RULE 70 Forcible Entry and Unlawful Detainer

RULE 70 Forcible Entry and Unlawful Detainer62

RULE 70FORCIBLE ENTRY AND UNLAWFUL DETAINER(Accion Interdictal)

Section 1. Who may institute proceedings, and when. Subject to the provisions of the next succeeding section, a person deprived of the possession of any land or building by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth, or a lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person against whom the possession of any land or building is unlawfully withheld after the expiration or termination of the right to hold possession, by virtue of any contract, express or implied, or the legal representatives or assigns of any such lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person, may, at any time within one (1) year after such unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession, bring an action in the proper Municipal Trial Court against the person or persons unlawfully withholding or depriving of possession, or any person or persons claiming under them, for the restitution of such possession, together with damages and costs. (1a)

JURISDICTION: Municipal Trial Courts

DEFINITION

Jose Casilang, Sr., substituted by his heirs, namely: Felicidad Casilang, et.al., vs Rosario Casilang-DizonG.R. No. 180269 February 20, 2013

Accion Interdictal, unlawful detainer and forcible entry are the two forms of ejectment suit that may be filed to recover possession of real property.

Encarnacion vs Amigo (September 15, 2006)GR No. 169793

Accion interdictal, or an ejectment proceeding which may be either that for forcible entry (detentacion) or unlawful detainer (desahucio), which is a summary action for recovery of physical possession where the dispossession has not lasted for more than one year, and should be brought in the proper inferior court.

FORCIBLE ENTRY

It consists of depriving a person of possession of land or building for a period of time not exceeding one year by force, intimidation, strategy threat or stealth. (Section 1 Rule 70, Rules of Court)

Nenita Quality Foods Corporation vs Crisostomo GalaboG.R. No. 174191 January 30, 2013

In a forcible entry case, a party who can prove prior possession can recover such possession even against the owner himself. Whatever may be the character of his possession, if he has in his favor prior possession in time, he has the security that entitles him to remain on the property until a person with a better right lawfully ejects him. He cannot be ejected by force, violence or terror -- not even by its owners.

UNLAWFUL DETAINER

Unlawful withholding by a person from another for not more than one year of the possession of any land or building after the expiration of termination of the right to hold such possession by virtue of a contract, express or implied.(Section 1 Rule 70, Rules of Court)

Spouses Armando and Remedios Silverio vs Spouses Ricardo and Evelyn MarceloG.R. No. 184079 April 17, 2013

Unlawful detainer is an action to recover possession of real property from one who illegally withholds possession after the expiration or termination of his right to hold possession under any contract, express or implied. The possession of the defendant in unlawful detainer is originally legal but became illegal due to the expiration or termination of the right to possess.

In an unlawful detainer case, the sole issue for resolution is physical or material possession of the property involved, independent of any claim of ownership by any of the parties. Where the issue of ownership is raised by any of the parties, the courts may pass upon the same in order to determine who has the right to possess the property. The adjudication is, however, merely provisional and would not bar or prejudice an action between the same parties involving title to the property.

UNDERLYING PRINCIPLE OF FORCIBLE ENTRY AND UNLAWFUL DETAINER

Drilon v Gaurana (April 30, 1987) GR No. L- 35482

It must be stated that the purpose of an action of forcible entry and detainer is that, regardless of the actual condition of the title to the property, the party in peaceable quiet possession shall not be turned out by strong hand, violence or terror. In affording this remedy of restitution the object of the statute is to prevent breaches of the peace and criminal disorder which would ensue from the withdrawal of the remedy, and the reasonable hope such withdrawal would create that some advantage must accrue to those persons who, believing themselves entitled to the possession of property, resort to force to gain possession rather than to some appropriate action in the courts to assert their claims. This is the philosophy at the foundation of all these actions of forcible entry and detainer which are designed to compel the party out of possession to respect and resort to the law alone to obtain what he claims is his.

LEGAL BASIS

Article 536 of the Civil CodeArt. 536. In no case may possession be acquired through force or intimidation as long as there is a possessor who objects thereto. He who believes that he has an action or a right to deprive another of the holding of a thing, must invoke the aid of the competent court, if the holder should refuse to deliver the thing.

PURPOSE

Holy Trinity Realty Development Corporation vs Spouses AbacanG. R. No. 183858 April 17, 2013

It is well-settled that the sole issue in ejectment cases is physical or material possession of the subject property, independent of any claim of ownership by the parties. The argument of respondent-spouses that they subsequently acquired ownership of the subject property cannot be considered as a supervening event that will bar the execution of the questioned judgment, as unlawful detainer does not deal with the issue of ownership.

Juanita Ermitano represented by her Attorney-in-fact Tsa Belo Ermitano vsLailanie PaglasG.R. 174436 January 23, 2013

In an unlawful detainer case, the sole issue for resolution is the physical or material possession of the property involved, independent of any claim of ownership by any of the party litigants. Where the issue of ownership is raised by any of the parties, the courts may pass upon the same in order to determine who has the right to possess the property. The adjudication is, however, merely provisional and would not bar or prejudice an action between the same parties involving title to the property.Salandanan vs Sps Mendez (March 13, 2009)GR No. 160280

Forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases are summary proceedings designed to provide for an expeditious means of protecting actual possession or the right to the possession of the property involved.

WHEN DO YOU FILE AN ACTION

At any time within one (1) year after such unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession. (Section 1, Rule 70)

Commencement of one year period

Forcible EntryUnlawful Detainer

The one year period is counted from date of entry or taking of possession by force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealthOne year period should be counted from the demand to vacate

In cases of stealth, the one year period is counted from the time of discovery

PARTIES TO THE ACTIONS

Who may bring action (Section 1, Rule 70)

Forcible Entry Unlawful Detainer

Anyone deprived of the possession, of any land or building by force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealthAny landlord, vendor, vendee or other person against whom the possession of any land or building is unlawfully withheld after the expiration or determination of the right to hold possession by virtue of any contract, express or implied; OR

The legal representatives or assignees of any such landlord, vendor, vendee, or any other person.

