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AVIATION SECURITY

AVIATION SECURITY. COURSE OUTLINE Concept of security and threats. Theory of security in ICAO. Threats to aviation industry. Security channels at airports

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Page 1: AVIATION SECURITY. COURSE OUTLINE Concept of security and threats. Theory of security in ICAO. Threats to aviation industry. Security channels at airports

AVIATION SECURITY

Page 2: AVIATION SECURITY. COURSE OUTLINE Concept of security and threats. Theory of security in ICAO. Threats to aviation industry. Security channels at airports

COURSE OUTLINE• Concept of security and threats.• Theory of security in ICAO.• Threats to aviation industry.• Security channels at airports.• Security status of airport premises.• Security survey & inspection.• Airport Security Committee.• Airport Security Program.• Inspection/Screening of passengers & baggage.• Security devices & equipment.• Prohibited items.• Security barriers.• Unaccompanied baggage, cargo, mail, store and expedite or priority parcels.• Identification system of functionaries, employees & visitors.• Cargo security.• Management during emergency situation.• Management of response against acts of unlawful

interference.

Page 3: AVIATION SECURITY. COURSE OUTLINE Concept of security and threats. Theory of security in ICAO. Threats to aviation industry. Security channels at airports

WHY SECURITY?WHY NOT SAFETY?

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SECURITYVS.

SAFETY

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THREATS TO

AVIATION INDUSTRY

• THREATS OF TERRORISTS ACTIVITIES• THREATS OF ILLEGAL ACTIVITIES• THREATS OF SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES• THREATS OF IMMORAL ACTIVITIES• THREATS OF ANTIMORAL/MORAL-LOWERING

ACTIVITIES• THREATS OF SOCIAL EVILS

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THREATS OF TERRORIST ACTIVITIES

• HIJACKING OF AIRCRAFT• SABOTAGE OF AIRCRAFT ON GROUND• SABOTAGE OF AIRCRAFT IN AIR• RAID ON AIRCRAFT ON GROUND• SABOTAGE OF VULNERABLE POINTS• FORCED BREAK THROUGH PERIMETER FENCE• SURREPTITIOUS INFILTRATION THROUGH PERIMETER• HOSTAGE TAKING OF PAXS AND OTHERS• ATTACK ON LOUNGES FOR KILLING PEOPLE• SABOTAGE IN PUBLIC /CARPARKING AREAS• SABOTAGE OF AIRPORT ASSETS• ATTACK ON VIPs AND VVIPs IN AIRPORT PREMISES• MESSILE ATTACK ON

AIRCRAFT,BUILDING,INSTALLATION AND VULNERABLE POINTS.

Page 10: AVIATION SECURITY. COURSE OUTLINE Concept of security and threats. Theory of security in ICAO. Threats to aviation industry. Security channels at airports

AVIATION SECURITY

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PRINCIPLES OF SECURITY

• SENSE OF RESPONSIBILITIES• FORESIHTNESS• CO-OPERATION AND CO-

ORDINATION• PRIORITIES• MAINTENANCE OF MORALE• COMMAND AND CONTROL

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SECURITY-CREATED DETERRENCE

• FEAR OF LAW BREAKING• FEAR OF PUNISHMENT• FEAR OF INSULT• FEAR OF HINDERING IN SMOOTH

FUNCTIONING• FEAR OF TIME WASTAGE• FEAR OF LOSS OF MATERIAL/

MONEY • FEAR OF LOSS OF LIFE• FEAR OFF UNDERMINING SOCIAL

STATUS

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OFFENDER TERRORIST,

THIEF,ATTACKER,CRIMINAL,LAW BREAKER ETC.

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DEFENDERSECURITY PERSON,

SECURITY AUTHORITIES.

