Beda Rednotes Legal Ethics

8/10/2019 Beda Rednotes Legal Ethics

1/39

L E G A L E T H I C S & P R A C T I C A L E X E R C I S E S

2005 C ENTRALIZED B AR O PERATIONS

MOST FREQUENTLY ASKED BAR QUESTIONS

PRACTICE OF LAW

PRACTICE OF LAW (1985, 1993, 1995, 1996, 1997, 2 , 2 2!

Q"#$%&' N') 1*W+ % -' .'" " -#/$% - 0. / %& # '4

A $ #/*Generally, to engage in the practice of law is to do any of those acts which are

characteristics of the legal profession. It embraces any activity, in or out of court, which requiresthe application of law, legal principle, practice or procedure and calls for legal knowledge, trainingand experience. It involves the carrying on of the calling of an attorney, usually for gain, acting ina representative capacity and rendering service to another. Engaging in the practice of lawpresupposes the existence of an attorney-client relationship. ence, where a lawyer undertakes an

activity which requires knowledge of law but involves no attorney-client relationship, such asteaching law or writing law books or articles, he cannot be said to be engaged in the practice of hisprofession as a lawyer.

Q"#$%&' N') 2*A) I$ %+# / %& # '4 /& +% '/ /&:& # #

B) D'#$ %+# # &$ %"/# + :# %+# ' #/ %' /# " %# -;&$$&' %' %+# 0 / - %+#/ %& # '4

A $ #/*A) !he practice of law is basically a privilege because it is limited

to persons of good moral character with special qualifications duly ascertained and certified. !hus,only those persons are allowed to practice law, who by reason of attainments previously acquiredthrough education and study, have been recogni"ed by the courts as possessing profound knowledgeof legal science. #ttorneys are the court$s constituency % to aid it in the administration of &ustice.

B) 'ongress under the ()*+ 'onstitution has no power to regulate admission to the ar and thepractice of law. nlike the () / and ()+ 'onstitutions, the ()*+ constitution no longer providesfor the power of the legislature to repeal, alter and supplement the rules promulgated by the0upreme 'ourt. nder the () / 'onstitution, the legislature had the power to repeal or alter therules promulgated by the 0upreme 'ourt although the power and the responsibility to admitmembers of the bar resides in the 0upreme 'ourt. nder the ()*+ 'onstitution, however, the0upreme 'ourt has the exclusive power to promulgate rules concerning the enforcement of rights,pleadings and practice and procedures of all courts and the admission to the practice of law.

DUTIES OF A LAWYER (1985, 1988, 199Q"#$%&' N') 3*B#& .#/ -='/ ;#;0#/ '4 %+# 0 / &$ #> # %&' /&:& # # '/%+ $ &/&

4'/ %+'" + &% # % & $ '% '4 /#$ ' $&0& &%$ - '0 & %&' $ ( ! %' %+# '"/%? (0! %' 4# '.#/$? ( ! %' %+# %$? - $% . (-! %' %+# "0 & & # #/ ) B/ . -&$ "$$ %+#$#

'0 & %&' $ - /#$ ' $&0& &%$)

A $ #/*A) 1irst and foremost among the duties of the lawyer is his duty to the court. !he chief mission of an attorney is to assist in the administration of &ustice. !o this end, his client$s successin the case is subordinate. is primary responsibility is to uphold the cause of &ustice.

!hus, the lawyer takes orders from the court and not from his client. !he lawyer mustalways maintain respect to the court. e must use respectful language. e must defend the

REDNOTES IN LE@AL ET

ICS9


2/39

San BedaCollege of Law

L E G A L E T H I C S &

P R A C T I C A L E X E R C I S E S

dignity and respect to the court. e must also cooperate with the court by being ready with hiscase and by being punctual and candid with the court.

B) !he lawyer must maintain harmonious relations with the members of the bar. e must becandid and courteous with fellow lawyers. e should deal fairly and squarely with others and nottake undue advantage over them. 2o ill-feeling must be entertained by him against the lawyer of an adverse party. #ccording to the 0upreme 'ourt in People vs. Sesbreno, clients, not the lawyers,are the litigants so that all personalities between counsel and client should be avoided.

e should also be a respectable member of the I 3 and other bar associations. e must notencroach upon professional employment. e should not solicit cases and advertise his profession.

C) !he lawyers owes entire devotion to his client, to protect his interest within the bounds of law and legal ethics. e must be candid with his client and advice him properly if he has no valid

cause of action.!he lawyer must also maintain absolute trust and not to demand unconscionable attorney$s

fees. e should not reveal information obtained from him given in secrecy. 4ikewise, he shouldnot purchase the property which is the sub&ect matter of litigation. e should not appear forconflicting interest.

D) !he attorney$s duties to the public is that he should set an example as a law abiding citi"enand give due respect to the lawful authorities. e should not instigate unnecessary lawsuits.

5ne important duty of the lawyer especially at this time is to defend cases of indigentlitigants for free. e must take active part in free legal aid services.

PRO IBITED APPEARANCE (199 , 1996, 2 !

Q"#$%&' N')


3/39



a= In the municipal trial court, a party may conduct his litigation in person or with the aidof an agent or a friend (Sec. 34, Rule 138).

b= In any other court, a party may conduct his litigation personally (id.) , except incriminal cases for grave felonies where a party must be represented by a counsel.

c= In criminal proceedings before a municipal trial court in a locality where a duly licensedmember of the bar is not available, the court may in its discretion admit or assign aperson, resident of the province of good repute for probity and ability, to aid thedefendant in his defense, although the person assigned is not a duly authori"ed memberof the bar (Sec. 4, Rule 116).

d= #ny official or other person appointed or designated in accordance with the law toappear for the Government of the 3hilippines shall have all the rights of a dulyauthori"ed member of the bar to appear in any case which said government has aninterest, direct or indirect (Sec. 33, Rule 138).

e= # senior law student who is enrolled in a recogni"ed law school$s clinical educationprogram approved by the 0upreme 'ourt may appear before any court withoutcompensation, to represent indigent clients accepted by the 4egal 'linic of the lawschool (Rule 138-A).

f= 2on-lawyers may appear before the 246' or any 4abor #rbiter if they representthemselves or their labor organi"ation or members thereof (Art. 222, L bor !ode).

g= nder the 'adastral #ct, a non-lawyer can represent a claimant before the cadastralcourt (Sec. ", Act 22#").

C AMPERTOUS CONTRACT (1988, 199 , 1999, 2 !