Parties in Forcible Entry

a. Plaintiff the one deprived of possession by means of force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth.b. Defendant the person who unlawfully deprives another of possession of a property

Parties in Unlawful Detainer

a. Plaintiff lessor, vendor, vendee, or the legal representatives or assigns of any such lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person against whom the possession of any land or building is unlawfully withheld after the expiration or termination of the right to hold possession, by virtue of any contract, express or implied. (Section 1, Rule 70)

b. Defendant persons unlawfully depriving or withholding possession or any person claiming under them .

REQUIREMENT FOR THE EJECTMENT SUIT TO BE FILED

Section 2. Lessor to proceed against lessee only after demand. Unless otherwise stipulated, such action by the lesser shall be commenced only after demand to pay or comply with the conditions of the lease and to vacate is made upon the lessee, or by serving written notice of such demand upon the person found on the premises if no person be found thereon, and the lessee fails to comply therewith after fifteen (15) days in the case of land or five (5) days in the case of buildings.

A. VENDOR AS PLAINTIFF

Larano v Calendacion (June 19, 2007)GR No. 158231

In unlawful detainer, the possession was originally lawful but became unlawful by the expiration or termination of the right to possess; hence, the issue of rightful possession is decisive for, in such action, the defendant is in actual possession and the plaintiffs cause of action is the termination of the defendants right to continue in possession.Applied to the present case, petitioner, as vendor, must comply with two requisites for the purpose of bringing an ejectment suit: (a) there must be failure to pay the installment due or comply with the conditions of the Contract to Sell; and (b) there must be demand both to pay or to comply and vacate within the periods specified in Section 2 of Rule 70, namely: 15 days in case of land and 5 days in case of buildings. The first requisite refers to the existence of the cause of action for unlawful detainer, while the second refers to the jurisdiction requirement of demand in order that said cause of action may be pursued.

Both demands to pay installment due or adhere to the terms of the Contract to Sell and to vacate are necessary to make the vendee deforciant in order that an ejectment suit may be filed. It is the vendor's demand for the vendee to vacate the premises and the vendee's refusal to do so which makes unlawful the withholding of the possession. Such refusal violates the vendor's right of possession giving rise to an action for unlawful detainer. However, prior to the institution of such action, a demand from the vendor to pay the installment due or comply with the conditions of the Contract to Sell and to vacate the premises is required under the aforequoted rule.

Thus, mere failure to pay the installment due or violation of the terms of the Contract to Sell does not automatically render a person's possession unlawful. Furthermore, the giving of such demand must be alleged in the complaint; otherwise, the MTC cannot acquire jurisdiction over the case.

B. VENDEE AS PLAINTIFF

Javelosa v CA (December 10, 1996)GR No. 124292

The purchaser at public auction is entitled to possession of the property. To obtain possession, the vendee or purchaser may either ask for a writ of possession or bring an appropriate independent action, such as a suit for ejectment, which private respondents did. The RTC case assailing the public auction sale of the property and seeking annulment of mortgages did not preclude the filing of an ejectment case against petitioner. We have consistently ruled that the pendency of an action for annulment of sale and reconveyance (which necessarily involves the issue of ownership) may not be successfully pleaded in abatement of an action for ejectment, the issue in the latter being merely physical possession.

Other case doctrines:Boy v CA (April 14, 2004) GR No. 125088

Upon delivery of the property subject to sale, the vendee has the right to the material possession of the property and can then sue as a plaintiff in an unlawful detainer case against the vendor.

Oronce v CA (October 19, 1998)GR No. 125766

In an equitable mortgage, the mortgagor or the seller still has the right of possession over the property under the principle that you cannot acquire the property under the principle that you cannot acquire the property without benefit of public sale or foreclosure; otherwise, it is pactum commissorium.

So in a mortgage situation, a deed of sale with assumption of mortgage which turns out to be an equitable mortgage, the vendee has no right to file an action for unlawful detainer because the seller as mortgagor has the right to possess the property.

NATURE

Section 3. Summary procedure. Except in cases covered by the agricultural tenancy laws or when the law otherwise expressly provides, all actions for forcible entry and unlawful detainer, irrespective of the amount of damages or unpaid rentals sought to be recovered, shall be governed by the summary procedure hereunder provided.

Salandanan v Sps Mendez (March 13, 2009)GR No. 160280

It is a "time procedure" designed to remedy the situation. Stated in another way, the avowed objective of actions for forcible entry and unlawful detainer, which have purposely been made summary in nature, is to provide a peaceful, speedy and expeditious means of preventing an alleged illegal possessor of property from unjustly continuing his possession for a long time, thereby ensuring the maintenance of peace and order in the community; otherwise, the party illegally deprived of possession might feel the despair of long waiting and decide as a measure of self-protection to take the law into his hands and seize the same by force and violence. And since the law discourages continued wrangling over possession of property for it involves perturbation of social order which must be restored as promptly as possible, technicalities or details of procedure which may cause unnecessary delays should accordingly and carefully be avoided.

To summarize: Nature if the action Both actions are possessory actions Both involves real properties Summary in nature, which is governed by Summary Rules of Procedure

Section 4. Pleadings allowed. The only pleadings allowed to be filed are the complaint, compulsory counterclaim and cross-claim pleaded in the answer, and the answers thereto. All pleadings shall be verified.

PLEADINGS ALLOWED

1. Complaint Answer2. Answer3. Cross-claims4. CounterclaimsRATIONALE FOR THE RULE

This is consistent with the summary nature of the ejectment cases. The affidavits should be within the personal knowledge of the affiant.

Section 5. Action on complaint. The court may, from an examination of the allegations in the complaint and such evidence as may be attached thereto, dismiss the case outright on any of the grounds for the dismissal of a civil action which are apparent therein. If no ground for dismissal is found, it shall forthwith issue summons.

