Bergedorf Round Table | Beijing

Global Governance: How Can China and Europe Work Together?

147th Bergedorf Protocol

Prelim

inary Vers

ion

147th Bergedorf Round Table

Global Governance: How Can China and Europe Work Together?14–16 October 2010, Aman at Summer Palace, Beijing

In cooperation with the International Department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China

Content

Summary 21Welcome Address 23Introduction by Helmut Schmidt 25

I. China 301. Challenges and Opportunities 302. Perspectives on the Rise of China 35

II. China and Europe 371. The Current State of Relations 372. The Potential for Future Cooperation 413. The Preconditions for Closer Relations 444. Agreeing on Values 515. Making Sense of Media Coverage 54

III. Global Governance 581. Why Do We Need Global Governance? 582. Proposals for Reform 623. The Global Role of the EU 704. G 20 735. Currency Policy 76

Closing Remarks 82

ProtocolConference Pictures 1Participants 20

Annex

Participants 85Recommended Literature 94List of Abbreviations 96Index 97Previous Round Tables 101The Körber Foundation 115Imprint 116

INITIATORDr. Kurt A. Körber

CHAIRDr. Richard von WeizsäckerFmr. President of the Federal Republic of GermanySun JiazhengVice-Chairman, National Committee, Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), Beijing

MODERATORSLi JinjunVice Minister, International Department, Central Com-mittee (CC), Communist Party of China (CPC), BeijingProf. Dr. Eberhard SandschneiderOtto Wolff-Director, Research Institute, German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP), BerlinProf. Dr. Zhang YanshengDirector, International Economic Research Institute, National Development and Reform Commission, Beijing

PARTICIPANTSGeorg Blume Foreign Correspondent, DIE ZEIT and die tageszeitung (taz), New DelhiChai YeDirector, International Department, Guangming Daily, BeijingProf. Dr. Chen JinVice-Minister, Party Literature Research Centre, Cen-tral Committee (CC), Communist Party of China (CPC), BeijingGernot Erler, MdBDeputy Chair, Social Democratic Party (SPD) Parliamen tary Group, German Bundestag, BerlinProf. Dr. Feng ZhongpingAssistant President, China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR); Director, Institute of European Studies, BeijingDr. Werner Hoyer, MdBMinister of State, Federal Foreign Office, BerlinHuang HuaguangDirector-General, Department for Europe, Inter national Department, Central Committee, Communist Party of China (CPC), BeijingHuang YongDeputy Director, International Department, Xinhua News Agency, BeijingDr. Huo JianguoChairman, Chinese Academy of International Trade and Economic Cooperation, Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM), BeijingHubert KnirschDirector, Office of fmr. Federal President Dr. Richard von Weizsäcker, BerlinStefan KorneliusForeign Editor, Süddeutsche Zeitung (SZ), MunichLi RuiyuDirector-General, European Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Beijing

Prof. Dr. Liu YoufaVice-President, China Institute of International Studies (CIIS), BeijingMa WenpuVice-Chairman, Foreign Affairs Committee, National People’s Congress, BeijingMao RubaiFmr. Chairman, Environmental and Resources Protec-tion Committee, National People’s Congress; President and Director, Center for Nature and Society, Beijing UniversityAmbassador Claude MartinPresident, Conseil des Affaires Etrangères, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ParisDr. Thomas PaulsenExecutive Director International Affairs, Körber Foundation, BerlinProf. Dr. Volker PerthesChairman and Director, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP), German Institute for International and Security Affairs, BerlinAmbassador Dr. Michael SchaeferAmbassador of the Federal Republic of Germany to the People’s Republic of China, BeijingPaulo Vizeu PinheiroSenior Diplomatic Adviser to the President of the European Commission José Manuel Barroso, European Commission, BrusselsProf. Dr. Wang JiaruiMinister, International Department, Central Com-mittee (CC), Communist Party of China (CPC), BeijingDr. Klaus WehmeierVice Chairman of the Executive Board, Körber Foundation, HamburgWei JianguoSecretary General, China Centre for International Economic Exchanges, Beijing; fmr. Vice-Minister of Commerce, BeijingDr. Rolf WenzelHead, Directorate-General Financial Market Policy, Federal Ministry of Finance, BerlinChristian WriedtChairman of the Executive Board, Körber Foundation, HamburgJörg WuttkeGeneral Manager and Chief Representative, BASF China, BeijingYu XiaoxuanDeputy Director-General, Department for Europe, international Department, Central Committee (CC), Communist Party of China (CPC), BeijingDr. Zhang TaoDirector-General, International Department, People’s Bank of China, BeijingDr. Zhang WencaiDeputy Director-General, Department for Cooperation, Ministry of Finance, BeijingProf. Zheng BijianFmr. Executive Vice-President, Central Party School, Communist Party of China (CPC), Central Committee (CC), Beijing

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I. ChinaThere was general appreciation of the staggering development that went on in China in the last three decades, making a backward and isolated society into the most important rising nation in the world. However, it was mentioned that the country still has to overcome enormous social problems, especially with regard to the lagging of rural in comparison to urban areas. One Chinese participant directed attention to the importance China ascribes to climate policy, in which the country is both making headway with unilateral measures as well as sup-porting the conclusion of international agreements (pp. 30–35). The round table then addressed the question of how the world is reacting to China’s rising power. Several speakers saw growing mistrust against the People’s Republic in western countries, especially with regard to China’s readiness to observe rules that have been agreed upon internationally. A number of participants from China argued that reservations against their country were a legacy of the Cold War and had to be overcome (pp. 35–36).

II. China and EuropeThe discussion of Chinese-European relations began with several speakers high-lighting the significance of the EU as the most important trade partner of China. It was noticed that the interests of China and the EU converge, not just in eco-nomic affairs but also in relation to political issues such as multilateralism as well as global and regional peace. This lead to a debate on the question of whether Chinese-European relations could be labeled a “strategic partnership.” Several par-ticipants were in favour of this denotation whereas others raised doubts, because such a partnership would imply the identification of very concrete political goals, something that, in their eyes, has not yet been achieved. One speaker expressed his hope that China would take on a stabilizing role in Central Asia, comparable to the role the EU plays in its own neighbourhood (pp. 37–41). While consider-ing the potential of future cooperation, a further increase in trade relations was sounded out just as the possibility of mutual efforts to curb climate change or to stabilize Africa (pp. 41–44).

Weighing the preconditions for a functioning cooperation, several speakers emphasized that a real dialogue is dependent upon mutual respect and under-standing, which at times were missing on both sides. Appeals by a number of Chinese participants for lifting the EU arms embargo against China were rejected by European speakers; such a step would be premature (pp. 44–50). This was

Summary

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followed by an exchange on how China and Europe will find common ground with regard to values. Several speakers drew attention to human rights as being the most difficult issue in Chinese-European relations. However, some participants from Europe emphasized a persistent Chinese readiness to talk on such contro-versial matters as well as China’s accomplishments in other areas (pp. 51–53). Several speakers from China accused western media of distorting the reality in the People’s Republic in their coverage while European speakers stressed that journa-lists play different roles in the respective systems (pp. 54–57).

III. Global GovernanceWhile discussing the question on how much significance China and the EU ascribe to global governance, a consensus emerged that both sides strongly support the existing multilateral structures. The UN was described as an indispensable body when it comes to developing international rules and to negotiate conflicting in-terests (pp. 58–62). A longer debate ensued on how to increase the legitimacy of international institutions. There were a number of detailed suggestions, including the redistribution of voting rights to the benefit of more populous or economically weaker countries as well as strengthening the position of particular institutions such as the WTO (pp. 62–70). The round table then directed its attention to the EU and its role in the world. In light of what they considered an insufficient har-monizing of European foreign policy, several participants expressed their doubts on whether the EU could counterbalance the emerging dualism between China and the US. However, speakers from China expressed their confidence that imple-menting the Treaty of Lisbon could put the EU in such a position (pp. 70–73). The growing significance of the G 20 in global governance drew a lot of atten-tion. Some participants praised the reaction of the G 20 to the financial crisis and argued for an increased role of the group in political matters as well, while others remained skeptical in this regard (pp. 73–76). The final exchanges concerned the question of to what extent monetary policy can contribute to the prevention of future crises. While European speakers expressed their belief that the Chinese renminbi had to be revalued significantly, participants from China warned against hasty steps in this regard. However, there was general agreement on the rejection of protectionism (pp. 76–81).

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Welcome Address

I would like to welcome you most warmly to the 147th Bergedorf Round Table in Beijing. The topic we have chosen on this occa-sion is “Global Governance: How Can China and Europe Work Together?” Ten years ago the Bergedorf Round Table met to dis-cuss a similar subject, “China. Partner in the Global Economy.”

Since then we have witnessed considerable changes. In the course of the financial and economic crisis it finally became ap-

parent that there has been a shift in the global balance of power. Global chal-lenges such as regulating the financial sector, dealing with climate change, and preventing nuclear proliferation can no longer be met without the participation of countries such as China and India. At the same time, these states are asking to be given a greater say in international institutions.

In this context, China and Europe have a key role to play when it comes to effective political coordination on the global level. Which issues are at the top of the global agenda, as far as China and Europe are concerned? How can China and Europe deepen cooperation, so that it resembles a strategic partnership? And to what extent are institutions such as the G 8, the G 20 and the UN in need of reform? We have invited politicians, diplomats and experts in order to discuss these questions. In organizing this Round Table we have cooperated closely with the International Department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (CPC). The discussion will be moderated by Li Jinjun (chapter 1), Eberhard Sandschneider (chapter 2), and Zhang Yansheng (chapter 3).

von Weizsäcker

Protocol

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I would also like to welcome you most warmly to the 147th Berge-dorf Round Table.

International policymaking is currently embarking on a new phase of cooperation; and as a result of economic globalization and the new global challenges, we are moving closer together, and relations between China and Europe are deepening. The CPC and the Chinese government ascribe great importance to our relations

with Europe. We would like to see a strong Europe that can play a greater role on the international stage. At the beginning of September there was a strategic meet-ing between China and the EU in Guiyang, and this was followed at the beginning of October by the 13th EU–China summit in Brussels. Such meetings form the basis for confidence-building and deepening mutual trust. This is the only way we can strengthen our political relationship and overcome our differences.

In the context of our relations with Europe, our strongest relationship is with Germany. In July, Chancellor Angela Merkel and Prime Minister Wen Jiabao signed a 28-point communiqué which envisages closer cooperation in the areas of policymaking, business, culture and society in general. This has upgraded Sino- German relations. We intend to keep pressing ahead with the strategic partner-ship between China and Germany.

China and Europe should enhance the intensity of their bilateral dialogue. This Round Table is certainly a step in the right direction. The Chinese participants who have been invited include experts and decision-makers from the bureaucracy, the party and the government.

The transcript contains an edited and authorized version of the participants’ spoken contributions.

Wang Jiarui

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Global Trends and Common Challenges

Many thanks for inviting me to this meeting and for giving me the opportunity to contribute some of my thoughts. Before I start, a personal memory: At the time of the Cultural Revolu-tion, I was 50 back then, I realized: This is a grievous mistake, but it will pass and China will in any event rise and become a world power again.

This realization encouraged me to urge my Chancellor, Willy Brandt, to enter into diplomatic relations with Beijing. That happened in 1972, seven years before the United States did the same. I was subsequently invited by Zhou Enlai to an official visit, but because of his grave illness, Mao Zedong and also Deng Xiaoping took over the role of hosts.

In the 35 years which have since passed, I have visited this city twelve or fif-teen times. My admiration for the over 3,000 years old Chinese civilization and for the rebirth of its vitality that I have experienced in the last 30 years just kept on growing.

I.Because I was asked to talk about global trends, I will start with a prognosis: The economic and political structure of the world population in the 21st century will be fundamentally different from the one we observed in the 20th century. At the start of the 20th century, the survival of the European colonial empires in Asia (and Africa) was beyond debate. China was a marginal entity, even though it already had an enormous population back then. Thereafter, two world wars made the 20th century the bloodiest period in world history. This is true for both the Asia-Pacific region and for Europe. But in the middle of the century, China was free again and all the colonies were on their way to become sovereign states.

Notwithstanding the restoration of the Chinese state under the leadership of Mao Zedong, a bipolar economic and political structure emerged in the world. The Cold War made Moscow and Washington the globally dominating poles. Next to them existed what was called back then the “Third World.”

Around the end of the 20th century—the old colonial empires of the Euro-peans had already dissolved—a couple of new developments became prominent.

1) The supranational sphere of influence of the Soviet Union vanished, be-cause the Soviet Union had overstretched its power.

Introduction by Helmut Schmidt*

* Presented in absentia by Richard von Weizsäcker

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2) The economic rise of China—which it owned to Deng Xiaoping—became visible to the rest of the world.

3) The economies of China, of Russia (though it took them twelve years longer) and of the states in the former Soviet sphere of influence, which in the meantime had become sovereign, opened up.

4) International trade, international exchange and the international flow of finances reached a scope that had never been seen in the history of mankind—that is what we now call globalization.

At the present time we are confronted with a multipolar world structure, in terms of economics, foreign policy and strategy. As far as the next decades are concerned, one can perceive clearly that this multipolarity will endure for a good part of the 21st century and that both China and the US will remain prominent factors in the calculation. Instead of a north pole and a south pole, the world will have a China pole and a US pole. Moreover, it appears unlikely at present that the EU will develop into a third pole. Even so, a couple of European states will retain their economic and political (though probably not exert any military) influence.

There will be a number of smaller poles besides them, which will exert con-siderable influence at the same time. Without doubt that is true for India, Japan, Indonesia, Brazil and so on. Maybe one day the same will be said about an alliance of states in the Islamic world.

Unlike many Americans, I do not expect that the continued economic and political rise of China will be interpreted as a challenge by the majority of other states. Admittedly, the world will be confronted with a variety of transnational political conflicts. In some China could also become embroiled. Time and again there will be military conflicts on a local or regional scale. But China has to solve some grave internal problems—social, economic and infrastructural problems—that it will not act in a way that will cause or encourage the risk of wars. China’s answer to all foreign provocations over the course of the last decades was restraint and prudence. I have admired that and place my confidence in a “peaceful rise” for the next decades as well.

Presumably America, driven by its missionary impulse, will continue trying, for many decades ahead, to spread its conception of societal and political order. But the demographic changes in the US, meaning the growing influence of Afri-can-Americans and Hispanics or Latinos (together they will constitute the majority of American voters by the middle of the 21st century), will have the consequence

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that internal problems, that is domestic political and especially social problems, will become more important to the Americans than solving problems in Asia, in the Middle East and in Africa or in Latin America. The aspiration for dominance on a global political scale on the part of the US will diminish, though some temporary ups and downs are to be expected.

II.The boom of the world population, which started in the middle of the 20th century and, as things stand now, will continue in the 21st century, will lead to challenges which affect all nations and their states together. Among them are the supply of energy, of all kinds of resources and of water, the overwhelming environmental problems and global warming with all their expected consequences, especially with regard to the human share of responsibility for global warming and efforts to curb its impact. Hitherto, neither the UN nor the G 20 have managed to introduce drastic new measures in this field—and it remains unclear whether changes will be made in the foreseeable future.

Another common challenge is the issue of a workable order for the global economy. The worldwide competition for wealth, resources and jobs will con-tinue. The role played by the World Trade Organization will become more impor-tant.

However, what is most important at present is the implementation and enforce ment of transnational rules for the global financial markets and for supervising the internationally active financial institutions and their increasingly obscure instruments.

In all likelihood, three currencies will exert global influence over the course of the next decades: the American dollar, the European euro and the Chinese yuan (or renminbi). It remains to be hoped that the unofficial teamwork of the three central banks responsible for them, which is working fairly well these days, will lead the relevant governments to face their responsibilities, that is getting rid as best as they can of the enormous deficits and surpluses in the most important balances of payments (to be more precise: trade balances).

In particular, this challenge concerns the deficit state USA and the surplus states China and Japan as well as some middle-sized states. The current global financial imbalance poses an extremely high risk for both the surplus states and the deficit states. Finding a fairly sustainable balance therefore lies in the interest of all those involved. This includes China, but Germany just as well.

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III.This leads me to the general question of shared interests. It goes without saying that in the 21st century, struggle for political influence, for ideological influence, for economic advantage and for prestige will continue to play as big a role as it did in past centuries. Nonetheless, it seems unlikely to me that all of this could lead to another world war. The overwhelming majority of the population on all five continents has a desire for peace. This holds true for a large majority of govern-ments, too. Still, from the experience of the 20th century we know very well that governments can be tempted to engage in military conflicts, especially if they are provoked. In this regard, differences of constitutional and governmental orders do not play a dominant role. Many governments in the world are upgrading their military, some countries experience a dictatorship based on the military. Time and again there are open as well as hidden threats with military interventions.

The military intervention of the Soviet Union and, subsequently, of the Ameri-can-led Great Coalition in Afghanistan are two examples. Other examples include the American intervention in Iraq, the Kashmir conflict and—probably posing the greatest danger for the world as a whole—the conflict between Israel and its neighbours. Furthermore, there are conflicts about the alleged aspirations of Iran as well as the aspirations of North Korea as regards nuclear armament and the threats uttered towards both powers in this context.

The Soviet-American conflict over missiles in Cuba in 1962 was defused because the leaders on both sides came to the conclusion that it was necessary to return to military balance. However, since then the number of states with nuclear arms has risen from five to nine. It is only the European states that actually have diminished significantly all parts of their military arsenals in this time. Apart from that, the principle of arms limitation based on international agreements has taken effect hardly nowhere. Unfortunately, this holds also true for the area of arms exports. And it is especially true for the area of limitations imposed on nuclear arms.

The inequitable Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), signed in 1968, did not do anything to offset the increase of the number of nuclear powers from five to nine. The most important reason for this lies in the fact that the original five parties of the treaty, and among them the US and Russia in particular, have not fulfilled their obligations arising from the NPT. If the US and Russia are not going to get really serious on limiting the number of nuclear warheads in their arsenals, amounting to tens of thousands, if they will not commit themselves to bilateral

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treaties on abandoning the development of new nuclear arms, then what we will see in the 21st century is that a number of additional states and their govern-ments—because they see it as crucial to their own safety—will decide to obtain nuclear arms.

I do not want to play the role of the doomsayer. There is the upside that, since Hiroshima and Nagasaki, nuclear arms have not been used against an enemy. Still, all of mankind and by far the greatest part of governments share the utmost inter-est of arms limitation, especially with regard to limits imposed on nuclear arms by way of treaties that are actually observed. And—just as important!—treaties imposing limits on the export of military arms. This is the reason why all of us together have to appeal to the peace-loving reason in the public opinion of our societies, our parliaments and our governments.

To be sure, the principle of peacefully oriented reason will not apply to a con-siderable and rising number of terrorist movements and organizations. Terrorism can turn into a worldwide problem, from India or Pakistan to the Middle East, in Europe just as well as at the southern tip of Manhattan. Presumably what most states in the world will need are an excellently trained police force and judiciary rather than military capabilities.

Finally, conflicts between China on the one hand and the EU or individual member states on the other seem very unlikely to me. We have a common inter-est in preserving peace. In East Asia and in Europe we still remember the Second World War, and for this reason we are prompted to say “once bitten, twice shy.” However, it stands to reason that peaceful economic competition for progress and wealth will continue in the 21st century.

In this regard, I heartily wish our Chinese hosts a very successful future in-deed.

China 30

1. Challenges and Opportunities

We shall first of all look at China, at how it has developed in recent decades, and at the situation in which it now finds itself. After that we will talk about how the rest of the world sees the way China has developed. How much has China changed, and what are the challenges and tasks with which the country is confronted today? Can China still be described as a developing country?

The new China has been in existence for more than 60 years. In 1978, under Deng Xiaoping, it introduced the reform and open-door policies. In the course of 60 years, China has changed in a very fundamental way. In certain areas it has managed to overcome poverty and backwardness, and is now the largest emerging nation in the world. All Chinese citizens lead much better lives than in the past.

However, China’s development has been uneven. In many areas we continue to be a developing country. In 2009, China’s per capita income was $ 3,700, which is about a tenth of the levels reached in EU countries. Whereas coastal regions and cities are experiencing a great boom, rural western and central China continues to be plagued by poverty and backwardness. About 700 million Chinese people live in these areas, millions of them below the poverty level as defined by the UN. The welfare state is still in the process of being set up. For example, the pension insurance levels are very low, and this is even more the case in the rural areas than in the cities. The differences between Beijing and other parts of China are enormous. The business community and society in general are struggling to cope with a plethora of structural problems.

These difficulties have a bearing on the modernization of China, the creation of wealth, and the development of policymaking, the economy, culture and soci-ety. The modernization of China is an arduous task which presupposes internal and external peace. Thus China’s priorities in the area of foreign policy are world peace and a pacified neighbourhood. Aggressive behaviour is at variance with its cultural traditions and philosophy. In China, peace and harmony are deemed to be more valuable than anything else. In this context harmony does not signify uniformity. It is the categorical imperative: Do not do unto others what you do not want to have done unto you.

On the international level China is assuming more and more responsibility, e.g. as a permanent member of the UN Security Council and in other forums

Li Jinjun

Sun Jiazheng China is now the largest emerging

nation in the world …

… but the differences between urban

and rural areas remain huge

Preserving peace remains the corner-

stone of Chinese foreign policy

I. China

31 Challenges and Opportunities

such as the WTO, the IMF or the G 20. All in all, China has supported moves to improve international financial controls and economic management, to combat global warming, and to strengthen the non-proliferation regime.

For the first twenty years of the 21st century, China is concentrated on economic reconstruction and on improving the living standards of its inhabitants. Over the past ten years the work in this area has been a spectacular success.

During the next ten years China will be adhering to its reform and open-door policies, doing everything it can to raise education levels and to ensure that Chinese society develops on harmonious lines. Our goal is modest prosperity for all. That is why China will be concentrating increasingly on the establishment of the internal market and on domestic demand. On account of its large foreign currency reserves, China is already a kind of “world bank,” and it also wants to become a world market. Another goal is social change. As they become more pros-perous, the aspirations of the Chinese will also develop, e.g. in the area of culture and education. For this new phase in its development, China needs a great deal of financial and human capital. China will continue to improve its infrastructure and strengthen its material, technical and institutional resources. The government will pursue a more pro-active economic policy and its ability to react to critical situations will improve. All in all, China will continue to be stable.

However, the next ten years will be shaped by some major challenges. China’s economic development will become more and more dependent on its ability to procure supplies of natural resources. There are also major imbalances between investment and consumption: domestic demand is still not high enough. And China is faced with major problems when it comes to its ability to innovate. Large parts of its economy are inefficient, and its agricultural sector is underdeveloped. There are major differences between urban and rural areas, and between the rich and the poor. Moreover, China is faced with gigantic social challenges, e.g. with regard to the labour market. Against this background we will witness an increase in the conflicts that beset Chinese society. The CPC is going to deal with the prob-lems, and it is optimistic about its ability to meet these challenges. China’s motto is: “Keep calm, no matter how high the waves may be, we are safe in our boat.”

In China we used to think that the vast majority of our difficulties would be resolved once the country had become developed. Today we have to admit that as a developed country we are still up against major problems. Some of them are

Zheng Bijian China’s goal is modest prosperity for all

In the next decade, China

will face major challenges

Chen Jin

“On account of its large foreign currency reserves, China is already a kind of ‘world bank,’ and it also wants to become a world market.”

Zheng Bijian

China 32

“In 1997 China managed to steer clear of the Asian financial crisis. This was simply impossible in 2008. China’s relations with

the rest of the world have changed.”