Q"#$%&' N') 6*A%%.) A $ $#/:& #$ $ .#/ #/# # #- 0. B %' /# ':#/ 4/'; C #/% & ' $%/" %&'

; %#/& $ - #G"& ;# %) B# "$# B -&- '% + :# %+# ;# $ %' -#4/ . %+# #> # $#$ '4 &%& %&'+# /' '$#- %' A%%.) A %+ % +# (A! $+'" -#/$ #> # $#$ '4 %+# &%& %&' - +# (B! '" - .+&; (A! '/%&' '4 %+# ' $%/" %&' ; %#/& $ - #G"& ;# % %' 0# /# ':#/#- $ '; # $ %&'4'/ +&$ /'4#$$&' $#/:& #$) M . A%%.) A '//# % . /## %' $" + // #;# %

A $ #/*2o, #tty. # may not correctly agree to such an agreement. 0uch an agreement would

constitute a champertous contract which is considered void due to public policy, because it wouldmake him acquire a stake in the outcome of the litigation which might lead him to place his owninterest above that of the client > $ utist vs. %on& les, 182 S!RA 1#1) . # champertous contract isone in which a lawyer undertakes to prosecute a case, and bear all the expenses in connectiontherewith without right of reimbursement, and will be paid his fees by way of a portion of theproperty or amount that may be recovered, contingent on the success of his efforts. It is differentfrom a contingent fee contract, which is valid, in which the lawyer will also be paid depending onthe success of his efforts, but he does not undertake to shoulder all the expenses in the case. emay advance such expenses but always sub&ect to reimbursement by his client.

Q"#$%&' N') 7*I$ ' %& # . 4## ' %/ % '% :&' %&:# '4 A/%& # 1


4/39




1orum shopping is the improper practice of filing several actions or petitions in the same ordifferent tribunals arising from the same cause and seeking substantially identical reliefs in thehope of winning in one of them.

!he possible consequences of forum shopping are supr =?d. 4awyer is prohibited from practicing law by reason of his public office which prohibits

appearances in court? ande. 4awyer is preoccupied with too many cases which will spell pre&udice to the new

clients.

Q"#$%&' N') 16*A%%.) ) B' , $#;& /#%&/#- M#%/' M & / %&%&' #/ + $ %% # / + & %+#

/#;'%# ;" & & &%. '4 C // , N"#: E & ) # %%# -$ %' +&$ '44& # & M & 'M' - .$, T"#$- .$ - W#- #$- .$, - %+# /#$% '4 %+# ##H +# $ # -$ & +&$ %% # / +/ &$& +'/$#$)

I /&;& $# # -& 0#4'/# %+# M" & & T/& C'"/% '4 C // , %+# ' . '%+#/& # $#- ;#;0#/ '4 %+# 0 / & %+# # &$ /# /#$# %& %+# '; & %) T+# "$#- &$

-#%# %&' /&$' #/) T+# "- # %$ %' #> #-&%# /' ##-& $)) W+ % ;"$% %+# "- # -' %' #> #-&%# /' ##-& $

0) I4 A%%.) B' &$ /#G"#$%#- %' % $ '" $# 4'/ %+# "$#-, '" - +# '/ $+'" -+# /#4"$# 0. $ .& %+ % & %+# /':& #, +# %$ %' -' '%+& #> # % /&-# +'/$#$

- $%/ %# 0" $ E> & )

A $ #/*

a. !he &udge may appoint attorney onan"a as counsel de o icio considering that theaccused is a detention prisoner and therefore it is assumed that he has no financial means of engaging a paid counsel.

b. !he attorney cannot refuse to be appointed as counsel de o icio merely on the reasonthat he is a semi-retired practicing lawyer. 3recisely one of the reasons for the integration of the


ICS9


8/39




bar in the 3hilippines is to compel all person who have been admitted to the practice of law in the3hilippines to perform their duties to assist the courts in the administration of public.

CONFLICT OF INTEREST (1985, 1989, 1991, 1992, 1993, 199 & .'"/ $ #/)2) I4 .'" #/# A%%.) A ; , +& + ' %&' '" - .'" % H# E> & )

A $ #/*(. !he options available to #tty. #nama are & .'"/ $ #/)3) W+# .#/ : &- . &%+-/ $ '" $# E> & .'"/ $ #/)

A $ #/*(. es, the client has the right to dismiss his lawyer anytime with or without cause. !he

reason is that a lawyer$s employment is strictly personal and highly confidential in nature. !heclient$s loss of confidence in his lawyer deprives the relation of that special element of trust.

@. es, the client has the right to hire another lawyer as collaborating counsel anytime. It isthe prerogative of the client to employ as many attorneys as he may desire to protect his interest.

. # lawyer can validly withdraw as counsel for good cause and upon notice. 'anon @@, 6ule@@.7( provides that a lawyer may withdraw his services in any of the following cases# "%&' %+ % $ &$$"#-0. "- #) T+#/# 4%#/, %+# '/-#/ $ # 4'/ #-, +' #:#/, %+# $"0 # % # # %;# % $ %" .

S A N B E D A C O L L E @ E O F

L A W

1


15/39



- & # . #># "%#- % -&44#/# % /#;&$# %+ %+ % /#4#//#- %' & %+# '/-#/) S+'" - %+#$+#/&44 0# +# - & 0 # 4'/ # & # #

YES) !he unfortunate incident could have been avoided had the sheriff observed due care

and diligence in ascertaining the exact location of the property sub&ect of the execution. !hesheriff is a ranking officer of the court, a public official entrusted with a fiduciary role. e plays animportant part in the administration of &ustice and is called upon to discharge his duties withintegrity, due care and circumspection. #nything less is unacceptable. !his is because in serving thecourt s writs and processes and in implementing the orders of the court, sheriffs cannot afford toerr without affecting the efficiency of the process of the administration of &ustice. Good faith onthe part of the sheriff, or lack of it, in proceeding to properly execute his mandate would be of nomoment, for he is chargeable with the knowledge that being an officer of the court taskedtherefore, it behooves him to make due compliances. is duty in the execution of a writ is purelyministerial? he is to execute the order of the court strictly to the letter. (ANDY LOBREGAT vs.CENEN L. A#ORANTO, SHERI)) III, BRANCH 0&, #eTC, 7UEZON CITY "A.#. No. 5$%1$ 8 .)e*+ -+ 8, /%%1.23

N'%& #$ %' : %# #/# $#/:#- %' /#$&-# %$ '4 S I$&-/', M H %& 0. S+#/&44$ C ; '$ ' -A #) A 4# - .$ %+#/# 4%#/, %+# $+#/&44$ %' #%+#/ &%+ ' & # #$ '/%$ - -#;' &%&' %# ;