Jurisdictional requirements that must be alleged in the complaint

Forcible EntryUnlawful Detainer

Prior physical possession

Prior demand to vacate

Deprivation of prior physical possession by force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth

Action was filed within one year from such deprivationAction was filed within one year from demand was made

What is meant by the word possession

Salandanan v Sps Mendez (March 13, 2009)GR No. 160280

In ejectment cases, the word possession means nothing more than actual physical possession, not legal possession, in the sense contemplated in civil law. The only issue in such cases is who is entitled to the physical or material possession of the property involved, independently of any claim of ownership set forth by any of the party-litigants. It does not even matter if the party's title to the property is questionable.

Instance where there are prior physical possession

Arbizo v Santillan (February 26, 2008)GR No. 171315Fencing the area immediately after purchase constitutes prior physical possession.

What is meant by force

Baes v. Lutheran Church in the PhilippinesGR No. 142308

In order to constitute force that would justify a forcible entry case, the trespasser does not have to institute a state of war. The act of going to the property and excluding the lawful possessor therefrom necessarily implies the exertion of force over the property which is all that is necessary and sufficient to show that the action is based on the provisions of Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court.

There is force when the guards are present to restrict the mobility of the occupants.

David v Cordova (July 28, 2005)GR No. 152992

If a trespasser enters upon land in open daylight, under the very eyes of the person already clothed with lawful possession, but without the consent of the latter, and there plants himself and excludes such prior possessor from the property, the action of forcibly entry and detainer can unquestionably be maintained, even though no force is used by the trespasser other than such as is necessarily implied from the mere acts of planting himself on the ground and excluding the other party.

DEMAND TO VACATE

Actual word vacate is not necessary, as long as there are other terms definitively implying that the tenant should vacate.

Golden Gate Realty v IAC (July 31, 1987)GR No. 74289

But the court feels that there is no necessity that such a word "vacate" or a phrase containing the word "vacate" must have to be so stated categorically in the complaint. It could be gleaned from the complaint that the plaintiff, through its counsel "gave notice to the defendant to pay the sum of P18,000.00 within five (5) days from receipt of his letter and failing to do so a case of ejectment would be filed against him."Such allegation substantially connotes that warning is given to the defendant that in case he fails to pay the amount demanded of him as rentals in arrears, then he has to vacate the premises. There is no necessity of so categorically stating the word "vacate" or the phrase containing the word "vacate" the premises in the allegation in the complaint.

However, the doctrine that the exact word vacate is not necessary to be stated is not applicable where no statement that is an unequivocal or even an implied demand on the defendant to vacate.

La Campana Food Products v CA (June 4, 1993)GR No. L-88246

The January 20, 1986 letter of La Campana to Cascade, however, is rather ambiguous. It warned that upon failure of Cascade to pay the rentals and unpaid water bill, "we may forward this matter to our legal counsel for proper action thereof." We do not see in this statement an unequivocal or even an implied demand on the defendant to vacate the leased premises. The doctrine covered in the Golden Gate case is therefore not applicable.

The certificate to file action cannot cure the lack of demand to vacate.

Bandoy v CA (July 19, 1989) GR No. 77133The defect was not cured because no evidence of a prior demand to vacate was presented in the trial court. The affidavit of Empaynado relied upon by the trial judge to the effect that: "na ako ang tinutukoy ni Marciano Tamis Bandoy dahil di umano'y sa di magandang asal namin na gusto niyang paalisin sa kanyang extension", does not prove that the spouses demanded that he vacate the premises. What Empaynado admitted in the said affidavit was that the spouses intended to expel him out of the premises ("gusto niyang paalisin') but has not actually or definitely demanded that he vacate the premises. An intention to oust is different from an actually or definitely demanded to vacate. It is the latter which confers jurisdiction upon the municipal court.

Possession by tolerance

Dela Cruz v CA (December 6, 2006)GR No. 139442

A person who occupies the land of another at the latters tolerance or permission, without any contract between them, is necessarily bound by an implied promise that he will vacate upon demand, failing which a summary action for ejectment is the proper remedy against them. The status of the defendant is analogous to that of a lessee or tenant whose term of lease has expired but whose occupancy continued by tolerance of the owner. In such a case, the unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession is to be counted from the date of the demand to vacate.

SECTION 6. Answer. Within ten (10) days from service of summons, the defendant shall file his answer to the complaint and serve a copy thereof on the plaintiff. Affirmative and negative defenses not pleaded therein shall be deemed waived, except lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter. Cross-claims and compulsory counterclaims not asserted in the answer shall be considered barred. The answer to counterclaims or cross-claims shall be served and filed within ten (10) days from service of the answer in which they are pleaded.

In case the defendant was issued summons, he should file his answer to the complaint within ten (10) days from service of such summons. The period to file an answer is mandatory. To make the same directive will forfeit the essence of summary procedure. In other words, to admit a late answer is to put a premium on dilatory measures, the very mischief that the rules seek to redress

Affirmative and negative defenses of the defendant should be pleaded in his answer. Otherwise, they are deemed waived except for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter.

Also, cross-claims and compulsory counterclaims should be asserted in the defendant's answer. Otherwise, they are deemed barred.

In case the defendant asserted cross-claims and compulsory counterclaims in his answer, the plaintiff should file his answer to such cross-claims and compulsory counterclaims within ten (10) days from service of the answer in which they are pleaded.

SECTION 7. Effect of failure to answer. Should the defendant fail to answer the complaint within the period above provided, the court motu proprio or on motion of the plaintiff, shall render judgment as may be warranted by the facts alleged in the complaint and limited to what is prayed for therein. The court may in its discretion reduce the amount of damages and attorney's fees claimed for being excessive or otherwise unconscionable, without prejudice to the applicability of Section 3 (c), Rule 9 if there are two or more defendants. (6, RSP)

In case the defendant failed to file his answer to the complaint within ten (10) days, the court motu proprio or on motion of the plaintiff, shall render judgment as may be warranted by the facts alleged in the complaint, however, limited only to what is prayed for therein.

