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ARISTOTLE AND AESCHYLUS ON THERISE OF THE POLIS:
THE NECESSITY OF JUSTICE IN HUMAN LIFE
Clifford Angell Bates, Jr.1
Abstract: Aeschylus’ Oresteia supports Aristotle’s claim about the naturalness ofthe city and the city’s role in shaping justice for humans. In the Oresteia, Aeschylusshows how the city’s justice is the only way to control the wrath of the Furies (whichsymbolize the power of blood ties and the family bonds). Aeschylus shows that the cityand its justice tames the Furies and provides for the only way by which the hus-band-wife relation, which is not a blood tie but provides the basis for which the family(the source of blood ties) is even possible, can be preserved and be secure from the pas-sions the Furies release in their quest for revenge. The Furies and their desire for ven-geance for the violation of the blood bond, threaten to undermine the vary basis onwhich the family is founded: the husband-wife bond. Thus Aeschylus gives supportand aids Aristotle’s position that the husband-wife bond is a political bond and restswithin the realm of the city and the political.
The issue of justice is central to political thought and of fundamental impor-
tance to a complete understanding of politics. Both Aristotle and Aeschylus
argue that politics or human political activity necessitates justice.2
Aristotle
says that without justice there can be no city and therefore no political life
(Pol. 3.12.1283a19–22). Aeschylus dramatizes this point in his Oresteia. It is
clear, at least in Aristotle, to be fully human, human beings need the political
community to fulfil their natures (Pol. 1.2.1252a25–53a40).3
The claim made by Aristotle that ‘human beings are political animals’ (Pol.
1.2.1253a2–6 and 3.6.1278b18–19) has, in the past several years, become a
1 Uniwersytet Warszawski, Institute of The Americas and Europe, American StudiesCenter, Al. Niepodleglosci 22, 2–653, Warzawa, Poland. Email: [email protected]
2 The following are the abbreviations used throughout: NE, Nicomachean Ethics;Pol., Politics; Agm., Agamemnon; LB, The Libation Bearers; and Eum., The Eumenides.In this essay, I used David Green and Wendy O’Flaherty, ed. and trans. [‘Introduction’with Nicholas Rudall] The Oresteia of Aeschylus (Chicago, 1989). Although RichardLattimore, trans., Aeschylus I: Oresteia (Chicago, 1953) and Robert Fagles, ed. andtrans., with introductory essay by W.B. Stanford, Aeschylus: The Oresteia (New York,1975) are still available, Green and O’Flaherty’s is slightly better in that they have thesetwo fine editions to work from. The translations of Aristotle’s Pol. and NE are mostly myown, although I refer to Carnes Lord’s translation of the Pol. and Terence Irwin’s transla-tions of NE.
3 John Ferguson argues that the Aristotelian dictum that man is a political animal is‘not far from the center’ of Aeschylus’ Oresteia, in that ‘man finds his fulfillment only inordered society’. See A Companion to Greek Tragedy (Austin, 1972), p. 106.
controversial topic in Aristotle scholarship.4
In many ways, the ‘political ani-
mal argument’ was put forward to stress the natural sociability of humans,
against the view held by Hobbes and other modern political theorists, who
argue that human sociability is not per se natural. The rejection of human nat-
ural sociability culminates in the rejection of Aristotle’s claim that the polis
(city) or the political community is natural.5
Also, a good portion of the schol-
arship concerning the political animal question in Aristotle’s political
thought, fails in at least four ways to address the issue of why the political
community must be authoritative over all other human associations. The four
failings are the following. 1) There is a tendency, among certain scholars, in
their attempt to defend the natural sociability of human beings against the
arguement of Hobbes et al., either to undermine or ignore the distinction
between the political community and the household.6
In doing so, these mod-
ern scholars, who claim to be defending Aristotle’s understanding of political
animals, seem to forget that Aristotle explicitly states that those who fail to
distinguish between the household and the polis — as being different in kind
and not merely different in terms of number or size — ‘do not argue rightly’
(Pol. 1.1.1252a7–15). 2) Another tendency, of another group of scholars, is to
overstress the cultural and productive (or technological) aspect of human
nature, which they believe really defines human beings as political animals.7
This group believes that physical and linguistic social constructs are what
define how humans are political. Yet this view ultimately denies any sort of
naturalness to the political bond and therefore tends to turn Aristotle into Kant
or another modern social thinker. 3) Then there are those scholars who claim
48 C.A. BATES
4 W. Kullmann’s article once again brought critical attention to this argument in Aris-totle (‘Der Mensch als politisches Lebenwesen bei Aristoteles’, Hermes, 108 (1980), pp.456–77). Kullmann’s article has been translated into English for David Keyt and Fred D.Miller, Jr., A Companion to Aristotle’s Politics (Oxford, 1991), pp. 94–117. Also seeR. G. Mulgan, ‘Aristotle’s Doctrine that Man is a Political Animal’, Hermes, 120 (1974),pp. 438–45. Mulgan replies to Kullmann and begins the current controversy over Aris-totle’s claim that ‘man is a political animal’.
5 See Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan and Jean Jacques Rousseau, Second Discourse[Discours sur les origins de l’inégalité]. Also see Leo Strauss, ‘What is Political Philoso-phy?’, in An Introduction to Political Philosophy: Ten Essays by Leo Strauss, ed. HilailGildin (Detroit, 1989), pp. 48–57. Now it could be argued (and most scholars argue) thatboth Hobbes and Rousseau do not deny that the family is ‘natural’, but merely that thepolitical community is not natural. But the focus of this paper is the naturalness of thepolitical community.
6 See Larry Arnhart, ‘Aristotle, Chimpanzees, and Other Political Animals’, SocialScience Information, 29 (1990), pp. 479–559; ‘The Darwinian Biology of Aristotle’sPolitical Animals’, American Journal of Political Science, 38 (1994), pp. 464–85, and‘The New Darwinian Naturalism in Political Theory’, American Political ScienceReview, 89 (1995), pp. 289–400; Roger D. Masters, The Nature of Politics (New Haven,1989); and James Q. Wilson, The Moral Sense (New York, 1993).