# % %' %+# 0 / . %' &; #;# % %+# -#;' &%&' '/-#/) T+# -#;' &%&' $ '% &; #;# %#--"# %' %+# $%/' /#$&$% # "% " 0. %+# 44# %#- /#$&-# %$, & "-& %+# E0#/'$) A +# %#-

/ ";# % # $"#-) I %+# '"/$# '4 %+# / ";# %, %+# $+#/&44$ '/-#/#- %+# ' & # #$ '/%$ %'# %+# E0#/'$ & $&-# %+# %/' :#+& # - 0/& %+#; %' M H %& P' & # S% %&' ) A '; & %

4'/ '0$%/" %&' '4 "$%& # #/# 4& #- & $% %+# E0#/'$ - %+#. #/# -#% & #- - #/#/# # $#- ' . +# %+# + / # '4 '0$%/" %&' '4 "$%& # $ -&$;&$$#- 0. %+# & G"#$%

/'$# "%'/) T+# E0#/'$ %+# 4& #- -;& &$%/ %&:# '; & % & $% %+# $+#/&44$) S+'" - %+#$+#/&44$ 0# +# - & 0 # #:# &4 ' -#G" %# #:&-# # $ /#$# %#- 0. %+# E0#/'$

NO) !he quantum of proof necessary for a finding of guilt is substantial evidence or such

relevant evidence as a reasonable mind may accept as adequate to support a conclusion. !hepresumption of regularity in the performance by the sheriffs of their duties must prevail.#llegations of the Eberos are not supported by those of another witness? neither are thecontentions of respondents corroborated by those of another witness. In other words, the evidenceon record deals only with the word of complainants to be pitted against that of respondents.0heriff s duty to execute a &udgment is ministerial. In the implementation of writs of demolition, asin the instant case, the sheriffs are mandated to use reasonable and necessary force to see that the&udgment debtors vacate the premises. (INOCENCIO D. EBERO -9d JUANITO D. EBERO vs. #AKATI CITY SHERI))S RAUL T. CA#5OSANO -9d BAYANI T. ACLE "A.#. No. 5$%1$ !/. #-+c6 /,/%%123

ADMINISTRATIJE CASE? DESISTANCE OF COMPLAINANT

@"& %' 4& #- # # %&' $# & $% M $% $ +& + /#G"&/#$ %+# /#:&$&' '4 ";0#/ '4 0 '% 0'>#$) "- # F '/#$ +' &$ + - & %+# $# '& %#- /#:&$&' ';;&%%## +& +%+#/# 4%#/ $"0;&%%#- &%$ /# '/% %' %+# '"/%) "- # F '/#$ %+# &$$"#- O/-#/ -# /& %+#

$# $"0;&%%#- 4'/ -# &$&' -#$ &%# M $% $ '0 # %&' $ - -#; -$ 4'/ +# /& ) A'; & % $ %+#/# 4%#/ 4& #- & $% "- # F '/#$) T+#/# 4%#/, %+# '; & % &%+-/# +&$'; & %) S+'" - "- # F '/#$ 0# +# - -;& &$%/ %&:# . & 0 # #:# &4 %+# '; & % /# -.&%+-/# +&$ '; & %

YES, :udge 1lores is administratively liable. !he withdrawal of the complaint or theexecution of an affidavit of desistance does not automatically result in the dismissal of anadministrative case. !o condition as administrative action upon the will of the complainant, whofor one reason or another, condones a detestable act, would be to strip this 'ourt of its power tosupervise and discipline erring members of the &udiciary. !he withdrawal of the complaints cannotdivest the 'ourt of its &urisdiction nor deprive of its power to determine the veracity of the chargesmade and to discipline, such as the results of its investigation may warrant, an erring respondent .(#ANALASTAS 4S. JUDGE )LORES "A.#. No. #TJ$%1$ '/0. )e*. %&, /%%1.23


ICS9


16/39




D'#$ %+# -&$;&$$ '/ &%+-/ '4 + / #$ - %+# -#$&$% # '4 &% #$$#$ "%'; %& ./#$" % & %+# -&$;&$$ '4 -;& &$%/ %&:# $#

NO) !he withdrawal of the complaint does not have the legal effect of automaticallyexonerating the respondent from any administrative disciplinary action. It does not operate todivest this 'ourt with &urisdiction to determine the truth behind the matter stated in thecomplaint. 1urthermore, the need to maintain the faith and confidence of the people in thegovernment and its agencies and instrumentalities should not be made to depend on the whims andcaprices of the complainants who are, in a real sense, only witnesses therein. (ARTE#IO SABATIN vs. JUDGE E)REN B. #ALLARE "A.#. No. #TJ$%1$ '0 . #-+c6 /', /%%1.23

ADMINISTRATIJE CASE? BURDEN OF PROOF

M' %#$ &$ %+# "$#- & /&;& $# 4'/ #$% 4 +& + &$ 0#& +# /- 0. "- # M /#)M' %#$ %+# 4& #- '; & % & $% "- # M /# 4'/ # #- . ' $ &/& &%+ %+#

'; & % & %+# /&;& $# & + :& +&; //#$%#- - & #-) T+# '; & % 4& #- 0.M' %#$ $ /#4#//#- %' #># "%&:# "- # 4'/ & :#$%& %&' , /# '/% - /# ';;# - %&' ) T+#

$# $ $ +#-" #- 4'/ +# /& 0"% %+# '%& # %+#/#'4 %' M' %#$ $ /#%"/ #- " $#/:#-)A '/-& %' %+# S+#/&44, M' %#$ + #- /#$&-# # &%+'"% # :& 4'/ /-& --/#$$) T+#+# /& '4 %+# $# $ /#$#% %' '%+#/ - %# 0"% M' %#$ & 4 & #- %' # /) T+# E># "%&:#

"- # /# ';;# -#- %+ % $ %+# '; & % /#$# %#- ' #:&-# # % %' $"0$% %& %# %+#+ / #$ & $% "- # M /#, %+# '; & % $+'" - 0# -&$;&$$#- 4'/ H '4 #:&-# #)

T+#/# 4%#/, %+# O44& # '4 %+# C'"/% A-;& &$%/ %'/ /# #&:#- #%%#/ 4/'; M' %#$ /#G"#$%& %+ %%+# E># "%&:# "- # 0# -&$ + / #- $ %+# & :#$%& %& '44& #/ ' %+# :#/;# % %+ % +# &H# &$#& $%&%"%#- '; & % & $% %+# E># "%&:# "- # 0"% &% $ -&$;&$$#-) I$ %+#/# ;#/&% & %+#

'; & %

NONE) It must be stressed that in administrative proceedings, the complainant has theburden of proving the allegations in his complaint with substantial evidence. In the absence of evidence to the contrary, the presumption that the respondent has regularly performed his dutieswill prevail. Even in administrative cases, if a respondent &udge should be disciplined for a graveoffense, the evidence against him should be competent and should be derived from directknowledge. In this case, the complainant failed to substantiate the charges he made against therespondent &udge, let alone appear before the investigating magistrate to prove his allegations.Hhile it is our duty to investigate and determine the truth behind every matter in complaintsagainst &udges and other court personnel, it is also our duty to see to it that they are protected andexonerated from baseless administrative charges. !he 'ourt will not shirk from its responsibility of imposing discipline upon its magistrates, but neither will it hesitate to shield them from unfoundedsuits that serve to disrupt rather than promote the orderly administration of &ustice. > #ONTES 4S.

