Beijing Foreign Policy in West Africa Finale

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BEIJING FOREIGN POLICY IN WEST AFRICA (Yang Jiechi Policy)

Foreign Policy Article: byKingsley

C. Onyenankeya

December 5, 2011 SUNY



Empire State College

Kingsley: Beijing Foreign policy in West Africa 1

Contents

Executive Summary

Concept and Assumptions

Methods of Argumentation

Theoretical and Policy Prescriptions

Conclusion

References




Executive Summary

China's increase involvement in West Africa over the past decade is one of the

most significant recent developments in the region. It appears to redirect the

idea of marginalization of West Africa and Africa as a continent, which brings

significant political consequences. Beijing's West Africa interest is part of a

recently more active strategy based on its booming economic growth, the need

to search for a new source of raw materials, and a new source to market its

manufactured goods. Beijing more recent policy practice in West Africa has

been the one of multi-polarity and non-intervention.

As a global demand for energy continues to rise, major economic powerful

nations like China, the United States, the European Union and Japan move to

secure long term energy supplies. Beijing as its economy booms, it is

committed in getting the resources needed for the maintenance of its rapid

economic growth, and is taking the search to close down sources of raw

materials and oil in West Africa and Africa as a continent. As part of an effort

to lock down sources of raw materials, Beijing has turned to West Africa, an

abundant place of raw materials and oil, whose risk and challenges has caused

it to be mostly abandoned and economically overlooked.

Increased aid, debt cancellation, and a recent explosion of trade transactions

with a strategic focus on oil, have proven mutually advantageous to Beijing

and West African states (Africapractice, Isaac idun-Arkhust and James Laing,

p.7). By offering aid without preconditions or strings attached, Beijing has



presented an alternative to Western conditional aid and gained influence and


diplomatic support to defend its international interest in the continent.

However, a general relationship differing from past African- Western patterns,

alongside support of authoritarian regimes and governments at the expense of

human rights, make the economic consequence of increased Beijing

involvement in West Africa and Africa as a continent intertwined at best, while

the political outcome will prove to be unsustainable.

China's economy has grown at an average rate of 9 per cent annually since the

last 3 decades and its energy consumption has tripled and outstrips its

domestic energy production (Stephanie Hanson, Council on Foreign Relations,

June 6 2008, p.14). Within the decade from 2000-2011, China's consumption

of aluminum, copper, nickel and iron ore has increased from 15 per cent to 25

per cent and has been growing rapidly. China's industrialization has led to

overproduction and Chinese companies and industries are looking to cultivate

new export markets for its manufactured goods and new foreign sources of

raw material, and more importantly oil.

In search for raw materials and new grounds for export markets, Beijing has

turned to West Africa and Africa in general, which command significant

untapped natural resources, including oil, natural gas, metal ores and cotton.

Most of the world’s resource- dependent economies are in Africa. Beijing is also

seeking alliances with West African countries to enhance its global status in the

world as a newly emerged global player and counter Western influence in world

institutions, such as the United Nations, International Monetary Fund, World

Trade Organization, and the World Bank, etc.



Beijing seeks to build solidarity with West African governments and to


showcase itself as a reliable partner between developing countries and

developed countries (Africapractice, Isaac Idun-Arkhurst and James Laing,

p.2). Beijing pledges large enormous amount of aid to West Africa, it also aid

in building infrastructure, and in most cases, in areas where the western

traditional powers have neglected, and it’s doing it with no strings attached,

except the withdrawal and rejection of diplomatic relations with Taiwan

(Africapractice, Isaac Idun-Arkhurst and James Laing, p.2).

In the past, Beijing presence was noted by lavish infrastructure buildings in the

coastal countries of West Africa, Beijing building of huge Olympic style

stadiums were at the apex of Chinese donations to West African countries.

Throughout the past 2 decades, Beijing provided technical assistance to West

African nations, scholarships, and various kind of promotional aid. Before

Beijing political influence never waned in West Africa, during the 1980's though

it was not able to compete of influence with Western countries through

diplomatic aid programs, but non recognition of Taiwan was its main priority. In

the 21st century Beijing returns to West Africa as a significant global player,

with the resources, ready to play the game in all sorts, economically and

politically.