7 Bernard Yack, Problems of a Political Animal (Berkeley, 1993).
that Aristotle’s political animal teaching is a blunder, which forces an incon-
sistency in Aristotle’s political thought, when otherwise he would really agree
with Hobbes, that the political community is a human construct and is not
really natural.8
4) Finally, there is another group of scholars who in a way
agrees with the view stated above, but argues that Aristotle does not make a
blunder; instead the blunder about the naturalness of the city is an esoteric
cover, one which points to the tension of the city and the best way of life —
i.e., philosophy.9
All four of the above groups of scholars seem to address how or how not
human beings are political animals, usually in strictly biological or anthropo-
logical terms. They tend not to address the question in political terms — i.e.,
that politics is the ruling or most central concern for human beings. Thus,
against the aforementioned ways of looking at the political animal question, I
will examine a question that was ignored by the above scholars — namely,
why the city or the political community must be authoritative. Addressing this
question is of utmost importance if one desires to understand why human
beings are political animals. It is the logic of man’s political nature which
requires that the polis or the political community be authoritative — i.e., to
have the authority or the power to sanction, legitimize or empower — in mat-
ters of human affairs. To do this, we must explore the origins of the polis and
Aristotle’s claim that the polis is prior to both the individual and the house-
hold (Pol. 1.2.1253a19). Although Aristotle gives us the conceptual frame-
work to address this question, Aeschylus gives us a poetic example, which not
only dramatizes but also clarifies and presents explicit reasons why the politi-
cal community must be authoritative, that are implicit in Aristotle’s account.
Aeschylus’ trilogy suggests that the city became authoritative when the
forces of the household were made to submit to the laws of the city. Or as Fer-
guson says, ‘the play cycle is about the blood feud coming under the rule of
law, and the people caught up in the process’.10
This article will attempt to
show how Aeschylus’ trilogy helps us come to a fuller understanding of Aris-
totle’s teaching about the authoritativeness of the polis. Although the authori-
tativeness of the polis over the household is stated by Aristotle in the Politics,
nowhere in that text is it shown how or why the polis became authoritative. On
the other hand, Aeschylus’ Oresteia, especially the Eumenides, dramatizes
both how and why the polis is authoritative. It shows how the old gods, repre-
sented by the Furies, which symbolize the power of the household, are put
under the control and rule of the polis. Thus the tension, between the new —
Olympian — deities and the older deities, is an intentional reflection of the
ARISTOTLE & AESCHYLUS ON THE RISE OF THE POLIS 49
8 David Keyt, ‘Three Fundamental Theorems in Aristotle’s Politics’, Phronesis, 32(1987), pp. 54–79.
9 Wayne Ambler, ‘Aristotle’s Understanding of the Naturalness of the City’, Reviewof Politics, 47 (1985), pp. 53–95.
10 Ferguson, A Companion to Greek Tragedy, p. 108.
tension between the household and the political community. As Christian
Meier contends, the discovery of the political occurs when political life
through community — derived decisions override family/kinship — derived
decision processes. This is the teaching of the Oresteia.
At the end of the Oresteia, the realm of the household, oikos, is now to be
under the authority of the polis or more correctly the political community.11
In
one sense the Oresteia represents not the rise of the polis per se, since the polis
may be said to have existed before the end of the trilogy, but the rise of the
authoritativeness of the polis or, as Meier says, the discovery of the political in
Greek political thought.12
Meier says that the Oresteia ‘gave expression to the
political at the very moment when it first burst upon Athens, and did so, more-
over, in a manner that was wholly adequate to the theme and is still relevant
today’.13
Although the Oresteia concerns itself with showing how the politi-
cal became authoritative, let us not forget the particular regime that triumphs
at the end of the trilogy — Athenian democracy — and Aeschylus’ role in giv-
ing it a defence. Also, W.B. Stanford argues that Aeschylus’ portrayal of
Athena’s founding of the Areopagus presents him as a ‘conservative demo-
crat, conserves his origins by competing with them, evincing their potential
for the future’.14
I
The plot of the Oresteia should be familiar to most readers. The Oresteia is in
fact a trilogy — Agamemnon, The Libation Bearers, and The Eumenides. It
begins with Agamemnon, the leader of the Greeks in their war against the Tro-
jans, returning home from the war. He returns home the victor of a great, yet
costly war. He brings back many great prizes. One of them is the Trojan prin-
cess Cassandra. While expecting great acclaim and acknowledgment upon his
triumphal return, he finds his wife Clytemnestra has taken up with Aegisthus,
a political enemy. The reason for her action is that she desires revenge on Aga-
memnon for the sacrifice of their daughter Iphigeneia.
Clytemnestra plots Agamemnon’s death with her lover to revenge
Iphigeneia’s sacrifice by Agamemnon, whom he sacrificed to win the war
against Troy. Although Aegisthus does not actually take part in the killing —
Clytemnestra alone murders Agamemnon — he goes along with the plot so he
may take over the city. Agamemnon ends with Clytemnestra and her lover
50 C.A. BATES
11 Aristotle, and Greek political thinkers in general, treat the polis — translated as thecity — in two ways: 1) as the urban centre — literally the city; 2) as the political commu-nity (in its generic meaning). In this essay I refer to the polis or the city as the latter, not theformer.
12 See Christian Meier, The Greek Discovery of Politics (Cambridge, 1990)pp. 80–139, and The Political Art of Greek Tragedy (Baltimore Md, 1995).
13 Meier, The Greek Discovery of Politics, p. 82.14 Stanford, in Fagles, Aeschylus: The Oresteia, p. 97.
Aegisthus in charge of the city and the citizens waiting for Orestes to remove
the newly imposed tyranny.15
Although the citizens of Argos challenge what
both Aegisthus and Clytemnestra did, they are powerless to right it. Although
the citizens can easily rise up and kill both murders,16
they lack the authority
or sanction to take action against either Aegisthus or Clytemnestra. The citi-
zens must wait for Orestes, who because he is Agamemnon’s son, has sanc-
tion to take vengeance. The city of Argos is thus reduced to the household of
Agamemnon, where only the head of the household has authority to pursue
policy.
Orestes, who is in exile, returns home to mourn over his father’s grave.
There he meets his sister, Electra. Although he desires to revenge his father,
he has some doubts. Electra demands that her father’s murderers be punished.