Chen Jin

due to the international financial and economic crisis. In 1997 China managed to steer clear of the Asian financial crisis. This was simply impossible in 2008. In the intervening period, China’s relations with the rest of the world have changed in a very fundamental way.

In general terms it is difficult for China to reconcile its own development with that of the global economy. On the one hand China has voluntarily opened up, adapted and thus become part of what is happening on a global scale. At the same time China feels compelled to go its own way. It has specific characteristics that it is forced to take into account as it develops.

Thus the goal of China’s economic reforms is the establishment of a socialist market economy. In other countries, people have often cast doubt on this. When Henry Kissinger was US Secretary of State, he once said that if it ever proved pos-sible to combine socialism and the market economy, both capitalism and socialism would have to grapple with problems of a fundamental kind. China has succeeded in coming up with answers to these questions. This specifically Chinese kind of development has been influenced by China’s robust economic growth.

Moreover, China’s challenges are not wholly identical to those of other coun-tries. Thus China and the world are now confronted with new security policy threats, which are slowing down economic growth. These include bottlenecks in the area of natural resources and fuels, environmental problems and climate change, and the uphill struggle against poverty and disease. The specific chal-lenges facing China are managing the development of the country and reducing the imbalances created by the development process. We will have to deal with these problems ourselves, since this is an area where others cannot do much to help us. But China certainly needs to look at what other people are doing.

China knows that it still has a long way to go before it reaches its development goals. Its current level of prosperity is not on a par with that of Europe or the United States. But even if that were to be the case one of these days, China cannot simply copy the consumer culture and lifestyle of Europe and the United States. If it did that, China would soon have 1.3 billion vehicles with internal combustion engines, which would lead to a 50 percent global increase in petrol consumption and CO2 emissions. That would be a catastrophe for the whole of humanity. For this reason the path pursued by China must be more compatible with the envi-ronment and the available resources. It also needs to convince its population that all this is necessary.

Although China participates in

the globalization, we are determined

to choose our own path …

… and are therefore working on the esta-

blishment of a socialist market economy

The problems of China ask for

internal solutions, foreigners will

not be of much help here

If all the people in China would

imitate western consumerism,

a catastrophe would be imminent

33 Challenges and Opportunities

“China has set itself the goal of becoming an industrialized nation by the year 2030.”

Mao Rubai

In the course of the last 30 years, China has received more foreign investment than any other developing country. Last year the US was slightly ahead of us. China is just in the process of devising concrete ways in which foreign companies will be treated just like Chinese companies when it comes to applying for gov-ernment tenders. Attracting foreign direct investment is an essential part of our open-door policy. Opening up China and attracting foreign direct investment is an important element of the twelfth five-year plan.

The industrialized countries are increasingly unwilling to treat China as a develop-ing country. On the one hand, China’s economic data clearly demonstrate that it is a developing country, but at the same time China is the world’s export champion and has the greatest level of economic growth, a fact which is also reflected in its increasing prosperity. Furthermore, for quite some time China has been giving other countries development aid, and uses this to promote its own interests, for example, when it comes to securing supplies of natural resources.

Even if the Chinese economy and Chinese society have developed in a very robust manner, China is still a developing country. It is true that China has foreign cur-rency reserves amounting to more than US$2 trillion. But that has nothing to do with Chinese living standards. I lived in Tibet for 32 years and for five years in Ningxia. These regions have never been, and to this day are not, on the level of the industrialized countries. This is the case with most of China’s rural areas, which together make up 50 percent of its territory. More than 800 million people live in rural China, in conditions of very great poverty and 120 million of them below the po verty level defined by the UN. This would not be possible in an industrial-ized state. China has set itself the goal of becoming an industrialized nation by the year 2030.

Does China think that climate change is an important issue?

Dealing with climate change is one of the greatest challenges facing humanity in the 21st century. The Chinese government has behaved in a very responsible way in this area. In 2005 it set itself the goal of lowering energy intensity by 20 per-cent by 2010, and of raising the proportion of renewable sources of energy from 10 percent to 20 percent. In order to reach this target the Chinese government has implemented a whole range of measures. For example, many old factories and

Wei Jianguo Facilitating direct foreign investment

remains a major goal for China

Kornelius

Mao Rubai The majority of the Chinese

people still live in rural areas and

in conditions of great poverty

Li Jinjun

Mao Rubai

China 34

“China wishes to deepen international coope-ration in the area of emissions reduction.”

Mao Rubai

small power stations have been shut down, and this has made it possible to save 260 million tons of coal. Energy-saving programmes have been implemented in more than 1,000 enterprises, which again has made it possible to save 130 million tons of coal. China has also given a great deal of support to the development of renewable energy technology. China produces more solar energy than any other country and is in third place globally when it comes to wind power. In rural China, the use of biogas has increased greatly, and 62 million hectares have been refor-ested, something which is unique in the world. In 2009, energy intensity was just about 15 percent below the 2005 level and by 2009 the proportion of renewable energy had risen to over 20 percent. Thus it seems likely that in 2010 we will reach the targets set in 2005.

At the climate summit in Copenhagen, Prime Minister Wen Jiabao announced an addi tional reduction of CO2 emissions by 40 to 45 percent of the levels achieved in 2000. The measures being adopted include the incorporation of emissions reduc tion targets in the twelfth five-year plan, which the Central Committee is now talking about. There have been calls for a special plan to deal with this issue. Apart from this we are doing a great deal to ensure that our industry is reduc-ing greenhouse gas emissions to a minimum. Pilot projects are in progress in five provinces. We are also looking at the feasibility of an emissions tax, trying to introduce appropriate legislation, and attempting to make society as a whole aware of the importance of the issue. China also wishes to deepen international cooperation in the area of emissions reduction. We have set ourselves these goals with no strings attached. However, they will be difficult to attain. For this reason China is very much dependent on cooperation with other countries.

Generally speaking, China is guided by three principles in the area of cli-mate policy. First, by the principle of common and differentiated responsibilities, which signifies that every country must bear its share of the burden, though its individual contribution will depend on what it can do and on the develop-mental state of its society. Second, by the principle of sustainable development. Economic development has to be coordinated with the fight against poverty and measures designed to deal with climate change. Third, China subscribes to the UNFCCC framework and the Kyoto Protocol. Since the first stage of the Kyoto Protocol ends in 2012, time is running out. We must try to complete the negotia-tions on the second commitment period as soon as possible. The important issues here relate to the transfer of technology from the industrialized states to the developing countries, and the question of financing emissions reductions. The

The Chinese leadership has

adopted numerous measures

for climate protection …

… and is putting its trust in cooperation

with other countries in this regard

Guidelines of China’s climate policy:

shared responsibilities, sustainable

development, international agreements

35 Perspectives on the Rise of China

2007 Bali roadmap is crucial. There is a need for binding targets, and countries must adhere to them.

2. Perspectives on the Rise of China

How have other countries perceived China’s robust development in the recent past?

The rise of China is not necessarily welcomed everywhere else, for China is not a small place such as Switzerland or Iceland, but the most populated country in the world and the strongest and most dynamic power in Asia. Whatever its peaceful intentions may or may not be, China is amassing a great deal of power. It possesses foreign currency reserves amounting to €2.4 trillion, which it is increasingly be-ginning to deploy. Thus China has enormous cash reserves. Today it is upgrading its armed forces and securing large supplies of natural resources, not with the help of delivery contracts, but by buying natural resources in the ground. In this way China is trying to ensure that it can continue to grow in the future. In this context, other countries see its large foreign currency reserves in a critical light. Many states are asking themselves whether or not the renminbi is undervalued. The US in particular wants to know how China’s enormous economic power has materialized.

China’s growth over the last few decades has been staggering. This is the most incredible economic comeback the world has ever seen. And up to this point, it has been a win-win situation for both the world and for China. However, in the last two years perceptions have changed in Europe and the US, and it is now generally believed that China is benefiting more than its partners. In the majority of round tables, such as this one, China likes to see itself as a victim, whereas the rest of the world thinks of China as the prime beneficiary. What are we to make of this state of affairs?

Moreover, there are global agreements that business standards should be inter national. The business community in China is witnessing an attempt to estab-lish a Chinese set of standards, which is not the same as the one used in the in-ternational system. There is now a debate in progress on indigenous innovation, the question of how much China actually contributes to international innovation, and the extent to which it is adopting international technology by copying it for

Li Jinjun

Erler The rise of Chinese power creates

distrust—especially in relation

to the foreign currency reserves

Wuttke There is a general belief in the West

that China is profiting more than its

partners from economic contacts

Is China part of the game or is the

country about to change the rules?

China 36

“China is not a threat, neither in political and economic terms, nor in military ones.”

Huang Yong

export purposes. Let us put it succinctly. Is China part of the game, or will it use its economic power to change the rules?

Many Europeans and Americans still think in terms of thought patterns that emerged during the Cold War. In the past the target was the Soviet Union, and now it is China, which is primarily perceived to be an economic threat. This is the reason for numerous conflicts. But China is not a threat, neither in political and economic terms, nor in military ones. Like all other countries, it is benefiting from globalization and suffering from its effects, e.g. in the shape of high unemploy-ment. Our development is based on Chinese socialism. The vast majority of the Chinese are convinced that this path suits their country. It would be a catastrophe if China were to copy the West. If the West wishes to understand China better, it will have to think again. That is the only way in which we can deepen cooperation, enhance trust, and meet our common challenges more effectively.

China has developed in a dramatic manner over the last thirty years without copying the West. China’s attitude to the West is as follows. There must be some good reasons for the tremendous development of the West. What can China learn from it? That is how Europe and the US should look at the rise of China. But that is exactly what they do not do. Europeans and Americans continue to express great reservations about the Chinese development model, and consider it to be an ideological challenge and a threat. But that is simply not true. The world is a very multifaceted place, so why should thought patterns be any different? Every country should be allowed to select its own type of development.

China must make it quite clear to the rest of the world that its rise does not con-stitute a threat to anyone. Apart from anything else, China’s resurgence requires tolerance and inclusivity towards its neighbours. It can be a success only by work-ing together with them, and not at their expense. That was also a decisive aspect of European integration. For this reason, China needs to strengthen its economic relations with Japan, Korea and the ASEAN states. And China and its neighbours need to ask themselves how an Asian identity, based on interests and values, might emerge—especially when the systems and cultures are so very different.

Huang Yong The distrust in China is a remnant of

the Cold War—it has to be overcome

Huang Huaguang China is more ready to learn from

western countries than vice versa

Zhang Yansheng

37 The Current State of Relations

1. The Current State of Relations

Let us turn to the subject of relations between China and Europe. What is the current state of affairs? How important for China are relations with Europe and vice versa?

For many years, Chinese foreign policy has accorded priority to China’s relations with Europe. Our diplomatic ties have been in existence for 35 years. Since their inception they have developed in a robust way. Mutual trust continues to increase. We are getting to know each other better and better, and in the area of cooperation the room for manoeuvre keeps getting larger. Today we are working together, more closely than ever before, in a comprehensive strategic partnership. Relations between China and Europe are among the most significant in the world. I would like to demonstrate this by adducing a few examples.

35 years ago the volume of trade amounted to $2.4 billion, whereas today it has reached $360 billion. This year we may surpass the level reached before the crisis. There is also increasing cooperation in the area of culture. Thus there have been China–France and China–Italy culture years, and a Chinese Art Festival in Eu-rope. In other areas, such as education and tourism, the exchange level contin ues to grow. At the moment almost 200,000 Chinese citizens are studying in Europe and about 150,000 Europeans are studying in China. We work closely together on an international level, with multilateral institutions and mechanisms. In the recent past, many senior European politicians have visited China, including Jerzy Buzek, the President of the European Parliament, Catherine Ashton, the EU for-eign minister, Chancellor Angela Merkel, and President Nicolas Sarkozy.

Even if there are the occasional differences of opinion, the areas of agreement are very much in the majority. China and Europe are both in favour of a multipolar world, of cultural diversity, of the democratic structuring of international rela-tions, and of global development, prosperity and growth.

Economic relations between China and the EU are highly developed and a great success. Germany is China’s most important trading partner in the EU, and in fact is even more important than the EU when we are talking about specific trade agreements. For many Chinese business partners, Germany is the gateway to the EU. Moreover, in the economic and financial crisis, China proved its worth as a partner. We are well aware that it could easily have behaved differently.

Sandschneider

Ma WenpuRelations between China and Europe belong

to the most significant in the world

It is not all about economics,

there are increased relations in culture,

education and tourism as well

Hoyer Germany is China’s most important

trading partner in the EU

II. China and Europe

China and Europe 38

“Relations between China and Europe are among the most significant in the world.”

Ma Wenpu

But the pace with which our economic relations are developing has yet not been matched by equal progress in the political field. It is true that the EU–China summit on 6 October was an amiable affair, but little was actually achieved. Germany had been hoping for more. It was unfortunate that the summit got embroiled in two issues which it was impossible to resolve: EU support in the WTO for China, which wishes to be accorded the status of a market economy, and the EU arms embargo against China.

The EU is far and away China’s most important trading partner. Their combined trade amounts to €300 billion, and there are predictions that it will reach €400 bil-lion and perhaps even €500 billion. These figures speak for themselves. In 2009, 23 percent of China’s exports went to the EU, which is several percentage points in excess of its exports to the US. EU investments in China amounted to about €47 billion in 2009, and Chinese investments in the EU reached €13 billion. This still leaves us with a lot of scope.

We share an interest in stability and prosperity throughout the world. We are both in favour of multilateralism and against protectionism. China and the EU depend on and are committed to a rule-based international system. We are con-ducting a number of senior-level dialogues, and in particular a strategic dialogue. That is why Lady Ashton was here in August. Her visit was a great success. We launched the Strategic Partnership in 2003; we now have more than 50 structural dialogues; we are currently discussing new structures; and we intend to keep devel oping our partnership in the years ahead.

At the recent EU–China summit, I noted a keen interest in tackling our com-mon challenges and in pursuing our common interests. The challenges can be met and overcome, and our leaders have the political will to do what is needed. It is clear that we already share a community of interests.

Can relations between China and Europe be described as “a strategic partner-ship”? What does this term actually signify?

Relations between China and the EU can certainly be described as strategic, be-cause they share powerful common interests, e.g. in multilateralism, in a balanced global economy, in sustainable development, in the reform of international mechanisms, and in an equitable world order. China has learnt a great deal from Europe, e.g. in the areas of technology, administration, legislation and investment.

Political relations have not yet reached

the same level as economic relations

Vizeu PinheiroEconomic contacts are extensive, but there

is room for even more development

In the framework of the Strategic

Partnership, we are engaged in more

than 50 structured dialogues

Sandschneider

Li Ruiyu The EU and China have common goals;

we have learnt a great deal from Europe

39 The Current State of Relations

“Copenhagen was a wake-up call. We were faced with a geo-strategic challenge in which Europe suddenly no longer had a role to play.”

Werner Hoyer

The dialogue on the rule of law continues to be a great success. We have copied a great deal in the areas of development, social security and education.

In September, European leaders discussed the EU’s strategic partnerships and how to make them more effective and mutually efficient. China was singled out as one of the EU’s most important partners, both in political and economic terms. EU leaders agreed that Europe needs to identify its strategic interests with greater precision. The EU is firmly committed at the highest level to improving coopera-tion with China and deepening the Strategic Partnership. We must work together on issues associated with the global economy and global governance by deepening our bilateral ties.

The EU did not really do its homework on the subject of “strategic partnerships,” which was discussed by the European Council in September. Strategic partner-ships were defined in a way that gave the impression that all those who were not mentioned are not important partners.

In my opinion one should not use the term “strategic partnership” too often. Since a strategy describes a possible way of attaining a specific target, a strategic partnership presupposes the existence of a common goal. I am not sure whether China and Europe actually have defined a broad range of common goals, apart from overriding aims such as global stability, prosperity and peace, and these are too vague for a strategic partnership.

The EU has lost touch with what is going on in the world if it thinks it is right and proper to deliberate at length about when and with whom it might “condescend” to embark upon a strategic partnership. The fact of the matter is that, as Europeans, we need to ask ourselves whether we are actually a strategic partner other countries might be interested in. Copenhagen was a wake-up call. Our climate policy targets were not compatible. Everyone had the best intentions. But we were faced with a geo-strategic challenge in which Europe suddenly no longer had a role to play.

The term “strategic partnership” has been used far too much in the recent past, which is a contradiction in terms. In point of fact, it stands for a special and privileged relationship. In a multipolar system, strategic partnerships are very important. In July, Chancellor Merkel and Prime Minister Wen Jiabao reached agreement in Beijing on a very important communiqué, the first of its kind since

Vizeu PinheiroThe EU is committed to making the

Strategic Partnership with China more

effective and mutually efficient

Hoyer A strategic partnership needs common

goals—and those do not exist yet

Schaefer The German-Chinese communiqué

of July 2010 is making the Strategic

Partnership more concrete

China and Europe 40

“We are committed to consolidating our political cooperation as regions in the

future, transcending bilateral relations.”

Michael Schaefer

Germany and China established diplomatic relations in 1972. Here the strategic partnership was spelled out in great detail. It became apparent that what was at stake was not only our economic and financial cooperation, focused on the triangle of energy / environment / climate; we are also committed to consolidating our political cooperation as regions in the future, transcending bilateral relations. Peace keeping is a good example.

Another goal is the establishment of a multi-dimensional cooperation on cultural issues. A case in point is the presentation of the largest art exhibition Germany has ever organized abroad, titled “The Art of Enlightenment.” It will be shown for twelve months at the new National Art Museum of China, starting April 2011. And we will use those twelve months to conduct a dialogue with our Chinese partners on the topic of enlightenment—in public events, in workshops for experts and in salons of the art scene of Beijing. We also intend to step up youth exchange programmes. We are about to create a “German-Chinese Bridge to the Future,” meaning a network of young leaders from all sections of society—industry, science, culture, education and the political field.

I think that the term strategic partnership signifies not only an intensive partner-ship that concerns itself solely with bilateral topics, but one in which the partners attempt to assume responsibility for other issues or perhaps other regions. The EU member states have a strategic partnership of this kind. They have assumed responsibility outside their own jurisdiction, by organizing regional cooperation in their immediate neighbourhood. For example, the EU has launched the Nordic Dimension and the Mediterranean Union. In 1999, after the catastrophe of the Balkan wars, it initiated the Stability Pact for South East Europe, an attempt to forge cooperation in the wake of a crisis. 2003 saw the inception of the European Neighbourhood Policy, which a year ago led to the Eastern Partner ship. Similar ventures are the EU’s Central Asia Strategy, which was launched in 2007, and Black Sea Synergy. All these initiatives constitute an attempt by the EU member states to transmit to others their positive experiences with regard to cross-border cooperation.

This approach may be typical of the EU, but one should actually be able to expect something similar from China. As Europeans, it would be a sign of a stra-tegic partnership, as we understand the term, if China were to devote itself to the stabilization of the Central Asia area within the framework of the SCO. Hitherto the SCO has not become involved in Central Asia, even though Kyrgyzstan contin-

There is growing cooperation on

cultural issues—such as the upcoming

“Art of Enlightenment” exhibition

Erler A strategic partnership means sharing

responsibility for some issues and regions

Just as the EU in its own neigh bour-

hood, China should take over regio-

nal responsibility in Central Asia

41 The Potential for Future Cooperation

“China should support the African Union and other forms of regional cooperation on that continent.”

Gernot Erler

ues to be in a state of crisis, which has also spilled over into Uzbekistan. Both of them are SCO member states.

And China could also become more involved in Africa. For example, the situa-tion in the DR Congo and other African countries is a catastrophe. The referendum in Sudan could easily lead to even more conflict. China has considerable interests and a great deal of influence in both countries. That is why China should support the African Union and other forms of regional cooperation on that continent. As far as I am concerned, such an understanding of a strategic neighbourhood is already very close to global governance. The latter is possible only if there is regional stability throughout the world. Conflicts and crises use up vast amounts of resources and make global governance impossible. Vast sums of money have gone to the Balkans and to Afghanistan. And the anti-piracy mission off the coast of Somalia is incredibly expensive, and ties up resources we need for the reso-lution of more important problems. Global policymaking should not be allowed to degenerate into being nothing but a repair business.

2. The Potential for Future Cooperation

How should relations between Germany and China develop? Are there any specific areas where closer cooperation might be possible?

The partnership between China and Europe stands at a crossroads. Now is the time to put our relations on a more long-term and strategic footing and to breathe new life into them. That means confronting the many global challenges together and laying the foundations for global peace and a more equitable world order. The EU consists of the largest group of developed countries. China is the largest develop-ing country. Their relations are no longer merely of bilateral significance, but increasingly of global importance. Although our societal systems and ideologies are different, there are no fundamental conflicts of interest. In fact, in the face of an increasing number of global challenges, more and more common interests are beginning to emerge.

Our deepening relations are based on our common interests. Thus China and Europe are both in favour of greater multilateralism in global policy making. We want to resolve global challenges together, to strengthen the role of the UN, and to democratize international relations. We are working towards an effective manage-ment of the globalization processes. In other words, we are trying to strengthen

Regional stability is important and

global policymaking should be more

than just a repair business

Sandschneider

Sun Jiazheng The relationship between China and the

EU is increasingly of global importance

China and the EU share a lot of interests

China and Europe 42

“A close strategic partnership is not only good for China and Europe,

but also for the rest of the world.”

Sun Jiazheng

the global governance structures and international financial controls. We both want to prevent a new international financial crisis and to stop countries from resorting to protectionist measures. We are also prepared to take drastic measures to save energy and reduce CO2 emissions in order to deal with climate change. A close strategic partnership is not only good for China and Europe, but also for the rest of the world. Thus we hope that Germany, the largest country in the EU, will make an active contribution to the development of the strategic partnership between China and Europe.

Since the year 2000, China has lent its support to peaceful development, endur-ing peace and prosperity for all. China has established a pragmatic and results- oriented kind of cooperation with America, Europe and Japan. This continues to be beneficial for everyone. At the beginning of the second decade of the 21st cen-tury, we want to deepen cooperation with other countries and to find and enlarge areas of common interest. For this reason China is in favour of a “come-what-may community of interests” with America and Europe. Despite our differences of opinion, we need to speak about our common interests.

We are currently confronted with numerous conflicts of an economic, poli-tical, cultural and military nature. Protectionism and nationalism are gaining ground. If we do not fight this trend, it will lead to a new confrontation. We can master the current challenges, e.g. supervision of the financial markets, the provi-sion of global supplies of foodstuffs and natural resources, and the fight against nuclear proliferation, climate change and epidemics, only in a “come-what-may community of interests.” In order to survive, we need to find new sources of energy, new industries and new lifestyles.

Europe and China should become an example of such a “come-what-may com-munity of interests.” It is necessary for their relationship, and good for the rest of the world. China has the highest economic growth in the world, and will soon have the largest market. The EU is the largest economic community and a technol-ogy leader. It has a mature market, and in many areas sets norms and standards. That is why we should transcend ideological differences and deepen the coopera-tion that now exists. This is already Chinese policy. Finally, in order to establish a community of interests, we need dialogue and exchange.

Now is the time to think about our relations in strategic terms and what they can mean in the long term. In doing so, we should take our bearings from three

Zheng Bijian China is committed to coope-

rating with Europe and the US—

despite all existing differences

Our community of interests

can defuse future conflicts …

… and is therefore more important

than all differences in ideology

Ma Wenpu

43 The Potential for Future Cooperation

“China and the EU should look for new sources of growth. We should join forces to develop a ‘green economy’ and to raise the level of energy efficiency.”

