Aviation Operations - United States Marine Corps

USMC

USMC

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PCN 143 000019 00

MCWP 3-20(Formerly MCWP 3-2)

U.S. Marine Corps

Aviation Operations

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVYHeadquarters United States Marine Corps

Washington, D.C. 20350-3000

4 April 2018

CHANGE 1 to MCWP 3-20Aviation Operations

1. This publication has been edited to ensure gender neutrality of all applicable and appropriate terms, except those terms governed by higher authority. No other content has been affected.

2. File this transmittal sheet in the front of this publication.

Reviewed and approved this date.

BY DIRECTION OF THE COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE CORPS

ROBERT S. WALSHLieutenant General, U.S. Marine Corps

Deputy Commandant for Combat Development and Integration

Publication Control Numbers:

Publication: 143 000019 00

Change: 143 000019 01

CD&I (C 116)

2 May 2016

ERRATUM

to

MCWP 3-2

AVIATION OPERATIONS

1. Change all instances of MCWP 3-2, Aviation Operations, to MCWP 3-20, Aviation

Operations.

2. File this transmittal sheet in the front of this publication.

PCN 143 000019 80

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVYHeadquarters United States Marine Corps

Washington, D.C. 20380-1775

9 May 2000

FOREWORD

Aviation is an integral part of the naval expeditionary air-ground team—itextends the MAGTF’s operational reach and flexibility and expands its war-fighting power. Marine Corps Warfighting Publication (MCWP) 3-2, AviationOperations, applies the warfighting philosophy in Marine Corps DoctrinalPublication (MCDP) 1, Warfighting, to Marine aviation operations. It is the linkbetween higher order doctrine and the tactics, techniques, and procedurescontained in other Marine aviation doctrinal publications. This publicationestablishes the doctrinal basis for the planning and execution of aviationoperations and provides the philosophy for employment of Marine aviation in theprosecution of war and other operations in support of the Marine Corps’ missionas the Nation’s expeditionary force in readiness.

This publication is intended primarily for commanders and staff officers whoare responsible for the planning and execution of aviation operations.Nonetheless, it should be read by all Marines who are supported by or involvedin the execution of aviation operations. It is also intended for other doctrinecenters, joint and multinational staffs, professional military educationalactivities, and any other activity that requires an understanding of Marineaviation. It explains U.S. Marine Corps aviation capabilities and how the Marineair-ground task force (MAGTF) exploits these capabilities, both operationallyand tactically. It does not discuss the specifics of unit-level tactics andprocedures; e.g., air-to-air combat tactics, how to conduct a helicopterborneoperation, or how to attack any particular target. Rather, this publication appliesmaneuver warfare concepts to Marine aviation operations, especially inaviation’s role as an integrated combat arm of the MAGTF.

As with all Marine Corps doctrinal publications, this publication is authoritativein nature but requires judgment in application. It supersedes Fleet Marine ForceManual (FMFM) 5-1, Organization and Function of Marine Aviation.

Reviewed and approved this date.

BY DIRECTION OF THE COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE CORPS

DISTRIBUTION: 143 000019 00

J. E. RHODESLieutenant General, U.S. Marine Corps

Commanding GeneralMarine Corps Combat Development Command

Aviation Operations

Table of Contents

PageChapter 1 The Role of Marine Aviation

1001 The Evolution of Marine Aviation: Adapting to Meet the Threat . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-21002 Marine Aviation and the Levels of War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-5

Chapter 2 The Missions, Functions, and Organization of Marine Aviation

2001 Functions of Marine Aviation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-12002 Marine Aviation Organization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-62003 Aviation Combat Element Task Organization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-14

Chapter 3 The Role of Aviation in Combined-Arms Force Operations

3001 The Six Warfighting Functions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-13002 The Operational Environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-23003 Organizational Adaptability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-33004 Marine Aviation and Maneuver Warfare . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-43005 The ACE in Maneuver Warfare . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-113006 Aviation in Offensive and Defensive Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-123007 Aviation in Security Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-133008 Aviation in Military Operations Other Than War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-14

Chapter 4 Command and Control of Marine Aviation Operations

4001 Command Relationships . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-14002 Aviation Combat Element Command and Support Relationships . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-24003 Marine Aviation Command Relationships in a Joint Force . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-44004 Other Command Authorities. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-64005 The Marine Air Command and Control System. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-7

Chapter 5 Aviation Planning

5001 The Commander’s Role in Planning. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-15002 Staff Organization for Aviation Planning. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-25003 Planning Cycles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-45004 Aviation Planning as an Element of MAGTF Planning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-55005 The Air Tasking Cycle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-7

Chapter 6 Aviation Logistics

6001 Strategic Aviation Logistics and Aviation Ground Support . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-16002 Operational Aviation Logistics and Aviation Ground Support . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-16003 Tactical Aviation Logistics and Aviation Ground Support . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-4

_____________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-2

Chapter 7 Marine Aviation in Navy, Joint, and Multinational Operations

7001 Navy Fleet Operational Support . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-17002 Joint Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-17003 Multinational Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-3

Chapter 8 Emerging Concepts

8001 Operational Maneuver From the Sea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-18002 Ship-to-Objective Maneuver. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-28003 Sustained Operations Ashore . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-38004 MPF 2010 and Beyond . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-3

Appendices

A Marine Aviation Organization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-1B Glossary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B-1C References and Related Publications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . C-1

To Our Reader

Chapter 1

The Role of Marine Aviation

“Today [aviation] is the dominant factor in war. It may not win a war by it-self alone, but without it no major war can be won.” 1

—Adm Arthur Radford

Marine forces are general purpose forces andtraditionally come “from the sea” with limitedorganic fire support and mobility assets. As such,Marine forces rely heavily on the fires, firesupport, and mobility provided by Marineaviation. Marine aviation is an integral part of theMarine air-ground task force (MAGTF). Itprovides the MAGTF with a complete spectrum ofoperational capabilities and is a flexible instru-ment of the MAGTF’s combat power. Theaviation combat element (ACE) is a powerful andversatile part of the MAGTF’s combined-armsteam, complementing the MAGTF’s groundcombat element (GCE) and combat servicesupport element (CSSE), while functioning inconsonance with the Marine Corps’ doctrinalphilosophy of maneuver warfare.

Marine aviation provides the MAGTF with theoperational flexibility it needs to accomplish itsmission across the range of military operations. Itextends the operational reach of the MAGTF andenables it to accomplish operational objectivesdesigned to achieve strategic goals. The MAGTFuses the strategic and operational mobility afford-ed by the sea to employ its integrated air arm andto exert a powerful influence in most geographicareas of potential national concern. Since mostground- and ship-based fires have a limited rangeand ground-based mobility systems are limited byspeed, range, and the terrain, the MAGTF’s ACEallows the MAGTF commander to conduct thedeep fight. The ACE affords the MAGTF the abil-ity to deliver fires, facilitate integrated commandand control, enhance mobility and maneuver, pro-vide force protection, sustain combat power, andcollect intelligence.

Marine aviation’s expeditionary character sets itapart from all other aviation organizations. TheACE’s role is to project combat power, conductair operations, and contribute to battlespace domi-nance in support of the MAGTF’s mission, and itorganizes, trains, and equips for that role. Marineaviation can operate from amphibious platforms,forward operating bases (FOBs), forward expedi-tionary land bases, carriers (as an integral part ofcarrier air groups), or any combination thereof.

The MAGTF’s single-battle concept exploits thecombined-arms nature of MAGTF operations. Itallows the MAGTF commander to fight a singlebattle with an integrated, task-organized force ofground, aviation, and logistic forces. Based onthis concept, operations performed by Marineaviation are rarely undertaken in isolation sinceits greatest value is in its integrated contributionto the MAGTF’s overall mission. It is designed tofunction most effectively as an integral part of theMAGTF and cannot be separated without asignificant loss of capability. Marine aviationprovides enhanced mobility and close fires forunits in contact and augments ground and navalindirect fires. Marine aviation also gives a Marineexpeditionary force (MEF), which would other-wise be a light infantry force, the operationalreach of a corps-level force.

Marine aviation performs a variety of roles andtasks in support of national objectives. This caninclude fulfilling missions outside Marine avia-tion’s traditional MAGTF, naval expeditionaryforce, and joint force roles. Examples of Marineaviation being used in nontraditional roles includeproviding direct support to the President; provid-ing aviation detachments for independent dutysuch as the Marines attached to the joint force air

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component commander (JFACC) in Aviano, Italy,in support of operations in Bosnia; providing forcesfor counterdrug operations such as the ground-based air search radars teams deployed to supportOperation Nimbus; and participating in disaster re-lief operations such as Homestead, Florida, after itwas struck by Hurricane Andrew.

Marine aviation provides the MAGTF with sixspecific functions: antiair warfare (AAW), offen-sive air support (OAS), assault support, air recon-naissance, electronic warfare (EW), and control ofaircraft and missiles. These six functions are dis-cussed in chapter 2.

1001. The Evolution of Marine Aviation: Adapting to Meet the Threat

The Marine Corps’ contribution to nationalsecurity is due largely to the ability of Marinesto identify and adapt to the Nation’s strategicand tactical needs, often before those needs arewidely recognized. As the Navy transitioned fromsail to steam during the era of Alfred ThayerMahan, the Marine Corps developed a concept forseizure and defense of advanced bases that wouldextend the fleet’s reach worldwide. In 1912, theMarine Corps recognized the potential contri-bution of aviation to its emerging Advanced BaseForce Concept. Less than a year later, Marineaviation participated in its first maneuvers offGuantanamo, Cuba. Marine pilots performedscouting and reconnaissance missions anddropped aerial bombs to support the fleet. Thiswas the beginning of the evolution of Marineaviation that would eventually evolve into today’ssix functions of Marine aviation.

In January 1914, an all-Marine aviation force func-tioned in conjunction with Marine ground forces ofthe Advanced Base Brigade during annual fleetexercises. This was the first demonstration ofwhat would become the Marine Corps’ integratedcombined-arms approach to warfare.

During World War I, Marine pilots received theirfirst combat experience when they scored theirfirst air-to-air victories, flew bombing missions,and conducted the first aerial resupply drop.These successfully integrated Marine air-groundoperations proved that aviation could provide co-ordinated, direct support of Marine ground forces.

Marine operations in Nicaragua (1927–1933)produced the first practical air-ground integrationand coordination techniques. Marine aviationwas able to inflict heavy casualties on massedSandinista forces by using bombs and machineguns. As a result of these attacks, Sandinista forcesnever massed again and were less of a threat toMarine forces. Marine aviation also conducted airreconnaissance, close air support (CAS), deep airsupport (DAS), aerial logistic support, and combataerial evacuation against the Sandinistas. In 1932,Marine aviation experimented with the use ofautogyros to support combat operations. However,at that stage of rotary-wing aircraft development,the rotary-wing aircraft was deemed ineffectivebecause of its limited payload. But this experi-mentation set the stage for the helicopter’s futuredevelopment as a means of mobility for bothtroops and logistics.

Meanwhile, world events indicated the likelihoodof a major naval war in the Pacific. Accordingly,the Marine Corps developed amphibious warfaretechniques that laid the foundation for U.S. andAllied amphibious triumphs in World War II.These techniques were published in the TentativeLanding Operations Manual (TLOM) in July1935. Concurrent with the development of theTLOM was the formal recognition and integrationof Marine aviation as a part of the Marine Corps’operating forces. On December 8, 1933, the FleetMarine Force (FMF) was created and aviationwas formally incorporated into the FMF’s organi-zation. Marine aviation went on to play a key rolein operations throughout World War II, particu-larly in providing CAS to amphibious forces.

During World War II, in the early months of 1942,the U.S. committed six carriers to the Pacific. ByNovember, all but one of them had been sunk orput out of action. Marines on Guadalcanal then

Aviation Operations _______________________________________________________________________________________ 1-3

focused on securing and improving a capturedJapanese airstrip, later dubbed Henderson Field.From this “unsinkable” aircraft carrier, Marine,Navy, and Army Air Corps pilots launched nu-merous counterattacks against the enemy and pro-vided a shield against Japanese forces attemptingto dislodge our foothold on the island. Tacticsused during these operations became the modelfor aviation support of ground and naval forcesthroughout the Pacific island-hopping campaignand, ultimately, led to the success of operations inthe Pacific.

Following World War II, Marines focused on thehelicopter’s potential utility. The first MarineExperimental Helicopter Squadron-1 was esta-blished at Quantico, Virginia. Its purpose was toconduct experiments, develop doctrine, anddevelop tactics for vertical envelopment usinghelicopters. The experiments produced tactics anddoctrine, but the helicopter’s lift capacity in 1948and 1949 was still limited to about 1,500 pounds.This experimentation resulted in the creation ofthe Shepherd Board and the establishment ofminimum lift requirements for Marine trooptransport helicopters.