JUDGE #ALLARE "A.#. NO. #TJ$%1$ '/8. )e*. %&, /%%123

CODE OF P ROFESSIONAL R ESPONSIBILTY

CONFLICT OF INTEREST

A%%.) S'/$' ' $ N : $ '" $# 4'/ ; . .# /$ 0"% -"# %' %+# .#/ $ +# %+ ' -&%&' , +#&%+-/# $ +#/ '" $# ) ' #:#/, A%%.) S'/$' ' # #- . /# /#$# %#- '%+#/ % &

$# & $% N : ) A%%.) S'/$' ' &$ & $&$%& %+ % %+# %%'/ #. % /# %&' $+& 0#% ## +&;

- N : + - # $#- - %+ % +&$ +# %+ & &% %#- +&; 4/'; 4"/%+#/ #/4'/;& +&$'0 & %&' $) S+'" - A%%.) S'/$' ' 0# +# - & 0 # 4'/ :&' %& %+# C'-# '4 P/'4#$$&'R#$ ' $&0& &%. 0. /# /#$# %& %$ &%+ ' 4 & %& & %#/#$%$ #:# &4 ' 4'/; & :#$%& %&'

$ ; - 0. %+# IBP


L A W

1


17/39



YES. #t the time respondent accepted his engagement as counsel for another client andfiled a case against the complainant, he was still acting as counsel for the latter in a number of cases. In complaints for disbarment, a formal investigation is a mandatory requirement. !he 'ourt

may dispense with the normal referral to the Integrated ar of the 3hilippines if the records arecomplete and the question raised is simple. 0imilarly, if no further factual determination isnecessary, the 'ourt may decide the case on the basis of the extensive pleadings on record.'omplaints against lawyers for misconduct are normally addressed to the 'ourt. If, at the outset,the 'ourt finds a complaint to be clearly wanting in merit, it outrightly dismisses the case. If,however, the 'ourt deems it necessary that further inquiry should be made, such as when thematter could not be resolved by merely evaluating the pleadings submitted, a referral is made tothe I 3 for a formal investigation of the case during which the parties are accorded an opportunityto be heard. (#ERCEDES NA4A vs. ATTY. BENJA#IN 5. SORSOGON "A.C. No. '11/. J-9 -+ /&,/%%123

ATTORNEY S FEES

A -##- '4 $ # ':#/& / # '4 - ' %#- & B "&' $ #># "%#- 0. M # - - E &F #-) T+# ;'" % &- 0. %+# 4'/;#/ $ /# #&:#- 0. E & F #- - -# '$&%#- & %+#

'" % '4 A%%.) A/%#;&' B"$% ; %#, %+# '" $# 4'/ %+# %%#/) I% $ 4'" - '"% %#/ 0.M # - %+ % %+# - &$ $"0 # % %' ' %/':#/$.) W+# A%%.) B"$% ; %# /#4"$#- %' /# # $#%+# /' ##-$ '4 %+# $ # %' E & F #-, %+# %%#/, %+/'" + +#/ # '" $# /#$ ' -# % A%%.)K' & , 4& #- '; & % 4'/ /#$ &$$&' '4 ' %/ %) A '; /';&$# /##;# % $ %+# #># "%#-

+#/#& M # - $ '% $& %'/. $ $+# $ & %+# U &%#- S% %#$ % %+# %&;#) T+# ;' #.$ %+# %/ $4#//#- %' %+# /#$ # %&:# '" %$ $ / .#- 4'/ & %+# '; /';&$# $#%% #;# %)

T+#/# 4%#/, M # - 4& #- '; & % + / & A%%.) K' & , &%+ :&' %&' '4 %+# .#/ $ ' %+,' %+# '" % %+ % %+# .#/ H ' & . "$#- %+# &%+-/ 4/'; %+# 0 H '4 %+# "/ + $#

/& # '4 %+# '% & G"#$%&' , -#$ &%# %+#&/ H ' #- # '4 -#4# % & %+#&/ % $ /& +% %' &;%+# $ &- ;'" %) D'#$ %+# .#/ + :# %+# /& +% %' . %+# $"0 # % ;'" % $ .;# % '4 %+#&/ /'4#$$&' 4##$ -#$ &%# %+# #>&$%# # '4 -&$ "%# ' %+# # &%. '4 %+# ;'" %

NONE. # lawyer may legally apply a client s funds in his possession to satisfy professionalfees which the client owes him, in the absence of any dispute as to the legality of the amountthereof. owever, the fact that a lawyer has a lien for his fees on the client s money in hispossession or the circumstance that the client owes him more than the client s funds in his handsmay not excuse him from making an accounting nor entitle him to unilaterally apply the client smoney to satisfy his disputed claims. It is a settled principle that the compensation of a lawyershould be but a mere incident of the practice of law, the primary purpose of which is to renderpublic service. !he practice of law is a profession and not a money-making trade. #s they are anindispensable part of the system of administering &ustice, attorneys must comply strictly with theoath of office and the canons of professional ethics K a duty more than imperative during thesecritical times when strong and disturbing criticisms are hurled at the practice of law. 'anon ( of the 'ode of 3rofessional 6esponsibility mandates all members of the bar to obey the laws of theland and promote respect for the law. 6ule (.7( of the 'ode specifically provides that Ja lawyershall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.J # lawyer is expected, at alltimes, to uphold the integrity of the legal profession. Hhenever it is made to appear that a lawyeris no longer worthy of the trust and confidence of the public, it becomes not only the right but theduty of the 'ourt which made him one of its officers and gave him the privilege of ministeringwithin its bar to withdraw the privilege. (#ARY D. #ALECDAN vs. ATTY. 5ERCI4AL L. 5EKAS -9d

