Benchmark Jan-June Digest

Digest of Supreme Court’s Benchmark

January – June 2007

Libertas et Iusticia

LIBERTAS ET IUSTICIA | DIGEST OF SUPREME COURT’S BENCHMARK 2006

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Table of Contents

January………………………………………………………………….. 3 Two Lawyers Suspended for Misappropriating Client’s Vehicle

February………………………………………………………………….. 4 Love in the Words of the Court

Clerk of Court Gets One-Year Suspension for Missing Funds

Double-Dealing, Deceitful, and Immoral Lawyer Suspended for Three Years

Dishonest Notary’s Commission Revoked

Makati RTC Judge Fined

Utility Worker Disciplined for False DTR

SC Clarifies Rules on Initiating Contempt Proceedings; Absolves Lawyer

Judge Dismissed for Neglect of Duty, Inefficiency

March…………………………………………………………………….. 7 SC Bans Coterminous Employment of Justices’ Spouses

SC Designates Special Courts to Try and Decide Cases of Extrajudicial Killings

SC Affirms Reinstatement of Employee Dismissed on Account of Pregnancy

Negligent, Irresponsible Lawyer Suspended

Lawyer Suspended for Failure to Turn Over Client’s Money

Court Upholds Retainer Contract

SC Adopts Add’l Rules re TROs on Foreclosures of Real Estate Mortgages

Court Orders Release of Salaries, Benefits Earned But Fines Sheriff For

Improperly Serving Suspension

SC Directs Removal of Pandacan Oil Terminals

SC Dismisses Four CA Employees for “Case-Fixing”

MERALCO Ordered to Pay Damages to Subscriber

April……………………………………………………………………….. 13 Court Cleanses Judiciary

SC Upholds Suspension of BIR Official for Non-Disclosure of Wealth

Bail Can Be Granted to Potential Extraditee on Basis of Clear and Convincing

Evidence

SC Acquits Illiterate Fisherman of Double Murder

SC Settles LP Leadership Controversy

SC Clarifies Evidentiary Value of Duplicate Originals

SC OKs Graft Charge Against PIATCO Chairman and President

May………………………………………………………………………… 17 No Time Limit for Administrative Cases vs Lawyers

SCEA President Suspended

Judge, Staff Penalized for Spurious Bailbonds and Release Orders

June ………………………………………………………………………. 26 SC Disciplines More Judges, Court Personnel

SC Clarifies Conditions for Discharge of State Witness

SC Orders PEA to Pay Php94 Million in Just Compensation

Mercury Drug Liable for Selling Wrong Medication

Administrative Proceedings: Not Arena for Squabbling Lawyers

SC Orders Dismissal of Rebellion Charges against Beltran, et al.

SC Upholds Textbook Supply Deal

SC Allows OWWA to Proceed with Reorganization

CJ Enjoins Officials and Employees to Strictly Observe Gambling Prohibition in

Court


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January 2007

Two Lawyers Suspended for Misappropriating Client’s Vehicle By Joshua P. Lapuz

TWO LAWYERS were recently suspended by the Supreme Court for

misappropriating their client’s vehicle, allegedly as payment for their

services.

Attorneys Salvador and Nancy Quimpo were suspended for three

months for gross misconduct. The Court found that the Quimpos caused

the filling in of a signed blank Deed of Sale of Rosemarie Hsieh’s

Mitstubishi Eclipse without Hsieh’s consent and authority.

“If the Deed of Sale was originally intended to serve as security

for the payment of complainant’s outstanding account with respondents,

as claimed by the latter, why was not the name of the oblige for whom

the security was allegedly executed – respondents – not also printed out?

And why did not respondents bother to advise complainant of the

eventual sale of the car and account the proceeds thereof? It is on this

account that this Court finds the above-quoted ratiocination of the IBP

Investigator in holding respondents to have committed breach of

contract well-taken,” said the Court. (AC No. 6128, Rosemarie L. Hsieh vs. Atty.

Salvador Quimpo and Atty. Nancy Quimpo, December 19, 2006)


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February 2007

Love in the Words of the Court Compiled by Atty. Richard Pascual, Office of the Reporter

IN THIS MONTH OF HEARTS, we have compiled the following passages

from decisions of the Court throughout the decades that speak of that

mysterious thing called LOVE.

“Love of country should be something permanent and lasting,

ending only in death; loyalty should be its worth of offspring. The

outward manifestation of one or the other may for a time be prevented

or thwarted by the irresistible action of the occupant; but this should not

in the least extinguish nor obliterate the invisible feelings, and

promptings of the spirit.” (GR No. L-409. Anastacio Laurel v. Eriberto Misa, January

30, 1947)

“There is nothing objectionable in her taking advantage of the law

to give tangible expression to her maternal love, which is, without any

doubt, universally considered the most sublime feeling nature has

infused in human hearts. The feeling is so elemental that it is not

unknown even to the lowest phyla of the animal kingdom. That even the

fiercest wild animals are not devoid of such feeling is a wonder that

cannot fail to move [the] most indifferent person.” (GR No. L- 1663,

Florentina Villahermosa v. The Commissioner of Immigration, March 31, 1948)

“Men may differ and do differ on religious beliefs and creeds,

government policies, the wisdom and legality of laws, even the

correctness of judicial decisions and decrees; but in the field of love of

country…they can hardly afford to differ, for these are matters in which

they are mutually and vitally interested, for to them, they mean national

existence and survival as a nation.” (GR No. L-13954, Genaro Gerona, et al. v. The

Honorable Sec. of Education, et al., August 12, 1959)

“The nuptial vows which solemnly intone the matrimonial

promise of love ‘(f)or better or for worse, for richer or for poorer, in

sickness and in health, till death do us part,‘ are sometimes easier said

than done, for many a marital union figuratively ends on the reefs of

matrimonial shoals. In the case now before us for appellate review, the

marriage literally ended under circumstances which the criminal law,

disdainful of romanticism, bluntly calls the felony of parricide.” (GR No.

102984. People of the Philippines v. Ruben Takbobo, June 30, 1993)

“Marital union is a two-way process. An expressive interest in

each other’s feelings at a time it is needed by the other can go a long way

in deepening the marital relationship. Marriage is definitely not for

children but for two consenting adults who view the relationship with

love… respect, sacrifice and a continuing commitment to compromise,

conscious of its value as a sublime social institution.” (GR No. 119190, Chi

Ming Tsoi v. Court of Appeals and Gina Lao- Tsoi, January 16, 1997)

“Parents have the natural right, as well as the moral and legal

duty, to care for their children, see to their proper upbringing, and

safeguard their best interest and welfare. Even when the parents are

estranged and their affection for each other is lost, the attachment and

feeling for their offspring invariably remain unchanged. Neither the law

nor the courts allow this affinity to suffer absent, of course, any real,

grave and imminent threat to the well-being of the child.” (GR No. 114742,

Carlitos E. Silva v. Hon. Court of Appeals and Suzanne T. Gonzales, July 17, 1997)

”We cannot castigate a man for seeking out the partner of his

dreams, for marriage is a sacred and perpetual bond which should be

entered into because of love, not for any other reason.” (GR No. 97369,

Patricia Figueroa, v. Simeon Barranco, Jr., July 31, 1997)

“That religion, or the duty which we owe to our Creator, and the

manner of discharging it, can be directed only by reason and conviction,

not by force or violence; and therefore, all men are equally entitled to

the free exercise of religion according to the dictates of conscience; and

that it is the mutual duty of all to practice Christian forbearance, love,


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and charity towards each other.” (AM P-02-1651, Estrada v. Escritor, August 4,

2003)

“The Court, like all well-meaning persons, has no desire to dash

romantic fancies, yet in the exercise of its duty, is all too willing when

necessary to raise the wall that tears Pyramus and Thisbe asunder.” (AM

No. P-02- 1564, Concerned Employee v. Glenda Espiritu Mayor, November 23, 2004)

Clerk of Court Gets One-Year Suspension for Missing Funds By Madeleine U.V.G. Avanzado

A CLERK OF COURT was recently suspended for one year for failing to

account for funds entrusted to her in a civil case.

The Supreme Court found Clerk of Court Marissa Angeles of the

Pantabangan Municipal Trial Court of Nueva Ecija guilty of dishonesty and

conduct unbecoming of a clerk of court and ordered her to pay

complainant Beatriz Vilar Php75,000 for failing to remit funds that were

entrusted to her in a civil case involving the complainant.

In its decision, the Court reiterated that the “failure of a public

officer to remit funds upon demand by an authorized officer constitutes

prima facie evidence that the public officer has put such missing funds or

property to personal use.” As Angeles failed to explain what she did with

the money entrusted to her, the Supreme Court suspended her “for one

year without pay, with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or

similar act shall be dealt with more severely.”

Though Section 52 of Rule IV of the Uniform Rules on

Administrative Cases in the Civil Service called for the penalty of

dismissal, the Court adopted the recommendations of the Office of the

Court Administrator and decided to temper the penalty as Angeles was a

first-time offender and had been with the judiciary for 22 years. (AM No. P-

06-2276, Beatriz F. Vilar vs. Marissa Angeles, Clerk of Court, Municipal Trial Court,

Pantabangan, Nueva Ecija, February 5, 2007)

Double-Dealing, Deceitful, and Immoral Lawyer Suspended for Three

Years By Gleo Sp. Guerra

THE SUPREME COURT recently suspended from the practice of law for

three years Atty. Luciano D. Valencia for misconduct and violation of

Canons 21, 10, and 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Atty. Valencia was found to have violated Canon 21 stating that “a

lawyer shall preserve the confidences and secrets of his client even after

the attorney-client relation is terminated” when he appeared as counsel

against a former client in a related action. The Court said that the rule is

“founded on the principles of public policy and good taste…for only then

can litigants be encouraged to entrust their secrets to their lawyers,

which is of paramount importance in the administration of justice.”

The Court also found that Atty. Valencia failed to comply with

Canon 10, which provides that a lawyer shall not do any falsehood nor

consent to the doing of any in court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the

Court to be misled by any artifice, when he presented as evidence in a

case a certificate of title that had already been cancelled.

Finally, the Court found Atty. Valencia to have sired three

illegitimate children in violation of Canon 1, Rule 1.01 stating that a

lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral, or deceitful

conduct. However, it mitigated his liability considering that he eventually

married the mother of the said children after the death of his first wife

and that it was his first offense of that nature. (Adm. Case No. 5439, Clarita J.

Samala v. Atty. Luciano D. Valencia, January 22, 2007)

Dishonest Notary’s Commission Revoked By Madeleine U.V.G. Avanzado

THE SUPREME COURT recently revoked the notarial commission of Atty.

Salud P. Beradio and suspended her for six months from the practice of


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law for having notarized a document which she knew contained a

material falsehood.

The Court found that Atty. Beradio violated Canon 1 and Rule 1.01

of the Code of Professional Responsibility when she notarized the

affidavit of adjudication of a certain Alfonso Villanueva while she had

personal knowledge that his claim of being the sole heir to the estate

concerned was untrue. The affidavit stated Villanueva as the sole heir to

his parents’ estate even though there were other compulsory heirs living

at the time it was executed, a fact which Atty. Beradio admitted to the

Court.

“Where admittedly the notary public has personal knowledge of a

false statement or information contained in the instrument to be

notarized, yet proceeds to affix his or her notarial seal on it, the Court

must not hesitate to discipline the notary public accordingly as the

circumstances of the case dictate. Otherwise, the integrity and sanctity of

the notarization process may be undermined and public confidence on

notarial documents diminished,” the Court said. (AC No. 6270, Heirs of

Spouses Villanueva vs. Atty. Salud P. Beradio, January 22, 2007)

Makati RTC Judge Fined

By Arcie M. Sercado

JUDGE REBECCA R. MARIANO of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City,

Branch 136, was fined Php40,000 by the Court for violating the Canons of

the Code of Judicial Conduct and Supreme Court Administrative Circular

No. 4-2004 for making untruthful statements in her monthly reports.