As helicopter lift capabilities advanced so did theuse of these aircraft. During the Korean War,helicopters were used extensively in combatoperations. In July 1950, Marine Aircraft Group-33(MAG-33) deployed with the Marine Corps’ FirstProvisional Brigade to Korea. One of MAG-33’ssquadrons, Marine Observation Squadron-6(Fixed-Wing) (VMO-6), was composed of fixed-wing observation aircraft and four helicopters.VMO-6 used its helicopters primarily for therescue of downed pilots, and it developed tactics(e.g., the use of armed escorts) that are still usedtoday during pilot rescue operations. In September1951, the Marine Helicopter Transport Squadron161 conducted the first Marine Corps verticalenvelopment in combat, which was based on thevertical envelopment doctrine and tactics devel-oped at Quantico, Virginia, during the 1940s.

Marine aviation’s tradition of providing effectiveCAS with its fixed-wing aircraft was also signifi-cantly enhanced during the Korean War as it flew

jets into combat for the first time on December 10,1950. During March and April of 1951, one squad-ron maintained 10-minute standby alerts, with fourpilots in the cockpits of their aircraft. This allowedthe unit to respond to urgent calls for CAS fromthe tactical air command center (TACC) via thedirect air support center (DASC). As a result, amore responsive CAS system was established thatallowed the use of airborne, alert aircrews thatwere briefed as they approached the target.

Radar systems that were effective at night werealso installed on some aircraft, such as the F-7FTigercat, during the Korean War. Radar capabili-ties allowed commanders to designate somesquadrons to fly only at night, thereby enhancingthe squadron’s effectiveness while minimizing itsvulnerability. These night-flying pilots were nor-mally under the control of a forward air controller(FAC), an employment method that was laterused extensively in the Vietnam War.

Another advancement during the Korean War wasthe establishment of Marine Photographic Squad-ron 1 on February 25, 1952. This squadron flewF2H-2P Banshees, which were specially modifiedwith a long nose to accommodate several recon-naissance cameras. These were the first Marineaircraft specifically dedicated to reconnaissance.The aerial photographs provided by this unit wereinvaluable aids to intelligence and targeting.

During the post-Korean and pre-Vietnam period,the Marine Corps continued to develop doctrineand tactics for the employment of both fixed-wingand rotary-wing aircraft. In 1962, Marine Medi-um Helicopter Squadron 362 was deployed toSouth Vietnam to provide mobility support to theSouth Vietnamese army, which was conductingoperations south of Saigon. These operations pro-vided invaluable experience to the Marine Corpsin the conduct of helicopterborne operations. Onthe basis of these experiences, helicopters werefitted with door-mounted, M-60 machine guns,which enabled helicopters to return fire whilelanding in hot landing zones. The need for anaerial escort to protect the helicopters and preparea landing zone was also recognized. Initially, this

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role was filled by slow-flying, fixed-wing fighteraircraft. Later, the UH-1B Huey helicopter gun-ship was developed to meet this need and wasfielded in Vietnam in 1963. The need for greaterfirepower and for armor to protect critical areas ofthe helicopter were also identified. The UH-1Bprovided escort and fire support for helicopter-borne operations until the AH-1G Cobra wasfielded in 1967.

Command and control of aircraft improved duringthe Vietnam War. Radar information was manual-ly plotted during the first several years of the war,then a computer-based aircraft command and con-trol system (Marine Corp tactical data system[MTDS]) was deployed to Vietnam. It providedthe first automated aircraft command and controlsystem for Marine aviation that was compatiblewith the Navy’s command and control system.

During the Vietnam War, Marine aviation devel-oped the foundations for the doctrine, tactics, andequipment used today. At the conclusion of theVietnam War, Marine aviation had developed anddemonstrated the capability to conduct OAS,assault support, air reconnaissance, EW (includingthe ability to counter modern air defenses), controlof aircraft and missiles, and AAW. Rotary-wingaviation concentrated on improvements in liftcapability, mobility, and helicopter fire supporttechniques. Fixed-wing aviation focused onimprovements in turbojet engine technology andaircraft design. These improvements led to a newgeneration of aircraft that were faster and moremaneuverable, and which could carry a wide vari-ety of new and improved munitions. One of themost significant aspects of this new technology,which was to have a profound impact on both air-craft design and AAW doctrine, was the introduc-tion of the guided missile. Unlike the KoreanWar, when air-to-air combat and air defense wasfought with essentially the same weapons and tac-tics as was used in World War II, the Vietnam airwar was fought with the guided missile. By theend of the war, missile technology and employ-ment dominated both friendly and enemy AAWdoctrine and accounted for a majority of our air-to-air combat victories.

Full-scale Marine participation in Vietnam beganin 1965. The doctrine and tactics for helicopter-borne operations, which were refined while sup-porting the South Vietnamese army, provided asound basis on which Marines continued to build.The UH-1B gunships that deployed to Vietnam in1963 were replaced by AH-1G attack helicoptersin 1967 and two-engined AH-1J Sea Cobra in1969. The CH-53A Sea Stallion and the CH-46Sea Knight were introduced in 1966 and provideda significant improvement to lift capacity and theability to conduct helicopterborne assaults and re-supply operations.

In July 1965, Marine Composite ReconnaissanceSquadron 1 (Fixed-Wing) arrived in Vietnam. Thisunit was equipped with the EF-10B Sky Knight, anelectronic countermeasures platform. The EF-10Bwas flown extensively during the next 2 years andprovided effective protection against Soviet-builtand -supplied surface-to-air missiles (SAMs). Latein 1966, a newer, more capable aircraft (the EA-6AIntruder) replaced the EF-10B. Also in 1966, theMarine Corps introduced the RF-4B Phantom,which was a reconnaissance version of the F4Phantom. The RF-4B provided a significant jumpin combat capability. It replaced the RF-8ACrusader, initially deployed to Vietnam, and wasthe first Marine aircraft capable of acquiringimagery at night.

Through the late seventies, the eighties, and intothe nineties, as the U.S. modernized its forces, theMarine Corps continued its legacy of innovation.From vertical/short takeoff and landing (V/STOL)aircraft to unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) toprecision-guided munitions, the Marine Corpscontinued to be a leader in adapting new technol-ogy to warfighting. The Marine Corps developeda warfighting concept that emphasized smallerexpeditionary forces that used speed, tempo, andseamless air-ground integration as force multipli-ers, known as maneuver warfare. This conceptproved highly successful against Iraqi forcesduring the Persian Gulf War.

This concept resulted in a Marine air-ground team,referred to as a MAGTF, that has had a profoundimpact on the Nation’s ability to respond to crises


and conflicts. The MAGTF is the Marine Corps’principal organization for all military operations. Itis composed of forces task-organized under asingle commander to accomplish a specificmission. These forces are functionally groupedinto four core elements: a command element (CE),an aviation combat element (ACE), a groundcombat element (GCE), and a combat servicesupport element (CSSE). The MAGTF’s flexibleorganizational structure allows for other Service orforeign military force(s) to be assigned or attachedto it. The four core elements are not formal com-mands. The number, size, and type of forces thatcomprise each element is mission dependent. TheACE is task-organized to provide the specificcapabilities required of Marine aviation to supportthe MAGTF. The ACE is not subordinate to theGCE; it is a co-equal combat arm of the MAGTFthat provides the mobility, flexibility, coordina-tion, and firepower required to successfully employmaneuver warfare.

An important part of the development of Marineaviation has been the concurrent development ofthe role of Marine aviation reserve forces. Since1935, the Reserves have not only played animportant role in conflicts but have often led theway in the development of aviation concepts anddoctrine. The Reserves are organized, equipped,and trained as an integral part of Marine aviation.Marine aviation reserve units can provide the fullspectrum of aviation support functions and indi-vidual aviation units to reinforce an ACE.

The end of the Cold War brought with it a period ofcrises and conflicts of increasing number, fre-quency, and variety, and the Marine Corps pro-vides the National Command Authorities with thecapability to rapidly respond to crises whereverthey may occur. Crisis response requires a fullspectrum of military capabilities, includingforcible entry and military operations other thanwar (MOOTW). Defense of national interestsrequires an expeditionary crisis response forcethat is specifically organized, trained, andequipped to quickly project military poweroverseas. This rapid-response, general-purposeforce must maintain itself in a continuous state ofreadiness and it must be prepared to adapt to a

broad range of operating environments on shortnotice. It must possess a strategic mobility thatallows it projection wherever it is required. Byvirtue of its naval character, expeditionarynature, and combined-arms organization, theMAGTF, with its ACE, is capable of respondingto these requirements.

The ever-changing world security environmentrequires that Marine aviation continually antici-pate and adapt to new challenges. Employing newtechnology with existing doctrine will not alwaysprovide the required operational capabilities.Constant refinement of aviation doctrine and acontinuous exploration of innovative ideas arenecessary. This proactive approach has been thehallmark of Marine aviation.

1002. Marine Aviation and the Levels of War

War is fought at three levels: strategic, operation-al, and tactical. Although Marine aviation is de-signed primarily as a tactical instrument, it canmake significant contributions at all three levels.

a. The Strategic Level of War In contrast to tactics, which is the art of winningengagements and battles, military strategy is theart of winning wars. Strategy is implemented bycombatant commanders and is always joint in na-ture. The MAGTF makes a strategic contributionwhen it is used as an element of national power toaccomplish national policy objectives. SinceMarine aviation is bonded to the MAGTF by mis-sion, organization, and employment, its strategiccontributions are normally encompassed withinthe MAGTF support it provides. For example, asea-based MAGTF strategically positioned near aworld “hot spot” may be the ideal force to indi-cate U.S. political concern or resolve on a volatileissue. If the strategic objective is to show a U.S.presence in the area, Marine aviation operationsbecome a visible show of force without physicallylanding U.S. troops ashore. In this case, Marineaviation’s contribution to the strategic objectivewould be dominant, but it is still performed in

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support of the MAGTF’s mission and not consid-ered an independent action.

Marine aviation’s naval expeditionary charactermakes it a force of choice whenever politicalconsiderations preclude a deliberate build up offorces and their supporting infrastructure ashore.Marine aviation also has the collateral mission ofparticipating as an integral component of navalaviation as directed by fleet commanders. Marineaviation has, in some cases, been tasked to conductoperations while not part of a MAGTF, this is theexception rather than the rule. For example,Marine aviation has been used against targets ofstrategic value in an air strike launched from aNavy aircraft carrier as part of a joint force.Another example is the use of Marine aviationassets in support of North Atlantic TreatyOrganization (NATO) forces in Bosnia andKosovo. Both examples are exceptions to thenormal doctrinal employment of Marine aviation.Marine aviation is, first and foremost, an integralcomponent of the MAGTF.

b. The Operational Level of War The operational level of war links tactical resultsto strategic aims. The operational use of aviationrelates to campaigning. Aviation at the operationallevel of war shapes events by deciding when,where, and under what conditions to engage theenemy in battle. At the operational level, theMAGTF commander uses aviation against targetsof operational significance. These targets consistof enemy capabilities or resources whose destruc-tion or neutralization are important to the prose-cution of the campaign.

Marine aviation participates at the tactical and op-erational levels as part of a MAGTF. Doctrinally,this is Marine aviation’s primary mission: to par-ticipate as the air component of the MAGTF inthe seizure of advanced naval bases and to con-duct land operations as may be essential for theprosecution of a naval operation. The capabilitiesprovided by aviation allow the MAGTF com-mander to generate operational capability quicklyat or near the location of any conflict. Aviationprovides the resiliency and flexibility required to

respond appropriately to developing situations byeither expanding or reducing U.S. military pres-ence as directed by the theater commander.

In most operations, the MAGTF serves as part ofa joint task force (JTF) under the command of ajoint force commander (JFC). Joint Publication(JP) 0-2, Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF),establishes the doctrine, principles, and policiesof a joint force. Marine aviation supports jointforce operations as an integral part of theMAGTF. This ensures that the MAGTF retains itsunique capability to generate combined-armscombat power. The MAGTF commander will re-tain operational control (OPCON) of the ACEduring all joint operations. Any sorties in excessof the MAGTF’s direct support requirements arenormally made available to the JFC. The JFC usesthe MAGTF’s excess sorties to support othercomponents of the joint force in pursuit of overallcampaign objectives. The MAGTF commanderalso makes sorties available to the JFACC for airdefense, long-range interdiction, and long-rangereconnaissance. See JP 3-56.1, Command andControl for Joint Air Operations, and JP 3-09,Doctrine for Joint Fire Support, for detailed in-formation on command and control of joint airand fire support operations.

The capabilities of aviation, including its speed,range, and mobility, easily translate to the opera-tional level of war. Because Marine aviation hassignificant range, the MAGTF commander can useair interdiction to strike deep within the enemy’srear areas and air reconnaissance to gather neededinformation. Air defense sorties can protect theMAGTF as well as contribute to the protection ofa joint force, all of which are significant contri-butions to the JFC’s operational goals.