This is the story of The Libation Bearers.
To aid him in his decision, Orestes informs her that he sought counsel from
Apollo’s oracle. He says the oracle told him to ‘kill them to match their kill-
ings’ or the Furies of his father’s blood would drive him mad. Now resolved to
do as Apollo’s oracle commands, he disguises himself as a stranger to enter
his mother’s house. He then kills both his mother and Aegisthus. Apollo then
requires Orestes to cleanse himself. Although he does what Apollo requires,
his mother’s Furies nevertheless pursue him, attempting to drive him mad.
This is how they seek vengeance for the murder of his mother.
The Eumenides begins with Orestes fleeing from the Furies. He again
appeals for Apollo’s protection. The god arrives but he cannot stop the Furies’
wrath. In an attempt to stop the Furies and aid Orestes, Apollo arranges with
the Furies for a trial of Orestes with Athena presiding. In Athens, however,
ARISTOTLE & AESCHYLUS ON THE RISE OF THE POLIS 51
15 Peter Euben rightly argues that Clytemnestra’s actions take her beyond the properscope of human action, thus endangering the possibility of human association (The RoadNot Taken: The Tragedy of Political Theory (Princeton, 1990), pp. 72–5). HoweverEuben’s feminist sensitivity understates the differences between the injustices of Aga-memnon and Clytemnestra. In one sense, although Agamemnon’s actions are harmful tohis own family, they could be justified in the context of faithfulness to one’s own oath.Remember, he is obligated by an oath to punish the Trojans for their injustice to hisbrother. On the other hand, Clytemnestra’s acts are far worse than her husband’s sincethey destroy the basis of marriage, which is the most fundamental basis of human associ-ation that does not rely upon force.
16 Nicholas Rudall says that the powerlessness or inaction of the free male citizens inAgamemnon should be contrasted to the slave women, who are prepared to take action, inthe beginning of LB (Green and O’Flaherty, The Oresteia of Aeschylus, p. 21). Althoughthe slave women are equally without authority to act, their thirst for vengeance — echo-ing the same thirst in the Furies against Orestes — has a plausible justification against tyr-anny. Clearly the rule of Aegisthus and Clytemnestra is tyrannical and since tyranny is anabrogation of the standards of all established authority and social norms, thus the slavewomen’s lack of authority to act can be practically ignored given the general lawlessnessof the newly established political regime. Yet the slave women do not act. Rather,Orestes, who in the old system — as heir and head of the household — alone has authorityto act, carries out what they themselves desire to do, revenge Agamemnon’s murder.
Athena says she cannot decide the case of murder alone, because the law
requires a jury trial. In doing this, Athena establishes the Areopagus as the
political institution in Athens which is concerned with justice and the rule of
law.17
A jury trial is agreed to. Apollo presents his defence of Orestes and his
actions. As Meier says, in this play, ‘right is pitted against right: a worse
dilemma cannot be imagined’.18
Following Apollo’s defence, the Furies present their case against Orestes.
Meier argues that the Furies ‘alone have assumed the task of avenging
Clytemnestra, since no mortal avenger is left’.19 Thus they see their role as
defender of blood ties and are forced to take action against Orestes, since no
one else shall. Athena, before the jury hands in its verdict, says her vote will
be for Orestes, because she is wholly for the father, and if there is a tie Orestes
is to go free. With Athena’s vote, the vote of the whole jury results in a tie —
thus the verdict favours Orestes. Ferguson suggests that there is a relationship
between the number of speeches made by both parties and the vote of the jury.
He says ‘the Furies have spoken six times, Apollo five; there are six votes for
condemnation, five for acquittal’.20
The Furies are not satisfied with the out-
come of the verdict. Although they will end their pursuit of Orestes, they now
desire to seek vengeance on Athens. Athena is aware of this and being Athens’
protector she tries to persuade the Furies not to engage in that course of action.
Instead, she attempts to persuade them to be the special guardians of the city.
She is successful in her argument and the Furies are reconciled to the city. The
play ends with Orestes restored as ruler of Argos, promising that Argos will
never be an enemy of Athens, and the Furies, now to be known as the
Eumenides, becoming the defender of the city.
In the Eumenides, there is a clear tension between the old gods, the Furies,
and the new gods, Apollo and Athena, fathered by Zeus. This tension echoes
the tension that is found in the play between the household (and the pre-politi-
cal) and the city (and the political). The old gods are aligned with the house-
hold and the new gods are aligned with the city. This is important: At the time
of the trial, the Furies are still unreconciled toward the city. The household
bonds, expressed as kin loyalty, force one to a cycle of revenge, in order to
right wrongs done to the family. There is no end to vengeance and no peace.
The desire for peace, which is needed for the fulfilment of human happiness
(eudaimonia), entails that one rise above one’s own — kin ties — to some
other claim that is more authoritative. This other claim is that of the polis.
52 C.A. BATES
17 See Meier, The Greek Discovery of Politics, pp. 106–15, 120–1, 124, and 134; andJames C. Hogan, A Commentary on the Complete Greek Tragedies: Aeschylus (Chicago,1984), pp. 168, 173 and 174.
18 Meier, The Greek Discovery of Politics, p. 89.19 Ibid., p. 90.20 Ferguson, A Companion to Greek Tragedy, p. 107.
II
In attempting to understand the tension between the household and the polis,
we can turn to Aristotle on the political and the polis.21
He says that human
beings are political animals (Pol. 1.2.1252b30–53a5 and 3.6.1278b18–19).
Yet Aristotle also says that the family, expressed in terms of the household, is
natural (Pol. 1.2.1252b10–14 and 1.2.1253a15–18). In the Nicomachean Eth-
ics, Aristotle is more explicit concerning the naturalness of the family. He
says that,
The friendship of man and woman also seems to be natural. For humanbeings naturally tend to form couples more than to form cities, to the extentthat the household is prior to the city, and child bearing is shared morewidely among the animals (NE 8.12.1262a17–19 [my emphasis]).
The two ties are essential to our nature as human beings, yet in order to be
fully human we need justice. In the last analysis, for Aristotle, justice (what
reason informs us that nature or human nature suggests is the right and fitting
course of action) — or at least one’s perception of justice — is what truly
defines a city. He explicitly says that without justice there is no city (Pol.