ATTY. #ATTHE: 5. KOLLIN "A.C. No. '80%. J-9 -+ /&, /%%1.23

CODE OF UDICIAL CONDUCT

@ROSS I@NORANCE OF LAW

C'/%#$ 4& #- -;& &$%/ %&:# '; & % & $% %+/## "$%& #$ &;& %+ % %+# /' ##-& $; -# 0#4'/# %+# S -& 0 . #/# &//# " /, $ &% %#/;& %#- %+# $# &%+'"% %+# -#4# $#+ :& ' -" %#- /'$$ #> ;& %&' ' +&; %' /#0"% %+# -&/# % %#$%&;' $ & $% %+#


ICS9


18/39




"$#-) C'/%#$ $' G"#$%&' #- %+# /' '" #;# % ; -# 0. %+# S -& 0 . %+ % +# $ # %' +&$ /& +%$ 4'/ 4 & & %' /#-##; %+# /' #/%. & G"#$%&' &%+& %+# ' # .# / #/&'- $/#G"&/#- " -#/ %+# ) # :#/$ %+ % %+#/# $ ' ##- 4'/ +&; %' /#-##; %+# /' #/%. $ %+#

" %&' $ # $ '% -" . /# &$%#/#- &%+ %+# R# &$%#/ '4 D##-$ '4 %+# P/':& # '4 B % ,+# #, " - :'&-) S+'" - %+# '; & % 4& #- 0. C'/%#$ /'$ #/

NO. It must be stressed that as a matter of policy, the acts of a &udge in his &udicialcapacity are not sub&ect to disciplinary action. e cannot be sub&ected to liability K civil, criminalor administrative K for any of his official acts, no matter how erroneous, as long as he acts in goodfaith. 5nly &udicial errors tainted with fraud, dishonesty, gross ignorance, bad faith or deliberateintent to do an in&ustice will be administratively sanctioned. !o hold otherwise would be to render&udicial office untenable, for no one called upon to try the facts or interpret the law in the processof administering &ustice can be infallible in his &udgment. !he provisions of #rticle @7A of the

6evised 3enal 'ode as to Jrendering knowingly un&ust &udgmentJ refer to an individual &udge whodoes so Jin any case submitted to him for decisionJ and has no application to the members of acollegiate court such as the 0andiganbayan or its divisions, who reach their conclusions inconsultation and accordingly render their collective &udgment after due deliberation. !he remedyof the aggrieved party is not to file an administrative complaint against the &udge, but to elevatethe assailed decision or order to the higher court for review and correction. #n administrativecomplaint is not an appropriate remedy where &udicial recourse is still available, such as a motionfor reconsideration, an appeal, or a petition for certiorari, unless the assailed order or decision istainted with fraud, malice, or dishonesty. (LEONIDES T. CORTES vs. SANDIGANBAYAN JUSTICES

#INITA 4. CHICO$NAZARIO, #A. CRISTINA G. CORTEZ$ESTRADA -9d RODOL)O G. 5ALATTAO"A.#. No. SB$%1$ $J. )e*+ -+ 0, /%%1.23

A '; & % $ 4& #- & $% "- # P ;& %" 4'/ & '/ # '4 %+# - //' #) I% $# #- %+ % & $#:# %## -&44#/# % $#$, "- # P ;& %" + - ;&$ - %+# I -#%#/;& %#

S# %# # L ) F"/%+#/;'/#, '; & %$ $' # #- %+ % "- # P ;& %" & $" %$ .#/$ 0.;# $ '4 & %#; #/ %# - + /$+ '/-$ & %+# /#$# # '4 &%& %$ & "0 & - %+ % +#:#/0 . $$ " % .#/$) F"/%+#/;'/#, +# /';" %#- -# &$&' $ &%+ ' $ %+#/#'4 '%/# -& . /# # $#- %' %+# /%$) S+'" - "- # P ;& %" 0# -&$ & & #- -;& &$%/ %&:# .

YES) !he application of the Indeterminate 0entence 4aw in the imposition of penalties incrimes punishable by the 6evised 3enal 'ode is a basic precept. :udge 3amintuan$s repeatedmisapplication thereof in quite a number of criminal cases he had rendered constitutes grossignorance of the law. # &udge is presumed to know the law and when the law is so elementary, notto be aware of it constitutes gross ignorance of the law. Indeed, &udges are duty bound to havemore than a cursory acquaintance with laws and &urisprudence. 1ailure to follow basic legalcommands constitutes gross ignorance of the law from which no one may be excused, not even a&udge. Hith regards to the other allegation, a &udge should be courteous both in his conduct and inhis language especially to those appearing before him. e can hold counsels to a properappreciation of their duties to the court, their clients, and the public without being petty,arbitrary, overbearing, or tyrannical. e should refrain from conduct that demeans his office andremember always that courtesy begets courtesy. #bove all, he must conduct himself in such amanner that he gives no reason for reproach. 'learly, the respondent &udge has failed to observecourtesy and civility to the lawyers as well as to the litigants who appeared before him. !he 'ourtfrowns upon the highly irregular practice of the respondent &udge of promulgating a decision,copies of which were not then ready for release to the parties. (THE O))ICERS AND #E#BERS O) THE IB5 BAGUIO$BENGUET CHA5TER vs. )ERNANDO 4IL 5A#INTUAN "A.#. No. RTJ$%/$ &! .

J-9 -+ &, /%%1.23

S+'" - "- # 0# +# - -;& &$%/ %&:# . & 0 # 4'/ & '/ # '4 %+# 4'/ / %& 0 & %' "$#- & /&;& $# &%+'"% %+# /#G"&$&%# 0 & +# /& , - -#$ &%# %+# 4 % %+ % %+#/#

$ #.# &% #$$ %' %+# ;"/-#/ +' ; -# '$&%&:# &-# %&4& %&' '4 %+# "$#-


L A W

1


19/39



YES) It is already settled that when a &udge grants bail to a person charged with a capitaloffense, or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment without conductingthe required bail hearing, he is considered guilty of ignorance or incompetence the gravity of which

cannot be excused by a claim of good faith or excusable negligence. Hhen a &udge displays an utterunfamiliarity with the law and the rules, he erodes the confidence of the public in the courts. #&udge owes the public and the court the duty to be proficient in the law and is expected to keepabreast of laws and the prevailing &urisprudence. Ignorance of the law by a &udge can easily be themainspring of in&ustice. (JOCELYN 4. GRAGEDA vs. JUDGE NIETO T. TRES4ALLES "A.#. #TJ No.%1$ '/&. )e*+ -+ /, /%%123