The implications of an action taken at one level ofwar seldom remain confined to that level. Actionstaken at the operational level may influence otheractions across all three levels of conflict. Thisoverlap between the operational and tactical levelsof war must be understood if we are to maximizeopportunities for success.


c. The Tactical Level of WarOperational goals give purpose to tactical actions.In turn, tactical actions may influence operationalgoals. The tactical-operational relationship is im-portant when deciding the best way to employaviation because aviation is uniquely capable ofhaving an immediate impact at both the tacticaland operational levels of war.

Success at the operational level can promote suc-cess at the tactical level. The employment of avia-tion at the operational level during OperationDesert Storm served to disrupt Iraqi commandand control, degrade defenses, and demoralizetroops. The success of Operation Desert Storm’soperational goals contributed to tactical successesduring the ground operations phase.

Success at the tactical level can foster success atthe operational level; however, success at the tac-tical level can prove indecisive unless linked tooperational goals. Aviation can play a significantrole in turning a tactical success into an operationaldecision. This is illustrated by Allied efforts in theSouth Pacific during World War II.

Beginning in the Solomon Islands with Guadalcanalin 1942, naval aviation played a major role in thedestruction of the best elements of the Japanesenaval air forces. Defending their major base atRabaul on the island of New Britain against Alliedair attacks, the Japanese committed and lost all oftheir fully-trained naval air units, including thosethat survived the Battle of Midway. They alsocommitted and lost a portion of their best-trainedarmy air units. Subsequently, the Japanese neverfully recovered from these losses.

The advantage gained by defeating a large portion ofJapan’s best-trained combat pilots in Guadalcanaland New Britain would prove vital to continuingAllied operations. The onslaught against Rabaulby Allied aircraft, over half of which were flownby Marine aviators, prevented Japanese aircraftfrom prohibitively interfering with Americanlandings in the Solomons area, most notably atCape Gloucester. The continued pressure of navalaviation against Rabaul eventually caused the

withdrawal of Japanese aircraft from the islandfortress. The combined effect of the tacticalsuccesses in the Solomons degraded Japan’s com-bat power and the Allies were able to bypassRabaul, an operational maneuver that isolatedabout 100,000 Japanese.

Operation Overlord, the great amphibious landingin Normandy during World War II, is an exampleof how the operational use of aviation determinedthe conditions of engagement. The operationalrole of aviation in Operation Overlord was toensure that the enemy forces attacking the beach-head did not increase at a more rapid rate than theAllied forces defending it and extending it. Threeair attacks were conducted on targets hundreds ofmiles from the contested ground and were timed todisrupt Nazi attempts to reinforce units engaged inNormandy. Allied aviation successfully delayedthe movement of German reserves that could havecountered the Allied landing. Operationally, theGerman army remained paralyzed. Field MarshalErwin Rommel reported in his June 10, 1944dispatch that practically all traffic on roads, tracks,and in open country was pinned down by powerfulfighter-bomber and bomber formations. As aresult, the movement of German troops on thebattlefield was almost completely paralyzed, whilethe Allies maneuvered freely.

The Gulf War contains recent examples of tacticalevents that impacted the operational level of war.During the first 6 months of Operation DesertShield, 1st Marine Division spent a great deal oftime scrutinizing the 8-year Iran-Iraq war. Plan-ners learned that Iraqi artillery was very effectivein trapping Iranian soldiers in confined areascalled firesacks, where thousands of Iranians per-ished. The firesack, like our engagement area, isan area along an enemy avenue of approach in-tended to contain and destroy an enemy forcewith the massed fires of all available weapons.Studies of the two obstacle belts in Kuwait andthe positioning of more than 1,200 Iraqi artillerypieces behind those obstacle belts indicated thatwhen the Marines attacked, the Iraqis meant totrap them in at least two firesacks. Marine plan-ners also recognized that their available aviationordnance was not sufficient to destroy the Iraqi

1-8 _________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-2

artillery during the first phase of Operation DesertStorm. Therefore, planners designed a series ofcombined-arms raids to defeat the Iraqis’ plan be-fore they even attacked into Kuwait.

Operation Desert Storm kicked off on January 17,1991. On January 19th, Marine aircraft conductedtheir first raid. Coalition forces were going to movean artillery battery, escorted by a light armoredinfantry company, close to the Kuwaiti border atnight. A Marine EA-6B Prowler EW aircraft wasto be stationed inside Saudi Arabian airspace tojam the Iraqis’ radars until after the entire artillerybattery had fired on a designated target. As theartillery battery started to withdraw, EA-6B aircraftwould stop jamming just long enough for the Iraqisto detect the battery’s movement before it beganjamming again. The intent was to cause the Iraqiartillery to respond to Marine indirect fires. Oncethe Iraqis began firing, a Marine forward aircontroller (airborne) (FAC[A]) in a Marine F/A-18Hornet detected the Iraqis’ muzzle flashes anddirected a flight of Marine F/A-18s to roll in on thefiring Iraqi artillery.

The plan’s goal was to convince Iraqi artillerysoldiers not to crew their artillery pieces for fearthat every time they did so Marine aircraft wouldattack them. By the third week in February, after aseries of these raids, the plan’s goal was achieved.UAVs showed Iraqi artillery soldiers abandoningtheir howitzers as Marine aircraft began attackingtheir positions.

These successful raids at the tactical level haddramatic effect at the operational level. The fearof an attack from aviation assets made Iraqi artil-lery ineffective in the final phase of the war. This

undoubtedly saved many lives and contributed tothe strategic success of Operation Desert Storm.

Another Gulf War example of the impact of avia-tion at the operational level took place the night ofJanuary 29, 1991. During the night, several battal-ion-sized Iraqi units attacked Coalition forces inand around the border town of Khafji. The Iraqissurprised the Coalition forces and occupied thetown. However, Arab ground forces belongingto the Coalition quickly counterattacked and,with the aid of CAS, regained possession ofKhafji 2 days later. This purely tactical event is,only part of the story. The night before the recap-ture of Khafji, farther to the north, Saddam Husseinamassed more than two divisions of armor andmechanized infantry to join the fight for the town.Because of technological advancements, the nightno longer provided its traditional sanctuary.Within minutes, the joint surveillance, and targetattack radar system (JSTARS) discovered theIraqi force and began employing Coalition air-craft against it. Using precision-guided weapons,air strikes continued throughout the night anddevastated the two divisions. They never reachedtheir desired objective, and by morning, theywere retreating in total disarray.

The Battle of Khafji was important for the Coali-tion. Tactically, the Pan-Arab forces defeated theIraqis in a pitched battle, launching a difficultnight counterattack against enemy armor. Opera-tionally, the destruction inflicted on two Iraqi divi-sions by Coalition aircraft convinced the Iraqis thatany force that left its defenses to conduct a mobileoperation would be decimated. During the remain-der of the war, the Iraqis never again attempted anoffensive operation. The operational result was aparalyzed military force that was unable to inter-fere with the Coalition maneuver operations.

Chapter 2

The Missions, Functions, and Organization of Marine Aviation

“Marine aviation units are an integral element of an air-ground combatsystem. They are not merely joined at the top when the time comes to fight.They are fully integrated from top to bottom, and they train that way full-time.”2

—Gen Carl E. Mundy

Marine Corps aviation is organized, trained, andequipped to provide a task-organized ACE forany size MAGTF. The ACE is not a formal com-mand. The term “ACE” categorizes the function-ality of specific forces within the MAGTF. Forany MAGTF, the ACE is composed of task-orga-nized Marine aviation forces under a single com-mander. The ACE commander is the MAGTFcommander’s principal advisor and subject matterexpert on all aviation activities.

The ACE must be prepared to support MAGTFexpeditionary operations from both sea-based andshore-based facilities. The ACE’s primary mis-sion is to support the MAGTF during all phases ofexpeditionary operations as well as during sus-tained operations ashore.

2001. Functions of Marine Aviation

The tasks of Marine aviation fall into six functionalareas (see fig. 2-1 on page 2-2): offensive air sup-port, antiair warfare, assault support, air recon-naissance, electronic warfare, and control ofaircraft and missiles. Planners initially considerthe functional area, not the means (i.e., particularweapons systems), when analyzing the fun-damental requirements of accomplishing anygiven objective.

a. Offensive Air Support OAS involves air operations that are conductedagainst enemy installations, facilities, and personnel

in order to directly assist in the attainment ofMAGTF objectives by destroying enemy resourcesor isolating enemy military forces. Its primary sup-port of the warfighting functions is to provide firesand force protection through CAS and DAS. Theapplication of OAS can sometimes be decisive bydirectly or indirectly affecting an enemy’s center ofgravity. OAS allows the commander to influencethe battle by projecting firepower to shape eventsin time and space. It also allows the commander toshape the battlespace by delaying enemy reinforce-ments, degrading critical enemy functions, andmanipulating enemy perceptions, which ultimatelyresults in protection of the force. Marine fighter/attack squadrons (VMFAs), Marine fighter attack(all weather) squadrons (VMFA[AW]s), Marineattack squadrons (VMAs), Marine light/attack heli-copter squadrons (HMLAs), and Marine unmannedaerial vehicle squadrons (VMU) provide OASduring OAS missions. OAS includes two catego-ries: CAS and DAS.

(1) CAS. CAS is an air action performed by fixed-wing and rotary-wing aircraft against hostiletargets that are in close proximity to friendlyforces. CAS requires detailed integration of eachair mission with the fire and movement offriendly forces.

(2) DAS. DAS is an air action against enemy tar-gets at such a distance from friendly forces thatdetailed integration of each mission with fire andmovement of friendly forces is not required.Close coordination of the fire and maneuver offriendly forces is a qualifying factor for a DAS

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mission. DAS missions are flown on either side ofthe fire support coordination line. These missionsinclude air interdiction and armed reconnaissance.

(a) Air Interdiction Operations. An air inter-diction operation destroys, neutralizes, or delaysthe enemy’s military potential before it can bebrought to bear effectively against friendly forces.This type of operation is a response to a knowntarget that is briefed in advance.

(b) Armed Reconnaissance Missions. Anarmed reconnaissance mission finds and attackstargets of opportunity (i.e., enemy materiel, per-sonnel, facilities) in assigned areas. This type ofoperation is a response to targets that are notknown or briefed in advance.

b. Antiair Warfare AAW is the actions used to destroy or reduce theenemy air and missile threat to an acceptable level.

It includes such measures as the use of intercep-tors, bombers, antiaircraft guns, surface-to-air andair-to-air missiles, and electronic attack and thedestruction of an air or missile threat both beforeand after it is launched. Other measures used tominimize the effects of hostile air action are cover,concealment, dispersion, deception (includingelectronic), and mobility. The primary purpose ofAAW is to gain and maintain whatever degree ofair superiority is required; this permits the conductof operations without prohibitive interference byopposing air and missile forces. AAW’s other pur-pose is force protection.

AAW uses both offensive and defensive means toaccomplish its objectives and to directly supportthe warfighting functions of fires and force pro-tection. Self-defense against enemy air is a taskfor all rotary-wing aircraft. Additionally, the low-altitude air defense (LAAD) battalion, VMFA,VMFA(AW), VMA, and HMLA are all specifi-cally tasked to perform AAW. The Marine air

Figure 2-1. The Six Functions of Marine Aviation.


control squadron (MACS) provides personnel andequipment for the operation of the tactical air op-erations center (TAOC). The TAOC’s mission isto detect, identify, and control the interception ofhostile aircraft and missiles.

(1) Offensive Antiair Warfare. Offensive anti-air warfare (OAAW) are operations conductedagainst enemy air assets and air defense systemsbefore they can be launched or assume an attack-ing role. OAAW operations in or near the objec-tive area consist mainly of air attacks that destroyor neutralize hostile aircraft, airfields, radar, airdefense systems, and supporting areas. OAAWalso includes attacks against enemy theater mis-sile operations and suppression of enemy air de-fenses (SEAD). Offensive counterair [OCA] isthe joint term for an operation that destroys, dis-rupts, or limits enemy air power as close to itssource as possible.

(2) Air Defense. Air defense includes alldefensive measures designed to destroy attackingenemy aircraft or missiles in the Earth’s atmos-phere or to nullify or reduce the effectiveness ofan enemy attack. Air defense involves both activeand passive measures.

(a) Active Air Defense. Active air defense in-cludes the use of aircraft, air defense weapons, sup-porting weapons (i.e., weapons not primarily usedin an air defense role), and EW. The approved jointterm for this is defensive counterair (DCA).

(b) Passive Air Defense. Passive air defenseincludes all measures other than active defensethat are taken to minimize the effectiveness ofhostile air action. These measures include the useof protective construction, concealment, camou-flage, deception, dispersion, cover, and electronicprotection. Passive air defense is a command re-sponsibility of every unit commander.

c. Assault SupportAssault support contributes to the warfightingfunctions of maneuver and logistics. Maneuverwarfare demands rapid, flexible maneuverabilityto achieve a decision. Assault support uses aircraft

to provide tactical mobility and logistic support tothe MAGTF for the movement of high-prioritypersonnel and cargo within the immediate area ofoperations (or the evacuation of personnel andcargo). It also uses Marine aerial refueler transportsquadrons (VMGRs) to provide in-flight refueling.Specific assault support tasks are discussed in thefollowing subparagraphs. See MCWP 3-24,Assault Support, for additional information.