3.12.1283a19–22). This only reinforces his argument concerning the political
nature of human beings. But would not the passage from Aristotle, which
seems to say man is a bonding animal, imply that the household is prior to the
polis and being prior to the polis, is also more authoritative than it? This
appears to be, in that being prior seems to imply being historically prior and
thus having a more ancient origin than the polis. Being older tends to give
more authority and if the family is prior, and thus older, it would appear to
have more authority than the polis. But note that Aristotle says that the bond-
ing between man and woman is more natural than the formation of cities
because couples are more easily formed than are cities. Thus the forming of
couples over cities is accidental and due to the relative simplicity of forming a
couple, compared to the greater difficulty of creating a city. Yet the passage
infers something more significant than the statement that couples arise more
easily than cities. The passage seems to suggest that the association between
the paired man and woman is akin to or similar to the political community.
This would further suggest that the household is more dependent on the polis
than one would originally think. But Aristotle does not develop either claim to
any final extent. Rather, he merely argues that the polis is not only prior to the
ARISTOTLE & AESCHYLUS ON THE RISE OF THE POLIS 53
21 The tension between the oikos, household, and the polis, the political community,is not to be understood as a tension between the public and the private. Such a reading, asdone by Judith Swanson, forces anachronistically the modern split of the public and theprivate upon Aristotle and his political thought. See Swanson, The Public and Private inAristotle’s Political Philosophy (Ithaca, 1992). Only in modern political thought, follow-ing Hobbes and Spinoza, is there a radical separation of the private and public realms,whereas such a separation is non-existent in classical political philosophy.
household (and the individual) in terms of existence (Pol. 1.2.1253a19), but it
is also authoritative, which means the household is subordinated to it.
On this point, the setting of the Oresteia is extremely informative, in that
the two natural human ties — of family and of city — are not yet unified.
Rather, it could be said that there is truly no polis — or at least it has not yet
become authoritative over the claims of the oikos, the household. To repeat:
the setting of the Oresteia is one in which the polis or the political community
is not yet authoritative. Rather the household, oikos, is still the source where
legitimate moral and social authority emanates. But as shown by the action of
both Clytemnestra and Orestes, who only act out the blood heritage of their
family, the household only has recourse to revenge and vengeance, which is
shown to be unending.
The example of the Furies, the defender of the oikos, compels us to examine
how non or a-political forces are limited in their attempt to rectify wrongs
done. It is clear in the trilogy that, for the household, revenge is the only ave-
nue available to rectify injustices. Yet, vengeance is unending, in that those
who are acted against will desire to right what they now perceive to be an
unjust injury. In one sense vengeance only ensures further vengeance. Also,
vengeance allows no purgation of crimes committed or evil deeds done to
enact it. It allows no peace nor happiness. It is the cycle of unending retribu-
tion. The cycle of violence is also reflected in the nature of the gods. Ferguson
observes that, ‘Ouranos ruled the gods by violence and was overthrown by
violence. Cronos ruled by violence and was overthrown by violence. Zeus
now rules’.22
This seems to indicate that up until the end of the Oresteia, there
seems to be no end to the cycle of violence. But Ferguson notes that Zeus’ rule
is unlike the rule of the other divine ruler, in that he does not merely rule by
force but through wisdom as well.23
Zeus’ rule is a break in the cycle of vio-
lence and thus is an attempt to establish the permanence of his rule over the
gods. Zeus’ actions — or directions — reflect the necessity to end the cycle of
violence within the human community, in that Apollo claims he is acting on
Zeus’ orders. To end it will allow the establishment of a form of human rule
that will lead to human happiness (eudaimonia) or, as Martha Nussbaum
would say, lead to the flourishing of human beings.24
The ending and purging of this cycle of violence is something required if
human beings are going to be able to live together in a fine and noble fashion.
In one sense, the Oresteia is all about the need to establish some source of
authority that will judge on matters of perceived injuries and evils. The
54 C.A. BATES
22 Ferguson, A Companion to Greek Tragedy, p. 78.23 Ibid., p. 79.24 Martha C. Nussbaum, The Fragility of Goodness: Luck and Ethics in Greek Trag-
edy and Philosophy (Cambridge, 1986); ‘Nature, Function and Capability’, OxfordStudies in Ancient Philosophy, 6 [suppl.] (1988) pp. 145–84; ‘Human Functioning andSocial Justice: In Defense of Aristotelian Essentialism’, Political Theory, 20 (1992),pp. 202–46.
authoritativeness of the political community allows the submission of griev-
ances to a non-participant judge who binds all parties to the decided outcome.
This is what law attempts to do. Law is, thus, the particular embodiment of
justice in the given political framework of a given political system. The estab-
lishment of authority of law in the city is an attempt to redress wrongs and pre-
vent further injustices. However, the Furies also claim to redress wrongs and
the Furies’ wrath caused both fear and terror in the minds of human beings
that restrained them in their acts against their own. This is not enough,
because human beings must associate with more than merely their kin in order
to live finely. However, the Furies seem not to care about injustices done to
strangers or people one is intimate, rather they merely defend the ties of blood
kin. Also, the Furies are unending and single minded in their pursuit of viola-
tors of kin ties. Thus they bring about the cycle of violence that the city desires
to escape from.
III
The wrath of the Furies, by perpetuating the cycle of unending and relentless
violence, does not allow the possibility of human community. Although it
does allow for the perpetuation of the family, via the preservation of the ties of
blood, it ignores the ties of oaths or of words spoken. Recall that the Furies are
deaf to the violation of Clytemnestra’s marriage vows (Eum. 209–225). In fact
they reject their duty to revenge Agamemnon’s murder because Clytemnestra
was not blood kin to her husband. From the point of view of the Furies there is
only one really important association, that of blood ties.