The Court ruled that Judge Mariano intentionally misrepresented

the date of promulgation of the decision in the Amanet Inc. v. Eastern

Telecommunications Philippines, Inc. case. The January 2005 monthly

report of Branch 136 included Amanet in its list of decided cases when

the decision had not yet been promulgated on the date of the submission

of the report on March 7, 2005.

Judge Mariano’s January 2005 monthly report also revealed that

there were cases submitted for decision that remained undecided

beyond the 90-day reglementary period despite the additional time she

was given to decide them. (AM No. RTJ-06-2010, Marissa R. Mondala v. Judge

Rebecca R. Mariano, January 25, 2007)

Utility Worker Disciplined for False DTR By Arcie M. Sercado

A UTILITY WORKER was reprimanded by the Supreme Court recently for

habitually making false entries in his daily time record (DTR).

Manuel Araya, Jr., utility worker of the Ozamiz City Municipal Trial

Court in Cities, Branch 2, was also warned that a more severe sanction

will be imposed on him should he repeat the said offense. The Court

noted that Araya only came to work for six hours and 45 minutes per

working day, instead of the mandated eight hours. Because of this, Araya

did not perform his responsibilities in the office.

The Court also reprimanded Ozamis Judge Rio Concepcion Achas

and Clerk of Court III Renato Zapatos for allowing Araya to come to work

on a flexi-time basis without prior authorization from the Court. (AM No. P-

05-1960, Concerned Litigants v. Manuel Z. Araya, Jr., Utility Worker, Municipal Trial

Court in Cities, Branch 2, Ozamiz City, January 26, 2007)

SC Clarifies Rules on Initiating Contempt Proceedings; Absolves Lawyer By Madeleine U.V.G. Avanzado

THE SUPREME COURT recently absolved Atty. Ma. Concepcion L.

Regalado of indirect contempt as the proceedings against her had been

improperly initiated.

The Court held that Section 4, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court

provides for two ways to initiate indirect contempt proceedings: “(1)

motu proprio by the court; or (2) through a verified petition and upon


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compliance with the requirements for initiatory pleadings.” It found that

the contempt proceedings against Atty. Regalado were improperly

initiated by the filing of an unverified Manifestation with Omnibus

Motion.

“Evidently, the proceedings attendant to the conviction of

petitioner Atty. Regalado for indirect contempt suffered a serious

procedural defect to which this Court cannot close its eyes without

offending the fundamental principles enunciated in the Rules that we,

ourselves, had promulgated,” the Court said, even as it accorded respect

to the Court of Appeals’ factual findings that Atty. Regalado’s acts

constitute indirect contempt.

The Court of Appeals earlier had convicted Atty. Regalado of

indirect contempt and fined her Php5,000 for facilitating a compromise

agreement in an illegal dismissal case on appeal with the appellate court

without the presence of the opposing party’s counsel. (GR No. 167988, Ma.

Concepcion L. Regalado vs. Antonio S. Go, February 6, 2007)

Judge Dismissed for Neglect of Duty, Inefficiency By Arcie M. Sercado

A JUDGE WAS DISMISSED from the service recently by the

Supreme Court.

Judge Ramon R. Legaspi, Jr. of the 3rd Municipal Circuit Trial Court

of Kinoguitan- Sugbongcogon, Misamis Oriental was found liable for gross

neglect of judicial duty for failing to decide or resolve within the

reglementary period 228 cases assigned to his sala. The Office of the

Court Administrator discovered this in an audit conducted in October

2002. Judge Legaspi was given several opportunities to decide the cases,

which stretched over more than two years, but he still failed to comply.

After more than three years, Judge Legaspi still had 89 cases left

to be decided, all of which have been submitted for decision since 1996

but were not stated in the judge’s Monthly Report of Cases for the third

and fourth quarters of 2004. The Court dismissed Judge Legaspi, saying,

“The wheels of justice would hardly move if respondent is allowed to

continue working in the judiciary.” (AM No. MTJ-06-1661, Office of the Court

Administrator v. Hon. Ramon R. Legaspi, Jr., January 25, 2007)

March 2007

SC Bans Coterminous Employment of Justices’ Spouses By Jay B. Rempillo

STARTING APRIL 1, spouses of incumbent Justices are banned from

working as coterminous employees in the Judiciary.

Prohibited is the employment of spouses of Justices in the

Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, Sandiganbayan, and Court of Tax

Appeals. Spouses presently employed and covered by the ban are

deemed resigned at the close of office hours on March 31.

The Court found it necessary to control and regulate the

employment of the spouses of Justices “to enforce the letter and the

spirit of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary

calling for an ethical judiciary that is above suspicion. [That] is premised,

among others, on the fact that ‘public confidence in the judicial system

and in the moral authority and integrity of the judiciary is of utmost

importance in a modern democratic society; and…it is essential that

judges, individually and collectively, respect and honor judicial office as a

public trust and strive to enhance and maintain confidence in the judicial

system.’” (AM No. 07-3-02-CA, In re: Rule Banning the Employment of Spouses of

Justices in the SC, CA, Sandiganbayan, and CTA as Coterminous Employees, March 6,

2007)


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SC Designates Special Courts to Try and Decide Cases of Extrajudicial

Killings By Jay B. Rempillo

THE SUPREME COURT has designated 99 Regional Trial Courts nationwide

to try and decide cases involving extrajudicial killings of political activists

and members of the media. Designated as Special Courts are 23 RTCs in

the National Judicial Capital Region (NCJR) and 76 RTCs in the 12 other

Judicial Regions.

Under Court-issued guidelines, to be considered in determining

whether a crime is a “political killing” are (1) political affiliation of the

victim; (2) method of attack; and (3) reports that state agents are

involved in the commission of the crime or have acquiesced in them.

All single-sala courts are considered Special Courts for the cases

involving killings of political ideologists and members of the media, which

shall be given priority in their respective trial calendars. In stations where

there are no designated Special Courts, the branches where the

concerned cases are raffled shall observe the guidelines.

The Special Courts shall conduct continuous trial for said cases, to

be terminated within 60 days from commencement of the hearing. A

judgment on said case shall be rendered within 30 days upon its

submission for decision unless a shorter period is provided by the law or

otherwise directed by the High Court.

Where trial has already begun, the same shall continue to be

heard by the respective branches to which they have been originally

assigned. A criminal case is considered begun when the accused had

already been arraigned.

The Special Courts are required to submit a report on the status

of the concerned cases which shall be attached to their respective

Monthly Report of Cases. Failure to submit such report shall be a ground

for withholding the salaries and allowances of the judges, clerks of court,

and branch clerks of court concerned without prejudice to whatever

administrative sanction the High Court may impose on them.

Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno has said that the creation of Special

Courts to resolve extrajudicial killings is high in the Judiciary’s priority list.

He made the announcement even before Malacañang made public the

findings of the Independent Commission to Address Media and Activists

Killings, headed by retired SC Justice Jose Melo, confirming the

extrajudicial killings of political activists and members of the media.

“The first and foremost of human rights is the right to life. It has

long been accorded universal status for the existence of all other rights is

premised on the preservation of life. The extrajudicial taking of life is the

ultimate violation of human rights. It cannot be allowed anywhere, and it

has to be resisted everywhere…Extrajudicial killings also constitute

brazen assaults on the rule of law. It is the constitutional duty of our

judiciary to protect the rule of law and we will link with all efforts to

prevent its erosion,” declared Chief Justice Puno.

SPECIAL COURTS FOR EXTRAJUDICIAL KILLINGS

NATIONAL CAPITAL JUDICIAL REGION

Manila RTC Branches 26, 39, 50;

Quezon City RTC Branches 95, 97, & 219;

Makati City RTC Branches 133, 148, & 150;

Pasay City RTC Branches 114 & 118;

Kalookan City RTC Branches 129 & 131;

Pasig City RTC Branches 157 & 265;

Taguig RTC Branch 271;

San Juan RTC Branch 160;

Malabon RTC Branch 73;

Marikina RTC Branch 263;

Mandaluyong RTC Branch 212;

Parañaque RTC Branch 260;

Las Piñas RTC Branch 255;

Muntinlupa RTC Branch 204


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SC Affirms Reinstatement of Employee Dismissed on Account of

Pregnancy By Arcie M. Sercado

IT IS ILLEGAL to terminate an employee on account of her pregnancy.

The Supreme Court found that Del Monte Philippines, Inc. illegally

terminated the employment of its field laborer Lolita Velasco after she

had been absent from work due to a urinary tract infection contracted

during pregnancy. It ruled that absences due to a justified cause cannot

be a ground for dismissal, even if the dates of her absences do not

correspond to those in her medical certificates because pregnancy is a

long-term condition accompanied by an assortment of related illnesses.

The Court found that Velasco was able to justify her absences in

accordance with company rules and policy. Prior to her absences, Velasco

consulted the company’s doctor, who advised her to have rest-in-

quarters for several days. Likewise, she attempted to file leaves of

absence, which Del Monte’s supervisor unjustifiably refused to receive.

The Court also ruled that Del Monte had no legal basis to

terminate Velasco on the ground that the latter had an alleged “long

history” of unauthorized absences committed several years beforehand

and that these absences should also be considered. The Court held that

Velasco’s last string of absences is justifiable and had been subsequently

explained. These cannot be considered together with her previous

infractions as gross and habitual neglect.

Article 137 of the Labor code states that “it is unlawful for any

employer to discharge a woman on account of her pregnancy, while on

leave or in confinement due to her pregnancy.” (GR No. 153477, Del Monte

Philippines, Inc. v. Lolita Velasco, March 6, 2007)

Negligent, Irresponsible Lawyer Suspended By Arcie M. Sercado

A LAWYER WAS RECENTLY SUSPENDED for six months from the practice

of law by the Supreme Court for lacking legal ethics and for falling short

of the diligence required of a lawyer entrusted with a case. He was also

directed to return with interest the attorney’s fee paid to him.

Atty. Manuel G. San Jose, from Libmanan, Camarines Sur, was

suspended for violating Canon 18 of the Code of Professional

Responsibility which stresses that “when a lawyer takes a client’s cause,

he covenants that he will exercise due diligence in protecting the latter’s

rights.”

The Court found that Atty. San Jose failed to file a civil case

against a lessee of a client’s property who had defaulted in paying

monthly rentals, despite his receipt of attorney’s fees. He also refused to

return pertinent documents and failed to pay the salary of his client’s

daughter who was his employee after the client had withdrawn the case

from him. (AC No. 3569, Fidela vda. De Enriquez v. Atty. Manuel G. San Jose, February

23, 2007)

Lawyer Suspended for Failure to Turn Over Client’s Money By Gleo Sp. Guerra

THE COURT RECENTLY SUSPENDED Atty. Ponciano G. Hernandez from the

practice of law for six months for violation of the attorney’s oath and of

serious professional misconduct. It also warned him that repetition of the

same or similar offense will be dealt with more severely.

The Court found that Atty. Hernandez refused to deliver to a

client a check representing a court award in the amount of Php1,060,800.

It was only after he had been ordered by the lower court to hand over

the check that Atty. Hernandez partially delivered the amount of


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Php502,838.79 to his client, while retaining Php557,961.21 as payment

for his attorney’s fees.

The Court held that a lawyer is not entitled to unilaterally

appropriate client’s money by the mere fact alone that the client owes

the said lawyer attorney’s fees. It said that Atty. Hernandez should have

provided his client with an accounting before deducting his attorney’s

fees and turned over the remaining balance to his client.

Pursuant to its power to supervise a contingent fee arrangement

as to its reasonableness, the Court held that a fee of 35% of the amount

awarded to his client is fair compensation for Atty. Hernandez’s services.

