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Editor’s IntroductionComplex crises call for adaptable anddurable capabilities
At the beginning of 2015, defence and security planners
were reecting on a preceding year that added extra
crises to an already increasingly complex and frac-
tured global security environment. European secu-
rity faced its most signicant challenge since the end
of the Cold War with Russia’s annexation of Crimea
and fomenting of instability in eastern Ukraine. In the
Middle East, meanwhile, rapid advances by ISIS in
Syria and Iraq threatened the Iraqi state and led to
greater military extroversion by regional states. The
year ended with the US again commiing to deploy
troops on a training mission to Iraq; at the same time
it was also leading a broad multinational coalition in
oensive operations against ISIS.
The broader, long-term strategic trend of China
and other Asian states’ growing economic and mili-
tary power, and the parallel US rebalance to the Asia-
Pacic, continued. While the US and, to a limited
extent, some other Western states still possessed
dominant military capabilities, there was growing
awareness that in some respects the West was not
only at risk of losing its military-technological edge but could also, with continuing budgetary reduc-
tions, see some military capabilities further eroded or
excised altogether.
Russia’s assertiveness, notably its actions in
Ukraine, refocused aention not just on Moscow’s
policy objectives and military capabilities, but also
on the impact of nancial constraints on Europe’s
armed forces. In real terms, European defence
spending continued the downward trajectory seen
since the 2008 economic crisis. Real European defence
spending in 2014 was cumulatively 7.7% lower than
in 2010. However, there were signs that the morechallenging strategic environment in Europe had
shifted budgetary priorities in some places, particu-
larly in Northern and Eastern Europe. One way that
European states had previously thought of boosting
capability amid budgetary pressure was to do more
together; NATO was at the forefront of such initia-
tives.
Many had expected NATO’s September 2014
Wales Summit to be largely administrative and pre-
ordained – the Alliance would mark the end of its
combat operations in Afghanistan and agree measures
to improve cooperation – but instead NATO’s Eastern
European members pressed the Alliance for reassur-
ance amid concern over Russia’s actions in Ukraine
and more widely. Any earlier hopes that some
NATO leaders might have had of a post-Afghani-
stan ‘strategic holiday’ evaporated. At the same time,
Russia’s assertiveness reinvigorated the Alliance’s
core purpose of collective defence. The eectiveness
of Russia’s actions led some member states to ques-
tion whether NATO would be able to defend them,
should they be the target of actions similar to those
in Ukraine. The Alliance realised this, rearming
the Article V commitment to collective self-defence
and embarking on a range of reassurance initiatives,
including exercises and rotational deployments that
will essentially lead to a permanent, though small, US
presence in Eastern Europe.
Rediscovering ‘hybrid warfare’
The politico-military methods employed by Russiagave NATO and its members pause for thought.
Moscow successfully employed a broad range of
traditional and non-traditional instruments to achieve
its goals in Crimea, and to some degree in eastern
Ukraine. The rst problem for NATO was to dene
the nature of the challenge, and there was some
concern in the West about possible gaps in its ability
to counter Russia’s employment of what was gener-
ally labelled ‘hybrid’ warfare. The methods applied
included the use of military and non-military tools in
an integrated campaign designed to achieve surprise,
seize the initiative and gain psychological as wellas physical advantages utilising diplomatic means;
sophisticated and rapid information, electronic and
cyber operations; covert and occasionally overt mili-
tary and intelligence action; and economic pressure.
Although this problem is not new, some of the
means used by Russia, and potentially others, to
support proxies and subvert governments are inno-
vative. Indeed, operations in Crimea in early 2014
showed that Russian thinking and capacity in these
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6 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2015
areas has matured. Russian forces demonstrated inte-
grated use of rapid deployment, electronic warfare,
information operations (IO), locally based naval
infantry, airborne assault and special-forces capa-
bilities, as well as wider use of cyberspace and stra-
tegic communications. The laer was used to shape
a multifaceted and overall eective information
campaign targeted as much at domestic as foreign
audiences; one where continual denials and rebuals
from Moscow that it was militarily involved, even if
increasingly implausible, had the potential to create
a sense of cognitive dissonance in foreign decision-
making circles. These operations demonstrated some
of the fruits of Russia’s military-reform process,
although too much focus on the new personal equip-
ment, weapons, vehicles, electronic-warfare (EW) and
tactical-communications equipment seen in Crimea
could be misleading when assessing the eects ofmilitary reform on the wider force.
Western responsesFor the West (and, indeed, other states seeking to
preserve the rule of law and the existing interna-
tional order), improving the ability to defend against
these threats applies beyond the challenges posed
by Russia. Policymakers may anticipate that some
current or potential state or non-state adversaries,
possibly including states such as China and Iran, will
learn from Russia’s recent employment of hybrid
warfare. Potential adversaries might discern whattactics worked and what capabilities are required to
eect results; other lessons might derive from percep-
tions of how Western governments and armed forces
react and adapt, politically as well as militarily. These
lessons might not necessarily be applied in conicts
with Western states, but their potential to rapidly
destabilise the existing order could, if applied in other
zones of political and military competition, mean
they have global ramications.
Coping with the threat of hybrid warfare will
require Western and other governments to invest in
relevant capabilities. Investment could be made to bolster long-term strategic-intelligence capabilities,
such that the de-prioritisation of, for instance, broad
language skills that can result from a focus on current
operational requirements is minimised. Some armed
forces are looking to address this problem by region-
ally aligning selected units, but it is also an issue that
could be considered by other government depart-
ments with international interests. Other capabilities
include cyberspace, law-enforcement, information
and nancial tools as well as precision-strike and
persistent ISR; but they still include deployable and
adaptable sea, air and land forces. Meanwhile, the
deterrent eect of high-readiness armed forces and
pre-positioned forces and capabilities should not be
underestimated.
Additionally, Western states and indeed NATO
might perceive that beer coordination of the infor-
mational eorts of member nations and international
organisations, such as strategic communications,
might improve speed of action while amplifying a
common position. However, in many Western coun-
tries these capacities have been reduced since the
Cold War; rebuilding and updating them will take
time and political commitment.
This aspect of hybrid warfare was also evident
in the media operations of ISIS in the Middle East.
Fusing modern social-media savviness with sharp broadcasting techniques and even computer gaming
to recruit, inspire and intimidate in equal measure,
the actions of ISIS in this regard demonstrated some
thematic similarities with the application of hybrid
warfare in Ukraine, even if in another geographical
area and a dierent operational environment. These
similarities required an understanding that, while
traditional military capabilities such as mobility, re-
power and protection remain relevant and impor-
tant, the application of force must also be eective on
the ‘baleground’ of perception, particularly against
enemies that can operate in and among popula-tions and extend operations beyond physical bale-
grounds to the realms of perception and subversion.
Indeed, this hybrid, adaptable nature of ISIS
proved key to its advances: it has been part insur-
gency; part light-infantry; and part terrorist group. In
the areas it captured, it relied on a minimal bureau-
cratic structure at the same time as repressive rule,
enforcing strict codes and ruthlessly eliminating
dissent. It adopted a decentralised structure to create
greater exibility on the ground and strengthen
internal security, and has a core of highly motivated
commanders, some of whom are former al-Qaedaor Sunni insurgents, while in Iraq some are former
Saddam-era military ocers. While ISIS’s advance in
Iraq led to a military collapse in that country’s north,
in Syria it combined with other factors, like the US
decision to call o air-strikes in September 2013 in
exchange for Damascus relinquishing its chemical
arsenal, as well as continuing Western reluctance to
back the armed rebellion. This created a situation
by late 2014 where the position of President Bashar
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7Editor’s Introduction
al-Assad seemed stronger than at any time since
2012.