Wei Jianguo

principles. First, objectivity and a results-oriented philosophy; second, equality; third, tolerance and inclusivity. They also include respect for the interests of one’s partners. We should jointly promote global growth. First, by developing the green economy, providing support for clean energy and energy efficiency, the construc-tion of intelligent power networks and emission reductions. Here there is a need for a political dialogue. Second, through an exchange of people, that is, a cultural dialogue, youth exchange programmes, etc. Third, through a strategic partner-ship in the area of the economy and finance. Here there is a need for more risk management.

In 2010, the volume of trade between China and Europe did not grow as fast as that between China and Japan. If the trend continues, Japan could end up by tak-ing the place of the EU as China’s most important trading partner. For this reason China and the EU should look for new sources of growth. We should join forces to develop a “green economy” and to raise the level of energy efficiency. Invest-ment in these areas needs to be increased drastically. If electro-mobility becomes the leading industrial sector, it might perhaps provide a stimulus to the global economy. Even if Germany is pleased about selling a large number of cars on the Chinese market, in the long run this is not going to do anything to alleviate the effects of climate change. For this reason China and Germany should join forces to develop new technologies and pursue new kinds of mobility. Moreover, China hopes that the EU will lift its export restrictions for high-tech products, that it will increase the level of its investments in the country and make it easier for Chinese companies to obtain access to the European market.

The China–Europe tandem may well find the subject of climate change rather invigorating. In China there has been a change of paradigms, and there are now deliberate environmental policies which are nudging the country towards a green economy. Europe is the avant-garde of the industrialized states in this area, and China the avant-garde of the emerging nations. Together we could be a global en-gine that can put this issue at the top of the agenda, coordinate its salient points and submit the results to the formal UN decision-making bodies.

China and Europe should think about where they might be able to do some-thing positive together that transcends their bilateral relations, and in the pro-cess pursue their various interests. For example, both China and Europe are very

Wei JianguoChina and Europe should join forces

and develop a “green economy”

Schaefer China and the EU could become the

engine of a new global climate policy

Perthes

China and Europe 44

“We must develop a common strategy in order to ensure that we do not finance

or support contradictory activities.”

Volker Perthes

interested in Central Asia in terms of an east-west link. Here they could join forces in order to promote stability.

Furthermore, we should approach the issue of Africa together. In this area we have levelled numerous accusations at each other over the past five years, but are gradually beginning to see that we are both partly right. In Europe and America much has been written about the fact that China is investing vast sums in Africa without asking where the money is actually going to, and which dictator and unsav oury regime it is supporting in the process. In Europe this was criticized and deemed to be pointless from a development policy point of view. In the mean-time in Europe, we now understand that investments in the infrastructure, no matter for what regime, can help the local population. Mobility can help to create a middle class, which one day will start to make political demands. At the same time China has come to recognize that European calls for certain minimum good governance standards are not altogether misplaced. As more and more Chinese investors and aid workers are sent to Africa, Chinese companies and the Chinese government are becoming increasingly interested in good governance and a mini-mum amount of respect for the rule of law and of the kind of stability that does not break down every couple of years, on account of yet another military coup, widespread corruption, or a civil war.

The positions adopted by China and Europe in this area have, to a certain extent, converged. We should assemble experts from think tanks, the foreign and development ministries and the development agencies, and talk about the preconditions for stable and sustainable development in African states. We must develop a common strategy in order to ensure that we do not finance or support contradictory activities. And perhaps we can actually combine our global goals of implementing improved climate and energy policies by the promotion of green growth in these countries. The possibilities are seemingly endless. We should not wear ourselves out with mutual recriminations. Both China and Europe are very interested in preventing the emergence of new Somalias in Africa.

3. The Preconditions for Closer Relations

What are the preconditions which must be met so that relations can deepen in the way that has just been mentioned? Where are the weaknesses? What has to change? How might it be possible to balance conflicting interests?

One important place for regio nal cooperation

between the EU and China could be Africa …

… therefore we should develop a

common strategy for the continent

Sandschneider

45 The Preconditions for Closer Relations

“We have to learn to talk with each other, not about each other.”

Michael Schaefer

To some extent we still think in terms of good and bad, the categories of the Cold War. Old prejudices have their influence on current perceptions. And often we find it difficult to place our own opinions in perspective, and this makes it difficult to take note of new developments in other countries, thereby limiting or even kill-ing our chances of reaching compromises. For example, even before the Copen-hagen climate summit had come to an end, there was general agreement about who was responsible for the failure of the conference. It was China, the country with the largest CO2 emissions, because it refused to make the same commitments as the industrialized states. This kind of condemnation—at least if it comes with such a sweeping gesture—is uncalled for. It would have served the cause better if people had tried to understand why China, a country both still developing and already modern, holds on to the principle of differentiated responsibility, as far as efforts against climate change are concerned. It is this mindset that leads China to reject the kind of binding international agreements that the fully industrial-ized countries are advocating, while being ready to adopt wide-ranging laws on a national level, which will amount to nothing less than a significant Chinese contribution in the battle against climate change.

However, this kind of thing also happens the other way round. If western states bring up subjects such as values, human rights, or minority rights, the instinctive reaction in China is to say that this is merely being done in order to pursue anti-Chinese policies and to hamper China’s development. The recent announce ment of the new Nobel Peace Prize laureate is a case in point here. In light of its tremendous success in developing the country, over the course of the last two decades, China should act much more relaxed in response to criticism, be it domestic or coming from abroad.

If China and Europe want to reach a real compromise, they must think about the issue of perception and confront the question of whether their respective perceptions are partly or in whole a distortion of facts. As long as we do not think about our perceptions and are unable to detach ourselves from them when they are based on distortions, we cannot reach a compromise. We also need to accept the fact that our partners have legitimate interests and that it is necessary to achieve a fair accommodation of these. We have to learn to talk with each other, not about each other.

An important precondition for a further improvement in our relations is that we must subscribe to the same rules; we need a “level playing field.” This is true of

Schaefer It is unfair to lay all the blame for

the failure of the Copenhagen climate

summit at the feet of China

China should react more relaxed

when western countries are

addressing human rights issues

Hoyer

China and Europe 46

“The EU has quite specific expectations in China.”

Werner Hoyer

the EU, which must be willing to accept Chinese exports and investment. But it is also true of China. Recently Wen Jiabao promised Angela Merkel that foreign com-panies in China will be treated the same way as Chinese ones. That now needs to be put into practice. Over and above this, the EU has quite specific expec tations in China: greater efforts to retract protectionist measures, e.g. in the case of certain kinds of environmental technology, and in this way to reduce the balance of trade surplus; the removal of state export subsidies and the prevention of the price dumping that this makes possible; the equal treatment of Chinese and European companies when it comes to licensing procedures; and the enactment of patent rights. This will also be of benefit to China. When innovation increases, there is bound to be a growing need to protect patents.

The restrictions China has imposed on the export of rare earths constitute an enormous problem for the global economy. In this way, China may very well hamper the technological progress in other countries, which it actually wishes to participate in. That is politically very problematical. It turns cooperation into some thing that is rather unpredictable. But predictability is what it is all about. However, Europe should not resort to protectionist counter-measures without further ado.

The EU and China must also talk about the conditions under which the EU would be prepared to grant China market economy status before 2016, which is what the WTO envisages. It is actually in the European interest if China were to sign the WTO Government Procurement Agreement at an earlier date. This is an important issue as far as manufacturers in Europe are concerned.

Angela Merkel has said quite clearly that Germany believes that the WTO should soon give China the status of a market economy, that is, quite a long time before 2016. However, she also made clear that China must meet certain technical condi-tions in order for that to happen. The German government is going to advocate the formulation of precise conditions in this regard, on the part of the EU. The EU is well-advised not to come up with new conditions again and again. China currently still does not qualify for the status of market economy and cannot as yet demand to be given it, just as the Europeans cannot forever refuse to confer this status on China. Both sides have to face up to the debate that has accompanied this dispute.

Prime Minister Wen Jiabao has said that European companies will be placed on a par with Chinese ones. That was an important statement, but in certain cases it is not being implemented. All too often, problems arise in relation to market

Restrictions imposed on the export

of rare earths constitute a huge

problem—for the EU and for China

SchaeferGermany supports a market economy

status for China—but there are conditions

47 The Preconditions for Closer Relations

“This year the EU has already taken 29 protectionist measures against China. And anti-dumping regulations have been decreed. That has got to stop.”

Li Ruiyu

access or in connection with public tenders, an area where European companies see themselves at a disadvantage compared to their Chinese competitors. Rainer Brüderle, the Minister for Economics and Technology, brought this up here re-cently with his Chinese counterpart and suggested resolving such disputes by means of an informal arbitration approach. For China, the market economy sta-tus is one of the most sensitive issues in psychological terms. We do not want to talk about the preconditions for years on end, and we also do not wish to have to spell out one after the other. We were hoping that the EU–China summit would define a few unambiguous conditions which are important for European compa-nies operating in China and their ability to access the market. Granting China the status of a market economy could very well follow, as soon as such conditions are implemented.

I am optimistic about the future of Sino-European relations. Our companies are working together far more frequently, and industrial cooperation is constantly be-ing upgraded, partly as a result of German investment in China. China certainly reacts to the complaints of foreign companies. On 31 December 2009 the Chinese State Council passed a law on the use of foreign capital. New sectors were opened up for foreign investment, e.g. the manufacturing industry in central and western China. China intends to adhere to the open-door policy. The potential for joint ventures is now very great.

This year the EU has already taken 29 protectionist measures against China. And anti-dumping regulations have been decreed. That has got to stop. Many products are simply produced more efficiently and more cheaply in China. The EU will simply have to come to terms with the fact.

An increase in cooperation presupposes that the general public is convinced that it is a good idea. The EU and China want fair trade. But we will attain this goal only if we can convince the general public in the EU countries that it is worthwhile. I admire the Chinese press. CCTV broadcasts very interesting debates on interna-tional issues. In France, you can watch 15 Chinese TV channels by subscribing to a commercial provider, whereas in China you can get only one French channel. That is rather sad. We need far more give and take in this area.

Some EU member states and China keep trying to take advantage of the fact that Europe is sometimes in disarray. This must stop. European states will always

Huo Jianguo China has reacted to European criticism

and has further opened its markets

Li Ruiyu

Martin

China and Europe 48

“Of course, there have been misunder-standings and disagreements. However, we should not point the finger at each other.”

Liu Youfa

be tempted to improve relations with China at the expense of other member states and to make the most out of a difficult situation by saying to themselves: “If someone else has problems with China, I can use the opportunity to show what I can do.” That can also be rather risky. The fact of the matter is that if relations between one European country and China take a turn for the worse, this can have a negative effect on China’s relations with Europe as a whole. On the other hand, China is clearly tempted to play off the Europeans against each other. Such attitudes are understandable, even if in the long run there could be disadvantages for both sides. China may lose the EU as a partner, whereas the EU member states can easily undermine a common EU relationship with China.

Confucius once said that “at the age of 40, a man should be mature enough to see through things, and to think and act prudently.” Relations between China and the EU have now existed for almost 40 years, and it is up to us to intensify and deepen them, to promote the convergence of our interests and our common aspirations for global governance. Both sides have done a great deal to get as far as this, but much remains to be done. Of course, there have been misunderstand-ings and disagreements. However, we should not point the finger at each other. We should try to resolve such conflicts by looking at them in greater detail. Our relationship needs new visions and new ideas, and we also need more mutual trust.

More specifically, I think the following preconditions have an important bear-ing on an improvement of our relations. First, the former state-owned enterprises in Europe ought to increase their investments in China. These enterprises are the big players when it comes to promoting bilateral relations between the EU and China. As a result of the economic reforms in Europe they have become independ-ent entities, and their only link with the government is that they are paying taxes. Second, industrial cooperation is a sustainable way of initiating a new phase in the development of our bilateral relations. Third, there is a need for more cooper-ation with regard to research and development in the technology sector. Fourth, we need to arrange more exchanges in the area of human capital development. EU companies should send more of their employees to China and Chinese companies to the EU. Chinese people believe in personal connections, partly because they can promote mutual understanding and dispel mistrust. A well-known Chinese proverb states that it takes ten years for a tree to reach its full size, but 100 years for personal connections to mature.

Liu Youfa Our relationship has existed for 40 years—

it now needs new visions and ideas

Former state-owned enterprises from

Europe should invest more in China

49 The Preconditions for Closer Relations

“China has a great opportunity to earn respect and approval in Europe, and that is if it makes progress in the ecological sector.”

Georg Blume

If we want to improve our relations, we will have to bring our citizens “on board.” Many Europeans do not consider the CPC to be a legitimate government, because it has not been elected. Many workers and farmers in Europe see China as a threat to their social benefits. And the liberal European middle class believes that China is a threat to its new ecological way of life. That is why agreements between European governments and China can quickly lead to major counter-movements in the electorate.

However, China has a great opportunity to earn respect and approval in Europe, and that is if it makes progress in the ecological sector. On the political system level, Europe and China will not move towards each other in the immedi-ate future. China will not be seeking legitimacy or recognition from western na-tions by becom ing democratic in our sense of the word. This is simply not on the agenda here. Ecology is another matter altogether. I was happy about the decision by the Plenary Session of the Central Committee five years ago, at which China embarked on an ecological change of direction. But no one back home seems to have noticed that. China did not do a good job of telling the West what it was doing. In the new five-year plan it is going to be setting itself CO2 reduction goals that go even further.

China continues to be too defensive about the ecological stance that it has adopt ed. This might be expressed as follows: We must incorporate ecology, be-cause otherwise we will destroy our natural environment. Moreover, the Chinese still prefer to point a finger at the industrialized states, in order to avoid having to do too much themselves. But China can quickly overtake us in this area. From the time I lived in Japan, I know how a bureaucracy, moulded in the spirit of Confu-cianism and one of the world’s most successful economies, can turn into the most energy-efficient and ecologically-minded.

Is it necessary to lift the arms embargo, which the EU imposed on China in 1989?

The EU arms embargo against China must be lifted as quickly as possible. It is some thing that all 1.3 billion Chinese people find rather offensive. And for China it would be a striking gesture of trust, since it does not actually want to purchase more arms from Europe.

The arms embargo was imposed after what happened in June 1989. China asks for lifting the embargo, because it thinks sanctions and a strategic partnership

Blume

China can earn respect and appro-

val in Europe by communicating its

eco logical policies better

China can quickly overtake us

in the area of the environment

Sandschneider

Liu Youfa

Schaefer

China and Europe 50

“We have to appreciate more strongly the achivements China has already

made in recent decades, especially in relation to economic and social rights.”

Michael Schaefer

cannot go hand in hand. We can talk about when the exact time has come to lift the embargo, but at the moment we are simply not yet prepared to do that in the EU. The Chinese reaction to the recent announcement of the Nobel Peace Prize was not helpful in this regard.

Human rights issues are complicated social issues in the relationship between China and Europe. We have to appreciate more strongly the achivements China has already made in recent decades, especially in relation to economic and social rights. The way China has managed to free its people from hunger is nothing but admirable. Many other states, and some democratic ones in particular, have not been able to do that. At the same time, China should react more relaxed towards people criticizing it, whether they are Chinese or foreigners. Every coun-try as large and as influential as modern China has to live with criticism. As far as human rights issues are concerned, we have to talk to each other and focus on middle and long-term developments. I am happy that I can talk quite openly with my friends in the CPC about such matters.

The arms embargo was imposed in a specific situation and linked to demands that certain values should be respected. The deputies in the German Parliament and the general public would not find it acceptable if it were to be lifted without much ado, while at the same time nothing has changed with regard to the numerous points of criticism, and, to name but one example, there are still political pris-oners in China. If problems cannot be resolved today they should not be dragged into the limelight. It would be better to leave them alone. One of these days the issue of the arms embargo will be resolved. But since it is largely a symbolic issue, there is no urgency whatsoever.

The arms embargo has a profound strategic significance. It is not simply about whether or not one is going to supply weapons to a particular country. This ques-tion is currently not very acute, though China’s growing influence in East Asia contains the seeds of many potential conflicts a few decades down the road. In the context of their own alliances, this will force Germany and Europe to make certain decisions. That is why we should talk about our strategic interests in a global context.

I do not believe that all 1.3 billion Chinese citizens are deeply interested in the arms embargo. I suspect that 99 percent of them do not even know that an embargo exists.

Every country as large and as influential as

modern China has to live with criticism

Hoyer The arms embargo is mainly a

symbolic issue and should there-

fore not be stressed too strongly

Kornelius China’s rise can lead to conflicts—

and the EU has to be prepared for that

Sandschneider

51 Agreeing on Values

“The Nobel Peace Prize awarded to Liu Xiaobo demonstrates that our value systems are still dissimilar.”

Stefan Kornelius

4. Agreeing on Values

To what extent do China and Europe have to reach agreement on questions relat-ing to values? What separates us in this regard?

A community of interests can function only if one has reached agreement on a system of values. Values are deeply embedded within the core of what interests are all about. China and Europe find nothing more difficult than to talk about this subject. We may have respect for the historical experiences and development of our partners, but the Nobel Peace Prize awarded to Liu Xiaobo demonstrates that our value systems are still dissimilar, and that there is a great potential for emotionally charged disputes. As far as I am concerned, value questions start with pluralism, which is a hallmark of west European democracies, and also character-izes German democracy. In China, pluralism exists under the aegis of the CPC. I find it impossible to explain how this works in practice, though I would very much like to understand what is going on. This is an issue we have to get to grips with.

We ought to be very worried about the extent to which we have not yet reached agreement on values. On the one hand there is the remarkable upsurge in our economic ties, and at the same time, by giving Liu Xiaobo the Nobel Peace Prize, Europe is paying homage to someone who in China is considered to be a crimi-nal. If we want to get anywhere with the value debate we must persuade people in Europe to trust the morality of Chinese policymaking, just as many educated people in China trust western notions of political participation.

The vast majority of people in Europe and America believes that the CPC governs in an immoral manner. That is not the case. In rural China 700 mil-lion people continue to live in very primitive conditions. The CPC has set itself the task of raising the living standards of these people. For example, there is a programme that has been instigated to build 2,000 new hospitals in the rural districts. At the moment the hospitals are still in a parlous state. The conditions are inhuman.

In Europe we simply have no idea of the political skills that are needed and how difficult it is to resolve China’s social problems. The CPC is not a party that governs on the basis of arbitrary despotism. It derives its ideas from the an cient political values of this country. In China, there is an intellectual tradition of govern ment that is two thousand years old. Many members of the CPC think of

Sandschneider

Kornelius Coming to an agreement on values is where

Europe and China have the most difficulties

Blume It is worrisome how much we still

differ on the issue of values

The CPC is very involved in attempts to

improve living conditions in rural areas

China and Europe 52

“I have a great respect for how the CPC continues to pursue basic communist

ideas by grappling with social problems.”

Georg Blume

themselves as “good mandarins” who are a kind of moral institution in public life. I have a great respect for how the CPC continues to pursue basic communist ideas by grappling with social problems.

But the CPC is also responsible for the fact that this problem has not been properly communicated to the outside world. When the Round Table has come to an end we shall be travelling with an express train to the modern port city of Tianjin. We should instead travel through the provinces and look at all the things that the CPC is doing there. The CPC must make its decision-making processes more transparent so as to reveal the basically moral character of its governance, and thus to make it explicable to the West.

As a result of the terrible things that happened in the past Europeans and Ger-mans very deliberately ask others to show respect for basic human rights. We should not turn human rights into a political issue and use them for political purposes, but we feel compelled to speak out whenever, in our opinion, they are being infringed upon. When we are talking about such controversial subjects, which in Europe are emotionally charged, we must learn to accept some kind of compromise. We must be prepared to listen, for otherwise prejudice will triumph, and this could easily lead to demonization. This holds true of both China and Europe. We have to engage in a constructive dialogue on such matters and desist from pointing fingers while talking about them. But an amicable dialogue is not enough if we sweep the issues on which we differ under the carpet. A summit attended by the heads of state and government is not necessarily the right place for this kind of dialogue, since on such occasions the participants often tend to circumvent the really difficult issues. Such dialogues must be conducted on a lower and more informal level, where we can take our time to listen to the argu-ments of both sides and give considered answers. A real dialogue only works if the argu ments presented by the other side are taken seriously. Both sides occasionally fail to follow this principle.

As far as human rights are concerned, the situation in China is not static, but in flux. We think that the Chinese leadership is very well aware that a continued healthy development of China’s society is dependent upon the rule of law and more progress in the field of civil-political rights. Proof of this lies in the persistent Chinese willingness to engage in a dialogue, even as it relates to difficult human rights issues.

The CPC should do a better job in

com municating its accomplishments

and priorities to western media

Schaefer A real dialogue on human rights

will only work if arguments of

the other side are taken seriously

There is a consistent Chinese willingness to

discuss difficult issues, even human rights

53 Agreeing on Values

“Both sides need to do a great deal to improve the level of mutual understanding.”

Li Ruiyu

China and the EU have such different histories, cultures, traditions and political systems that it stands to reason that we cannot always be of the same opinion. These differences are quite normal and we will simply have to live with them. In order to overcome them, we will have to get to know each other better, to define our common interests, and to be more tolerant of the views held by the other side. We can always learn from each other. The CPC is constantly interacting with political parties, think tanks and media in Europe. Many study groups from China have visited Germany and France in order to find out more about the political and economic system and the challenges facing the European political parties. We want to understand Europe and to adopt and learn from its experiences inasmuch as they can be put to good use.

Exerting pressure on people is not very helpful if one wants to resolve differences. What we need is a real dialogue. We should deal with these sensitive issues in a cir-cumspect manner. Whether we like it or not, we have different societal systems, different notions of culture and values, and different levels of development. But we should respect each other; we should look for joint solutions; and we should not allow these problems to damage our relations. Both sides need to do a great deal to improve the level of mutual understanding.

In many areas, China has made far more progress than most Europeans would like to believe. I am fascinated by the fact that debates and pluralism are flourishing under the umbrella of the CPC. In the end there may be a common approach, but before that there are extremely exciting discussions. That is China’s counterpart to multiparty democracy. But of course China has no wish to dis mantle its ideo-logical principles. China, the US and the EU share a common denomi nator: the universal validity of human rights is an obligation for all of us. For this reason we will have to talk about this issue and to elucidate precisely what we think it means.

“Meeting at eye level” is a pivotal principle for China concerning all political fields and its relations with all its partners. This holds true for the area of human rights, too. It is thus important to take seriously the Chinese position, which is embedded in a historical context, and to phrase one’s criticism in a manner that is results-oriented and constructive. We should not lose sight of the goal of our involvement, meaning to further improve conditions for the people of China.

Huang Huaguang The heightened level of relations will lead

to a reduction of misunderstandings

Li Ruiyu You do not settle differences by exerting

pressure—a real dialogue is the way to go

Hoyer Exciting debates and pluralism are flou-

rishing under the umbrella of the CPC

SchaeferThe principle of “meeting at eye

level” is the cornerstone on

which China builds partnerships

China and Europe 54

“China is not afraid of criticism. If it is to the point, one should react by making

the necessary corrections, whereas in appropriate criticism should be rejected.”

Huang Huaguang

5. Making Sense of Media Coverage

To what extent do members of the media from China and Europe engage in ex-changes? What are the differences in this area?

