Bangladesh After Zia a Retrospect and Prospect

8/3/2019 Bangladesh After Zia a Retrospect and Prospect

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Bangladesh after Zia: A Retrospect and ProspectAuthor(s): Marcus FrandaReviewed work(s):Source: Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 16, No. 34 (Aug. 22, 1981), pp. 1387-1394Published by: Economic and Political WeeklyStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4370140 .

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SPECIALARTICLES

Bangladesh a f t e r Z i aA Retrospect and Prospect

Marcus FrandaThe assassination of Ziaur Rahman dramatised the many ironies of his life and political career.By his own admission, 406 mnilitaryofficers were executed during his regime; and yet, he could not elimi-nate all opposition and was finally himself killed by a group of officers who were known to be opposedto him, but whom he failed to discipline. IHe wvasentirely ruthless against his opponents; but the cir-cumstance of his assassination suggest a relaxation of the security apparatus and an almost naive beliefin his powers of persuasion.This paper examines the circumstances that surrounded the assassination of Zia and briefly con-siders the prospect for the fuiture. While the military establishment has been further strengthened by thedevelopments in Bangkdesh, the dilemmas confronting the military, which are the same as those faced byZia and which he was attempting to resolve, continue. While there has been an appearance of orderlysuccession and re-establishment of the political process, the appearance of order conceals and covers upproblems which the military is, by definition, unable to solve.

ZIAUR RAHMAN's violent death onMay 30, 1981i; dramatised the mLanyironies of his life and political career.Zia had been in power in Bangladeshfor 532years, during which time, by hisown admission, 406 military officerswere executed at his orders. And yethe was killed by a General and a gtoupof young officers whom he had refusedto discipline despite persistent recom-mendations from senior military advisorsthat the dissident officers be disciplinedor even retired. Zia was most frequentlycriticised by his opponents for beingbrutal, ruthless, cold and authoritarian;but his death was intimately related toa self-itmposed relaxation of the secu-rity apparatus around him and to analmost naive belief in his powers ofpersuasion. In the vast majority of thenew nations of Asia and Africa leadersbecome more autocratic and less acces-sible the longer their regimes last. Thegreat difference, the great drama, thegreat tragedy of Ziaur Rahman wasthat his own regime was cut short atthe zenith of his powers precisely be-cause he was moving significantly to-wards civilianisation and democratisa-tion.The great puzzle surrounding ZiaurRahman's death was how he managedto get himself stuck in Chittagong with-out sufficient security to protect himfrom army officers who had been in-creasingly hostile over the previousyear. Zia had taken only 15 personalbodyguards with him to C-hittagong;neither these people nor a few dozenpolicemen guarding the Circuit Housewhere he was assassinated were armedwith anything more sopbisticated than

common pistols or rifles. Most of Zia'ssecurity and intelligence officers hadbeen cautioning him for months to bemore careful, but Zia, who had beentrained in intelligence by the Paldstanarmy, seemed to prefer less and lesssecurity as his regime wore on. Foreigxicorrespondents, diplomats and govern-ment officials were seldomnf ever check-ed when they entered Zia's home,office, aixport lounge or aircraft; thePresident travelled to the most remotevillages by helicopter, with only oneother helicopter as escort and with onlytwo or three bodyguards accompanyinghim.'Many of the top brass in the Bangla-desh army saw the relaxation of secu-rity around Zia as part of a dramaticattempt on the President's part to be-come a truly civilian politician. AfterZia came to power in November 1975he governed as a General through arather severe Martial Law Administra-tion for 18 months and then began tomove towards civilian rule by assumingthe title of President in April 1977.During this period the security aroundZia was fornidable and two majorcoup attempts against him - in June1976 and September/October 1977 -were brutally suppressed. Continual dis-sension within the army convinced Ziathat he needed a powerful civilian poli-tical base if he were to govern effecti-vely; but, perhaps more important, hebegan to enjoy immensely the give-and-take of Bangladesh politics once hedecided to become a civilian leader. InJune 1978 he was elected President fora five-year term and in February 1979elections his new political party, the

Bangladesh National Party (BNP), secu-red 206 of 300 seats in Parliament with412 per cent of the popular vote. Afterhis 'civilianisation'Zia continued to livein a rented home in the Dacca MilitaryCantonment, where he had resided since1972; but he stopped wearing his mili-tary uniform in public and insisted onbeing called 'President Zia' rather than'General Zia'.A number of military leaders inBangladesh were wary of Zia's attemptsto build a political base independent ofthe military. Local Units of the BNPwere distrusted by army men and werefrequently singled out as 'nests of cor-ruption'. On May 20, ten days beforehe went to Chittagong, several MajoiGenerals met Zia in Dacca and criti-cised him severely for 'over-democrati-sing' the political system. They wereespecially critical of Zia's economicpolicies, which had begun to favour therural sector and pinch the urban mid-dle-class, including the military andthe bureaucracy.2 They argued thatinflation and the law and order situa-tion were both careening out of control,that Zia had been so concerned withhis 'international image that he hadneglected demestic politics, that therewas rampant corruption within theBNP, and that Zia had not been strongenough in his dealings with India. Theycriticised the President for trying, inthe words of one General, to "playpolitics too much", or, in the words ofanother, for "being too clever in balan-cing off all the political factions". Theoverwhelming demand of the militaryleaders at this meeting was for a re-imposition of martial law, to be accom-


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panied by press censorship, restrictionson political activities, and denial ofsome judicial rights.GENERAI. M&NZOOR

The most vocal and outspoken personat the meeting was Major-General Mo-hammad Abdul Manzoor, comamander fa Divisien in Chittagong, who was re-ported to have pounded on the tableand shouted at Zia during the discus-sion. The other officers present did notnecessarily support Manzoor, but theirsullenness and milder expressions ofdiscontent made it clear to everyonethat they were unhappy wiht the direc-tions in which Zia was leading thecountry. Manzoor flew back to Chitta-gong after the meeting and apparentlystarted planning the coup that cost Ziahis life. Some reporters speculate thatManzoor rnight have believed that themeeting had sealed "an unwritten co-venant between him and the rest of thearny" were he to attempt a coup.3 Thegossip mills in Dacca had spread ru-mors - even before Zia's death - thatManzoor and others were planning tolead a coup in July or August 1981,prompting other reporters to speculatethat Manzoor and his associates inChittagong had simply hastened theirplans once they found the Presidentunguarded in their territory and feltthreatened by his movements againstthem.'