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International Civil Aviation Organization

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The ICAO AnnexesAnnex 1 - Personnel Licensing

Annex 2 - Rules of the Air

Annex 3 - Meteorological Services

Annex 4 - Aeronautical Charts

Annex 5 - Units of Measurement

Annex 6 - Operation of Aircraft

Annex 7 - Aircraft Nationality and Registration Marks

Annex 8 - Airworthiness of Aircraft

Annex 9 - Facilitation

Annex 10 - Aeronautical Telecommunications

Annex 11 - Air Traffic Services

Annex 12 - Search and Rescue

Annex 13 - Aircraft Accident and Incident Investigation

Annex 14 - Volume I "Aerodrome Design and Operations"

Annex 15 - Aeronautical Information Services

Annex 16 - Environmental Protection

Annex 17 - Security

Annex 18 - The Safe Transportation of Dangerous Goods by Air

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SAFEGUARDING CIVIL AVIATION AGAINST ACTS OF UNLAWFUL

INTERFERENCE

ICAO CONVENTIONS• TOKYO 14 SEP,1963 CONVENTION

ON OFFENCES AND CRTAIN OTHER ACTS COMMITTED ON BOARD AIRCRAFT.

• HAGUE 16 DEC,1970 CONVENTION FOR THE SUPPRESSION OF UNLAWFUL SEIZURE OF AIRCRAFT

• MONTREAL 23 SEP 1971 CONVENTION FOR THE SUPPRESSION OF UNLAWFUL ACTS AGAINST THE SAFETY OF CIVIL AVIATION

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ANNEX-17 INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS

AND RECOMMENDED PRACTICES

FOR SAFEGUARDING INTERNATIONAL

CIVIL AVIATION AGAINST

ACTS OF UNLAWFUL INTERFERENCE

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ICAO SECURITY MANUAL

FOR SAFEGUARDING CIVIL AVIATION AGAINST ACTS OF UNLAWFUL INTERFERENCE

BY ICAO

DOCUMENT No.8973

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DEFINITION OF SECURITY IN ICAO

A COMBINATION OF MEASURES, HUMAN AND MATERIAL RESOURCES

INTENDED TO SAFEGUARD CIVIL AVIATION AGAINST ACTS OF UNLAWFUL INTERFERENCE.

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AVIATION SECURITY

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CHANNELS OF ICAO IMLEMENTATION

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AIRPORT SECURITY PROGRAMME

•MODEL OUTLINE.•A COMPREHENSIVE WRITTEN PROGRAMME.•STUDIED BY SECURITY AUTHORITIES.•CAREFULLY CO-ORDINATED WITH ALL PRACTICE CONCERNED.[INTERNAL & EXTERNAL]•AIRLINES SECURITY PROGRAMME.•RESPONSIBILITIES OF SECURITY OFFICER OF AIRPORT SECURITY.

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AIRPORT SECURITY COMMITTEE

1 AIM TO ADVISE ON DEVELOPMENT & TO CO-ORDINATE IMPLEMENTATION OF SECURITY MEASURES & PROCEDURES.2.PERIODICAL CO-ORDINATION MEETING.3.COMPOSITATION • AIRPORT MANAGER (CHAIRMAN) CAA• CHIEF OF AIRPORT SECURITY• AIRLINE`S REPRESENTATIVE• IMMIGRATION• CUSTOM • FIRE FIGHTING & RESCUE SERVICES.CAA• AIRTRAFFIC CONTROL.CAA• FACILITATION.CAA• ADDITIONAL MEMBER AS REQUIRED

Page 29: AVIATION SECURITY. COURSE OUTLINE Concept of security and threats. Theory of security in ICAO. Threats to aviation industry. Security channels at airports

AIRPORT SECURITY COMMITTEE

4. RESPONSIBILITIES• IMPLEMENTATION OF POLICY DECISIONS OF NATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION COMMITTEE.• OVERSEE & MONITOR SECURITY PROGRAM & MEASURES.• IMLEMENTATION OF RECOMMENDED PRACTICES ENUMIRATED IN ICAO SECURITY MANUAL.• REVIEW & MIANTAIN VULNERABLE POINTS,ESSENTIAL EQUIPMENT,FACILITIES.• ARE SECURITY MEASURES ADEQUATE FOR NORMAL,HIGH ALERT AND EMERGENCY SITUATIONS?• ARRANGE REGULAR SECURITY SURVEYS & INSPECTIONS.• ENSURE IMPROVEMENT IN SECURITY MEASURES & ITS IMPLEMENTATION.• CONVEY PROBLEMS TO APPROPRIATE AUTHORITIES TO RESOLVE.• ARRANGE PERIODICAL TRAINING & EDUTATION OF AIRPORT STAFF.• ENSURE SECURITY MEASURES INCORPORATED IN EXPANSION PROGRAM.