It thus ordered him to return Php290,109.21 to the latter with legal

interest from the date of finality of the Court’s judgment until full

payment. (GR No. 169079, Francisco Rayos v. Atty. Ponciano G. Hernandez, February

12, 2007)

Court Upholds Retainer Contract

By Gleo Sp. Guerra

THE COURT UPHELD the validity of a retainer contact between Aurora B.

Camacho and Atty. Angelino Banzon whereby the former undertook to

convey 5,000 sq. m of her property as payment for the latter’s legal

services. It, however, ruled that Atty. Banzon is no longer entitled to an

additional 1,000 sq.m., it appearing that the parties had agreed upon

specific sums of money as attorney’s fees for their other cases.

The Court held that “Lawyers are…as much entitled to judicial

protection against injustice on the part of their clients as the clients are

against abuses on the part of the counsel. The duty of the court is not

only to see that lawyers act in a proper and lawful manner, but also to

see to it that lawyers are paid their just and lawful fees. If lawyers are

entitled to fees even if there is no written contract, with more reason

that they are entitled thereto if their relationship is governed by a

written contract of attorney’s fees.” (GR No. 127520, Aurora Fe B. Camacho v.

Court of Appeals and Angelino Banzon, February 9, 2007)

SC Adopts Add’l Rules re TROs on Foreclosures of Real Estate Mortgages By Jay B. Rempillo

THE SUPREME COURT has issued additional guidelines on the issuance of

temporary restraining orders (TROs) or writs of preliminary injunctions

enjoining foreclosures of real estate mortgages, effective March 10,

2007.

The following guidelines are contained in the Court’s three-page

resolution adopting the following additional rules on Extrajudicial or

Judicial Foreclosure of Real Estate Mortgages as recommended by the SC

Committee on Revision of the Rules of Court:

1. No TRO or writ of preliminary injunction against the

extrajudicial foreclosure of real estate mortgage shall be issued on the

allegation that the loan secured by the mortgage has been paid or is not

delinquent unless the application is verified and supported by evidence

of payment;

2. No TRO or writ of preliminary injunction against the

extrajudicial foreclosure of real estate mortgage shall be issued on the

allegation that the interest on the loan is unconscionable, unless the

debtor pays the mortgagee at least 12 percent per annum interest on the

principal obligation as stated in the application for foreclosure sale,

which shall be updated monthly while the case is pending;

3. Where a writ of preliminary injunction has been issued against

a foreclosure of mortgage, the disposition of the case shall be speedily

resolved. To this end, the court concerned shall submit to the SC, through

the Office of the Court Administrator, quarterly reports on the progress

of the cases involving Php10 million and above;

4. All requirements and restrictions prescribed for the issuance of

a TRO/writ of preliminary injunction, such as the posting of a bond, which


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shall be equal to the amount of the outstanding debt, and the time

limitation for its effectivity, shall apply

as well to a status quo order. (AM No. 99-10-05-O, Re: Procedure in Extrajudicial

Or Judicial Foreclosure of Real Estate Mortgages, February 20, 2007)

Court Orders Release of Salaries, Benefits Earned But Fines Sheriff For

Improperly Serving Suspension By Arcie M. Sercado

THE SUPREME COURT recently ordered the release of the salaries and

benefits of a sheriff suspended for neglect of duty, but fined him

Php5,000 for having served his period of suspension during a different

period than that directed by the Court.

Joel Francis C. Camino, Sheriff III of the Municipal Trial Court in

Cities in the Island Garden City of Samal, who was suspended by the

Court for two months for dereliction of duty, received a copy of the

resolution penalizing him on March 20, 2006. Although he should have

served the period of suspension from March 20 to April 20, 2006, he

continued reporting to work until he received the denial of his motion for

reconsideration, which prompted him to be absent from work from July

20 to September 20, 2006.

The Court found that Camino was entitled to his salaries and

benefits for the period of April 21 to July 19, 2006 as his supposed

suspension should have been lifted on April 21, 2006, entitling him to pay

for work rendered from that date. However, the Court said that Camino

should be fined for disobeying the directives of the Court and be

considered to have been on leave without pay during the period of his

unauthorized absences. (AM P-06-2115, Angeles Mangubat v. Joel Francis C.

Camino, Sheriff III, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Island Garden City of Samal, February

22, 2007)

SC Directs Removal of Pandacan Oil Terminals By Jay B. Rempillo

THE SUPREME COURT recently ordered Manila City Mayor Jose L.

Atienza, Jr. to comply with his ministerial duty to immediately enforce

Ordinance No. 8027, which reclassifies portions of the Manila districts of

Pandacan and Sta. Ana from industrial to commercial, by removing the

Pandacan Oil Terminals.

The Court described Ordinance No. 8027 as a measure enacted

pursuant to the delegated police power of local government units “to

promote the order, safety, and health, morals, and general welfare of the

society.” Approved by the Manila City Council on November 28, 2001 and

taking effect on December 28, 2001, the ordinance reclassifies portions

of Pandacan and Sta. Ana from industrial to commercial and directs the

owners and operators of businesses disallowed under it to cease and

desist from operating their businesses in the area concerned within six

months from its effectivity. Among the businesses in the area are the so-

called Pandacan Terminals being operated by Caltex (Philippines), Inc.,

Petron Corporation, and Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation.

The Supreme Court said that “there is nothing that legally hinders

[Mayor Atienza] from enforcing Ordiinance No. 8027,” taking into

consideration a June 26, 2002 Memorandum of Understanding entered

into by the City of Manila, Department of Energy, and the oil companies

involved in which they agreed that “the scaling down of the Pandacan

Terminals [was] the most viable and practicable option.”

“Ordinance No. 8027 was enacted right after the Philippines,

along with the rest of the world, witnessed the horror of that September

11, 2001 attack on the Twin Towers of the World Trade Center in New

York City. The objective of the ordinance is to protect the residents of

Manila from the catastrophic devastation that will surely occur in case of

a terrorist attack on the Pandacan Terminals. No reason exists why such a


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protective measure should be delayed,” the Court said. (GR No. 156052,

Social Justice Society, et al. v. Atienza, Jr., March 7, 2007)

SC Dismisses Four CA Employees for “Case-Fixing” By Katrina M. Martinez

FOR THEIR INVOLVEMENT in a “case-fixing” incident, four Court of

Appeals (CA) employees were dismissed from service recently by the

Supreme Court.

Feliciano S. Calinga (Utility Worker I), Evelyn L. Caguitla (Court

Stenographer IV), Luis N. Gnilo (Utility Worker I), and Atty. Edwin Michael

P. Musico (Court Attorney IV) were found guilty of grave misconduct and

dismissed from service. The Court, however, dismissed the charges of

dishonesty and grave misconduct against Frankie N. Calabines (Utility

Worker I) for lack of sufficient evidence.

The Court adopted the report of Justice Martin Villarama stating

that “the evidence on record has satisfactorily established that

respondents Caguitla, Calinga, Atty. Musico, and Gnilo acted in

conspiracy and actively cooperated with one (1) another to defraud

complainant [Dolor] Catoc who was misled into believing that they can

‘facilitate’ the resolution or secure a favorable judgment in CV-73287,” a

case involving the registration of a property for which Catoc acted as the

broker. The Court agreed with Justice Villarama that respondents’

behavior “constitutes a serious violation of their sworn duties as

employees of this Court and which undermines the public’s faith and

trust in the administration of justice.” (A.M. No. 04-5-20-SC, In re: Affidavit of

Frankie N. Calabines, A Member of the Co-Terminous Staff of Justice Josefina Guevara-

Salonga, Relative to Some Anomalies Related to No. 73287 “Candy Maker Inc. v.

Republic of the Philippines,” March 14, 2007)

MERALCO Ordered to Pay Damages to Subscriber By Madeleine U.V.G. Avanzado

THE SUPREME COURT recently ordered the Manila Electric Company

(MERALCO) to desist from collecting an unjustified billing adjustment

from its subscriber Ma. Victoria Jose and to pay her moral and exemplary

damages.

MERALCO previously issued a differential billing adjustment after

alleging that defects caused Jose’s meter to register only 50% of her

actual electric consumption for a period of two years. Jose filed a petition

with the lower court seeking to permanently restrain the collection of the

adjustment, which amounted to Php232,385.20, and prevent MERALCO

from discontinuing electrical services.

The Supreme Court held that although MERALCO has the right to

collect on differential billings, it was unable to establish the factual basis

for arriving at the amount of the adjustment. The Court found that the

adjustment was merely based on MERALCO’s company policy, as testified

by its billing clerk, and its own records of Jose’s billings, which revealed

no dramatic increase nor decrease in electric consumption in the billing

cycles preceding, during, and succeeding the period concerned.

The Court also found that MERALCO was grossly negligent in

failing to conduct regular precautionary tests on its meters and, thus,

could not pass its liability for losses arising from defective meters onto

the consumer by issuing a differential billing and threatening

disconnection for non-payment.

MERALCO was thus ordered to pay Jose Php100,000 in moral

damages and Php50,000 in exemplary damages for “its callousness

toward its customers and its inattention to its duty of keeping its facilities

and equipment well maintained.” (GR No. 152769, Manila Electric Company v.

Ma. Victoria Jose, February 14, 2007)


www.libertas.ph 13

April 2007

Court Cleanses Judiciary By Anna Katrina M. Martinez

THE JUDICIARY MUST BE PURGED of corruption and incompetence so as

not to run the risk of losing public confidence.

Furthering its efforts to discipline its ranks, the Supreme Court

imposed sanctions on 10 erring members of the Judiciary in separate

administrative cases. Ordered dismissed from service, with forfeiture of

benefits and perpetual disqualification from office, were a Municipal Trial

Court (MTC) judge and a Regional Trial Court (RTC) process server, while

two sheriffs were suspended without pay. Three more judges and three

clerks of court were ordered to pay fines, with stern warnings that a

repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more

severely.“We cannot overly emphasize our previous pronouncements

that, circumscribed as it is with a heavy burden of responsibility, the

official and nonofficial conduct required of court personnel – from the

presiding judge to the rank and file – must always be beyond reproach,”

stressed the Court in a per curiam resolution involving the dismissal from

service of Jaime C. Eugenio, Process Server of the RTC, Branch 123,

Caloocan City. Eugenio was found guilty of gross misconduct for having

solicited and received money from a complainant for the dismissal of a

criminal case.

The Court held that it is imperative upon its personnel “to

maintain the good name and standing of the court as a true temple of

justice, the administration of which is a sacred task. By the very nature of

their duties and responsibilities, all those involved in it – from the highest

officials to the lower court employees – must faithfully adhere to and

hold inviolate the principle solemnly enshrined in our Constitution: that a

public office is a public trust.”

Also dismissed from service was Judge Lorinda B. Toledo-Mupas

of the MTC of Dasmariñas, Cavite, after the High Court, in a per curiam

resolution, found her guilty of gross ignorance of the law for the fourth

time.

The Court held that Judge Mupas’ practice of issuing orders

dubbed as “Detention Pending Investigation of Cases” in criminal cases

instead of requiring the accused to execute a written waiver of rights

under Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code falls short of the measure of

responsibility expected from a judge. “It is gross ignorance of the law,

pure and simple,” said the Court.

The Court lamented that “When the gross inefficiency springs

from a failure to consider so basic and elemental a rule, a law, or a

principle in the discharge of his or her duties, a judge is either too

incompetent and undeserving of the exalted position and title he or she

holds, or the oversight or omission was deliberately done in bad faith and

in grave abuse of judicial authority.”