(1) Combat Assault Transport. Combatassault transport provides mobility and logisticsupport to the MAGTF. It is used to deploy forcesefficiently in offensive maneuver warfare, bypassobstacles, or quickly redeploy forces. Combatassault support allows the MAGTF commander tobuild up his/her forces rapidly at a specific timeand location.

(2) Air Delivery. Air delivery is the transporta-tion of equipment and supplies to FOBs or remoteareas. Delivery can be accomplished with heli-copters or loads can be air dropped from fixed-wing aircraft such as the KC-130. Air drops arenormally used when surface or helicopter trans-ports cannot be used because of range, closedlines of communications, a lack of adequate air-fields, a prohibitive ground tactical situation, hightonnage, or reduced response time.

(3) Aerial Refueling. Aerial refueling allowsMAGTF aircraft, both fixed- and rotary-wing, toconduct flight-ferrying operations, extend time onstation, and extend mission range.

(4) Air Evacuation. Air evacuation is the trans-portation of personnel and equipment from FOBsor remote areas. This includes flights from areasof operations to secure rear areas, medical evacu-ations, and extraction of forces. Transport heli-copters and fixed-wing transport aircraft performair evacuations.

(5) Tactical Recovery of Aircraft andPersonnel. The tactical recovery of aircraft andpersonnel (TRAP) is performed by an assignedand briefed aircrew for the specific purpose of therecovery of personnel, equipment, and/or aircraft.TRAP is a subcomponent of combat search and

2-4 _________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-2

rescue (CSAR) and/or joint combat search andrescue (JCSAR) missions, but it is only executedonce the location of survivors is confirmed. Itdoes not involve dedicating aircraft assets tolocating survivors. Tactical recovery occurs oncethe general location of survivors is confirmed. ATRAP mission may include personnel to conducta local ground search if required. Marine Corpstactical aircraft are not normally equipped toconduct the search portion of CSAR or the overwater portion of search and rescue missions. Thecomposition of a tactical recovery mission mayvary from a single aircraft and aircrew to anassault support mission package that consists ofmultiple fixed-wing and rotary-wing aircraft withan onboard compliment of security, groundsearch, and medical personnel.

(6) Air Logistical Support. Air logisticalsupport operations are conducted by fixed-wingaircraft and provide assault support of MAGTFforces on the ground. Air logistical supportdelivers troops, equipment, and supplies to areasbeyond helicopter range and lift capability orwhen surface transportation is slow or unavailable.

(7) Battlefield Illumination. Battlefield illumi-nation can be provided by both fixed-wing androtary-wing aircraft. Illumination may be visible tothe naked eye or invisible (i.e., visible only withnight vision equipment). Battlefield illuminationcan last for a few minutes or several hours.

d. Air Reconnaissance Air reconnaissance employs visual observationand/or sensors in aerial vehicles to acquire intelli-gence information. It supports the intelligencewarfighting function and is employed tactically,operationally, and strategically. The three typesof air reconnaissance are visual, multisensorimagery, and electronic. All aircraft unitsconstantly perform visual air reconnaissance. TheMarine tactical electronic warfare squadron(VMAQ), VMU, VMA, VMFA, VMFA(AW),HMLA, and other air reconnaissance platformscan be equipped with sensors to conduct other thanvisual reconnaissance. For additional information,see MCWP 2-11, MAGTF Intelligence Collection,

and MCWP 2-15.4, Imagery Intelligence, formore information.

(1) Visual Reconnaissance. Visual recon-naissance may be conducted by any airborne plat-form. It consists of an observer or pilot visuallysearching a route, point, or area. Visual aerial re-connaissance is frequently used in support of thedelivery of offensive fires such as artillery sup-port, naval surface fire support, or CAS.

(2) Multisensor Imagery Reconnaissance.Multisensor imagery reconnaissance includesphotography from standard cameras, photographand radar imagery from the advanced tacticalaerial reconnaissance system (ATARS), andinfrared imagery. Multisensor imagery reconnais-sance is used to detect and pinpoint the location ofenemy installations, facilities, and concentrationsof forces. It is also used to support terrain analysis.

(3) Electronic Reconnaissance. Electronicreconnaissance is used to detect, locate, identify,and evaluate enemy electromagnetic radiation.Electronic reconnaissance is performed with pas-sive interception equipment that recovers signalsand determines signal direction, source, and char-acteristics. It gathers data that, when processedinto intelligence, is used to update the electronicorder of battle and technical intelligence.

e. Electronic Warfare EW is any military action involving the use ofelectromagnetic and directed energy to control theelectromagnetic spectrum or to attack the enemy.EW supports the warfighting functions of fires,command and control, and intelligence throughthe three major subdivisions: electronic attack,electronic protection, and electronic warfare sup-port. Only the VMAQ is specifically equipped toperform all aspects of EW.

(1) Electronic Attack. Electronic attack is thatdivision of EW that involves the use of electro-magnetic energy, directed energy, or antiradiationweapons to attack personnel, facilities, or equip-ment with the intent of degrading, neutralizing, ordestroying enemy combat capability.


(2) Electronic Protection. Electronic protec-tion involves the actions taken to protect personnel,facilities, and equipment from the effects of friendlyor enemy employment of EW that degrade, neutral-ize, or destroy friendly combat capability.

(3) Electronic Warfare Support. Electronicwarfare support is tasked by or under the directcontrol of an operational commander. It involvesthe actions needed to search for, intercept, identify,and locate sources of intentionally and uninten-tionally radiated electromagnetic energy for thepurpose of immediate threat recognition.

f. Control of Aircraft and Missiles The control of aircraft and missiles integrates theother five functions of Marine aviation by provid-ing the commander with the ability to exercisecommand and control authority over Marine avia-tion assets. It enhances unity of effort and dissem-inates a common situational awareness. Itinvolves the integrated employment of facilities,equipment, communications, procedures, and per-sonnel. It also allows the ACE commander to planoperations and to direct and control aircraft andmissiles to support accomplishment of theMAGTF’s mission. The control of aircraft andmissiles supports the warfighting function ofcommand and control. The ACE commandermaintains centralized command, while control isdecentralized and executed through the Marine aircommand and control system (MACCS), which isdescribed in chapter 4.

The Marine air control group (MACG) is respon-sible for providing, staffing, operating, and main-taining the principal MACCS agencies. Theseagencies include the TACC, TAOC with the earlywarning/control (EW/C) center, Marine air trafficcontrol detachment (MATCD), DASC, and thedirect air support center (airborne) (DASC[A]).All Marine aircraft have the capability to providesome form of airborne coordination and controlduring assault support missions, and HMLAs andVMFA(AW)s can provide FAC(A) or tactical aircoordinator (airborne) (TAC[A]) services sup-porting the MACCS. The methods of aviation

control are depicted in figure 2-2 and discussed inthe following paragraphs.

(1) Air Direction. Air direction is the authorityto regulate the employment of air resources (in-cluding both aircraft and surface-to-air weapons)to maintain a balance between their availabilityand the priorities assigned for their use. The pur-pose of air direction is to achieve a balance be-tween the MAGTF’s finite aviation resources andthe accomplishment of the ACE’s mission.

(2) Air Control. Air control is the authority todirect the physical maneuver of aircraft in flightor to direct an aircraft or surface-to-air weaponsunit to engage a specific target. Air control in-cludes airspace management and airspace control.

(a) Airspace Management. Airspace man-agement is the coordination, integration, andregulation of the use of airspace based on defined

Figure 2-2. Categories of Air Control.

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dimensions. Commanders use airspace manage-ment to optimize the available airspace and toallow the maximum freedom consistent with thedegree of acceptable operational risk. TheMACCS provides the ACE commander with theability to conduct airspace management.

(b) Airspace Control. Airspace control is theauthority to direct the maneuver of aircraft so thatthe best use is made of assigned airspace.Airspace control provides for the coordination,integration, and regulation of the use of a definedairspace. It also provides for the identification ofall airspace users. The authority to exerciseairspace control is inherent to the commanderwhose unit is responsible for particular blocks ofairspace, types of missions, or types of aircraft.Airspace control does not include measures toapprove, disapprove, deny, or delay air opera-tions. MACCS agencies accomplish airspacecontrol through the use of positive control, pro-cedural control, or a combination of the two.Positive control is a method of airspace controlthat relies on positive identification, tracking, anddirection of aircraft within an airspace. It isconducted with electronic means by an agencywith the appropriate authority and responsibility.Procedural control is a method of airspace controlbased on a combination of previously agreed andpromulgated orders and procedures.

2002. Marine Aviation Organization

Administratively, Marine aviation is organized intothree active duty and one reserve Marine aircraftwings (MAWs). MAWs are designed to provideunits in support of MAGTF or other operations.Each MAW has a unique organizational structure(see app. A and fig. 2-3). The MAW may bereinforced with assets from other MAWs to pro-vide the necessary assets to meet mission require-ments. It is organized into a MAW headquarters,several Marine aircraft groups (MAGs), a MACG,and a Marine wing support group (MWSG).

The wing headquarters and subordinate groups aretask-organized based on the assigned mission.When the MAW is deployed as the ACE for aMEF, the MAW headquarters becomes the ACE’scommand element. Each group consists ofspecialized squadrons and/or battalions thatperform one or more of the six functions of Marineaviation. The MACG contains the bulk of theMAW’s command and control assets. The MWSGcontains the personnel and equipment that arenecessary to provide direct aviation ground sup-port to the MAW. The MAW is capable ofperforming all six functions of Marine aviation.Through task organization, a wing can providedeployable detachments that are capable ofaccomplishing any or all Marine aviation func-tions. Aviation organizations smaller than a wingnormally task-organize to provide only a specificportion of the six aviation functions.

The following paragraphs provide a brief descrip-tion of the MAW’s subordinate units and how theyrelate to the functions of aviation. Table 2-1 containsa summary of aviation units and correspondingfunctions. MCRP 5-12D, Organization of MarineCorps Forces, contains a detailed discussion.

a. Marine Air Control GroupThe MACG coordinates all aspects of air com-mand and control, air reconnaissance, and air de-fense within the MAW. When deployed as part ofthe MAGTF ACE, it provides the command andstaff functions for the MACG commander and co-ordinates the employment of aviation commandand control equipment, facilities, and personnel insupport of the ACE.

Figure 2-3. Notional Marine Aircraft Wing.


Table 2-1. Marine Aviation Units and Functions.

Type of Aviation Unit AAW

AssaultSupport OAS EW

Air Reconnaissance

Control of Aircraft and

MissilesMAW X X X X X X

MACG Support Support Support Support Support X

MTACS TACC

MASS DASC DASC DASC DASC

MACS TAOCATC

ATC TAOCATC

ATC TAOCATC

TAOCATC

LAAD X Support Support X

MWCS Communications

MWSG Support Support Support Support Support Support

MAG (VF/VA) X X X X X Support

MALS (fixed wing) Support Support Support Support Support Support

VMGR Support X Support Support Support DASC(A)

VMAQ Support Support Support X X Support

VMU Support Support Support Support X Support

VMFA X Escort X Support X Support

VMFA (AW) X Escort X Support X FAC(A)/TAC(A)

VMA X Escort X Support X Support

MAG (VH) X X X Support X Support

VMM Self-defense X Support Support Support Airborne control and coordination

MALS (rotary-wing) Support Support Support Support Support Support

HMH (CH-53D) Self-defense X Support Support Support Airborne control and coordination

HMH (CH-53E) Self-defense X Support Support Support Airborne control and coordination

HMM Self-defense X Support Support Support Airborne control and coordination

HMLA Utility Self-defense X Support Support Support Airborne control and coordination

HMLA Attack X X X Support X Airborne control and coordination

X—The unit performs that function of Marine aviation as part of its primary mission. However, all Marine aircraft are specifi-cally designed to be multi-mission capable and provide significant support for multiple functions.Support—The unit provides general support for that function in varying degrees based on equipment capabilities and the situation.Specifically indicated support (armed reconnaissance, DASC, escort, etc.)—Many units perform a specific type of support for one or more of the six functions of Marine aviation. The ability to provide this type of support is often depen-dent on equipment and/or aircraft mission configuration or specialized personnel training, and it must be specifically requested. For MACG units, the MACCS agency provided by the unit is indicated.

2-8 _________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-2

The major task performed by the MACG is plan-ning and coordinating the support of the com-mand and control function of Marine aviation.The MACG ensures that its subordinate squad-rons and battalions are organized, supplied, andprepared to execute the MACCS’ mission.

(1 ) Marine Tactica l Ai r CommandSquadron. The Marine tactical air commandsquadron (MTACS) provides equipment, main-tenance, and operations for the TACC of the ACE.It equips, operates, and maintains the majority ofthe staffing for the current operations section ofthe TACC. It also provides and maintains afacility for the TACC future operations and futureplanning sections and installs and maintainsassociated automated systems. As a result of therecent merger of the Marine wing headquarterssquadron (MWHS) into the MTACS, MTACS willalso provide administrative, logistic, and supplysupport (including the wing commander’s mess)for the Marine wing headquarters.