Rivalry between Manzoor and Ziahad a long past. Manzoor was bornon January 24, 1940 in Krishnanagar,West Bengal, to a relatively poorfamily originally from Noakhali district.Manzoor received an Intermediatedegree from the Air Force CadetCollege at Sarghoda in West Pakistanand attended Dacca University for ayear before joining the military. Hedistinguished himself as a brilliantstudent at the Pakistan Military Aca-demy, attended the Defence ServiceStaff College in Canada, and subse-quently built a reputation as a brightand able officer. During the liberationwar in 1971, Manzoor was one of thefew Bangladeshi :)fficers to escapefrom West Pakistan, making a dramaticentry into India in the Rajasthandesert. He soon found himself as one ofeight Sector Commanders (Ziaur Rah-man was another) fighting the Pakistanisin Bangladesh.

Manzoor, like Zia, had something ofa falling out with Sheikh MujiburRahman after independence, with theresult that he was sent by Mujib to NewDelhi as militar attache in the Bangla-desh High Commissioynn 1973. ZiaurRahinan rescued Manzoor from that ig-nomjinousexile when he came to power

in 1975 and brought him back to Daccaas Chief of the General Staff, relyingon him as one of his leading Generalswhile promoting himn rapidly up theladder. Manzoor at first co-operatedfully with Zia and in fact saved Zia'sregime and life by helping to put downan attempted coup on October 2, 1977.5Manzoor's role in quashing that' coupattempt intensified his quest to becomeChief of Staff, the top spot in the arny,which Zia gave to Lieutenant-GeneralH M Ershad after Zia became a civi-lian Commander-in-Chief and Presidentin April 1977. To be sure, Ershad wasolder and had more seniority than Man-zoor (Ershad was born on February 1,1930 and was commissioned in 1952;Manzoor was the youngest General inthe Bangladesh army and was commis-sioned only in 1960), but Manzoor sawErshad as an unimaginative desk-boundGeneral who had blotted his copybookby remaining loyal to the Pakistan arnyin 1971.Zia's decision to name Ershad overManzoor as Chief of Staff reflected hisoverall strategy for building a discip-lined army, which placed a heavy reli-ance on repatriated officers and jawansfrom Pakistan plus new recruits whohad not fought in the liberation war.At the time of Zia's death only two ofthe top 50 Major-Generals and Briga-diers in the Bangladesh army were menwho had fought for Bangladesh in 1971;

of these two, only Manzoor had troopsunder his command. The other 'free-dom-fighter' was Major-General MirShaukat Ali, who had previously beenstripped of his command by Zia andwas (at the time of Zia's death) Princi-pal Staff Officer to the President. Ofthe 11 men who had served at varioustimes as Sector Commanders during theliberation war, none is now in theBangladesh army. Most of them -like Manzoor and Zia - are dead,having been executed or killed in coupattempts; the others, including ShaukatAli, have been retired from the military.With the death of Manzoor and theexecutions and forced retirements thatwill inevitably follow Court Martialpro-ceedings against Manzoor'ssurviving co-conspirators, the proportion of freedom-fighters in the Bangladesh army willalmost certainly fall below 10 per cent.At the time of Zia's death it was esti-mated at 15 per cent, with another 25per cent being jawans repatriated fromPakistan after 1971 and 60 per cent newrecruits. Zia and other senior officers inthe Bangladesh army felt strongly that

the repatriates and new recruits weremuch better and more disciplined sol-diers than the freedom-fighters, primari-ly because their training had beenmore

thorough and the circumstancesof theirpromotions within the army less politi-cised. Most of the freedom-fighterswere heady with the heroism of theliberation war, trained hastily in gueril-la warfare in India and then quicklyprcmnoted y Sheikh Mujibur Rahman inorder to give them seniority over thePakistan repatriates. Some of the free-dom-fighters, especially the unit knownas the Rakhi Bahini (which was formedspecifically to protect Mujib and hisgovernment), were little more than ex-tensions of political parties.As Talukder Maniruzzaman has ex-plained it, the freedom-fighters in theBangladesh army were mostly studentswho joined the guerilla forces in 1971or deserters from Pakistan's conventionalarmy who were called upon to learnguerilla warfare in 1971.6 Participa-tion in guerilla warfare, side-by-side

with political activists and politicallyconscious students, served to radicalisethe freedom fighters, to the point wherethey demanded a restructuring of thearmed forces into what they called a'democratic and productive' army afterthe liberation war was over. They alsodemanded their own advancement overthose older militarv officers who hadstayed on in Pakistan, and did nothesitate to take up arms in guerilla-style operations against their command-ing officers, or even against the head-of-state. Maniruzzamnan stimates thatthere had been 19 attempts to seizepower in Bangladesh prior to the 1981Chittagong putsch, almost all of themled by participants in the 1971 guerillawar.

Zia did make some attempts to inte-grate the freedom fighters into theBangladesh military, but for the mostpart he conceived of himself as being'ruthless' towards anyone in the armywho was guilty of indiscipline. He ex-panded the arny from five divisionswhen he took over in 1975 to eightNvhenhe was killed in 1981 (there aretwo divisions in Dacca, two in Chitta-gong and the Chittagong Hill Tracts,and one each in Rangpur, Bogra,Comilla and Jessore), with the idea thatthis would bring in so many new re-cruits that the freedom fighters wouldbe greatly outnumbered. WhencolonelAbu Taher, a leading freedom fighter,joined a political party and began tocall for a revolution against Zia's gov-emnment in 1976, Zia had Taherarrested, tried, and hanged despite thefact that Taher had been one of Zia'sbest frienlds, had 2been a Sector Com-mnander n 1971, andhad played a majorrole in staging the coup that brought Ziato power. Later, in 1977, Zia hadhundreds of officers and politicians tried


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and executed for plotting against thegovernment within the army. Almostevery one of those executed came fromamong the freedom fighters.In this atmosphere it is all the moresurprising that Zia failed to disciplineManzoor, right up until the very end.Manzoor's contempt for Ershad and hiscriticisms of Zia were widely known.Like Taher, Manzoor conceived of him-self as a socialist who wanted less cor-ruption, less reliance on internationalde-velopment aid, and fewer internationalties than Zia was willing to countenanceor promote. Manzoor, like Taher, hasoften been associated in press reportswith a pro-Chineseposition, but it mightbe fairer to say that both Manzoor andTaher were more anti-Indian, anti-Russian and anti-American than theywere pro-Chinese. Taher was far moreintimately involved in politics than Man-zoor, since he was a member and leaderof an underground unit of the JatioSamajtantrikDal (JSD), a Marxist groupthat at one time advocated an armedrevolution to be led by the jawans.Manzoor was reported to have met JSDleaders on occasion - against thewishes of other military officers, includ-ing Zia - and he was also reportedlya friend of Mohammad Toaha, theBangladesh politician who is probablyclosest to the Chinese. But there is noevidence that Manzoor ever acted onbehalf of either a political paxty or aforeign power.While Zia had preferred Ershad toManzoor because Ershad was loyal, be-lieved in the constitutional process andhad the confidence of the repatriateGenerals, it was also widely assumedthat Manzoorwas a bit too independent,arrogant, ambitious and revolutionary owarrant Zia's complete trust. More-over, once Zia had opted for Ershadover Manzoor, relations between thetwo steadily deteriorated. In 1978 ZiatransferredManzoor to Chittagong, pre-sumably to get him out of the centreof