The Court also meted the penalty of suspension without pay to

Edmundo B. Barriga (Sheriff III of MTC, Branch 5, Cebu City), who was

suspended for one year without pay and fined Php 20,000 for grave

misconduct after he had insinuated to the complainants in a civil case

that a pay-off of Php 50,000 could defer the execution of a writ of

demolition, and after he had demolished the property subject of the

execution despite being informed of a court order enjoining said

demolition, and Samuel G. Basco (Sheriff IV, RTC, Branches 29 & 30,

Surigao City), who was suspended for six months for simple neglect of

duty after he had failed to implement a court order directing him to

proceed with the public sale of levied properties in a civil case.

The other court personnel who were disciplined by the High Court

are Atty. Romulo V. Paredes (former Clerk of Court, RTC, Branch 2 of

Bangued, Abra), who was fined Php 5,000 for simple neglect of duty after


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failing to properly supervise and manage the financial transactions in his

court; Atty. Raquel G. Kho (Clerk of Court IV, RTC of Oras, Eastern Samar),

who was fined Php 5,000 for unlawful conduct after his failure to make a

timely remittance of judiciary funds in his custody; Judge Benedicto G.

Cobarde (RTC, Branch 53 of Lapu-Lapu City, Cebu), who was fined Php

15,000, for undue delay in rendering a decision, and an additional

amount of Php 5,000, for his prolonged and repeated refusal to comply

with the directives of the Office of the Court Administrator; Judge Edison

F. Quintin (Executive Judge, MTC, Branch 56 of Malabon City), who was

fined Php 3,000 for gross inefficiency after his delayed action in an order

of inhibition of a fellow judge; Alexander C. Rimando (Clerk of Court IV,

Municipal Trial Court in Cities of Olongapo City), who was fined Php

10,000 for having sent letters to a party to a civil case which “created the

impression that relief can be obtained from the courts without filing a

case”; and Judge Iluminada M. Ines (MTC of Sinait, Ilocos Sur), who was

fined Php 20,000 for gross ignorance of the law, after she failed to

properly apply the rule on bail bond application in accordance with the

Rules of Court. (AM No. RTJ-06-2216, Rodriguez v. Eugenio, April 20, 2007; AM No.

03-1462-MTJ, Español v. Toledo-Mupas, April 19, 2007; AM No. P-05-2016, Salazar v.

Barriga, April 19, 2007; AM No. P-07-2310, Sulapas v. Basco, April 19, 2007; AM No. P-

06-2103, Office of the Court Administrator v. Paredes, April 17, 2007; AM No. P-06-

2177, Re: Report on the Financial Audit Conducted on the Books of Accounts of Atty.

Raquel G. Kho, Clerk of Court IV, RTC, Oras, Eastern Samar, April 13, 2007; AM No. RTJ-

07-2042, Paquing v. Cobarde, April 19, 2007; AM No. MTJ-07-1674, Kara-an v. Lindo,

April 19, 1977; AM No. P-04-1926, Spouses Inot v. Rimando, April 19, 2007; and AM No.

MTJ-07-1673, Savella v. Ines, April 19, 2007)

SC Upholds Suspension of BIR Official for Non-Disclosure of Wealth By Annie Rose A. Laborte

THE SUPREME COURT recently affirmed the preventive suspension of an

official of the Bureau of Internal Revenue for failure to disclose his

ownership of several properties as well as certain business interests of

his wife in his sworn Statement of Assets, Liabilities, and Net Worth

(SALN).

In affirming the petition of the Fact-Finding and Intelligence

Bureau of the Office of the Ombudsman to nullify and set aside the

decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals which sought to clear

Nestor Valeroso of criminal and administrative charges, the Court said

Valeroso’s non-disclosure in his SALN from 1995 to 2002 “essentially

embraced or comprehended concealment of unexplained wealth”; a

violation of RA No. 3019 otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt

Practices Act.

The Court explained that Section 8 of RA No. 3019 speaks of

“unlawful acquisition of wealth, the evil sought to be suppressed and

avoided, and Section 7, which mandates full disclosure of wealth in the

SALN, is a means of preventing said evil and is aimed particularly at

curtailing and minimizing the opportunities for official corruption and

maintaining a standard of honesty in the public service. ‘Unexplained’

matter normally results from ‘non-disclosure’ or concealment of vital

facts.”

The Court added that the CA, instead of saying that Valeroso was

denied due process, should have considered his “unexplained increase in

net worth,” a “superfluity that should bolster or strengthen the charge of

dishonesty rather than a reason to invalidate the preventive suspension

order.”

The SALN is the means to achieve the policy of accountability of

all public officers in the government, the Court stressed. (G.R. No. 167828,

The Ombudsman, Fact-Finding and Intelligence Bureau, Office of the Ombudsman, and

Preliminary Investigation and Administrative Adjudication Bureau, Office of the

Ombudsman v. Nestor S. Valeroso, April 2, 2007)


www.libertas.ph 15

Bail Can Be Granted to Potential Extraditee on Basis of Clear and

Convincing Evidence By Jay B. Rempillo

THE SUPREME COURT recently held that a potential extraditee may be

granted bail on the basis of clear and convincing evidence that the person

is not a flight risk and will abide with all the orders and processes of the

extradition court.

Citing the various international treaties giving recognition and

protection to human rights, the Court saw the need to reexamine its

ruling in Government of United States of America v. Judge Purganan that

limited the exercise of the right to bail to criminal proceedings.

It said that while our extradition law does not provide for the

grant of bail to an extraditee, there is no provision prohibiting him or her

from filing a motion for bail, a right under the Constitution.

“The time-honored principle of pacta sunt servanda demands that

the Philippines honor its obligations under the Extradition

Treaty….However, it does not necessarily mean that in keeping with its

treaty obligations, the Philippines should diminish a potential extraditee’s

rights to life, liberty, and due process. More so, where these rights are

guaranteed, not only by our Constitution, but also by international

conventions, to which the Philippines is a party. We should not,

therefore, deprive an extraditee of his right to apply for bail, provided

that a certain standard for the grant is satisfactorily met,” the Court said.

RP, being a signatory to the 1996 UN General Assembly which

adopted the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, is “under

obligation to make available to every person under detention such

remedies which safeguard their fundamental right to liberty,” the Court

held.

The case involved the petition of the Government of Hong Kong

Special Administrative Region to nullify two orders by a Manila Regional

Trial Court (RTC) allowing potential extradite, Juan Antonio Muñoz, to

post bail. The RP and Hong Kong signed in 1995 an extradition treaty,

which became effective in 1997. Later, Muñoz was charged before the

Hong Kong Court with three counts of the offense of “accepting an

advantage as agent,” in violation of sec. 9 (1) (a) of the Prevention of

Bribery Ordinance, Cap. 201 of Hong Kong. He also faces seven counts of

the offense of conspiracy to defraud, penalized by the common law of

Hong Kong.

The Supreme Court remanded the case to the Manila RTC, Branch

8 to determine whether Muñoz is entitled to bail on the basis of “clear

and convincing evidence.” If Muñoz is not entitled to such, the trial court

should order the cancellation of his bail bond and his immediate

detention; and thereafter, conduct the extradition proceedings with

dispatch. (GR No. 153675, Government of Hong Kong Special Administrative Region v.

Judge Olalia, Jr., April 19, 2007)

SC Acquits Illiterate Fisherman of Double Murder By Gleo Sp. Guerra

THE SUPREME COURT recently acquitted an unschooled fisherman, Jerry

Rapeza, on the ground of insufficiency of evidence leading to reasonable

doubt of two counts of murder, thereby reversing the latter’s conviction

by the Regional Trial Court of Palawan, Puerto Princesa City as affirmed

by the Court of Appeals.

The Court held inadmissible the thumbmarked extrajudicial

confession executed in Filipino of Rapeza, as it was not sufficiently

established that Rapeza, who is not well-versed in Filipino, was assisted

by an interpreter during the execution thereof. It further held that

Rapeza’s confession was not made with the assistance of competent and

independent counsel of his choice, as the only participation of the lawyer

concerned appears to be the notarization of the extrajudicial confession.

Thus, the Court ruled that the lack of legal assistance, along with the

circumstance that the confession contains facts and details appearing to


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have been supplied by the police investigators themselves, belies the

voluntariness of the confession. It also noted that the confession does

not dovetail with the autopsy report. Finally, the Court said that no

motive for the crimes can be ascribed to Rapeza.

“In conclusion, the overriding consideration in criminal cases is

not whether appellant is completely innocent, but rather whether the

quantum of evidence necessary to prove his guilt was sufficiently met.

With the exclusion of appellant’s alleged confession, we are left with no

other recourse but to acquit him of the offenses charged for the

constitutional right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty can be

overcome only by proof beyond reasonable doubt,” the Court concluded.

(GR No. 169431, People v. Rapeza, April 4, 2007)

SC Settles LP Leadership Controversy By Madeleine U.V.G. Avanzado

THE SUPREME COURT recently upheld Senator Franklin M. Drilon’s

leadership, over that of Mayor Jose “Lito” L. Atienza, Jr.’s, in the Liberal

Party (LP) claim, at the same time confirming the jurisdiction of the

COMELEC over the LP’s leadership issue and exercising its power of

judicial review over the contested COMELEC resolutions.

The Court upheld the COMELEC ruling voiding the elections held

by Atienza, but found that the Daza-Drilon amendments to the LP

Constitution, which effectively gave Drilon a fresh term as party

president, were validly ratified. Thus, it overturned the COMELEC’s

finding that Drilon’s position was merely hold-over in nature until it

conducted elections for a new president. Consequently, the Court held

that the issue as to whether the COMELEC has jurisdiction to order the LP

to hold the election of its officers has become academic.

The rift in LP’s leadership began when Drilon’s camp withdrew

their support from President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo in July 2005,

causing Atienza’s camp to hold the invalidated elections for new party

leadership.

Justices Antonio T. Carpio, Dante O. Tinga, and Cancio C. Garcia

wrote separate opinions. Justice Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura took no

part as he had previously participated in the subject LP Elections prior to

being appointed to the Judiciary. (Res., GR Nos. 174992 & 175546, The Liberal

Party v. COMELEC & Atienza v. COMELEC, April 17, 2007)

SC Clarifies Evidentiary Value of Duplicate Originals By Madeleine U.V.G. Avanzado

ALL NOTARIZED COPIES of deeds of conveyance are duplicate originals,

which for all legal intents and purposes may be considered as the best

evidence of the transaction they embody.

The Supreme Court recently clarified the evidentiary value of such

duplicate originals when it corrected both the appellate and trial courts

for treating two copies of the same Absolute Deed of Sale as different

documents for the purpose of determining the genuineness of the

signatures therein. It held that the two copies presented in evidence

were duplicate originals as they were executed at or about the same time

and contained identical contents.

“Original does not mean the first paper written, in contrast to a

copy or transcript made later. The original depends upon the issue to be

proved. It is immaterial whether that document was written before or

after another, was copied from another, or was itself used to copy from,

as long as its contents are the subject of inquiry. Hence, one or some of

these copies are still considered as originals, and they have equal claims

to authenticity… As a matter of practice, deeds of conveyance are

prepared in several copies for notarization and record purposes. After

notarization, the notary public retains copies pursuant to the Rules on

Notarial Practice, one for his record and the other for transmittal to the


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court, through Clerk of Court concerned, where he secured his notarial

commission… All the notarized copies are originals,” the Court said.

The case involved a contested Deed of Absolute Sale, wherein an

expert witness was presented to testify on the genuineness of the

signatures contained therein. Differing factual findings of the appellate

and trial courts led the High Court to delve into the facts of the case.

Finding the testimony presented to be inconsistent and unconvincing, it

upheld the validity of the contested sale as there was no clear, positive,

and convincing evidence of forgery that would impugn the due execution

of the contested deed, which remains the best evidence of the

transaction. (GR No. 162864, Spouses Alfaro v. Court of Appeals, March 28, 2007)

SC OKs Graft Charge Against PIATCO Chairman and President By Gleo Sp. Guerra

THE SUPREME COURT recently upheld the information for violation of

Section 3(g) of RA 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt

Practices Act, against Henry T. Go, Chairman and President of Philippine

International Air Terminals Co., Inc. (PIATCO).