The court has discretion to reduce any amount of damages and attorney's fees claimed for being excessive or otherwise unconscionable. This is without prejudice, however, to the applicability of Section 3 (c), Rule 9 if there are two or more defendants.

Rule 9, Section 3 states:

(c) Effect of partial default. When a pleading asserting a claim states a common cause of action against several defending parties, some of whom answer and the others fail to do so, the court shall try the case against all upon the answers thus filed and render judgment upon the evidence presented. (4a, R18)

Similar Provision in The Revised Rules on Summary Procedure and a Related Case

Dr. Luna vs. Judge MirafuenteA. M. No. MTJ-05-1610 September 26, 2005

Sections 5 and 6 of the 1991 Revised Rule on Summary Procedure provide:

Sec. 5. Answer. Within ten (10) days from service of summons, the defendant shall file his answer to the complaint and serve a copy thereof on the plaintiff. xxx

Sec. 6. Effect of failure to answer. Should the defendant fail to answer the complaint within the period above provided, the court, motu proprio, or on motion of the plaintiff, shall render judgment as may be warranted by the facts alleged in the complaint and limited to what is prayed for therein: Provided, however, That the court may in its discretion reduce the amount of damages and attorneys fees claimed for being excessive or otherwise unconscionable. This is without prejudice to the applicability of Section 4, Rule 18 of the Rules of Court, if there are two or more defendants.

The word "shall" in the above-quoted sections of the 1991 Revised Rule on Summary Procedure underscores their mandatory character. Giving the provisions a directory application would subvert the nature of the Rule and defeat its objective of expediting the adjudication of the suits covered thereby. To admit a late answer is to put a premium on dilatory maneuvers the very mischief that the Rule seeks to redress.

In the present case, respondent gave a liberal interpretation of the above-said Rule. Liberal interpretation or construction of the law or rules, however, is not a free commodity that may be availed of in all instances under the cloak of rendering justice. Liberality in the interpretation and application of Rules applies only in proper cases and under justifiable causes and circumstances. While it is true that litigation is not a game of technicalities, it is equally true that every case must be prosecuted in accordance with the prescribed procedure to insure an orderly and speedy administration of justice.

SECTION 8. Preliminary conference; appearance of parties. Not later than thirty (30) days after the last answer is filed, a preliminary conference shall be held. The provisions of Rule 18 on pre-trial shall be applicable to the preliminary conference unless inconsistent with the provisions of this Rule.

The failure of the plaintiff to appear in the preliminary conference shall be cause for the dismissal of his complaint. The defendant who appears in the absence of the plaintiff shall be entitled to judgment on his counterclaim in accordance with the next preceding section. All cross-claims shall be dismissed. (7, RSP)

If a sole defendant shall fail to appear, the plaintiff shall likewise be entitled to judgment in accordance with the next preceding section. This procedure shall not apply where one of two or more defendants sued under a common cause of action who had pleaded a common defense shall appear at the preliminary conference.

No postponement of the preliminary conference shall be granted except for highly meritorious grounds and without prejudice to such sanctions as the court in the exercise of sound discretion may impose on the movant. (n)The court shall held a preliminary conference not later than thirty (30) days after the last answer is filed. The preliminary conference serves the purpose of a possible amicable settlement. Rule 18 is applicable to preliminary conference, provided, the same is not inconsistent with this Rule 70.

If the plaintiff failed to appear in the scheduled preliminary conference, his complaint will be dismissed. In case the defendant appears while the plaintiff is absent, the former shall be entitled to judgment on his counterclaim in accordance with Section 7, Rule 70. However, all cross-claims of the defendant shall be dismissed.

In case the defendant fail to appear while the plaintiff is present, the latter is entitled to judgment in accordance with Section 7, Rule 70. However, this rule shall not apply where one of two or more defendants sued under a common cause of action who had pleaded a common defense shall appear at the preliminary conference. The presence of one of the defendants will benefit the defendants who are absent.

The preliminary conference shall not be postponed except only for highly meritorious grounds and without prejudice to such sanctions as the court in the exercise of sound discretion may impose on the movant. This is in connection with the essence of a summary procedure in preventing delay.

Similar Provision in The Revised Rules on Summary Procedure and Related Cases

Murphy Chu vs. Hon. CapellanA.M. No. MTJ-11-1779 July 16, 2012

The relevant background facts shows that the unlawful detainer case against the complainants was filed on March 22, 2007 and the complainants filed their answer thereto on March 30, 2007. Under Section 7 of the 1991 Revised Rules on Summary Procedure, a preliminary conference should be held not later than thirty (30) days after the last answer is filed.

The respondent set the case for preliminary conference only on June 24, 2008, i.e., at a time way beyond the required thirty (30)-day period.

The Revised Rules on Summary Procedure was promulgated to achieve an expeditious and inexpensive determination of the cases that it covers. In the present case, the respondent failed to abide by this purpose in the way that he handled and acted on the subject unlawful detainer case.

Another of the respondents procedural lapses relates to the frequent resetting of the date of the preliminary conference. The preliminary conference scheduled for June 24, 2008 was reset, for various reasons, to August 26, 2008, November 25, 2008 and December 9, 2008, and was finally conducted on February 3, 2009, or almost two (2) years after the complainants filed their answer. Clearly, the respondent failed to exert his authority in expediting the proceedings of the unlawful detainer case. Sound practice requires a judge to remain, at all times, in full control of the proceedings in his court and to adopt a firm policy against unnecessary postponements.35

In numerous occasions, we admonished judges to be prompt in the performance of their solemn duty as dispensers of justice because undue delay in the administration of justice erodes the peoples faith in the judicial system.36 Delay not only reinforces the belief of the people that the wheels of justice in this country grind slowly; it also invites suspicion, however unfair, of ulterior motives on the part of the judge. Judges should always be mindful of their duty to render justice within the periods prescribed by law.