power in Dacca; in 1980 he told Man-zoor he was being transferred to Bogra.When Manzoor refused to move toBogra, Zia tried to strip him of hiscommand and transfer him to Dacca asa Principal Staff Officer, but Manzoorsimply tore up this transfer order andreftised to budge. Throughout early1981 Zia then tried to negotiate withManzoorby offering him an ambassador-ship in any West European nation;Manzoor responded with intensified cti-ticism of Zia's regime. On the morningof May 27, two days before he flew offto Chittagong, Zia had issued orders toManzoor to report as Commandant ofthe Military Staff College in Dacca

"with effect from June 1". Unike pre-vious orders, this one had specified adate and copies of it were sent aroundto all other army units on May 29. Atlast it appeared that Zia had decidedto discipline Manzoor.But then Zia went down to Chitta-gong with inadequate security and waskilled by officers in the command ofManzoor. Senior Bangladesh officersnow claim that they had warned Zianot to go to Chittagong at all, but in-stead to simply have Manzoor arrestedand brought back to Dacca for a mili-tary trial. The Defence Forc'esIntelle-gence (DFI) had been irked for sometime because Zia had been graduallyshifting his security affairs to the non-military National Security Intelligence(NSI) and the Special Branch of theHome Ministry. NSI was in charge ofthe President's trip to Chittagong afterZia himself sent Major-GeneralMahab-batian Choudhary, the Chief of DFI,back to Dacca on the evening of the29th. A number of BNP leaders had toldZia during the previous week that therewas no need for him to travel to Chitta-gong on party business, since the partydispute that he was going to patch uphad its roots in a personality clash bet-ween Deputy Prime Minister JamaluddinAhmed and Deputy Speaker SultanAhmed Chowdhury, both of whom werein Dacca.Whatever the reasons for Zia's inade-

quate security, the main events of May29 and 30 are fairly well-established.Zia arrived in Chittagong at 10.10 amon the 29th held meetings with BNPleaders throughout the day, and addres-sed a group of civic leaders. Manzoorhad been offended because Zia had toldhim that it was not necessary for anyonefrom the cantonment to meet him at theairport. There were numerous reportsthat Zia and Manzoor met on the 29th- either in the cantonmentor at CircuitHouse - but witnessespresent in Chitta-gong recall no such meeting. While Ziamay have had plans to meet Manzoor onthe 30th, his ostensible purposefor goingto Chittagong was to iron out a politicalparty dispute. He had not even toldmany of his top security people that hehad issued orders transferring Manzoorto Dacca.

Manzoor may have been planning acoup for some time, but it seems morelikely that he and a group of youngofficers had put this assassination efforttogether within the space of a few days.The people who came to kill Zia, by allaccounts, were 20 officers (Brigadiers,Colonels, Majors, Captains and oneLieutenant); Manzoor was not amnong

them. They arrived in the midst of atorrential downpour that had startedshortly after midnight in two vehicles,without supporting soldiers. Zia'ssecurity offered little resistance. Fifteenof the attackers shelled the CircuitHouse from a distance with two rocketsthat hit below Zia's room, engulfingthat portion of the building in smoke,while the other five machine-gunnedtheir way up to the second floor andkilled the President. Forty or fiftyarmed police on the grounds of theCircuit House had taken shelter fromthe rain by the time the military officersarrived. A few reacted quickly to theshelling and offered immediate resistanceto the attackers; the others were repor-tedly unsure whether the army jeepcoming up the driveway containedsoldiers who were txying to help or killthe President. Zia exposed himself tohis attackers by leaving his room to per-sonally confront them. Had he remainedin his suite or locked himself in his bath-room, he might have given his body-guards and the police the additional in-crement of time that would have beennecessary to repel the attack. Somesecurity people have speculated that Ziamay have come out of his room to leadthe attack because he had mistakenlythought that his attackers were still outon the driveway rather than on the stairsleading up to his suite. Most "peopleclose to Zia explain his actions as beinghis natural instincts, which were tocharge headlong into a fight rather thanrun or hide from it.

Only two of Zia's bodyguards werereported to have resisted the attackingofficers and two of the attackers wereinjured. Seven of the people in CircuitHouse - including three of Zia's body-guards, two aides, an electrician and atelephone operator - were killed. Onthe grounds of Circuit House, onepoliceman was killed and eight otherpolicemen injured. An autopsy indicatedthat at least 21 and perhaps as manyas 27 bullets entered Zia's body, pri-marily in his face and chest. Severalother people in Zia's party were un-hanred; no attempt was made tosearch out and kill anyone but Zia.The entire operation lasted less than20 minutes.

CONSPIRACYTnEonnasThere has been widespread spepula-tion about the role of Manzoor and his

younger officers in the coup attempt.Most of the evidence suggests thatManzoor was concerned that he wouldno longer be able to resist a transferto Dacca, which meant that he, likeShaukat, would be stripped of his com-1389


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mand. This would have been tertiblyhumiliating or Manzoor, ince he sawhimselfas deserving of Ershad'sposi-tion and as a future President. Hisyoungercolleagues realised that theymight be subjected to forced retire-ment from the military or some formof discipline f they lost the protectionof Manzoor. They all knew that anyhopes they might have had for staginga coup would be dissipatedonce Ziaretumed to Dacca. More than ahundred officershad just been purgedfrom the army in the month beforeZia'sdeath. In addition, only a fewdays before Zia's trip to Chittagongtwo army officers and a civilian hadbeen sentencedto termsof up to 10yearsrigorous mprisonment n chargesof plottingthe abortive coup of June17, 1980. One of the officers nvolvedin that coup attempt - DeedarulAlam - had become a fugitive andwas ultimately arrested n Chittagong,where he was thought to have hadconnectionswith some of Manzoor'ssubordinates.Manzoormust have expectedsupportfrom military and civilian leaders inDacca, as happened in 1975 whenSheikhMujibwas killed. But Zia wasfar more popularthan Mujib at thetime of his assassination, nd Manzoorfoolishly- madly - tried to stage acoup froma peripheral rea like Chitta-gong withoutany semnblancef a basein the capital city of Dacca. Unlike1975, when mostAwamiLeagueMinis-ters crossedover and supportedtheyoungmajorswho killed Mujib,Ershadand every other officer outside Chitta-gong responded o news of Zia's deathby swearingallegiance o the constitu-tional' government in Dacca. Vice-President Abdus Sattar was draggedout of his bed at CombinedMilitaryHospital n Dacca at 6 a m and takenstraight o the President's alacewherehe was swornin as ActingPresident.Ershadand several Cabinet Ministerswere present at the swearing-incere-mony; Prime Minister Shah AzizurRahmanwas in Kushtiabut returnedto Dacca within a half-hourafter re-ceivingnews of the assassination.TheCabinet assembled at 9 a m on the30th, initiating the post-Ziaphase ofBangladeshpolitics.Within a few hours of Zia's deathit was clear that the coup attemptwasgoing to fail. If Manzoorand his menhad any understanding ith officers nthe other cantonments,hey nevermaterialised. Manzoormade only oneradio broadcast in Chittagong duringthe 48 ho)ursthat the rebels controlledthe port city and that was on theevening of May 31, shortly before the