Through diplomacy, trade agreements, large aids, investment deals, debt

forgiveness and infrastructure development with no strings or conditions

attached, except the withdrawal and non recognition of Taiwan, Beijing has

gained considerable amount of leverage and access to West African resources

and consumer markets. Beijing now receives approximately 20 per cent of its



import from West Africa. Beijing has become a major actor in the energy


sector in West Africa, which has become the largest producer of oil in the

continent, since Ghana discover its own offshore oil. Nigeria, Ghana and

Equatorial Guinea are the main producer of oil in the region and Beijing has

become main actor in those countries.

Some West African governments, who are angered and dislikes by the

conditional offers and aids imposed on them by the western countries and the

international financial systems, see Beijing as a reliable and non-interfering

alternative partner that offers other sources to development which is critically

needed to West African states. Most of the weakened economies in West Africa

are seen re-emerged because of Beijing economic assistance and demand for

exports of raw materials. There are also, statistical analysis that Beijing

economic commitment is lifting millions of people out from poverty and

subsistence in the last few decades in West Africa.

On the whole, there are concerns for the West Africans populations on the

negative sides of imbalance in economic terms, trade, and market practices.

But weighing generally, on the Beijing presence and policy in West Africa, it is

considered by many as been positive for the continent, but the buck stops with

the West African governments and African governments as a whole. Since

statistically, West African countries see Chinese presence as positive, West

African governments could maximize the benefits of Sino-West African

commitments, but only if they adopted and promoted policies and rules of

engagement to deal and address issues that matters most to them, regarding

its economies, domestic trade, balance trade, labor standards and domestic



trade policies. As for the western Colonial and traditional powers, it is time to


acknowledge the change in the rules and styles of the game.

The emergence of China as a major great power reshaped West Africa from the

status-quo placed on it by its colonial West. It is though the time, that Western

nations engage China as global player with powerful economic strength, in

formulating the rules of international economic system and redraw aid

commitments to West African nations to be able to identify which is best for

the West African people and its development. On the other hand, Beijing needs

to redress its policy in the region to enhance and secure its long term strategic

interest in aspects of economy and influence, by promoting stable democratic

reforms, institutional reforms, and in depth long term investments, to promote

sustainability and stability in a side of the world, that is ridden with instability

and conflict, but rich in resources.

Concepts and Assumptions

In combining economic assistance, debt relief, and expanding market access

for West African countries, such as Ghana, Nigeria, Guinea, Guinea Bissau,

Beijing’s commitment is in a way similar to the Western traditional powers. But

Beijing is unique in its way, because, however it significantly depends on its

active involvement through its national companies and corporations. Beijing

also uses its strategy in West Africa to develop the skill of its corporations in an

effort to advance its comparative advantages, gain access to needed sectors,

open new markets abroad for its manufactured goods, create global Chinese

brand and help China to becoming overly dependent on export led



development. According to Washington Quarterly Summer 2007, the Chinese


government promotes business ties with West African countries by providing

them with needed information, coordination mechanisms and financial

assistance for Chinese companies and Chinese investors in West Africa. For

example Chinese construction companies operating in West Africa and Africa as

a whole receive export credit for feasibility studies, receive guaranteed loans

support, and exports credit for financing operational cost of their projects.

Beijing encourages national oil companies (NOC's) to increase purchases in

West African markets. Beijing also facilitates the acquisition of oil reserves

abroad through sweetener deals with West African governments (Ian Taylor,

China's new role in Africa, p.5). In Ghana by the first nine months of 2009,

Chinese companies launched 14 projects in Ghana and topped the list of

foreign firms registered in terms of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in the

country (Wenran Jiang and Jing Jing, China Brief 2010, p.1). This trend follows

in line with Beijing Commitment in the rest of West Africa. According to the

Ministry of Commerce of the People's Republic of China (PRC), In 2009 Chinese

investment in West Africa and Africa as a whole rose to 77.5 per cent to $875

million from January to October (Ghanabusinessnews.com, p.1).

