Bangor ED Ebola Aide Memoire

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Do the staff of your ED know what to do if a patient were to book in *right now* who might possibly have Ebola? The last thing ED staff need in this situation is to wade through dozens of pages of closely-typed public health documents, however good their content may be. So we created this aide memoire for our ED staff which contains only the stuff they need to know for the first 15-30 minutes. Please feel free to plagiarise at will.Other hints & tips for preparing your ED:- Find out if there are any local migration patterns that make it more likely than you would expect that someone with Ebola might turn up at the door. For example, we learned only last week that there is a tradition of Anglesey men working in Sierra Leone on groundwork/construction projects, and they come home every 8 weeks or so. - Make sure you know which room within your ED you would use to isolate a possible case of Ebola (or indeed anything other dangerously infective disease) if required. Many hospitals are dusting off their SARS plans. - This document is personalised to our ED, and if you're wondering why we have to "empty the decontamination room" before putting a patient in there, it's because we (sadly) don't have anything approaching a proper isolation room in our 30-year old ED, and our decontamination room is the best we can do. It's a very basic clinical room (i.e. it has both oxygen and suction) that functions as a store-room most of the time. Unfortunately, like all our available side-rooms, it opens straight onto a main corridor frequented by patients and ambulance staff. This is far from ideal. - Modern ED isolation facilities *should* consist of a proper isolation room (ideally with negative-pressure ventilation) with en-suite loo (or dedicated commode) for the patient & an ante-room for staff to take PPE on and off carefully & wash their hands in the middle of the process. We are mindful that many of the health-care workers who have died of Ebola in the current outbreak in Africa became infected whilst taking off their PPE. - If your ED would face similar problems to ours in safely isolating a potential case of Ebola, we suggest that you ascertain whether your neighbouring EDs have better isolation facilities. If the answer is yes, discuss with Public Health colleagues whether possible Ebola cases arriving by ambulance should be diverted to a hospital better placed to isolate & care for them safely, leaving you with only self-presenting patients to consider. - For us, working out where we would put a case of possible Ebola has been a sobering reminder of how our decades-old Emergency Department facilities simply cannot meet today's standards. The reason why every Emergency Physicians working in antiquated facilities (like ours) begs for a new department isn't only about space to maintain adequate patient flow, provision for modern IT, and patient dignity & privacy. It's also because, when faced with something like Ebola (or SARS, or whatever communicable disease threat comes next - there's something every few years) then without proper isolation facilities we "just have to do the best we can" and keep our fingers crossed. Having to "just do the best we can" seems somewhat astonishing, given that we are working in a major NHS district general hospital, in the 18th richest nation in the world (admittedly, that's the UK as a whole - not Wales) in the 21st century. From the perspective of Bangor ED, we could - and should - have been installed in our rebuilt and expanded ED by now, the plans for which include proper isolation facilities. Unfortunately, the Welsh Government appears to have put plans for the rebuild on ice. We don't know why. The other two hospitals in North Wales have had their EDs redeveloped. However, the Bangor ED team are working hard to ensure the rest of our Ebola Preparedness plan is as good as it can be. This is a frightening disease and we are well aware that our own lives are on t

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  • Patient with fever >38 (or history of fever in last 24 hours) AND either been in a VHD endemic country

    OR has been in contact with person/body fluids/lab samples or handled/eaten animals known or strongly suspected to have VHF

    Ysbyty Gwynedd Emergency Department

    Ask patient to wait outside whilst decontamination room is emptied of all equipment (except a trolley & designated commode) and PPE is fetched: there are sets in the decontamination room, in triage, and in Matron Lynns office

    Put patient into the emptied decontamination room

    Minimise contact to one doctor (most senior available) +/- one nurse who must both wear PPE. A 3rd staff member must supervise the process of putting on and taking off PPE.

    Take bloods for FBC, U&Es, LFTs, Coag screen, CRP, glucose, and malaria screen plus at least one spare yellow and purple-topped bottles.

