Aytona vs CastilloAytona one was of those appointed by outgoing president Garcia during the last minute of his term. Aytona was appointed as the ad interim governor of the Central Bank. When Macapagal took his office as the next president he issued Order No. 2 which recalled Aytona’s position and at the same time he appointed Castillo as the new governor of the Central Bank. Aytona then filed a quo warranto proceeding claiming that he is qualified to remain as the Central Bank governor and that he was validly appointed by the ex-president. Macapagal averred that the ex-president’s appointments were scandalous, irregular, hurriedly done, contrary to law and the spirit of which, and it was an attempt to subvert the incoming presidency or administration.

ISSUE: Whether or not Aytona should remain in his post.HELD: Had the appointment of Aytona been done in good faith then he would have the right to continue office. Here, even though Aytona is qualified to remain in his post as he is competent enough, his appointment can nevertheless be revoked by the president. Garcia’s appointments are hurried maneuvers to subvert the upcoming administration and is set to obstruct the policies of the next president. As a general rule, once a person is qualified his appointment should not be revoked but in here it may be since his appointment was grounded on bad faith, immorality and impropriety. In public service, it is not only legality that is considered but also justice, fairness and righteousness.Pamantasan ng Lungsod ng Maynila vs Intermediate Appellate Court

in 1973, Dr. Hernani Esteban was appointed by Dr. Consuelo Blanco as the Vice-President for Administration in the Pamantasan ng Lungsod ng Maynila (PLM). Esteban’s appointment was ad interim in nature (because at that time the PLM Board of Regents was not in session). His appointment was extended in 1975. However, he later discovered that his name was not included among those recommended for permanent appointment. He then requested Blanco to make him a permanent appointee. Blanco, however, appointed Esteban as Professor III instead and his appointment as VP for Admin was terminated. Esteban brought the case before the Civil Service Commission where he got a favorable judgment. The trial court reversed the CSC. The Intermediate Appellate Court reversed the trial court.

ISSUE: Whether or not Esteban is a permanent appointee.HELD: Yes. Hence, he enjoys security of tenure. The Supreme Court explains that the term “ad interim” as used in the Philippines does not literally translate to “temporary”. In this jurisdiction an ad interim appointment is a permanent appointment. This was explained in the landmark case of Summers vs Ozaeta:…an ad interim appointment is one made in pursuance of paragraph (4), section 10, Article VII of the Constitution, which provides that the President shall have the power to make appointments during the recess of the Congress, but such appointments shall be effective only until disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of the Congress.’ It is an appointment permanent in nature, and the circumstance that it is subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments does not alter its permanent character. An ad interim appointment is disapproved certainly for a reason other than that its provisional period has expired. Said appointment is of course distinguishable from an ‘acting’ appointment which is merely temporary, good until another permanent appointment is issued.

In other words, if the Board of Regents is in session, the PLM President merely nominates while the Board issues the appointment. But when the Board is not in session, the President is authorized to issue ad

interim appointments. Such appointments are permanent but their terms are only until the Board disapproves them. If confirmed, the appointee’s term is converted into the regular term inherent in the position. In the case at bar, apparently, Esteban was confirmed by the Board of Regents in 1975. Blanco however did not relay this confirmation to Esteban. The latter was made to believe (due to souring relationship with Blanco) that his appointment was extended but only as an extension of temporary appointment.

In Re Appointments of Hon. Mateo Valenzuela and Hon. Placido Vallarta AM No. 98-5-01-SC | November 9, 1998FACTS:

On March 30, 1998, The President signed appointments of Hon. Mateo Valenzuelaand Hon. Placido Vallarta as Judges of RTC-Bago City and Cabanatuan City,respectively. These appointments were deliberated, as it seemed to be expresslyprohibited by Art 7 Sec 15 of the Constitution:

Two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to theend of his term, a President or Acting President shall not make appointments,except temporary appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public safety." 

A meeting was held on March 9, 1998 by the Judicial and Bar Council to discuss theconstitutionality of appointments to the Court of Appeals (CA) in light of theforthcoming 1998 Presidential elections. Senior Associate Justice Florenz Regalado,Consultant of the Council and Member of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, wasin the position that election ban had no application to the CA based on theCommission s  records .  This

was then submitted to the President forconsideration together with the Council s nominations for  8 vacancies in the CA.The Chief Justice (CJ) received on April 6, 1998, an official communication from theExecutive Secretary transmitting the appointments of 8 Associate Justices of CA dulysigned on

(day immediately before the commencement of the banon appointments), which implies that the President s Office did not agree with the