coup attempt was abandoned. Most ofthe broadcasts from Chittagong Radiowere made in the name of Manzoor,who was described as the head of aseven-member Revolutionary Council;but Manzoor never introduced himselfas head of a new government. He point-edly described himself in his radiobroadcast as GOC (General Office inCharge) of the Chittagong Division ofas Commanderof the 24th Division andsuggested that the RevolutionaryCouncil had 'requested' him to speak.Speculation that Manzoor was not theman behind the coup attempt wasencouraged by a five-hour delay be-tween the time Ziaur Rahman waskilled and the announcement on Chitta-gong radio declaring a new govern-ment. Dacca Radio did not blameManzoor until its noon broadcast onthe 30th. Nowhere did Manzoor con-done the murder of Zia or tty tojustify it, although in somnebroadcastsmade in Manzoor's name the Revolu-tionary Council had called Zia "auto-cratic" and had invoked the ghost ofAbu Taher.When he appeared at a 'cross-section' meeting of Chittagong bureau-crats, journalists, bank managers andpolice officials on the morning of May31, Manzoor was already a defeatedman. A Chittagong journalist who at-tended the meeting described his ap-pearance as follows:The man was a bundle of nerves.He said, he was committed to die.He raved and ranted against every-thing. He invoked Islam. The nextmoment he talked of secularism. Hespoke against corruption and pointedfingers at the bank managers, describ-ing them as the fountainhead of cor-ruption. He said he had prohi-biteddrinking, gambling and the fleshtrade. He talked of socialism. In thesame breath, he reposed his trustin Allah. As he wobbled out of theroom, he looked like a stuffed soldier,already dead.7Manzoor and 150 of his followersincluding Manzoor's and other officers'wives and children - fled Chittagong

around mid-night on May 31/June 1 insix desparate groups that went in sixdifferent directions. Their exit had beenprompted by the surrender to Daccaof a trusted platoon that Manzoor haddispatched towards Noakhali (theplatoon simply said good-bye to therebels over the radio and voluntarilygave itself up to the government).Manzoor and his group were arrestedin the Fatekchari forest, 30 miles orso north of Chittagong, at around9 a m on June 1.When was taken tothe Fatekchari police station, Mazoorpleaded with his captors not to sendhim hack to the cantonment but insteadto imprison him in Chittagong central

jail; he was especially anxious that thepolice tape-reoord his statement imme-diately. The police officer-in-chargeapparently recorded Manzoor's lengthystatement, which has not been releasedto the public and may have been lostor destroyed. Manzoor and two of hisofficers were sent back to the cantorn-ment in mid-aftemoon. The policeoriginally stated that they had re-turned Manzoor to the cantonment,where he and two of his officers weresubsequently killed by vengeful armymen. The official Bangladesh govetn-ment version of Manzoor's death isthat he was killed by angry mobs onthe way to the cantonment.

Some conspiracy theories since Man-zoor's death are based on speculationthat a claque of repatriate Generalsand politicians in Dacca may have setManzoor up to kill Zia, leading Man-zoor to believe that they would sup-port himnonce the deed was done. Byfirst encouraging Manzoor and laterabandoning him after he had carriedout the assassination, according to thistheory, they were able to get rid ofthe last two freedom-fighter Generalswho stood in the way of the re-patriates claiming power exclusivelyfor themselves. This theory accountsfor the lack of security around Zia assomething designed by the conspira-tors. Zia's decision to stay the nightin the extremely vulnerable CircuitHouse (it is located on a hill and hasno place for cover) is similarly explain-ed as being arranged by Zia's securitymen as part of the plot. The death ofManzoor before he could be put ontrial and the disappearance of Man-zoor's tape-recorded statement areviewed as the logical culmination of ascheme that was carried out withcold-blooded efficiency.

In a vain effort to put rumors atrest, the Bangladesh government hasnamed three tribunals which are in-vestigating the assassination. One is acivilian Supreme Court Commission,headed by Justice Ruhul Islam andcomposed of a second Supreme CourtJudge (A T M Afzal) and a District andSessions Judge from Khulna (Syed Sera-juddin). The second is a MilitaryInquiry Tribunal, under Major-GeneralMuzzamil Hussain. The third is aseven-man Field General Court Martialdirected by Major-General AbdurRabman, which is already conductingtrials of armed forces personnel accusedof involvement in the coup attempt.More tan 30 rebel officers have beenarrested and are awaiting trial in Chitstagong or Dacca. Two others havefled to the G:hittagongHill Tracts andlare being pursued by the Bangladesh

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arny. The Bangladesh governmentdoesnot plan to try the jawans who obeyedorders from rebel officers, but there arelikely to be a number of forced retire-ments and perhaps more arrests. Boththe Supreme Court Commission and theMilitary Inquiry Tribunal have beenspecifically directed to find out if therewas a conspiracy involving governmentand militaxy people outside Chittagong.The government's own conspiracytheory is laid out in a five-part WhitePaper published early this month.Aside from Manzoor and the juniorofficers in Chittagong, the White Paperimplicates retired Colonel MahfuzzarRabman, Zia's Personal Military Secre-tary, who was arrested shortly after thecoup attempt. "Mahfuz" is alleged tohave sent Zia's two closest bodyguardsdownstairs from Zia's room just priorto the attack on May 30 and to havelater showed up in the Chittagongcantonment. The announcement of thedeath of Ziauir Rahman on ChittagongRadio was made in the name of'Mahfuz'. A number of other officetsin Dacca and other cantonments havebeen arrested, including Lieutenant-Colonel Matiur Rahman, who wasnamed by the Revolutionary Councilas the most brutal of Zia's assassins.However, the government has notarrested all the officers named by theRevolutionary Council as its co-conspirators, since in many instances itis quite clear that the Council wassimply appealing for national supportby appointing officers or claiming theloyalties of army men in other canton-ments. Shaukat Ali, who was namedActing Chief of Staff by the Revolu-tionary Council, has not been arrestedbut has instead been promoted andretired from the army and placed atthe disposal of the Foreign Ministryfor eventual appointment as an am-bassador.