PROMPT DISPOSITION OF CASES

I;0 &$ %+# & %&44 & $# & :' :& ' # %&' '4 ;' #. &%+ - ; #$) "- # -#R'$ /&' 4 & #- %' -# &-# ' %+# $# &%+& %+# 9 - . /# #;# % /. #/&'- - #:# 4%#/ %+#

$# '4 %# ;' %+$, %+# "- # + - '% .#% /#$' :#- %+# $#) S+'" - "- # -# R'$ /&' 0#

$ %&' #- -;& &$%/ %&:# . 4'/ +&$ 4 & "/# %' /#$' :# $# &%+& %+# /# #;# % /. #/&'-

YES) !he 1ailure 5f # :udge !o Immediately 6esolve 3ending Dotions and to Becide 'asesHithin !he )7-Bay 6eglementary 3eriod 'onstitutes Gross Inefficiency. 6ule .7/ of !he 'ode of :udicial 'onduct requires &udges to dispose of the court s business promptly and to act, one way orthe other, on cases pending before him within the prescribed period therefore. ndue delay inresolving a pending motion constitutes gross inefficiency. Belay results in undermining the people sfaith in the &udiciary and from whom the prompt hearing of their supplications is anticipated andexpected, and reinforces in the mind of the litigants the impression that the wheels of &ustice grindever so slowly. 'ertainly, undue delay cannot be countenanced at a time when the clogging of thecourt dockets is still the bane of the &udiciary. :udges are expected to observe utmost diligence anddedication in the performance of their &udicial functions and the discharge of their duties. :udgeBel 6osario is meted with a fine in the amount of !en !housand 3esos. (DOLORES I#BANG vs.

JUDGE DEOGRACIAS K. DEL ROSARIO "A.#. No. #TJ$%0$ ' '. )e*+ -+ 0, /%%1.23

S+'" - "- # 0# -&$ & & #- 4'/ +&$ 4 & "/# %' -# &-# %+# # # %&' $#$ &%+& %+#/# #;# % /. #/&'-

YES) :udges should dispose of court business promptly within the period prescribed by lawor the extended time granted them by this 'ourt. !his is mandated by 6ule .7/ of 'anon of the'ode of :udicial 'onduct, and by no less than the 'onstitution itself. 'anon C reminds a &udge to beprompt in disposing of all matters submitted to him or her, remembering that &ustice delayed isoften &ustice denied. Belay in the disposition of cases erodes the faith and confidence of the publicin the institution of &ustice, lowers its standards and brings them into disrepute. Every &udge mustcultivate a capacity for quick decision? he must not delay the &udgment which a party &ustlydeserves. !he public trust reposed in a &udge$s office imposes upon him the highest degree of responsibility to promptly administer &ustice. !he 'ourt, however, is not unaware of the heavy caseload of &udges and the rigors of travelthat they sometimes have to make because of detail to vacant salas. It is precisely for this reasonthat the 'ourt has been sympathetic to requests for extensions of time within which to decidecases and resolve matters and incidents related thereto. Indeed, the 'ourt allows a certain degreeof latitude to &udges and grants them a reasonable extension of time to decide and resolve casesupon proper application by the &udge concerned and on meritorious grounds. ( RO#ERO TEODOSIO,ROLANDO RICO vs. HON. JUDGE ARTURO R. CAR5IO "A. #. No. #TJ$%/$ 1 &. )e*+ -+ / ,/%%123

PARTIALITY

D'#$ "- # $ %&:# /%& & %&' -"/& %+# +# /& '4 %+# /&% '4 /# &;& /. & " %&';'" % %' #:&-# % -&$ . '4 +&$ 0& $ - /%& &%. & 4 :'/ '4 %+# /&: %# /#$ ' -# %$ -

$+'" - +# %+#/#4'/# -&$G" &4. +&;$# 4 4/'; 4"/%+#/ +# /& %+# &:& $#


ICS9


20/39




NO) 3aragraph >@=, 0ection ( of 6ule ( +, 6ules of 'ourt, provides that a &udge may, in theexercise of his sound discretion, disqualify himself from sitting in a case, for &ust or valid reasonsother than those mentioned in the said provision. ut it does not give &udges the unfettereddiscretion to decide whether to desist from hearing a case. !he inhibition must be for &ust and validreasons. !he mere imputation of bias or partiality is not enough ground for them to inhibit,especially when the charge is without basis. Dere intervention of the respondent &udge during thehearing of preliminary in&unction by simply asking the materiality of a question directed upon thewitness and ruling against the petitioners are within the prerogatives and powers of the &udge. !hefact that the &udge asked questions in the course of the trial does not make him a biased &udge. Itis not only the right but also the duty of a trial &udge to examine witnesses when it appearsnecessary for the elucidation of the record. # &udge may also properly intervene in the presentationof evidence to expedite and prevent unnecessary waste of time and clarify obscure and incompletedetails after the witness has given direct testimony. Dere suspicion of partiality is not enough.

!here should be hard evidence to prove it, as well as a manifest showing of bias and partialitystemming from extra&udicial source or some other basis. In the absence of clear and convincingevidence to prove the charge, a ruling not to inhibit oneself cannot &ust be overturned.1urthermore, &ust because the opinion of a party is at variance with that of the &udge, the formercannot use it as an excuse to hurl imputations of unfairness and partiality in the absence of clearand convincing proof . (S5OUSES LEO5OLDO HIZON -9d 5ERLITA DELA )UENTE HIZON vs.S5OUSES GIGI DELA )UENTE -9d JOSE5HINE #ANGAHAS, S5OUSES JORGE #AGBITANG -9d

ADELAIDA 4ILLACORTA #AGBITANG "G.R. No. '/0/8. #-+c6 /0, /%%1.23

LANDMARK DECISIONS

LE@AL ET ICS

ADMISSION TO T E PRACTICE OF LAW

!he 0upreme 'ourt and the 3hilippine ar have always tried to maintain a high standard for

the legal profession, both in academic preparation and legal training, as well as in honesty and fairdealing. 5ne of the ways of achieving this end is to admit to the practice only those persons whoare known to be honest, possess good moral character, and show proficiency in and knowledge of the law by the standard set by this 'ourt by passing the ar Examinations honestly and in theregular and usual manner. 'onsequently, any charge or insinuation of anomaly in the conduct of

ar Examinations, of necessity is imbued with wide and general interest and material importance.(I9 Re I9ves;i


21/39



independently and are guided by their own rules of procedure. ()ide=- 4-+


22/39




!here can be no question that personal differences and family problems are not lawfulgrounds and valid &ustification for the frequent absences of an employee in the public service.3ursuant to 'ivil 0ervice #ct >3.B. 2o. *7+=, frequent unauthori"ed absences are grounds fordisciplinary action and the 'ourt considers respondent$s misconduct, a dereliction of duty and,therefore, pre&udicial to the public service. (Ho9. J. Ce>-+ S-9