The MTACS’s major task is to provide the com-mand post for the ACE commander. This involvesthe planning and coordination of air operations,deployment and employment issues, and logisticand supply support.

(2) Marine Air Control Squadron. TheMACS provides air surveillance, control of air-craft and surface-to-air weapons for AAW, con-tinuous all weather radar and nonradar air trafficcontrol (ATC) services, and airspace managementin support of a MAGTF.

The MACS provides deployable detachments thatare capable of air surveillance, airspace manage-ment, and control of aircraft and SAMs for AAWin support of the MAGTF. It also provides deploy-able detachments that can provide ATC services atexisting or expeditionary airfields (EAFs) andremote area landing sites.

(3 ) Mari ne Wing Communicat ionsSquadron. The MWCS provides expeditionarycommunications for the ACE of a MEF, includingthe phased deployment of task-organized ele-ments thereof.

The MWCS provides some of the ACE’s majorcommunications support, including planning andengineering. The squadron also provides opera-tional systems control centers, digital backbonecommunications support, tactical automatedswitching and telephone services, electronic mes-sage distribution, external single-channel radioand radio retransmission communications, widearea network (WAN) and deployed local areanetwork (LAN) servers, and support of crypto-graphic sites.

(4) Marine Air Support Squadron. A Marineair support squadron (MASS) provides DASCcapabilities for control and coordination of fixed-wing and rotary-wing aircraft operating in directsupport of MAGTFs. The MASS’s major tasksinclude conducting operational planning forMAGTF direct air support operations; receiving,coordinating, and processing immediate requestsfor air support; providing equipment, facilities,and personnel for operation of air supportelements; and maintaining continuous control ofdirect air support while displacing.

(5) Low Altitude Air Defense Battalion. Themission of the LAAD battalion is to provideclose-in, low altitude surface-to-air weapons firesin defense of the MAGTF. LAAD battalions de-fend forward combat areas, maneuver forces, vitalareas, installations, and/or units engaged in spe-cial or independent operations. Major tasks of theLAAD battalion include—Providing support of subordinate batteries.Maintaining a primary capability as a highly

mobile, vehicle-mounted, and Marine-porta-ble surface-to-air weapons component of theMAGTF.

Providing surface-to-air weapons support forunits engaged in special and/or independentoperations.

Providing for the separate deployment of subor-dinate batteries and platoons to accommodatespecial tactical situations and task organizations.

(6) Marine Unmanned Aerial VehicleSquadron. The VMU operates and maintains aUAV system in order to provide unmanned aerial


reconnaissance support to the MAGTF via theACE TACC. VMU tasks include—Conducting reconnaissance, surveillance, and

target acquisition.Performing airborne surveillance of designated

target areas, MAGTF areas of interest and/orinfluence, and other areas as directed.

Performing airborne surveillance for searchand rescue and TRAP.

Performing reconnaissance of helicopter ap-proach and retirement lanes in support of verti-cal assaults.

Providing real-time target information to the DASCand fire support coordination center (FSCC).

Providing information to assist in adjusting in-direct-fire weapons and to support and facili-tate DAS and air interdiction.

Collecting battle damage assessments (BDAs).

b. Marine Aircraft Group

The MAG provides the staff support necessary forthe effective command of subordinate squadronsof the MAG. The MAG is usually composed offunctionally similar aircraft squadrons and theirsupport units. Table 2-2 delineates the types ofsquadrons and aircraft present in a MAG.

Table 2-2. MAG Squadrons and Aircraft.

Squadron Type Aircraft Type # of Squadrons1 # of Primary AircraftAuthorized2

VMA AV-8B 7 16

VMFA F/A-18A/C 12 12

VMFA (AW) F/A-18D 6 12

VMAQ EA-6B 4 5

VMGR KC-130 5 12

VMAT AV-8 Training 1 30

VMFAT F/A-18 Training 1 12 F/A-18A/C17 F/A-18D

VMFT Aggressor SquadronF-5

1 11 F-5E1 F-5F

VMGRT KC-130 Training 1 8

VMU UAV 2 5

HMH CH-53E 6 16

HMH3 CH-53D 5 8

HMM CH-46E 18 12

HMLA UH-1NAH-1W

10 9 UH-1N12 AH-1W

HMTHMMT(T)

Helicopter Training HMM(T)1 CH-46E1 CH-53E1 CH-53D

1 UH-1N/AH-1W

18 CH-46E15 CH-53E6 CH-53D14 UH-1N20 AH-1W

VMM MV-22 TBD 12

VMMT MV-22 Training 1 TBD1 The total number of squadrons, including reserve units.2 The primary aircraft authorization for each squadron is a fixed number. However, the actual number of aircraft in a squad-

ron varies based on production timelines, scheduled depot-level maintenance cycles, aircraft transfers, etc.3 Although CH-53D squadrons have retained their HMH designation, they are considered medium lift like a CH-46E squad-

ron, instead of heavy lift like a CH-53E squadron.

2-10 ________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-2

The MAG is the smallest aviation unit that isdesigned to conduct operations with no outsideassistance except access to a source of supply.MAGs normally contain either fixed-wing orrotary-wing aircraft in order to streamline logisticsupport requirements. MAGs can be task-organized to include any combination of fixed-wing and rotary-wing aircraft, as well as othersupporting units. A MAG can also be task-organized into an ACE for a particular mission inorder to provide one or more aviation functions to aMAGTF. When it is deployed as a MAGTF’sACE, the MAG headquarters becomes the tacticalcommand element for the ACE. Currently, thereare two types of MAGs within the MAW: thefixed-wing MAG (MAG VF/VA) and the rotary-wing MAG (MAG VH).

The primary mission of a MAG (VF/VA) is toprovide AAW and OAS support for MAGTF op-erations from a variety of main bases, FOBs, andaircraft carriers. The MAG may consist of anycombination of VMAs, VMFAs, VMFA(AW)s,VMGRs, VMAQs, or Marine aviation logisticssquadrons (MALSs) (fixed wing). It also usuallycontains one or more training squadrons.

The primary mission of the MAG VH is to provideassault support for MAGTF operations in anylocation or environment required. The MAG VHmay include any combination of HMLAs, Marinemedium helicopter squadrons (HMMs), Marineheavy helicopter squadrons (HMHs), MALS, andone or more training squadrons. As the MV-22 isintroduced into the fleet, all HMMs and most ofthe CH53D squadrons will eventually transition toMarine medium tilt-rotor squadrons (VMMs).

(1) Marine Aviation Logistics Squadron(Fixed-Wing/Rotary-Wing). The MALSprovides aviation logistic support, guidance, anddirection to MAG squadrons on behalf of thecommanding officer. It also provides logisticsupport for Navy-funded equipment in thesupporting MWSS, MACS, and Marine wingmobile calibration complex. There is normally

one MALS in each MAG VH and MAG VF/VA.The MALS provides—Intermediate-level maintenance for aircraft and

aeronautical equipment.Aviation supply support for aircraft.Class V(A) ordnance and ammunition logistic

support.Coordination with the MWSG, the MACG, the

MAW calibration complex, and other support-ing Navy and Marine Corps activities and/oragencies in planning for the support required toexecute the Marine Aviation Logistic SupportProgram (MALSP).

Maintaining the capability to deploy and pro-vide MALSP support packages.

(2) Marine Aerial Refueler TransportSquadron. The VMGR’s primary tasks are toprovide tactical aerial refueling service to Marineaviation units and to serve as an aircraft platformfor the DASC(A). Other tasks include assault airtransport for air-landed and air-delivered person-nel, supplies, and equipment; ground refuelingservice to aircraft when other suitable means ofaircraft refueling are not available; and air trans-port service for the evacuation of casualties andnoncombatants. The VMGR maintains an allweather capability and the ability to operate froma variety of bases.

(3) Marine Tactical Electronic WarfareSquadron. The VMAQ conducts airborne EWin support of Fleet Marine Force (FMF) opera-tions to meet the EW and air reconnaissance func-tions of Marine aviation. Major tasks include—Conducting airborne electronic attack and EW

support operations.Conducting electronic attack in support of

MAGTF training.Processing and providing mission data on EW

missions for updating and maintaining an elec-tronic order of battle.

Maintaining the capability of operating fromaircraft carriers, advance bases, and EAFs.

Aviation Operations _____________________________________________________________________________________ 2-11

Maintaining the capability to operate duringdarkness and under all weather conditions.

Maintaining the capability to deploy or conductextended-range operations that require aerial re-fueling.

(4) Marine Fighter/Attack Squadron. TheVMFA intercepts and destroys enemy aircraft un-der all weather conditions and attacks and de-stroys surface targets.

Note: In this publication, the term all weather isused to indicate that the aircraft can perform allor part of its primary mission in all “types” ofweather, not all “extremes” of weather. Thiscapability is linked more to the type of equipmenton board the aircraft, than to the effect of theweather on the aircraft. For example, all Marineaircraft are designed with the capability to fly infog, rain, sleet, snow, etc. However, only aircraftequipped with special sensors like radar canrealistically perform their mission without visualreferences. The term adverse weather is used toindicate that, while the weather is bad, a visualreference can still be maintained.

VMFA tasks include—Intercepting and destroying enemy aircraft.Maintaining the capability to attack and de-

stroy surface targets.Providing escort of friendly aircraft under all

types of weather conditions.Maintaining the capability to deploy and oper-

ate from aircraft carriers and advance bases.Conducting day and night CAS under all types

of weather conditions.Maintaining the capability to deploy or con-

duct extended-range operations by using aerialrefueling.

Maintain the capability to conduct SEAD oper-ations.

(5) Marine All-Weather Fighter AttackSquadron. The VMFA(AW) attacks and destroyssurface targets under adverse weather conditionsduring both day and night operations; conductsmultisensor imagery reconnaissance; providessupporting arms coordination; and intercepts and

destroys enemy aircraft under all types of weatherconditions. VMFA(AW) tasks include—Conducting day and night CAS under adverse

weather conditions.Conducting day and night DAS under all

weather conditions, including armed recon-naissance, radar search and attack, air interdic-tion, and strikes against enemy installations.

Conducting multisensor imagery reconnais-sance, this includes pre-strike and post striketarget damage assessment and visual recon-naissance.

Conducting day and night supporting arms co-ordination, including forward air control air-borne, tactical air coordination airborne, andartillery and/or naval gunfire (NGF) spotting.

Intercepting and destroying enemy aircraft.Maintaining the capability to operate from air-

craft carriers, advance bases, and EAFs.Maintaining the capability to deploy or con-

duct extended-range operations by using aerialrefueling.

Maintaining the capability to conduct SEADoperations.

(6) Marine Attack Squadron. The VMAattacks and destroys surface targets under dayand night visual meteorological conditions. Italso provides helicopter escort. VMA’s majortasks include—Conducting CAS, armed reconnaissance, air inter-

diction, and strikes against enemy installations.Conducting air defense operations.Maintaining the capability to operate during

darkness and under instrument flight condi-tions.

Maintaining the capability of deployment orextended operations by employing aerial refu-eling.

Maintaining the capability to operate fromaboard carriers, other suitable seagoing plat-forms, EAFs, and remote tactical landing sites.

Conducting armed escort missions in support ofassault support operations.

(7) Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron(CH-53D). The HMH (CH-53D) supports the

2-12 ________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-2

assault support function of Marine aviation byproviding assault helicopter transport of heavyweapons, equipment, and supplies during amphi-bious operations and subsequent operationsashore. CH-53D squadrons have retained theirHMH designation, but only CH-53E squadronsare now considered to be capable of heavy lift.The CH-53D is now considered a medium lifthelicopter, like the CH-46E. The main tasks forthe CH-53D include—Providing combat assault transport of heavy

weapons, equipment, and supplies.Providing combat assault transport of troops.Conducting tactical retrieval and recovery op-

erations for downed aircraft, equipment, andpersonnel.

Conducting assault support for evacuation op-erations and other maritime special operations.

Providing support for mobile FARPs.Maintaining the capability to operate from am-

phibious shipping, other floating bases, andaustere shore bases.

Maintaining the capability to operate at night, inadverse weather conditions, and under instru-ment flight conditions at extended ranges.

(8) Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron(CH-53E). The HMH (CH-53E) provides assaulthelicopter transport of heavy weapons, equip-ment, and supplies during amphibious operationsand subsequent operations ashore. The main tasksfor the CH-53E include—Providing combat assault transport of heavy

weapons, equipment, and supplies.Providing combat assault transport of troops.

Conducting tactical retrieval and recovery op-erations for downed aircraft, equipment, andpersonnel.

Conducting assault support for evacuation op-erations and other maritime special operations.

Providing support for mobile forward armingand refueling points (FARPs).

Maintaining the capability to operate from am-phibious shipping, other floating bases, andaustere shore bases.

Maintaining the capability to operate at night,in adverse weather conditions, and under in-strument flight conditions at extended ranges.