On December 30, 2009, “The Agreement on Economic and Technical

Cooperation between Beijing and Accra” was signed at the Ghanaian Ministry of

Finance and Economic Planning in Accra Ghana. According to the agreement,

China will provide two concessional financial facilities including a grant and an

interest free loan to the government of Ghana in 2010 (Gh.china-embassy.org,

January1). At the same time, state owned China National Offshore Oil



Company (CNOOC) made bid for share of U.S based Kosmos Energy assets in


Ghana Jubile oil field in October 2009 (Chinadaily.net, October 13, 2009).

Ghana together with Nigeria and Guinea is rising in terms of its strategic

economic importance to the energy seeking Beijing, as the recent economic

development in that area of the continent moves to consolidate their

development.

Due to the economic importance of China to the West African countries,

Nigerian Central Bank Governor Lamido Sanusi said in Beijing on the

September 6, 2011, that Africa's top oil exporter will be converting as much as

10 per cent of its $3.3 billion in foreign reserves from US dollars to Chinese

Yuan (Drew Hinshaw, September, 6 2011). Central Banks use foreign reserves

to manage their own currency value. This recent development in Nigerian

Central Bank policy proves the extent through which Beijing policy influences

West African governments. In the case of Nigeria, Converting 3.3billion to

Chinese Yuan isn’t such a huge sum, not at least for the rich oil exporting

country, but what is enormous, economists say, is the decision of the Central

Bank of Nigeria. Beijing has also acquired 45 per cent stake in Akpo oil field

Nigeria for $2.27 billion (An Africapractice report, Isaac Idun-Arkhust and

James Laing, p.11). In July 2005, Beijing and Nigeria signed an $800 million

crude oil sale agreement setting in motion an annual purchase of oil by Beijing

of 30,000 barrels a day for five years. Much more significant is that Beijing has

won a license to operate four of Nigerian oil blocs, “as part of an incentive to

build a hydro power station” (Princeton Lyman, July 21, 2005 p.2/6). Beyond

this is the China's willingness to takeover privatized oil refinery in Nigeria, a



money losing investment that no Western company would likely engage.


In Conakry, Guinean government will soon be signing a $5.8 billion mining deal

with a Chinese state owned fund, In return for digging rights to a plot outside

the capital, Reuter’s reports. China Power Investment would finance the

construction of a coal power plant, deep water port, and a refinery long sought

by the nation's rulers (Drew Hinshaw, September 6 2011). The West African

newest democracy boasts of half of the world’s reserves of bauxite, the key ore

used in aluminum manufacturing. The West African Country has been

hampered by the activities of its past brutal dictators, until having democracy

in 2010. Now the former French colony is looking to redress its lost years by

quickly embracing the economic opportunities from Beijing.

Approximately some 40 per cent of Africa's export to China, are from five West

African countries (Nigeria, Niger, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, and Ghana),

according to the World Bank (WB). But Beijing interest in West Africa and

Africa as a region goes beyond oil, Beijing now ranks as the second highest

trading partner in the region, behind the United States, and ahead of France

and Great Britain. From 2002 to 2003, trade between China and West Africa

doubled and tripled by 2007, expected to reach 73 billion. Much of the growth

was due to increase oil import from Nigeria, Ghana, Guinea and Guinea Bissau.

But Chinese companies also import a large significant of non-oil commodities,

such as timber, copper, and diamonds as, West Africa are truly enriched in

those mineral resources. Beijing recently began to import some West African

manufactured goods, such as processed foods and household consumer goods.

Experts such as Ian Taylor and Stephanie Hanson say that Beijing see West



Africa as both an excellent market for their low cost consumer goods and an


area enriched with untapped raw materials (Stephanie Hanson, June 6 2008).

However China's foreign direct investment (FDI) in West Africa and Africa as a

region is still at only 3 percent of China's total FDI, according to the United

Nations report. Experts, such as Ian Taylor and Stephanie Hanson, suggest,

that the need to secure natural resources, whether oil, metal or timber is the

driving force of Beijing foreign policy in West Africa. China's manufacturing

sector has created enormous demand for aluminum, copper, nickel, iron ore,

and oil. In 2005, David Zweig and Bin Jianhai wrote in foreign affairs “that

China has been able to adapt its foreign policy to its domestic development

and manufacturing strategy to an unprecedented level by encouraging state

controlled companies to seek out exploration, resource and supply contracts

with West African states and African countries that produce oil, gas and other

natural resources. At the same time Beijing aggressively courts the

government of those countries with diplomacy, trade deals, debt forgiveness

and aid packages.