The actual and potential threat to international
security posed by ISIS triggered a degree of military
engagement and political alignment by regional and
international states that had not been seen for some
time. Indeed, some Arab states, particularly in the
Gulf, demonstrated their increasing strategic extro-
version. The actions of both the United Arab Emirates
and Egypt over their reported activity in Libya in 2014
marked something of a watershed in regional politics,
illustrating a potential to use force and the capacity
to operate independent of Washington. For all that,
the US remained the strategic guarantor for most
regional states, and still brought to bear unique mili-
tary and political capabilities. The US was successful
in enlisting the political and military support of key
Arab states to join the coalition to defeat ISIS. SomeGulf states calculated that ISIS was becoming an ideo-
logical and security threat; they also believed that
their involvement was essential to shape US strategy
in Syria and to ensure that Iran would not be a prin-
cipal beneciary of the campaign. Bahrain, Jordan,
Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the UAE all contributed
aircraft and other military capabilities.
Wider concernsThe potential for ‘hybrid’ incidents also worried
states in other parts of the world. In Japan, the
government expressed unease at possible ‘grey-zone’ contingencies, short of actual conict and
possibly not involving regular armed forces, with the
Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands a likely area of concern. For
all that, and despite some Asian defence establish-
ments’ continuing concerns with internal security
and a growing interest in improving capacity to deal
with HA/DR and other human-security challenges,
most regional defence programmes were driven by
state-on-state threats and conventional capability
procurements. Aempts to strengthen capabilities
in the Asia-Pacic have focused particularly (though
not exclusively) on the maritime domain, reectingworries about conventional naval threats, as well as
concerns over the need to defend natural resources,
territorial claims and freedom of navigation.
Defence budgets in Asia have continued to rise, by
an estimated 27% between 2010 and 2014. The biggest
spender remained China. By 2014, China’s share of
Asian spending had risen to around 38%, up from
28% in 2010. This increased spending has provided
for growing military procurement, the most news-
worthy being in the maritime and air domains, while
China and some other Asian states have increased
their investment in defence science, and research and
development. These states are making greater eorts
to acquire and absorb foreign technologies and they
are overhauling their existing defence-innovation
systems.
China’s technical advances in the defence sphere
are legion, and are leveraging the resources of
the defence as well as, in some cases, the national
commercial sector – even if gaps remain, such as in
advanced turbofan engines for high-performance
combat aircraft. This rapid progress has led some
in the US defence establishment to claim that the
technology gap that hitherto allowed the US armed
forces technological dominance is closing. Mindful
of the diering trajectories in the two countries’
defence budgets, US ocials emphasise the need forcontinued innovation and the Pentagon is aempting
to minimise potential vulnerabilities in its weapons
systems arising from other states’ technical devel-
opments. For instance, Washington is assessing its
dependence on space, including GPS, and there has
been greater aention to developing more resilient
space systems and satellite constellations, as well as
scrutiny of established technologies (such as inertial
navigation) that could minimise the eects of these
vulnerabilities on weapons systems.
While many countries will only have been aected
tangentially by events in Ukraine, Syria and Iraq,even if there might have been incidents inspired by
events in the Middle East, the lessons that potential
adversaries could draw from these might be of greater
long-term relevance. As such, their military planners
will study these lessons in detail; but there will be as
much interest in how the defence and security estab-
lishments of key states – in the West and the Gulf, as
well as in Russia and Eurasia – react and adapt. For
the US, unanticipated events like these were among
the possible ‘risks’ to the country’s armed forces
highlighted in the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review.
Though the QDR, according to the US Chairmanof the Joint Chiefs of Sta, largely protected certain
capabilities, it also ’takes risk in the capacity of each
service, but particularly in land forces’.
On current trajectories, cuts to land forces will
continue in many states – and US Army chiefs are
reported as saying that personnel strength might
drop to around 450,000. That total, of course, dwarfs
many other armed forces, but calculations change
when the numbers are teased apart. According to
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8 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2015
General Raymond Odierno, 55,000 are deployed
troops, and 80,000 are stationed abroad in 150 coun-
tries; others will doubtless be forming part of the
deployment cycle. Previous strategies had assumed
that the demand for land forces would decline,
but 2014 has seen additional – even if small-scale –
Western land forces deploy to Eastern Europe and
Iraq, and Russian ground forces played a key role in
shaping operations in eastern Ukraine. The complex
nature of some of these tasks might also lead to
further questions about whether armed forces are
even best suited for some of these complex crises,
certainly those that require security aention short of
war ghting; in some cases this might lead to a reas-
sessment of the relative utility of paramilitary forces
like gendarmeries.
It is unlikely that budget realities in the West will
see forces grow once more, but that places a premium
on policymakers and defence planners providing a
suitable force mix and spectrum of capabilities, and
generating adaptive military and security capacities
able to deploy rapidly and operate across all domains.
States also have to ensure nimble EW, IO, cyber and
strategic-communications capacities so that they can
operate in the information realm as well as in military
theatres.
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PAGE 3 OF 4 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2015Press Launch ARUNDEL HOUSE, LONDON 11 FEBRUARY 2015
SYRIA, IRAQ AND ISIS
While a revisionist Russia has challenged the European
security order, the threat from extreme Islamic terrorists
strengthened during the year. The rise of Islamic State ofIraq and al-Sham (ISIS) and the ow of jihadists in and
out of various Middle East theatres of war has become
a major pre-occupation for European states. Intelligence
services have to concentrate heavily on the threats posed
to European societies by returning jihadists. Military
successes on the part of ISIS galvanised a US-led coalition
into launching airstrikes against the jihadi movement in
Iraq and also in northern Syria.
The hybrid nature of ISIS – part insurgency, part-light
infantry, part-terrorist group – proved key to its advances.
Its campaigns in Iraq and Syria have shown ISIS to be
an adaptable adversary, demonstrated by its tactical
adjustment in late 2014 to reduce vulnerability to coalition
airpower and ISR capacities.
Since launching an air campaign against ISIS in August
2014, the US-led Operation Inherent Resolve has met with
mixed results in both Iraq and Syria. The strategy of giving
extended air support to local allies has certainly played a
part in breaking the strategic momentum that ISIS created
through the summer of 2014. In Iraq, coalition airpower
was crucial in the retaking of Mosul dam in August, as
well as defending Erbil, the capital of the Kurdish Regional
Government, from an ISIS onslaught. Iran also provided airsupport to Iraq. In Syria, the heavy use of airpower proved
decisive in the defence of the Kurdish city of Kobane. Still,
the US Pentagon had to acknowledge in late January that
the total gains made against ISIS in Iraq add up to only
1% of the territory it holds in that country. It is clear that
American allies on the ground, the Kurdish Peshmerga,
the Iraqi army and the Free Syrian Army, are not yet
strong enough, in spite of US weapons supplies, training
and air support, to win sustainable victories against ISIS.
The upcoming push to retake Mosul, Iraq’s second largest
city, will be a decisive test of whether President Obama’s
strategy of giving extended support to proxy forces on the
ground, can defeat, as opposed to contain, ISIS.
It is likely that long-term training and support for
both Syria’s non-ISIS rebels and Iraq’s security forces and
broader government institutions will be required. That
support will need to be combined with sustained political
eorts to regain the trust of Iraq’s Sunni minority.
Coalition air operations may lead to tactical victories
against ISIS – especially when they enable progress by
ghters opposed to it – but they cannot inict strategic
defeat on the group. Military methods alone cannot
successfully tackle the sophisticated means that ISISuses to recruit and inspire its followers and sustain its
operations Countering ISIS’s information operations
designed in equal measure to intimidate and open
seams in the coalition will also require lasting, whole-of-
government and multilateral aention.