Maintaining the capability to deploy and con-duct extended range operations by employingaerial refueling.

(9) Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron.The HMM provides assault transport of combattroops in the initial assault waves and follow-onstages of amphibious operations and subsequentoperations ashore. HMM’s major tasks include—Providing combat assault troop transport.Providing combat assault transport of supplies

and equipment.Conducting assault support for evacuation op-

erations and other maritime special operations.Providing support for mobile FARPs.Maintaining the capability to operate from am-


Maintaining the capability to operate at night,in adverse weather conditions, and under in-strument flight conditions at extended ranges.

Augmenting local search and rescue assets andprovide aeromedical evacuation of causalities.

Tactical HMMs will begin replacing the CH-46Eand CH-53D helicopters with the MV-22 tilt-rotoraircraft beginning in fiscal year 2003.

(10) Marine Medium Tilt-Rotor Squadron.The Marine medium tilt-rotor squadron (VMM)provides transportation of combat troops, sup-plies, and equipment across the spectrum of expe-ditionary operations. VMM’s primary function isto provide combat assault troop transport. It alsoprovides combat assault transport of supplies andequipment, as a secondary function. Other VMMtasks include—Conducting combat assault support for evacua-

tion operations and other maritime special op-erations.

Providing support for forward arming and re-fueling points.

Providing airborne command and control forassault support operations.

Maintaining a self-defense capability for air-toair and ground-to-air threats.


Maintaining the capability to operate from na-val ships and expeditionary airfields.

Maintain the capability to operate at night, inadverse weather, and under instrument flightconditions from extended ranges.

Maintain the capability for deployment and/orextended range operations employing aerial re-fueling.

Augmenting local search and rescue assets.Providing aeromedical evacuation of casualties

from the field to suitable medical facilities orother aeromedical aircraft.

Performing organizational maintenance on as-signed aircraft in all environmental conditions.

(11) Marine Light/Attack Helicopter Squa-dron. The HMLA provides combat utility heli-copter support, attack helicopter fire support, andfire support coordination during amphibiousoperations and subsequent operations ashore. Theprimary tasks of utility helicopters include—Providing an airborne command and control

platform for command elements.Providing armed escort for assault support op-

erations. Providing combat assault transport of troops,

supplies, and equipment. Providing airborne control and coordination

for assault support operations. Augmenting local search and rescue assets and

provide aeromedical evacuation of casualties.Conducting combat assault and assault support

for evacuation operations and other maritimespecial operations.

Controlling, coordinating, and providing ter-minal control for supporting arms, includingCAS, artillery, mortars, and NGF.

Providing fire support and security for forwardand rear area forces.

Maintaining the capability to operate from am-phibious shipping, other floating bases, andaustere shore bases.


The primary tasks of attack helicopters include— Providing fire support and security for forward

and rear area forces. Conducting point-target and/or antiarmor oper-

ations.Conducting anti-helicopter operations. Providing armed escort, control, and coordina-

tion for assault support operations. Controlling, coordinating, and providing ter-

minal control for supporting arms, includingCAS, artillery, mortars, and NGF.

Conducting armed and visual reconnaissance. Maintaining the capability to operate from am-



(12) Marine Wing Support Group. TheMWSG’s mission is to provide aviation groundsupport for the MAW and to provide commandand control, administration, supply, and logisticsupport assets to subordinate units performingaviation ground support for Marine aviation. TheMWSG’s primary task is to provide the capabilityto establish and maintain airfields and FOBs, andtheir associated aviation ground support require-ments, for the conduct of ACE operations in sup-port of the MAGTF.

(13) Marine Wing Support Squadron. TheMarine wing support squadron’s (MWSS’s) mis-sion is to provide for all essential aviation groundsupport requirements for a designated fixed-wingor rotary-wing component of an ACE. TheMWSS also provides aviation ground support forall supporting or attached units of the MACG.The MWSS’s primary tasks include providing—Internal airfield communications.Weather forecasting and services.Aircraft crash, fire, and rescue services.Structural fire fighting services.Aircraft and ground equipment refueling.Essential engineering services.Motor transport operations internal to the ACE.

2-14 ________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-2

Messing facilities.Organic nuclear, biological, and chemical ca-

pabilities.Routine and emergency sick call services.Security and law enforcement services.Air base command functions.

See MCWP 3-21.1, Aviation Ground Support,and MCWP 3-35.7, MAGTF Meteorology andOceanography [METOC] Support, for additionalinformation.

2003. Aviation Combat Element Task Organization

An ACE is the core element of a MAGTF that istask-organized to conduct aviation operations. Itprovides all or a portion of the six functions ofMarine aviation. The ACE is usually composed ofan aviation unit headquarters and various otheraviation units or their detachments. It can vary insize from a small aviation detachment of specifi-cally required aircraft to one or more MAWs. TheACE may contain other Service or foreign military

forces assigned or attached to the MAGTF. TheACE itself is not a formal command.

The ACE is task-organized to contribute tobattlespace dominance in support of the MAGTF’smission, project combat power, and conduct airoperations. The ACE is task-organized to supportthe MAGTF based on the MAGTF commander’smission and his/her estimate of the aviation capa-bilities required to accomplish that mission. TheMAGTF commander presents these requirementsto the Marine Service component commander,and the selection of actual aviation units ordetachments is determined by the tasked wingcommander(s). Selected assets are task-organizedto meet the MAGTF commander’s requirements.

The ACE is normally built around an existing air-craft unit (squadron, group, or wing) reinforced asnecessary with the appropriate command and con-trol, combat, combat support, and combat servicesupport (CSS) (including aviation logistic) unitsand detachments. In creating an ACE, the opera-tional requirements of the mission, capabilitiesand limitations of specific units and equipment,and the availability of units determine the choiceof units, type of equipment, and source location.Marine aviation forms the ACE of the three stand-ing MEFs. However, this is merely the startingpoint for constructing the ACE for a MEF in timeof war. For actual deployment, the ACE would bereinforced with units and/or detachments from theother two active duty MAWs and the Reserves. Ifproviding the ACE to a Marine expeditionary unit(special operations capable) (MEU [SOC]), theACE will usually be sourced from a single MAW.

Satisfying the MAGTF commander’s aviationrequirements is paramount. However, the identi-fication of specific units for assignment to the ACEis driven by many factors in addition to the aviationfunctions required to support the MAGTF mission.Some of these factors are as follows:Mode of deployment (amphibious shipping,

strategic airlift or sealift, aircraft carriers, self-deployment, or a combination).

Mode of operations (from aircraft carriers and/or amphibious ships, FOBs, EAFs, or a combi-nation).

Figure 2-4. Notional MEF (ACE).

Figure 2-5. Notional MEU ACE.

MAW

HQ

MAG

FW/RWMACG MWSG


Availability of supporting infrastructure (run-ways, shelters, electricity, and fuel).

Special qualifying criteria, training require-ments and/or, operational experience.

Length and responsiveness of logistic supportdetermines sustainability.

Replenishment rate of consumables, specifi-cally aviation fuel and ordnance.

Anticipated missions and expected intensity offlight operations.

The MEF ACE can be built around one or moreMAWs, or any portion of the MAW, that fulfillsthe required functions of Marine aviation. It mayconsist of one or more MAGs (fixed-wing or rotary-wing), a MACG, and a MWSG. The MAW also pro-vides task-organized forces for smaller MAGTFs,such as a Marine expeditionary unit (MEU) andspecial purpose MAGTFs (SPMAGTFs). See fig-ures 2-4 for a notional MEF and 2-5 for a notionalMEU ACE.

The MEU ACE normally consists of a reinforcedhelicopter squadron that includes attack aircraftand two fixed-wing assault support aircraft (thelatter are based in the continental United States).The notional MEF ACE is task-organized to pro-vide assault support, low-level air defense, CAS,and airborne command and control. It includes aMACG detachment, MWSS detachment, fixed-wing MALS detachment, and rotary-wingMALS detachment.

SPMAGTFs, a re organized, t rained, andequipped with narrowly focused capabilities.Each SPMAGTF is designed to accomplish aspecific mission, often of limited scope andduration. This special purpose force may be any

size but is normally small (the size of a MEU). Itmay contain other Service or foreign militaryforces assigned or attached to the MAGTF. TheACE composition for a SPMAGTF varies, butnormally it is the size of a MEU ACE or smaller.For example, a SPMAGTF ACE may be createdto operate and fly missions in support of hostnation forces out of an EAF. In such a case, theSPMAGTF might consist predominantly of Marineaviation units supported by only a small securityand logistic force. In other cases, the SPMAGTFACE may represent a relatively small portion ofthe force.

Since the ACE is formed around an aviation head-quarters, it will only contain one senior aviationunit. In the case of a MEF, the wing that compris-es the ACE will be task-organized with units froma single wing and/or reinforced with as manygroups and squadrons from other wings as are re-quired to support the MAGTF’s mission. ForMEFs with multiple divisions in the GCE, theACE may require the combined assets and per-sonnel of several wings in order to meet this re-quirement. However, these assets and personnelremain under one ACE commander. This singleACE commander concept is essential to Marineaviation’s doctrinal philosophy of centralizedcommand and decentralized control (discussed indetail in chap. 4).

The ACE may be employed from ships or forwardexpeditionary land bases and can readily transi-tion between sea and land bases without loss ofcapability. It has the capability to conduct com-mand and control across the battlespace. TheACE is one of the two arms of the MAGTF spe-cifically designed to conduct combat operations.

(reverse blank)

Chapter 3

The Role of Aviation inCombined-Arms Force Operations

“On our drive to Manila, I depended solely on [Marine Aircraft Groups 24and 32] to protect my left flank against possible . . . counterattack. . . . . Ican say without reservation that the Marine dive bombers are one of themost flexible outfits that I have seen in this war. They will try anythingonce, and . . . I have found . . . that anything they try usually pans out intheir favor. [They] have kept the enemy on the turn. They have kept him un-derground and have enabled troops to move up with fewer casualties andwith greater speed. I cannot say enough in praise of these men of the divebombers . . . for the job they have done in giving my men close ground sup-port in this operation.”3

—MajGen Verne D. Mudge

The essential difference between Marine aviationand other aviation forces is that Marine aviation isdesigned to operate as an integral part of a com-bined-arms organization. Due to Marine Corpsground forces expeditionary nature and their lim-ited indirect fire assets, ground forces rely heavilyon the ACE to provide fire support in both closeand deep operations. Therefore, the MAGTF mustretain control of its aviation assets. But Marineaviation provides much more than just tacticalfires in support of ground maneuver. It also pro-vides the MAGTF commander with long-rangefires (including electronic fires), intelligence col-lection, enhanced mobility, and force protection.It may also serve as the MAGTF’s main effort.

This chapter begins with a discussion of the sixwarfighting functions; discusses the operationalenvironment; moves to a discussion of a numberof key maneuver warfare ideas; then examinesthe role that aviation may play in conventionaloffensive and/or defensive operations, securityoperations, and MOOTW, as discussed inMCDP-1, Warfighting.

3001. The Six Warfighting Functions

Marine aviation provides a significant contribu-tion to each of the warfighting functions duringall phases of an operation. The warfighting func-tions are discussed in more detail in MCDP 1-2,Campaigning, and MCWP 5-1, Marine CorpsPlanning Process.

a. Command and Control

Command and control is the exercise of authorityand direction by the commander over assignedforces in the accomplishment of the assignedmission. Command and control functions areperformed through organization of personnel,procedures, equipment, communications, andfacilities by the commander and staff to plan,direct, coordinate, and control forces and opera-tions in the accomplishment of the mission. Avia-tion’s EW capabilities and control of aircraft andmissiles contribute to this warfighting function.

3-2 _________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-2

b. Maneuver

Maneuver refers to the employment of ground oraviation forces in order to gain a relative advan-tage over a threat by achieving a tactical, opera-tional, or strategic objective. The advantage canbe positional, temporal, or psychological. In con-junction with fires, maneuver generates tempoand combat power in the battlespace to over-whelm the threat. Mobility operations are inherentin maneuver. Mobility operations enhance thecommand’s ability to move forces and supplieswithin the area of operations. Deception opera-tions are integral to maneuver and usually involveelements of the other warfighting functions.Marine aviation elements may, in some cases,function as maneuver elements themselves. In anycase, any scheme of maneuver will have aviationaspects, particularly in assault support and OAS.

c. Fires

Fires include the organization, planning, coordi-nation, and employment of all lethal and nonlethalattack systems that are available for use againstthreat resources and capabilities. This includes allsea-, air-, and land-based fire systems; the appli-cation of special operations capable forces; andpsychological operations to achieve specified re-sults. AAW, OAS, EW, and the control of aircraftand missiles are aviation functions that contributeto this warfighting function.

d. Intelligence

Intelligence is the actions taken to collect infor-mation, process and analyze it to determine its rel-evance, and disseminate it to commanders in atimely manner to support decisionmaking. Intelli-gence constantly evaluates three of the environ-mental elements (infrastructure, threat, andnoncombatants) of the battlespace. Intelligencefocuses on revealing threat capabilities, disposi-tions, and intentions. It enables the commander toanticipate the threat’s actions and reactions andpromote tempo. Timely intelligence is imperativein developing an effective plan. Air reconnais-sance and aviation EW capabilities are major con-tributors to this warfighting function.

e. Logistics Logistics encompasses all activities required tomove and sustain military forces. The compo-nents of logistics include supplies, maintenance,transportation, general engineering, and healthservices. Aviation assault support is an importantaspect of combat logistics.

f. Force Protection Force protection is the protection of the fightingpotential of the command so that the commandercan conduct decisive actions at a chosen time andplace. It is the most difficult of the warfightingfunctions to execute because it requires the effortsof every member of the command. It involves bothactive and passive measures taken by the commandthat include individual protective measures,camouflage, hardening of facilities and vehicles,operational security procedures, dispersion,counterreconnaissance operations, counterintelli-gence operations, and preventive health efforts bymedical and dental personnel. The synchronizationof countermobility efforts, fires, and maneuverresults in the generation of combat power and atempo that overwhelms the threat’s capability tointerfere with friendly mission accomplishment.All aviation functions, especially AAW and airreconnaissance, can contribute to force protection.