Methods of Argumentation

Beijing began seriously pursuing market socialism in the 1970's under the

leadership of Deng Xiaoping. It marked the acceleration of a slow acceptance

of change to capitalist practices as the foundation of the PRC's socioeconomic

development. But Beijing political relationship with West Africa and Africa as a

region goes way back as 1950's, when relations between the two relied on



mutual ideological struggle against major Western powers (Africapractice,


Isaac Idun-Arkhurst and James Laing, p.14). China proclaims itself as the

leader of the developing world. Beijing sees itself as a developed and

developing world, and as a result, Beijing is presenting itself to West Africans

as a partner who would understand the challenges of the West African people.

Beijing is presenting itself as a partner who will defend its West African

Counterparts in the international stages, since it possesses the economic

strength and political material to defend its West African interest. Through

Beijing Assistance program, Beijing has weakened the influences of its Asian

rivalry (Japan), both on the international stage and in West Africa. Beijing has

tried and successfully blocks Japan from a permanent membership seat in the

United Nation Security Council (UNSC) (Evan S. Medeiros, p.136). Beijing by

presenting itself as a leader of the developing world, Beijing is promoting the

interest of the West Africa and other developing countries within United

Nations, including adding an African country as a permanent member of the

United Nation Security Council; in return Beijing is winning the support of

countless Africans. Major Western countries like the United States refuse to

deal with some West African countries, such as Equatorial Guinea, for being

corrupt and not respecting human rights, for Beijing is just an opportunity to

fill the void, since the same United States can still be supporting an

authoritarian regime in the gulf such as Saudi Arabia, with little or no human

rights records. Beijing established early relations with West African States,

shortly after West African countries gained independence. In the case of

Ghana, after Ghana established diplomatic relations with China in 1960, Accra



received the first $12 million concessional loan from China in 1964. In the


following decades, Ghana received aid from China in various forms, such as

loans, grants, and educational funds. Most loans and funds are related to

infrastructure building in Ghana. Beijing assisted Accra in the construction of

Ghanaian National Theater, the Bui Hydro-Electric Power Dam, the Afafe

Irrigation project, the Dangame East District (Wenran Jiang and Jing Jing,

February 18 2010,p.1) Hospital, the Ghanaian police and Military Barracks, the

Kumasi Youth Center, the Office block of the military of Defense, and the

assistance of rural schools building. Among all these projects, the construction

of Bui Dam, was financed by China Export-Import (EXIM) Bank (Mofep.gov.gh,

September 25 2007, p.1).

Secondly, China's export credit and guaranteed agency is the single largest

Chinese financial commitment to Ghana till date, and has contributed

significantly in the development of the power generation capacity in Ghana

(Mofep.gov.gh, September 25 2007, p.1).