    Keep samples in room with patient till they are collected and do not take a venous or arterial blood gas for analysis in the ED!

    Get history Treat as clinically indicated

    v1.1 - 21st Sept 2014 Dr Linda Dykes (Consultant EM, YG) based on Welsh Public Health Guidance for Acute Hospital Staff and the UK VHF Risk Assessment Algorithm (HPA & ACDP)

    Then do exactly what the consultant in microbiology or infectious diseases tells you.

    S/he will organise any necessary VHF testing & decide ongoing management - not you!

    Your own safety is

    paramount, but even in patients we have to treat

    as at high risk of VHF. the most likely diagnosis is still

    malaria, and this must be ruled in or out

    urgently.

    ED Nurse In Charge to alert the microbiology consultant on-call, who will arrange for all initial laboratory specimens to be collected from the ED & provide further advice. Do not use the chute!

    Based on local infection control advice, in Bangor we will be using the higher level of PPE for all

    contacts with possible VHF patients: Hand hygiene, double gloves, fluid repellant disposable gown/suit, eye protection, mask/FFP3 respirator,

    and boots

    The 2014 Ebola outbreak in Sierra Leone, Guinea & Liberia The incubation period for Ebola Virus Disease is 2-21 days Apart from fever, symptoms may include headache, sore throat,

    general malaise, diarrhoea, vomiting, bleeding & bruising (late). Ask whether there has been any contact with persons known/

    suspected of having Ebola, or a history of caring for anyone with a severe illness (or who has died of unknown cause), attended any funerals, had any contact with dead bodies, visited any traditional or spiritual healers, or been admitted to hospital in the affected areas.

    Dehydration & electrolyte disturbances have been predominant features in many of the deaths in Africa during current outbreak.

    Admit

    VIRAL HAEMORRHAGIC FEVERS RISK ASSESSMENT (Version 3: 11.08.2014) A) Does the patient have a fever [>38oC] or history of fever in past 24 hours AND has returned from (or is currently residing in) a VHF endemic country (http://www.hpa.org.uk/Topics/InfectiousDiseases/InfectionsAZ/ViralHaemorrhagicFever/VHFMaps/) within 21 days? OR B) Does the patient have a fever [>38oC] or history of fever in past 24 hours AND has cared for / come into contact with body fluids of / handled clinical specimens (blood, urine, faeces, tissues, laboratory cultures) from an individual or laboratory animal known or strongly suspected to have VHF?

    NO to A AND B YES to A only

    VHF Unlikely; manage locally

    ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS: Has the patient travelled to any area where there is a current VHF outbreak? (http://www.promedmail.org/) Has the patient lived or worked in basic rural conditions in an area where Lassa Fever is endemic?

    (http://www.hpa.org.uk/webw/HPAweb&Page&HPAwebAutoListName/Page/1191942150101) Has the patient visited caves OR mines, or had contact with primates, antelopes or bats in a Marburg / Ebola

    endemic area? (http://www.hpa.org.uk/webw/HPAweb&HPAwebStandard/HPAweb_C/1254510365073) Has the patient travelled in an area where Crimean-Congo Haemorrhagic Fever is endemic

    (http://www.hpa.org.uk/webw/HPAweb&HPAwebStandard/HPAweb_C/1195733776241) AND sustained a tick bite* or crushed a tick with their bare hands OR had close involvement with animal slaughter?

    NO

    YES

    YES to B

    No to ALL additional questions

    CLINICAL QUESTION TO DETERMINE INFECTION CONTROL BEHAVIOUR AND PROTECT STAFF: does the patient have extensive bruising or active bleeding?

    HIGH POSSIBILITY OF VHF ISOLATE PATIENT IN A SIDE ROOM Urgent Malaria investigation Full blood count, U&Es, LFTs, Clotting screen, CRP, glucose, blood cultures Inform laboratory of possible VHF case (for specimen waste disposal

    purposes if confirmed)

    Clinical concern OR continuing fever after 72 hours?