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AIRPORT SECURITY OFFICER1. CRITERIA• REPORT TO AIRPORT MANAGER• TECHNICAL KNOWLEDGE OF SECURITY• AUTHORISED TO HAVE ACCESS TO ALL INSTALLATIONS2. RESPONSIBILITIES• SECURITY SURVEY & INSPECTIONS• DEVELOPE & MODIFY SECURITY PROGRAM• KEEP APPROVED SECURITY PROGRAM UPDATED• ENSURE EFFECTIVE IMPLIMENTATION OF SECURITY

MEASURES & PROCEDURES AND MAINTAIN IT• CO-ORDINATION AMONG SECURITY,FIRE & RESCUE STAFF• EFFECTIVE LIAISON• ENCOURAGE SECURITY AWARENESS & VIGILANCE• ADEQUATE TRAINING TO SECURITY PERSONNEL• EFFECTIVE THREAT/OCCURRENCE RESPONSE CAPABILITY• INCORPORATION OF SECURITY PLAN IN NEW PROJECTS• KNOW TO DEAL ACTS OF UNLAWFUL INTERFERENCES IN

LIGHT OF NATIONAL LAWS• MAINTAIN RECORD OF ALL OCCURRENCES• COLLECT & TRANSMIT PERTINENT INFORMATIONS TO

APPROPRIATE AUTHORITY• CONDUCT INQUIRIES & TAKE ACTION PROMPTLY

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AVIATION SECURITY

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SECURITY BARRIERS

• NATURAL BARRIER• STRUCTURAL BARRIER• HUMAN BARRIER• ANIMAL BARRIER• ENERGY BARRIER

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ENERGY BARRIERS

• INTRUDER ALARM SYSTEM

• ELECTRIC CURRENT FLOW

Page 34: AVIATION SECURITY. COURSE OUTLINE Concept of security and threats. Theory of security in ICAO. Threats to aviation industry. Security channels at airports

NATURAL BARRIERS

• MOUNTAINS• HILLS• SEA• RIVERS• STREAMS• LAKES

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STRUCTURAL BARRIERS

• MASONRY WALL• MESH FENCING• BARRICADES• BUILDINGS (AS SECURITY

BARRIER)• CONCERTINA BARBED- WIRE

Page 41: AVIATION SECURITY. COURSE OUTLINE Concept of security and threats. Theory of security in ICAO. Threats to aviation industry. Security channels at airports
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Aviation Seurity

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HUMAN BARRIERS

• TRAINED SECURITY STAFF (OVERTLY & COVERTLY)• ALLIED SECURITY AGENCIES• ORGANIZATION`S EMPLOYEES• GENERAL PUBLIC

Page 46: AVIATION SECURITY. COURSE OUTLINE Concept of security and threats. Theory of security in ICAO. Threats to aviation industry. Security channels at airports

HUMAN BARRIER ADVANTAGES

DISADVANTAGES• SENSIBILITY . FRAGILE LIFE• MOVEABLE . CAN BE OVER-

COME• DECISION TAKER . NON-ECONOMICAL• REGULATE MOVEMENT . HUMAN

WEAKNESSES• SCRUTINITY . ALL-TIME

ALERTNESS• MANADATORY . USELESS AGAINST BIG FORCE

Page 47: AVIATION SECURITY. COURSE OUTLINE Concept of security and threats. Theory of security in ICAO. Threats to aviation industry. Security channels at airports