However it is obviously a well known fact to scholars and foreign policy

analyst, that Beijing principal interest in the region is access to its mostly

untapped natural resources. Beijing trade with West Africa and Africa as a

region has risen sharply, from $10 billion in 2003 to $20 billion in 2005 and

rises to tremendously 50 per cent increase in 2005 (Princeton Lyman, July 21,

2005). The Chinese manufactured goods are flooding the West African

markets, much to the concern of local domestic companies and employment

sector in the region. The primary focus is textile industries, where growth in



Chinese imports has hampered the local domestic companies. According to Ian

Taylor, an expert in the region, African imports from China rose 712%, it jump


from $895 million in 1996 to 7.3 billion, much at the cost of African companies

who are dying and moving out of business. Since the international pressure in

Africa, has led to the creation of AGOA (African Growth and Opportunity Act),

which offered incentives for African countries to open their economies and

build free markets. The modification made from AGOA permitted least

developed African and West African countries to employ materials from the

cheapest contractors worldwide. The effect of the AGOA act, was the fact that

foreign global economies took advantage of the initiative to penetrate African

Markets. Later, due to the increasing problem a quota system was introduced

known as MFA (Multi-Fibre Agreement). The MFA allocated export quotas to

low cost developing countries and limiting amount of imports for states whose

domestic textile industries were negatively affected. As a result of MFA

agreement, a system of triangular production was developed by Asian

industries particularly, China, who start to produce its markets in West Africa

and Africa as a region. The result of the triangular production leads to the

collapse of MFA in January 1, 2005, which was blamed to Beijing, because a

much larger part of the fabric in production was actually Chinese. As a result

exports fabric materials from Africa to the European Union and United States

fell.

In Nigeria, low cost imports have largely devastated the textile and other

consumer products industries in the Northern region of Kano and Kaduna (Ian



Taylor). In these northern Muslim dominated area, which a member of the

parliament, from the northern region laments about the rise in unemployment

in a region mostly underdeveloped and politically fragile. The idea of Nigeria


getting to compete with China in that sector for now is largely unthinkable. In

Nigerian neighboring country of Ghana, the same phenomenon has been

alarming and leads to the threat of closure in most of the leading industries. In

the oil rich region of Nigeria's Niger Delta, local communities have taken their

anger towards the Chinese companies, they have at sometime attack Chinese

oil workers, and there has also been a bomb attack in Chinese oil companies.

The aggrieved locals have sometime ransacked and kidnapped Chinese

engineers and workers for ransom.

Nevertheless, there have been cases of positive responses particularly from

West African governments, for example, in Ghana, Mr. G.D Boateng, Executive

Secretary at Ghana's Secretariat of the Chinese Funded Bui Dam project was

bullish about Beijing presence: He was quoted as saying “With the Chinese

assistance, old development plans that were jettisoned at the instance of

development partners are now being revived and are being executed at a

much lower costs,” (Isaac Idun-Arkhust and James Laing, April 26 2007, p17).

He went ahead to say that before the Chinese assistance, “the Bui Dam project

had been on the shelf since 1960's. We had expressions of interest from a

number of Western companies in the 1990's and in 2001, but they all fell

through because those companies didn't see the project as bankable, now with

the Chinese assistance the project has gone off the shelf to the ground and



this time it is an integration that includes the building of a new city around Bui

and the idea came from previous projects in China”. Chinese companies

operating in West Africa and Africa as a region are subsided by Beijing and are

instructed to keep profit margins at a very low rate, sometimes at 3 per cent


low that is never the case with Western companies operating in Africa who set

their profit margins at 15 per cent. Generally, there are growing satisfaction of

Chinese presence in West Africa and Africa as a region. “To most of the

Africans, as most people in the Western world would say God bless America,

most Africans will say, God bless China”. There is no doubt that increase

competition of assets in West Africa is rising, sometimes through overpayment

for equity positions, which releases more resources for local development

(Isaac Idun-Arkhust and James Laing, April 26, 2007, p17). But on the other-

side, there is a concern that such an overpayment may end up providing “extra

windfalls for corrupt officials instead of benefiting local communities.

Theoretical and Policy Prescriptions

Beijing’s policy and economic expansion in West Africa and Africa as a region,

is causing waves of unrest in the Western world, which see Africa, not only as

their former colonial offshoot but also as their sphere of influence. The Western