Along with former Secretary of Transportation and

Communication Vicente C. Rivera, Go had been charged by the

Ombudsman in the Sandiganbayan regarding the Amended and Restated

Concession Agreement (ARCA) for the construction of the Ninoy Aquino

International Passenger Terminal III (NAIA-IPT III), alleged to be

“manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the government of the

Republic of the Philippines.”

The charge was a result of the May 5, 2003 ruling of the Court

declaring, among others, the ARCA null and void for being contrary to

public policy and that Paircargo, PIATCO’s predecessor-in-interest, lacked

the requisite financial capacity to bid for the NAIA-IPT III project.

In a 20-page decision penned by Justice Romeo J. Callejo, Sr., the

SC Third Division held that “private persons, like petitioner Go, when

conspiring with public officers, may be indicted and, if found guilty, held

liable for violation of Section 3 (g) of RA 3019.”

Citing as precedents the cases of Luciano v. Estrella, Singian, Jr. v.

Sandiganbayan, and Domingo v. Sandiganbayan, the Court held that its

ruling “is in consonance with the avowed policy of the anti-graft law to

repress certain acts of public officers and private persons alike

constituting graft or corrupt practices or which may lead thereto.” (GR No.

172602, Go v. Sandiganbayan, April 13, 2007)

May 2007

SC Continues Purging the Judiciary By Katrina M. Martinez

“ANY CONDUCT that would be a bane to the public trust and confidence

reposed in the Judiciary cannot be countenanced.”

Thus said the Supreme Court as it intensified its efforts in

cleansing the Judiciary by disciplining eight court officials and employees,

including a judge. Dismissed from service with forfeiture of all benefits

and privileges and with prejudice to re-employment in any government

agency were a Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) Branch Clerk of Court,

an MCTC Junior Process Server, and a Regional Trial Court (RTC) Clerk III.

The High Court also suspended an interpreter for two months, ordered a

judge to pay a fine, forfeited all the retirement benefits of a retired RTC

clerk, and dropped from the rolls two other court employees.

“No position demands greater moral righteousness and

uprightness from its occupant than a judicial office,” the High Court

emphasized in a per curiam resolution concerning the dismissal from

service of Justafina Hope T. Laya, Clerk III of the Office of the Clerk of

Court RTC, Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya, and the forfeiture of the


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retirement benefits of Benilda M. Maddela, former Clerk IV of the said

office. Both Laya and Maddela were found guilty of dishonesty and grave

misconduct for having appropriated for their personal use monies from

the Judiciary Development Fund, the Fiduciary Fund, the Clerk of Court

General Fund, and the Sheriff’s General Fund of the RTC of Bayombong

totalling Php4,009,351.09. Maddela and Laya were also ordered to jointly

and severally restitute the funds within 30 days from notice.

The Court stressed that “the nature and responsibilities of public

officers enshrined in the Constitution and oft-repeated in our case law

are not mere rhetoric to be taken as idealistic sentiments” as the same

are standards and objectives that should correspond with actual deeds.

Also dismissed from service were Jerry V. Adolfo, Junior Process

Server of the MCTC of Magarao-Canaman, Camarines Sur, and Darryl C.

Montealto, Branch Clerk of Court of the MCTC of Sapang Dalaga-

Concepcion, Misamis Occidental. Adolfo was found guilty of gross

inefficiency, habitual absenteeism, and failure to serve court processes,

while Montealto was found guilty of misconduct for his failure to turn

over to the police a pistol which formed part of the prosecution’s

evidence in a criminal case, having instead kept the said pistol in his

personal custody for more than three years from the termination of the

said case.

The Court also meted the penalty of two-month suspension

without pay to Jose Rene C. Vasquez, Interpreter III of RTC, Branch 42,

Bacolod City, for conduct unbecoming of a court employee, i.e.,

intentionally bumping a woman, hitting her left breast, and kicking the

said woman when she fought back.

Another court personnel disciplined by the Court was Judge

Evelyn L. Dimaculangan-Querijero, Presiding Judge of RTC, Branch 26,

Cabanatuan City, who was fined Php21,000 for gross ignorance of the

law. Among others, she dismissed a criminal complaint against two

accused in a rape case after the latter had paid their individual civil

liability, in violation of the well-established principle that payment of civil

liability does not extinguish criminal liability.

The High Court also dropped from the rolls Lolita B. Batadlan,

Court Stenographer III of RTC, Branch 26 of Surallah, South Cotabato, and

Fernandita B. Borja, Clerk of Court of MCTC, Branch 15 of Bilar Bohol.

Batadlan incurred an “unsatisfactory” performance rating for three

consecutive periods from January 2004 to June 2005 while Borja was

found to have been continuously absent from work without approved

leave since August 2004.

Statistics from the Office of the Court Administrator, the Office of

Administrative Services, and the Court of Appeals show that from January

to April this year, a total of 45 judicial employees, have been

administratively disciplined by the High Court, with actions taken ranging

from admonition to dismissal from service. This includes an Associate

Justice of the Court of Appeals (CA), 14 judges, and 30 rank-and-file

employees of the 14 judges_seven belong to the second-level (RTC)

courts while the remaining seven are from the first-level (Metropolitan

Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Municipal Trial Court, MCTC)

courts.

Of the 30 rank-and-file personnel, two are from the Supreme

Court, seven are from the CA, and the remaining 21 are from the second-

and first-level courts. (AM No. 06-2-125-RTC, Re: Dropping from the Rolls of Ms.

Lolita B. Batadlan, April 13, 2007; AM No. 06-1-10-MCTC, Re: Absence Without Official

Leave (AWOL) of Ms. Fernandita B. Borja, April 13, 2007; AM No. P-04-1924, Office of

the Court Administrator v. Laya, April 27, 2007; AM No. P-06-2231, Clerk of Court

Rodrigo-Ebron v. Adolfo, April 27, 2007; AM No. 06-8-279-MCTC, Report on the Judicial

Audit Conducted at the MCTC-Sapang Dalaga-Concepcion, Misamis Occidental, April 27,

2007; AM No. P-07-2313, Nicopior v. Vasquez, April 27, 2007; and AM No. RTJ-02-1735,

Spouses Cabico v. Judge Dimaculangan-Querijero, April 27, 2007)


www.libertas.ph 19

CJ Puno to Special Court Judges: Protect the Right to Life By Jay B. Rempillo

CHIEF JUSTICE REYNATO S. PUNO has urged the Regional Trial Court (RTC)

judges who will handle cases involving killings of political activists and

media members to always uphold the right to life, the most fundamental

of all rights, as “special court” judges.

Speaking during the closing ceremonies of the two-day Seminar-

Workshop for Judges on Extrajudicial Killings and Enforced

Disappearances held at the Manila Pavilion Hotel, United Nations

Avenue, Manila last May 8, Chief Justice Puno stressed that political,

economic, and all other rights merely add quality to life and depend on

the pre-existence of life itself for their operation.

“It is with our checkered history, with our generous contribution

to humanity’s continuing struggle to enthrone human rights in the hearts

of all as backdrop, that you must view your distinct call as special judges

to decide extrajudicial killings. You are special judges because you are to

protect the most special, the most important right of man – the right to

life,” the Chief Justice said.

The Supreme Court, through its education arm the Philippine

Judicial Academy (PHILJA) in partnership with the Commission on Human

Rights (CHR), conducted the extensive seminar-workshop for the first

batch of RTC judges who will handle extrajudicial killings. The first batch

came from the National Capital Judicial Region and the First and Second

Judicial Regions. Two other batches will undergo the same seminar

within the year.

The seminar is aimed at addressing the procedural concerns of

special court judges in identifying and deciding cases on extrajudicial

killings.

The lecturers in the seminar-workshop are experts in the fields of

International Law, Human Rights Law, and Humanitarian Law. They

include Justice Adolfo S. Azcuna, CHR Chairperson Purificacion V.

Quisumbing, University of the Philippines Office of Legal Aid Director

Atty. Theodore O. Te, and PHILJA Professors Sedfrey M. Candelaria and

Herminio Harry L. Roque.

Ninety-nine RTCs nationwide have been designated as special

courts to handle cases of extrajudicial killings.

Intel Entitled to Tax Refund, Leniency in VAT Implementation

Imperative By Madeleine U.V.G. Avanzado

THERE IS NO LAW, internal revenue rule, or regulation requiring a Value

Added Tax (VAT)-registered entity engaged in export sales to obtain

authority from the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) to print its sales

invoices or requiring such authority to be reflected or indicated therein.

Thus the Supreme Court held when it ordered the Court of Tax

Appeals (CTA) to determine and compute the tax credit or refund due to

Intel Technology Philippines (Intel) for its unutilized VAT input taxes on

domestic purchases of goods and services attributable to its zero-rated

sales.

Although finding Intel to be legally entitled to its claim for refund

or issuance of a tax credit certificate, the tax and appellate courts

previously denied its claim on the ground that it purportedly failed to

comply with invoicing requirements under Sections 113 and 237 of the

National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC) since the Intel’s invoices do not

bear the BIR authority to print, and in some cases failed to indicate Intel’s

VAT-Registered Entity Tax Identification Number (TIN-V). This prompted

the High Court to declare that “law and revenue regulations do not

provide that failure to reflect or indicate in the invoices or receipts the

BIR authority to print, as well as the TIN-V, would result in the outright

invalidation of these invoices or receipts. Neither is it provided therein

that such omission or failure would result in the outright denial of a claim

for tax credit/refund.”


www.libertas.ph 20

“It bears reiterating that while the pertinent provisions of the Tax

Code and the rules and regulations implementing them require entities

engaged in business to secure a BIR authority to print invoices or receipts

and to issue duly registered invoices or receipts, it is not specifically

required that the BIR authority to print be reflected or indicated therein.

Indeed, what is important with respect to the BIR authority to print is

that it has been secured or obtained by the taxpayer, and that invoices or

receipts are duly registered… What applies to petitioner, as a PEZA-

registered export enterprise, is the Court’s pronouncement that leniency

in the implementation of the VAT is an imperative, precisely to spur

economic growth in the country and attain global competitiveness as

envisioned in our laws. The incentives offered to PEZA enterprises,

among which are tax exemptions and tax credits, ultimately redound to

the benefit of the national economy, enticing as they do more

enterprises to invest and do business within the zones, thus creating

more employment opportunities and infusing more dynamism to the

vibrant interplay of market forces,” the Court said.

Setting aside the Court of Appeals decision affirming the CTA’s

denial of Intel’s claim for refund or issuance of a tax credit certificate in

the amount of Php11,770,181.70, the High Court found that Intel, as a

VAT-registered and Philippine Economic Zone Authority (PEZA)-registered

entity engaged in the export of advanced and large-scale integrated

circuits, is entitled to its claim representing the input taxes it has paid on

domestic purchases of goods and services for the period of April 1, 1998

to June 30, 1998, in accordance with the NIRC as amended by RA 9337.

(GR No. 166732, Intel Technology Philippines v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, April

27, 2007)

Less is More: Benchmark and CourtNews Merge By Jed M. Eva III

BEGINNING THIS MONTH, CourtNews will be

merged with Benchmark under the latter’s

new masthead.

CourtNews was introduced in

November 2003 as a special supplement to

Benchmark at the height of the attempt to

impeach then Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide,

Jr. It featured in-depth articles explaining

the Court’s side in the Judiciary

Development Fund controversy.

In January 2004, CourtNews was

made a regular monthly publication to

complement Benchmark, which at that time

was released bi-monthly. The audiences of

the two publications were also redefined––

Benchmark would primarily cater to court employees, while CourtNews

would focus on the Court’s external publics.