THE NEW PoLITIcsThe new government is headed by

74-year-old Abdus Sattar, who wasappointed Vice-President by ZiaurRabman in 1979 and who constitu-tionally became Acting President atZia's death. Sattar promised that hewould hold elections within the 180days prescribed by. the constitution andat first declared that be would not bea candidate. Within a few weeks,however, Sattar was co-opted by theBNP as its compromise candidate whenthe party was threatened with a splitbetween two factions that wanted dif-ferent nomninees.Sattar not only accept-ed the BNP nomination but helpedput through a constitutional amnend-ment that makes him eligible to con-tenst the election. He originally

scheduled the election for September21 but has since postponed it toOctober 15.Were it not for his advanced ageand poor health, Sattar might be con-sidered an ideal successor to ZiauiRahman. Zia himself had not namednor provided for a successor; the BNP

party constituition had not even setdown a procedure by which a newparty leader might be chosen. In theBangladesh Constitution, which wasoriginally drafted by Mujib in 1972and amended by Zia in 1977, theVice-President becomes Acting Presidentat the death of the President and isrequired by law to hold new Presiden-tial elections within six months.Strangely enough, according to theconstitution, the Acting President wasnot allowed to contest those electionsbecause his office could be interpretedin another constitutional clause as "anoffice of profit". Consternation aboutthe 'office of profit' clause has beenexpressed by almost everyone wmho asread it after Zia's death (and ap-parently vely few had read it carefullyprior to Zia's death) since the consti-tution explicitly stated that the clausedid not apply to the Prime Minister,Ministers and Members of Parliamentbut was binding on everyone else,including, presumably, an incumbentPresident, Vice-President or ActingPresident. If this clause had beenallowed to remain in the Constitution,Zia himself would not have beeneligible for re-election had he livedwithout first resigning his Presidency.Zia's closest associates have statedthat the anomalies of the 'office ofprofit' clause had been pointed out toZia while he was alive and that he hadchosen not to pursue a constitutionalamendment to change it. Some saythat Zia opted for this course becausehe did not want to make his secondterm a political issue until it becamenecessary; others suggest that Zia mayhave been thinking of stepping downfrom the Presidency to stage a drama-tic election campaign, or changing thepolitical system entirely. In any event,Sattar's government moved quickly toamend the Constitution after the BNPhad decided that Sattar should be itsnominee. The new sixth amendment,which was passed in Parliament onJuly 8, 1981, enables an incumbentPresident, Acting President or Vice-Presidetnt to cntest elections withoutresigning their 'office of profit'.Most of the oppositionwv parties boy-cotted the Parliamentary session inwhich the 6th amendment was passed,contending that the amendment hadbeen drafted solely to suit the needs

of the ruling party. The two majoropposition groups - led respectivelyby the Awami League of Mujib'sdaughter, Hasina Wajed, and the De-mocratic League of ex-President Khon-dakar Muishtaque Ahmed - wouldhave preferred a constitutional amend-ment re-establishing a Parliamentaryrather than a Presidential system, butneither of the opposition parties hadmany votes in Parliament and the twowere incapable of uniting against theBNP. Leaders of both parties have ex-pressed serious doubts that free andfair elections would be possible withthe BNP in control of the electoralmachinery.8 Both parties set downconditions for their participation inthe elections, which included: (1) with-drawal of the emergency that had beendeclared after Zia's death; (2) releaseof all political prisoners; (3) an end topolitical harassment; (4) the shifting ofthe election date from September toNovember; (5) revision of the electoralrolls on the basis of the 1981 census;(6) freedom of the press and equalaccess by all candidates to the media;and (7) regulations prohibiting thegovernment from using official transportor administrative machinery for elec-tioneering.

Serious questions about the fairnessof the elections were raised in thepublic mind when BNP leaders claimedthat the leaders of the two majoropposition parties were ineligible tocontest, although the government hasnot yet rejected any nomination. HasinaWajed claims that she will be 35 years-old on September 28, 1981, whichwould makle it possible for her tomeet the constitutional provision re-quiring that a candidate be at least35 years-old on the day of the election,but Sattar,originally called the electionfor September 21st (a week beforeHasina's birthday) and the BNP hastried to argue that Hasina has addedtwo or three years to her age in anycase. Mushtaque Abmed is widely as-sumed to be ineligible because he serv-ed a 332year jail sentence after a 1976conviction on charges of corruption.Mushtaque contends that a constitu-tional clause barring anyone convictedof 'crimes of moral turpitude' fromcontesting for the Prosidency for five-years after the end of the jail sentencedoes not apply to him, since he wasconvicted by a Martial Law courtthat has no authority to try an ex-President. By a quirk of fate, a legalease that was filed against the govern-ment by Mushtaque in 1979 - whichwill certainly have a bearing o)nMushtaque's eligibility - is scheduledto be decided in the Dacca High Court


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this month.Only 62-years-old, Mushtaque, un-like Sattar, is in the peak of health.Mushtaque's 22'' months as Presidentof Bangladesh in 1975 are still re-membered for a few significant andgenerally popular accomplishments, in-cluding the scrapping of Mujib's one-party system, a movement away fromsecularism, India and the USSR, there-building of links to Pakistan, and ablossoming of relationships with theIslamic world. Mushtaque's 18-partyalliance represents a broad spectrum ofBangladesh politics, being composed ofa nuimber of small Marxist-left partiesplus Muislimn ftndamentalists andbusinessmen. Mtushtaquehad a reputa-tion *for being less corrupt than otherAwami League Ministers before hebecame President and is still the onlyone of them who has continued to livein a rather modest home in old Daccarather than move to the posh coloniesin the residential enclaves of the inter-national development establishment. Heis respected for his decisiveness asPresident in rescinding Mujib's Presi-dential Order Number 9 - whichempoweied Mujib to dismiss any careerofficial without due process of lawand for restoring three nationalise(dnewspapers (Ittefaq, Azad and Sangbad)to their previouis owners. Withfairly solid ties in some sectionsof the military and a halo ofself-abnegation his willingness tovoluntarily relinquish the Presidency in1975 - Mushtaque maintains a per-sonal reserve of political support thatcould be a factor in Bangladesh in thefuture. As Zillur Rabman Khan haspointed out:There is no doubt that Mtushtaquewas becoming contraver.sial towardthe end of his Presidency. Yet, whenhe stepped down in November 1975,there was a general appreciation ofhis contribuitions o the fledgling re-public. He was seen by some politi-cal commnentators as a man for allseasons; a person who could fill avacutum that neededl to be filled inthe interests of the nation; a manwho was readv to relinquish lowerwhen he felt that it was also in theinterests of the nation.9On the negative side, from Muish-taque's perspective, are several liabili-ties that the BNP might be able toexploit. His failuire to discipline orcontrol the young majors who killedMujil) in 1.975 resuilted in a somewhatchaotic situation for his governmentand ultimately enticed into the poli-tical process army Generals bent onre.storing theirom- mand over theyoung officers. Mushtaque also suc-cumbed to the temptations of office byuIsing government funds to imnprove isfamily land in Comilla while he was