3002. The Operational Environment

Marine aviation is capable of operating in anyenvironment and across the range of militaryoperations. The challenge is to be equally preparedto operate in high- or mid-intensity combatscenarios against a technologically advanced andhighly capable threat. Marine aviation must alsooperate against less advanced but numericallysuperior foes; in urban warfare; against diffused,ambiguous threats in undeveloped areas; and inadverse environmental conditions resulting fromnatural and/or manmade catastrophes, includingnuclear, biological, chemical, or ecological events.Marine aviation may serve as either the main orsupporting effort in offensive or defensive


conventional warfare, security operations, orMOOTW. MOOTW can include everything fromcounterinsurgency to disaster relief and otherhumanitarian operations.

3003. Organizational Adaptability

Given the uncertainties that are inherent in theoperational environment, the greatest singlerequirement for Marine aviation is adaptability.The ACE can be task-organized to meet theMAGTF’s needs. All ACE operations are con-ducted as part of an overall MAGTF air-groundconcept of operations that is focused on the enemy.Aviation brings a degree of versatility, range, andagility not possessed by other elements of theMAGTF. It is not, however, a substitute for anyother element of the MAGTF; its unique capa-bilities complement the other MAGTF elements’capabilities. For example, aviation under idealci rcumstances may prov ide t he MAGT Fcommander with long-range, 24-hour, all weatherfirepower to shape the battlespace and to exploitenemy critical vulnerabilities that are beyond thereach of other elements of the MAGTF. Itenhances the operational and tactical mobility ofthe GCE by providing the capability to conductvertical assaults as part of a ship-to-objectivemaneuver (STOM) or during sustained operationsashore. Aviation units can maneuver both rapidlyand simultaneously throughout the battlespace,thereby enabling the commander to rapidlyconcentrate combat power at decisive points,anywhere and at any time, to set the stage fordecisive action. The ACE also provides air defensefor the MAGTF as part of the MAGTF forceprotection effort. The ACE’s flexibility ensuresthat aviation combat and logistic capabilities arealways available to the MAGTF.

Marine aviation is a highly visible asset. It pro-vides the commander with options that are equallyadaptable to combat and to MOOTW. Marinemultirole aircraft provide a formidable capabilitythat is useful across the range of militaryoperations. MAGTF helicopters that carry combat-ready Marines into a hostile landing zone are the

same platforms that evacuate noncombatants fromlife-threatening danger. Fixed-wing assault supportaircraft can deliver thousands of pounds of suppliesto support ground operations or thousands ofpounds of food for humanitarian assistance.Multirole fighter/attack aircraft can gain airsuperiority in combat or patrol a no-fly zone tosupport peace enforcement operations.

Similarly, Marine aviation command and controlagencies can function in many diverse roles andenvironments. The ACE MACCS can facilitatecommand and control in joint and combined avia-tion operations such as direction of interceptoraircraft, countering missile threats to the joint orcombined force, or tracking aircraft in support ofcounterdrug operations.

Marine aviation forces can operate outside theMAGTF in support of joint or combined opera-tions. Fixed-wing and rotary-wing aircraft con-ducting flight operations near a country’scoastline demonstrate military presence throughthe effective use of show of force operations. Forexample, in Bosnia Operations Deny Flight andJoint Endeavor created conditions under which allwarring factions agreed to the cessation of hostili-ties and a monitored separation. Both operationsstand as examples of the powerful presence thataviation can provide in efforts to establish andmaintain peace.

Marine aviation is not constrained by the chal-lenges of poor infrastructure and restrictive ter-rain. The ability to operate from austere sites,along with the reach, mobility, and sustainmentprovided by fixed-wing or rotary-wing transportaircraft, can overcome obstacles commonly en-countered in humanitarian assistance operations.These capabilities are particularly beneficial whenproviding humanitarian relief services. MarineATC units can establish ATC capabilities if theyhave been disrupted or destroyed or if none previ-ously existed. The damage resulting from naturaldisasters may span tens of thousands of squaremiles. Damage to roads and other transportationinfrastructure may hamper disaster relief efforts.Aviation’s ability to operate in such areas, to sus-tain delivery efforts until the local infrastructure

3-4 _________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-2

is restored, and to respond rapidly to crisis situa-tions can be crucial to success in disaster relief.

One of the key features of a Marine’s expedition-ary nature is the ability to expand, contract, andchange the balance and focus of Marine forces.Because many crises are sudden and require arapid response, the initial force arriving at thescene of a developing crisis is rarely sufficient toconduct decisive operations. The ability torespond effectively to such crises demands theability to restructure an expeditionary force afterits introduction into the theater without sacrificingcontinuity in operational capability. The ACE’smodular structure allows rapid expansion into alarger force by adding the needed forces to eachof the existing subordinate units. Similarly,should the situation require a lesser force or a dif-ferent balance of capabilities, the ACE is easilyredesigned to suit the situation. This flexibility insize and force includes the ability to expand into ajoint or combined force.

3004. Marine Aviation and Maneuver Warfare

The Marine Corps’ warfighting philosophyemphasizes an integrated combined-armsapproach that employs rapid, flexible maneuver.Maneuver warfare seeks to shatter the enemy’scohesion through a variety of rapid, focused, andunexpected actions. These actions create aturbulent and rapidly deteriorating situation for theenemy. The Marine Corps implements themaneuver warfare concept through air-groundteams—MAGTFs. These teams execute mission-type orders and maneuver in time and space, incombination with the application of fires, to createpositional or temporal advantages over the enemy.Inherent in maneuver warfare is the need for speedin order to seize the initiative, dictate the terms ofaction, and keep the enemy off balance. Marineaviation plays a crucial role in the MAGTF’sability to conduct maneuver warfare by contri-buting task-organized ACEs that are specificallydesigned to provide the MAGTF with thenecessary mobility, flexibility, force protection,and fires. The following subparagraphs discuss

ways in which the maneuver warfare conceptrelates to the employment of Marine aviation.

a. Orienting on the Enemy Orienting on the enemy is fundamental to maneu-ver warfare. Maneuver warfare attacks the enemy“system.” The enemy system is whatever consti-tutes the entity confronting us within our particu-lar sphere. For a pilot, it might be the combinationof air defense radars, surface-to-air missiles, andenemy aircraft that must be penetrated to reachthe target. For an electronic warfare specialist, itmight be the enemy’s command and control net-work. For a MEF commander, it might be all themajor combat formations within an area of opera-tion as well as their supporting command andcontrol, logistic, and intelligence organizations.

Economy demands that the MAGTF focus its ef-forts toward some object or factor of decisive im-portance to achieve the greatest effect at the leastcost. Therefore, planners must understand boththe sources of the enemy’s strength and where theenemy is vulnerable.

We call a key source of strength a “center ofgravity.” It represents something without which theenemy cannot function. In broad terms, centers ofgravity are the characteristics, capabilities, orlocalities from which a military force derives itsfreedom of action, physical strength, or will tofight. In practice, planners must distinguishbetween a strategic center of gravity and anoperational center of gravity. A strategic center ofgravity is an objective whose seizure, destruction,or neutralization will have a profound impact onthe enemy leadership’s will or ability to continuethe struggle. It may be something tangible, like apolitical leader, a particular military force, or acapital city, or it may be intangible, like a popularbelief in a cause or faith in eventual victory. Anoperational center of gravity, on the other hand, isnormally an element of the enemy’s armed forces.It is that concentration of the enemy’s militarypower that is most dangerous to us or the one thatstands between us and the accomplishment of ourmission. The degree of danger that a force posesmay depend on its size or particular capabilities, itslocation relative to ourselves, or the particular skill


or enterprise of its leader. MCDP 1-2 containsdetailed information on centers of gravity andcritical vulnerabilities.

Often we cannot attack enemy strengths directlybecause they are too well protected. Rather, weseek to attack a weakness that allows us to strikeat the enemy’s center of gravity indirectly, pittingour power against its weakness. A vulnerabilitycannot be critical unless it undermines a keystrength. It also must be something that we arecapable of attacking effectively.

However, even critical vulnerabilities may not beeasy to at tack. We may have to design aprogressive sequence of actions that expose,create, or isolate a vulnerability that creates, overtime, an opportunity to strike the decisive blow.An example would be to peel away the enemy’sair defenses in order to permit a successful airattack on key command and control facilities.These facilities become the critical vulnerabilitythat allow us to disable or destroy the enemy’s airforce, which is one of its centers of gravity.

In supporting the maneuver warfare tenet oforienting on the enemy, Marine aviation op-erations draw on both the center of gravity andcritical vulnerability concepts. Aviation expandsthe operational reach of the MAGTF, potentiallyexposing a wide range of the enemy’s potentialcritical vulnerabilities to attack. At the same time,it contributes greatly to the protection of friendlycenters of gravity and critical vulnerabilities. Justas we pursue our enemy’s critical vulnerabilities,we should expect the enemy to pursue ours. TheACE can play a proactive role in identifying thoseaspects of the enemy defense that are vulnerableto attack by air. The ACE is also responsible forplanning air defense for the MAGTF and ensuringthat the MAGTF’s assets are not exposed toenemy aviation.

b. Philosophy of Command Our philosophy of command must support the waywe fight. First and foremost, to generate the tempoof operations we desire and to best cope with theuncertainty, fluidity, and disorder of combat,

command and control must be decentralized.Marine aviation adheres to the MAGTF’s maneu-ver warfare philosophy of centralized commandand decentralized control. Typically, the ACE iscommanded by a single commander located in theTACC, who then delegates the control of aviationassets to the subordinate agencies of the MACCSinvolved in the execution of operations.

c. Decisive Actions

Decisive actions on the battlefield are thoseactions that most directly and expeditiously leadto the imposition of our will on the enemy bydestruction of its forces and capability to wagewarfare or the destruction of the enemy’s will toresist. By concentrating our efforts and assets onactions that have a maximum impact on theenemy, we can minimize the number of decisiveengagements required to attain victory.

It is possible for aviation forces to provide thedecisive action in a battle. Normally, however,aviation forces are but one of several forces in theMAGTF that together conduct decisive actions.The MAGTF fights as a combined-arms teamwhere the actions of the whole are greater than thesum of the actions of the individual parts. TheMAGTF is more likely to be decisive (e.g., accom-plish its mission) when it is employed as a whole,rather than employing its major subordinateelements sequentially, separately, or piecemeal. Itdoes not rely on any one element alone to achieve adecisive action. Marine aviation makes its greatestcontribution to MAGTF decisive action when theindividual actions of aviation forces are integratedwith those of the MAGTF’s other elements.

d. Shaping Action

To influence an action to our advantage, we mustproject our thoughts forward in time and space.Since war is inherently disorderly and we cannotexpect to dictate its terms with any sort of preci-sion, we attempt to shape the general conditionsof war. We shape the battlespace to create situa-tions of advantage. Shaping actions are intendedto render the enemy vulnerable to attack, facilitatethe maneuver of friendly forces, and dictate the

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time and place for decisive battle. Shaping opera-tions occur at all levels of war.

Aviation contributes to the MAGTF’s shapingefforts in several ways. Aviation can make theenemy react against his/her will. It can impede orprevent the enemy from moving when they must.Aviation can hinder or prevent the massing ofenemy forces and equipment by delaying thearrival of those forces, compelling enemycommanders to commit their forces piecemeal,and denying the enemy the supplies they need toremain operational. Aviation can diminish theenemy’s physical capabilities, upset their plan,and stifle their initiative. Aviation also helpsshape the battlespace through the operationalrange and mobility that it provides Marine groundforces. The option for vertical insertion of groundforces adds yet another dimension to the groundcommander’s maneuver options.