Five Star Marketing vs. BoocG.R. No. 143331 October 5, 2007

The record reveals that both the respondent and his counsel failed to appear at the preliminary conference scheduled on August 3, 1999. The only explanation offered to justify their non-appearance was the counsel's unpostponable personal engagement in Manila, without specification as to the details thereof. Assuming that the counsel's justification is acceptable, the same should be applied only as an explanation for the his non-appearance. However, no explanation at all was offered with respect to the respondent's failure to appear. At the very least, the respondent should have attended the preliminary conference notwithstanding the absence of his counsel. Absent any clear justification for the party and counsel's non-appearance, the defiance of the lawful order of the court as well as the well-entrenched rule laid down by the rules of procedure on the effect of non-appearance, cannot be allowed.

This Court cannot ignore the fact that even on appeal to the RTC, the respondent likewise failed to offer a sufficient explanation for defying the Rules. It is thus unfortunate that the RTC ruled in his favor on the sole ground that Rules may be liberally applied especially when its strict observance will result in the denial of due process.

Rules of procedure are essential to the proper, efficient and orderly dispensation of justice. Such rules are to be applied in a manner that will help secure and not defeat justice. Thus, the Court had the occasion to rule against the dismissal of appeals based solely on technicalities, especially so when the appellant had substantially complied with the formal requirements. Substantial compliance warrants a prudent and reasonable relaxation of the rules of procedure. Circumspect leniency will give the appellant the fullest opportunity to establish the merits of his complaint rather than to lose life, liberty, honor or property on technicalities. The Rules are relaxed when rigidity would result in a defeat of equity and substantial justice.

To reiterate, respondent offered no explanation for his defiance of the rules on preliminary conference. Neither did he exert effort to substantially comply by appearing before the court even without his counsel. Thus, there is no reason to affirm the theory of the RTC on the relaxation of the Rules.

Soriente vs. The Estate of the Late ConcepcionG.R. No. 160239 November 25, 2009

Petitioner asserts that considering that the cases against her, defendants Caballero and Sadol were consolidated, and she and defendant Caballero signed and filed one common Answer to the Complaint, thus, pleading a common defense, the trial court should not have rendered judgment on her case based on Section 7 of the 1991 Revised Rules on Summary Procedure when she failed to appear in the preliminary conference.

Petitioner claims that Section 6 of the Rules on Summary Procedure applies to her as a defendant, since the ejectment cases were consolidated by the trial court, and she and Caballero filed the same Answer to the Complaint.

The Court notes that the ejectment case filed by respondent against petitioner was docketed in the trial court as Civil Case No. 17973, the case against Alfredo Caballero was docketed as Civil Case No. 17974, while the case against Severina Sadol was docketed as Civil Case No. 17932. These cases were consolidated by the trial court.

Section 7 of the Rules on Summary Procedure states:

SEC. 7. Preliminary conference; appearance of parties. Not later than thirty (30) days after the last answer is filed, a preliminary conference shall be held. The rules on pre-trial in ordinary cases shall be applicable to the preliminary conference unless inconsistent with the provisions of this Rule.

The failure of the plaintiff to appear in the preliminary conference shall be a cause for the dismissal of his complaint. The defendant who appears in the absence of the plaintiff shall be entitled to judgment on his counterclaim in accordance with Section 6 hereof. All cross-claims shall be dismissed.

If a sole defendant shall fail to appear, the plaintiff shall be entitled to judgment in accordance with Section 6 hereof. This Rule shall not apply where one of two or more defendants sued under a common cause of action who had pleaded a common defense shall appear at the preliminary conference.

Section 6 of the 1991 Revised Rules on Summary Procedure, which is referred to by Section 7 above, states:

SEC. 6. Effect of failure to answer. Should the defendant fail to answer the complaint within the period above provided, the court, motu proprio, or on motion of the plaintiff, shall render judgment as may be warranted by the facts alleged in the complaint and limited to what is prayed for therein: Provided, however, That the court may in its discretion reduce the amount of damages and attorneys fees claimed for being excessive or otherwise unconscionable. This is without prejudice to the applicability of Section 4, Rule 18 of the Rules of Court, if there are two or more defendants.

Under the above rule, if a sole defendant shall fail to appear in the preliminary conference, the plaintiff shall be entitled to judgment in accordance with Section 6 of the Rule, that is, the court shall render judgment as may be warranted by the facts alleged in the Complaint and limited to what is prayed for therein. However, "[t]his Rule (Sec. 7) shall not apply where one of two or more defendants sued under a common cause of action, who had pleaded a common defense, shall appear at the preliminary conference." Petitioner claims that the preceding provision applies to her as a defendant, since the ejectment cases were consolidated by the trial court, and she and Caballero filed the same Answer to the Complaint; hence, the trial court should not have rendered judgment against her when she failed to appear in the preliminary conference.

The Court holds that the provision above does not apply in the case of petitioner, since she and Caballero were not co-defendants in the same case. The ejectment case filed against petitioner was distinct from that of Caballero, even if the trial court consolidated the cases and, in the interest of justice, considered the Answer filed by Caballero in Civil Case No. 17974 as the Answer also of petitioner since she affixed her signature thereto.

Considering that petitioner was sued in a separate case for ejectment from that of Caballero and Sadol, petitioners failure to appear in the preliminary conference entitled respondent to the rendition of judgment by the trial court on the ejectment case filed against petitioner, docketed as Civil Case No. 17973, in accordance with Section 7 of the 1991 Revised Rules on Summary Procedure.

SECTION 9. Record of preliminary conference. Within five (5) days after the termination of the preliminary conference, the court shall issue an order stating the matters taken up therein, including but not limited to:

1. Whether the parties have arrived at an amicable settlement, and if so, the terms thereof;

2. The stipulations or admissions entered into by the parties;

3. Whether, on the basis of the pleadings and the stipulations and admissions made by the parties, judgment may be rendered without the need of further proceedings, in which event the judgment shall be rendered within thirty (30) days from issuance of the order;

4. A clear specification of material facts which remain controverted; and

5. Such other matters intended to expedite the disposition of the case.

Similar Provision in The Revised Rules on Summary Procedure and Related Case

Diaz vs. Judge Gestopa, Jr.A.M. No. MTJ-11-1786 June 22, 2011

Complainant alleged she filed an unlawful detainer case. The case was scheduled for pre-trial conference. Since complainant cannot attend the conference because of her heart ailment, she instead sent her nephew, Elmer Llanes, to appear in her behalf.