President, an uinexplained failing onhis part that resulted in his convictionand imprisonment- nder Ziaur Rahman.Zia had expected that Mushtaquewouild be hbs principal rival and aformidable opponent once he was re-leased from jail in 1980, but Mush-taque's political fortunes have notzoomed ahead at nearly the pace thatmany political observers had expected.A major weakness of Mushtaque'spotential candidacy, even if he is ableto overcome legal hurdles that couldprevent it, is his apparent inability toraise the kind of money needed tomount an effective presidential cam-paign. In 1981 a group of DaccaUniversity Political Scientists estimatedthe costs of such a campaign at 300-40(0 million Taka.The other towering opposition leaderis Ilasicia Wajed, Mujib's dauighter,

who escaped death in 1975 when shewas in Germnany with her physicisthuLsbandn the day of the assassinationof Mujib and most of his family. Hasinahas several political liabilities. She hadbeen living in India for more than fiveyears prior to her return to Bangladeshin Mav 1981, anrd this exile, parti-cularly when coupled with some of herpublic statements and her father'slega-cies, has identified her with an unreserv-ed pro-Indian position. Two complicat-inag actors for Hasina have been her in-experience in politics and a series ofdomestic problems that have stemmedfrom her husband's opposition to herpolitical career. The Awarni League,which she now heads, is seriouslydivided into pro-and anti-Moscow fac-tions, with Hasina being the only glueholding them together. She was electedptesident of the Awami League onFebruary 16, 1981 and chose to holdher first meetings with her party peoplein New Delhi rather than Dacca. Whenshe did finally return to Dacca - onMay 17, 1981 - she was immediatelyembarrassed by her unwillingness tocondemn outright India's claims to thenewly-formed island in the Bay ofBengal that the Bangladeshis call SouthTalpatty (it is known as New Mooreisland in New Delhi and Purbasha inCalcutta) which has been claimed byboth Bangladesh and India. Bangla-deshis were reminded of the corruptionan(d violence of the AwamniLeagueyears when Mujib's house and 2.7 mil-lion Taka worth of currency notes andjewellery that had been found in itwere handed over to Hasina by theBangladleshgovemrnnenthortly after herreturn to Dacca. At the same time,government officialspointedly refused tosurrender to Hasina several dozen un-licensed firearms and weapons that had

been found in Mujib's house at thetime of his assassination.Hasina's great strengths are her sym-bolic importance as the daughter ofMujib, whose mnemory till evokes posi-tive emotions among many Bangladeshis,and the network of local Awami Lea-,gue units that continue to exhibit

strength in the countryside. The AwamiLeague is not as disciplined or as xvell-organised as the Jamaat-i-Islami, theprincipal ftndamentalist Islamic party inBangladesh, but it is far more broadly-based and considerably larger thanthe Jamaat. Hasina's return to Bangla-desh demonstrated the strength of theAwami League when the party turnedout 3,000 lorryloads of people to meether, in driving rain, on one of the dark-est and stormiest days of the year. Sincethen, Hasina has turned out largecroNvdswherever she has appeared. Sheelicited tears from the eyes of mostBengalis by visiting her father's grave,speaking eloquently of her mother, an'dvowing to take revenge against thekillers of her family. The determinationof the govermment to prevent her be-coming a martyr was demomonstratedwhen she was provided with an Intel-ligence and police shield during theiincertain days following Ziaur Rahman'sassassination.

Granted the upsurge of pro-Islamicand anti-Indian sentiment in Bangladeshin recent years, most observers doubtthat HLasinar the Awami League couldwin a free and fair election in 1981.But this makes it all the more difficultto understand why the BNP ever putitself in a position where it could beaccused of denying Hasina the chanceof contesting the election. Had theBNP allowed or even invited Hasina torun from the beginning, it is unlikelythat she would have contested, sincethe Awami League has been reluctantto threaten her political future bynominating her while she is still bur-dened with inexperience, family prob-lems, and a pro-India identification. Itis a measure of the ineptitude andcowardice of BNP leaders that theythrust on themselves the onus forIlasina's inability to contest the elec-tions when they could have placed thebutirdenquiarelvon the shoulders of theAwami League.ANvamiLeague leaders contend thatthey could win a free-and-fair.electionbecause their organisational people arepresent in most villages of the countrywhile the BNP's organisationalapparatusis still centred in the big cities. Since1975, when the Awami League lostpower, it has maintained its nationwideorganisation by contesting local andnational elections, staging demonstra-


8/9

tions, and otherwise sustaining its frontorganisations among students, workers,women and peasants. Awami Leaguerswho tnade money when the party wasin power have continued to providefiniancial support, since many of themview the party as a form of politicalprotection against their rivals and findthemselves ulnable to cross over to anyof the other parties. Most of Bangla-lesh's Hindus (10 per cent of the popu-

lation) and many businessmen intereste(din expanded commercial relationshipswith India are supporters of the AwamiLeagtue because of its close connectionsand historical links with New Delhi. Itis widlelv assumed that both India andthe Soviet Unioni provide fue-ndsto theAwami League, but no conicrete evidenceof such funding has ever been madepublic.