The President, addressed to the JBC, requested on May 4, 1998 the transmission of the list of final nominees for the vacancy in view of the 90 days imposed by theConstitution (from Feb 13, date present vacancy occurred). In behalf of the JBC, CJsent the reply on May 6 that no session has been scheduled after the May electionsfor the reason that they apparently did not share the same view

appointments.However, it appeared that the Justice Secretary and the other members of theCouncil took action without waiting for the CJ reply. This prompted CJ to call for ameeting on May 7. On this day, CJ received a letter from the President in reply of theMay 6 letter where the President expressed his view that Article 7 Sec 15 onlyapplied to executive appointments, the whole article being entitled

EXECUTIVEDEPT .  He posited that appointments in the Judiciary have special and specificprovisions, as follows:

 Article 8 Sec 4"The Supreme Court shall be composed of a Chief Justice and fourteen Associate Justices. It may sit en banc or in its discretion, in divisions of three, five, or seven Members. Any vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from theoccurrence thereof."  Article 8 Sec 9"The Members of the Supreme Court and judges in lower courts shall beappointed by the President from the list of at least three nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council for every vacancy. Such appointments need no confirmation

ARTURO M. DE CASTRO vs. JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL (JBC) G. R. No. 191002. March 17, 2010.

FACTS: This case is based on multiple cases field with dealt with the controversy that has arisen from the forthcoming compulsory requirement of Chief Justice Puno on May 17, 2010 or seven days after the presidential election. On December 22, 2009, Congressman Matias V. Defensor, an ex officio member of the JBC, addressed a letter to the JBC, requesting that the process for nominations to the office of the Chief Justice be commenced immediately. In its January 18, 2010 meeting en banc, the JBC passed a resolution which stated that they have unanimously agreed to start the process of filling up the position of Chief Justice to be vacated on May 17, 2010 upon the retirement of the incumbent Chief Justice. As a result, the JBC opened the position of Chief Justice for application or recommendation, and published for that purpose its announcement in the Philippine Daily Inquirer and the Philippine Star. In its meeting of February 8, 2010, the JBC resolved to proceed to the next step of announcing the names of the following candidates to invite to the public to file their sworn complaint, written report, or opposition, if any, not later than February 22, 2010. Although it has already begun the process for the filling of the position of Chief Justice Puno in accordance with its rules, the JBC is not yet decided on when to submit to the President its list of nominees for the position due to the controversy in this case being unresolved. The compiled cases which led to this case and the petitions of intervenors called for either the prohibition of the JBC to pass the shortlist, mandamus for the JBC to pass the shortlist, or that the act of appointing the next Chief Justice by GMA is a midnight appointment. A precedent frequently cited by the parties is the In Re Appointments Dated March 30, 1998 of Hon. Mateo A. Valenzuela and Hon. Placido B. Vallarta as Judges of the RTC of Branch 62, Bago City and of Branch 24, Cabanatuan City, respectively, shortly referred to here as the Valenzuela case, by which the Court held that Section 15, Article VII prohibited the exercise by the President of the power to appoint to judicial positions during the period therein fixed. 

ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the petitioners have legal standing.2. Whether or not there is justiciable controversy that is ripe for judicial determination.3. Whether or not the incumbent President can appoint the next Chief Justice.4. Whether or not mandamus and prohibition will lie to compel the submission of the shortlist of nominees by the JBC. 

HELD:1.Petitioners have legal standing because such requirement for this case was waived by the Court. Legal standing is a peculiar concept in constitutional law because in some cases, suits are not brought by parties who have been personally injured by the operation of a law or any other government act but by concerned citizens, taxpayers or voters who actually sue in the public interest.” But even if, strictly speaking, the petitioners “are not covered by the definition, it is still within the wide discretion of the Court to waive the requirement and so remove the impediment to its addressing and resolving the serious constitutional questions raised.” 

2. There is a justiciable issue. The court holds that the petitions set forth an actual case or controversy that is ripe for judicial determination. The reality is that the JBC already commenced the proceedings for the selection of the nominees to be included in a short list to be submitted to the President for consideration of which of them will succeed Chief Justice Puno as the next Chief Justice. Although the position is not yet vacant, the fact that the JBC began the process of nomination pursuant to its rules and practices, although it has yet to decide whether to submit the list of nominees to the incumbent outgoing President or to the next President, makes the situation ripe for judicial determination, because the next steps are the public interview of the candidates, the preparation of the short list of candidates, and the “interview of constitutional experts, as may be needed.” The resolution of the controversy will surely settle – with finality – the nagging questions that are preventing the JBC from moving on with the process that it already began, or that are reasons persuading the JBC to desist from the rest of the process. 