Aristotle argues that there are two natural human associations: 1) family,
and 2) political community.25
The first is expressed in the household, oikos,
and the second is expressed in the city, polis. The Furies only protect the ties
of blood and this is essentially the realm of the oikos, the household. In regard
to the city, the Furies are originally its enemies. This is made explicit, when
the Furies awaiting the jury’s verdict, say to Apollo,
I wait to hear the settlement.I have two minds still about my hate for the city (Eum. 731–32)
This implies up to this point, the Furies clearly perceived themselves to be an
enemy of the city, but now they appear to be undecided how to direct their
hatred. Their hostility towards the city goes along with their ignoring the
importance of speech or words. Not only do they ignore the marriage vow of
Clytemnestra as unimportant, they will not let words have power over them.
This is shown when the Furies refuse to let Apollo stop their prosecution of
Orestes by the power of his words (Eum. 228). The Furies in the beginning
ARISTOTLE & AESCHYLUS ON THE RISE OF THE POLIS 55
25 Some may say that the village is a third natural association, but Aristotle does notargue this. Instead of being another form of natural association, he claims, the village is‘above all an extension of the household’ (Pol., 1.2.1252b16–17).
will not let mere words stop them in their demand for vengeance and Apollo
and the other gods appear either not to desire to use force or cannot use force
to stop the Furies. However, when Athena does end the Furies’ hostility to
both Orestes and the city, she does so not with force but through speech. She
accomplishes this feat because the Furies are worn down by the power of
Athena’s words. Note that she tries to subdue them by persuasion at least three
times before the Furies surrender to her argument. Why is Athena’s speech
more powerful than Apollo’s? Clearly it rests within the greater persuasive-
ness of her speech over Apollo’s. This is so because, unlike Apollo’s,
Athena’s speech does not exclude, reject or spurns the Furies. Instead, her
speech offers them a new and more important a role to play in the new dispen-
sation. She offers them beauty and role in defending the political community,
whereas Apollo merely desire their downfall.
The Furies ignore the claim of the marriage bed, and hence of the oath that
makes possible the marriage bed. But is not the relationship between husband
and wife, properly speaking, the realm of the household? The Furies say No!
In this sense their view of the oikos agrees with Kevin Cosner’s Wyatt Earp
that wives (or husbands) come and go and live and die. The Furies would
wholeheartedly agree with Earp’s father who says ‘that blood kin is all that
matters, all the others are strangers’. Clearly the Furies hold to this same phi-
losophy — blood kin over all, there is no other significant obligation.
The view presented by the Furies, that blood ties are the only ties that mat-
ter, very emphatically states that the most significant bond for the household
is the bond of parent and child. In one sense this view is not incorrect, in that
the bond between parent and child is the preservation, hence survival, of the
household. Without the next generation the household dies. Because of this
fact, the next generation owes a debt to the previous one for both giving them
life and giving them a particular heritage. It is this debt that the next genera-
tion has to the previous one and it is the source of the Furies’ authority, in that
it is wrong for a debt to be dishonoured. The breaking of this bond is seen as a
sacrilege that demands retribution. This is why Orestes is hounded. His act of
killing his mother is seen as ignoring the debt of one generation to its prede-
cessor. Also, this is why Clytemnestra is not haunted by them. She is no blood
relation to her husband and hence owes no debt to him.
Aristotle suggests that the relationship between husband and wife, properly
speaking, belongs not to the household but to the polis, in that the relationship
between man and wife is not one based upon either master-slave or the rule of
the foresighted over one lacking in foresight. Rather, the relationship between
man and wife is akin to the relationship of citizens in the political community.
Therefore the limited protection of the oikos by the Furies opens the door to
the fuller protection by the polis. Thus Aristotle allies the marriage relation to
the political relation, rather than either economic-household rule or despotic
rule.
56 C.A. BATES
Please recall that at Politics 1.2.1252a25–b1, the two reasons for social
association are: 1. reproductive bonding and 2. the rule of the foresighted over
those who lack it. Clearly the household involves both these associations —
the pairing of man and woman and also both the rule of parents over children
and masters over slaves. Yet in one sense it overlooks something about the
first association. The process of sexual reproduction involves two stages:
1. the union of male and female, and 2. the birth of offspring from that union.
Although birth of offspring necessitated the union, the union does not neces-
sarily produce the offspring. In other words, you can have the pairing (or
bonding) of man and woman without necessarily bearing young. Therefore
the pairing has a character to it that is more than merely the desire to reproduce
another like one’s self.
The claim of the Furies, and hence the household in the Oresteia, is the
claim of blood ties and thus they concern themselves with the second aspect of
the bonding of man and women — the production of offspring. Here is the tie
of blood from one generation to another. Here is how the household is perpet-
uated. But the Oresteia seems to indicate that the guardians of the household,
the Furies, have no concern for that which necessarily is prior and necessary
for the generation of offspring — the paring of husband and wife.
The Furies are not concerned with the killing of a husband (or even a wife),
but merely of a mother (or a father or a son, daughter, brother or sister).26
This
supports Aristotle’s claim that the relationship between husband and wife is
not similar to the household/economic rule or despotic rule, but to political
rule. This is why the polis must be both prior to the household in nature and
more authoritative than the household. The relationship between husband and
wife is the political bond — oaths are sworn to be loyal — like the oaths citi-
zens make. One has some choice in marriage, one has no such choice in blood
ties. Thus marriage is like politics in that one deals with choice or different
possible courses of action, hence praxis.
IV
The Oresteia is set against two different cities, with two different regimes
(politeiai): Argos and Athens. It is through these two cities and their differ-
ences that the question of how justice arises from the political first becomes
clear. Argos is an elected kingship, whereas Athens is some form of limited
democracy. First let us examine Argos and its regime and then Athens.
Argos’ regime, elected kingship, is one of the five forms of kingship men-
tioned at Politics 3.14. The succession of the title of king is to be passed on
from father to son. This is the law of Argos. Clytemnestra and Aegisthus’
murder of Agamemnon, along with the forced exile of Orestes, enact a revolu-
tion of regimes in Argos, from kingship to tyranny. Thus an act of vengeance
ARISTOTLE & AESCHYLUS ON THE RISE OF THE POLIS 57
26 In one sense, Clytemnestra’s desire to revenge Iphigeneia’s death, makes her aFury or at least Fury like.
becomes a revolution in regimes. Clytemnestra and Aegisthus’ reign in Argos
is clearly tyrannical. It is tyrannical in that it both violates the law, nomos, of
succession of the title of king from father to son and is rule over unwilling sub-
jects. The latter point is clear in what is said by the citizens in the ending of
Agamemnon. After hearing the death moans of Agamemnon, the chorus of cit-
izens say,
It is the king crying out; I think all is over.But let us plan safety for ourselves — if we can.My vote is to cry, Help! to the citizensto come to the palace.Yes, and at once, I think,to catch them red-handed with dripping sword.I think you’re right; at least we should do something.It certainly isn’t the moment for hesitation.But we can see. This is a kind of first act;it looks like the beginning of a tyranny.Yes, it does — because we’re wasting time.Their hands don’t sleep, and they trample underfootthe good reputation of delay (Agm. 1343–1357).