ANIMAL BARRIERS

• DOG• DUCK• PARROT

Page 48: AVIATION SECURITY. COURSE OUTLINE Concept of security and threats. Theory of security in ICAO. Threats to aviation industry. Security channels at airports

ENERGY BARRIER

1. INTRUDER ALARM SYSTEM

2. CURRENT FLOW

3. SECURITY LIGHTS

4. CCTV SYSTEM

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SECURITY STATUSOF

AIRPORT PREMISES

STERILE AREA

CONCOURSE HALL[CHECK-IN AREA],LOUNGES

APRON,RUNWAY

NON-STERILE AREA

CARPARK ARE,VERANDA

Page 50: AVIATION SECURITY. COURSE OUTLINE Concept of security and threats. Theory of security in ICAO. Threats to aviation industry. Security channels at airports

COURSE OUTLINE• Concept of security and threats.• Theory of security in ICAO.• Threats to aviation industry.• Security channels at airports.• Security status of airport premises.• Security survey & inspection.• Airport Security Committee.• Airport Security Program.• Inspection/Screening of passengers & baggage.• Security devices & equipment.• Prohibited items.• Security barriers.• Unaccompanied baggage, cargo, mail, store and expedite or priority parcels.• Identification system of functionaries, employees & visitors.• Cargo security.• Management during emergency situation.• Management of response against acts of unlawful

interference.

Page 51: AVIATION SECURITY. COURSE OUTLINE Concept of security and threats. Theory of security in ICAO. Threats to aviation industry. Security channels at airports

CHANNELS OF SECURITYAT

AIRPORTSRUNWAY

NO ACCESS

PROHIBITEDAREA

AIRCRAFTCABIN

CHECKINGANDSEARCH

AIRSIDE-------------------PROHIBITEDAREA

NO ACCESS

PROHIBITEDAREA

APRON

CHECKINGANDSEARCH

AIRSIDE

LAUNGES

CHECKINGANDSEARCH

AIRSIDE

CONCOURSEHALL

SURVEILANCE ANDCHECKING

LANDSIDE

CAR PARKAREA

SCRUTINY,CHECKINGAND SEARCH

LANDSIDE

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MOVEMENT OF PAX THROUGH

SECURITY CHANNELSRUNWAY

NO ACCESSAT ALL

[STERILE]PROHIBITEDAREA

AIRCRAFTCABIN

PAX+HANDBAG

AIRSIDE-------------------PROHIBITEDAREA

NO ACCESSAT ALL

[STERILE]PROHIBITEDAREA

APRON

PAX+HAND BAG

[STERILE]AIRSIDE

LOUNGES

PAX+HAND BAG+

[STERILE]AIRSIDE

CONCOURSEHALL

PAX+HAND BAG+HOLDBAG

[SEMI-STERILE]LANDSIDE

CAR PARKAREA

PAX+HAND BAG+HOLDBAG+VISITOR+VEHICLE

[NON-STERILE]LANDSIDE

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Categories of Airport Entry Passes

S.No Type Issued to

1 Functionary Pass Airport functionary i.e. Airline staff, CAA and Ground Handling agencies etc.

2 Courier Pass a. Rep of Foreign Mission approved by MOFA.b. Non-diplomatic staff as per auth approved by MOD/MOFA

3 Hajj Pass Issued to Functionaries only for Hajj Operation.

4 Protocol Pass (Exempted From Body Search)

Dignitaries exempted by the Government from body search at airports within Pakistan.

5 Protocol Pass Department/Organizations/Individuals specifically approved by Ministry of Defence.

6 Temporary Permit Functionary by CSO, for a period not exceeding three months, till issuance of permanent pass.

7 Single Entry Permit Handle unaccompanied child, aged, sick/wheel chair cases and to receive dead body.

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KINDS OF PERSONAL SEARCH• IMAGINARY SEARCH• VISUAL SEARCH• PHYSICAL SEARCH (FRISKING)• CURSORY SEARCH• PAT SEARCH• EQUIPMENTAL SEARCH• DETAILED SEARCH• SUSPECT`S SEARCH• ANOTOMICAL SEARCH• SURGICAL SEARCH

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What are Dangerous Goods?