3.Prohibition under section 15, Article VII does not apply to appointments to fill a vacancy in the Supreme Court or to other appointments to the judiciary. The records of the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission reveal that the framers devoted time to meticulously drafting, styling, and arranging the Constitution. Such meticulousness indicates that the organization and arrangement of the provisions of the Constitution were not arbitrarily or whimsically done by the framers, but purposely made to reflect their intention and manifest their vision of what the Constitution should contain. As can be seen, Article VII is devoted to the Executive Department, and, among others, it lists the powers vested by the Constitution in the President. The presidential power of appointment is dealt with in Sections 14, 15 and 16 of the Article. Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in Section 15, Article VII to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court, they could have explicitly done so. They could not have ignored the meticulous ordering of the provisions. They would have easily and surely written the prohibition made explicit in Section 15, Article VII as being equally applicable to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court in Article VIII itself, most likely in Section 4 (1), Article VIII. 

4.Writ of mandamus does not lie against the JBC. Mandamus shall issue when any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act that the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station. It is proper when the act against which it is directed is one addressed to the discretion of the tribunal or officer. Mandamus is not available to direct the exercise of a judgment or discretion in a particular way.  For mandamus to lie, the following requisites must be complied with: (a) the plaintiff has a clear legal right to the act demanded; (b) it must be the duty of the defendant to perform the act, because it is mandated by law; (c) the defendant unlawfully neglects the performance of the duty enjoined by law; (d) the act to be performed is ministerial, not discretionary; and (e) there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.

Sen. Aquilino Pimentel, Jr. et. al vs Office of the Executive Secretary, et. al.G.R. No. 158088July 6, 2005

Facts:

This is a petition for mandamus filed by petitioners to compel the Office of the Executive Secretary and the Department of Foreign Affairs to transmit the signed copy of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court to the Senate of the Philippines for its concurrence in accordance with Section 21, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution. 

The Rome Statute established the International Criminal Court which “shall have the power to exercise its jurisdiction over persons for the most serious crimes of international concern xxx and shall be complementary to the national criminal jurisdictions.” Its jurisdiction covers the crime of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and the crime of aggression as defined in the Statute. The Statute was opened for signature by all states in Rome on July 17, 1998 and had remained open for signature until December 31, 2000 at the United Nations Headquarters in New York. The Philippines signed the Statute on December 28, 2000 through Charge d’ Affairs Enrique A. Manalo of the Philippine Mission to the United Nations. Its provisions, however, require that it be subject to ratification, acceptance or approval of the signatory states. 

Petitioners filed the instant petition to compel the respondents — the Office of the Executive Secretary and the Department of Foreign Affairs — to transmit the signed text of the treaty to the Senate of the Philippines for ratification.

It is the theory of the petitioners that ratification of a treaty, under both domestic law and international law, is a function of the Senate. Hence, it is the duty of the executive department to transmit the signed

copy of the Rome Statute to the Senate to allow it to exercise its discretion with respect to ratification of treaties. Moreover, petitioners submit that the Philippines has a ministerial duty to ratify the Rome Statute under treaty law and customary international law.

Petitioners invoke the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties enjoining the states to refrain from acts which would defeat the object and purpose of a treaty when they have signed the treaty prior to ratification unless they have made their intention clear not to become parties to the treaty.

Issue: W/N the executive department has no duty to transmit the Rome Statute to the Senate for concurrence; or

Whether the Executive Secretary and the Department of Foreign Affairs have a ministerial duty to transmit to the Senate the copy of the Rome Statute signed by a member of the Philippine Mission to the United Nations even without the signature of the President.

Held:

In our system of government, the President, being the head of state, is regarded as the sole organ and authority in external relations and is the country’s sole representative with foreign nations. As the chief architect of foreign policy, the President acts as the country’s mouthpiece with respect to international affairs. Hence, the President is vested with the authority to deal with foreign states and governments, extend or withhold recognition, maintain diplomatic relations, enter into treaties, and otherwise transact the business of foreign relations. In the realm of treaty-making, the President has the sole authority to negotiate with other states. 

Nonetheless, while the President has the sole authority to negotiate and enter into treaties, the Constitution provides a limitation to his power by requiring the concurrence of 2/3 of all the members of the Senate for the validity of the treaty entered into by him. Section 21, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution provides that “no treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective unless concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate.” The 1935 and the 1973 Constitution also required the concurrence by the legislature to the treaties entered into by the executive. 

It should be emphasized that under our Constitution, the power to ratify is vested in the President, subject to the concurrence of the Senate. The role of the Senate, however, is limited only to giving or withholding its consent, or concurrence, to the ratification. Hence, it is within the authority of the President to refuse to submit a treaty to the Senate or, having secured its consent for its ratification, refuse to ratify it. Although the refusal of a state to ratify a treaty which has been signed in its behalf is a serious step that should not be taken lightly, such decision is within the competence of the President alone, which cannot be encroached by this Court via a writ of mandamus. This Court has no jurisdiction over actions seeking to enjoin the President in the performance of his official duties. The Court, therefore, cannot issue the writ of mandamus prayed for by the petitioners as it is beyond its jurisdiction to compel the executive branch of the government to transmit the signed text of Rome Statute to the Senate.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is DISMISSED.