    No

    Malaria Negative

    LOW POSSIBILITY OF VHF Urgent Malaria investigation Urgent local investigations as normally

    appropriate, including blood cultures

    VHF Unlikely; manage locally

    Yes

    Alternative diagnosis confirmed?

    No

    Yes

    CLINICAL QUESTION TO DETERMINE INFECTION CONTROL BEHAVIOUR AND PROTECT STAFF: does the patient have extensive bruising OR active bleeding OR uncontrolled diarrhoea OR uncontrolled vomiting?

    Is the patient fit for outpatient management?

    Inform/update Local Health Protection Unit Ensure patient contact details recorded Patient self isolation Follow up VHF screen result Review daily

    Discuss with Infection Consultant (Infectious Disease/Microbiology/Virology)

    Infection Consultant to arrange VHF screen with Imported Fever Service (0844 7788990)

    Notify Local Health Protection Unit Consider empiric antimicrobials

    Discuss with Infection Consultant (Infectious Disease/Microbiology/Virology) Possibility of VHF; Infection Consultant to consider discussion of VHF screen with Imported Fever Service (0844 7788990)

    YES to ANY ADDITIONAL QUESTION

    Malaria Positive: Manage as Malaria; VHF unlikely

    Malaria Negative

    No

    Positive

    Yes No

    Yes

    Negative CONFIRMED VHF Contact High Level Isolation Unit for transfer

    (020 7794 0500: Royal Free) Launch full public health actions, including

    categorisation and management of contacts Inform lab if other lab tests are needed Manage locally

    VHF Result

    INFECTON CONTROL MEASURES

    MINIMAL RISK Standard precautions apply: Hand hygiene, gloves, plastic apron (Eye protection and fluid repellent surgical facemask and for splash inducing procedures)

    STAFF AT RISK Hand hygiene, gloves, plastic apron, fluid repellent surgical facemask, eye protection (FFP3 respirator for aerosol generating procedures ) Patients that have extensive bruising, active bleeding, uncontrolled diarrhoea, uncontrolled vomiting: Hand hygiene, double gloves, fluid repellent disposable gown/suit, eye protection, FFP3 respirator

    STAFF AT HIGH RISK Hand hygiene, double gloves, fluid repellent disposable gown or suit, plastic apron (over disposable gown/suit) eye protection, FFP3 respirator

    Continuing fever after 72 hours?

    * If an obvious alternative diagnosis has been made e.g. tick typhus, then manage locally Please note this algorithm is a guide designed to aid early diagnosis of VHF cases

    These features would mean patient is deemed high risk of VHF on the UK risk assessment tool (left & PTO)

    Find the latest version within HPA document

    at bit.ly/1A7geGO

    Management of clinical waste/decontamination of room Keep everything that has touched patient in the room, and bar

    access to it until advice obtained Keep a record of all staff who have had contact with the patient

    What to do if someone might haveEbola Virus Disease (or other VHFs)

    If patient is sick enough to need

    resus room care, use Room 4 instead

  • What to do if someone might have Ebola Virus Disease (or other VHFs)

    Ysbyty Gwynedd Emergency Department

    Below is the September 2014 Advisory Committee on Dangerous Pathogens (ACDP) Risk Assessment flowchart. It is included here as a thumbnail, to help ED staff recognise which document they need to be using. In the event of needing to use it in anger, you must download the latest version by looking at the Public Health England/UK guidance at bit.ly/1pKLzNW (this is a shortcut web link) or by Googling HPA Ebola. Do not try to read this thumbnail!

    v1.1 - 21st Sept 2014 Dr Linda Dykes (Consultant EM, YG) based on Welsh Public Health Guidance for Acute Hospital Staff and the UK VHF Risk Assessment Algorithm (HPA & ACDP)