concerns about Beijing presence in West Africa ranges from preserving the

normative ideas, such as political freedoms, human rights and fear of

diminishing Western political influences in the region. The Booming Chinese

economy allows Beijing to get back to West Africa in the 21st century able to



play the game with cash at hand and also the political will to follow it up. But

as the Chinese activities expand in West Africa and Africa as a region, the

reactions from the locals are mixed, though there are negative perceptions of

Chinese activity in West Africa. Beijing has been accused by other powers as


exercising “irresponsible global leadership” because of its energy

resource interest, particularly oil. But same goes to the United States and

other major powers in exercising their own global leadership. The United

States plays a double standard game when it comes in applying morality in its

leadership role. For example, trying to enforce democracy to some countries,

such as in Belarus or Iraq and supporting authoritarian regimes in the gulf,

such as in Saudi Arabia, is not morality. Beijing has been accused of hiding a

commitment to a non-interfering policy to pursue a predatory foreign policy in

West Africa, grabbing Africa's resources without any “moral Scruples” about

the conflict that plague many countries in the region (africapractice report,

Isaac Idun-Arkhust and James Laing, p.22). There are growing voices in West

Africa that see China as a neo-colonial power that has come to extract African

resources. The Chinese construction companies employ few local workers, and

large number of Chinese workers, that will remit money back to China, all

these to the resentment of most of the local West African populations. Most of

the Chinese export goods that go to West Africa are low quality goods. There

has been trade friction between Beijing and West African nations, because they

cannot compete with China, and as a result, run trade deficit in their dealings

with Beijing. Most of the local merchants and industrialist in West Africa has

gone out of business, because of China, mostly in textile industries due to the



importation of cheap Chinese goods. There are concerns in the West that

because of Chinese aid practices in West Africa; the traditional Western donors

are losing influence in the region.

Experts such as, Todd Moss, Senior Fellow at Washington-based Center For


Global Development (CGD) and one of the experts who designed Nigeria's Paris

Club debt relief package, the “Chinese Invasion” is helping to “diversify”

Africa's trade and development partners and to the extent that this promotes

economic development, it is good for Africa, but it may also be “wrecking all

the cooperation that the donors have worked so hard to build on environmental

and governance standards, human rights and transparency initiatives

(africapractice, Isaac Idun and James Laing, p. 23).As Beijing engagement in

West Africa expands, it established a strategy of relying on state-owned

corporations to advance its broad political and strategic interest in the region,

but the strategy is increasingly becoming problematic to Beijing. Beijing

encourages national oil companies (NOC's) to expand its purchases of oil in

West African markets. The ability of Beijing to tell the National Oil Companies

(NOC's) what to do is limited. Beijing lacks a central ministerial agency

overseeing the oil industries (Ian Taylor, China’s new role in Africa, p.6).

Beijing has been incapable of enforcing a geographical division of labor on the

main NOC's (Ian Taylor, China’s new role in Africa, p.6). This development

results in competition and overlapping between the national oil companies

(NOC's). The notable of these companies, are, the China National Petroleum

Corporation (CNPC), the China Petroleum and Chemical Corporation (Sinopec),

and China National Offshore Oil Company (CNOOC).



The China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), and China Petroleum and

Chemical Corporation (Sinopec), always compete against each other, such as in

Sudan. The Chinese National Oil Companies view each other as rivals,

competing not only for natural resources, such as oil and gas, but they also vie


for political supremacy. The more highly assets a company acquires, the more

likely it is to obtain diplomatic and financial support from Beijing for its

subsequent investment (Ian Taylor, China’s new role in Africa, p.10). In this

case the Sinopec and CNPC have more political influence, than CNOOC, though

the inter-firm competition is part of the Western capitalist system but it is

endangering the strategic interest of Beijing in West Africa and African

continent. Beijing has also been constantly accused of paying bribe to secure

its interest. International observers say the way China does business-

particularly its willingness to pay bribes, as documented by Transparency

International and attach no conditions for aid money-undermines local efforts

to increase good governance and international efforts at macroeconomic

reform by institution like the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund

(Stephanie Hanson, June 6 2008). At the same time, there are irrational

hostility towards Beijing dealings in West Africa, Chinese trade with West Africa

has become normalized in most ways, in most cases multiple actors are involve

rather than state controlled corporations. Much of West Africa's manufacturing

industries collapsed well before the Chinese appearance, but all is counted

towards Beijing. If West Africa is to move from been dependent economy, it

has to start manufacturing and move from being the exporter of primary



commodities. Most of the local resentment to Beijing in West Africa is just

“Irrational”. Domestic problems constitute much of West African problems, plus

the huge importation of Chinese goods by West African citizens. Most of the

West African industries have poor organizational procedures, inadequate

management and low level of skill. Ghanaian manufacturers of textiles have to


face the imposition of an illegal 20%duty by Cote d' Ivoire, a “transit tax”

collected at Benin and extortion by Nigerian authorities (Ian Taylor, China’s

new role in Africa, p.25). Most of the West African industries have poor quality

standards, poor finishing, poor packaging, and inability to meet up export

demands on scheduled time. There are still a lot of challenges facing the West

African government. There are so much institutional failings, bureaucratic

incompetence, and unpredictable policies, such as unpredictable property

rights, ineffectiveness and corrupt judiciary systems. Manufacture goods

imported from China arrives into the West African markets at a very much

lower prices, at much less domestic competition, but Beijing are blamed for it,

instead of blaming the West African governments and its policy makers, for its

failure to adopt the right policy choices.