PBOSPECTS FOR THE FuTunEThe unwillingrness of the BNP toencounage open party competition im-

mediately after Zia's death has drivenhome several wveaknesses of the party,which, wvhen taken together, bode illfor the 'power ar-rangement' that Ziahad created.-" Zia had allowed all partiesto compete relatively freely, was re-mnarkably liberal towards the press, andcommanded extraordinary respect andinfluence in the army, bureaucracy andamong politicians. Within the BNP to-clay there is no one who could aspire tothe kind of confidenit pre-emninence Ziacnjoye(ld iioI is any such person visiblein the army or among the oppositionpolitical parties. Most of the oppositionand a sizeable faction of the BNP itselfhave taken the position that the awe-some powers accuimuilatedby Ziaur Rah-lnatn should n)ow be diffuised among many(lifferent potential power centres, bydrastically altering Zia's Fifth Amend-nment, which created his version of aPresidential systemn (the first Presiden-tial system in Bangladesh was establish-ecl by Mujibur Rabtman's Fourth amend-ment). What most opposition politiciansadvocate is a Parliainentary forn ofgovernmentt with a strong Prime Minis-ter ancd a sovereigi Parliament. Thegreat irony is that the BNP governmentfeels it all the more necessary to uiseand retain the powers that Zia had ac-cumuilated precisely because the partyis so mnuch weaker now than it wastitnder Zia.

The major power behind AbdusSattar in the present government isPrimne Minister Shah Azizur Rahman,54, a renowned lawyer from West Ben-gal, who was General-Secretary of theAwvami LeagUie in the 1950s, General -Secretary of the M-uslim]League in the1960s, leader of the opposition in Parlia-ment during the last years of Ayub

Khan, and a supporter of the idea of aunited Pakistan throughout the periodof the Bangladesh liberation movement.Shah Aziz is a brilliant orator and asuperb politician, but he has been socrippled by widespread resentment ofhis support for Pakistan in 1971 thathis ascendancy to a position of domi-nance withini the party and governmentxwotuld inost likely lead to a massiveparty split. Most party leaders feel thatShah Aziz lacks the personality andb)readth necessary for the Presidency:his grtff manner and lack of knowledgeof external affairs are viewed as seriousshortcomings. The position of Shah Azizand his suipportershas also been cloud-ed by the fact that Zia had beerncon-sideriniga purgye f 'bad elenents' withinthe BNP wvhohad been guilty of cor-rupt activities, and Shah Aziz hadfrequently beeni listed as a prime targetof Zia's contemplated reshbuffle.

One possible successor to Zia underother ciIrcuimstances might have beeniBudraclozza Choudhury, General-Secre-tairy of the BNP and a nmarsihom Ziclappeared to be promoting as a possiblesuccessor. Choudhury, who is still in his40s, is' often regarded as the best phy-sician in Bangladesh and has establishedat prominient reputation with a natiog-wvide elevision programme in which hegives medical advice and answers ques-tiolns fro)m viewers. Unfortmuately, herivalry betwveen Choudhury and ShahAziz is so dleep-rooted that the candi-(lacy of either one of them for President'votulduntidoubtedly ave split the party.It is to- the credit of the political actu-men of bothimen that they have agreedto unianimouslyback the no6mination fSattar.The imiost formiiidable opposition toShah Aziz within the BNP has comefroml-a third factioin, which consists ofmeii in their early 40s wvho,unllike ShahAziz, are identified with the liberationmovemnent.The principal leaders of thisthird group which is sometimes knownias the gang of 70, reflecting its prol)a-ble strength in Parliameirt are: (1)Moudud Ahmed, who vas Deputy PrimeMinister under Zia until 1979 when hewas relieved of office for trying to'deemocratise' he BNP. Moudud weTntto Harvard University and to Germanyafter his innings as Deputy Prime Minis-ter, where he finished a book on Bangla-desh politics.1' He is reported to havethe support of at least 20 Members ofParliament. including six ex-Ministerswho were droppedl from the Cabinet atthe time of his dismissal by Zia.

(2) Nurul Islam Shisho, a fornnerMajor-General in the liberation army fromnBarisal, who wvas rapidly promoted byZia, retired from the army at the age

of 40, and made Agricultural Ministerin the last of Zia's Cabinets. Shishuhas the advantages of personality, vigor,connections in the military, amongbusinessmen and in international deve-lopmernt circles, plus his record as afreedom-fighter. His major liabilitiesstemn from his reputation as a modemrjet-setter who drinks and enjoys thecompany of women, these being per-sonal characteristics that tend to alienatethe Muslim :rightists in the BNP and inthe army. Shortly affter Zia's death,Shishu and Akbar Hossain were drop-ped from Sattar's Cabinet, allegedly be-cauise they were politicking in the can-tu3nment; miiany observers viewed thedismissals as a suIre sign that Shishu iscci-isidered forever unacceptable to boththe Shah Aziz faction of the BNP andtl-he Generals. Since then, Shishu hasbeconme the leader of the dissidents\vithin the BNP.

(3) The third dissident leader isAkhar Hossain, a retired LieutenantColonel, also in his 40s, who fought inthe liberation war, joined t-he BNPwhile Zia was alive, and was PetroleumMNinister during the last year of Zia'slife. Hossain was dismissed frotn Sattar'sCabinet along with Shishu. It is esti-mated that Shishu and Hossain togetherhave a grouip of 30 to 50 Members ofP>arliamenitwho are loyal to them.

Mouu(lh, Shishlt and Hossain haveaccelted Satttar's nomination for Presi-dent, but have reportly extracted a pro-nmise, as a conidition of their support,that the Vice-President would be 'elec-tel.'. While Shah Aziz reportedly agreedto this arranigement, he Sixth amend-ment provided only for election of thePlresi(dent, with the Vice-President con-tinuing as before to be the appointeeof a newly elected President. Negotia-tions are now goiing on withini the partvto see if a procedure acceptable to bothfacti(mtiscan be worked out for a 'BNPor LParliamnentaryelection' of the Vice-Presidential appointee. Considering thepoor state of Sattar's health and theawesoimie powers of the Presidency, itis understandable that the attention ofall politicians in Bangladesh today isrivetted on the Vice-Presidency. Untilthe elections are over and a new Vice-President either 'elected' or named, theSpeaker of the Parliament, Mirza Gho-lam Hafiz, is the constitutional successorto Sattar. Hafiz is president of theChinese-Banagladesh Friendship societyand a long timnerival of Shah Aziz.