Yet this passage points out another and more important problem with the
regime of Argos. With kingship, the regime of Argos, it is too easy to confuse
the household of the king with the city. Thus the distinction of the household
and the city is blurred under such a regime.
Clearly the problem of the blurring of the city and the household is seen in
the reaction of the citizens of Argos to the tyranny imposed by the two mur-
derers. The citizens say,
Are we then, in order to stretch our own lives,to yield to a government that shames our royal house?No, that is awful. Death is better than that.Death is better than subjection to a tyranny (Agm. 1362–5).
Note that tyranny is said to be imposed on the household, not the city (see
Aristotle’s Pol. 2, 3, and 5). But clearly Aegisthus and Clytemnestra’s reign is
not merely over the house of Agamemnon but over the city of Argos.
The citizens are not alone in their confusion over the difference of the
household and the polis. Aegisthus and Clytemnestra also blur the city and
household. Clytemnestra says at the end of Agamemnon,
Do not pay heed to their vain yappings. Iand you together will make all things well,for we are masters of this house (Agm. 1672–3).
And the inaction of the citizens of Argos and their awaiting for Orestes to set
things right shows that in Argos there is no distinction between household and
city. On this point Peter Euben says that Clytemnestra, in murdering her
58 C.A. BATES
husband, ‘moves out of the household to assume her husband’s place’.27
Euben goes on to argue that like her husband, Clytemnestra assaults both the
household and the city. But unlike her husband, she destroys ‘the balance of
nature’ between the two.28
In one sense Euben over-personalizes the action of
the play, in that the wrongs Agamemnon commits are inherent in the political
nature of his regime — kingship, in which the distinction between the city and
his own house is unclear. However, Clytemnestra’s actions are a wilful
destruction of the difference of the household and the city. The weak balance
between the city and the household that kingship creates is wholly destroyed
by her alliance with Aegisthus. She needs him to keep Argos, not her house-
hold, controlled. Also, her act of murder of her husband is not only a strike at
the household but also the basis of all non-violent human association. Her
murder not only destroys the existing social order and replaces it with her
arbitrary and wilful rule, but undercuts all human associations and therefore
the possibility of human flourishing — happiness. Thus, Euben overstates the
balance between household and city, because he ignores Argos’ regime and
the role it plays in structuring the action of the characters.
The inability to easily distinguish between the city and the household found
in the regime of kingship renders the citizens of Argos powerless or without
authority to act against Aegisthus and Clytemnestra. Tyranny is a political
concept. It cannot be applied to the rule of the household in a fitting manner.
The only similarity in the household to tyranny is the despotic rule of masters
over slaves — thus the members of the household are all treated as slaves. But
despotism and tyranny are not the same. Tyranny is the negation of the laws of
the city (or ruling without law or any rules restraining the ruler or ruling
body), in favour of the personal rule of the tyrant. Whereas despotism is the
rule over slaves or treating persons as though they are merely slaves. Thus
Aeschylus’ use of tyranny is said to be inappropriate in that it is anachronis-
tic.29
But I believe that Aeschylus did this intentionally, to force the viewer or
the reader to ponder the political consequences of blurring the household and
the city.30
Clearly the citizens of Argos are correct in saying that the new
regime is a tyranny, but to say this is to imply a political reality that is not pres-
ent in the context of Argos. Thus there is no city — or more correctly — no
political community of Argos, there is only the household of Agamemnon.
ARISTOTLE & AESCHYLUS ON THE RISE OF THE POLIS 59
27 Euben, The Road Not Taken, p. 74.28 Ibid.29 See Lattimore’s note on Aeschylus’ use of tyranny in Aeschylus I: Oresteia,
pp. 10–11.30 Does not the blurring of the household and the city, and the consequences of doing
so, in the Oresteia seem to agree with Aristotle’s insistence that the two are fundamen-tally different in kind and those who fail to see this are in error concerning not only theirunderstanding of politics but also human nature (Pol. 1.1.1252a7–15)?
Therefore there are no citizens, only subjects.31
Again this is why the chorus
awaits Orestes — the son who is in authority after the father. He must lead in
the household. If Argos were truly a city, the citizens themselves could have
set affairs right and avoided the fate of Orestes. But Argos is not a city and the
member of the chorus are not citizens, rather they are subjects of the house-
hold and are totally without authority in this matter. This is why after Orestes
takes vengeance on the murderers, the dramatic action must leave Argos and
go to Athens.
V
This leads us to Athens and why the last part of the trilogy is set there. Athens
is either a form of democratic rule guided by law or some form of rule by a
political multitude (see Pol. 4.4.1291b29–92a38 and 4.6.1292b22–93a10).
The exact nature of Athens’ regime is not clear, but it does incline to some
form of popular rule. Where Argos had a king, Athens in the play has no king
presently. Athens on the other hand does have Athena — a goddess. Yet
although she is there, she is not sovereign, rather the city and its regime
restrain her. This is shown when Athena says that she cannot decide Orestes’
case by herself.
Although Athena may have the authority by divine sanction, she defers to
the city. Why does she defer her authority to the city? Because, as she argues,
the outcome of the case is too great a matter for her to judge, since the poison
of the Furies if thought wronged could bring ill to Athens. But another reason
is more likely: If Apollo could not stop the Furies from haunting Orestes,
could Athena really have more power? One doubts it. So instead of deciding
the case herself, which the Furies agreed to originally, the case will be decided
by a jury of the citizens of Athens. Now in originally agreeing to having
Athena hear the case, the Furies submitted their case to be judged by a deity
who was a third party, not directly involved in the case. However, by deferring
the authority of the case to the city, Athena defers divine sanction to political
sanction. Or she establishes the legitimacy of decisions by the political body
concerning such matters, whereas before these matters where dealt with
within the moral realm of the household, oikos.