Complex security dynamics across the region meant
that regional defence spending was already high, butgrowing insecurity and conict have contributed to a
further acceleration. Spending remains focused on air-
defence and strike systems, particularly in the Gulf,
though some states have invested in rotary-wing, airlift
and tanker capacities, as well as armour and artillery. In
2011, average real defence spending growth in the Middle
East and North Africa region was 3.5%. In each year since,
we estimate it has increased by an average of 10%.
ASIA’S MILITARISATION CONTINUES
In contrast to the continuing decline evident in Europe,
overall defence spending has increased in Asia – since
2010 by more than a quarter in nominal terms, growing
to more than US$340bn in 2014. China’s defence spending
continues to outpace its neighbours’ eorts. In 2010 China
accounted for around 28% of the Asian total; by 2014 its
share had increased to around 38%. In contrast, Japan’s
share of regional military outlays fell from 20% in 2010 to
just less than 14% in 2014.
China’s military procurement programme, supported
by these budget increases, continues to aract aention.Following a urry of new naval programmes, from
the Liaoning carrier to destroyers, more are underway.
Armament has also improved. The 60 frigates and
destroyers in service in 2000 had less than 600 anti-ship
and surface-to-air missile tubes between them; the current
eet has almost triple that number with only 20% more
hulls. The November 2014 Zhuhai air show provided
further insights into China’s military progress. Highlights
of the show included the FC-31 combat-aircraft prototype,
which might be intended for export, a large ramjet-
powered supersonic anti-ship missile design, the CX-1,
and a range of air-to-surface weapons being oered for
use on UAVs.
Japan too has increased its defence budget, and
continues to boost its military capabilities. Tokyo’s defence
plans include acquisition of F-35s, tilt-rotor aircraft and an
expanded submarine eet, including the advanced Soryu-
class. This boat’s advanced propulsion oers a substantial
increase in the time a submarine could spend submerged
at sea. Australia is assessing the Soryu-class as a possible
replacement for its existing submarines. Submarines
remain a key requirement for states across Asia. Vietnam
has started to receive its Kilo-class boats from Russia,and India, South Korea, Indonesia and Singapore are also
upgrading their submarine forces
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CONCLUSION
The West still spent more than half of global defence
outlays in 2014, though this was down from two-thirds
of global totals in 2010. Given this trend, and even thoughsome states have marginally increased their defence
eorts amid heightened security concerns, European
states will have to more seriously weigh the optimum
balance between their defence ambitions, decit reduction
and discretionary spending, such as military outlays.
In contrast, emerging economies have continued to
escalate their defence spending. In 2014 these increases
more than oset Western reductions; overall, real global
defence expenditure in 2014 rose by 1.7% after three
years of reductions. However, this trend may moderate
this year in light of falling oil prices, the stagnation of the
Russian economy and slowing global growth.
Of course spending is only part of the picture.
Military capability like that of the US – still the world’s
largest defence spender – relates to more than simply
the equipment a state might procure. It also relates to the
quality of personnel and decades of accumulated military
training and operational experience; factors like these
inform a more rounded assessment of a country’s military
capability. So while defence investment gaps are closing,
Western states with global defence ambitions must try to
retain that accumulated experience mindful that once a
capability is lost, it is harder to rebuild.
Additionally, Western states will look to retain a
technological edge while aempting to minimise the risks
to their military power from the diusion of previouslyselect technologies to a broader range of state and non-
state actors.
This time last year, we highlighted the challenge to
defence planners from a fractured and complex security
environment. As we enter 2015 this state of aairs is more
threatening. Insecurity, violence and the use of military
force are all increasing; the ‘arc of instability’ is widening,
and military crises do not seem to end, but rather multiply.
Meanwhile, armed forces remain involved not just on
traditional military tasks, but also on missions as wide-
ranging as humanitarian assistance and disaster relief and
pandemic response; these missions remain global in scope
and complex in execution.
As policymakers grapple with these issues, the 2015
edition of The Military Balance provides the best available
public information on military capabilities, trends
and defence expenditure across the world. The facts
and analysis concerning national military capabilities
contained in The Military Balance will help signicantly
to inform discussions within government and the wider
public debate.
Top 15 Defence Budgets 2014† US$bn
l l l l l l l l
i i
United
States
Other
top 15countries
Rest
of theworld
US$bn1. United States
581.0
2. China
129.4
7. Japan
47.7
5. United Kingdom
61.8
4. Russia
70.0
8. India
45.2
11. Brazil
31.9
12. Italy
24.3
13. Israela
23.2
14. Australia
22.5
15. Iraq
18.9
10. South Korea
34.4
9. Germany
43.9
6. France
53.1
3. Saudi Arabia
80.8
a Includes US Foreign Military Assistance
Note: US dollar totals are calculated using average market exchange rates for 2014, derived using IMF data. The relative position of countries will vary not only as a result of actual adjustments in defence spendinglevels, but also due to exchange-rate fluctuations between domestic currencies and the US dollar. The use of average exchange rates reduces these fluctuations, but the effects of such movements can be significantin a small number of cases.
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
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THE MILITARY BALANCE 2015Further Assessments ARUNDEL HOUSE, LONDON 11 FEBRUARY 2015
since 2010. By contrast, defence outlays are rising in many
emerging economies, particularly Asia, the Middle East
and Russia.
Nominal defence spending in Asia has increased by
more than a quarter since 2010. However, despite the largeabsolute spending increases in Asia, percentage real-terms
increases in the region have averaged some 3.8% since 2010,
a rate lower than regional growth rates (which averaged
around 6.8% over the same period). In the Middle East
and North Africa , nominal defence spending is estimated
to have risen by almost two-thirds since 2010. Factoring
in exchange rate and inationary eects, this equates to a
40% increase in real defence outlays over the period.
Real Russian defence spending increases have
averaged 10% in the three years to 2014 , with a large
increase in funds allocated to nance Russia’s ambitious
State Armaments Programme. Maintaining this rate of
increase will be dicult given the deterioration in the
Russian economy due to poor economic fundamentals,
falling oil prices and economic sanctions; and will likely
require political prioritisation of defence while focusing
budget cuts on other government spending areas.
NAVAL AND MARI TIME
Research and development was going into new platforms
for the US Navy , including unmanned systems, and planswere emerging to address concerns levelled against the
LCS programme. This led, in late 2014, to the requirement
for a ‘Small Surface Combatant’, to be paired in a 52-strong
eet with an LCS eet retro-ed with systems oering
improved survivability and lethality.
In the last ve years the Chinese People’s Liberation
Army Navy has commissioned more frigates and
destroyers than in any comparable period in its history. It
also now has fewer destroyer and frigate hulls in service
than at any point in the last decade, though the vessels
themselves have increased in size. The 61 hulls in service
in 2000 had less than 600 anti-ship and surface-to-air
missile tubes between them; the current eet has almost
treble that number, with only 20% more hulls.
Russia’s navy continues to focus primarily on two
nuclear submarine projects: eight Borey-class SSBNs due
to be equipped with the troubled Bulava SLBM; and seven
Yasen-class multipurpose cruise-missile-equipped SSNs.
Additional classied ‘special projects’ boats are planned.
It seems unlikely that these ambitious plans will be
implemented on schedule given the diculties already
experienced in building 50 or so major surface warships,
and the time taken to complete submarines that have goneinto service in recent years.
LAND WARFARE
Numbers of land platforms in Europe have reduced
substantially since the mid-1990s. This reduction has been
driven by changing defence aspirations and procurementplans, as well as nancial considerations. Between 1995
and 2015, numbers of main bale tanks in Europe declined
from around 25,000 to just under 8,000. Over the same
period, armoured infantry ghting vehicles declined from
just over 11,000 to around 7,500.