Cooperation between China and Europe in the media sector is not as good as in other areas. In November 2008, Ambassador Schaefer organized the first German-Chinese media dialogue here in Beijing. On that occasion, we also discussed the question of whether reports about China in the western media are appropriate. Many Chinese journalists, including former foreign correspondents, were of the opinion that most of the western media carry negative reports about China and are thus responsible for the popular negative image of China. The second media dialogue was held in Germany in April, and was not so confrontational. We talked about environmental protection and intellectual property, topics that are of inter-est to both sides. If we want a fruitful exchange of ideas, we should look for such points of contact and use them to expand the media dialogue.

The mutual perceptions of Europe and China, it is true, have improved in the course of time, but they are not perfect by any stretch of the imagination. There are frequent misunderstandings. The media are partly to blame for this. Many Chinese citizens cannot read the foreign press and have to rely on what they are told by their own media if they want to know what is going on in the US or Europe. For this reason all Chinese media have a commitment to report comprehensively, objectively and precisely. At the same time the government of every country must of course provide as much information as possible.

The People’s Republic of China has been in existence for 61 years. Already in the early days it was viciously attacked in the foreign press. But China is not afraid of criticism. If it is to the point, one should react by making the necessary correc-tions, whereas inappropriate criticism should be rejected. This was Mao Zedong’s attitude, and is the stance adopted by the current Chinese leadership. I can only suggest that we should all treat criticism in a down-to-earth way and avoid over-reaction, even when the reports about China are obviously malicious.

Many of the European media interpret our policies incorrectly, criticize China, or simply do not carry reports about things which are important. That is the reason why many Europeans who travel to China for the first time are very surprised.

Sandschneider

Chai Ye Western media portray China

in too negative a light—a better

media dialogue could help here

Huang Huaguang

China should answer western criticism in

an objective manner, not by overreacting

Li Ruiyu

55 Making Sense of Media Coverage

“The European media should provide more balanced and comprehensive reports about China.”

Li Ruiyu

On account of the misleading reports in the press they had a completely different picture of China. On his last trip to Europe Wen Jiabao gave an important speech at a meeting of the European-Chinese Chamber of Commerce in which he said that all European companies active in China would be treated exactly the same as Chinese ones. Many of the European media did not carry reports about this. That was disappointing. The European media should provide more balanced and comprehensive reports about China. This would improve China’s image and the way it is perceived by the general public in Europe.

Western media are selective and quite obviously decide what can be reported and what cannot. In 2008, a Chinese member of the staff of Deutsche Welle was dis-missed, because she spoke out in defence of the Chinese government. I take this to mean that in the German media one cannot praise the Chinese system if one feels like it. Prime Minister Wen Jiabao recently gave a speech in which he said that freedom of speech and democracy had to be encouraged in China, and that, although stability was important, the constitution also had to be respected. Not a single western newspaper carried a report about that. There were comments about other parts of the speech. That is simply not right. If you are going to quote, then please quote the whole text and not just bits of it.

To claim that it is impossible to praise China’s political system in the German press is rabble-rousing, pure and simple. Conversely, I could easily say that in China one is not allowed to criticize China, though I am not going to, because I can read between the lines.

The western media are not alone in selecting topics on the basis of a whole host of different criteria, some of them economic and some political. It is always a question of what people want to pay for. But the Deutsche Welle incident in 2008 is not a typical one. German media organizations make the same mistakes as anyone.

For years our bilateral discussions have been accompanied by mutual re-proaches in the media. It is about time we came to some kind of agreement on this point. The German media are basically independent of the German government and are not required to restrict themselves to a narrow reporting framework in the way the Chinese media are. The media in China and Europe quite simply work on the basis of different rules. If one wants to be a success in one of these systems,

Huang YongIt appears that it is a taboo for western media

to find some thing praiseworthy in China

Blume

Sandschneider

Media in China and in Europe

work on a different set of rules—

and it shows in their coverage

China and Europe 56

“It is not a sign of criminal behaviour if the Chinese and European media occasionally

make critical remarks about the other side.”

Eberhard Sandschneider

one has to know what they are and how to apply them. One cannot survive on the German media market if one tries to use Chinese rules. And the reports about China published in Europe are in fact moulded by the latter’s rules.

Moreover, it is not a sign of criminal behaviour if the Chinese and European media occasionally make critical remarks about the other side. The Chinese de-bate about Germany in the internet is often far less complimentary than what is said about China in the German media. Sometimes one just has to put up with such criticism. That is not only true of the bilateral relationship between Germany and China: in the EU itself we keep having such debates with states that have been our closest friends for many years. In this media debate, we need to relinquish our maximum demands and learn to appreciate that certain mechanisms in our countries function in different ways. These conflicts can be resolved only if one thinks about and understands the nature of the systems.

A few days ago there was an article in the South China Morning Post about an internet appeal by 25 former senior officials of the media and cultural sector in which they complained that there had been insufficient coverage in the West of various speeches given in recent months by Wen Jiabao, beginning with a speech in Shenzhen on 21 August in which he spoke about reforming the UN. In the media dialogues between Germany or Europe and China, the Chinese are always complaining about the reports that are published in Europe. But that does not get us anywhere. In Europe, journalists do not provide a eupho nious accompani-ment for the activities of politicians. They are independent, and they form their own opinions, even if I would not want to be so presumptuous as to describe the media as the fourth estate. Furthermore, journalists can only do their job and file reports if they receive some information. Unfortunately foreign journalists in China often do not have the information they need. The country is developing so fast that one simply cannot handle the available information. The Chinese au-thorities have it in their power to satisfy this craving for infor mation. Withholding it does not make things any better. That is why I would like to make an appeal for more openness!

People in China should not demonize the western press. I feel that the German press keeps me reasonably well informed about China. When Wen Jiabao said in Greece that China wanted to support the euro by investing in Greek bonds, this was widely reported in the European press. It went down quite well, even with

China has to put up with western

criticism—just as Germany has

to put up with Chinese criticism

Kornelius Chinese criticism of western media leads us

nowhere—more openness is the way to go

Perthes I feel reasonably well informed

about China by the German media

57 Making Sense of Media Coverage

“We are not actually expecting China to turn into another Mother Teresa. But China seems to trust the euro, and that is a good thing.”

Volker Perthes

politicians. However, we should be aware of the fact that China naturally does not want to help Greece for altruistic reasons, and that self-interest has prompted it to support the global economy and thus its own economy. We are not actually expecting China to turn into another Mother Teresa. But China seems to trust the euro, and that is a good thing.

Global Governance 58

1. Why Do We Need Global Governance?

What are the challenges with which China and the rest of the world will have to grapple in the years ahead?

The coming decade is crucial for China and the rest of the world. It will be domi-nated by new and closely interlinked developments. I shall mention seven of them. 1. Multipolarization and economic globalization. The interdependence between the various different countries will continue to increase. 2. A new relationship between the great powers. In future we will still be competing with one another. The reactions to the financial crisis have demonstrated that we are in a position to take joint action. Such cooperation will continue to deepen. 3. The inexorable and peaceful rise of the emerging countries. The emerging nations feel a need for stability and prosperity. They will be a driving force for world peace. 4. An industrial revolution in the developing and emerging countries that will concen-trate increasingly on sustainability, environmental protection and climate change. This will go hand in hand with a shift of economic power from the industrialized states to the emerging countries. 5. A slow-down in global economic growth in the wake of the financial crisis. Global demand will change. As a result of the rise of the emerging countries the competition for the best people, for market share, foodstuffs, natural resources and energy supplies will become more pronounced. At the same time, global governance has been put on the agenda, as a result of the financial crisis. 6. War is still a distinct possibility. Even if we assume that there will be peace, the danger of war and aggression should never be underestimated. There are still numerous inter-state and intra-state conflicts, which can erupt into hostilities at any time. 7. Good development prospects for the global economy and for China. All in all and despite the potential dangers, the opportunities will outweigh the challenges.

What is the significance of global governance against this background?

Global governance is absolutely essential. Individual nation-states are increasingly confronted with challenges that they are unable to meet on their own, for exam-ple, natural disasters, such as the earthquake in Haiti or the flooding in Pakistan. Both countries had to fall back on international assistance, and this had to be organ ized within the framework of global governance structures. Another chal-

Zhang Yansheng

Zheng Bijian Seven examples for the increased connec-

tions between China and the world

Zhang Yansheng

Erler

III. Global Governance

59 Why Do We Need Global Governance?

lenge is the problem of failed states, which can destabilize whole regions and can become hotbeds of organized crime and international terrorism. Here again individual states are incapable of dealing with the situation on their own.

The indispensable nature of global governance is even more obvious in the case of climate change. Uncoordinated counter-measures lead to nothing. We have in fact reached agreement about the goal, which is that we want to make sure that the temperature of the earth’s atmosphere does not rise by more than two degrees by the end of the 21st century. But in order to attain this goal, we need a global strategy. We must set in motion a process in which not only international organi zations play an important role, but also networks of NGOs and the volun-tary agreements concluded by the individual states. We can actually start to talk about global governance only when these three elements come together.

The financial crisis showed that there is a need for global governance. Not all of the dangers have as yet been overcome, and a breakdown of the global eco-nomic system as in 1929–30 must be prevented at all costs. Interestingly enough, the responsibility for the countervailing measures was put in the hands of the G 20, and not in those of the UN, the WTO or the IMF, which is what one might have been led to expect. The G 20 states decided to implement gigantic stimulus packages, to introduce international financial regulatory reforms, and to embark on banking regulations. That was certainly a success. For the time being, at any rate, a collapse of the global economy has been prevented. However, many meas-ures have not as yet been implemented. An enduring solution to the problem has not emerged. Yet the crisis certainly demonstrated the indispensable nature of global governance, even though much still remains to be done.

Global governance is not possible without cooperation between the EU, Ger-many and China. Today there are more than 60 dialogue forums between China and the EU, and more than 30 between China and Germany, but a structured dialogue about global governance has not as yet materialized. When it comes to global governance, Germany can contribute its valuable experiences in the EU, relating to the organization of responsibility on a regional level. And China can contribute its experiences in various regional cooperation forums. An exchange of ideas on this specific issue between the EU and China would be an excellent idea.

Economic globalization has come a long way since the 1990s. The ups and downs on the international markets—for financial services, energy and foodstuffs—have increased dramatically. The various continents are developing differently in eco-

Global governance needs the cooperation

of NGOs as well as contractual obligations

Despite the measures adopted by

the G 20, the economic and finan-

cial crisis has not yet been solved

We need a structured dialogue

on globalization

Wei Jianguo

“War is still a distinct possibility. Even if we assume that there will be peace, the danger of war and aggression should never be underestimated.”

Zheng Bijian

Global Governance 60

“A break-through in the Doha Round would have very positive consequences for global trade.

China regrets that it proved impossible to reach agreement on the salient points.”

Wei Jianguo

nomic terms. Many countries have not managed to raise the living standards of the population or to protect the environment. The economic and financial crisis confronted a large number of countries with severe problems. And many indus-trialized states have acquired huge amounts of debt and are suffering from high levels of unemployment. The global market is contracting, and this is having a negative effect on the global economy. At the same time protectionist tendencies are gaining ground. Whereas it is no doubt true that the global economy is recov-ering, there is still a danger that we will be hit by a new crisis.

Against this background, global governance is now more important than it has ever been. In recent years the institutions and mechanisms of global govern-ance have been strengthened, above all in the area of the economy. Thus the devel-oping countries have been given greater participatory rights and steps have been taken to improve cooperation with the industrialized countries. Despite all this, global governance still needs to be strengthened: and that is the shared respon-sibility of all the states throughout the world. Their primary task is to contribute to the ongoing recovery and consolidation of the global economy. And there is a need for more coordination in the area of global economic and finance policy.

China respects the existing mechanisms such as the UN, the IMF, the World Bank, and the WTO. We have always said that we would be only too happy to resolve new problems with the existing mechanisms. Hitherto, the WTO has stimu lated the global economy in significant ways. A break-through in the Doha Round would have very positive consequences for global trade. China regrets that it proved impossible to reach agreement on the salient points. Unfortunately, there are countries that are not of this opinion. Thus the US, under both George W. Bush and Barack Obama, conducted bilateral negotiations about foreign direct investments with other countries, such as the Gulf states, and thus circumvented the WTO. This was not helpful as far as the Doha Round was concerned.

China is convinced that the global challenges can be met only with the help of multilateralism and is thus clearly opposed to unilateral action of any kind. For a long time, US unilateralism posed a challenge to the whole world. President Obama has fortunately decided to go back to multilateralism. However, multilat-eral action is not simple. For one thing there are important differences of opinion between developing countries and industrialized states. As a developing country, China must decide whether it intends to devote itself primarily to its own develop-ment or whether it is going to assume responsibility on an international level. Not

Strengthening global governance

is the responsibility of all countries

China puts its trust in multilateral institu-

tions such as the UN, the IMF and the WTO

Feng Zhongping China is opposed to unilateralism

and wants to convince other coun-

tries to adopt the same position

61 Why Do We Need Global Governance?

“If we want to have a harmonious world, we will have to do more to achieve a balance between the development of the north and the south.”

Zhang Wencai

infrequently, the two contradict each other. And multilateral action tends to get shot down by those who profit from the conflicting interests of the great powers and therefore wish to prevent the emergence of a compromise. These countries are not interested in any way, shape or form in better coordination, e.g. when it comes to reforming the UN, the World Bank or the IMF. We must persuade these countries to change their attitude.

Global governance is very similar to the Chinese notion of a “harmonious society.” One of the things that China is trying to achieve is a harmonious balance between policymaking, the economy and society. We are in favour of sustainable develop-ment and the establishment of universal rules. The purpose of this striving for harmony is to help the human personality with all its qualities and competences to unfold its full potential. That is of fundamental importance for us.

Global governance can make a contribution to a more harmonious, better, fairer, more orderly and inclusive world. If we want to have a harmonious world, we will have to do more to achieve a balance between the development of the north and the south. This is the only way in which we can overcome global poverty. And time is running out.

There are three reasons why harmony is not necessarily the organizational prin-ciple that will underpin the multilateral order.

First, the old powers are not altogether happy about the emergence of new poles. It is true that the US and Europe are continually asking China, Brazil and India to assume more responsibility on the international level by getting involved in what is going on in various parts of the world. However, whenever they actually comply with such requests, their participation is often rejected by Europe and the US because their views are at variance with Western policies, e.g. with regard to the Iranian nuclear programme or certain conflicts in Africa.

Second, a few of the smaller emerging countries are a source of discord. The international system will consist not only of five or six poles which together will govern the world. There will also be poles on a regional level, e.g. in Africa and in Asia. This means that there will be new conflicts. Today some of the smaller emerging nations, for example in the Islamic world, are already complaining about the fact that the old industrialized countries and an emerging country, such as China, form an exclusive club in the UN Security Council, which retains the

Liu Youfa Global governance corresponds

with the principle of harmony that

is so important in China

Zhang Wencai

Perthes Insisting on harmony will hardly help

us in overcoming conflicting positions

Global Governance 62

“We must dedicate ourselves in a far more responsible manner to the juridifi-

cation of our cooperation on all levels.”

Michael Schaefer

right to possess nuclear weapons. The dividing line does not necessarily separate emerging nations and industrialized states.

Third, there are obvious opposing interests, and not only competition. Compe-tition can be dealt with peacefully by stipulating rules, but this is not the case with opposing interests. One cannot resolve opposing interests by simply saying that everyone should decide to live together harmoniously. What one needs are clear-cut rules. And sometimes there will have to be someone who makes sure that these rules are actually observed and implemented.

In the case of conflicting interests there is a need for mechanisms that can recon-cile them. An example of this is competition for natural resources. In the years ahead, the scarcity of resources will be far greater than it is now. Competition for these resources will increase. Countries such as China, India and Brazil, which are dependent on high levels of economic growth in order to develop their societies, will need more resources than the industrialized states. It would be wrong to embark upon a fierce natural resources contest. What we ought to be doing in order to avoid zero-sum games is to conclude binding agreements. We need legally binding regulations and standards. International law has an important inter-state function, because this is the only way in which others can obtain recognition of their legitimate interests. We must dedicate ourselves in a far more responsible manner to the juridification of our cooperation on all levels.

2. Proposals for Reform

Do the global governance structures have to be reformed, and, if so, how? How can we strengthen global governance?

As we have seen, there is a consensus on the indispensable nature of global gover-nance, but there is no consensus on its structures. And here again we are faced with the unresolved contradiction between the effectiveness and legitimacy of international institutions and bodies.

The most important institution of global governance is the UN, which es-sentially consists of two bodies. On the one hand there is the General Assem-bly, which comprises 192 countries. Here every country has one vote, though equal participation goes hand in hand with a lack of proportional representa-tion. China with its 1.3 billion inhabitants is on a par with Montenegro with its

One may solve competition by

adopting specific rules, but that does

not work with conflicts of interest

SchaeferA competition for natural resources

would be harmful—we have to

con clude binding agreements on this

Zhang Yansheng

Erler

The UN remains the most important

instrument of global governance …

63 Proposals for Reform

“As the G 20 becomes more important, it is turning into a rival of the UN.”

Gernot Erler

600,000 inhabitants. That is a definite problem. Similarly, the second UN body, the Security Council, does not take into account the sizes of the various countries. The five permanent members and official nuclear powers possess a right of veto. The ten non-permanent members are elected for two years at a time. The permanent members do not include any representatives from two continents: Africa and Latin America. Thus the lack of legitimacy is clearly apparent. There is no equality of opportunity when it comes to choosing the non-permanent members. On top of this the right to veto of the permanent members makes a consensus imperative. This leads to long-winded decision-making processes, and these often do not pro-duce a result.

Against this background there have, for a long time, been proposals to reform the UN. One idea is to create a UN Popular Assembly, a kind of second chamber next to the General Assembly, in which countries would be represented on the basis of the size of their populations. Another proposal is to upgrade the involve-ment of civil society via the NGOs, which are playing an increasingly important role in global politics. In 2003 Kofi Annan set up a group of distinguished ex-perts under the chairmanship of former Brazilian president Fernando Henrique Cardoso to examine this issue. Unfortunately, its pioneering final report led to nothing.

Other global governance institutions also have legitimacy problems. In the IMF and the World Bank the ten most powerful countries have more than 50 per-cent of the votes. In the IMF, the OECD countries have 61 percent of the votes, whereas Africa has only 6 percent. A redistribution of voting rights is in progress, but is proceeding at a snail’s pace. Another institution, the G 8, is a very effective body, partly because its members share the same value systems. However, its le-gitimacy is not obviously apparent, since membership is based solely on economic performance. And the G 8 excludes China.

All in all, many global governance institutions, and first and foremost the UN, are suffering from a loss of confidence and low approval ratings. On the other hand, the G 20 has become increasingly popular, on account of the way in which it tackled the financial crisis. The G 20 could also play a greater role in the field of security policy. However, as the G 20 becomes more important, it is turning into a rival of the UN. This became visible last year when UN Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon convened a committee of experts under the chairmanship of Joseph Stiglitz and a UN Conference on the World Financial and Economic Crisis and thus made it plain that he does not intend to surrender the field to the G 20.

… but reforming its institutions would

provide more legitimacy

Smaller and economically weak countries

are at a disadvantage in the IMF and the G 20

The financial crisis gave the G 20 a boost,

making it into a competitor of the UN

Global Governance 64

Yet even the G 20 has image problems. Smaller states such as Singapore, Switzer land and Qatar, which are not represented in the G 20, have launched the “Global Redesign Initiative” and the “Global Governance Group” (which is also referred to as “3G”), and they now have 28 members. To my mind they are obvi-ously protesting against the G 20. I find that alarming.

Another problem is the attitude of large countries, e.g. the US, to global gover-nance decisions. It is true that under Obama, US foreign policy is once again more openly in favour of multilateralism. Washington has at long last paid its outstanding contributions to the UN. The Obama administration is more willing to counte nance a reform of the UN than the Bush administration, and has, for example, joined the UN Human Rights Council, which the Bush administration continued to boycott. Obama is also prepared to sign agreements on disarma-ment, climate change and financial market regulation. However, it will be diffi-cult to get the requi site majority in Congress. The latter always backpedals when it comes to binding rules. Despite the oil catastrophe in the Gulf of Mexico and the Democratic majority in both houses of Congress at the time, Obama failed to make any headway with the ratification of these commitments. This indicates the existence of a structural problem. Resistance in the US increases in proportion to the number of international policy goals that are formulated in binding terms. Even if we end up by reforming the UN, there will still be the problem of large countries that refuse to adhere to binding decisions, and as a result hamper the implementation of specific decisions.

So democracy can also be an obstacle to good governance. There are many people who see an alternative to this in informal cooperation. The term “club governance” is used in the case of IBSA (India, Brazil and South Africa), the BRIC states (Brazil, Russia, India and China), and the MEF (Major Economies Forum). And many people believe that these informal bodies will be more useful than the formal ones. In this context, a US diplomat, Richard Haass, has spoken of “coali-tions of the willing and relevant.” But these bodies also have significant legitimacy problems.

Global governance is based on the idea that even very strong powers may be prepared to surrender part of their sovereignty to a collective organization, and to a certain extent to comply with decisions made by others. Germany experienced an upsurge in the 19th century, and at the end of the century had become the strongest power in Europe. In the 20th century this led to two horrific tragedies. The two world wars originated in Germany, which used its newly-acquired power

Not all countries are ready to

accept the new role of the G 20

Even if the UN reforms, larger coun-

tries, such as the US, will not always

feel bound by its resolutions

Informal groups appear as an alternative

to the UN—but they also lack legitimacy

Global governance will only work

if larger states are prepared to

sur render part of their sovereignty

65 Proposals for Reform

“The G 20 should play a more prominent role in combating economic difficulties, and international political problems.”

Wei Jianguo

with great brutality in order to protect what it deemed to be its own interests. Germany learnt from these tragic events and after the Second World War accepted the fact that, as the strongest power in Europe, it had a future only if it was pre-pared to hand over part of its sovereignty to the EU. That was not self-evident. But Germany has done well out of this. The question is whether China would also be prepared to surrender part of its sovereignty in this way.

It would be unfair to ask China to give up part of its sovereignty and commit itself, because the point of departure in Europe and Germany was a completely differ-ent one. Even the US, a mature economy and a democracy, which is a member of every international organization, is often not prepared to comply with inter-national rules when they impinge on national interests, no matter whether they are decisions made by the UN or the IMF. Notwithstanding the discussions about global governance, the US is very much concerned to retain its power of veto. The willingness to commit oneself clearly has certain limits, especially in the case of larger countries which play an important role on the international level: and these are reached when the international community votes against them.

I should like to make five proposals for the improvement of global governance.1) The WTO must be strengthened in order to prevent protectionism and to

redress the global trade imbalances.2) Greater importance must be accorded to the G 20 by giving the emerging

nations greater co-participation rights. The G 20 should play a more prominent role in combating economic difficulties, and international political problems, inclu ding those on the regional, military and security policy levels. Unnecessary issues should be avoided.

3) International financial controls must be strengthened. There are many new ideas: Basel III, various pieces of legislation in the US, or suggestions from the EU. The international institutions and countries throughout the world should do every thing they can to implement these proposals. Here the G 20 has an impor-tant role to play.

4) The suspension of the economic stimulus packages that were designed to deal with the financial and economic crisis must be coordinated. The haphazard and premature termination of these measures could lead to a second recession in the world economy. The crisis has not yet been overcome. In many countries the situation continues to be unstable. In Greece and in France there have been large

Wenzel The willingness of larger coun tries

to commit themselves to binding

agreements has clear limits

Wei Jianguo

The G 20 should play a more promi-

nent role—and not just concerning

economic and financial policy

Global Governance 66

demonstrations. A further rise in US unemployment would be another blow to the global economy. Against this background EU monetary union clearly needs to be reformed, since it is responsible for the current difficulties of the euro. Thus the ECB makes its own monetary policy, whilst the individual member states continue to decide the amount of debt they want to incur. If certain states pile up large amounts of debt, the EU, in the final analysis, will have to pick up the ticket. This has an adverse effect on smoothly functioning economies with low levels of debt, such as Germany. This kind of monetary policy cannot work.