In September 2005 in response to the fast clip of events and

activities of the valedictory year of then Chief Justice Davide, the

Benchmark began coming out monthly as a four-page spread. Since then,

the PIO has come out with two publications every month.

Staff members from both publications will now collaborate to

come out with one publication that will provide audiences, within and

outside the Court, with important and relevant information about the SC

and its programs and activities.


www.libertas.ph 21

Fixed Savings Deposit Subject to Documentary Stamp Tax By Madeleine U.V.G. Avanzado

A PASSBOOK representing an interest- earning deposit account issued by

a bank qualifies as a certificate of deposit drawing interest and is

therefore subject to Documentary Stamp Tax (DST) under the National

Internal Revenue Code (NIRC).

Affirming the Court of Tax Appeals, the Supreme Court has upheld

a deficiency assessment of Php71,005,757.77 against the International

Exchange Bank (IEB), representing deficiency DST on its Fixed Savings

Deposits (FSD) for the years 1996 and 1997. The Court found that sec.

179 (180) of the NIRC, as amended by RA 9243, specifically includes

“certificates or other evidences of deposits that are either drawing

interest significantly higher than the regular savings deposit taking into

consideration the size of the deposit and the risks involved or drawing

interest and having a specific maturity date” as one type of debt

instruments subject to DST, to which the FSD belongs.

The Court said that “not all certificates of deposit are negotiable.

A certificate of deposit may or may not be negotiable as gathered from

the use of the conjunction or, instead of and, in its definition. A

certificate of deposit may be payable to the depositor, to the order of the

depositor, or to some other person or his order… In any event, the

negotiable character of any and all documents under Section 180 is

immaterial for purposes of imposing DST.”

“To claim that time deposits evidenced by passbooks should not

be subject to DST is a clear evasion of the rule on equality and uniformity

in taxation that requires the imposition of DST on documents evidencing

transactions of the same kind, in this particular case, on all certificates of

deposits drawing interest,” the Court said. (GR No. 171266, International

Exchange Bank v. CIR, April 4, 2007)

SC Orders Comelec to Disclose Party-List Nominees’ Names By Jay B. Rempillo

UPHOLDING THE PEOPLE’S RIGHT TO INFORMATION on matters of public

concern, the Supreme Court has compelled the Commission on Elections

(Comelec) to disclose the names of the nominees of the accredited party-

list groups or organizations participating in the May 14 party-list

elections.

The Comelec, which initially refused to reveal said information,

had complied with the Court’s directive and released the names of the

nominees of the party-list groups before the May 14 polls.

In a unanimous decision penned by Justice Cancio C. Garcia, the

Court En Banc said that the Comelec “commited grave abuse of

discretion when it refused the legitimate demands of the petitioners for a

list of the nominees of the party-list groups subject of their respective

positions.” It said that the Comelec “has a constitutional duty to disclose

and release the names of the nominees of the party-list groups.”

The Court cited section 7, Article III of the Constitution (the right

of people to information on matters of public concern) and section 28,

Article II of the Constitution (the State adopts and implements a policy of

full public disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest) as its

basis in ordering the poll body to divulge the said names.

The Court noted that no national security or like concerns is involved in

the disclosure of the names of the nominees of the party-list groups in

question. It said that the prohibition imposed on the Comelec not to

disclose the names under section 7 of RA 7941 (Party-list System Act) is

limited in scope and duration as it extends only to the certified list which

the same provision requires to be posted in the polling places on election

day. It further said that to stretch the coverage of the prohibition to the

absolute is to read into the law something that is not intended. (GR No.

177271, BA-RA 7941 v. Comelec; GR No. 177314, Rosales v. Comelec, May 4, 2007)


www.libertas.ph 22

Award of Damages vs. Electric Cooperative Upheld By Gleo Sp. Guerra

THE SUPREME COURT has affirmed both the Court of Appeals and the

Regional Trial Court in holding an electric cooperative liable for damages

for disconnecting an electric meter of one of its subscribers for alleged

tampering without notice to the latter.

In a decision penned by Justice Ma. Alicia Austria-Martinez for the

Court’s Third Division, Samar Electric Cooperative, Inc. (SAMELCO) was

ordered to pay jointly and severally with its inspector Baltazar Dacula a

total of Php37,000.00 in damages to Estrella Quijano and to immediately

reconnect the latter’s electric meter upon her request.

The Court held electricity to be “a basic necessity, the generation

and distribution of which is imbued with public interest, and its provider

is a public utility subject to strict regulation by the State in the exercise of

police power. Failure to comply with these regulations will give rise to the

presumption of bad faith or abuse of right.” In this case, the Court noted

that under the law in force at the time of disconnection, PD 401,

SAMELCO should only resort to disconnection after notice of differential

billing to Quijano and affording her opportunity to settle the same, which

it had failed to do. It also failed to give her notice when it disconnected

her electric meter.

“The purpose of the notice requirement is to afford electric

consumers opportunity to witness the inspection and protect themselves

from contrived discovery of tampering. They must also be allowed to

dispute any accusation of electricity pilferage. This purpose is not served

by allowing inspection teams to swoop down on unsuspecting

consumers,” the Court ruled. (GR No. 144474, Samar II Electric Cooperative, Inc. v.

Quijano, April 27, 2007)

SC Unseats Mabalacat, Pampanga Mayor By Jay B. Rempillo

THE SUPREME COURT has unseated Mabalacat Mayor Marino “Boking”

Morales whom it found ineligible to have run in the 2004 elections as

being a fourth-term candidate and ordered the vice-mayor of Mabalacat,

Pampanga to immediately head its local government until June 30, 2007.

The Court granted the petitions of lawyers Venancio Q. Rivera and

Normandick De Guzman to cancel Morales’ Certificate of Candidacy

(COC) dated December 30, 2003.

The Court also dismissed the petition of mayoral candidate Anthony Dee

for being moot since Morales was disqualified from continuing to serve

as Mabalacat mayor.

The Court found that Morales had served as mayor for three

consecutive terms immediately preceding the 2004 elections. Citing Ong

v. Alegre, the Court said that the three-term limit rule as provided for in

RA 7160 or the Local Government Code applies to Morales, making him

ineligible to run for a fourth consecutive term.

Having found Morales ineligible, the Court said the former’s COC

for the 2004 elections should also be cancelled per sections 6 and 7 of RA

6646 (The Electoral Reforms Law of 1987). Morales ran as candidate for

mayor of Mabalacat, Pampanga for the term commencing July 1, 2004 to

June 30, 2007. (GR No. 167591, Rivera v. Comelec; GR No. 170577, Dee v. Comelec,

May 9, 2007)

Same Benefits for INP, PNP Retirees By Arcie M. Sercado

INTEGRATED NATIONAL POLICE (INP) retirees should have the same

retirement benefits as those of Philippine National Police retirees (PNP).

Thus the Supreme Court held when it affirmed the Court of

Appeals, which declared that the INP retirees are entitled to the same


www.libertas.ph 23

retirement benefits accorded upon retirees of the PNP under RA 6975,

An Act Establishing the Philippine National Police under a Reorganized

Department of the Interior and Local Government, as amended by RA

8551, The Philippine National Police Reform and Reorganization Act of

1998.

The Court ordered the Department of Budget and Management

and concerned government agencies to implement the proper

adjustments on the INP retirees’ retirement benefits. It found that the

INP was never abolished by RA 6975 but was, instead absorbed,

transferred, and/or merged, along with the other offices comprising the

Philippine Constabulary (PC)-INP, with the PNP. As the INP was merely

transformed into the PNP, its retirees cannot be excluded from the

retirement benefits accorded to PNP retirees.

The Court likewise found that RA 6975 provides for its retroactive

application to those who had retired prior to its effectivity.

Prior to the Court’s decision in this case, INP retirees and PNP

retirees of the same rank had a disparity in their monthly pensions of as

high as Php10,628.

The PNP was created through RA 6975 on December 13, 1990, to

establish a police force that is national in scope and purely civilian in

character, and to erase the stigma spawned by the militarization of the

police force under the PC-INP structure. (GR No. 169466, Department of Budget

and Management v. Manila’s Finest Retirees Association, Inc., May 9, 2007)

P.I. Matters Held to be Privileged Communication By Arcie M. Sercado

MATERIALS PRESENTED during preliminary investigation cannot be used

as a basis for libel.

Thus the Supreme Court held when it upheld the lower court’s

order granting the withdrawal of the information for libel against an

estafa complainant on the ground that the newsletter, upon which the

complaint was based, was considered privileged communication.

Complainant Vicente C. Ponce previously filed an estafa case

against Nicasio I. Alcantara. Ponce submitted a newsletter to the

investigating prosecutor as an annex to his complaint-affidavit, discussing

how Alcantara defrauded him of his shares in the Iligan Cement

Corporation. This in turn prompted Alcantara to file a libel complaint

against Ponce.

The Court found that the newsletter was presented during the

preliminary investigation of the estafa case, thus making it a form of

privileged communication which consequently exempts it from libel.

Referring to the United States case of Borg v. Boas, the Court stressed

that “preliminary steps leading to judicial action of an official nature have

been given absolute privilege.”

The Court explained that the controversial statements in the

newsletter were made in the context of a criminal complaint against

petitioner and were disclosed only to the official investigating the

complaint and thus, were relevant to the investigation.

Privileged communication is communication which takes place within the

context of a protected relationship, such as that between an attorney

and a client or in this case, between a complainant and a prosecutor and

cannot be used as basis for a libel case. (GR No. 156183, Alcantara v. Ponce,

February 28, 2007)

SC Disciplines 3 Lawyers By Maribeth C. Cruz

Fulfilling its duty to preserve the integrity of the Philippine Bar, the

Supreme Court recently suspended two lawyers and reprimanded

another for separate offenses.

The Court ordered Atty. Pablo C. Cruz’s one-year suspension from

the practice of law for violating Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional


www.libertas.ph 24

Responsibility when he entered into a second marriage while his first

marriage was still subsisting. Rule 1.01 states that “A lawyer shall not

engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral and deceitful conduct.”

Cruz was also found to have violated Canon 5 of the same Code,

which requires all lawyers to “keep abreast of legal developments.” He

had claimed ignorance of the fact that the Family Code was already in

effect when he entered into his second marriage in 1989.

Atty. Edgardo S. Arias for his part was slapped with a one-month

suspension for violating the Code of Professional Responsibility when he

failed to inform his client, Luisito Balatbat, of the status of the latter’s

case, which had lost. The Court held that Arias’ actuations violated Rule

18.04, which mandates that a lawyer must keep the client informed of

the status of the case.

Likewise, Arias was found negligent for his failure to attend a

hearing of said case after he requested for its re-scheduling.

The Court also found that Arias did not properly withdraw as

counsel for his client. “The only way to be relieved as counsel is to have

either the written conformity of his client or an order from the court

relieving him of his duties as counsel, in accordance with Rule 138,

Section 26 of the Rules of Court,” the Court said.

Atty. Jacinto D. Jimenez for his part was reprimanded for filing a

premature criminal complaint against another lawyer, Atty. George C.

Briones, in a move to compel the latter to deliver to his (Jimenez’s)

clients the residue of the estate of the late Luz J. Henson, which was

under Briones’ administration, as mandated by the testate Court.

The filing of the criminal complaint was in violation of Rule 19.01

of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which states that “A lawyer

shall employ only fair and honest means to attain the lawful objectives of

his client and shall not present, participate in presenting or threaten to

present unfounded criminal charges to obtain an improper advantage in

any case or proceeding.”