During the conference, Judge Gestopa recommended the case for barangay conciliation, pursuant to Section 408 (g) of the Local Government Code. Complainant's counsel objected and moved for mediation instead. However, respondent judge insisted that he has the authority to refer it back to barangay for conciliation.

Respondent judge argued that such referral to the barangay is justified by Section 408 (g) of the Local Government Code.

We are unconvinced.

Indeed, in Farrales v. Camarista, the Court explained that while the last paragraph of the afore-cited provision apparently gives the Court discretion to refer the case to the lupon for amicable settlement although it may not fall within the authority of the lupon, the referral of said subject civil case to the lupon is saliently an unsound exercise of discretion, considering that the matter falls under the Rule on Summary Procedure. The reason is because the Rule on Summary Procedure was promulgated for the purpose of achieving "an expeditious and inexpensive determination of cases." The fact that unlawful detainer cases fall under summary procedure, speedy resolution thereof is thus deemed a matter of public policy. To do otherwise would ultimately defeat the very essence of the creation of the Rules on Summary Procedure.

To further strengthen and emphasize the objective of expediting the adjudication of cases falling under the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure, Sections 7 and 8 mandated preliminary conference which is precisely for the purpose of giving room for a possible amicable settlement, to wit:

SEC. 7. Preliminary conference; appearance of parties. - Not later than thirty (30) days after the last answer is filed, a preliminary conference shall be held. The rules on pre-trial in ordinary cases shall be applicable to the preliminary conference unless inconsistent with the provisions of this Rule.

Section 8 of said Rule reads in full:

SEC. 8. Record of preliminary conference. - Within five (5) days after the termination of the preliminary conference, the court shall issue an order stating the matters taken up therein, including but not limited to:

a) Whether the parties have arrived at an amicable settlement, and if so, the terms thereof;

b) The stipulations or admissions entered into by the parties;

c) Whether, on the basis of the pleadings and the stipulations and admissions made by the parties, judgment may be rendered without the need of further proceedings, in which event the judgment shall be rendered within thirty (30) days from issuance of the order;

d) A clear specification of material facts which remain controverted; and

e) Such other matters intended to expedite the disposition of the case.

Thus, there was no reason anymore to refer the case back to the barangay for the sole purpose of amicable settlement, because the abovementioned Sections 7 and 8 provided already for such action.

Furthermore, considering that complainant had already manifested in court, albeit belatedly, the presence of what it considered to be a valid Certification to File Action in court due to unsuccessful conciliation, respondent's act of referring the case to barangay conciliation rendered its purpose moot and academic.

SECTION 10. Submission of affidavits and position papers. Within ten (10) days from receipt of the order mentioned in the next preceding section, the parties shall submit the affidavits of their witnesses and other evidence on the factual issues defined in the order, together with their position papers setting forth the law and the facts relied upon by them. (9, RSP)

The parties shall submit affidavits of their witnesses and other evidence on the factual issues defined by court in the order issued in accordance with Section 9, Rule 70 within ten (10) days from receipt of the such order. The parties shall also file their position papers wherein the law and the facts relied upon by them must be stated.

Macaslang vs. ZamoraG.R. No. 156375 May 30, 2011

Rule 70 of the Rules of Courthas envisioned the submission only of affidavits of the witnesses (not oral testimony) and other proofs on the factual issues defined in the order issued within five days from the termination of the preliminary conference;35and has permitted the trial court, should it find the need to clarify material facts, to thereafter issue an order during the 30-day period from submission of the affidavits and other proofs specifying the matters to be clarified, and requiring the parties to submit affidavits or other evidence upon such matters within ten days from receipt of the order.

Sec. 11. Period for rendition of judgment. Within thirty (30) days after receipt of the affidavits and position papers, or the expiration of the period for filing the same, the court shall render judgment. However, should the court find it necessary to clarify certain material facts, it may, during the said period, issue an order specifying the matters to be clarified, and require the parties to submit affidavits or other evidence on the said matters within ten (10) days from receipt of said order. Judgment shall be rendered within fifteen (15) days after the receipt of the last affidavit or the expiration of the period for filing the same. The court shall not resort to the foregoing procedure just to gain time for the rendition of the judgment.

Judgement

The period for rendition of judgment is within 30 days after receipt of the affidavits and position papers, or the expiration of the period for filing the same. (Sec. 11 Rule 70, Rules of Court) Is binding not only against the defendant but also against all persons claiming under him. It also binds squatters, trespassers, transferees pendente lite, sub lessees, family and relatives. The extent of the judgement is only on the issue of possession and not on ownership. (Section 18 Rule 70, Rules of Court)

In case of ambiguity

The court may, during the said period, issue an order specifying the matters to be clarified, and require the parties to submit affidavits or other evidence on the said matters within ten (10) days from receipt of said order. Judgment shall be rendered within fifteen (15) days after the receipt of the last affidavit or the expiration of the period for filing the same. (Sec. 11 Rule 70, Rules of Court)

To guard against abuses

The court shall not resort to the foregoing procedure just to gain time for the rendition of the judgment. (Sec. 11 Rule 70, Rules of Court)

Related Laws: REVISED RULES ON SUMMARY PROCEDURE

Florida Teraa vs. Hon. Antonio de Sagun G.R. No. 152131 April 29, 2009

The failure of one party to submit his position paper does not bar at all the MTC from issuing a judgment on the ejectment complaint. Section 10 of the RSP states: Section 10. Rendition of judgment. Within thirty (30) days after receipt of the last affidavits and position papers, or the expiration of the period for filing the same, the court shall render judgment. [Underscoring supplied.]However, should the court find it necessary to clarify certain material facts, it may, during the said period, issue an order specifying the matters to be clarified, and require the parties to submit affidavits or other evidence on the said matters within ten (10) days from receipt of said order. Judgment shall be rendered within fifteen (15) days after the receipt of the last affidavit or the expiration of the period for filing the same. The court shall not resort to the foregoing procedure just to gain time for the rendition of the judgment. Thus, the situation obtaining in the present case has been duly provided for by the Rules; it was correct to render a judgment, as the MTC did, after one party failed to file their position paper and supporting affidavits.