5) We have to put more emphasis on the green economy, improve energy effi-ciency and work on ways to tackle the problem of climate change.

The current global governance structures can no longer deal with global chal-lenges. Both the WTO and the World Bank failed dismally in the crisis. I some-times have the impression that the situation today resembles the one before the Second World War, when the League of Nations was quite rightly accused of not being in a position to do anything. The WTO needs to be given more powers. The redistribution of voting rights is only one measure among many. Furthermore, anti-dumping measures must be banned, since certain countries use them for entirely selfish reasons. We cannot resolve these problems with the WTO arbitra-tion mechanism and nothing else. Nor is the G 20 the most appropriate forum for the resolution of many problems. We should coordinate our positions within the G 20, and follow this up with decisions in the UN.

Global governance is fundamentally all about ridding the world of imbalances and injustice and setting in motion a juridification process. Global governance must do both in the forthcoming decades. I have been active in the multilateralism business since the end of the 1970s. I have to say that the way multilateral work is done has become increasingly complicated. Today, everyone seems to be doing everything. Indeed, more and more people are doing things at more and more large conferences, and working less and less in a target-oriented manner.

Thus, in order to be able to tackle these issues in an effective way, we need to change the multilateral system on three levels. First, regional questions, which constitute the largest chunk of the problem, must be resolved in the context of intra-regional cooperation —in Asia, in Europe and in Latin America. On the level above this, which is the interregional one, we must concentrate on a few issues and areas where there is substantial regional overlap. Here we need cooperation

Huo Jianguo The existing global governance structures

can no longer deal with global challenges

Schaefer Global governance is getting

more and more complicated

We have to prioritize issues

according to their urgency and then

solve them on different levels

67 Proposals for Reform

“Since the establishment of the G 20 is very much based on the interests of those involved, it will soon have reached the limits of its usefulness.”

Stefan Kornelius

between the EU and ASEAN, or between the EU and the Gulf states. And we should concentrate on a handful of issues which are at the top of the agenda in these regions. On the third and highest level, the international one, people should con-centrate on a very small number of crucial issues such as climate change, energy and world peace. These issues can only be solved if all countries are involved. And it will be less efficient if umpteen other, less important, issues are discussed at the same time. The latter can be resolved much better on the interregional or intra-regional levels.

As we develop a new world order that incorporates the rising powers, we keep coming up against two obstacles. The old order had two qualities that were of fundamental importance: the rule of law and the power of trust. The ability to implement the decisions that were made depended on the legal commitments of the participants. In the case of the G 20 this is only just beginning to materialize. Since the establishment of the G 20 is very much based on the interests of those involved, it will soon have reached the limits of its usefulness. And since the pressure to produce results has disappeared rather quickly, it is becoming increas-ingly difficult to create such a system of rules and regulations. The G 8 is a classic example of the power of trust. The G 8 apparatus—the bureaucratic structures and the mechanisms which prepare for decision-making—has led to a state of affairs where the participants know each other very well. Only the small G 8 group, with its equal partners, is capable of generating some kind of peer pressure; and this leads to a situation where decisions are actually implemented. No other forum can lead to such mutual trust in such a short space of time.

When it comes to global governance we find nothing easier than to define goals such as the prevention of protectionist measures or global warming. In politics people always find it easy to approve of goals, especially when one is talking about long-term goals: this means that the politicians concerned are no longer around when they have to be attained. But reaching agreement on goals has nothing to do with global governance. The latter signifies making rules, implementing them, and supervising the implementation by means of international transparency and non-state actors.

Reciprocity is a good principle for an international regime when you are defin-ing rules and regulations. In the context of the current debate, it is reasonable to ask whether China is ready to adhere to the principle of reciprocity, even when

Kornelius It is doubtful that the same level of trust can

develop in the G 20 as it did in the smaller G 8

Perthes Global governance means significantly more

than just agreeing tentatively on goals

Global Governance 68

we are talking about protectionism. There are justified complaints in China about protectionist measures adopted by the US. However, other countries also complain about protectionism in China, and about discrimination against foreign compa-nies when applying for public tenders, or when trying to obtain access to the services sector.

In order to implement the rules, we no doubt need new mechanisms, and all countries will have to comply with them. Do we need arbitration mechanisms, which must be agreed to and ratified by all (and then are universally applicable), such as those which to some extent already exist in the WTO, e.g. for environ-mental issues, the export of resources, or for access to resources? Recently there was a political conflict between China and Japan that the former used as an excuse to restrict exports of certain natural resources to the latter.

The efficiency and legitimacy of international organizations depend on whether or not people approve of them. We must persuade the nations to follow in our footsteps. In the final analysis they are going to have the last say about whether global governance will actually work. It was Jürgen Habermas who pointed out that democracy cannot function without a public sphere, and that the good sense that emerges in the political process must also be present among ordinary people. The French ‘No’ vote on the European constitutional treaty showed us, in no un-certain terms, what can happen if we do not persuade ordinary people to follow our example.

Let us go back to the redistribution of voting rights.

The shift in the global balance of power simply has to be reflected in the voting rights. Some progress in this area has already been made in the World Bank, and in the IMF such reforms are on the point of being introduced. The proposals include the redistribution of voting rights and a reshuffle of the Board of Gover-nors. Concrete results are expected to emerge in the very near future.

The voting rights must be redistributed, because they no longer reflect the current realities. However, this will not be easy and it will not be done in quite the radical way that some emerging nations are hoping for. To some extent, their expecta-tions will be disappointed. In all these institutions, China must be given a signifi-cantly larger weighting. In the G 20, it could well be on a par with Japan or even

In order to implement rules one needs

mechanisms that are accepted by all

Blume The efficiency of international

organisations relates to their accep-

tance among ordinary citizens

Zhang Yansheng

Zhang Tao

Wenzel China will benefit from a redistri-

bution of voting rights—but this

also implies more responsibility

“It is reasonable to ask whether China is ready to adhere to the principle of reciprocity, even

when we are talking about protectionism.”

Volker Perthes

69 Proposals for Reform

“China must be prepared to listen to others, and on the basis of this, come to certain conclusions that will affect its policymaking.”

Rolf Wenzel

overtake it. As a result, it would have the second-largest number of voting rights after the US. But China also needs to be aware of the fact that if it wants to have more voting rights in international organizations, it must also be prepared to lis-ten to others, and on the basis of this, come to certain conclusions that will affect its policy making. This means assuming more responsibility and making a greater contribution to the stability of the financial markets, in particular, and of growth, in general, within the framework of exchange rate and economic policy. I am not quite sure whether China has come to that realization yet.

China has always been in favour of giving the emerging countries a greater say. It has supported a reform of the quotas and voting rights; endorsed a selection procedure based on qualifications and not on size; and called for dialogues that could run parallel to the G 20, e.g. the G 80. In this context, it has set its sights on a more equitable world order. In the case of international issues, there are sim-ply different responsibilities, e.g. those that have something to do with climate change or global trade imbalances. But it is also clear that both the industrialized states and the emerging nations have certain responsibilities. With its stable, healthy and balanced development, China wishes to make an ongoing contribu-tion to the stability and prosperity of the global economy. But before we do that, we will have to solve our own problems.

What is the state of global financial supervision? How can it be improved?

Cooperation in the area of financial supervision is not transparent when it comes to the distribution and collection of information. We need additional measures designed to strengthen financial supervision and macroeconomic management. Basel III was a start. There are also bilateral agreements on, and regional institu-tions designed to facilitate, financial cooperation. In Asia, for example, there is the Chiang Mai Initiative. The Chinese Central Bank has launched a currency po licy initiative with South Korea and other Asian countries that is designed to strengthen the confidence of investors and consumers in the regional economy. All these initiatives and measures will have a positive effect on the global economy.

The lesson to be learned from the financial crisis is that the international com-munity has no control over global economic developments and global capital flows. There was no early warning, there was no coordination of the measures

Zhang Wencai A more prominent role for the emerging

nations will lead to a more just world order

Zhang Yansheng

Zhang Tao China supports better financial

supervision—and is cooperating with

its neighbours in this regard

Liu Youfa

Global Governance 70

“China hopes that Europe will become even stronger, and that it will play a more

active role on the international stage.”

Sun Jiazheng

adopted, there were no counter-mechanisms. This represents an opportunity for cooperation between China and Europe. A Chinese proverb says: “When the pen has collapsed and the goat has bolted, we should first of all rebuild the pen.” That is why China and Europe should do everything in their power to support the im-plementation of new global mechanisms. The UN, the IMF and other insti tutions still have an important role to play in the future. In addition we need forums where we can conduct a political dialogue, e.g. the G 8 and the G 20. These bodies will provide far greater incentives for policy coordination if they are institutional-ized.

China and the EU are committed to improving the WTO rules, because both need a stable, predictable and functioning regulatory system. We are convinced that this framework can provide long-term stability and effectively prevent its mem-bers from succumbing to the short-term attraction of protectionism, or adopting unilateral macro-economic measures. Last week, at the EU–China summit, our leaders confirmed their G 20 commitment to global growth and agreed that a sound and sustainable recovery requires contributions from all the global eco-nomic actors. We agreed that we will have to fight a number of threats to the recovery pro cess, and these include foreign debt, an incomplete financial repair process, high unem ployment rates, and re-emerging global imbalances. The G 20 has made quite a lot of progress, but many issues remain to be resolved and will have to be tackled jointly by the EU and China.

3. The Global Role of the EU

What is the EU’s global role? What is its significance for global governance, and what is its potential?

The EU has a thriving economy and is a global leader in the scientific and techno-logical sector. In a multipolar world, it is becoming increasingly important. The Treaty of Lisbon marks a new stage in European integration. China hopes that Europe will become even stronger, and that it will play a more active role on the international stage.

Within the EU there are often completely divergent opinions, e.g. with regard to an international financial transaction tax, which is supported by Germany and

Vizeu Pinheiro China and the EU are opposed

to protectionism—because

it endangers global growth

Zhang Yansheng

Sun Jiazheng

Huang Huaguang

71 The Global Role of the EU

“Europe cannot as yet be a powerful political and diplomatic partner, even if we are a great trading power.”

Claude Martin

France, but rejected by Italy. Opinions also differ when it comes to an emissions tax and the question of institutionalizing the G 20. A single EU point of view would make international coordination of these issues much easier.

China considers the EU to be an important force in international affairs. Its policy on Europe takes a long-term view. That was one of the reasons why China did not stand idly by and instead offered to help, when the debt crisis hit certain EU countries. It has already invested large sums in government bonds, and, as Wen Jiabao has said, will continue to do so.

China’s expectations about how the EU would develop were sometimes too opti-mistic. For example, it believed that enlargement would lead to an increase in the EU’s international influence. We were not aware of the fact that enlargement also posed a challenge to the EU as a result of the need for deepening.

However, the Treaty of Lisbon is a milestone for the EU. It seeks to answer the question of what kind of international role the EU intends to play in the years ahead.

The innovations of the treaty, such as the creation of the offices of President of the European Council and EU foreign minister, are a sign that the EU is begin-ning to transform its economic influence into political clout, even if it will take a long time until it manages to speak with one voice. Moreover, integration differs significantly from one area to another. Thus it has made significant progress with regard to the economy and financial matters, whereas other areas such as the common foreign policy still have a long way to go. That is like China, where there are developed and under-developed regions.

Europe cannot as yet be a powerful political and diplomatic partner, even if we are a great trading power. Many years ago, when I was working at the French embassy in Beijing, the then prime minister, Zhou Enlai, said he was very pro-European and hoped each day that Europe would become stronger, because China needed Europe in order to strike a balance with the US. He had realized that a triangular relationship—in this case between the US, Europe and China—is always bene fi-cial for all three partners, because everyone has two options and for this reason can slip from one coalition into another. That is very important in diplomacy. For example, the climate summit in Copenhagen was a failure, because the triangular relationship did not function properly.

Li Ruiyu

Feng Zhongping

The Treaty of Lisbon shows that the EU is

transferring its economic into political clout

Martin The triangular relationship China–

EU–US is of the utmost importance

Global Governance 72

“Once the EU begins to speak with one voice, it will be much easier to reach

agreement with China and to deal with common challenges conjointly.”

Werner Hoyer

In the EU we are suffering from the fact that we have not formulated a clear vision of the future, which is what we did in the 1950s, 1960s, 1970s and 1980s. The EU was initially a project designed to bring about prosperity and peace for all after the Second World War. Later the topic of freedom became a central issue. These are all things that we now take for granted. And today we once more need a project that can make people feel passionately about the EU. This project is actually rather obvious, and it is all about organizing the self-assertion of Europe’s inhabitants in a globalized world. When you try to define what that entails, you soon arrive at the question of partnerships.

The Treaty of Lisbon has created a new framework for the Common Foreign and Security Policy. Right now, Catherine Ashton is putting a lot of effort into setting up the European External Action Service. It will take some time before it becomes fully operational, because the Commission, the Council Secretariat and the member states are all equally involved in this process. But we will then be able to speak with one voice more often than in the past. Moreover, in the long term we should act as a single entity in the UN, e.g. by having a joint seat in the Security Council.

Once the EU begins to speak with one voice, it will be much easier to reach agreement with China and to deal with common challenges conjointly. To some extent we already coordinate our interests today, e.g. with regard to North Korea, Iran and Afghanistan. And in Africa and Latin America there are areas where we have the same interests. We should not merely be suspicious of China’s involve-ment. Sometimes we can also learn from each other and do things together, e.g. in the field of development cooperation. There is a great deal of potential out there.

The EU respects the fact that China has decided to accord priority to domestic policy, stability, prosperity and growth. Nevertheless China should assume more responsibility on the international level and adopt a more pro-active stance. In this context Germany is in favour of a close dialogue with China. This is also relevant to the issue of disarmament and arms control. Today nuclear weapons have to some extent lost their credibility; often they no longer make a contribution to the resolution of difficult issues and in fact cause more problems than they solve. For this reason, we need an open dialogue on disarmament and proliferation.

The EU is unique in the world. It is the most advanced and sophisticated system of regional governance in existence. It keeps on getting bigger, and it is the largest market in the world. The Treaty of Lisbon has made the EU more effective by

Hoyer The EU needs a new vision—in

order to organize the self-assertion

of Europe in a globalized world

There is a huge potential for

regional cooperation, e.g. concerning

Africa and Latin America

Vizeu Pinheiro

73 G 20

“The EU is a global player of reference in a sense that it sets standards and inspires rules of governance, it is a unique, true laboratory for global governance.”

Paulo Vizeu Pinheiro

introducing new institutions and mechanisms. The EU is a major global trading partner and a major donor. It is committed to reaching the Millennium Develop-ment Goals, with aid targeting amounting to 0.7 percent of GDP. At the MDG High-Level Meeting in New York, the EU announced that it would be donating €1 billion to deal with the most pressing and neglected objectives. No other donor has contributed as much as the EU. We are promoting accountability, ownership and transparency in the context of our development aid, which is based on a capacity building approach. Development is crucially dependent on principles, norms and standards. The EU is a global player of reference in a sense that it sets standards and inspires rules of governance, it is a unique, true laboratory for global governance.

Moreover, the EU includes small, medium-sized and large states, some of them more highly developed than others. Our partners—and China, of course—con-sider this diversity to be a valuable asset. For example, Portugal has very close relations with Portuguese-speaking countries in Africa, and with Brazil. This will turn out to be useful now that it has won a seat on the UN Security Council. The EU is also doing a great deal of work in the area of economic policy coordination, and fiscal and budgetary surveillance.

The EU has operated 23 military and civilian missions throughout the world within the ESDP framework, most of them of a civilian nature, and all of them endorsed by the UN. This has involved a great deal of work, and has been an incred ible success. China has participated in the anti-piracy mission, which is one of the most synergetic operations in the world. There should be more cooperation of this kind.

4. G 20

Let us turn to the place of the G 20 in the context of global governance. How did the G 20 come into being, and what role does it play today?

Germany gave a helping hand when the G 20 came into being. It was instituted in 1999 at the G 7 / G 8 summit in Cologne as an informal information mechanism. The first meeting of G 20 finance ministers was held in Berlin at the Ministry of Finance in December 1999. This mechanism continued to develop successfully, even before (and not because of) the financial crisis. One of the reasons for this was that issues of a rather technical kind were on the agenda and very few politi-

Our partners, China included,

appreciate the diversity of the EU

Zhang Yansheng

Wenzel The G 20 has had a positive

development—because it concen-

trated on rather specific issues

Global Governance 74

“In future the G 20 should do more to define global economic policy, and should also play a

greater role in the maintenance of world peace.”

Wei Jianguo

cal topics. When it was suggested that the G 20 should be held on the level of the heads of state and government, we were initially rather sceptical. However, the first meeting of the heads of state and government in Washington in 2008 dispelled our doubts. It was certainly a good idea to be given the go-ahead on the highest political level for the responses being adopted to deal with the financial crisis: on the one hand with regard to the reforms that needed to be introduced in international organizations, and on the other hand with regard to measures that were designed to shore up the global economy.

The G 20 now plays an important role. We must do our utmost not to disappoint the expectations of many countries, that is, we must ensure that there is more effec tiveness, legitimacy and approval. We should try to avoid political issues in the G 20. They would overlap with the UN, and it would be unclear where the border lines are. Financial and economic policy are the topics that the G 20 should discuss. We must be careful not to politicize such issues, and to deal with them in a sensible and objective manner.

Hitherto, the G 20 has been a toothless tiger. It will acquire some teeth only if it concentrates quite clearly on the economy and on financial matters, and if it becomes more institutionalized. An example would be its summits. We need ongoing interaction on the ministerial and experts level, and a mechanism for the regulation of investment, trade and the promotion of academic cooperation.

In future the G 20 should do more to define global economic policy, and should also play a greater role in the maintenance of world peace. Unnecessary topics should be avoided. And the emerging nations need to have a greater say.

If the G 20 were to become involved in security policy, it would become a serious competitor for the United Nations. And despite all the problems, the UN Security Council enjoys more legitimacy and approval than the G 20, since it is the only international body in which at least two-thirds of the members are elected.

As far as Germany is concerned, there is no alternative to the UN. No other body in the world can represent the interests of the weak and small countries in world politics. For this reason it is impossible to do political deals with Germany which in some way or other weaken the UN. It is also the reason why Germany plays

Zhang Wencai More responsibilities in political issues would

turn the G 20 into a competitor of the UN

Liu Youfa The G 20 is still a toothless tiger—

we need more meetings of both

government heads and experts

Wei Jianguo

Perthes

Erler For Germany there is no alterna-

tive to the UN—that is why we want

to take over more responsibility

“The G 20 still has to demonstrate that it is ca pable of taking action once the turmoil has subsided. I am rather sceptical about that.”

Rolf Wenzel

such an active role. We are the third-largest financial contributor, and are trying to implement reforms, not because they are necessarily in our interests, but because we believe in the indispensable role of the UN. Germany is also prepared to assume greater responsibility. It has underlined this with its successful application for a non-permanent seat in the Security Council for 2011 / 2012.

At the same time Germany is realistic enough to see that the G 20 is an impor-tant body, though its tasks are clearly different to those of the UN. The G 20 should not be allowed to supplant the UN. Moreover, we see the greater role played by NGOs and civil society on the global level as an opportunity to strengthen the legiti macy of the UN. Germany prefers legally binding framework agreements, but is also willing to accept informal arrangements, if it is impossible to make progress in any other way, e.g. when large states are unwilling to accede to legally binding rules and regulations.

I am surprised how much enthusiasm there is for the G 20, not only here, but also in other forums. People are expecting too much from the G 20. It still has to demonstrate that it is capable of taking action once the turmoil has subsided. I am rather sceptical about that. There was talk of discussing climate change within the framework of the G 20, but the proposal got a lukewarm reception. People said that climate was a UN subject, and Kyoto and Bali were UN processes upon which the G 20 should not intrude.

Then there is the following contradiction: On the one hand we are asking for more voting rights in international organizations for developing and emerging countries, and on the other hand we are proposing to strengthen the G 20. If the G 20 becomes increasingly impor tant, we do not need a redistribution of voting rights in the other organizations. If we want to discuss new issues in the G 20, we will have to ask ourselves whether the composition of G 20 is appropriate. Africa is not properly represented by South Africa.

The German government is sceptical about a formalization of the G 20 struc-tures, e.g. the establishment of a G 20 secretariat. This would mean that the G 20 was detaching itself even more from the other international organizations that underpin its activities, that is, the IMF, the World Bank and the OECD. For this reason Germany has suggested the establishment of working groups, which would also be open to non-members. We should define groups such as the G 20 as informal coordination mechanisms. Decisions should continue to be made at the UN and in the Bretton Woods institutions.

The G 20 must not replace the UN

Wenzel The role of the G 20 is limited—it is

not the right forum for climate policy

The enlargement of the G 20’s role

raises the question of representation

Germany is not in favour of more

formalized structures within the G 20

75 G 20

Global Governance 76

In order to tackle the big global issues we need more efficient institutions with greater legitimacy. Here the solution is not to choose between the UN and the G 20. What we need to do is to get used to the idea that in international relations we will have variable geometries. On the one hand there will be a series of formal bodies in which decisions are made and in which juridification takes place, either on a regional or a global scale. There can be no question about the fact that the UN is the central global institution, but it could be far more efficient if competences were handed over to the regional level. On the other hand we need informal bodies for prior coordination and political will formation. The G 20 is about to replace the G 8 as the most important body for advance consultations. It is in the area of such informal bodies that we are going to need variable geometries. Thus in order to deal with financial and economic questions, we do not necessarily have to have the same combination of states that are required for climate change or energy issues. We must jettison the idea that an organization always has to do everything with the same team. What we need are intelligent political processes which are sustained by institutional authority and flexibility concerning content and political will.

You will never manage to exclude a country from the G 20, even if it is only for certain issues, and replace it with another. This means that the only thing you can do is to expand the number of countries involved. The G 20 is no longer a G 20, since there is an agreement that the country that chairs a meeting can invite five other countries to participate, and one of these always seems to be Spain.

5. Currency Policy

At the end of October, Guido Mantega, the Brazilian finance minister, said that there was a danger of a currency war. Do you share this view?

Interestingly enough the term “currency war” was introduced into the debate by the finance minister of an emerging nation and not of an industrialized country. In my opinion, we are already on the brink of a currency war. There have been some measures in the shape of unilateral intervention, e.g. by Japan, Thailand and Switzerland. A few days ago Thailand introduced capital controls. And the US is toying with the idea of protectionist measures.

In order to resolve the conflict, it is pointless to study the economic data and surpluses of the last two years. The last two years were dominated by the financial

Schaefer

Wenzel The G 20 is de facto a G 25 already

Zhang Yansheng

Wenzel We are on the brink of a currency war—

countries are adopting measures unilaterally

77 Currency Policy

“In the IMF we need to discuss which future- oriented global growth model we intend to choose, that is, whether we prefer export-driven growth or strong domestic demand.”

Rolf Wenzel

and economic crisis, and the global demand for Chinese products declined. How-ever, once the economic situation improves, the trend will go back to burgeoning Chinese current account surpluses.