    Admit

    VIRAL HAEMORRHAGIC FEVERS RISK ASSESSMENT (Version 4: 10.09.2014) A) Does the patient have a fever [>38oC] or history of fever in past 24 hours AND has returned from (or is currently residing in) a VHF endemic country (https://www.gov.uk/viral-haemorrhagic-fevers-origins-reservoirs-transmission-and-guidelines or see VHF in Africa map at https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/354636/VHF_Africa_2014_update.jpg) within 21 days? OR B) Does the patient have a fever [>38oC] or history of fever in past 24 hours AND has cared for/come into contact with body fluids of /handled clinical specimens (blood, urine, faeces, tissues, laboratory cultures) from an individual or laboratory animal known or strongly suspected to have VHF?

    NO to A AND B YES to A only

    VHF Unlikely; manage locally

    ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS: Has the patient travelled to any area where there is a current VHF outbreak? (http://www.promedmail.org/) Has the patient lived or worked in basic rural conditions in an area where Lassa Fever is endemic?

    (https://www.gov.uk/lassa-fever-origins-reservoirs-transmission-and-guidelines#epidemiology) Has the patient visited caves OR mines, or had contact with primates, antelopes or bats in a Marburg / Ebola

    endemic area? (https://www.gov.uk/ebola-and-marburg-haemorrhagic-fevers-outbreaks-and-case-locations) Has the patient travelled in an area where Crimean-Congo Haemorrhagic Fever is endemic

    (http://www.who.int/csr/disease/crimean_congoHF/Global_CCHFRisk_20080918.png?ua=1 AND sustained a tick bite* or crushed a tick with their bare hands OR had close involvement with animal slaughter?

    NO

    YES

    YES to B

    No to ALL additional questions

    CLINICAL QUESTION TO DETERMINE INFECTION CONTROL BEHAVIOUR AND PROTECT STAFF: does the patient have extensive bruising or active bleeding?

    HIGH POSSIBILITY OF VHF ISOLATE PATIENT IN A SIDE ROOM Urgent Malaria investigation Full blood count, U&Es, LFTs, Clotting screen, CRP, glucose, blood cultures Inform laboratory of possible VHF case (for specimen waste disposal

    purposes if confirmed)

    Clinical concern OR continuing fever after 72 hours?

    No

    Malaria Negative

    LOW POSSIBILITY OF VHF Urgent Malaria investigation Urgent local investigations as normally

    appropriate, including blood cultures

    VHF Unlikely; manage locally

    Yes

    Alternative diagnosis confirmed?

    No

    Yes

    CLINICAL QUESTION TO DETERMINE INFECTION CONTROL BEHAVIOUR AND PROTECT STAFF: does the patient have extensive bruising OR active bleeding OR uncontrolled diarrhoea OR uncontrolled vomiting?

    Is the patient fit for outpatient management?

    Inform/update Local Health Protection Unit Ensure patient contact details recorded Patient self isolation Follow up VHF screen result Review daily

    Discuss with Infection Consultant (Infectious Disease/Microbiology/Virology)

    Infection Consultant to arrange VHF screen with Imported Fever Service (0844 7788990)

    Notify Local Health Protection Unit Consider empiric antimicrobials

    Discuss with Infection Consultant (Infectious Disease/Microbiology/Virology) Possibility of VHF; Infection Consultant to consider discussion of VHF screen with Imported Fever Service (0844 7788990)

    YES to ANY ADDITIONAL QUESTION

    Malaria Positive: Manage as Malaria; VHF unlikely

    Malaria Negative

    No

    Positive

    Yes No

    Yes

    Negative CONFIRMED VHF Contact High Level Isolation Unit for transfer

    (020 7794 0500: Royal Free) Launch full public health actions, including

    categorisation and management of contacts Inform lab if other lab tests are needed Manage locally

    VHF Result

    INFECTON CONTROL MEASURES

    MINIMAL RISK Standard precautions apply: Hand hygiene, gloves, plastic apron (Eye protection and fluid repellent surgical facemask and for splash inducing procedures)