Many items, which might appear to be harmless in everyday use, can pose dangers wherever they are carried on an aircraft and are consequently forbidden for carriage by passengers either in the cabin or in their checked baggage. 

Page 59: AVIATION SECURITY. COURSE OUTLINE Concept of security and threats. Theory of security in ICAO. Threats to aviation industry. Security channels at airports

DANGEROUS GOODS• After it has been determined

that the possession of an article such as one of those prescribed in preceding slide dose not constitute a breach of national law, and if it is believed that there is no criminal intend on the part of passenger, the article should be taken from passenger and transported as checked/hold baggage for which the passenger is issued a standard claim tag. It will be desirable to package such item in a container made of opaque material. In all such cases compliance with the provision of Annex 18 – The Safe Transportation of Dangerous Goods by Air shall be ensured.

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PROHIBITED ITEMS(NOT TO BE CARRIED ONTO AN AIRCRAFT)

• THOSE MADE OR INTENDED FOR OFFENSIVE OR DEFENSIVE USE SUCH AS FIREARMS AND POINTED,SHARP-EDGED OR BLUNT WEAPONS WHICH WOULD INCLUDE TRUNCHEONS,AXES AND LOADED OR SPIKED STICKS.

• GRENADES,EXPLOSIVES,AMMUNITION OR INCENDIARY MATERIAL.

• IMITATIONS/REPLICAS OF ANY ONE OF THE ARTICLES DESCRIBED ABOVE.

• INFLAMMABLE,CORROSIVE OR TOXIC SUBSTANCES,INCLUDING GASES,WHETHER OR NOT UNDER PRESSURE.

• ALL ORDINARY ARTICLES CABABLE OF BEING USED AS OFFENSSIVE OR DEFFENSIVE WEAPONS SUCH AS ICE-AXES,METAL-TIPPED WALKING STIKS,OPEN RAZORS,LONG-POINTED SCISSORS, KNIVES,PROFESSIONAL TOOLS,AEROSOL CONTAINERS.

• ANY OTHER ARTICLE WHICH GIVES RISE TO REASONABLE SUSPICION.

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Examples of forbidden items include.

Type Items

Explosives Fireworks, flares, party poppers, toy caps

Gases Mace, camping gas, culinary glazing torches

Flammable Liquids

Machines with petrol fuelled engines (including those which have been drained), petrol, lighter fluid

Flammable Solids

Non-safety matches

Oxidizers Beach

Poisons Pesticides

Corrosives car batteries, mercury

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INSPECTION/SCREENINGOF

PASSENGERS & BAGGAGE

• PREVENT INTRODUCTION OF FIRE ARMS,WEAPONS AND DANGEROUS DEVICES INTO AREAS ON THE AIRCRAFT TO WHICH ACCESS MAY BE GAINED DURING FLIGHT THROUGH INSPCTION/SCREENING OF PAX AND THEIR CABIN BAGGAGE.• INSPECTION/SCREENING OF PAXs & CABIN BAGGAGE BY THE USE OF METAL DETECTION, X-RAY DEVICES, AND OTHER DEVICES, BY MANUAL SEARCH OR BY A COMBINATION OF BOTH.• INSPECTION/SCREENING SYSTEMS TO BE APPLIED TO ALL DOMESTIC & INTERNATIONAL FLIGHTS,SIMULTANEOUSLY TO ACHIEVE THE OBJECTIVE OF PREVENTING AND DETERING THE INTRODUCTION OF FIREARMS,WEAPONS, AND OTHER DANGEROUS DEVICES ONTO AIRCRAFT AND ASSURING THAT THE OFFENDER IS DISCOVERED BEFORE HE BOARDS THE AIRCRAFT.

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INSPECTION/SCREENINGOF

PASSENGERS & BAGGAGE• ENSURE NO POSSIBILITY OF MIXING OR CONTACT

BETWEEN THE PASSENGERS ON ARRIVAL OR DEPARTURE.