The Court said that the filing of the complaint was premature

since the Regional Trial Court had yet to determine and define the

residue it was referring to in its order. (AC No. 6854, Dulalia, Jr., v. Cruz, April 27,

2007; AC No. 1666, Balatbat v. Arias, April 13, 2007; AC No. 6691, Briones v. Jimenez,

April 27, 2007)

A Must-Read re AWOL, Habitually Absent, and Tardy Employees By Albert N. Lavandero

ENSHRINED IN SECTION 1, Article XI of the Constitution is the credo for

people working in government: “Public office is a public trust. Public

officers and employees must at all times be accountable to the people,

serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency,

act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives.”

Thus, Supreme Court (SC) employees who are absent without

official leave (AWOL), incur habitual absenteeism, habitual tardiness, or

unauthorized absences should know the consequences of their

infractions.

AWOL. Section 35, Rule XVI of the Omnibus Rules Implementing

Book V of Executive Order No. 292 (Leave of Absences) states that an

employee absent for at least 30 days without approved leave shall be

considered on AWOL and shall be dropped from the service after due

notice. However, the employee shall be informed, at the latter’s address

appearing on the 201 files or the latter’s last known written address, of

the employee’s separation from the service not later than five days from

its effectivity. However, when the exigencies of the service require the

employee’s immediate presence and the former fails/refuses to return to

the service, the head of office may drop the same from the service even

prior to the expiration of the 30-day period above stated.

An employee’s being AWOL will be reflected in the latter’s service

record. For unauthorized absences of less than 30 days, it has been the

procedure at the SC-Office of Administrative Services-Leave Division to


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inform the OAS-Complaints and Investigation Division of such

unauthorized absences by serving the employee at the latter’s last known

address on record a Return-to-Work Order signed by the Chief

Administrative Officer. “Failure on his part to report for work within the

period stated in the Order shall be a valid ground to drop him from the

rolls.” (2nd par. Sec. 63, amended by CSC MC Nos. 41, s. 1998 and 14, s.

1999.)

It must be noted that filing a letter of resignation by the

concerned employee does not automatically clear the latter, since the

resignation letter has to go through proper channels and must be with

the recommending approval of the employee’s immediate superior or

the Chief of Office. The resignation letter will then be forwarded to the

SC through the Clerk of Court for approval by the respective Chair of the

Court’s three divisions. While the employee concerned is awaiting action

on the letter of resignation by the SC, the employee must still report to

work in order that the government service may not be prejudiced,

otherwise the employee will be declared on AWOL.

In 2006, six SC employees were dropped from the rolls; one in

2005; and five in 2004.

Habitual Absenteeism. “An officer or an employee commits

habitual absenteeism if he incurs unauthorized absences exceeding the

allowable monthly leave credit of two and a half days under the leave law

for at least three months in a semester or at least three consecutive

months during the year.” [Sec. 22 (q), Rule XIV, Omnibus Rules

Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292 (Administrative Code of

1987) reiterated in Memorandum Circular No. 4, series of 1991; GALDO,

Ruben Q., CSC Resolution No. 97-1823, March 11, 1997]

In 2006, two employees were fined by the Court for habitual

absenteeism. In 2005, one employee was fined, while another was

suspended for six months. The year 2004 recorded no employee

penalized for the said offense.

Tardiness. When an employee fails to report on a time set as his

official time of arrival, he is considered tardy. “It is committed by an

employee if he incurs tardiness, regardless of the number of minutes, ten

(10) times a month for at least two (2) months in a semester or at least

two (2) consecutive months during the year.” [HOMECILLO, Carmelito v.,

CSC Resolution No. 97-0791, January 28, 1997, MC No. 4, s. 1991] To

make sure that your half days are not considered tardiness or undertime,

file the corresponding leave.

“Where the position an employee holds not only requires the

latter to report for duty at a prescribed time, but more significantly, the

exigency of public service so requires it, the employee’s tardiness in

office irreparably prejudices the government service, taking into account

the frequency and regularity of its commission. An employee’s

unauthorized tardiness constitutes either a grave offense or a light

offense, depending on its depravity and effects on the government

service as defined by the agency head.” [Rule IV, Section 52, Paragraph

(A)/(C), No. 4; Parungao, Edelwina DG., CSC Resolution No. 00-1397, June

13, 2000]

Frequent unauthorized tardiness or habitual tardiness is penalized

with a reprimand for the 1st offense; suspension of one to 30 days for

the 2nd offense; and dismissal from the service for the third offense.

Moreover, Rule 17, sec. 8 (Government Office Hours) of the

Omnibus Rule Implementing Book 5 of #) No. 292 and Other Pertinent

Civil Service Laws states that “Officers and employees who have incurred

tardiness and undertime regardless of the number of minutes per day,

exceeding 10 times a month for two consecutive in a semester shall be

subject to disciplinary action.” (*Amended by CSC Memo Circular No. 19,

Series of 1999)

In year 2006, 13 were reprimanded; 12, severely reprimanded;

four, suspended; 21, sternly warned; and two, fined. Year 2005 saw 14

reprimanded and two suspended employees. Twenty-eight Court


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employees were reprimanded, 12 were suspended, and one was fined in

2004.

Unauthorized Absences. Rule XVI of the Omnibus Rules

Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292 [LEAVE OF ABSENCES]

also states that “An official/employee who is absent without approved

leave shall not be entitled to receive his salary corresponding to the

period of his unauthorized leave of absence. It is understood, however

that his absence shall no longer be deducted from his accumulated leave

credits, if there are any.”

The Rule also provides that “When ever the application for leave

of absence, including terminal leave, is not acted upon by the head of

agency or his duly authorized representative within five (5) working days

after receipt hereof, the application for leave of absences shall be

deemed approved (Amended by CSC MC No. 41., s. 1998).”

In 2006, one employee was dismissed for this offense. In 2005,

one employee was suspended, and another (1) was fined. In 2004, one

case was filed, but was dismissed.

(Editor’s Note: Atty. Lavandero is Court Attorney IV at the SC-OAS-Complaints and

Investigation Division.)

June 2007

SC Disciplines More Judges, Court Personnel By Katrina M. Martinez

“THE NATURE AND RESPONSIBILITIES of men and women in the

Judiciary…are neither mere jargons nor idealistic sentiments, but working

standards and attainable goals that should be matched with actual

deeds.”

As its drive towards a corruption-free judiciary continues, the

Supreme Court recently subjected to disciplinary action five judges and

nine court personnel for various administrative offenses.

The Court suspended Judge Henry J. Trocino and Court

Stenographers Emezer Arellano and Evelyn Montoyo, all of the Bago City,

Negros Occidental Regional Trial Court, Branch 62, and Silvino R. Malana,

Jr., Sheriff IV of the Tuguegarao City RTC.

Judge Trocino was suspended for three months after he was

found guilty of undue delay in rendering decisions, aggravated by the fact

that he made untruthful statements in his Monthly Certificates of

Service.

An audit team from the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA)

found that Judge Trocino failed to decide 71 cases submitted for decision

in its first audit in July 2003, 33 of which remained undecided during a

second audit in July 2004. Nevertheless, Judge Trocino stated in each of

his Monthly Certificates of Service for the months of November 2004 to

February 2005 that he had decided “all special proceedings, applications,

petitions, motions, and all civil and criminal cases which had been under

his submission for decision or determination for a period of ninety (90)

days or more.”

Arellano and Montoyo were both suspended for one month

without salaries and benefits after the High Court found them guilty of

simple neglect of duty for their failure to transcribe their respective

stenographic notes in a total of 97 cases.

The Court also suspended Sheriff Malana for one month and one

day for simple neglect of duty after the latter failed to make a return of

the writ of execution in a civil case as required by the Rules of Court.

Also subject to administrative sanctions were Judge Edgardo L.

Catilo, former Acting Presiding Judge of the Bago City RTC, Branch 62,

who was fined Php20,000 for undue delay in rendering decisions after it

was found that he failed to decide 50 cases in the July 2003 OCA audit, 43

of which remained undecided during the second audit in July 2005; Judge


www.libertas.ph 27

Godofredo G. Hernandez, Sr. of the Pinamalayan, Oriental Mindoro,

Municipal Trial Court (MTC), who was fined Php20,000 for gross

ignorance of the law and procedure after he issued warrants of arrests

notwithstanding the lack of both a preliminary investigation and probable

cause, and for violating the right to due process of the accused in a

number of related criminal cases; Judge Deogracias K. Del Rosario of the

Patnongon, Antique Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC), who was fined

Php20,000 for undue delay in the disposition of a civil case falling under

the Rules on Summary Procedure after it was found that he had rendered

a decision in the said civil case after the lapse of three years, which was

clearly beyond the 30-day period prescribed by the Rules; Judge

Francisco C. Gedorio, Jr. of the Ormoc City RTC, Branch 12, who was

reprimanded and fined Php5,000 for conduct unbecoming of a judge

after he was found to have embarrassed persons and used insulting and

insensitive language (i.e., “punyeta,” “animal,” “bakla,” and “bullshit”) in

his court; Atty. Josephine Mutia-Haggad, Clerk of Court of the Bago City

RTC, Branch 62, who was fined Php5,000 for simple neglect of duty after

she failed to supervise and follow-up other court employees of their

obligations; Peter A. De Vera, Clerk of Court III, and Alexander C.

Rimando, Clerk of Court IV, both of the Olongapo City MTC in Cities,

Office of the Clerk of Court, who were fined Php1,000 each for simple

misconduct after the two engaged in a shouting match, “with one even

cursing the other,” inside the premises of the court; Rodolfo V. Payumo,

Sheriff IV of the Quezon City RTC, Branch 93, who was fined Php5,000 for

violation of the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials

and Employees after the Court found that he had uttered statements to a

complainant in an ejectment case “which insinuated that he could have

spared the complainants from being ejected if they had approached

him”; Charlie S. Gatbunton, Sheriff IV of the Balanga, Bataan RTC, Branch

4, who was fined Php10,000 for gross ignorance of the law after he was

found to have conducted the auction sale of a mortgaged property

without publishing a new Notice of Sheriff’s Sale with the new auction

date as required by law, and Eusebio A. Oaferina, Accountant I of the

Accounting Division, Fiscal Management and Budget Office of the

Supreme Court, who was dropped from the rolls for having been on

unauthorized absence since February 1, 2007.

The recent stream of imposition of administrative penalties and

disciplinary action on court personnel is part of the ongoing efforts of the

High Court to curb and punish corruption in the Judiciary.

Court Administrator Christopher O. Lock notes that “while we

have a very uncompromising Chief Justice, we also need the full

cooperation of other members of the Judiciary in eliminating the problem

of corruption.” (AM No. P-07-2290, Malsi v. Malana, Jr., May 25, 2007; AM No. RTJ-

05-1955, Re: Anonymous Complaint Dated February 18, 2005 of a “Court Personnel”

Against Judge Francisco C. Gedorio, Jr., RTC, Branch 12, Ormoc City, May 25, 2007; AM

No. P-06-2135, Paguyo v. Gatbunton, May 25, 2007; AM No. RTJ-05-1936, Office of the

Court Administrator v. Trocino, May 28, 2007; AM No. 2007-05-SC, Re: Dropping from

the Rolls of Mr. Eusebio A. Oaferina, June 5, 2007; AM No. MTJ-06-1628, Gutierrez v.

Hernandez, Sr., June 8, 2007; AM No. MTJ-07-1662, Balajedeong v. Del Rosario, June 8,

2007; AM No. P-03-1672, De Vera Jr. v. Rimando, June 8, 2007; AM No. P-05-2010,

Spouses Almacha v. Payumo, June 8, 2007)

SC Clarifies Conditions for Discharge of State Witness By Katrina M. Martinez

THE TESTIMONY OF A PROSPECTIVE state witness is not required to be

substantially corroborated by other prosecution witnesses who are not

among the accused in the same criminal case. Otherwise, the condition

that “there must be no other direct evidence available for the proper

prosecution of the offense committed, except the testimony of the state

witness” will be rendered nugatory.