Some observers of China’s People’s Liberation Army
have talked of ‘brigadisation’ of the ground forces, but
this has not yet been totally realised. About 20 infantry
divisions and one armoured division remain both in the
18 group armies and as independent units. After these
reductions began, many divisions were downsized into
one brigade of the same type. Recently, all armoured
divisions – bar the 6th in Beijing – have transformed into
brigades.
MILITARY AEROSPACE
The coalition air-led campaign against ISIS underscores
both the utility and the limitations of air-power, but
suggestions the air campaign has failed are incorrect. An
air campaign alone was never going to prove decisive
against ISIS. This requires a concerted whole-of-government approach including non-military as well as
military tools.
Armed UAVs apparently in Nigeria and almost
certainly in Pakistan mark the beginning of the provision
of such capabilities other than by the US (Israel is not
known to have exported armed UAVs) – in both cases,
China is almost certainly the provider. The UAV observed
in Nigeria appeared to be ed with two kinds of air-
to-surface weapons that China has been developing for
unmanned platforms.
Underlining the importance of airborne intelligence,
surveillance and reconnaissance, the US has decided to
retain the U-2 ISR aircraft until 2019. Air power remains
a strategic asset with the US and Russia continuing next-
generation bomber projects – during 2014 the US issued
a request for proposals while Russia is thought to have
completed the basic design of its project. Meanwhile the
US is examining future concepts of combat aircraft to
succeed the current fth-generation programmes while
both the US, Russia, China and others are considering the
optimum mix of manned and unmanned aircraft that will
constitute future force structures. These developments
will be watched by emerging military powers across theglobe.
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Contents
Indexes of Tables, Figures and Maps 4
Editor’s Introduction 5
Part OneCapabilities, Trends and Economics
Chapter 1 Defence-policy trends and analysis ............................. ............................... .............................. ........... 9
Directed energy weapons: finally coming of age? 9; Military space systems: US ambitions to secure space 13; Hybrid warfare: challenge
and response 17
Chapter 2 Comparative defence statistics .............................. ............................... .............................. .............. 21
Defence budgets and expenditure 21; Changes in the global submarine market since 1990 23; Key defence statistics 24; Precision attack
by guided artillery 26; US rebalance to the Asia-Pacific: vessel deployments 2014–20 27; Latin American fixed-wing aircraft fleets, 1994–
2014 28
Chapter 3 North America .............................. .............................. ............................... .............................. ......... 29
United States: defence policy and economics 29; Armed forces data section 37;
Canada: defence policy 36; Selected arms procurements and deliveries 55
Chapter 4 Europe ........................... .............................. .............................. .............................. ......................... 57
Regional defence policy and economics overviews 61; Armed forces data section 72;
France: defence policy and economics 64; Selected arms procurements and deliveries 154
UK: defence policy and economics 68;
Chapter 5 Russia and Eurasia ............................. .............................. .............................. ............................... .. 159
Russia: defence policy and economics 159; Armed forces data section 174;
Central Asia: defence policy 167; Selected arms procurements and deliveries 205
Ukraine: defence policy 168;
Chapter 6 Asia ............................... .............................. .............................. .............................. ....................... 207
Regional defence policy and economics overviews 207; Myanmar: defence policy 225
China: defence policy and economics 212; North Korea: defence policy 226;
India: defence policy and economics 217; Armed forces data section 228;
Japan: defence policy and economics 221; Selected arms procurements and deliveries 296
Chapter 7 Middle East and North Africa ............................ .............................. .............................. .................. 303
Regional defence policy and economics overviews 303; UAE: defence policy and economics 314;
Libya: defence policy 306; Armed forces data section 319;
Israel: defence policy 310; Selected arms procurements and deliveries 360
Chapter 8 Latin America and the Caribbean ........................... ............................... .............................. ............ 363
Regional defence policy and economics overviews 365; Armed forces data section 375;
Brazil: defence policy 369; Selected arms procurements and deliveries 418
Colombia: defence policy and economics 370;
Chapter 9 Sub-Saharan Africa ............................ .............................. .............................. ............................... .. 421
Regional defence policy and economics overviews 423; Armed forces data section 430;
Kenya: defence policy and economics 425; Selected arms procurements and deliveries 480
The Somali National Army 427;
Chapter 10 Country comparisons – commitments, force levels and economics ........................... ....................... 481
Selected Training Activity 2014 482; Selected Non-State Armed Groups:
International Comparisons of Defence Observed Equipment Holdings 491
Expenditure and Military Personnel 484;
Part Two Reference
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Explanatory Notes ................................................................................................................................................................. 493
Principal Land Definitions 497; Principal Naval Definitions 498; Principal Aviation Definitions 499
List of Abbreviations for Data Sections ............................... .............................. .............................. .................. 501
Index of Country/Territory Abbreviations .......................................................................................................... 503
Index of Countries and Territories ............................ ............................... .............................. ............................ 504
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Chapter One: Directed energy weapons: finallycoming of age?
To cite this article: (2015) Chapter One: Directed energy weapons: finally coming of age?, TheMilitary Balance, 115:1, 9-20, DOI: 10.1080/04597222.2015.996336
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and power requirements for the laser systems most
likely to be elded in the near-to-medium term
are more modest than systems such as ABL. While
the ABL programme predates the 1980s Strategic
Defence Initiative it received a major llip from the
Reagan-era initiative.
Laser systems are currently viewed, in the near
term at least, as an adjunct or complement to existing
weapons, rather than as direct replacements. In the
maritime role, for instance, a laser could provide the
ability to engage particular target sets – such as fast-aack craft or unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) –
without having to expend a costlier weapon such as
a missile, of which vessels will have limited stocks.
Air-defence missiles could then be saved to engage
more demanding targets, such as high-speed anti-ship
cruise missiles, that remain beyond the power-output
abilities of the lasers most likely to enter operational
service by 2020. There is also interest in using laser
weaponry to counter subsonic cruise missiles – both
at sea and on land – either by degrading the perfor-
mance of or damaging electro-optical (EO) seekers, or
by causing structural damage to the missile airframe.Power requirements in the hundreds of kilowas
would likely be required for this role.
US naval laser research
Even though substantial funds have been invested
into laser research, and the results have so far been
mixed, the projected benets in cost terms remain a
signicant motivation for continued military interest
in the technology. The US Navy’s (USN) Oce of
Naval Research has suggested that a typical 110kW
high-energy laser (HEL) for a multi-second shot
would cost less than US$1 per round. Firing a missileto full a similar role costs substantially more, with
most of this related to the round itself. With lasers, the
costs lie with the engineering architecture required
to generate, point and steer a beam of the required
power for the requisite period of time; so far these
costs have generally been prohibitively high. For
instance, although Israel pursued a counter-rocket
laser system with the US (the cancelled Mobile
Tactical High Energy Laser), it still relies on a kinetic
finally coming of age?
Directed energy (DE) systems have been something
of a chimera for defence planners. From their rst
appearances in science ction, to the ambitious 1980s
United States’ Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), they
have been touted by advocates of the technology as a
means of engaging military targets with, in the case
of lasers, speed-of-light delivery and the possibility
of near-unlimited magazines compared with kinetic-
eect weapons, such as missiles or guns.
The US, several European countries, including
the United Kingdom, Germany and France, as wellas Russia, China and Israel, have all been engaged in
long-standing research and development (R&D) into
DE systems. While there has been limited transition
from the laboratory and related test environments
into weapons systems suitable and ready for opera-
tional exploitation, in spite of considerable levels
of investment since the 1970s, the practical military
employment of DE systems is drawing closer.
