-signans and/or proto-sigantum to become signans and/or signa-

tum to render the signum as their dialectical synthesis, necessarily em-

bedded in a sign system). Notwithstanding the fact that there is a steady

to and fro (Wittgensteins interplay of movements, with its larger em-

bedding in social practice, in the end), this is a sober but fundamental

description of what is actually at stake in perception. Further analysis

could show the details within the to and fro, such as, e.g., the rejectionof certain objects, the dierentiation between objects that are already

signs, and for which we do not have to take account of the degrees of

habitualization, etc. But this is another story.



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Notes

1. For a more elaborated version see Bernard (2004, in press).

2. The paper upon which this article is based was first given in the course of the Interna-

tional Symposium Perception and self-consciousness in the arts and sciences held under

the auspices of the International Association for Semiotic Studies IASSAIS on Septem-

ber 2628, 1995, in Oporto, Portugal, organized by Norma Tasca and the Portuguese

Association for Semiotics at the Catholic University of Oporto. The planned publication

of the results could never be realized.

Figure 1. Perception/sign scheme

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Rossi-Landi, Ferruccio (1985). Metodica filosofica e scienza dei segni. Nuovi saggi sul

linguaggio e lideologia. Milan: Bompiani.

Rossi-Landi, Ferruccio (1995). Work, time, and some uses of language. In Zeichen/Manipulation. Akten des 5. Symposiums der Osterreichischen Gesellschaft fur Semiotik,

Klagenfurt, 15.16.12.1984 ( Angewandte Semiotik 6), Je Bernard (ed.), 141159.

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Je Bernard (b. 1943) is the Director of the Institute for Socio-Semiotic Studies

[email protected]. His research interests include sociosemiotics, semiotics of cul-

ture, and theoretical semiotics. His publications include Strukturen autonomer Kulturarbeit

in Osterreich (4 vols. 19901995); Modelling History and Culture (2 vols., 2001); and Myths,

Rites, Simulacra (2002).


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Bernard Ten Theses SEMI