To my mind it is not a question of whether the renminbi is over-valued or under-valued. What Europe is asking China to do is to stick to the inter national rules of the game. Part and parcel of this is the notion that the exchange rate should reflect the basic economic data or “economic fundamentals.” That is why China should make the exchange rate more flexible. The international community expects China to do this voluntarily. And if the exchange rate goes up, so does the purchasing power of the Chinese. In this way Chinese growth would be put on a more solid footing, and it would be more independent of the economic development of the industrialized states. IMF models show that the consequences of revaluation would not be serious for China, though its com-petitiveness would suffer. But according to the IMF, the net result would be positive. The Chinese Central Bank has actually switched over to a “managed float” regime this summer and created greater flexibility for internal monetary policy. That was an important decision. But China needs to go another step down this road.

Indeed, the question of the exchange rate of the renminbi conceals the much more important question of the strategy we intend to pursue in the context of forthcoming global trends. In the IMF we need to discuss which future-oriented global-growth model we intend to choose, that is, whether we prefer export-driven growth or strong domestic demand. We must also discuss the question of how the world can find solutions for the consequences of the financial and economic crisis. The financial markets are still very fragile, the recovery in the US is still uncertain, and the EU is faced with the problem of how the long-term stability of the Euro zone can be guaranteed, despite the various different growth rates of the member states and their dissimilar levels of competitiveness.

In this context, many industrialized countries are currently engaged in the quantitative easing of their monetary policy. The ECB will also be keeping interest rates down. The newly issued money will be used for investment opportunities in emerging countries; it will drive up their exchange rates, insofar as these are flexible, and in doing so will have a negative effect on their ability to export. New financial bubbles will be created, because the money will be invested in the wrong areas. This cannot go on forever. It is time that the industrialized countries took the anxieties of the emerging nations seriously.

The world would profit from a

more flexible exchange rate of the

renmimbi—and so would China

We need an international under-

standing on which growth model

should dominate in the future

The easing of monetary policy

on the part of industrialized

states could create new bubbles

Global Governance 78

“A 40 percent revalua tion of the renminbi, which is what some people are asking

for, would be just too much for China at this point in time. It would finish us off.”

Huo Jianguo

The message sent out by Europe and the US must be that you need a convertible renminbi. That is the long and short of it. A currency war would not get rid of the global trade imbalances. And Europeans and Americans should abstain from telling China what the exchange rate should be.

At the last ASEAN forum we talked about whether or not the Asian economy should give up its strength in exports. All of the twelve ASEAN member states rejected the idea. One of the reasons for this is that exports are our only strength. We need time in order to forge other strengths. A second reason is that Asia has emerged from the crisis relatively unscathed, because China’s domestic market is becoming larger and larger, and thus attracts many imports from neighbouring countries. According to the Chinese customs authorities, China’s volume of trade in September 2010 was $270 billion, whereas in July it was only $262 billion. So there is a rising tendency. On account of the growing domestic demand, the bal-ance of trade surpluses will in the long run continue to decline. Greater domestic demand is in the interests of China and the rest of the world. China also wishes to increase its imports of high-value consumer goods.

If we do not manage to prevent a race to devalue currencies in order to stimu-late our exports, we will experience a second financial crisis and a recession. A new recession would be far more severe than the first, and would last longer. Mon-etary policy is crucial in order to prevent that from happening. Here we urgently need to reach some kind of agreement. The G 20 must come up with ideas on how to solve the problem. I have talked about this to many foreign economists such as Joseph Stiglitz, Robert Zoellick and Dominique Strauss-Kahn. They all underes-timate the role of monetary policy in preventing the onset of a second recession.

Since 2005, we have continually revalued the renminbi. We reached 20 percent in 2008, and added another 4 percent this year. Our partners should give us credit for that. We simply need more time. China has so many problems on its plate. It first has to make sure that the economy is stable, and then it can spend more time on trying to deal with the exchange rate problem. A 40 percent revalua-tion of the renminbi, which is what some people are asking for, would be just too much for China at this point in time. It would finish us off. Revaluation will work only in conjunction with China’s rising level of development. For years China has been trying to strengthen the internal market, in order to offset its reliance on exports. To some extent we have succeeded in doing this. In the years

Hoyer

Wei JianguoExports are the pillar on which

Asian economic success rests—

we cannot do without it yet

A race to devalue currencies

could lead to a new recession

Huo Jianguo China has revalued the renminbi

several times, but a radical approach

would be counterproductive

79 Currency Policy

“We reject protectionism, and would prefer to see a situation where Chinese investors can operate as freely in the rest of the world as they can in Europe.”

Jörg Wuttke

ahead we must ensure that the prosperity of our citizens and domestic demand continue to rise.

Politicians, academics, the general public, the US administration and European governments have begun to see China as a threat, and are starting to introduce protectionist measures. The US approach to China has changed. Senator Max Baucus, chairman of the Senate Finance Committee, recently came to Beijing in order to discuss the renminbi after the House of Representatives had passed a motion designed to put up trade barriers if China refuses to revalue its currency. He made it very clear that the Senate will follow suit by calling for the revaluation of the renminbi. President Obama would find it difficult to oppose the call for trade barriers, and this could lead to a trade war. This is bad news for business, because business needs stability and predictability, a sound legal basis on which to operate in China, and to import and to export. We need open markets. We reject protectionism, and would prefer to see a situation where Chinese investors can operate as freely in the rest of the world as they can in Europe. Chinese carmaker Zhejiang Geely’s acquisition of Volvo is a good example.

Let us move on to the reasons for the global trade imbalances. The US–China Economic and Security Review Commission in Washington, which presents its policy proposals to the US Congress, believes that the reason for the global trade imbalances is the financial crisis. But the imbalances were already there before the crisis. In 2006, the US balance of trade deficit was more than $800 billion, whereas Germany’s surplus amounted to $190 billion, that of the Middle East $220 billion and that of China $250 billion. Germany’s surplus is due to its technologi-cal products, the quality of which is very high, and the associated components industry. The Middle East has a great deal of oil. On the other hand, China’s trump card is cheap labour. Most of China’s surplus is notched up by its manufacturing industry, and 80 percent of it comes from joint ventures. More and more compa-nies from the industrialized countries are shifting their production abroad and often to China, partly on account of the availability of cheap labour.

Thus, there are a number of reasons for the global trade imbalances. But they constitute a great challenge. The question arises whether or not we might be in a position to tackle this challenge together and to assume responsibility conjointly. Unfortunately, the majority of states tend to shift responsibility to someone else, so that they do not have to do anything themselves.

Wuttke Protectionism on the part of the US

is mainly directed against China

Zhang Yansheng Large trade imbalances already

existed before the financial crisis—

they are not its result

Instead of blaming each other,

we should adopt a common

strategy on trade imbalances

Global Governance 80

“One needs to be aware of the fact that half of the trade surplus is notched

up by foreign companies in China and that the profits are repatriated.”

Huo Jianguo

Other reasons for the global trade imbalances are excessive indebtedness, exces-sive consumption and the rudimentary economic structure of some devel oping countries. These imbalances cannot be overcome with the help of protectionism. That is something that the US should take to heart. It should do all that it can to make the Doha Round a success. China and Germany also play an important role in this context. As exporting nations they have both profited a great deal from the liberalization of global trade. That is why China, in recent years, has become the target of protectionist measures and trade disputes.

The global trade imbalances are caused by the existence of dissimilar economic structures and the fact that investment capital is being shifted to China. One needs to be aware of the fact that half of the trade surplus is notched up by foreign com-panies in China and that the profits are repatriated.

By the end of 2010, the trade deficit between the EU and China may reach $100 billion. But this money is not only going to China. It is true that Chinese companies are copying products and reselling them to the EU. However, ASEAN, Japanese and US companies in China are doing exactly the same. These companies do not share their profits with the Chinese government.

Apart from the global trade imbalances there is the question of how many reserve currencies there will be in future. In my opinion there will be three: the dollar, the euro and the renminbi or a common Asian currency. We can deal with the risks inherent in the global economy and protect our wealth only if we have three reserve currencies. The EU took fifty years to get from the European Coal and Steel Community to the introduction of the euro, and then another ten years until the euro advanced to become a global reserve currency. Asia also ought to have a reserve currency, even if that is still pie in the sky. It is to be hoped that in 60 years’ time the renminbi will be just as strong as the euro.

Let us hope that the renminbi will become a global reserve currency in the fore-seeable future, and not in 60 years’ time.

The present global currency system is based on an insufficient number of reserve currencies, which can be used for a country’s foreign exchange reserves. It takes its bearings from economic cycles and is not equipped to deal with sudden crises.

Wei JianguoWe need a success of the Doha Round

Huo Jianguo

Liu Youfa The discussion on trade im balances

often ignores the profits western

companies make in China

Zhang Yansheng The world needs not one, but three reserve

currencies: dollar, euro and renminbi

Wenzel

Zhang Tao

81 Currency Policy

“The reform of the currency system will take a long time to accomplish. But we must press ahead with it, and at the same time preserve the stability of the current system.”

Zhang Tao

If countries with reserve currencies have economic problems and then attempt to overcome their difficulties with a currency policy of their own, it is bound to have a negative effect on the global economy. We will have to continue to live with this problem for some time to come. The reform of the currency system will take a long time to accomplish. But we must press ahead with it, and at the same time preserve the stability of the current system.

Closing Remarks 82

Closing Remarks

In the course of the discussion we have talked about China, its relations with Eu-rope, and the subject of global governance. Of course, we did not agree on every-thing, e.g. with regard to the question of whether or not it was now possible to define relations between China and Europe as being strategic; of whether or not the EU arms embargo against China will soon have to be lifted; and of whether or not the reports about China carried by the western media are always too nega-tive. With regard to the G 20, we failed to agree on whether or not this informal mechanism should also assume security policy tasks, and whether or not this would simply turn it into a rival of the UN. There was also some disagreement about the question of whether or not the exchange rate of the renminbi will have to become more flexible.

But despite these differences there was a broad consensus. Many of the partici-pants emphasized the great importance of relations between the EU and China. Deepening these relations would be a good thing for China, the EU, and the rest of the world. However, the general public in Europe would have to be persuaded of the fact that such enhanced cooperation is both necessary and desirable. We agreed that global governance is absolutely essential in order to meet global chal-lenges, and that global governance institutions need to be reformed. Thus the emerging nations ought to be given more voting rights in international financial institutions. There was general agreement that the EU should try increasingly to speak with one voice, in order to be able to exercise greater influence on a global level. On the other hand, protectionist measures, designed to deal with the cur-rent trade imbalances, were roundly rejected.

Globalization has drawn China and Europe closer together in both economic and political terms. That is the reason why we should not simply disregard the fact that we have different ways of looking at things. We should talk about these differ ences, and we should devise appropriate solutions. And that is something to which this Round Table has certainly made a contribution.

von Weizsäcker

ANNEX

85

Georg Blume Born 1963Foreign Correspondent, DIE ZEIT and die tageszeitung (taz), New Delhi; Recipient of the Liberty Award.Former Positions: Foreign Corre­

spondent, DIE ZEIT and taz, Beijing; Foreign Cor­respondent, DIE ZEIT, taz and Die Weltwoche, Tokio; Foreign Correspondent, taz, Paris.Selected Writings: China ist kein Reich des Bösen. Trotz Tibet muss Berlin auf Peking setzen (2008); Modell China (with Chikako Yamamoto, 2002); Chinesische Reise (with Chikako Yamamoto, 1999).Pages: 49, 51–52, 55, 68

Chai YeBorn 1953Director, International Department, Guangming Daily, Beijing.Former Positions: Deputy Head, In­ternational Department, Guang­ming Daily; Chief Correspondent,

Guangming Daily in Austria and Germany.Pages: 54

Prof. Dr. Chen JinBorn 1958Vice­Minister, Party Literature Re­search Centre, Central Com mittee (CC), Communist Party of China (CPC), Beijing; Vice­ Chairman, CPC Literature Research Association,

Beijing.Former Positions: Chief Editor, “Party Literature”,

“Document and Research”, Party Literature Research Centre, CPC CC, Beijing; Director, 1st Editorial Department, Party Literature Research Centre, CPC CC, Beijing.

Selected Writings: Mao Zedong, Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin and China’s Advanced Culture; Memories of the Great Times: From May Fourth Movement to Reform and Opening­up.Pages: 31–32

Gernot Erler, MdBBorn 1944Deputy Chair, Social Democrat ic Party (SPD) Parliamentary Group, German Bundestag, Berlin; Presi­dent, South­Eastern Europe Society, Munich.

Former Positions: Minister of State, Federal Foreign Office, Berlin; Coordinator, German­Russian Inter­societal Cooperation, Federal Foreign Office, Berlin.Selected Writings: Mission Weltfrieden—Deutsch­lands neue Rolle in der Weltpolitik (2009); Russland kommt. Putins Staat—Der Kampf um Macht und Modernisierung (2005).Pages: 35, 40–41, 58–59, 62–65, 74–75

Prof. Dr. Feng ZhongpingAssistant President, China Insti­tutes of Contemporary Interna­tional Relations (CICIR); Director, Institute of European Studies, Beijing.Former Positions: Professor, Chinese

Academy of Social Sciences, Renmin University, China Foreign Affairs University, University of Inter national Relations, Beijing; Standing Council Member, China Society on EU Studies; Vice­Chair­man, China Society on French Studies; Secretary General, China Society on UK Studies, Beijing; Vis­iting Scholar, Harvard University; Visiting Scholar, Durham University.Pages: 60–61, 71

Participants

86

Dr. Werner Hoyer, MdBBorn 1951Minister of State, Federal Foreign Office, Berlin.Former Positions: Deputy Chairman and Spokesman on Foreign Affairs,Free Democratic Party (FDP) Parlia­

mentary Group, German Bundestag, Berlin; Chair­man, European Liberal, Democrat and Reform Party (ELDR); Member of Presidium, FDP, Berlin; Minister of State, Federal Foreign Office, Berlin and Bonn; Spokesman on Security Affairs and Parliamen­tary Secretary, FDP Parliamentary Group, German Bundes tag, Bonn.Pages: 37–39, 45–46, 50, 53, 72, 78

Huang HuaguangDirector­General, Department for Europe, International Department, Central Committee, Communist Party of China (CPC), Beijing.Pages: 36, 53–54, 70–71

Huang YongBorn 1958Deputy Director, International De­partment, Xinhua News Agency, Beijing.Former Positions: Head, Berlin Branch, Xinhua News Agency;

Chief Correspondent, Zagreb Branch, Xinhua News Agency; Correspondent, Washington Branch, Xinhua News Agency.Pages: 36, 55

Dr. Huo JianguoChairman, Chinese Academy of Intern ational Trade and Economic Cooperation, Ministry of Com­merce (MOFCOM), Beijing; Presi­dent, China Chamber of Commerce of Import and Export of Foodstuffs,

Native Products and Animal By­Products, Beijing.Former Positions: Deputy Director­General, Depart­ment of Foreign Trade, MOFCOM; Deputy Direc­tor­General, Department of Commerce and Trade Services, MOFCOM; Deputy Director­General, Depart ment of International Trade, State Economic and Trade Commission, Beijing; Chinese Embassy, London.Pages: 47, 66, 78–80

Hubert KnirschBorn 1961Director, Office of fmr. Federal Pres­ident Dr. Richard von Weizsäcker, Berlin.Former Positions: Head, Political Sec­tion, German Embassy, Warsaw;

Deputy Head, Department for International Eco­nomic and Financial Policy, Ministry of Foreign Af­fairs, Berlin; Desk Officer for Security Policy, Federal Chancellery, Berlin and Bonn; Desk Officer, German Embassy, Washington, D.C.

87

Stefan KorneliusBorn 1965Foreign Editor, Süddeutsche Zei­tung (SZ), Munich.Former Positions: Deputy Bureau Chief, SZ, Berlin; Bureau Chief, SZ, Washington, D.C.; Political Corre­

spondent, SZ, Bonn; Co­Founder and Editor, Medium Magazin; Freelance Correspondent, Stern and BBC.Selected Writings: The Undeclared War. Germany’s Self­deceit in Afghanistan, Körber Policy Paper (2009); Al Gore—Mission Klima: Sein Leben—seine Ziele (2007).Pages: 33, 50–51, 56, 67

Li JinjunBorn 1956 Vice Minister, International Depart­ment, Central Committee (CC), Communist Party of China (CPC), Beijing. Former Positions: Chinese Ambassa­

dor, Manila; Chinese Ambassador, Rangun; Deputy Secretary, CPC County Committee, Huantai County, Shandong Province; Director­General, Bureau of West European Affairs, International Department, CPC CC, Beijing; Director­General, General Office; Director­General, China Economic Cooperation Cen­tre, Beijing.Pages: 30, 33, 35

Li RuiyuBorn 1956Director­General, European Depart­ment, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Beijing.Former Positions: Deputy Head of Mission, Chinese Embassy, London;

Attaché, Chinese Embassy, Rome; Head, Europe Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Beijing; I. Secre tary, Chinese Embassy, London; II. Secretary, Chinese Embassy, Malta.Pages: 38–39, 47, 53–55, 71

Prof. Dr. Liu YoufaBorn 1954Vice­President, China Institute of International Studies (CIIS), Beijing.Former Positions: Professor, Xi’an Jiaotong University; Visiting Re­search Fellow, Fudan University,

Beijing; Minister Counsellor, Chinese Embassy, Washington, D.C.; Counsellor, Chinese Embassy, Addis Abeba and Dodoma; I. and II. Secretary, Chinese Embassy, Port Moresby; I. and II. Secretary, Chinese Embassy, Canberra; Deputy Division Chief, Language Training Center, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Beijing.Pages: 48–49, 61, 69–70, 74, 80

Ma WenpuVice­Chairman, Foreign Affairs Committee, National People’s Congress, Beijing; Chairman, Sino­ German Parliamentarian Friend­ship Group, National People’s Congress; Chairman, 10th and 11th

National People’s Congress, Beijing.

88

Former Positions: Vice­Minister, International Depart­ment, Communist Party of China (CPC) Central Committee (CC), Beijing; Deputy Secretary­General; Deputy Director, Bureau of America, Oceania and Northern Europe; Director­General; Clerk, Interna­tional Department, CPC CC, Beijing; Deputy Secre­tary, City Committee Hunan Province, Changsha; II. Secretary, Chinese Embassy, Stockholm; Staff Mem­ber, Chinese Embassy, Helsinki.Pages: 37, 42–43

Mao RubaiBorn 1938Fmr. Chairman, Environmental and Resources Protection Commit­tee, National People’s Congress, Beijing; President and Director, Center for Nature and Society,

Beijing University.Former Positions: Member, 15th Central Committee (CC), Communist Party of China (CPC); Deputy, 9th National People’s Congress, Beijing; Chairman, Environmental and Resources Protection Commit­tee, NPC, Beijing; Secretary, CPC, Autonomous Re­gional Committee, Ningxia Autonomous Region; Chairman, Permanent Committee, People’s Con­gress, Ningxia Autonomous Region; Vice­Minister, Ministry of Construction, Beijing; Vice­Chairman, Autonomous Region People’s Government, Tibet Autonomous Region, Lhasa; Deputy Secretary, CPC Regional Committee, Tibet Autonomous Region; Director, Meteorological Bureau, Tibet Autonomous Region, Lhasa.Pages: 33–35

Ambassador Claude MartinBorn 1944President, Conseil des Affaires Etrangères, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Paris; Judge, Audit Court of the French Republic, Paris.Former Positions: French Ambas­

sador, Berlin; General Director for European and Economic Affairs, Minis try of Foreign Affairs, Paris; French Ambassador, Beijing; Director, Asia and Pacific Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Paris; Deputy Head, French Delegation to the EU, Brus­sels; Desk Officer, French Embassy, Beijing; Advisor for the European Economic Community (EEC) and Asian Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Paris.Pages: 47–48, 71

Dr. Thomas PaulsenBorn 1967Executive Director International Affairs, Körber Foundation, Berlin.Former Positions: Senior Manager, PricewaterhouseCoopers, Berlin; Analyst, HypoVereinsbank, Mu­

nich; Visiting Professor, Institute for European Stud­ies, Hebrew University, Jerusalem; Senior Research Fellow, Center for Applied Policy Research (CAP), Ludwig­Maximilians­Universität, Munich.Selected Writings: Economic Diplomacy: Die Ökono­misierung der amerikanischen Außenpolitik unter Präsident Clinton (1999); Die Jugoslawienpolitik der USA 1989–1994 (1995).