There is now the potential for DE to be adopted far
more widely than in the niche applications in which
it has been utilised so far, such as vehicle immobilisa-
tion. This is in part because technology has matured, but also because near-term ambitions have been
reviewed by defence planners. DE is now seen as a
disruptive technology that can potentially provide
substantial military benet at the tactical rather than
strategic level – with the proviso that such systems
must be brought to an appropriate level of maturity
for deployment. Two areas, in particular, have long
interested armed forces: laser systems and radio
frequency (RF). These oer the most promise in terms
of tactical application.
Laser weaponsThe development of laser weaponry has had several
expensive false starts. One of the most public was
the US Airborne Laser (ABL) programme. This
exemplied much that was wrong with DE weapons
projects. Irrespective of the technical progress made
during the programme, the project suered from
over-reach with regard to the maturity of the tech-
nology then available, and came in over budget.
Today, the level of ambition, projected target set
Chapter One
Directed energy weapons:
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10 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2015
approach to defeat rockets with its Iron Dome missile
system.
Recent tests by the USN have been illustrative of
the increasing likelihood that DE weaponry will soon
be integrated into military platforms. In April 2014,
the USN announced that the landing platform dock
USS Ponce would carry out trials, during a year-long
operational deployment to the Persian Gulf, with a
Laser Weapon System (LaWS) demonstrator in order
to examine its utility against a range of air and surface
targets. These tests followed others in US home waters
on board USS Dewey , an Arleigh Burke-class destroyer,
where LaWS was used to engage a small UAV.
LaWS is a comparatively low-powered 30kW
‘solid-state’ laser. This modest power level has
limited its notional target set to UAVs and fast
inshore aack craft (usually by targeting the engine
block to disable the craft), particularly when engagedin swarm aacks. Anticipating questions about the
compatibility of LaWS with existing ship systems, the
USN has said that the system could be directed onto
targets from the radar track obtained from a Mk 15
Phalanx Close-In Weapon system or other targeting
source. Indeed, integration with a relatively low-tier
tracking and targeting system such as that used in
Phalanx could, when allied with its relatively modest
power requirement, increase the possibilities of LaWS
being integrated more broadly across eet platforms
of varying sizes.
This deployment forms part of the USN’s Solid-State Laser Quick Reaction Capability work strand,
which it hopes will help inform the Solid-State Laser
Technology Maturation programme (SSL-TM),
which grew originally from the 2011 Maritime Laser
Demonstration. In May 2014, Rear Admiral Mahew
Klunder, the USN’s chief of naval research, told
the Senate Appropriations Defense Subcommiee:
‘SSL-TM will help determine the load capacity and
most eective means to integrate a HEL … on surface
ships such as DDG-51 [USS Arleigh Burke] and the
Lioral Combat Ship. The SSL-TM goal is to demon-
strate a 100–150 kilowa Advanced DevelopmentModel … by 2016. The programme will address tech-
nical challenges in rugged laser subsystems, optics
suitable for maritime environments, and capability to
propagate lethal power levels in the maritime atmo-
sphere.’
However, while the USN might have ambitions to
increase the power output of its laser systems, these
are incremental steps towards realising fairly limited
objectives. For instance, the power output of LaWS is
dwarfed by the near-megawa-level power output
required for ABL to damage a ballistic missile at an
operationally valid range. While ABL, housed in a
Boeing 747-400 airframe, was rst used in 2010 to
successfully engage a ballistic-missile target at such a
range, the project was some distance from providing a
system suitable for introduction into general service.
Other defence-related laser research
Naval laser-damage or ‘dazzle’ weapons have already
been developed by various states, including the
former Soviet Union and the UK, with several other
countries – including France, Germany and China –
pursuing long-term R&D into laser dazzle or damage
systems. The UK deployed a naval laser weapon, the
Laser Dazzle Sight, during the Falklands campaign
in 1982, although previously classied documents
suggest it was not used in action.As well as examining the utility of medium-power
lasers for applications such as air defence, the UK has
also pursued – since at least the late 1970s – projects
to defend sensors and personnel against lasers. The
original code name for this activity was Raker , while
development projects arising from the research fell
under the Shingle programme. These included coat-
ings for EO sensors and aempts to develop eye-safe
visors for aircrew. Conversely, the blinding eect of
lasers has also been considered by some nations for
both defensive and oensive anti-satellite purposes,
including China, Russia and the US. Lasers can beused to degrade or disrupt the performance of space-
based EO reconnaissance sensors.
A number of European countries, including the
UK and Germany, also support R&D work into laser
systems for maritime and land-based air defence. In
the UK, there has been ongoing naval interest in laser
systems with work streams examining eects, and
pointing and tracking requirements. In Germany,
MBDA Deutschland has been working under contract
to the German defence ministry to develop and test
a solid-state laser for the Counter-Rocket, Artillery
and Mortar role and against UAVs, either to defeatsensors at extended ranges or to shoot down the air
vehicle. A number of increasingly demanding trials
were carried out in 2012 and 2013 to verify elements
of the system, including the ability to engage a mortar
round and to automatically acquire and track a high-
speed target. Several possible applications are now
being considered including land and naval roles. One
option for the former might be to install a 10–20kW
laser on an armoured vehicle to provide a counter-
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11Directed energy weapons
UAV capability as a complement to existing missile
systems.
The types of EO sensors used by UAVs in the
intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR)
role are vulnerable to laser damage or blinding. The
USN’s Ground-Based Air Defense Directed Energy
On-The-Move programme is being developed to
address the threat to deployed forces presented by
enemy UAV sensors. The programme is a result of
the need to counter ISR surveillance of ground forces,
as outlined in the US Marine Corps’ Science and
Technology Strategic Plan. While a 10kW laser was
due to be tested before the end of 2014, the aim is to
have a 30kW laser ready for eld-testing during 2016.
But again, there is no monopoly on this technology.
EO sensor countermeasures were examined by the
Soviet Union: the 1K11 Stileo and 1K17 Szhatie were
vehicle-mounted systems intended for baleeld useagainst NATO EO systems, and during the 1980s
work was also carried out on a land-based tactical air-
defence laser system.
Radio-frequency weapons
While lasers have garnered much aention, RF
weapons have also seen both defensive and oensive
research activity. RF systems are more commonly
referred to as high-power microwave (HPM), and
have possible applications across the air, land and
sea domains. They provide the potential ability to
temporarily or permanently disable systems thatrely on computers or electronics by emiing very
high-output, short-duration, electromagnetic bursts.
Initial work into HPM or RF ordnance conducted in
the 1990s by the UK utilised explosive-driven ux
compression generators to produce the required
energy, although this limited output to single shots.
This led researchers to investigate other technolo-
gies, such as Marx Generators, which allow for the
voltage of the output discharge to be far higher than
the input, to deliver multiple bursts of RF energy.
Like laser systems, there have been some niche
applications in terms of counter-personnel (suchas the US Active Denial System, which relies on
the sensation of skin heating), counter-vehicle and
counter-improvised-explosive-device systems, but
the development of ‘stand-o’ HPM or RF payloads
to provide weapons eects has proved more chal-
lenging. Eorts to develop HPM warheads have
been under way for at least three decades, and while
systems have been tested in the laboratory and in
the eld, it remains unclear whether any have been
operationally deployed (although there may be some
applications in the classied realm). In common with
lasers, though, the possibility is growing that an air-
delivered RF weapon might soon be elded.