    STAFF AT RISK Hand hygiene, gloves, plastic apron, fluid repellent surgical facemask, eye protection (FFP3 respirator for aerosol generating procedures ) Patients that have extensive bruising, active bleeding, uncontrolled diarrhoea, uncontrolled vomiting: Hand hygiene, double gloves, fluid repellent disposable gown/suit, eye protection, FFP3 respirator

    STAFF AT HIGH RISK Hand hygiene, double gloves, fluid repellent disposable gown or suit, plastic apron (over disposable gown/suit) eye protection, FFP3 respirator

    Continuing fever after 72 hours?

    * If an obvious alternative diagnosis has been made e.g. tick typhus, then manage locally Please note this algorithm is a guide designed to aid early diagnosis of VHF cases

    Putting on and taking off PPE Needs an additional member of staff,

    standing outside the room, to supervise Use these WHO PPE guidelines as a

    checklist - there are copies inside the PPE kits, and in strategic locations in the ED.

    Remember this is the stage where HCW in Africa have been infected: so do not hurry, take care, and it is ok to be a bit paranoid!

    1Always put on essential required PPE when handlingeither a suspected,probable orconfirmed case of viralhaemorragic fever.

    2The dressing and undressing of PPE shouldbe supervised by another trainedmember of the team.

    3 Gather all the necessary items of PPE beforehand. Put on the scrub suit in the changing room.

    4 Put on rubber boots. If not available, make sure you have closed,puncture and fluid resistant shoes and put on overshoes.

    Steps to put on personal protective equipment (PPE)

    5 Place theimpermeablegown over the scrubs.

    6 Put on face protection:6a Put on a medical mask. 6b Put on goggles or a face shield.

    OR, IF BOOTS UNAVAILABLE

    7If available, put a head cover on at this time.

    8 Perform hand hygiene. 9 Put on gloves* (over cuff).

    While wearing PPE: Avoid touching or adjusting PPE Remove gloves if they become torn or damaged Change gloves between patients Perform hand hygiene before putting on new gloves

    10 If animpermeable gown is not available,placewaterproof apron over gown.

    All reasonable precautions have been taken by the World Health Organization to verify the information contained in this publication. However, the publishedmaterial is being distributed without warranty of any kind, either expressed or implied. The responsibility for the interpretation and use of the material lies with thereader. In no event shall the World Health Organization be liable for damages arising from its use.

    * Use double gloves if any strenuous activity (e.g. carrying a patient or handling a dead body) or tasks in which contact with blood and body fluids are anticipated. Use heavy duty/rubber glovesfor environmental cleaning and waste management.

    All reasonable precautions have been taken by the World Health Organization to verify the information contained in this publication. However, the publishedmaterial is being distributed without warranty of any kind, either expressed or implied. The responsibility for the interpretation and use of the material lies with thereader. In no event shall the World Health Organization be liable for damages arising from its use.

    3 Remove gown and gloves and rollinside-out anddispose of safely.

    4 If wearing rubber boots, remove them (ideally using the boot remover) withouttouching them with your hands.Place them in a container with disinfectant.

    6 If wearing a head cover,remove it now (frombehind the head).

    7b Remove mask from behindthe head. When removingmask, untie the bottom stringfirst and the top string next.

    Source: Modified from Clinical Management of Patients with Viral Haemorrhagic Fever: A pocket Guide for the Front-line Health Worker.World Health Organization, 2014

    8 Perform hand hygiene.

    5 Perform handhygiene.

    1 Remove waterproof apron and dispose of safely. If the apron is to be reused, place it in a container with disinfectant.

    2 If wearing overshoes,remove them with your gloves still on (If wearing rubberboots, see step 4).

    7 Remove face protection:7a Remove face shield or goggles

    (from behind the head). Placeeye protection in a separatecontainer for reprocessing.

    Steps to remove personal protective equipment (PPE)

    WHO instructions on have to safely put on & take off PPE.