89

Prof. Dr. Volker PerthesBorn 1958Chairman and Director, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP), German Institute for International and Security Affairs, Berlin; Pro­fessor, Humboldt University and

Free University, Berlin; Member, Advisory Council, Shanghai Institute for International Studies (SIIS); Member, Advisory Research Council, The Finnish Institute of Inter national Affairs (FIIA).Former Positions: Head, Research Division Middle East and Africa, SWP, Berlin; Assistant Professor, American University, Beirut.Selected Writings: Of Trust and Security. Contribu­tion to the Report to the Trilateral Commission (2008); Orientalische Promenaden (2006); Syria Under Bashar al­Assad—Modernisation and the Limits of Change (2004); Arab Elites—Negotiating the Politics of Change (2004); Geheime Gärten—Die neue arabische Welt (2004).Pages: 43–44, 56–57, 61–62, 67–68, 74

Prof. Dr. Eberhard Sand schneiderBorn 1955Otto Wolff­Director, Research Insti­tute, German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP), Berlin.Former Positions: Dean, Faculty for

Political and Social Sciences, Free University Berlin; Executive Director, Otto Suhr Institute of Political Science; Professor for Chinese Politics and Interna­tional Relations, Free University Berlin; Professor for International Relations, Johannes Gutenberg University, Mainz.Selected Writings: Globale Rivalen—Chinas unheim­licher Aufstieg und die Ohnmacht des Westens

(2007); Is China’s Military Modernization a Concern for the EU?, in: Facing China’s Rise—Guidelines for an EU­Strategy (2006); Empire (Ed., 2007); The Study of Modern China (Ed., 1999).Pages: 37–38, 41, 44, 49–51, 54–56

Ambassador Dr. Michael SchaeferBorn 1949Ambassador of the Federal Repub­lic of Germany to the People’s Re­public of China, Beijing.Former Positions: Political Director,

Federal Foreign Office, Berlin; Special Envoy for Southeast Europe; Head, Western Balkans Task Force, Federal Foreign Office, Berlin; Head, Political Department, Permanent UN Mission, Geneva; Head, Training for Senior Civil Servants, Federal Foreign Office, Berlin; Permanent Representative, German Embassy, Singapore; Advisor, UN Permanent Mis­sion, New York.Selected Writings: Regional Cooperation as the Road to European Union. The Future of the Stability Pact, in: Südosteuropa Mitteilungen 04 / 2004; Wie erzeugt man Stabilität auf dem Balkan?, in: Enrico Brandt, Christian Buck (Eds.): Auswärtiges Amt (2002); Menschen rechtsschutz in der Praxis der Vereinten Nationen (with Gerhart Baum and Eibe Riedel, Eds., 1998); Menschenrechtsfeldmissionen—ein innovati­ver Ansatz, in: Vereinte Nationen (1997); Berufsbild Diplomat (1995); Die Friedenssicherungsfunktion der Vereinten Nationen, in: Ferdowsi / Opitz (Eds.): Macht und Ohnmacht der Vereinten Nationen (1987); Die Funktionsfähigkeit des Sicherheits­mechanismus der Vereinten Nationen (1981).Pages: 39–40, 43, 45–47, 49–50, 52–53, 62, 66–67, 76

90

Sun JiazhengBorn 1944Vice­Chairman, National Commit­tee, Chinese People‘s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), Beijing; Alternate Member, 12th, 13th and 14th Communist Party of

China (CPC) Central Committee (CC); Member, 15th and 16th CPC CC; President, China Federation of Literary and Art Circles, Beijing.Former Positions: Minister of Culture, Beijing; Minis­ter of Radio, Film and Television; Deputy Secretary, CPC Jiangsu Provincial Committee; Director, Public­ity Department; Member, Standing Committee, CPC Jiangsu Provincial Committee; Secretary, CPC Xuzhou Municipal Committee; Member, Standing Committee, CPC Liuhe County Committee; Deputy Head, Liuhe County Revolutionary Committee.Pages: 30–31, 41–42, 70

Paulo Vizeu PinheiroBorn 1963Senior Diplomatic Adviser to the President of the European Com­mission José Manuel Barroso, Euro­pean Commission, Brussels. Former Positions: Director­ General

for National Defence Policy, Ministry of Defence, Lisbon; Deputy Permanent Representative to the Or­ganisation for Economic Co­operation and Develop­ment (OECD), Paris; Interim Director­General, Serv­ice for Strategic Defence and Military Information, Ministry of Defence, Lisbon; Deputy Director­Gen­eral, Service for Strategic Defence and Military Infor­mation, Junior Diplomatic Adviser to the Prime Min­ister, Lisbon; Diplomatic Advisor to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Lisbon; Diplomatic Advisor to the Secretary of State for For­

eign Affairs and Development, Minis try of Foreign Affairs, Lisbon; Counsellor, Portuguese Embassy, Moscow; First Secretary, Portuguese Embassy, Washington, D.C.; Portuguese Delegate to Angola Peace Structure, Luanda.Pages: 38–39, 70, 72–73

Prof. Dr. Wang JiaruiBorn 1949Minister, International Department, Central Committee (CC), Commu­nist Party of China (CPC), Beijing; Member, 17th CPC CC, Beijing; Pro­fessor, Business Administration

School, Fudan University; Professor, Guanghua Busi­ness Administration School, Beijing University.Former Positions: Candidate, 16th CPC CC; Member, 9th National People’s Congress; Vice Minister, Inter­national Department, CPC CC, Beijing; Mayor, Qingdao; Deputy Secretary, CPC Qingdao Municipal Committee; Director­General, Market Circulation Department, State Economic and Trade Commis­sion, Beijing; Deputy Director­General, Commerce Department, Economic and Trade Office, State Council, Beijing; Director­General, Newspapers and Periodicals Distribution Department, Ministry of Post and Telecommunications, Beijing.Pages: 24

91

Dr. Klaus WehmeierBorn 1951Vice Chairman of the Executive Board, Körber Foundation, Ham­burg; Member, Advisory Board, Federal College for Security Stud­ies; Member, Steering Committee,

Petersburger Dialog; Member, Governing Council, European Foundation Centre; Member, Advisory Board, Association of the German Foundations; Member, Supervisory Board, Körber­AG; Chairman of the Executive Board, Leonardo Foundation, Basel. Former Positions: Managing Director, Employers’ and Trade Association, Bad Honnef; Head of Commu­nication, Kienbaum & Partner, Gummersbach and Düsseldorf; Head, Research Unit, Institute of Politi­cal Science, University of Münster.

Wei JianguoBorn 1947Secretary General, China Centre for International Economic Exchanges, Beijing; fmr. Vice­Minister of Com­merce, Beijing.Former Positions: Member, Ministry

of Commerce, CPC Leading Party Group, Beijing; Vice­Minister, Ministry of Commerce; Vice­Minister, Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Coopera­tion; Assis tant Minister; Head, Personnel, Educa­tion and Labor Department; Head, West Asian & African Affairs Department; Deputy Division Chief, Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Coopera­tion; Embassy Counsellor, Head, Department for Economy and Trade, Chinese Embassy, Libreville; Desk Officer, Chinese Embassy, Tunis; Desk Officer, Chinese Embassy, Rabat.Pages: 33, 43, 59–60, 65–66, 74, 78, 80

Dr. Richard von WeizsäckerBorn 1920Fmr. President of the Federal Republic of Germany (1984–1994); fmr. Governing Mayor of West Berlin (1981–1984); fmr. Vice Presi­dent of the German Parliament

(1969–1981); fmr. President of the German Protes­tant Church Gathering; Laureate of the Heinrich Heine (1991) and Leo Baeck Awards (1994); Chair­man of the Bergedorf Round Table of the Körber Foundation.Selected Writings: Der Weg zur Einheit (2009); Was für eine Welt wollen wir? (2005); Drei Mal Stunde Null? 1949–1969–1989 (2001); Vier Zeiten. Erinner­ungen (1997); Richard von Weizsäcker im Gespräch (1992); Von Deutschland nach Europa (1991); Die deutsche Geschichte geht weiter (1983).Pages: 23, 82

Dr. Rolf WenzelBorn 1954Head, Directorate­General Financial Market Policy, Federal Ministry of Finance, Berlin.Former Positions: Head, Directorate International Financial and Mone­

tary Policy, Federal Ministry of Finance, Berlin; Advi­sor to the German Executive Director, International Monetary Fund, Washington, D.C.; Assistant Profes­sor, Ruhr University, Bochum.Pages: 65, 68–69, 73–77, 80

92

Selected Writings: My 30 Years in China (2008); The Chemical and Pharmaceutical Industry in China (2005).Pages: 35–36, 79

Yu XiaoxuanDeputy Director­General, Depart­ment for Europe, International De­partment, Central Committee (CC), Communist Party of China (CPC), Beijing.

Dr. Zhang TaoDirector­General, International De­partment, People’s Bank of China, Beijing.Former Positions: Head, Interna­tional Division, Shanghai Head­quarters, People’s Bank of China,

Beijing; Director­General, Department of Survey and Statistics; Deputy Director­General, International Depart ment; Deputy Director­General, Research Office, People’s Bank of China, Beijing; Expert Con­sultant and Economist, World Bank, Washington, D.C.; Research Fellow, State Commission for Eco­nomic Reconstructing, Ministry of Commerce, Beijing.Pages: 68–69, 80–81

Dr. Zhang WencaiBorn 1964Deputy Director­General, Depart­ment for Cooperation, Ministry of Finance, Beijing.Former Positions: Executive Direc­tor, Asian Development Bank,

Mandaluyong City.Pages: 61, 69, 74

Christian WriedtBorn 1951Chairman of the Executive Board, Körber Foundation, Hamburg; Rep­resentative of Foundation, German Children and Youth Foundation, Berlin; Member of the Executive

Board and Treasurer, Weichmann Foundation, Ham­burg; Member of Senate, Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz Scientific Community, Berlin; Member, Board of Trustees, German Foundation Musikleben; Chair­man, Supervisory Board, Körber­AG; Chairman, Foundation Board, Leonardo Foundation, Basel; Member, Supervisory Board, Kübler & Niethammer Papierfabrik AG.Former Positions: Member of the Executive Board, Körber Foundation, Hamburg; Executive Director, Körber Foundation; Private Asset Manager of Kurt A. Körber, Hamburg; Asset Manager, Generali Life Insurance, Munich.

Jörg WuttkeBorn 1958General Manager and Chief Rep­resentative, BASF China, Beijing; Member, European Bahai Business Foundation (EBBF); Member, Ad­visory Board, Centre for Interna­

tional Business Ethics (CIBE), Beijing; Honorary Profes sor, University of Applied Sciences Heidelberg.Former Positions: President, European Union Cham­ber of Commerce in China; Founding Member and Chairman of the Board, German Chamber of Com­merce in China; Chief Representative, ABB China, Shanghai; Sales Manager, Power Plants Division, ABB, Mannheim; Finance and Administrations Man­ager, ABB, Beijing.

93

Prof. Dr. Zhang YanshengBorn 1955Director, International Economic Research Institute, National Devel­opment and Reform Commission, Beijing.Former Positions: Lecturer, Central

University of Finance and Economics (Beijing), Colo­rado University and Toronto University; Desk Officer, EDI Section, World Bank, Washington, D.C.Pages: 36, 58, 62, 68–70, 73, 76, 79–80

Prof. Zheng BijianBorn 1932Fmr. Executive Vice­President, Cen­tral Party School, Communist Party of China (CPC), Central Committee (CC); Director, Academic Commit­tee; fmr. Director, China Reform

and Opening­up Forum, Beijing.Former Positions: Standing Member, 9th and 10th Na­tional Committee, Chinese People’s Political Consul­tative Conference (CPPCC), Beijing; Member, 14th and 15th CPC CC; Executive Vice­President, Party School; Deputy Head, Publicity Department, CPC CC; Vice President, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences; Di­rector, Research Institute for Marxism, Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences; Deputy Director­General, Inter national Affairs Research Center, State Council; Political Assistant to General Secretary Hu Yaobang, CPC CC; Board Member and Researcher, Research Office, Sec­retariat, CPC CC; Deputy Chief, Theory Group, Mao Zedong Works Editing Committee, CPC CC.Selected Writings: Process of Thinking, A New Road for China’s Peaceful Rise and Development.Pages: 31, 42, 58

94

Lattemann, Christoph; Kupke, Sören (2010) Internati-onal and Inter-Organizational Governance. Berlin: wvb.

Lesage, Dries (2009) Contemporary Global Governance: Multipolarity vs New Discourses on Global Governance. Brussels: PIE Lang.

Li, Mingjiang (2009) ‘China–EU Relations: Strategic Partnership at a Crossroads.’ China—An Internatio-nal Journal 7.2, 227–254.

McClintock, John (2010) The Uniting of Nations: An Essay on Global Governance. 3rd Ed. Brussels: Lang.

Men, Jing; Balducci, Giuseppe, eds. (2010) Prospects and Challenges for EU–China Relations in the 21st

Century: The Partnership and Cooperation Agreement. Brussels: PIE Lang.

Peruzzi, Roberto et al. (2007) ‘China’s Views of Europe: A Maturing Partnership.’ European Foreign Affairs Review 12.3, 311–330.

Ritter, Raymond (2009) Transnational Governance in Global Finance: The Principles for Stable Capital Flows and Fair Debt Restructuring in Emerging Markets. Frankfurt am Main: ECB.

Stumbaum, May­Britt U. (2009) The European Union and China: Decision Making in EU Foreign and Security Policy towards the People’s Republic of China. Baden­Baden: Nomos.

Veeck, Gregory et al., eds (2007) China’s Geography: Globalization and the Dynamics of Political, Economic, and Social Change. Lanham, New York: Rowman & Littlefield.

Bijian, Zheng (2005), ‘China’s “Peaceful Rise” to Great­Power Status.’ Foreign Affairs 84.5, 18–24.

Brandt, Loren et al., eds. (2008) China’s Great Eco-nomic Transformation. Cambridge, New York: Cam­bridge University Press.

Chance, Giles (2010) China and the Credit Crisis: The Emergence of a New World Order. Hoboken: Wiley.

Chuang, Yhi­chyi (2010) China and the World Eco-nomy: China’s Economic Rise after Three Decades of Reform. Berlin, Münster: Lit.

Dent, Christopher M., ed. (2008) China, Japan and Regional Leadership. Cheltenham: Elgar.

Fardoust, Shahrokh et al., eds. (2011) Postcrisis Growth and Development: A Development Agenda for the G-20. Washington, D.C.: World Bank.

Goldbach, Roman et al. (2010) ‘Global Governance of the World Financial Crisis?’ Göttingen Journal of International Law 2.1, 11–42.

Gu, Jing et al. (2007) Global Governance and Developing Countries: The Implications of the Rise of China. Bonn: DIE.

Halper, Stefan A. (2010) The Beijing Consensus: How China’s Authoritarian Model Will Dominate the World. New York: Basic Books.

Kerr, David, ed. (2007) The International Politics of EU–China Relations. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Recommended Literature

95

Wang, Gungwu (2008) China and the New Internatio-nal Order. London: Routledge.

Wang, Yiwei (2010) ‘Clashes of Identities: Why China and the EU are Inharmonious in Global Governance.’ UNISCI Discussion Papers 24, 101–111.

Wei, Xiaojun (2008) EU Foreign Direct Investment to China: Locational Determinants and Lessons from an Enlarged European Union. Hamburg: Kovac.

Weiss, Thomas G. et al., eds. (2009) Sustainable Glo-bal Governance for the 21st Century: The United Nations Confronts Economic and Environmental Crises Amidst Changing Geopolitics. Berlin: Friedrich­Ebert­Stiftung.

Yu, Hongyuan (2008) Global Warming and China’s Environmental Diplomacy. New York: Nova Science Publ.

Zheng, Yongnian (2010) China and the Global Eco-nomic Crisis. Singapore: World Scientific.

Zhu, Zhiqun (2010) China’s New Diplomacy: Rationale, Strategies and Significance. Farnham, Burlington: Ashgate.

96

ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations BRIC Brazil, Russia, India, ChinaCCTV China Central TelevisionCPC Communist Party of ChinaECB European Central BankESDP European Security and Defence PolicyEU European UnionG 7 Group of SevenG 8 Group of EightG 20 Group of TwentyIBSA India, Brazil, South AfricaMEF Major Economies Forum on Energy and Climate Change NGO Non­Governmental OrganizationNPT Non­Proliferation Treaty (on nuclear weapons)OECD Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development SCO Shanghai Cooperation Organization UN United NationsUNFCCC United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change US United States USA United States of America WTO World Trade Organization

List of Abbreviations

97

European Union 23–24, 26–28, 30, 32, 35–56, 59, 65–68, 70–73, 78, 80–82

– arms embargo against China 38, 49–50, 82– Central Asia Strategy 40– Commission 72– Common Foreign and Security Policy 37–38,

48, 71–72– Constitutional Treaty 68– European Council 39, 71– European Parliament 37– Neighbourhood Policy 40–41– Treaty of Lisbon 71–72

Financial Crisis, global 23, 32, 37, 42, 58–60, 63, 65–66, 69, 73–74, 77–79

Five­Year Plan 33, 34, 49France 37, 47, 53, 65, 68, 71G 7 73G 8 23, 63, 67, 70, 73, 76G 20 23, 27, 59, 63–71, 73–76, 78, 82German­Chinese Communiqué (2010) 24, 39German­Chinese Media Dialogue 54–55Germany 24, 28, 37–38, 40–43, 46–47, 50–56, 59,

64–66, 70, 72–75, 79–80 – Government 24, 37, 39, 46–47, 55–56, 75– Parliament 50

Global Governance 23, 39, 41–42, 48, 58–68, 70, 73, 82

Global Governance Group 64Global Redesign Initiative 64Globalization 24, 26, 36, 41, 58–59, 72, 82Greece 56–57, 65Guiyang 24Gulf of Mexico 64Haiti 58Hiroshima 29Human Rights 45, 50, 52–53, 64IBSA 64

Afghanistan 28, 41, 72Africa 25, 26–27, 41, 44, 61, 63, 72–73, 75ASEAN 36, 67, 78, 80Asia 25–26, 32, 35–36, 61, 66, 69, 78, 80– Central Asia 40, 44– East Asia 29, 35, 50

Balkans 40–41Basel III 65, 69Beijing 23–25, 30, 39–40, 54, 71, 79Black Sea Synergy 40Brazil 26, 61–64, 73, 76BRIC 64Brussels 24CCTV 47Chiang Mai Initiative 69China, People’s Republic of 23–65, 68–73, 77–82– Central Bank 69, 77– State Council 24, 40, 46–47, 55–57, 71

Chinese Cultural Revolution 25Climate Policy/Climate Change 23, 32–34, 39–40,

42–45, 58–59, 64, 66–67, 69, 71, 75–76 – Conference of Bali 35, 75– Conference of Copenhagen 34, 39, 45, 71– Kyoto Protocol 34, 75

Cold War 25, 36, 45Cologne 73Communist Party of China (CPC) 23–24, 31, 49–53– Central Committee 23, 34, 49

Congo 41Cuba 28Deutsche Welle 55Development Aid 33, 73Dollar 27, 80EU–China Summit 24, 38, 47, 70Euro 27, 56–57, 66, 77, 80European Central Bank 66, 77European­Chinese Chamber of Commerce 55

Index

98

Iceland 35IMF 31, 59–61, 63, 65, 68, 70, 75, 77India 23, 26, 29, 61–62, 64Indonesia 26Iran 72– Nuclear programme 28, 61

Iraq 28Israel 28Italy 37, 71Japan 26–27, 36, 42–43, 49, 68, 76, 80Kashmir 28Kyrgyzstan 40Latin America 27, 63, 66, 72Mediterranean Union 40Middle East 27, 29, 79Millennium Development Goals 73Montenegro 62Moscow 25Mulilateralism 37–38, 41, 58–81Nagasaki 29National Art Museum of China 40New York 29, 73NGOs 59, 63, 75Ningxia 33Nobel Peace Prize 45, 50–51Nordic Dimension 40North Korea 28, 72Nuclear Non­Proliferation Treaty 28Nuclear Weapons 28–29, 63, 73– proliferation of 23, 31, 43, 62, 73

OECD 63, 75Pakistan 29, 58Portugal 73Protectionism 38, 42, 46–47, 60, 65, 67–68, 70, 76,

79–82Qatar 64Renmimbi/Yuan 27, 35, 77–80, 82Russia 26, 28, 64

Shanghai Cooperation Organization 40–41Shenzhen 56Singapore 64Somalia 41, 44South Africa 64, 75South China Morning Post 56South Korea 36, 69Soviet Union 25–26, 28, 36Stability Pact for South East Europe 40Strategic Partnership 23–24, 37–42, 49, 82Sudan 41Switzerland 35, 64, 76Terrorism 29, 59Thailand 76Tianjin 52Tibet 33United Nations/UN 23, 27, 30, 33, 42, 44, 57,

59–66, 70, 72–73, 75–76– General Assembly 62–63– General Secretary 63– Human Rights Council 64– Security Council 30, 61, 63, 72–75– UNFCCC 34

US–China Economic and Security Review Commission 79

USA 25–29, 32–33, 35–36, 38, 42, 44, 52, 54–55, 60, 61, 64–66, 68–69, 72, 77–81

– Congress 64, 79Uzbekistan 41Volvo 79Washington 25, 74, 79World Bank 60–61, 63, 66, 68, 75World War, First 25, 64World War, Second 25, 29, 64–66, 72WTO 31, 38, 46, 59–60, 65–66, 68, 70– Doha Round 60, 80– Government Procurement Agreement 46

Zhejiang Geely 79

99

Persons

Annan, Kofi 63Ashton, Catherine 37–38, 72Baucus, Max 79Brandt, Willy 25Brüderle, Rainer 47Bush, George W. 60, 64Buzek, Jerzy 37Confucius 48Cardoso, Fernando Henrique 63Enlai, Zhou 25, 71Haass, Richard 64Habermas, Jürgen 68Jiabao, Wen 24, 34, 39, 46, 55–56Ki­Moon, Ban 63Kissinger, Henry 32Mantega, Guido 76Merkel, Angela 24, 37, 39, 46Obama, Barack 60, 64, 79Sarkozy, Nicolas 37Schaefer, Michael 54Stiglitz, Joseph 63, 78Strauss­Kahn, Dominique 78Teresa, Mother 57Xiaobo, Liu 51Xiaoping, Deng 25, 30Zedong, Mao 25, 54Zoellick, Robert 78

101

Topic Speakers ModeratorProtocol

Previous Round Tables*

*A complete list of all participants since 1961 is available at www.bergedorf-round-table.org

H. B. Tolkmitt

Fritz Voigt

Günther Buch

Eugen Kogon

Josef Müller-Marein

François Bondy

Gottfried Bombach

Fritz Voigt

Arnold Gehlen

Freiherr von Stackelberg

Th. Eschenburg

Eugen Kogon

Gottfried Bombach

François Bondy

Edgar Salin

Ralf Dahrendorf

Eugen Kogon

Hellmut Becker

Hans Wenke

F. W. Schoberth

Erik von Sivers

Fritz Baade

Helmut Gollwitzer

Rüdiger Altmann

Stéphane Hessel

Theodor Pütz

Hans-Constantin Paulssen

Pierre Bertaux

O. W. Haseloff

Winfried Martini

U. W. Kitzinger, Roland Delcour

Edgar Salin

Alfred Grosser, Karl Theodor Frhr. zu Guttenberg

Walter RauE. F. Schumacher

Raymond Aron

Helmut MeinholdH. J. Wallraff

Alexander Mitscherlich

Gottfried BombachGünter FriedrichsKurt Pentzlin

Schwächen der industriellen Gesellschaft

Kulturkrise in der industriellen Gesellschaft

Glanz und Elend der Entwicklungshilfe

Gesellschaftliche Entwicklung im Osten

Die Fragwürdigkeit der Bildungspolitik

Die Erziehung zum Europäer

Die Bewältigung des Preis-Lohn-Problems

Die Preis-Lohn-Dynamik in der BRD

Maschine — Denkmaschine — Staatsmaschine

Kybernetik als soziale Tatsache

Westliche Gesellschaft und kommunistische Drohung

Wohin treibt die EWG ?

Planung in der freien Marktwirtschaft

Wohin Deutschland in Europa ?

Entwicklungshilfe — Mittel des Aufstiegs oder des Verfalls ?

Industrielle Gesellschaft — Menschlich oder unmenschlich ?

Vermögensbildung in Arbeit nehmerhand

Hemmen Tabus die Demokratisierung ?

Automatisierung — eine gesellschaft liche Herausforderung ?

1961 1

2

3

4

1962 5

6

7

8

1963 9

10

11

12

1964 13

14

15

16

1965 17

18

19

102

Topic Speakers ModeratorProtocol

Edgar Salin

Hellmut Becker

Eugen Kogon

Hellmut Becker

Edgar Salin

Hellmut Becker

Hellmut Becker

Eugen Kogon

Carl-Friedrich Frhr. v. Weizsäcker

Alfred Grosser

Hans Peter Ipsen

Hellmut Becker

Hoimar von Ditfurth

Eugen Kogon

Theo Sommer

Karl Carstens

Nikolai E. Poljanow

D. Klaus von Bismarck

Franz Karasek

Leo H. Klaassen

Friedrich Heer

Rüdiger AltmannJoseph Rovan

Helmut SchelskyUlrich Lohmar

Carl-Friedrich Frhr. v. Weizsäcker

Helmut Arndt

Ralf Dahrendorf

Alfred Mozer

Jeanne Hersch

Wladimir Chwostow

Hans von der Groeben

Robert Jungk

Adolf Portmann

Friedrich Hacker

Alfred Grosser

Carl-Friedrich Frhr. v. WeizsäckerRichard Löwenthal

Alfred GrosserNikolai E. Poljanow

Joseph Rovan

—

Ein Dilemma der westlichen Demo kratien

Die “unterentwickelten” hochin dustrialisierten Gesellschaften

Muss unsere politische Maschinerie umkonstruiert werden ?

Wissenschaftliche Experten und politische Praxis — Das Problem der Zusammenarbeit in der heutigen Demokratie

Ist der Weltfriede unvermeidlich ?

Bedroht die Pressekonzentration die freie Meinungsbildung ?

Neue Wege zur Hochschulreform

Beherrschen die Technokraten unsere heutige Gesellschaft ?

Freiheit als Störfaktor in einer programmierten Gesellschaft

Fördern die Bündnissysteme die Sicherheit Europas ?

Haben wir im entstehenden Europa eine Chance für die freie Marktwirtschaft ?