The position of Shah Aziz has beengreatly str-engthened by supp)ort fromnleading politicianls like Sattar, and bythe ulnquestio3nedacking of the upperechelons of the army. General Ershadis *reporte(l o be genuinely in support

1 QQQ


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of the BNP government, and highlydesirous of a constitutional transition inwhich the army remains out of power.Shah Aziz seems comnpatiblewith thepresent leaders of the Bangladesh mnili-tary, since he, like them, is a repatriatefrom Pakistan who shares their valuesand pays attention to their concerns.In the first few weeks after Zia's death,army leaders were frequently seen inthe company of Sattar, Shah Aziz andother government officials. Somewhatominously, the influence of the militarywas widely perceived to be a factor be-hind both the continuation of emerg-ency rule and a censorship order im-posed on three newspapers that werediscussing conflicts within the army.12Civilian and army leaders agree thatthe best future scenario for Bangladeshw%oulde one in which the army wouldremain united, disciplined and suppor-tive of an elected constitutional govern-ment. One difficuIltyn establishing sucha scenario is that the present govern-ment is struggling for electoral legitimacybecause it lacks the confidence to per-mit an entirely open competition betweenitself and the opposition, and the BNPitself is seriously divided by intensepersonalistic factionalism. Judging fromthe experience of Bangladesh's past,what one would expect is an eventualbreak-up of the BNP and a shifting ofcoalitions between and within parties,with governments coming and goingand changing their spots fairly often.Bangladesh does not have the innumfier-able linguistic, religious and caste divi-sions found in India, but personalisticconflicts - between repatriates andfreedom-fighters, West Bengalis andEast Bengalis, Muslim fundamentalistsand modernisers, leftists, rightists andinnumerable others - have often pro-ven to be far more intractable thanstraight-out ethnic divisions that pitdifferent races, religions or castesagainst one another.Factional conflict in Bangladesh hasbecome even more dysfunctional since1971 because of the propensity of somefactional groups to pursue the heroic,guerilla style 'of the liberation war. AsManiruzzaman has pointed out, therehas been a patterned structure to muchof the violence that has occurred inBangladesh over the last decade: "agroup of armed men make a suddenand surprise appearance, liquidate thetarget with volleys from automaticweapons and run away out of sight, allwith lightning speed"." This was aprincipal tactic of the Bangladeshguerillas in the 1971 wvar,when Pakis-tani mnilitary fficers and administratorswere liquidated in their homes andoffices. It has become a tactic that isnow widely used in the universities, in

political parties and labour unions, inthe army, and in attacks on nationalleaders. Police statistics indicate thatmore than 23,000 persons (an averageof seven a day) have been murderedin Bangladesh since it became indepen-dent, with most of these murders al-legedly having political motives.14Zia'sdeath - and the other violent deathsthat have preceded and followed it-raises the spectre, not. of a politicalsystem in which there might be count-less numbers of successful coups, butrather, and more frighteningly, the pros-pect of innumerable abortive coup at-tempts and lightning raids on authorityfigures, which could render life uin-bearably insecure for aniyone who triesto assume responsibility for gettingthings done.There is another side to Bangladeshwhich has perhaps not received as muchattention as it should. The army is nowunited at the top, behind repatriateGenerals and Brigadiers who have adeep-seated interest in maintainincgunity among themselves. This group ofofficers has demonstrated that it canwork effectively together and has pro-ven - on many occasions, as it didin the case of the Chittagong putschthat it can thwart coup attempts direc-ted against the civilian govemments ithas supported. Indiscipline within theBangladesh army might lead to mnanyraids and murders by commandoes inthe night, but. for the near future, theonly possibility of a successful coulpd'etat would be one led by the Gene-rals themselves.While the Generals might intervenedirectlv at some point in the future,their clear preference is to allow acivilian governiment to exist, with thearmy leadership having disproportionateinfluence relative to other groups in thefunctioning of government and in thedistribution of patronage. This wasZia's conception of civil-military rela-tions, particularly in the early years ofmartial law, and it is ope that couldremain viable for at least a few yearsinto the future. Zia's re-institution ofthe bureaucraticelite that had first beencreated by the Pakistanis in the 1950sand 1960s has made it possible for themilitarv to conceptualise a situationwhere the upper echelons of the bureau-cracy and the army form the bedrockof a stable political core, with partypoliticians and the lower ranks of themilitary and bureaucracy stirring in astate of constant flux around them. Ziahad a similar conception during hisfirst two years in power, but he was-clearly try ng to move towards greaterdemocratisation, decentralisation andcivilianisation in the two or three yearsimmnediately efore he was killed.

The dilemmas confronting the Bangla-desh mnilitary ow are the same as thosefaced by Ziaur Rahman. Rule by themilitary-bureaucraticelite may producea political process that looks quiteorderly, but it tends to cover up prob-lems and suppress discontent in sucha way as to produce a pressure cookereffect that can suddenly result in dra-matic spurts of massive oppositionagainst it. The strength of the bureau-cratic establishtnent is not that it canget things done, but that it can protectits own interests and the interests ofthose it serves by sustaining an environ-ment 'of inertia and lethargy that hasexisted for a number of decades. Simi-larlv, while the military has historicallybeen able to suppress the opposition, ithas not been able to inspire the popu-lation to produce more or to distributeit more equitably, both of these beingnecessary if problems are to be solvedin the future. Notes1 See Chanchal Sarkar,'Zia: Journeyon Razor'sEdge', Hindustan Times,June 2, 1981 for a description ofthe casual security that characteris-ed Zia's encounters with newsmenand diplomats.2 Forra discussion of these policies,see, Marcus Franda, 'The VeryPoor in Bangladesh Food Policyand Politics', Itdia Quarterly, April-June 1981.3 Gautam Adhikari, 'Zia and Man-zur: Were Two Killed With OneStone?' The Hindu, July 20, 1981.4 Manash Ghosh, 'Manzoor was a

Victim, Not the Villain', TheStatesmian., une 17, 1981.5 The incident is detailed in ZillurRabman Khan, "Leadership in theLeast Developed Country: Bangla-desh", Unpublished Manuscriptscheduled for publication in 1982,p 214.6 Talukder Maniruzzaman, 'ZiaurRabmaci and Bangladesh', in"Group Interests and Politics inBangladesh and Pakistan", SouthAsian Publishers, New Delhi, 1981.7 Quoted in Sumit Mitra, 'An Omi-nous Void', Inidia Today, June 16-*30, 1981, p 31.8 The opposition boycott and doubtsthe fairness of the 1981 electionsare explained in Mainul Hosein,'A Custom-Tailored Constitution',The New Nation, July 12, 1981.9 Zillur Rahman Khan, op cit, p 191.10 The term is Enayetullab Khan's;see his 'Power as Plaything', Holi-day, July 12, 1981.11 Ahmed's earlier book is "Bangla-desh: Constitutional Quest forAutonomy, 1950-1971", UniversitvPress, Dacca, 1979.12 The three weeklies are: (1) Itehad,published by the DemocraticLeague of former President Mush-taque Abmed; (2) Khabar,an organof the Awamii League; and (3)Satqakatha, an independent pub-lication.13 Maniruzzaman, op cit, p 40.14 Ittefaq, June 13, 1981.

Documents

Bangladesh After Zia a Retrospect and Prospect