23/39



Ethics had also warned that lawyers should not resort to indirect advertisements for professionalemployment, such as furnishing or inspiring newspaper comments, or procuring his photograph tobe published in connection with causes in which the lawyer have been engaged or concerning themanner of the conduct, the magnitude of the interest involved, the importance the lawyer s

position, and all other like self-laudatory claims. (U=e@ vs. Le


24/39




#ttorneys are reminded of their solemn oath upon their admission to the 3hilippine ar thatthey will do no falsehood and conduct themselves as lawyers according to the best of theirknowledge and discretion with all good fidelity to the courts and their clients. !he unsatisfactoryexplanation given by #tty. Belante as against the pleadings of record in the case at bar evinces awillful disregard of his solemn duty as an attorney to employ in the conduct of a case such meansonly as are consistent with truth and honor, and never seek to mislead the courts by an artifice orfalse statement of fact or law. !he 'ourt has ever stressed that a lawyer must do his best to honorhis oath, as there would be a great detriment to, if not failure of, the administration of &ustice if courts could not rely on the submissions and representations made by lawyers in the conduct of acase. #s stated by the 'ourt in one case, J!ime and time again, lawyers have been admonished toremember that they are officers of the court, and that while they owe their clients the duty of complete fidelity and the utmost diligence, they are likewise held to strict accountability insofar ascandor and honesty towards the court is concerned.J (Li*e+-;o C-s-=s, e;. -=. vs. Ho9. 4ice9;e N.C si, J+. "'/ SCRA '8. J = /, ! 023

DUTY OF A LAWYER TO OBEY LAWFUL ORDERS OF T E COURT

'onsistent with respondent s failure to file an answer to the complaint herein filed againsthim, he also did not appear, despite due notice on the four occasions when the hearing of thepresent complaint was set at the 5ffice of the 0olicitor General. 2either has respondent shownconcern or interest about the status of the complaint filed against him. !he inaction of respondentto the resolutions of this onorable 'ourt requiring him to file his #nswer to the 'omplaint filedagainst him and his subsequent failure to attend the hearings on the said complaint indicate thatrespondent has not obeyed the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities and he has notconducted himself as a lawyer according to the best of his knowledge and discretion with all goodfidelity as well to the courts as to his clients >0ec. , 6ule ( *, 6ules of 'ourt=. 1urther, lawyers areparticularly called upon to obey court orders and processes. !hey should stand foremost incomplying with the court s directives or instructions being themselves officers of the court >p. +/,4egal Ethics, 6uben #gpalo, @nd Ed.=. !his lack of concern shown by respondent regarding thematter that involved the very foundation of his right to engage in the practice of law would showhow much less he would regard the interest of his clients.J (N


25/39



circumstances of each case. #dherence to the general rule would, in the instant case, result in theoutright deprivation of their property through a technicality.

!he 'ourt finds that the negligence of counsel in this case appears to be so gross andinexcusable. !his was compounded by the fact, that after petitioner gave said counsel another

chance to make up for his omissions by asking him to file a petition for annulment of the &udgmentin the appellate court, again counsel abandoned the case of petitioner in that after he received acopy of the adverse &udgment of the appellate court, he did not do anything to save the situationor inform his client of the &udgment. e allowed the &udgment to lapse and become final. 0uchreckless and gross negligence should not be allowed to bind the petitioner. 3etitioner was therebyeffectively deprived of her day in court. (4ic;o+i- Le


26/39




proceedings, that a counsel for a party should file with the court his formal written appearance inthe case, before filing a pleading therein, or mention in said pleading that he is submitting thesame in collaboration with the counsel of record, the mere circumstance that such acts were notdone does not warrant the conclusion that the pleading filed by such counsel has no legal effectwhatsoever. (O9< C6i9< vs. Ho9. Jose R-?o=e;e, e;. -=. "' SCRA 0. #- 8, ! 023

WIT DRAWAL AS COUNSEL DE OFICIO

!here was no incompatibility between the duty of petitioner to the accused and to thecourt and the performance of his task as an election registrar of the 'ommission on Elections andthat the ends of &ustice would be served by allowing and requiring Dr. 4edesma to continue ascounsel de oficio, since the prosecution has already rested its case. !he role of a member of the

ar in the defense of an accused is indispensable. 0uch consideration could have sufficed forpetitioner not being allowed to withdraw as counsel de oficio. !here are times, and this is one of them, when duty to court and to client takes precedence over the promptings of self-interest.(A9;o9io Ledes?- vs. Ho9. R-f-e= C=i?-co "' SCRA 1 0. J 9e /8, ! 123

WIT DRAWAL OF COUNSEL

It is not disputed that the Hithdrawal of #ppearance of #tty. :ose :imene", :r. was filedwith the trial court on 1ebruary (@, ())(. 0ince the withdrawal was with the client$s consent, noapproval thereof by the trial court was required because a court approval is indispensable only if the withdrawal is without the client$s consent. !he retirement is completed once the withdrawal isfiled in court. 2o further action thereon by the court is needed other than the mechanical act of the clerk of court of entering the name of the new counsel in the docket and of giving writtennotice thereof to the adverse party. !he failure of the clerk of court to do either does not affectthe validity of the retirement. !he appearance of the new counsel, #tty. 3ineda, did not likewiserequire the approval of the court. #n appearance may be made by simply filing a formal motion,plea or answer, or through the formal method, vi"., by delivering to the clerk of court a writtendirection ordering him to enter the appearance of the counsel. !he latter method is exactly what#tty. 3ineda followed. (E=ois- A+-?* =o, e;. -=. vs. Co +; of A@@e-=s -9d E9


27/39



parties, and hence, his fees should be sub&ect to &udicial control. 2or it should be ignored thatsound public policy demands that courts disregard stipulations for counsel fees whenever theyappear to be a source of speculative profit at the expense of the debtor or mortgagor. (B-c6+-c6vs. Go=i9


28/39




TO BE E ERCISED WIT @REAT CAUTION

!he power to disbar must be exercised with great caution. 5nly in a clear case of misconduct that seriously affects the standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the'ourt and member of the bar will disbarment be imposed as a penalty. It should never be decreedwhere a lesser penalty, such as temporary suspension, would accomplish the end desired. (#o9;-9ovs. I9;e