• INSPECTION/SCREENING OF PAXs & CABIN BAGGAGE THROUGH METAL DETECTION DEVICES AND X-RAY DEVICES BY WELL TRAINED AND SKILLED SECURITY PERSONNEL.

• STERILITY SEARCH/SCANNING OF THE LOUNGE BE CARRIED OUT FIRST BEFORE THE PAXs & THEIR CABIN BAGGAGE ARE ALLOWED IN DEPARTURE LOUNGE AFTER SEARCH,INSPECTION & SCREENING.

• ENTRANCES OF DEPARTURE LOUNGE WHICH ARE NOT EQUIPPED WITH INSPECTION/SCREENING DEVICES SHOULD PERMANENTLY BE KEPT CLOSED FOR ANY SORT OF ENTRY.

• ALL AIRPORT FUNCTIONARIES, AUTHORISED TO HAVE ACCESS TO DEPARTURE LOUNGE, MUST BE PASSED THROUGH PROPER SEARCH PROCESS.

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STRATEGY OF SECURITY IMPLEMENTATION

SECURITY

THREATANALYSIS

AVALABLERESOURCES

HOW TOFOIL

THREATS

VOLUMEOF

THREATS

SENSITIVITYOF

THREATS

PRIORITYOF

THREATS

IN-BUILTSECURITY

HUMANRESOURCES

EUIPMENTAND

GADGETS

SECURITYPROGRAMME

RULESAND

REGULATION

UTILIZATIONOF

SKILL

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SECURITY MEASURES ABOARD AIRCRAFT

IN FLIGHT

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PRE-FLIGHT PRECAUTIONS• EXTERIOR & INTERIOR INSPECTION OF AIRCRAFT AS PER CHECK LIST BEFOR BOARDING OF PAXs. • CORDONING OF A/C ON THE GROUND BY ARMED SECURITY.•MONITORING OF A/C MAINTENANCE & SERVICING OPERATION.• AUTHORISED ACCESS OF GROUND STAFF INTO THE A/C AFTER SEARCH ON “NEED TO ENTER” BASIS.•PREVENTION OF UNAUTHORISED ACCESS TO A/C.•INSPECTION/SCREENING OF PAXs & CABIN BAGGAGE.• SUPERVISION OF LOADING OF HOLD BAGGAGE,CARGO,MAIL/STORE.• PILOT-IN-COMMAND SHOULD KNOW SEAT ASSIGNMENT OF SKY MARSHALS/PERSON-IN-CUSTODY ANT ITS ESCORT.• VERIFICATION OF PROCEDURE TO PILOT-IN-COMMAND FOR POSSIBLE UTILIZATION OF SKY-MARSHALS.

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IN-FLIGHT VIGILANCE• CREW MEMBER TO PAY ATTENTION OVER CHANGE OF

SEAT BY ANY PAX.• CREW MEMBERS TO REMAIN ALERT FOR ANY

SUSPICIOUS OR UNUSUAL BEHAVIOUR OF PAX(S).IF AN, IMMEDIATELY INFORM PILOT-IN-COMMAND.

• ALL FLIGHT CREW MUST FOLLOW LAWS,REGULATIOS AND PROCEDURES OF STATE.

• PILOT-IN-COMMAND IS RESPONSIBLE FOR OPERATION AND SAFETY OF A/C & PAXS ON-BOARD.

• PIC IS RESPONSIBLE FOR DISCIPLINE AND TO ENSURE EFFECTIVE PERFORMANCE OF DUTIES BY CREW.

• PRIOR TO DEPARTURE,PIC TO ENSURE THAT SECURITY MEASURES ARE ADEQUATE FOR FLIGHT OPERATION.

• DURING FLIGHT, PIC MUST UTILIZE EVERY MEANS TO RETAIN AUTHORITY OVER CREW,PAXS & A/C ACTING ON THE INSTRUCTIONS AND ADVICE RECEIVED FROM GROUND AUTHORITIES AND IN RESPONSETO THE DEMAND OF THE OFFENDER.MAINTAIN PASSIVE CONTROL OVER THE SITUATION.