Thus the Supreme Court First Division, through Chief Justice

Reynato S. Puno, clarified when it affirmed the decision of the Court of

Appeals discharging accused Feliciano Abutin and Domingo Tampelix

from the information in a murder case to become state witnesses.


www.libertas.ph 28

The Court held that the corroborative evidence required by rules

on the discharge of an accused to be a state witnesse does not have to

consist of the exact same evidence that will be testified on by the

anticipated state witnesses. “We have ruled that ‘a conspiracy is more

readily proved by the acts of a fellow criminal than by any other

method…Even if the confirmatory testimony only applies to some

particulars, we can properly infer that the witness has told the truth in

other respects.’ It is enough that the testimony of a co-conspirator is

corroborated by some other witness or evidence,” the Court said. (GR No.

143093, Salvanera v. People, May 21, 2007)

SC Orders PEA to Pay Php94 Million in Just Compensation By Gleo Sp. Guerra

THE SUPREME COURT recently ordered the Public Estates Authority (PEA)

to pay Php94,380,000.00 as just compensation for the property on which

the southern abutment of the Zapote bridge of the Manila-Cavite Coastal

Road had been constructed.

In a decision penned by Justice Angelina Sandoval-Gutierrez, the

Court’s First Division reversed the Court of Appeals (CA) and reinstated

the orders of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 202 of Las Piñas

when it held that PEA should pay the property’s owner Julieta P. Tan the

said property’s zonal valuation at Php20,000 per square meter when PEA

filed its petition for expropriation in 2003. The Court said that the CA

erred in ruling that the PEA’s taking of the property occurred in 1985 and

that just compensation should be based on the zonal valuation in that

year (Php2,000 per square meter). It noted that PEA’s entry into the

property in 1985 was not for the purpose of expropriating the property

but on condition that it should pay a monthly rental of Php10,000.00 and

that, up to the present, no agreement had been reached for the sale of

the property to PEA.

The Court also held that the CA erred in not dismissing PEA’s

petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus for being the wrong

remedy since the RTC’s orders fixing the just compensation and denying

PEA’s motion for reconsideration, respectively, are final in nature and

should instead be appealed. (GR No. 170740, Tan v. Republic, May 25, 2007)

Mercury Drug Liable for Selling Wrong Medication By Arcie M. Sercado

THE SUPREME COURT recently ordered Mercury Drug Corporation

(Mercury Drug) to pay Php50,000 and Php25,000 in moral and exemplary

damages, respectively, due to its employee’s error in selling the wrong

medicine to a customer. As a result, the customer fell asleep on the

wheel and had an accident.

In a decision penned by Justice Angelina Sandoval-Guttierez, the

Court’s First Division found that respondent Sebastian M. Baking would

not have fallen asleep and lost control of his car had the employee of

Mercury Drug issued the correct medication. Thus, the Court found

Mercury Drug liable for the resulting injuries as its employee’s negligence

implies that there has also been negligence on its part.

Baking, who was diagnosed with high blood sugar and triglyceride

in November 1993 was sold Dormicum, a potent sleeping tablet, instead

of the prescribed Diamicron, in an Alabang branch of the Mercury Drug

Corporation because the latter’s sales representative had misread his

prescription. Unaware that he was given the wrong medicine, Baking

took one pill of Dormicum for three consecutive days. On the third day,

he fell asleep on the wheel, causing his car to collide with another

vehicle. (GR No. 156037, Mercury Drug Corporation v. Baking, May 25, 2007)


www.libertas.ph 29

Administrative Proceedings: Not Arena for Squabbling Lawyers By Madeleine U.V.G. Avanzado

MUTUAL BICKERING and unjustified recriminations between attorneys

detract from the dignity of the legal profession and will not receive

sympathy from the Court.

Thus the Supreme Court Special Third Division held in a resolution

penned by Justice Cancio C. Garcia denying a motion for contempt and/or

disbarment against Attorney Justo Paras filed against him by his

estranged wife, Rosa Yap-Paras, for the former’s alleged violation of the

suspension order meted upon him by the Court.

“The Court takes this opportunity to remind the parties in the

instant case, as well as petitioner-movant’s counsels, to avoid further

squabbles and unnecessary filing of administrative cases against each

other. An examination reveals a pervasive atmosphere of animosity

between Atty. Paras and petitioner’s counsels as evidenced by the

number of administrative cases between them… Lawyers should treat

each other with courtesy, fairness, candor, and civility,” the Court said.

The Court found no sufficient bases to support Yap-Paras’

allegation and, instead, found that Atty. Paras himself took the initiative

to inform the lower courts of his one-year suspension from law practice

for committing a falsehood in violation of his lawyer’s oath. However,

the Court reprimanded Atty. Paras for his failure to observe the respect

due the Court in not promptly complying with its directive to comment

on Yap-Paras’ motion for contempt and/or disbarment. (AC No. 4947, Yap-

Paras v. Paras, June 7, 2007)

SC Orders Dismissal of Rebellion Charges against Beltran, et al. By Katrina M. Martinez

FOR WANT OF PROBABLE CAUSE and due process, the Supreme Court

has ordered the dismissal of the criminal cases for rebellion against six

party-list representatives and four private individuals implicated in an

alleged foiled plot to overthrow the Arroyo administration on February

24, 2006 on the occasion of the 20th anniversary of the EDSA Revolution.

In a decision penned by Justice Antonio T. Carpio, the Court’s

Second Division granted the consolidated petitions for the writs of

prohibition and certiorari to stop the prosecution for rebellion of

Representatives Liza L. Maza, Joel G. Virador, Saturnino C. Ocampo,

Teodoro A. Casiño, Rafael V. Mariano (known as the “Batasan 5”), Crispin

B. Beltran, and private individuals Vicente P. Ladlad, Nathanael S.

Santiago, Randall B. Echanis, and Rey Claro C. Casambre. The Court ruled

that the inquest proceeding against Beltran was void for failure of the

latter’s panel of inquest prosecutors to comply with the rules on

preliminary investigation in cases involving lawful warrantless arrests as

provided for by the Rules of Court and by DOJ Circular No. 61.

The High Court also alluded to “the obvious involvement of

political considerations in the actuations” of Secretary of Justice Raul M.

Gonzalez concerning the rebellion charges, stressing the partiality of the

prosecutors after the Secretary stated in an interview that “We [the DOJ]

will just declare probable cause, then it’s up to the [C]ourt to decide x x

x.” The Court said “this clearly shows pre-judgment, a determination to

file the Information even in the absence of probable cause.”

The Court found that in the case of Beltran, none of the arresting

officers saw him commit in their presence the crime of rebellion, nor did

the arresting officers have personal knowledge of the facts and

circumstances sufficient to form probable cause to believe that Beltran

had committed rebellion. It also ruled that there was no probable cause

to indict him for rebellion as none of the affidavits executed by members

and some civilians presented as evidence before the panel of prosecutors

that conducted the inquest stated that Beltran committed specific acts of

rebellion.

The High Court also held that the preliminary investigation

conducted against the petitioners was tainted with irregularities for the


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failure of the respondent prosecutors to comply with the rule which

provides that the complaint be accompanied by affidavits of the

complainant and his witnesses, subscribed and sworn to before any

prosecutor or government official authorized to administer oath, or, in

their absence or unavailability, before a notary public. (GR Nos. 172070-72,

Ladlad v. Velasco, June 1, 2007)

SC Upholds Textbook Supply Deal By Katrina M. Martinez

VOTING UNANIMOUSLY, the Supreme Court En Banc recently upheld the

validity of the award of the Department of Education (DepEd) to Vibal

Publishing House, Inc. (Vibal) and Watana Phanit Printing and Publishing

Co., Ltd. (Watana) of the World Bank-funded supply and delivery of some

17.5 million copies of social studies textbook “Makabayan” and teachers’

manual.

In a 16-page decision penned by Justice Cancio C. Garcia, the

Supreme Court nullified and set aside the order dated December 4, 2006

of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 18, which granted a petition

for injunction filed by losing bidder Kolonwel Trading (Kolonwel) to enjoin

the DepEd and the Department of Budget and Management Procurement

Service (DBM-PS) from awarding the project to Vibal and Watana.

The Court said that Kolonwel failed to meet the requirements

prescribed by Section 55 of RA 9184, or the Government Procurement

Reform Act, which provides that decisions of the DBM’s Inter-Agency Bids

and Awards Committee (IABAC) may be protested by submitting a

verified petition paper to the head of the procuring entity and paying a

non-refundable protest fee. It stressed that Kolonwel “sought judicial

intervention even before completing the protest process. Hence, its filing

of SP Civil Case No. 06-116010 was precipitate. Or, as the law itself

would put it, cases that are filed in violation of the protest process ‘shall

be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.’”

Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno and Justice Conchita Carpio-Morales were

on leave, while Justice Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura took no part as he

participated in the case when he was still Solicitor General. (GR No. 175608,

Department of Budget and Management Procurement Service and the Inter-Agency

Bids and Committee v. Kolonwel Trading, June 8, 2007)

SC Allows OWWA to Proceed with Reorganization By Madeleine U.V.G. Avanzado

THE SUPREME COURT recently gave the go-signal for the implementation

by the Overseas Workers Welfare Administration (OWWA) of a new

organizational structure to stabilize its internal organization and promote

careerism among its employees.

In a 23-page decision penned by Justice Minita V. Chico-Nazario, the

Court’s Third Division set aside the Writ of Preliminary Injunction issued

by Branch 117 of the Pasay City Regional Trial Court, which restrained

OWWA from implementing its new organizational structure as per its

Resolution No. 001, Series of 2004.

The Court found that injunctive writ improvidently issued as there

was no showing of a clear and unmistakeable legal right on the part of

the employees challenging Resolution No. 001 to warrant the writ’s

protection. “There was no showing that they are the employees who are

in grave danger of being displaced. [They] were similarly wanting in

proving that they… will allegedly suffer by reason of the reorganization,”

the Court said.

Likewise, the Court held that the trial court committed grave

abuse of discretion in granting the assailed writ as it interrupted the

status quo instead of maintaining it. “What was preserved by the RTC

was the state of affairs before the issuance of Resolution No. 001… and

the subsequent administrative orders pursuant to its passing,” the Court

noted. (GR No. 169802, OWWA v. Chavez, June 8, 2007)


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CJ Enjoins Officials and Employees to Strictly Observe Gambling

Prohibition in Court By Madeleine U.V.G. Avanzado

CHIEF JUSTICE Reynato S. Puno has enjoined all officials and employees

of the Judiciary to strictly observe the prohibition against any form of

gambling regardless of whether or not it involves monetary bets within

Court premises “to maintain the highest level of ethical conduct and

morals in the Judiciary.”

As per Memorandum Circular No. 09-2007 dated June 18, 2007,

appropriate administrative disciplinary actions will be taken against any

court official or employee caught gambling within court premises,

whether such gambling activities occur during working days, weekends,

or holidays; or during office hours or beyond.

In the Supreme Court, the Chief of Staff of the Office of the Chief

Justice and the respective Judicial Staff Heads of the Offices of the

Associate Justices, the Court Administrator, the Clerk of Court and

Division Clerks of Court, the various Chiefs of Offices, the Philippine

Judicial Academy Chancellor, and the Judicial Bar and Council Executive

Committee Chair have been instructed to ensure compliance amongst

their personnel, adopting appropriate measures to such effect.

Implementation in the Court of Appeals, Sandiganbayan, Court of Tax

Appeals, and the lower courts shall be seen to by their Presiding Justices

and the Court Administrator, respectively. (Memorandum Circular No. 09-

2007, Enjoining All Officials and Employees of the Judiciary to Strictly Observe the

Prohibition Against Gambling or Engaging in other Forms of Gambling within Court

Premises, June 18, 2007)

Documents

Benchmark Jan-June Digest