That a position paper is not indispensable to the courts authority to render judgment is further evident from what the RSP provides regarding a preliminary conference: "on the basis of the pleadings and the stipulations and admissions made by the parties, judgment may be rendered without the need for further proceedings, in which event the judgment shall be rendered within 30 days from the issuance of the order." Thus, the proceedings may stop at that point, without need for the submission of position papers. In such a case, what would be extant in the record and the bases for the judgment would be the complaint, answer, and the record of the preliminary conference.

Sec. 12. Referral for conciliation. Cases requiring referral for conciliation, where there is no showing of compliance with such requirement, shall be dismissed without prejudice, and may be revived only after that requirement shall have been complied with.

Related Laws PD 1508

Fidel M. Baares vs Elizabeth BalisingG.R. No. 132624. March 13, 2000

Referral to Lupon. Cases requiring referral to the Lupon for conciliation under the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1508 where there is no showing of compliance with such requirement, shall be dismissed without prejudice, and may be revived only after such requirement shall have been complied with. This provision shall not apply to criminal cases where the accused was arrested without a warrant.

Sec. 13. Prohibited pleadings and motions. The following petitions, motions, or pleadings shall not be allowed: 1. Motion to dismiss the complaint except on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, or failure to comply with section 12; 2. Motion for a bill of particulars; 3. Motion for new trial, or for reconsideration of a judgment, or for reopening of trial; 4. Petition for relief from judgment; 5. Motion for extension of time to file pleadings, affidavits or any other paper; 6. Memoranda; 7. Petition for certiorari, mandamus, or prohibition against any interlocutory order issued by the court; 8. Motion to declare the defendant in default; 9. Dilatory motions for postponement; 10. Reply; 11. Third-party complaints; 12. Interventions.

Antonio L. Del Mundo vs. Judge Lizabeth Gutierrez-TorresA.M. No. MTJ-05-1611 September 30, 2005Section 19 of the 1991 Revised Rule on Summary Procedure and Section 13, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court expressly prohibit the filing of a motion to dismiss in a case for ejectment, except on the ground of lack of jurisdiction or failure to refer the case for conciliation to the Lupon.The defendants Motion to Dismiss was based on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, there being no previous demand to pay and vacate made by the plaintiffs upon the defendant as provided for under Section 2, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court.It is an elementary rule that jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined by the allegations in the complaint and is not made to depend upon the allegations in a motion to dismiss, for if it were, the question of jurisdiction would depend almost entirely upon the defendant.

Sec. 14. Affidavits. The affidavits required to be submitted under this Rule shall state only facts of direct personal knowledge of the affiants which are admissible in evidence, and shall show their competence to testify to the matters stated therein. A violation of this requirement may subject the party or the counsel who submits the same to disciplinary action, and shall be cause to expunge the inadmissible affidavit or portion thereof from the record.

What other statements may constitute as a substitute to the affidavit of witnesses?

De la Rosa v. Carlos G.R. No. 147549. Oct. 23, 2004

The verified statement by the defendants that all the allegations in the position paper are true and correct of their own personal knowledge constitutes the affidavit of witnesses required by Rule 70 attaching thereto their documentary to their position witness, the requirements of Sections 10 and 14 are deemed satisfied. There is no need of separate affidavits.

Sec. 15. Preliminary injunction. The court may grant preliminary injunction, in accordance with the provisions of Rule 58 hereof, to prevent the defendant from committing further acts of dispossession against the plaintiff. A possessor deprived of his possession through forcible entry or unlawful detainer may, within five (5) days from the filing of the complaint, present a motion in the action for forcible entry or unlawful detainer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction to restore him in his possession. The court shall decide the motion within thirty (30) days from the filing thereof.

In what situations can you apply section 15 of Rule 70?

Under the Civil Code, every possessor has the right to be respected in his possession; and should he be disturbed therein he shall be protected in or restored to said possession by the means established by the laws and the Rules of Court. (Art. 539) Under the present law, an inferior court has jurisdiction to grant provisional remedies in proper cases. These proper cases would be:

1.) Preliminary attachment under Rule 57, provided the principal action is within jurisdiction, such as an action of forcible entry and unlawful detainer.

2.) Preliminary injunction under Rule 58 in both forcible entry and unlawful detainer also in cases mentioned in the preceding paragraph. ( Dean Jose Y. Feria, Phil. Legal Studies, Series No.1, the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980).Section 16.Resolving defense of ownership. When the defendant raises the defense of ownership in his pleadings and the question of possession cannot be resolved without deciding the issue of ownership, the issue of ownership shall be resolved only to determine the issue of possession.

Jurisdiction remains in the MTC despite the issue on ownership raised by the defendant

Rural Bank of Sta. Ignacia vs. Dimatulac (April 29, 2003)G.R. No. 142015

The assertion by the defendant of ownership over the disputed property does not serve to divest the inferior court of its jurisdiction. The defendant cannot deprive the court of jurisdiction by merely claiming ownership of the property involved.If the defendant raises the question of ownership and the issue of possession cannot be resolved without deciding the question of ownership, the issue of ownership shall be resolved only to determine the issue of possession(Sec. 3, RA 7691).

Section 17.Judgment. If after trial court finds that the allegations of the complaint are true, it shall render judgment in favor of the plaintiff for the restitution of the premises, the sum justly due as arrears of rent or as reasonable compensation for the use and occupation of the premises, attorney's fees and costs. If a counterclaim is established, the court shall render judgment for the sum found in arrears from either party and award costs as justice requires.