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IN-FLIGHT VIGILANCE• ATTEMPT TO GET THE A/C ON THE GROUND & KEEP

THERE.• COMMUNICATE EFFECTIVELY AS POSSIBLE BY USING A/C

VOICE,VISUAL SIGNALS & AIR TRAFFIC FACILITIES.• IMPLEMENT APPROPRIATE FLIGHT CREW PROCEDURES.• TAKE PRECAUTIONS TO AVOID STARTLING THE

OFFENDERS.• AVOID TO USE FORCE OR UNUSUAL A/C MANOEUVERS

TO OVERCOME & SUBDUE THE OFFENDER.• ON COMPLITION OF EMERGENCY,SUBMIT REPORT AS

PER PRESCRIBED FORMAT OF ICAO.

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ACTION BY THE RECIPIENT

OFA BOMB THREAT

TELEPHONE CALL

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QUESTIONS TO BE ASKED

TO THE CALLER• WHAT TIME IS THE BOMB SET

TO EXPLODE?• WHERE IS THE BOMB PLACED?• WHAT KIND OF THE DEVICE IS

IT?• WHAT DOSE IT LOOK LIKE?• WHY DID YOU PLACE THE

BOMB?

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MORE QUESTIONS• CAN YOU GIVE US ANY IDEA WHERE WE MIGHT

LOCATE THE BOMB?MAY BE YOU CAN GIVE US A CLUE-THIS WOULD GIVE US A CHANCE TO ALERT PEOPLE WHO MIGHT BE ON THE AIRCRAFT/IN THE BUILDING.

• WILL YOU PLEASE DESCRIBE THE TYPE OF DETONATING MECHANISM?

• DOSE IT HAVE A PARTICULAR TIME DEVICE TO SET IT OFF?

• WHY DO YOU WISH TO INJURE OR KILL THE INNOCENT PEOPLE ON THE AIRCRAFT/IN THE BUILDING?

• YOU KNOW THERE ARE MANY INNOCENT PEOPLE ON BOARD THE AIRCRAFT WHO HAVE NOT DONE YOU ANY HARM.WHY DO YOU FEEL IT WAS NECESSARY TO PLANT A BOMB?

• WHAT DO YOU HOPE TO ACCOMPLISH BY DAMAGEING OR DESTROYING THIS AIRCRAFT/BUILDING?

• WHY HAVE YOU CHOSEN TO DAMAGE OR DESTROY THIS AIRCRAFT/BUILDING?

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QUESTIONS• WHAT EXPLOSIVE IS BEING USED?• WHO AND WHERE ARE YOU?• OF WHAT GROUP ARE YOU A MEMBER?• ARE YOU SURE THAT YOUR BOMB WILL GO OFF AS

YOU EXPECT?• DO YOU HAVE A FAMILY OF YOUR OWN? HOW

WOULD THEY FEEL IF THEY KNEW WHAT YOU HAVE DONE?

• WHY HAVE YOU CHOSEN THIS MEANS TO EXPRESS YOUR FEELINGS?

• WHY DO YOU FEEL THAT BOMBING THIS AIRCRAFT/BUILDING WILL HELP SOLVE ANY PROBLEMS OR GRIEVANCES YOU MIGHT HAVE?

• DO NOT YOU REALIZE THAT YOU ARE PROBABLY GOING TO DESTROY VALUABLE PROPERTY WHICH BELONGS TO OTHERS?

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We all know well about the Fire Triangle. We learned that in order for a fire to burn, three things are required. They are Heat, Fuel and Oxygen. Remove any one of the three and a fire can’t happen.

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INCLINATION ASSETS

 

 

 

 

OPPORTUNITY 

 

Crime, like fire, requires three components in order to occur. . These components are Inclination, Assets and Opportunity. As with fire, removal of one or more of the components will prevent the crime from occurring.