In 2012, Boeing carried out ight tests of the
Counter-electronics High-Powered Microwave
Advanced Missile Project (CHAMP) on behalf of
the US Air Force Research Laboratory. The CHAMP
concept, housed within a cruise-missile airframe,
used a compact pulsed-power system to provide
a ‘narrowband’ HPM, with the system capable of
generating multiple pulses to engage multiple targets.
Narrowband sources provide high energy output
over specic frequencies tailored to the systems they
are intended to counter. (‘Broadband’, as the name
suggests, is a less discriminate output of RF energy.)
The US is not alone in trying to exploit the poten-
tial of air-delivered HPM devices. For well over adecade, the UK has been developing and testing
HPM payloads capable of cruise-missile delivery,
while Russia has also considered an RF warhead
for future air-to-air missile applications. The UK has
carried out trials of an HPM payload against a variety
of simulated targets in order to beer understand
the eects of this technology. The UK Ministry of
Defence’s Black Shadow Novel Air Vehicle project was
believed to be related to the delivery of DE payloads,
including HPM.
Challenges to and ramications of RF weapon useThere are, arguably, three basic challenges to the
use of an RF warhead: repeatability, bale damage
assessment (BDA), and second- and third-order
eects. One issue with early HPM systems was that
the burst of energy could dier from one shot to the
next, with this output variation meaning there was
no guarantee the desired eect could be achieved.
Much R&D activity has been devoted to this issue.
BDA during operational use is another problem area
for HPM payloads, particularly if the objective is to
permanently or temporarily disable a surface-to-
air missile system radar or a command-and-controlnode. Monitoring these may enable the detection of
any degradation in capability, but generating such
analysis may take time and serve only to generate
additional intelligence requirements. A conventional
cruise-missile strike, meanwhile – even against hard-
ened structures – will show a penetration point, and
post-detonation indicators may also be available to
provide additional BDA data.
While a multiple-shot HPM payload has the
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12 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2015
obvious advantage of providing the ability to engage
more than one target, as opposed to a conventional
one-hit warhead, it also gives rise to challenges. For
instance, did the HPM payload work as intended or
did the target simply shut down operation coinci-
dentally at around the time of the planned engage-
ment? Furthermore, what should be done with
the cruise-missile airframe once the mission is
completed? The airframe will likely house sensitive
HPM technology – should the weapon be recovered
like a UAV, or should it be ed with an explosive
warhead to try and ensure the RF elements of the
payload are destroyed? Another option would be to
t a multi-shot HPM as part of an unmanned combat
aerial vehicle (UCAV) payload, though this would
require such levels of electromagnetic shielding to
ensure the UCAV itself would not be aected by the
HPM.A further consideration is that of second-order
eects, not least of all in terms of the laws of armed
conict. Legal issues surrounding previous and
current RF and laser weaponry have to be taken into
account in development and integration plans. In the
case of the laer, a protocol on blinding laser weapons
was adopted in 1995, which might need to be revis-
ited as more powerful laser systems enter service.
For HPM systems, meanwhile, there are potential
issues related to unanticipated, follow-on collateral
eects, as opposed to collateral damage. In both tech-
nology areas, a key challenge for policymakers and
legal experts is the speed of developments, which
are, in many cases, outpacing current conceptual and
legal frameworks. These concerns will need to be
addressed as DE systems nally move out of the test
environment and into broader operational service,
instead of the niche applications that have typied
their roles so far.
In the near term, DE systems will be drawn rst
into the wider inventory as complements to, rather
than as replacements for, kinetic weapons. This level
of ambition means that the capabilities deployed
initially will be considerably more modest than some
of the systems envisaged in the 1980s and 1990s. The
defence-technology base was at that time incapableof delivering systems that provided robust and reus-
able operational utility, and was hampered by power-
output and beam-steering demands it could not meet.
This lowering of ambitions – at least initially – means
that DE weapons are nding a path into active service,
and it is only in the course of their elding and use
that the true operational and transformational aspects
of these technologies will become clear.
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US ambitions to secure space
kinetic kill mechanisms, and environmental hazards,
including orbiting debris.
For the US armed forces, the perceived vulnera-
bility of space-based systems is of increasing concern.
In February 2014, referring to a satellite constellation
under construction (the Advanced Extremely High
Frequency satellite, or AEHF), then-Space Command
chief Air Force General William Shelton said: ‘if an
adversary wanted to go after one of our satellites, [an
AEHF satellite] might be the one you’d choose … If
that happened, and one of the four gets knocked out,
we’re left with a big geographic hole in our ability totransmit data around the world and [help] the presi-
dent give the direction that he needs to give.’ Shelton
also highlighted the potential of high-powered lasers
to aect payload operation. Some lasers have the
potential to blind electro-optical reconnaissance satel-
lites (see p. 10).
China’s ASAT test in January 2007 caused alarm
in Washington. Beijing destroyed its own Fengyun
1C polar-orbiting weather satellite with what was
thought to be an SC-19 missile, based on the DF-21
(CSS-5) intermediate-range ballistic missile. This
resulted in a large debris eld, much of which remainsin orbit and has prompted numerous ‘manoeuvres’
by satellite operators in order to avoid secondary
collisions in space.
China has continued to rene its capabilities since
then, and is believed to have executed an aempted
engagement of a ballistic missile in 2010. Another
test, in 2014, was labelled by US ocials as an ASAT
operation. In August, Frank Rose, US deputy assis-
tant secretary of state for space and defence policy,
told the 2014 US Strategic Command Deterrence
Symposium that, ‘despite China’s claims that this was
not an ASAT test … the United States has high con-dence in its assessment, that the event was indeed an
ASAT test’. In contrast, China’s state-run news agency
claimed the test was a missile intercept. Western
analysts believe that Beijing is investing signicant
resources in technologies and techniques to inuence
operations in space. If anything, these discussions
are only illustrative of the concern expressed by the
US government and its allies that space services are
vulnerable.
Once the exclusive domain of the Cold War super-
powers, national space capabilities are now main-
tained by a growing number of countries. Eleven
states have an indigenous capacity to launch satellites,
while 170 operate satellites or have a nancial interest
in a satellite constellation. Along with the established
space-operating nations of the United States, Russia,
France, the United Kingdom, Germany and Israel,
nations such as China and India now possess signi-
cant, and in some cases growing, space capabilities.
While its early uses were dominated by national-
security tasks, space is now of far broader economic,commercial and military importance. For example,
the US Global Positioning System (GPS) provides
precision timing and navigation data, among other
information. Russia’s Glonass oers a similar capa-
bility, and Europe has successfully launched four
of its Galileo timing and navigation spacecraft into
orbit. Recent commercial uses of space include the
earth-observation collections from DigitalGlobe and
others that drive imagery products such as Google
Maps. Satellites providing these services are in low-
Earth orbit (LEO); spacecraft in geosynchronous
orbit (GEO) provide television and communicationsservices.
However, the vulnerability of space systems to
deliberate or inadvertent damage or interference is
an increasing concern, not least in Washington, as
the US seeks to sustain and protect those satellite
systems that are not only central to its commercial
and economic security, but also at the core of its mili-
tary infrastructure.
Military uses of space have grown substantially
in the years since the rst satellite, Sputnik , orbited
the Earth. Over the years, armed forces have increas-
ingly relied on space-based systems for naviga-tion, targeting, surveillance and communications.
Reconnaissance satellites, for instance, typically
operate in LEO – often within 400km of Earth – while
critical ballistic-missile warning and communica-
tions payloads operate in GEO, roughly 35,000km
away from the surface of the planet. However, both
orbital regimes are under threat. There is particular
concern about intentional and inadvertent radio-
frequency jamming, as well as anti-satellite (ASAT) or
Military space systems:
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15Military space systems
of FY2017. For the next SBSS satellite, ocials are
targeting a less complex design than that of Pathnder ,
which featured a two-axis, gimballed sensor and cost
US$823m.