Mögliche und wünschbare Zukünfte

Die Biologie als technische Weltmacht

Verstärken oder verringern sich die Bedingungen für Aggressivität ?

Welchen Spielraum hat die Entspannungspolitik ?

Zugänge zur Friedensforschung

Europäische Sicherheit und Möglichkeit der Zusammenarbeit

Demokratisierung der Demokratie ?

Arbeitsgespräch : Aufgabenstellung und Verfahrensfragen einer inter natio nalen Konferenz für Europäische Sicherheit

20

1966 21

22

23

24

1967 25

26

27

1968 28

29

30

31

1969 32

33

34

1970 35

36 Leningrad

37

1971

103

Topic Speakers ModeratorProtocol

D. Klaus von Bismarck

Herbert Giersch

D. Klaus von Bismarck

Hellmut Becker

François Bondy

Rudolf Kirchschläger

D. Klaus von Bismarck

D. Klaus von Bismarck

Gottfried Bombach

Olivier Reverdin

D. Klaus von Bismarck

Gottfried Bombach

Max Thurn

Kurt A. KörberLew Tolkunow

Gaston Thorn

Ralf Dahrendorf

Helmut Kohl

Gottfried Bombach

Dennis Gabor

Hans Maier

Richard Löwenthal

R. DahrendorfJean-Pierre BrunetSir Con O’Neill

Helge Pross

Richard Frhr. v. Weizsäcker

Hans-Jochen VogelHugo Thiemann

Rudolf KirchschlägerGaston ThornJósef Czyrek

Ralf Dahrendorf

H. B. G. CasimirManfred Schäfer

Peter T. BauerKarl-Heinz Sohn

Ralf DahrendorfH. EhrenbergTheo SommerC.-F. Frhr. v. Weiz säckerG. ArbatowO. BogomolowSchalwa SanakojewGeorgij Shukow

Helmut Schmidt

Gaston Thorn

Infrastrukturreform als Innenpolitik

Globalsteuerung der Wirtschaft ?

Der bevollmächtigte Mensch

Sprache und Politik

Arbeitsgespräch : Demokratie und Nationalbewusstsein in der BRD

Das erweiterte Europa zwischen den Blöcken

Wo bleiben die alten Menschen in der Leistungsgesellschaft ?

Die “neue Mitte” : Schlagwort oder Strukturwandel ?

Umsteuerung der Industrie gesellschaft ?

Neutralität — Wert oder Unwert für die europäische Sicherheit

Revolution der Gleichheit — Ende oder Beginn der Freiheit ?

Rohstoff- und Energieverknappung

Entwicklungshilfe —Eine Illusion ?

Arbeitsgespräch : Entspannungspolitik, wirtschaftliche und kulturelle Zusammenarbeit

Kooperation oder Konfrontation — Stürzt die Wirtschaft in eine weltpolitische Krise ?

Welche Zukunft hat die parlamen tarische Demokratie westlicher Prägung ?

38

39

40

1972 41

42

43

1973 44

45

46 Vienna

1974 47

48

49

1975 Moscow

50

51 Bonn

104

Topic Speakers ModeratorProtocol

Theo Sommer

Hellmut Becker

Ralf Dahrendorf

Ralf Dahrendorf

Hans K. Schneider

Gaston Thorn

Hans K. Schneider

Ralf Dahrendorf

Werner H. Bloss

Gottfried Bombach

Ralf Dahrendorf

K. A. KörberBoris A. Borrissow

Hans Maier

Hans K. Schneider

Udo Steinbach

Theo Sommer

Karl Kaiser

Kurt H. Biedenkopf

Hans Maier

—

G. ArbatowLeonard H. MarksTheo SommerRyszard Wojna

E. F. Schumacher

Claude CheyssonHerbert Giersch

Guido Brunner

Walter Laqueur

Joachim Gretz

Volker HauffGerhard FelsErich Streissler

Carl-Friedrich Frhr. v. Weizsäcker

Klaus von DohnanyiAlexander E. Bowin

Leopold Rosenmayr

Herbert Giersch Karl Otto Pöhl

Arnold HottingerHans A. Fischer-BarnicolH. Hobohm

Christoph BertramW. R. Smyser

W. A. MatweewStanley Hoffmann

Ordnungspolitik oder Verteilungskampf ?

Die Berufsgesellschaft und ihre Bildung

Nach der Wahl ’76 : Welchen Spielraum hat die deutsche Innenpolitik ?

Entspannungspolitik nach Helsinki

Ein anderer “Way of Life”

Europa und die Weltwirtschaft

Energiekrise — Europa im Belagerungszustand ?

Terrorismus in der demokratischen Gesellschaft

Arbeitsgespräch : Alternativenergien

Europäische Arbeitslosigkeit als Dauerschicksal

Wachstum und Lebenssinn — Alternative Rationalitäten ?

UdSSR und Bundesrepublik Deutsch land — Wirtschaftliche und politische Perspektiven in den 80er Jahren

Jugend und Gesellschaft

Weltrezession 1980 ?Befürchtungen und Hoffnungen

Der Westen und der Nahe Osten

Europas Sicherheit

Voraussetzungen und Ziele der Entspannung in den 80er Jahren

52

1976 53

54

55

1977 56 Bonn

57 Luxemburg

58

1978 59

60

61

1979 62 Moscow

63

64

1980 65

66

67

105

Topic Speakers ModeratorProtocol

Armin Gutowski

Karl Kaiser

Ralf Dahrendorf

Hans Heigert

Herbert Giersch

Ralf Dahrendorf

Karl Kaiser

Karl KaiserJuri Shukow

Luigi Vittorio Graf Ferraris

Fides Krause-Brewer

Ralf Dahrendorf

Karl Kaiser

R. DahrendorfAnke Fuchs

R. DahrendorfStanley Hoffmann

Hans-Jochen VogelE. Noelle-Neumann

Werner RemmersRichard Löwenthal

J. TobinM. FeldsteinSir Alec CairncrossA. A. WaltersP. E. UriP. SalinA. GutowskiH. Schulmann

Präsident Gaston Thorn

Richard Frhr. v. Weizsäcker

Horst TeltschikWadim W. Sagladin

Franz Kardinal KönigHelmut Schmidt

Helmut MeinholdUlf FinkOlaf Sund

R. BurtS. TichwinskijM. SzürösL. V. Graf FerrarisM. Dobrosielski H. Teltschik

Jacques DelorsLord CarringtonHelmut Schmidt

Der Ausbau des Sozialstaates und das Dilemma des Staatshaushaltes

Europe and America facing the crises of the 80’s

Was bleibt noch vom staatsbürgerlichen Grundkonsens ?

Repräsentieren die Parteien unsere Gesellschaft ?

Wirtschaftspolitik in der Krise ? Zur Situation in den Ver-einigten Staaten, Großbritannien, Frankreich und der Bundesrepublik Deutschland

Ein Weg zur Erneuerung der Industriegesellschaft

Die deutsche Frage — Neu gestellt

Zukunft Europas : Probleme der poli ti schen und militärischen Entspannung.

Ist die Spaltung Europas das letzte Wort ?

Neue Strukturen für die soziale Sicherheit ?

10 Jahre Helsinki — Die Herausforderung bleibt

Findet Europa wieder die Kraft, eine Rolle in der Weltpolitik zu spielen ?

1981 68

69 Washington

70

1982 71

72 Bonn

1983 73 Zurich

74 Berlin

1984 75 Moscow

76 Rome

1985 77

78 Bonn

1986 79 Brussels

106

Topic Speakers ModeratorProtocol

Ralf Dahrendorf

Valentin FalinTheo Sommer

Luigi V. Ferraris

Karl Kaiser

Jürgen Engert

Hans Maier

Karl Kaiser

Max Schmidt

Sir Ralf Dahrendorf

Hans Heigert

Sir Ralf Dahrendorf

Andreas Meyer-Landrut

Sir Ralf Dahrendorf

Hans Maier

Brigitte Seebacher-Brandt

Hans Maier

Volker RüheWadim W. SagladinEgon Bahr

Hermann Lübbe

M. SzürösHelmut SchmidtR. BogdanowH. Sonnenfeldt

W. LeonhardHarry Maier

Frhr. v. LersnerAlois Glück

Wadim W. SagladinHorst Teltschik

W. MundtW. Haber

Lawrence EagleburgerSir Christopher MallabyHorst Teltschik

Valtr KomárekKurt Biedenkopf

Willy BrandtManfred StolpeLothar Späth

Wadim W. SagladinHorst Teltschik

W. WladislawlewF. W. Christians

Tadeusz MazowieckiSir Ralf Dahrendorf

Kurt Biedenkopf Wolfgang Thierse

Bürger und res publica — Die Zukunft der Verantwortung

Die Beziehungen zwischen der Sowjetunion und der Bundesrepublik Deutschland

Die Modernität in der Industrie gesellschaft — Und danach ?

Zusammenarbeit als Mittel zur Vertrauensbildung

Systemöffnende Kooperation ? Perspektiven zwischen Ost und West

Die ökologische Wende — Hat sie noch Chancen ?

Das gemeinsame europäische Haus — Aus der Sicht der Sowjetunion und der Bundesrepublik Deutschland

Globale Umweltproblematik als gemeinsame Überlebensfrage

Auf dem Wege zu einem neuen Europa ? Perspektiven einer gemein samen westlichen Ostpolitik

Chancen für die europäische Kultur am Ende des 20. Jahrhunderts

Wie geht es weiter mit den Deutschen in Europa ?

Europa im Aufbruch — Auf dem Wege zu einer neuen Friedensordnung

Perestrojka : Kontinuität, Ende oder Wende ?

Nach dem “Sozialismus” : Wie geht es weiter mit den neuen Demokratien in Europa ?

Wege zur inneren Einheit

80

1987 81 Moscow

82 Geneva

83 Budapest

1988 84 Berlin

85 Munich

86 Bonn

1989 87 Dresden

88 Bonn

89 Prague

1990 90 Dresden

91 Moscow

1991 92 Moscow

93 Berlin

1992 94 Dresden

107

Topic Speakers ModeratorProtocol

Karl Kaiser

Andreas Meyer-Landrut

Andreas Meyer-Landrut

Jürgen Engert

Lord Ralf Dahrendorf

Dieter Grimm

Andreas Meyer-Landrut

Jürgen Engert

Lord Ralf Dahrendorf

Karl Kaiser

Hermann Korte

Michael Stürmer

Willy BrandtJacques Delors

Jim HoaglandDr. KrenzlerLennart MeriT. ÖrnB. Schmidbauer

Hermann KrämerW. SkljarowHelga SteegY. Rudenko

Antje VollmerWolf Lepenies

Bill BradleyW. F. van EekelenH.-G. Poettering

Kurt BiedenkopfAlbert O. Hirschman

A. A. KokoschinVolker RüheA. A. Sobtschak

Lothar SpäthLeo A. Nefiodow

Jean-Claude CasanovaTimothy Garton AshWolfgang Schäuble

Bronislaw GeremekAnders BjörckJ. François-Poncet

Horst SeehoferBarbara Riedmüller

Mahdi F. Abdul HadiHanan Bar-OnLeonard HausmanJean-Paul JesseHelmut Schäfer

Welche Antworten gibt Europa auf die neuen Einwanderungswellen ?

Zwischen Integration und nationaler Eigenständigkeit : Wie findet Europa zusammen ?

Energiesicherheit für ganz Europa ?

Orientierungskrise in Politik und Gesellschaft ? Perspektiven der Demokratie

Will the West survive the disintegration of the East ?

Wieviel Gemeinsinn braucht die liberale Gesellschaft ?

Russland und der Westen : Internationale Sicherheit und Reformpolitik

Zukunftsfähigkeit von Politik, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft

Die Verfassung Europas

Europa — Aber wo liegen seine Grenzen ?

Ein neuer Gesellschaftsvertrag ?

Europe and the Future of the Middle East — An Agenda for Peace

95 Paris

96 Tallinn

97 Kiev

1993 98 Berlin

99 Ditchley Park

100 Dresden

1994 101 St. Petersburg

102Friedrichs roda

1995 103 Oxford

104 Warsaw

105 Munich

1996 106 Jerusalem

108

Topic Speakers ModeratorProtocol

Thomas Kielinger

Andreas Meyer-Landrut

Curt Gasteyger

Lord Ralf Dahrendorf

Michael Stürmer

Barbara Riedmüller

Andreas Meyer-Landrut

Hermann-Anders Korte

Jutta Limbach

Andreas Meyer-Landrut

Klaus v. Dohnanyi

Wolfgang DonsbachWolfgang Hoffmann-RiemTheo Sommer

Sergej BaburinSir Rodric Braithwaite

Ilter TürkmenMorton Abramowitz Hans-Ulrich Klose

André LeysenJürgen Rüttgers

Ulrich CartellieriSir Christopher MallabyWolfgang IschingerMarten van HeuvenFrits BolkesteinDavid P. CalleoMax KohnstammElmar Brok

Kurt BiedenkopfHeinz BudeWolfgang Huber

Terry D. AdamsVafa GoulizadePaul HaseldonckxHans-Friedrich von Ploetz

Hans LenkHerbert Riehl-HeyseJürgen Palm

Antonia GrunenbergSabine Leutheusser- Schnarrenberger

Wolfgang IschingerOleg MorosowUlrich CartellieriAndrej A. Kokoschin

Henning ScherfCarl Christian v. Weizsäcker

Medien — Macht — Politik

Was bewegt Russland ?

At the crossroads of geo-politics — Turkey in a changing political environment

Wege aus der blockierten Gesellschaft

Wie ist Europa zu sichern ?

Wachsende Ungleichheiten — Neue Spaltungen ?

Energie und Geostrategie im kaspischen Raum

Welche gesellschaftliche Wertigkeit hat der Sport ?

Neue Dimensionen des Politischen ? Herausforderungen für die repräsen ta tive Demokratie

Russland in Europa : Zehn Jahre nach dem Kalten Krieg

Modell Deutschland :Reif für die Globalisierung ?

107

108 Moscow

1997 109 Istanbul

110 Berlin

111 Amsterdam

1998 112 Leipzig

113 Baku

1999 114 Magdeburg

115 Berlin

116 Moscow

2000 117 Berlin

109

Topic Speakers ModeratorProtocol

Rudolf von Thadden

Mei ZhaorongKarl Kaiser

Robert Leicht

Jaako Iloniemi

Sergej W. JastrschembskijSergej A. Karaganow

Martti AhtisaariErhard Busek

Lord Ralf Dahrendorf

Sylvie GoulardKlaus HänschJerzy Kranz

Yang QixianZheng SilinWang ChunzhengShen JuerenZhu MinShi MingdeSong JianKonrad SeitzHorst TeltschikMartin Posth

Dieter GrimmAnnette Fugmann-Heesing

Bertel HaarderArtur J. KuznetsovAlar J. Rudolf OlljumHans OlssonTimo SummaErkki TuomiojaChristoph Zöpel

—

Andy BearparkErhard BusekNebojša ČovićBozidar DjelićAlexandra JovičevićHerwig KempfGerald KnausWolfgang PetritschGoran Svilanović

Egon BahrJohn L. HirschPeter W. SingerPaul W. SchroederGeorges-Henri SoutouKarsten D. VoigtNorbert WalterSamuel F. Wells Jr.

Ein föderatives Europa ?

China : Partner in der Weltwirtschaft

Verhandlungsdemokratie ? Politik des Möglichen — Möglichkeiten der Politik

The Baltic Sea — a Region of Prosperity and Stability ?

Russia’s European Dimension

The Future of Southeast Europe

Contours of a “New World Order” ?

118 Berlin

119 Beijing

2001 120 Berlin

121 Helsinki

122 Moscow

2002 123 Belgrade

124 Berlin

110

Topic Speakers ModeratorProtocol

Otto von der Gablentz

Roger de Weck

Christoph BertramSeyed Kazem Sajjadpour

Christoph Bertram

Roger de Weck

Theo Sommer

Hélène AhrweilerÜstün ErgüderMonika GriefahnYudhishthir Raj IsarHywel Ceri JonesKarl SchlögelGary SmithGijs de Vries

Henri de BressonAndrea ManzellaGesine SchwanLarry SiedentopGijs de VriesHelen Wallace

Gilles KepelMichael McFaulHomayra Moshirzadeh Ahmad Nagheebzadeh Giandomenico PiccoJohannes Reissner Hossein Salimi

Paul SchroederDame Pauline Neville-JonesDavid RieffHeather GrabbeGhanim AlnajjarMichael SchaeferAvis Bohlen

Ian BoagGernot ErlerYaroslav HrytsakDanuta HübnerEvgenii M. KozhokinWolfgang SchäubleOleksandr O. TschalyJakub T. Wolski

Badria Al-AwadhiMark ChingonoLarry DiamondRainer ForstSheikh Ali Gom’aAmr HamzawyStefano ManservisiNorbert Walter

Reinventing Europe — Cultural Dimensions of Widening and Deepening

The Future of Democracy — European Perspectives

The Middle East and Western Values: A Dialog With Iran

Power and Rules — Elements of a New World Order

Frontiers and Horizons of the EU — The New Neighbors Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova

Forging a Just Global Order — Trade, Development, Political Strategies

2003 125 Hamburg

126 Florence

127 Isfahan

2004 128Wilton Park

129 Lviv

2005 130 Cairo

111

Topic Speakers ModeratorProtocol

Wolfgang Eichwede

Volker Perthes

Theo Sommer

Volker Rühe

Roger de Weck

Volker Perthes

Elmar BrokVladimir ChizhovVasili LikhachevDmitri RogozinWolfgang SchäubleManfred Stolpe

Ghassan AtiyyahRobert CooperRami George KhouriMichael McFaulHossein MousavianMichael Schaefer

Sadeq Al-AzmKhalil A. Al-KhalilHisham KassemElaheh KoolaeeErnest MayGhassan MoukehiberFriedbert PflügerRuprecht PolenzKurt Volker

Gernot ErlerKonstantin GabashviliCharles KingBorys TarasyukMihael-Răzvan UngureanuYaşar Yakiş

Christoph BertramVladimir ChizhovMehmet DülgerSylvie GoulardJim HoaglandUlrich SchlieFritz Stern

Hüseyin BağciCengiz ÇandarRobert CooperAhmet DavutoğluHeinz KramerHossein MousavianRuprecht PolenzYaşar Yakiş

Russia and the West

Stability in the Persian Gulf

Reforms in the Middle East —How Can Europe and the US Contribute ?

The Black Sea Between the EU and Russia:Security, Energy, Democracy

Interests and Partners of German Foreign Policy

Turkey as a Partner for European Foreign Policy in the Middle East

131 Berlin

132 Dubai

2006 133Washington, D. C.

134 Odessa

135 Berlin

2007 136 Istanbul

112

Topic Speakers ModeratorProtocol

Rudolf Adam

Janusz Reiter

Volker Perthes

Wolfgang Ischinger

Alexander Rahr

Volker Perthes

Thomas Paulsen

Kairat AbdrakhmanowEdnan KarabaewHans-Dieter LucasPierre MorelVolker RüheSuchrob Sharipow

Egon BahrZbigniew BrzezinskiMarek A. CichockiJohn RobertsVolker RüheWitold WaszczykowskiPawel Zalewski

Walid Al-MuallemJoschka FischerRosemary HollisFlynt LeverettRosch Noori ShawaysMostafa Zahrani

Gijs M. de VriesJohn ManleyAlain RichardVolker RühePaul W. SchroederKarl-Theodor zu Guttenberg

Sergey KaraganovSergey V. LavrovPierre MorelVyacheslav NikonovRuprecht PolenzMaxim Shevchenko

Cengiz ÇandarMustafa B. Hamarneh Bassma KodmaniDaniel C. KurtzerHossein MousavianFouad Siniora

Christoph HeusgenAlexander Graf LambsdorffKristiina OjulandUrsula Plassnik Janusz ReiterHelga Maria Schmid

European Policy Towards Central Asia

Can the EU Ensure Europe’s Security ?

Iraq and its Neighbours: Strategies for Stability

The Future of the NATO

Russia’s Responsibility in Global Affairs

Conflict Management in the Middle EastRegional Solutions to Regional Problems?

Is a Common European Foreign Policy Possible?

137 Astana

138 Warsaw

2008 139 Damascus

140 Berlin

141 Moscow

2009 142 Beirut

143 Berlin

113

Topic Speakers ModeratorProtocol

Stefan Kornelius

Wolfgang Ischinger

Thomas Paulsen

Volodymyr FessenkoHryhoriy NemyriaJohn RobertsJaroslav RomanchukVolker RüheBorys Tarasyuk

Zbigniew BrzezinskiJames F. DobbinsRobert KaganParag KhannaGeorge PerkovichVolker PerthesRuprecht Polenz

Werner HoyerWinfried NachtweiReinhold RobbeVolker RüheUlrich SchlieWalther Stützle

Europe’s East between Brussels and Moscow

The Limits of Power: Europe and America in a New World Order

The Role of the Federal Armed Forces in German Foreign and Security Policy

144 Kiev

2010 145 Washington, D.C.

146 Berlin

The Bergedorf Round Table

Chairman Dr. Richard von Weizsäcker, fmr. President of the Federal Republic of Germany

Coordinator Dr. Klaus Wehmeier (Deputy Chairman of the Executive Board) Dr. Thomas Paulsen (Executive Director International Affairs)

Program Manager Bernhard Müller-Härlin

Conference Management Julia Bader

Address Körber Foundation Berlin Office Pariser Platz 4a D-10117 Berlin Phone : +49 -30-206267-60 Fax : +49 -30-206267-67 E-mail : ip@koerber-stiftung.de www.bergedorf-round-table.org

Imprint

Bibliografische Information Der Deutschen BibliothekDie Deutsche Bibliothek verzeichnet diese Publikation in der Deutschen Nationalbibliografie; detaillierte bibliografische Daten sind im Internet über http://dnb.ddb.de abrufbar.

© edition Körber-Stiftung, Hamburg 2011

Editor Bernhard Müller-Härlin, Jörg ZägelTranslation Dr. Alfred ClaytonPictures Marc DarchingerDesign Groothuis, Lohfert, Consorten, HamburgReproduction Frische Grafik, HamburgPrint creo Druck & Medienservice, Bamberg

ISBN 978-3-89684-376-0ISSN 1864-8088

All rights are reserved. These minutes may be reproduced upon request.www.edition-koerber-stiftung.de

The Bergedorf Protocols are also published in German. Both versions are available for download and research at www.bergedorf-round-table.org

9<HTOIUG=iedhga>11,– (D)

ISSN 1864-8088ISBN 978-3-89684-376-0

What is the western world’s reaction to the rise of China? What kind of hopes and problems are associated with a “strategic partnership” between China and the EU? Do both sides have a similar understanding of “global governance” and are they equally in favour of strengthening multilateral structures?

The 147th Bergedorf Round Table, taking place in Beijing and chaired by Richard von Weizsäcker and Sun Jiazheng, brought together politicians and high-profile experts from China and from EU countries to discuss openly the perspectives and possible obstacles for Chinese-European cooperation in a globalized world.

The starting point of the discussion was the current situation of China, marked by both rapid economic development and staggering social and ecological problems. The participants envisioned cornerstones of a future partnership and referred to a plethora of shared interests and targets in global affairs. However, frictions arising from different values and from distorted views of the other side were also addressed. The Round Table also tackled overriding issues relating to the future of “global governance”: Which kinds of reforms are necessary to give multilateral institutions more legitimacy? Which role will China and the EU play in this regard? What will be the status of institutions such as the UN and the G 20 in years to come?

With an introduction by Helmut Schmidt

Prelim

inary Vers

ion