Page 76: AVIATION SECURITY. COURSE OUTLINE Concept of security and threats. Theory of security in ICAO. Threats to aviation industry. Security channels at airports

INCLINATION

This component describes the desire or motivation of an individual to

commit a crime. Examples are: financial gain, revenge, jealousy, anger

and hatred.

Because inclination involves a person and their mental processes, from

an airport management standpoint, it is the most difficult component to

remove. Inclination exists in the realm of psychologists, sociologists

and criminologists. There is little that airport managers can do to

influence it.

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ASSETS

This component describes something to be gained by committing a

crime. Assets are usually thought of as tangible objects such as an

aircraft or avionics. However they may be intangible or abstract objects.

In a murder, the victim is the asset. The bombing of a building could

involve multiple assets. These may include the property that is

destroyed. They might also include the symbol that the organization

projects and the employees working in the building. The World Trade

Center is an example of a symbolic asset.

While it may be theoretically possible in some instances to remove

assets to prevent crime, it is generally impractical or unrealistic.

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OPPORTUNITYThis component describes the circumstances and conditions that permit

a crime to occur. Every crime has its own unique set of opportunities,

but two conditions are usually present.

These are: (1) Access to the asset(s), and (2) An apparent likelihood

that the crime can be committed successfully with minimal risk to the

perpetrator.

Opportunity is the crime component that is most readily influenced by

security measures. When developing an airport security program, the

first priorities should be the recognition of criminal opportunities followed

immediately by the initiation of actions to remove those opportunities

The remainder of this manual and the accompanying assessment

checklist will explore in detail the tools available to eliminate the

opportunity for criminal activity at your airport.

 

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CRIME PREVENTION IN 3Ds

.Most crimes occur because the criminal found the right opportunity to act.

.The criminal’s inclination and the victim’s asset came together at a time and place

where the criminal felt they could successfully commit the crime with minimal risk of interference or apprehension.

.That is, the criminal found circumstances

and conditions to be within their comfort zone.

.Your job, when developing an airport security program, is to

create an environment that lowers the comfort level of potential criminals. Applying the three “D’s” of crime prevention helps to do this.

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DETER

The goal of deterrence is the creation of an environment that is unattractive to

criminals. Anything that increases the likelihood that a criminal’s actions will be

observed and reported to police or security personnel is a deterrent. In

general, open, well lit, well used areas are less susceptible to crime. The

visible presence of security measures and the use of access control devices

and barriers are deterrents. Alert employees, security personnel and legitimate

airport users are deterrents. A successful deterrence program makes the

criminal hesitant to commit their crime in that environment. Even when the

facility itself is the target, such as with anti-government terrorist attacks, a well-

designed deterrence program may prevent an attack.

Effective deterrents place psychological and/or physical barriers in the

criminal’s path and imply to them that they have no easy opportunity to

successfully commit their crime.

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DELAYIn spite your best efforts, some criminals may not be put off by security

measures and other deterrent efforts. In these instances, your next line of

defense is to delay completion of the attack. The longer it takes a criminal to

complete an attack, the greater the probability that they will be observed and

apprehended.

Barriers such as solid doors, good locks, fencing and other physical security

measures are all devices that delay a criminal’s activities.

The presence of delaying measures increases both the difficulty and risk

associated with a criminal’s activities. Increased delay usually equates to

decreased opportunity in the criminal mind.

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DETECTEven with the best security programs, there is always a chance that criminal

activity will occur. Total security doesn’t exist. When a crime does occur, early

detection greatly increases the odds that the criminal will be apprehended.

Early detection can be accomplished by a variety of means. During business

hours, the best detection devices are alert people. After hours and in areas of

the airport not normally occupied, various electronic devices can be employed

to detect criminal activity. These devices include alarm systems and closed

circuit television.

The presence of alert people and electronic security devices sends a message

to the potential criminal that their actions will be detected. This increased risk

of apprehension reduces their level of comfort. As a result, opportunity is also

reduced.