29/39



ever remain obliged in eternal gratitude to :ustice 6eyesJ, the negative answer to the question of &udge Eli"aga yields to exceptions in extraordinary cases. (J d- ;& %&' $, M&$$ A-'/ 0 # &;;#-& %# . '- #- '; & % &%+ %+# S" /#;# C'"/%, / .&%+ % J& P" '%# 0# -&$ ' #- 4/'; % H& %+# ' %+ $ ;#;0#/ '4 %+# P+& & & # B / 0# "$#+# $ ; & % & & & & &% $#>" /# %&' $ &%+ $#:#/ ';# '%+#/ %+ +&$ 4" . #--#-$ '"$#) ' #:#/, 4/'; " #> & #- /# $' $, +# $" ##-#- %' % H# +&$ ' %+ $ .#/) L %#/,


ICS9


30/39




+# ' 4/' %#- &%+ M&$$ A-'/ 0 # $ '; & % 4'/; ., P" '%# ;':#- 4'/ &%$ -&$;&$$ ' %+#/'" - %+ % &% &$ /# -. ;''% - -#;& ) S+'" - M&$$ A-'/ 0 # $ '; & % 0# -&$;&$$#- '/'% E> & 0/ .)

A $ #/!he complaint of Diss #dorable should not be dismissed. In the case of ; puc r v. ; puc r

the 0upreme 'ourt ruled that good moral character is not only a condition precedent for admissionto the legal profession, but it must also remain intact in order to maintain one$s good standing inthat exclusive and honored fraternity. !he grounds for disbarment or suspension of a lawyer consistof those acts of misconduct committed before and after his admission to practice. !he acts of misconduct prior to admission include those which indicate that at the time the lawyer took hisoath he did not possess the required qualifications for membership in the bar, such as good moralcharacter, citi"enship, completion of the educational requirements and passing the bar

examinations. #nything which shows that he has none of any of these qualifications will &ustifycancellation of his license. !hus, the taking of the oath as a member of the 3hilippine ar neitherwarrants the dismissal of the complaint against ic 3ugote nor does it render said complaint mootand academic.

A %#/ %&:# A $ #/#tty. Dalibu$s contention is not tenable. Bisciplinary proceedings are sui eneris. !hey are

neither civil nor criminal proceedings. Its purpose is not to punish the individual lawyer but tosafeguard the administration of &ustice by protecting the court and the public from the misconductof lawyers and to remove from the profession of law persons whose disregard of their oath of officeproves them unfit to continue discharging the trust reposed in them as members of the bar.Bisbarment is imprescriptible. nlike ordinary proceedings, it is not sub&ect to the defense of prescription. !he ordinary statute of limitations has no application to disbarment proceedings.(! lo vs. 0e /o, @7 0'6# ((C@ M()C+N=.

RI@ TS OF T E ACCUSED

Q"#$%&'U ' ' # & $#$$&' '4 +&$ '"/%, %+# P/#$&-& "- # '%& #- %+# /#$# # '4

%# #:&$&' ;#/ $ $#% " % $%/ %# & #$ & +&$ '"/%/''; - %+# '$%& '4 ;#-&/ %&%&' #/$ ':#/ +&$ $ &%+ %+#&/ :&-#' ;#/ $) T+# "- # 4'/%+ &%+ &$$"#- '/-#/

-&/# %& %+# #> "$&' 4/'; %+# '"/%/''; '4 %# #:&$&' / +#/ & - 4"/%+#/& $%/" %& %+# /# '/%#/$ & $&-# %+# + '% %' ' #/ %# %+#&/ :&-#' ;$ -"/& %+#

/' ##-& $) T+# -#4# $# .#/$ '0 # %#- %' %+# '"/% $ '/-#/, &;& %+ % &% $ :&' %&:#'4 %+#&/ % $ ' $%&%"%&' /& +% %' "0 & %/& )

I &$$"& %+# G"#$%&' #- '/-#/, -&- %+# "- # % & :&' %&' '4 %+# /& +%$ '4 %+#"$#- %' "0 & %/& D&$ "$$ 0/ .)

D&- %+# "- # % & -#/' %&' '4 /#$$ 4/##-'; +# +# -&/# %#- %+# #> "$&' '4 %+#%# #:&$&' / +#/ & 4/'; %+# '"/%/''; - +# +# /'+&0&%#- %+# # $ /# '/%#/$ & %+#

'"/%/''; 4/'; ' #/ %& %+#&/ :&-#' ;$ -"/& %+# /' ##-& $ R# $' 0/ .)

A $ #/*#. N' , the :udge did not act in violation of the rights of the accused to a public trial. !heright assured under the 'onstitution covers the right of the defendant to be given an opportunity tobe heard and that &udgment be rendered upon lawful hearing. !he &udge has the right to order the

exclusion of the reporters from the courtroom since under 6ule .7 of the 'ode of :udicial'onduct, 8# &udge shall maintain order and proper decorum in the court.9 # trial is public 8whenanyone interested in observing the manner a &udge conducts the proceedings in his courtroom maydo so< >% rci vs. 0o/in o, /@ 0'6# (A M()+ N=. !here is to be no ban on attendance. In the


L A W

1


31/39



question given, the &udge did not bar attendance, only the use of television paraphernalia and8video cams9.

. N' . 3ress freedom is not violated when the &udge directed the exclusion of the television

paraphernalia from the courtroom since 6ule (.7 of the 'ode of :udicial 'onduct provides that 8#&udge should be vigilant against any attempt to subvert the independence of the &udiciary andresist any pressure from whatever source.9 !he &udge may lawfully do so since he merelyprotecting the 'ourt by proscribing public comments on pending litigations which is not allowed if such would impede obstruct, embarrass or influence the courts in administering &ustice in a pendingsuit or proceeding.

!he serious risks posed to the fair administration of &ustice by live ! and radio broadcast,especially when emotions are running high on the issues stirred by the case, should be taken intoconsideration before addressing the issue of press freedom. !he right of the accused to a fair trial,not by trial by publicity takes precedence over press freedom as invoked by the ! reporters in thiscase. > Sec.Pere& vs. 9str d , C/ 0'6# C@, M@77(N=.

CODE OF PROFESSIONAL R ESPONSIBILITY

LAWYER S DUTIES

Q"#$%&' *U -#/ %+# C'-# '4 P/'4#$$&' R#$ ' $&0& &%., + % &$ %+# /& & '0 & %&' '4

.#/ %' /-$*

1) T+# # /'4#$$&' - %+# I %# / %#- B /2) &$ /'4#$$&' ' # "#$3) T+# -#:# ' ;# % '4 %+# # $.$%#;


32/39




/. !he principal obligations of a lawyer to his client are

Documents

Beda Rednotes Legal Ethics