As said before, the jury sides with Orestes — only barely because of
Athena’s vote.32
Athena’s vote siding with Orestes may forgive the murder of
60 C.A. BATES
31 See Pol. 3.3–4 about the distinction between being a citizen and being a mere sub-ject. Also see Pol. 1.3–13 concerning the character of the household and the relations ofthe various members — i.e., husband/wives, parents/children, and master/slaves —within it.
32 The closeness of the vote is interesting in that the ugliness and horrible nature of theFuries versus the beauty, rationality, and nobility of Apollo is almost overlooked by themale citizens of Athens. Far from being the male sexists which most feminist interpreta-tions assert they are, the juror’s outcome is too close to justify such a view. Rather, the cit-izens take seriously the argument of the Furies and are not convinced by Apollo’s argu-
a mother by a son, but it also says that the murder of a husband by a wife (or
vice versa) is worse and more dangerous to the life of a political community in
that marriage is clearly a political creation. Stanford points out that Athena’s
siding with Orestes can be seen as lending support to ‘the ties of marriage, a
civic institution, rather than the ties of blood’.33
The Furies are not happy and wish to punish Athens for acquitting Orestes.
However this does not occur. Because Athena is determined to have them
become part of the new social order — the city. Athena’s point in bringing the
Furies into the political is, as Stanford argues: ‘Think what men might gain . . .
if Athens lets the Furies choose for good instead of for evil. Why together they
might turn the tragic choice into a victory, nothing less than the birth of law
itself, the Furies’ evolution from their origins to the ministers of justice.’34
In
fact, although Orestes is acquitted, he is not welcomed in the city or at least he
is not persuaded to become a citizen of Athens. On the other hand, the Furies
are welcomed to become a part of Athens.35
Thus the Furies are persuaded by
Athena to be reconciled to the city and thus to play a very important role in the
new order as the city’s special protector.
The embracing of the Furies by Athens at the end of the Eumenides symbol-
izes the new role that the household and its primary defender will play in the
polis. Thus, Euben is insightful on the importance of the Furies. He says that
they are ‘as much sustainers of civilization, pious dread of authority, and pun-
ishers of pride and violent outrages by men against their own, as they are
uncivilized, outrageous violators’.36
Athena’s actions indicate a fundamental
awareness that the polis or the political community as such needs the power of
the Furies so that the city is able to defend itself. Thus like the alliance Orestes
gives to Athens at the end of the trilogy, the alliance of the Furies to the city is
intended to strengthen the city as the source of human fulfilment.
Clearly the goods that the household brings are essential to any notion of
human happiness or flourishing (see Pol. 2.2.1261a10–b15). However, the
problem of the household was its inability to get beyond both the loyalty
merely to one’s own and the endless violence that occurred, because of its
inability to adjudicate acts of injustice without recourse to personal acts of
vengeance. The city provides an attachment that, while it does not implicitly
reject the love of one’s own, places restraint on it so the public and common
good of all who live in that association will be preserved. In doing this, peace
is maintained and peace provides the possibility for the attainment of human
happiness.
ARISTOTLE & AESCHYLUS ON THE RISE OF THE POLIS 61
ments. It is Athena, who because of her divine nature sees a greater possibility for theFuries in a new social order, makes possible Orestes’ victory.
33 See Stanford, in Fagles, Aeschylus: The Oresteia, p. 81.34 Ibid., p. 77.35 Hogan, Commentary on the Complete Greek Tragedies, p. 179.36 Euben, The Road Not Taken, p. 79.
Conclusion
The reconciliation of the Furies to the city at the end of the Oresteia is essen-
tial if the political community is going to be authoritative concerning human
affairs. This is Athena’s gift to Athens — politics or more correctly the authori-
tativeness of the political community. Also, Euben is correct in saying that
‘what Athena does in the play, Aeschylus does through it’.37
Thus Aeschylus’
portrayal of how the political becomes authoritative — which is wholly absent
from Aristotle’s discussion of the polis in either Politics 1.2 or elsewhere — is
to remind us of how human life understood through community, by its rejec-
tion or ineffectualness, can be returned to the pre-political cycle of blood vio-
lence. Further, it is clear that Aeschylus sides with Athena, not Apollo. Apollo
desires to merely get rid of the Furies, Athena does not. She is far more aware
of the importance of the Furies in human life. Therefore Aeschylus under-
scores Athena’s project — the creation of the political — with his, the creation
of the Oresteia.
Athena understands that without the power of the Furies the justice which
the city desires to provide would be ineffectual. This echoes Aristotle’s under-
standing, against that of the Sophists, that politics is more than mere reason or
persuasion (logos); rather, it is the combination of persuasion and coercion.
Coercion or force is to be understood, in this particular context, as the exercise
of law. If the justice of the city is ineffectual, then the forces of vengeance
would continue to be the only source for the satisfaction of injustice. Thus the
cycle of violence would again make human community either impossible or
increasingly despotic. Therefore Stanford is correct in arguing that ‘law is
strong, moreover, because Athena incorporates the new invaders, the Furies
and their powers. Terror and reverence become her people’s kindred powers,
and seizing on the Furies’ most creative hopes, Athena commands her people
not only to repel injustice but preserve the right of men’.38
Ferguson adds to
Stanford’s interpretation of Athena’s incorporation of the Furies in the city.
He argues that the Furies are needed allies for the survival of political commu-
nity. He says that ‘in the past, justice has been equated with the power of the
Furies, the power of blood feud, blood always calling for blood in endless
secession’.39
Now justice is to be associated with the city and its manifestation
in Athena’s creation — the Aeropagus. Thus, in Aristotle’s eyes, the Furies
come to embody what is essentially necessary for politics, the promise of
coercion (i.e., retribution) for non-compliance with the laws of the city.