Judgment award1. Restitution of the premises2. Monthly rents or rents in arrears or reasonable compensation for the use and occupation of the property3. Attorneys fees and4. Costs

What are the damages that can be recovered in ejectment cases

Terana vs de Sagun G.R. No. 152131 April 29, 2009

Rule 70, Section 17 of the Rules of Court authorizes the trial court to orderthe award of an amount representing arrears of rent or reasonable compensation for the use and occupation of the premises if it finds that the allegations of the complaint are true.The rationale for limiting the kind of damages recoverable in an unlawful detainer case was explained inAraos v. Court of Appeals, wherein the Court held that:The rule is settled that in forcible entry or unlawful detainer cases, the only damage that can be recovered is the fair rental value or the reasonable compensation for the use and occupation of the leased property.The reason for this is that in such cases, the only issue raised in ejectment cases is that of rightful possession; hence, the damages which could be recovered are those which the plaintiff could have sustained as a mere possessor, or those caused by the loss of the use and occupation of the property, and not the damages which he may have suffered but which have no direct relation to his loss of material possession.

Section 18.Judgment conclusive only on possession;not conclusive in actions involving title or ownership. The judgment rendered in an action for forcible entry or detainer shall be conclusive with respect to the possession only and shall in no wise bind the title or affect the ownership of the land or building.

Does it bar an action with regard to the issue of ownership

Roberts vs. PapioG.R. No. 166714 Feb. 9, 2007

The judgment would not bar an action between the same parties respecting title to the land or building. The resolution of the MeTC on the ownership of the property is merely provisional or interlocutory. Any question involving the issue of ownership should be raised and resolved in a separate action brought specifically to settle the question with finality.

Where do you appeal the judgment?

The judgment or final order shall be appealable to the appropriate Regional Trial Court which shall decide the same on the basis of the entire record of the proceedings had in the court of origin and such memoranda and/or briefs as may be submitted by the parties or required by the Regional Trial Court.

Section 19.Immediate execution of judgment;how to stay same. If judgment is rendered against the defendant, execution shall issue immediately upon motion unless an appeal has been perfected and the defendant to stay execution files a sufficient supersedeas bond, approved by the Municipal Trial Court and executed in favor of the plaintiff to pay the rents, damages, and costs accruing down to the time of the judgment appealed from, and unless, during the pendency of the appeal, he deposits with the appellate court the amount of rent due from time to time under the contract, if any, as determined by the judgment of the Municipal Trial Court. In the absence of a contract, he shall deposit with the Regional Trial Court the reasonable value of the use and occupation of the premises for the preceding month or period at the rate determined by the judgment of the lower court on or before the tenth day of each succeeding month or period. The supersedeas bond shall be transmitted by the Municipal Trial Court, with the papers, to the clerk of the Regional Trial Court to which the action is appealed.XXX

How to stay the immediate execution of judgment

Defendant must take the following steps to stay the execution of the judgment:(a) Perfect an appeal;(b) File a supersedeas bond to pay for the rents, damages and costs accruing down to the time of the judgment appealed from; and(c) Deposit periodically with the RTC, during the pendency of the appeal, the adjudged amount of rent due under the contract or if there be no contract, the reasonable value of the use and occupation of the premises(Sec. 19).

What happens if the requisites are not complied with

Republic of the Philippines vs. LurizG. R. No. 158992 January 26, 2007

The foregoing rule provides that a judgment in favor of the plaintiffs shall be immediately executory.It can be stayed by the defendant only by perfecting an appeal, filing a supersedeas bond, and making a periodic deposit of the rental or the reasonable compensation for the use and occupancy of the property during the pendency of the appeal.These requisites are mandatory and concurrent.Thus, if not complied with, execution will issue as a matter of right.

Where do you appeal the judgment of the MTC?Section 18.xxxThe judgment or final order shall be appealable to the appropriate Regional Trial Court which shall decide the same on the basis of the entire record of the proceedings had in the court of origin and such memoranda and/or briefs as may be submitted by the parties or required by the Regional Trial Court.

Section 20.Preliminary mandatory injunction in case of appeal. Upon motion of the plaintiff, within ten (10) days from the perfection of the appeal to the Regional Trial Court, the latter may issue a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction to restore the plaintiff in possession if the court is satisfied that the defendant's appeal is frivolous or dilatory or that the appeal of the plaintiff isprima faciemeritorious.

What is the nature of RTCs judgment in ejectment cases?Section 21.Immediate execution on appeal to Court of Appeals or Supreme Court. The judgment of the Regional Trial Court against the defendant shall be immediately executory, without prejudice to a further appeal that may be taken therefrom.

How do you stay the execution?

Writ of execution may be enjoined

La Campana Development Corporation vs. Ledesma G.R. No. 154152 August 25, 2010

It is true that Section 21, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court provides that [t]he judgment of the Regional Trial Court against the defendant shall be immediately executory, without prejudice to a further appeal that may be taken therefrom.However, the Court ruled inBenedicto v. Court of Appealsthat on appeal the appellate court may stay the said writ should circumstances so require.x x xeven if RTC judgments in unlawful detainer cases are immediately executory, preliminary injunction may still be granted.

From the RTC, where does the aggrieved party go and through what means?

To the CA through Petition for Review

Leynes vs. CAG. R. No. 154462 January 19, 2011

Supreme Court Circular No. 2-90 clearly lays down the proper modes of appeal to the Court of Appeals from the RTCs:3.Appeals to the Court of Appeals. On the other hand, appeals bycertiorariwill not lie with the Court of Appeals.Appeals to that Court from Regional Trial Courts may be taken:a)by writ of error (ordinary appeal) where the appealed judgment was rendered in a civil or criminal action by the regional trial court in the exercise of its original jurisdiction; orb)by petition for review where the judgment was rendered by the regional trial court in the exercise of itsappellate jurisdiction.The mode of appeal in either instance is entirely distinct from an appeal by certiorari to the Supreme Court.4.Erroneous Appeals. An appeal taken to either the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals by thewrong or inappropriate modeshall bedismissed.