BCCM - Session 18 - Power Point

7/30/2019 BCCM - Session 18 - Power Point

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Business Crisis and Continuity

Management (BCCM)

Class Session 18

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Crisis Characteristics

Threats to major values.

Time urgency. Ambiguity or uncertainty.

Surprise or uniqueness.

Source: Post, Jerrold M. 1993. The Impact of Crisis-Induced Stress on Policy Makers, in

Avoiding Inadvertent War, edited by A. George. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. Page 472.

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CRISIS SITUATIONS AND

INFORMATION MANAGEMENT

Crisis situations are novel, unstructured and outside of an

organizations or individuals typical operating

framework

Crises require nonprogrammed decision responses

Crises are highly uncertain and complex situations

Crises are characterized by an overload of incomplete,

conflicting information

The process of perceiving, selecting, and processing this

information is critical to effective crisis management

Source: Reilly, A.H. 1993. Preparing for the Worst: The Process of Effective Crisis

Management. Industrial and Environmental Quarterly. Vol. 7, No. 2. Page 118. 18 - 3


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CRISIS

ATTRIBUTES

PROBLEM

SENSING

PROBLEM/THREATDIAGNOSIS

DECISION

RESPONSE

EXTERNAL

INFORMATION

FLOW

RESOURCE

MOBILIZATION

RESPONSE ACTIONS

INTERNAL

INFORMATION

FLOW

CRISIS

OUTCOMES

DECISIONS

AND ACTIONS

EVENT

PERCEPTION

CRISIS MANAGEMENT

Environment

THE ROLE OF INFORMATION

IN CRISIS MANAGEMENT(Source: Reilly, A.H. 1993. Preparing for the

Worst: The Process of Effective Crisis

Management.Industrial and EnvironmentalQuarterly. Vol. 7, No. 2.)

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The Three Rights of Information to

Support Crisis Decision Making

Get the right information

to the right people at the right time.

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Layered Functions

5. Organizational Memory 6. Group Processes

4. Values

3. Filtering

2. Data Validation

1. Connectivity

Source: Hale, Joanne. 1997. A Layered Communication Architecture for the Support of Crisis

Response.J ournal of Management Information Systems. Vol. 14, No. 1.

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Tasks of the Crisis Decision Maker

Define the main elements of the situation

Maintain receptivity to new information

Identify and adequately consider the major values, interests, and

objectives to be fulfilled

Search for and evaluate alternative courses of action Estimate probable costs and risks of alternatives

Search for new information relevant to assessment of options

Discriminate between relevant and irrelevant information

Consider problems that arise in implementing options Assess the situation from the perspective of other parties

Resist both defensive procrastination and premature closure

Monitor feedback from the developing situation

Make adjustments to meet real changes in the environment 18 - 7


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Characteristics of Defective Decision

Making in Crisis

A truncated time span, with major attention being devoted to the immediate

and diminished attention to long-range consequences of the action;

A perceived requirement for decisional closure, which may in turn lead to

premature action or, conversely;

In searching for certainty, a tendency to irrational procrastination;

Cognitive rigidity, a tendency to maintain a fixed mind-set and not be open to

new information;

A tendency to reduce cognitive complexity and uncertainty;

A reduction of the range of options considered;

In considering options, a tendency to bolster, - that is to upgrade factors infavor of the favored action prescription and downgrade factors militating

against;

Source : Post, Jerrold M. 1993. The Impact of Crisis-Induced Stress on Policy Makers, in

Avoiding Inadvertent War, edited by A. George. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. Pages 475.

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Characteristics of Defective Decision

Making in Crisis (Contd)

A tendency to view the present in terms of the past;

A tendency to seek familiar patterns, to relate the critical events to

mental schemata or scripts;

Diminished creativity;

A tendency toward the fundamental attribution bias to see the

others actions as being precipitated by internal (psychological) causes

rather than external circumstances (example: my adversarys actions

show he is malevolently out to destroy us, rather than that he is

protecting himself from external threats); and A corresponding tendency to fall into the actor-observer discrepancy

that is, to see the external situation as the cause of ones own behavior

without attending to ones own internal psychological motivations.

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The Impact of Crisis-Induced Stress on

Decision Makers

Stimulus

situation

Perception

of threat to

values

Anxiety or

fear

Coping

Pattern

Impact on

information

processing

Choice of

decision or

policy

Effects of stress on leadership decision-making

Source:Post, Jerrold M. 1993. The Impact of Crisis-Induced Stress on Policy Makers, inAvoiding Inadvertent War, edited by A. George. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. Page 475.

Stress

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Source:Post, Jerrold M. 1993. TheImpact of Crisis-Induced Stress on

Policy Makers. in AvoidingInadvertent War, edited by A. George.Boulder, CO: Westview Press. Page

474.

PERFORMANCE/STRESS CURVE

Stress

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The Compulsive Personality

Under Crisis Induced Stress

Folie du doute - paralyzed by indecision.

Tendency to irrational procrastination because of search for

certainty; fear of making a mistake.

Once decisional closure, difficult to reopen. Comfortable with applying set policies and procedures to

solve problems.

Sensitive to position in hierarchy.

Overly responsive to superiors, competes with peers anddominates subordinates.

Source:Post, Jerrold M. 1993. The Impact of Crisis-Induced Stress on Policy Makers, inAvoiding Inadvertent War, edited by A. George. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. Pages 477-479.

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The Narcissistic Personality

Under Crisis Induced Stress

Self centered, egocentric, and self-absorbed.

Seek constant reassurance of self-worth.

Primary loyalty to self; acts to promote own position.

Can shift positions easily.

Believe that they are principled and scrupulous individuals.