Ground-based supportWashington is also improving the terrestrial radars
used for SSA. A new Space Fence S-band active elec-
tronically scanned array is due to begin operating in
2018. The system, developed by Lockheed Martin,
is intended to be installed at Kwajalein Atoll in the
Pacic Ocean. A possible follow-on site could be in
Western Australia, but that option on the US$914m
contract has not yet been exercised. A C-band radar
formerly in Antigua has already been relocated to
Western Australia, the site of DARPA’s SST. These
radar assets are sited to provide intelligence on
Chinese launches, specically those from the TaiyuanSatellite Launch Centre. Until recently, the US lacked
the ability to conduct continuous tracking of Chinese
payloads launched into certain orbits.
US government ocials have long held that SSA is
only one aspect of the United States’ posture in space.
These radar upgrades will improve Washington’s
understanding of activity in space, making it easier
to aribute actions there. Diplomatic agreements
with space operators to deter irresponsible or hostile
behaviour are known to exist, but only aribution can
allow the US and its allies to properly apply diplo-
matic pressure and, if needed, military force in reac-tion to hostile acts against space assets. At an Air
Force Association conference in 2014, AFSPC chief
General John Hyten said: ‘we have to be prepared to
do all those things the president has told us to do and
if deterrence fails, defeat eorts to aack us.’
Responses to perceived vulnerabilitiesAbsent from the public dialogue are technologies
elded to respond to threats. One is the United
States’ Counter Communications System, designed
to deny an adversary the ability to access friendly
military-satellite communications. Lile has beenrevealed about the technology, but since 2006 it has
been operated by the 4th Space Control Squadron
at Peterson Air Force Base, Colorado. Another is the
Rapid Aack, Identication, Detection and Reporting
System, the prototype of which began operations in
the Middle East in 2005. This system was designed
to ‘detect, characterize, geolocate and report’ sources
of interference to allied communications systems in
the region and, according to the USAF, consists of a
‘central operating location and a variety of transport-
able antennas’. During operations, data was relayed
to teams that would physically locate, identify and
nullify the interference.
A so-called Counter Surveillance and Recon-
naissance System, which was conceived of more
than ten years ago to impede an adversary’s access
to space-based reconnaissance assets, disappeared
from US budget documents in 2004, suggesting that
it was either terminated or classied so that funding
accounts for continued work could be hidden.
The US has also been exploring alternative
propulsion systems for its workhorse Atlas V two-
stage expendable launch vehicle. Now operated by
the United Launch Alliance (ULA), a joint venture
between Lockheed Martin and Boeing, Atlas V
relies on the Russian RD-180 engine, sold to ULA
exclusively by a US–Russian joint venture. In 2014increased tensions between Washington and Moscow
prompted Dmitry Rogozin, Russia’s deputy prime
minister, to state that he would cut o the supply
of engines used for military purposes. Although
the threat had not been fullled by October 2014, it
caused concern in Washington and, after months of
wrangling, Congress was assessing whether to fund
an alternative Atlas V engine.
Headway is also being made by Space Exploration
Technologies (SpaceX). The private company’s Falcon
9 v1.1 rocket, rst own in September 2013, has edged
closer to USAF certication, expanding its potentialmarket beyond NASA and commercial operators.
Once certied, SpaceX can compete against ULA,
which currently has a monopoly on large national-
security launches in the US with its Delta IV and Atlas
V rocket families. In the meantime, a lawsuit regarding
the USAF’s deal with ULA, led by SpaceX in April
2014, is still pending. Rogozin made his threat around
the same time that the lawsuit was led, calling into
question the USAF’s future launch strategy.
The various challenges to US space security, which
range from the increasing congestion of space to
oensive actions by other states, have led Washingtonto see its space-based systems as increasingly vulner-
able. This has prompted the development of a range
of monitoring capacities, both earthbound and space-
based, in a bid to improve SSA. But the US has also
taken other steps. For instance, there has been some
focus on increasing resilience by considering dierent
constellation architectures. This might result in a
move away from ‘the multiple payload, big satellite
construct into a less complex satellite architecture
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16 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2015
with multiple components’, as Shelton said in 2014.
It could mean that payloads are distributed across
multiple platforms. Perceived vulnerabilities are also
leading Washington to assess its level of military
dependence on space, including its ability to operate
in degraded information environments, such as one
in which access to GPS is reduced. As a result, there
has been some scrutiny of established technologies
that could minimise the eects of vulnerabilities on
weapons systems. For example, inertial guidance is
being revisited, including technologies such as terrain
mapping and the miniaturisation of atomic clocks.
There is also a focus on hardening existing tech-
nology to minimise the risk of electromagnetic aack,
and of GPS degradation or spoong, in which false
readings – perhaps imperceptible to the operator –
may be generated by an adversary seeking to degrade
satellite capabilities.
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employing hybrid warfare might evade a response
through ambiguity deliberately calculated to avoid
an early declaration of Article V.
Perhaps most dangerous to NATO, adver-
saries might aack Alliance cohesiveness and
magnify possible political divisions. Campaigns
against NATO states could begin with eorts to
shape the political, economic and social landscape
through subversion, espionage and propaganda.
An example of this tactic could be an appeal for the
protection of ethnic minorities, similar to concerns
expressed by Moscow over elements of the popula-
tion in Eastern Ukraine, and the rapid formation of
pressure groups that might be locally staed, but
externally directed and supported. The urgency for
NATO to develop responses to these threats has
been heightened due to Russia’s aggressive appli-
cation of hybrid warfare, particularly because ofthe fear, among those newer NATO members who
might feel more vulnerable to Russian actions, that
they could be directed against them.
Broader responsesIn developing responses to hybrid warfare, policy-
makers might rst look to the past, and to the history
of the Cold War in particular. Russian conduct of
hybrid warfare is grounded in maskirovka , the Soviet
doctrine of denial and deception, featuring deni-
ability, concealment, deception and disinformation,
to accomplish political objectives. The current incar-nation of maskirovka has received modern updates.
Today, Russia has developed an ability to shape polit-
ical, economic and social environments through divi-
sion, subversion, espionage, information operations
and social tension. As Russia’s Chief of the General
Sta General Valery Gerasimov observed in 2013,
‘the means of achieving political and strategic goals
has grown, and, in many cases, they have exceeded
the power of force of weapons in their eectiveness’.
These new means include the use of cyber warfare,
entertainment television, business groups and social
media to inuence popular will and perception. Therewas evidence of cyber aacks on Ukrainian systems
in 2014, including the reported insertion of an espio-
nage tool called ‘Snake’, although as an example of
cyber warfare the Ukraine crisis appeared muted in
comparison with previous aacks, such as that by
Russia on Estonia in 2007.
To prevail in what is a psychological and polit-
ical contest supported by military operations, states
– and international organisations like NATO – must
consider how to counter three fundamental elements
of hybrid warfare:
• the use of conventional and unconventional
forces in combination with information
operations to intimidate, coerce and foment
ethnic conict;
• the use of conventional and unconventional
forces to strike rapidly in combination with
cyber aacks;
• the establishment of new political structures,
economic relationships and social structures
to consolidate gains and prevent reverses.
Deterring and countering hybrid warfare will
require states to improve capabilities in the informa-
tion domain as well as strengthening military readi-
ness and forward defence. For NATO, this shouldalso involve building upon recent work on the
‘comprehensive approach’, its recognition that eec-
tive response to crises must combine civilian and mili-
tary instruments. To that end, clause 89 in the Wales
Summit Declaration – referring to NATO’s ‘Defence
and Related Security Capacity Building Initiative’ –
was instructive, as it reected awareness of broader
capacity-building requirements.