Aeschylus’ project in the Oresteia is to reinforce and remind his audience
of the argument that without the Furies supporting the city’s jury, justice
would be wholly ineffectual. But making the Furies the city’s special protec-
tor, not only puts the Furies under the control of the city, and thus restrains
62 C.A. BATES
37 Ibid., p. 83.38 Stanford, in Fagles, Aeschylus: The Oresteia, p. 80.39 Ferguson, A Companion to Greek Tragedy, p. 106.
them in how they will carry out their vengeance, but it gives greater stature to
the new social order — the political community. In doing this, Aeschylus
gives us a dramatic explanation of what Aristotle claims, and thus he allows us
to come to a fuller understanding of what Aristotle means by the political
community and its authoritativeness in human affairs.
In the Oresteia, the city’s justice is likened to the Furies ancient’s role as
defender of what is right and the corrector of injustices. Thus, while the
demand for ‘blood calling for blood in endless secession’ is replaced by the
deliberation and action of the city’s jury, the city will indeed do what the
Furies did — right wrongs and protect the family. However, it will not do so in
the same ruthless and destructive manner. Rather, the justice of the city will be
a compromise between the peace, which is an essential precondition for
human happiness, and the demand that wrongs be righted and those who com-
mit them are punished.
In the new order of the city, it is clear that not all acts of injustice will be
sought out and punished; rather, only those that threaten to destroy the peace
or happiness of the human association. Therefore justice, which is made pos-
sible by the political community and which will make human happiness possi-
ble, cannot and will not punish all injustice. To do so would be irrational and
harmful to the greater human good. This Aristotle knew well. This is why his
account of justice in the Nicomachean Ethics is not as comprehensive or abso-
lute as some contemporary social theorists desire it to be.
In this light, to punish all violators would make the same error that the
Furies did — to destroy all the good things in order to remove one single evil.
But this is also why the Furies needed to be made part of the city. The modera-
tion which is to be imposed on the Furies is also imposed on the city in regards
to them. Moderation is now to be the qualifier of justice. Again, this echoes
Aristotle’s account of both justice and moderation (sophrosyne) in the
Nicomachean Ethics. Richard Lattimore agrees with such an interpretation of
the trilogy. He says: ‘Man cannot obliterate, and should not repress, the unin-
telligible emotions. Or again, in different terms, man’s nature being what it is
and Fury being a part of it, Justice must go armed with Terror before it can
work.’40
Rather, the justice of the political community is a moderation of the
Furies and therefore explains why the political is and must be authoritative for
human life.
The above argument also explains the centrality of Aeschylus’ Oresteia to
the tradition of western political thought. It is, as Meier said about it, the docu-
ment which gives form to the idea of the supremacy of democratic or popular
rule restrained by law.41
It also illustrates Aristotle’s argument that man is by
nature a political animal. It does so by demonstrating that the political com-
munity, the habitat where human beings can only live well, needs to be
ARISTOTLE & AESCHYLUS ON THE RISE OF THE POLIS 63
40 Lattimore, Aeschylus I: Oresteia, p. 31.41 Meier, The Greek Discovery of Politics, pp. 83–7.
authoritative in human affairs. Only when the political community is authori-
tative, can human life obtain not only peace and security, but also the higher
goods, such as happiness and the best way of life.
Therefore, the supremacy of the political over the household, as dramatized
in Aeschylus’ trilogy, makes possible the enrichment of human lives that
before were constrained by endless violence, responding to endless violence.
So justice — that which the city only brings about — insures an end or at least
a long break from the violence of the non or sub-political. Yet, this is the
essential precondition, in which human nature can fulfil its proper end in
moral and intellectual excellence. Or, to repeat John Ferguson’s comment
about the Oresteia, ‘man finds his fulfillment only in ordered society’.42
Given that the political community or polis (defined by its regime) is the
ordering of society (see Pol. 3.1.1274b34–38, 3.3.1276a40–b3, and
3.6.1278b9–11), we come full circle to the origins of the polis and the reason
for its being authoritative. Again the reason is simple. Aristotle says it is
because human beings have speech (Politics 1.2.1253a9). Speech, in humans,
serves ‘to reveal the advantageous and the harmful and hence also the just and
the unjust’ (Pol. 1.2.1253a14–15). The ability to distinguish between the just
and the unjust is said by Aristotle to be ‘peculiar to human beings’ (Pol.
1.2.1253a14–15). Regarding justice, Aristotle has also said that without it the
city cannot exist (Pol. 3.12.1283a19–22). Thus the interdependency of the
political community and justice becomes clear. Because justice, through law,
habituates citizens of a political community to be just, therefore the political
community becomes the soil or essential habitat for the development of
human excellence.43
Given this, the political community is to be understood to be essential for
human beings, for without it, it is highly unlikely that human beings would be
capable of reaching the peak of moral or intellectual excellence. Yet, accord-
ing to Aristotle, this is only the precondition for the polis and not its end. To
this point, Aristotle says, although the political community or polis ‘comes
into being for the sake of living, it exists for the sake of living well’ (Pol.
1.2.1252b29–30). The implication of Aristotle’s argument is that although
‘living well’ is the real end or final purpose (i.e., telos) of the political commu-
nity, nevertheless it is true that human beings need to share a life together. He
says that humans ‘join together, and maintain the political community, for the
sake of living itself’ (Pol. 3.6.1278b23–25). He continues,
For there is perhaps something fine (kalos) in living just by itself, providedthere is no great excess or hardship. It is clear that most men will enduremuch harsh treatment in their longing for life, the assumption being that
64 C.A. BATES
42 Ferguson, A Companion to Greek Tragedy, p. 106.43 Let us be clear here, being just is to be understood not merely as being lawful but
also as embracing the moral excellences (see NE 5.1.1229b12–19).
there is a kind of joy inherent in it and a natural sweetness (Pol.3.6.1278b25–30).
It is this ‘joy’ and ‘natural sweetness’ which is inherent in mere life that signi-
fies the importance of the origins of the polis; for as Aristotle says, it comes to
be for the sake of life. Thus, the polis is not only necessary precondition for
‘living well’, but because of the ‘natural sweetness’ of existence, it is the soil
out of which humans flourish and grow toward their peaks of excellences —
both moral and intellectual.
Clifford Angell Bates, Jr
UNIWERSYTET WARSZAWSKI
ARISTOTLE & AESCHYLUS ON THE RISE OF THE POLIS 65