Conclusion

It is a palpable fact, that recent Chinese engagement in West Africa, is driven

by Beijing desperate need to find natural resources, more especially oil, to be

able to sustain its booming economy, and also create a new market in West

Africa for its manufactured goods. Beijing emergence as one of the West



African largest trading ally has reshaped the traditional system and attracted

attention of the global world. Beijing recent activities in West Africa, especially

in Nigeria, Ghana, and Guinea Bissau are significant, though there are many

implications beyond the good side of the game. Clearly Beijing from the

extraction of West African raw material and importation of Chinese


manufactured goods, Beijing has enormous leverage over Western competitors

in African markets, because its value demands, with investment, infrastructure

building, debt forgiveness, and aids, provides a comfortable ground and gives

it access into the West African markets and its resources. Beijing because of its

critical economic interest, political interest, and the establishment of itself as

an emerged super power that will defend West African governments in the

international stage, gave it an overwhelming leverage ahead of Western

traditional powers, who view West Africa and Africa as a region as their colonial

offshoot and their spheres of influence. Beijing has a long term commitment in

its dealings with West African governments, and has through its commitments

nurture a potential market ground for its manufactured goods. West African

natural resources are untapped and its markets are strategically open for

Beijing. Though Chinese economic activities in West Africa has produced mixed

effects and reactions. West African governments are happy that most of their

dying economies are resuscitated by high Beijing demand for their natural

resources exports and large Beijing investments on infrastructure and basic

sectors neglected by Western powers. However there are sections of the local

industries badly affected by the surge of Chinese manufactured goods, such as

textile industries, which as a result, cause unemployment and a decline in local



domestic made products. Some sections of the population are outrage by the

environmental effects, businesses, and human rights concern. Most of the

Chinese companies, don't employ local domestic workers, in most cases, the

local population are not allow to learn the technicalities needed to sustain the

industries when Beijing left, many employers in Chinese companies are


Chinese migrant workers that will remit money back to China, all to the

resentment of the local population. Beijing also faces pressure and criticisms

from Western countries, they criticize Beijing for supporting repressive

regimes, then undermining international efforts to bring economic and political

sanity to the region. On the other hand, Beijing aid practices are lifting millions

of West Africans from poverty, and their market activities are creating a

growing middle class, for example in Nigeria, where its economy are growing

sharply, not because of its richness in oil resources, but because of its growing

domestic consumption. The Question is, whether Beijing engagements in West

Africa, for the long term, that can help the region to develop its industries and

human resources or is it going to be like the past colonial activities in West

Africa? This I left for its conscience to examine. Because of Beijing extraction

of West Africa's natural resources, and its heavy trade activities in the region,

it weighs heavily in the region's development. Its investment and resource

exploitation could be an opportunity for the region to accelerate its economic

capacity and develop its human resources and industry, but only if the West

African governments adopt and implement the right policy choices needed for

development. But until then, an over influx of Chinese manufactured goods

and irresponsible extraction of resources could potentially devastate the



already fragile region and its economies. Generally, majority of West Africans,

believe that Beijing have a positive impact in West African development, but it

is left for the governments to address the negative aspect of the business

practices. As for the traditional Western donors, it is time, to accept the fact

that China has emerged and establish itself as a major player,


with the resources to play the game, so it has to engage Beijing in recreating

the rules of international economic system and review most of Beijing activities

in the region to see if it is good for the development of the region.

References

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Aicardi de Saint Paul, Marc (2004) Atlas on Regional Integration in West Africa. Africa and China.

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Documents

Beijing Foreign Policy in West Africa Finale