Seek advisors who prop up their self-esteem.


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The Paranoid Personality Under Crisis

Induced Stress

Surrounded by enemies - extreme suspiciousness.

Difficulty trusting own subordinates.

Fixed conclusion in search of evidence.

Do not accept information and advice that runs

contrary to own conclusions.


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Unconflicted adherence

Unconflicted change

Defensive avoidance Hypervigilance

Vigilance

Five Basic Patterns of Decision

Making

Source: Fink, Steven. 1986. Crisis Management: Planning for the Inevitable. New York:Amacom. Pages 133150.

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Define the main elements of the situation Maintain receptivity to new information



Search for and evaluate alternative courses of action

Estimate probable costs and risks of alternatives



Consider problems that arise in implementing options

Assess the situation from the perspective of other parties



Make adjustments to meet real changes in the environment 18 - 16


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Decision Making Patterns

Vigilance follows a methodical, high-quality process to objectively collect

available information, thoroughly consider it, search for other possible

options, and make a well reasoned decision.

Unconflicted adherence continuing with the current situation.

Unconflicted change following the last advice received.

Defensive avoidance avoiding decision making.

Hypervigilant vacillating approach.

Source: Fink, Steven. 1986. Crisis Management: Planning for the Inevitable. New York:Amacom. Pages 133150.

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A Definition of Groupthink

a mode of thinking that people engage in when they are

deeply involved in a cohesive in-groupmembers striving

for unanimity override their motivation to realistically

appraise alternate courses of action a deterioration of

mental efficiency, reality testing, and moral judgement that

results from in-group pressures.

Source: Neck, C.P., and Manz, C.C. 1994. From Group Think to Teamthink: Toward the

Creation of Constructive Thought Patterns in Self-Managing Work Teams. HumanRelations. Vol. 47, No. 8. Derived from Victims of Groupthink, by I.L. Janis (Boston:Houghton Mifflin. 1972). Page 9 in Groupthink.

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Antecedent Conditions for Groupthink Primary: Moderately or highly cohesive group.

Structural or administrative faults in the organization in which the

group exists including:

Insulation of the group.

The group leaders preference for a certain decision.

A lack of norms requiring methodical procedures for the group.

Homogeneity of the group members social background and ideology.

High stress from external threats with low hope of a better

solution than the leaders.

Low group self-esteem induced by the groups perception of

recent failures, excessive difficulty on current decision-makingtasks, and moral dilemmas (i.e., apparent lack of feasible

alternatives except ones that violate ethical standards).

Source:Neck, C.P., and Manz, C.C. 1994. From Group Think to Teamthink: Toward the Creation of Constructive ThoughtPatterns in Self-Managing Work Teams. Human Relations. Vol. 47, No. 8. Derived from Victims of Groupthink, by I.L. Janis

(Boston: Houghton Mifflin. 1972). Page 2 and 3. 18 - 19


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Symptoms of Groupthink

Direct social pressure placed on a member who argues against thegroups shared beliefs.

Members self-censorship of their own thoughts or concerns that

deviate from the group consensus.

An illusion of the groups invulnerability to failure.

A shared illusion of unanimity.

The emergence of self-appointed mind guards that screen out

information from outside the group.

Collective efforts to rationalize.

Stereotyped views of potential adversaries outside the group.

Unquestioned belief in the groups inherent morality.Source:Neck, C.P., and Manz, C.C. 1994. From Group Think to Teamthink: Toward the Creation of Constructive ThoughtPatterns in Self-Managing Work Teams. Human Relations. Vol. 47, No. 8. Derived from Victims of Groupthink, by I.L. Janis

(Boston: Houghton Mifflin. 1972). Page 3.18 - 20


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Symptoms of Defective

Decision-Making

Incomplete survey of alternatives.

Incomplete survey of objectives.

Failure to examine risks of preferred choices.

Failure to reappraise initially rejected alternatives.

Poor information search.

Selective bias in processing information at hand.

Failure to work out contingency plans.


(Boston: Houghton Mifflin. 1972). Page 3. 18 - 21


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Antecedent Conditions of

Teamthink

Team beliefs and assumptions emphasizing the

positive.

Team self-talk - encouraging open discussion.

Team mental imagery - creating a common vision.

Thought patterns - optimism.


(Boston: Houghton Mifflin. 1972). Page 57.18 - 22


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Symptoms of Teamthink

Encouragement of divergent views.

Open expression of concerns and ideas.

Awareness of limitations and threats. Recognition of members uniqueness.

Discussion of collective doubts.

Source:Neck, C.P., and Manz, C.C. 1994. From Group Think to Teamthink: Toward the Creation of Constructive ThoughtPatterns in Self-Managing Work Teams. Human Relations. Vol. 47, No. 8. Derived from Victims of Groupthink, by I.L. Janis(Boston: Houghton Mifflin. 1972). Page 7.

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Define the main elements of the situation Maintain receptivity to new information



Search for and evaluate alternative courses of action

Estimate probable costs and risks of alternatives



Consider problems that arise in implementing options

Assess the situation from the perspective of other parties



Make adjustments to meet real changes in the environment18 - 24


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Myers Briggs

http://www.humanmetrics.com/cgi-

win/jungtype.htm

http://www.typelogic.com/

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http://www.humanmetrics.com/cgi-win/jungtype.htmhttp://www.humanmetrics.com/cgi-win/jungtype.htmhttp://www.typelogic.com/http://www.typelogic.com/http://www.humanmetrics.com/cgi-win/jungtype.htmhttp://www.humanmetrics.com/cgi-win/jungtype.htmhttp://www.humanmetrics.com/cgi-win/jungtype.htm

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BCCM - Session 18 - Power Point