Hybrid warfare entails the pursuit of psycholog-
ical eects both on the target nation and internation-
ally, and so Western states and NATO might improve
their ability to clarify intentions; counter enemy disin-formation and propaganda; bolster the resolve and
cohesion of the nation or nations under aack; and
expose the actions and duplicity of the enemy. For
instance, quick action to counter Russia’s narrative of
its right to protect pro-Russian and Russian-speaking
populations seems particularly important. Because
deception has been employed to foster confusion
and achieve deniability, it will be important for intel-
ligence eorts to establish the foundation for infor-
mation campaigns. Compelling intelligence products
will help deny the enemy’s ability to use ambiguity
to avoid sanction. Intelligence will also be a criticalcomponent of countering eorts to sow dissen-
sion, doubt and division within and among nations.
Inuence agents working on behalf of adversaries
could be systematically and publically exposed.
For NATO, beer coordination of the informational
eorts of member nations, as well as those of inter-
national organisations such as the European Union,
might improve speed of action while magnifying the
Alliance’s voice, but in many Western countries these
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19Hybrid warfare
capacities have been reduced since the Cold War;
rebuilding and updating them will take time and
political commitment.
Military aspectsThe most important focus for NATO, to deter Russia
in particular, might lie in strengthening the readi-
ness of its military forces. That is because the Russian
application of hybrid warfare in Ukraine is essentially
an eort to wage limited war for limited objectives.
Moscow believes that those limited objectives are
aainable at an acceptable cost. If the cost of poten-
tial oensive action against a NATO member is high
due to capable military forces ranged in opposition,
Russia may well conclude that it cannot rapidly
achieve its objectives in this way. While the develop-
ment of the NATO Very High Readiness Joint Task
Force is an important initiative, strengthening mili-tary forces on NATO’s periphery and the forward-
positioning of US or European forces may be more
important to deterring future aggression. That is due,
in part, to the often slow response by Western policy-
makers, particularly when aggressors are successful
in preserving ambiguity. Conicts in Georgia, Crimea
and Eastern Ukraine demonstrated that Russia was
able to act more quickly than international organisa-
tions could react. Hybrid warfare, like all warfare, is
a contest of wills; the positioning of capable forces
forward along a frontier remains a compelling way to
communicate the determination to confront aggres-sion.
Deterring and defending against a sophisticated
campaign demands a comprehensive approach
and the integration of military, diplomatic, infor-
mational, economic, cyber and law-enforcement
activities. NATO has a well-developed focus on inter-
operability and integration across these and other
domains, which could be applied to the problem of
hybrid warfare. Contingency planning and training
could be orientated to the hybrid model, and lessons
could be applied from experiences in Afghanistan
against networked insurgent and criminal organisa-tions. Defence planners might look for asymmetrical
advantages that could be applied to this problem.
A potential advantage, often under-utilised, is the
ability to take law-enforcement and nancial action
against enemy organisations so that their sources of
strength and support are exposed and prohibited.
International and non-governmental organisations
may be mobilised to expose illicit nancial ows
and to sanction individuals and companies that aid
and abet adversaries. The French, Italian and Dutch
models of blending military and law-enforcement
actions overseas might be applied at the operational
and strategic levels. All of these eorts should add
the dimension of cyberspace as a critical element in
understanding hybrid warfare, defending against it
and, if necessary, taking oensive action.
As NATO and many Western states look beyond
the long war in Afghanistan, there has been a
tendency to return to the orthodoxy of the 1990s
Revolution in Military Aairs, and especially the
belief that complex land-based problems can be
eectively addressed by technology and precision-
strike operations conducted at stand-o range. In
hybrid warfare, exclusive use of stand-o capabili-
ties leaves decisions in the hands of enemies who
operate in and among populations and extend oper-
ations beyond physical balegrounds to realms ofperception and subversion. A signicant aspect of
Russia’s hybrid warfare is the use of conventional
forces, capable of mobilising quickly and massing
to intimidate the target nation while shielding and
supporting (directly and indirectly) unconventional
forces employed inside that nation. The combination
of tactics and capabilities employed in Ukraine, and
the deniability professed by Moscow, even saw the
insertion of conventional forces into Eastern Ukraine
in mid-2014.
States wishing to respond eectively to hybrid-
warfare threats are likely to have to apply greaterinvestment in special operations and conventional
land forces, irrespective of whether the threat mani-
fests itself in the Baltic States, Eastern Europe, the
greater Middle East or the broader Sahel. In particular,
land forces should have the ability to deploy rapidly
and transition to both oensive and security opera-
tions. Combinations of conventional and special-
operations forces must have the ability not just to
take direct action but to defeat hybrid enemy organ-
isations, secure territory and isolate populations from
enemy subversion as well. Traditional army capabili-
ties such as mobility, protection and repower willremain relevant and important, but forces must also
be eective on the ‘baleground’ of perception while
integrating military operations with broader eorts,
including in the areas of counter-threat nance and
law enforcement.
Hybrid warfare represents a grave threat to
NATO’s collective security. However, improving the
ability to defend the Alliance and its member states
from hybrid-warfare threats applies beyond those
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Chapter Two: Comparative defence statistics
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Chapter Two
Comparative defence statisticsTop 15 Defence Budgets 2014† US$bn
2014 Top 15 Defence and Security Budgets as a % of GDP*
*Analysis only includes countries for which sufficient comparable data is available. Notable exceptions include Cuba, Eritrea, Libya, North Korea and Syria.
† At current prices and exchange rates.
†Figures do not sum due to rounding effects
UnitedStates
Other top 15
countries
Restof theworld
US$bn1. United States
581.0
2. China
129.4
7. Japan
47.7
5. United Kingdom
61.8
4. Russia
70.0
8. India
45.2
11. Brazil
31.9
12. Italy
24.3
13. Israela
23.2
14. Australia
22.5
15. Iraq
18.9
10. South Korea
34.4
9. Germany
43.9
6. France
53.1
3. Saudi Arabia
80.8
a Includes US Foreign Military Assistance
Note: US dollar totals are calculated using average market exchange rates for 2014, derived using IMF data. The relative position of countries will vary not only as a result of actual adjustments in defence spendinglevels, but also due to exchange-rate fluctuations between domestic currencies and the US dollar. The use of average exchange rates reduces these fluctuations, but the effects of such movements can be significant
in a small number of cases.
Algeria
5.3%
Myanmar
3.9%
Bahrain
3.9%
Yemen
4.2%
Azerbaijan
4.5%
Republicof Congo
5.1%
Angola
5.2%
Afghanistan
14.6%
SaudiArabia
10.4%
Jordan
4.3%
Iraq
8.1%
Oman
12.0%
Israel
7.6%
Armenia
4.3%
SouthSudan
8.8%
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
North America37.1%
Europe17.8%
Russia and Eurasia5.1%
Asia andAustralasia
21.4%
Middle East andNorth Africa
12.6%
Latin America and the Caribbean
4.6%Sub-Saharan Africa
1.5% Sub-Saharan Africa1.5%
United States36.1%
United Kingdom3.8%
France3.3%Germany
2.7%Other NATO
7.6%
Non-NATO Europe, 1.4%
China, 8.0%
Japan, 3.0%
India, 2.8%
South Korea, 2.1%
Other Asia andAustralasia, 5.4%
Russia, 4.4%Other Eurasia, 0.7%
Saudi Arabia, 5.0%
Other Middle Eastand North Africa, 7.6%
Latin Americaand the Caribbean, 4.6%
Planned Defence Expenditure by Country 2014†Planned Global Defence Expenditure by Region 2014