Shaping actions, by all elements of the MAGTF,are also used to maximize aviation capabilities.Special operations forces can identify, disrupt, ordestroy portions of the enemy’s air defensesystem. Enemy aircraft can be destroyed on theground through OAAW. Ground forces can seizean airfield needed as a FOB to extend the reach ofaviation. CSS units can ensure the uninterruptedsupply of fuel and ammunition at FARPs toenhance aviation responsiveness. The combinedshaping efforts of all elements provide aviationwith the freedom of action necessary to conductsuccessful air operations.

The MAGTF commander uses organic ACEaviation to set the course of operations in supportof the JFC’s campaign plan well in advance of theGCE’s close combat operations. SuccessfulMAGTF shaping maximizes aviation’s ability toprovide continuous, uninterrupted air support;delay enemy reinforcements through interdiction;degrade critical enemy functions or capabilitiessuch as command and control, OAS, or logistics;and manipulate the enemy’s perceptions.

The most important shaping operation performedby aviation is to gain air superiority. Air superi-ority is the degree of dominance in the air battleof one force over another that permits the conduct

of operations by the former and its related land,sea, and air forces at a given time and placewithout prohibitive interference by the opposingforce. Successful MAGTF operations are con-tingent on the ability to operate freely within thebattlespace and to deny the enemy freedom ofaction. The ACE’s ability to shape both the closeand deep batt lespace, provide potent andresponsive firepower and enhance mobility arekey contributions to the MAGTF’s achievementof battlespace dominance.

Air superiority is essential to the conduct of allfunctions of Marine aviation and therefore weighsheavily in creating conditions for successfulaviation operations. Theater-wide air superioritycannot always be achieved immediately. At times,it may be necessary only to achieve local airsuperiority in order to facilitate a particular phaseof a campaign.

Control of the air must be a priority for the entireMAGTF—not just the ACE. Air superiorityextends beyond the realm of air-to-air combat. Itrequires the combined efforts of the MAGTF toneutralize or destroy enemy air defenses, airfields,and air command and control facilities. Once airsuperiority is achieved, aviation is free to provideeffective support to the MAGTF.

This is also true for a joint force, where MAGTFactions, at least initially, will be integrated into thejoint force’s goal of achieving a degree of airsuperiority. One of the most important aspects ofthe initial air operations phase of Operation DesertStorm (January 17 to February 23, 1991) was togain and maintain air superiority. The effectivenessof this action was illustrated by the fact that at notime during the subsequent ground operationsphase (February 24 to 27, 1991) did Iraqi aviationpossess either the capability or the will to interferewith our actions. Aviation operations seldomachieve a decisive result alone, but the advantagethat air superiority provides in the conduct ofMAGTF or joint operations is significant.

Although Marine aviation is designed largely fortactical operations, air superiority providesprofound operational and strategic benefits.


During the island-hopping campaign of WorldWar II, naval aviation’s ability to attack virtuallyanywhere compelled the Japanese to spread theircombat forces to defend everywhere (e.g., theconcept of divide and conquer). It forced theJapanese to staff literally hundreds of outposts.Thinly spread, the Japanese military provedunable to mass forces to withstand the combinedmight of U.S. air, land, and sea forces. Thisplaced the Japanese on the defensive, created anopportunity to turn the course of the war in thePacific, and achieved a decision.

e. Decisionmaking Decisionmaking is essential to the conduct of warsince all actions are the result of decisions or ofnondecisions. Warfare, by its very nature, isfraught with uncertainty. Uncertainty is exacer-bated by the lack of time—a critical factor and afundamental constraint in effective decision-making. The commander must always balance thevalue of gaining more information to mitigateuncertainty against the need to shorten thedecisionmaking process.

Decisionmaking may be an intuitive process basedon experience, particularly when time is extremelyconstrained. This will likely be the case at lowercommand echelons and in fluid, uncertain situa-tions like those in an ATC center or in the cockpit.Alternatively, decisionmaking may be a moreanalytical process that is based on comparingseveral options. This will more likely be the case athigher echelons or in deliberate planning situationsfound in the future planning cell of the TACC,where the planning horizon is longer.

In execution, decisionmaking becomes a time-competitive process, and timeliness of decisionsbecomes essential to generating tempo. Tempo isthe use of time as a weapon, and it is a criticalconsideration for the ACE commander. Beingable to consistently generate a tempo of opera-tions that the enemy cannot handle is crucial tothe conduct of maneuver warfare. However, thehighest tempo of operations, of which a force iscapable, is not normally sustainable over ex-tended periods.

Two levels of operational activity exist foraviation: sustained and surge. Sustained opera-tions match the regeneration capabilities of thesystem (maintenance, manpower, and supply) tothe utilization rate, thus achieving tempo thatmaintains a steady state. Surge operations cantemporarily increase tempo in order to takeadvantage of battlefield opportunities. However,surge rates are obtained at the expense of all or aportion of the regenerative capability. Aviationunits operating at a sustained rate can maintain aspecific tempo of operations for an extendedperiod of time. These same units operating at thesurge rate can maintain a heightened tempo, butonly for a limited period. The ACE commandermust employ an appropriate mix of sustained andsurge operations to control the operational tempoand maintain momentum without exhaustingassets before the culminating point is reached.

f. Mission Tactics MCDP 1 and MCDP 6, Command and Control,both emphasize a command and control philo-sophy based on mission orders and missiontactics. This approach to command and controllies at the heart of maneuver warfare. Under thisapproach, seniors assign missions and explaintheir underlying intent but allow subordinates asmuch latitude as possible in the manner of accom-plishment. It is the assignment of a subordinate amission without specifying how the mission mustbe accomplished.

Mission tactics works in conjunction with avia-tion’s philosophy of centralized command anddecentralized control. It a llows the seniorcommander to focus on higher-level concernsrather than the details of subordinate executionand serves as a contract between senior andsubordinate commanders. The senior prescribesthe method of execution only to the degree neededfor coordination. The pace, complexity, anduncertainty of modern warfare necessitate thisdecentralization of control. The actual degree towhich control is decentralized depends on theunique requirements of the specific situation. Insome instances detailed and highly centralizedcontrol (e.g., ATC) is required. Centralized plan-ning may be employed to enhance unity of effort

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and to concentrate resources on an identified maineffort. However, whenever possible, decentra-lized control is used to increase the speed andagility of the MAGTF—including its aviation arm.

Once the mission and plan have been preparedand briefed by the commander and the staff, sub-ordinates are expected to exercise their initiativebased on their understanding of the commander’sintent. Aviation groups supply the aircraft andcrews to meet the air tasking order (ATO) or airplan. They execute the assigned mission with thelatitude necessary to accomplish it. MACCSagencies execute the plan for command and con-trol without interference from the commander.Mission tactics are fundamental to Marine avia-tion operations and provide the flexibility neces-sary to adapt to rapidly changing situations andexploit fleeting opportunities.

g. Commander’s Intent

There are two parts to any mission: the task to beaccomplished and the reason or intent behind it.The task describes the action to be taken, and theintent describes the purpose of the action. The in-tent is part of every mission and is established bythe commander assigning it. The commander’s in-tent, clearly stated, enables unity of effort whiledecentralizing command and control. Once themission is assigned, the commander develops avision of how the operation should unfold in orderto achieve the desired goal. This vision is sharedwith subordinates and includes the commander’sintent. In the absence of detailed instructions,which are often unavailable in the midst of uncer-tainty and rapid changes in the battlespace, the in-tent provides the purpose and direction. Thecommander’s intent is a device used at all com-mand echelons within the MAGTF to enable sub-ordinates to take the initiative. The MAGTFcommander provides his/her intent to the ACEcommander, the ACE commander provides his/her intent to his/her group commanders, andgroup commanders provide their intent to theirsquadron commanders. Prior to launching anyaviation sortie, the mission commander, flightleaders, and individual pilots review the com-mander’s intent and analyze how it applies to a

particular mission so they will be prepared to takethe initiative as the situation dictates.

h. Main Effort The main effort is the designated subordinate unitwhose mission is most critical to overall missionsuccess. Commanders design an operation care-fully so that success by the main effort facilitatesthe success of the entire force. The main effortreceives priority for support of any kind, and allother units support the main effort. Unlikecommander’s intent, which is a harmonizingdevice for subordinate initiative, the main effort isa unifying device that concentrates the MAGTF’sefforts on the most important goal. Support of themain effort becomes an overriding factor in alldecisions. When the MAGTF commanderdesignates an element (ACE, GCE, or CSSE) ofthe MAGTF as the main effort, the other elementsassume a supporting role. Thus, the main effort isthe supported unit (one element of the MAGTF),while the supporting effort is provided by thesupporting units (other elements of the MAGTF).The ability to shift the emphasis or to change themain effort from one element to another providesthe MAGTF commander with flexibility. Anyelement of the MAGTF can be designated as themain effort. But, typically, only the ACE or GCE(or any portion thereof) with their inherentcapability to maneuver and fire is designated asthe main effort during combat operations. SinceMOOTW encompasses a wide spectrum ofoperations, any of the three MAGTF elements(ACE, GCE, or CSSE) can be designated as themain effort. The ACE provides the MAGTFcommander with firepower, flexibility, mobility,force protection, sustainability, and command andcontrol, whether it is designated as the main effortor as the supporting effort.

Within the ACE, the concept of main effort iscritical to the decisions made in the planning andexecution of all aviation operations. With theACE as the main effort, both the GCE and CSSEprovide full support to ensure the success of theACE. For example, the MAGTF commandermight designate the ACE as the main effort whenthe operation plan or the JFC’s campaign planrequires air superiority. In this case, the GCE and


CSSE could provide suppression of enemy airdefenses or security for a FOB, or they could givepriority in fuel and ammunition transportation toaviation units.

When the ACE is not the MAGTF’s main effort, itassumes a supporting role. The ACE commanderfocuses all internal ACE resources (maintenance,manpower, supply, etc.) on the aviation functionsand capabilities needed to support the MAGTF’smain effort. The ACE commander may stilldesignate a main effort within the ACE toachieve maximum ACE support to the MAGTF’smain effort.

i. Surfaces and Gaps Surfaces are enemy strengths, also referred to ashard spots. Gaps are enemy weaknesses, alsoreferred to as soft spots. We avoid enemystrengths and focus our efforts against the enemy’sweaknesses. Whenever possible, we exploitexisting gaps or we create gaps as needed. Sur-faces and gaps are a tactical application of theoperational concept of finding and attacking acenter of gravity through a critical vulnerability.Surfaces and gaps can be, but are not always,centers of gravity or critical vulnerabilities. Thecommander strives to match the MAGTF’sstrength against the enemy’s weakness.

Because of the fluid nature of war, gaps will rarelybe permanent and will usually be fleeting. Toexploit them requires flexibility and speed. Thecharacteristics of Marine aviation make it ideallysuited to temporarily fill gaps or to create gapswhere none exist. Marine aviation’s ability torapidly and accurately concentrate firepower in asmall area can be effective in creating gaps, and itscontinuous and aggressive aviation reconnaissancecan seek out existing gaps. Once gaps are located,exploitation by fast-moving, mobile forces iscritical. Aviation units can prevent enemy forcesfrom closing the gap or they can be used to exploitthe gap with assault support forces.

Exploitation usually occurs at a gap and extendsthe destruction of the enemy by maintainingcontinuous offensive pressure. Exploitation

destroys the enemy’s cohesion. In a classicdemons trat i on of maneuver warfare , thecommander aims to render the enemy incapableof effectively resisting by shattering enemymoral, mental, and physical cohesion and abilityto fight as an effective, coordinated whole.Marine aviation offers the commander the speedand flexibility needed to support exploitation in anumber of ways. It can provide direct air supportto the main effort to prevent enemy forces fromdisengaging, withdrawing, reconstituting, orreinforcing. It can also support a committedreserve, either with firepower or mobility, at themoment when the opportunity for exploitation isrealized. As enemy cohesion breaks down, theexploitation may develop into a pursuit.

The pursuit seeks to annihilate the enemy forceonce resistance has completely broken down. Thecondition of the enemy may determine whether anexploitation becomes a pursuit. The opportunityto conduct a pursuit is often fleeting and must beseized quickly by the commander. An effectivepursuit requires the integrated efforts of theMAGTF’s combat arms. During a pursuit, adirect-pressure force must have sufficient combatpower to maintain pressure on the enemy. Anencircling force must have continuous firesupport and greater mobility than the enemy. Theability of aviation to move quickly to destroyenemy forces and deny them routes of escapemakes aviation particularly valuable as anencircling force in the pursuit. The main effortmay shift to the ACE during the pursuit tomaintain pressure on the enemy or to destroy theenemy’s will to resist.

j. Combined Arms Ten years after the first combat use of aircraft, theItal ian air power theorist, Giulio Douhet,recognized the need to focus all combat forcestoward one common goal. Douhet believed thatthe use of military ground, naval, and aerial forcesin war should be focused on a single outcome—towin. Douhet cautioned that the best results can beobtained only by a proper apportioning of ground,naval, and aerial forces. To attain maximumeffectiveness, these forces must be coordinatedand in harmony with one another. These three

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forces should function as ingredients (or factors)that produce a single product.

Douhet was speaking of combined arms. TheMAGTF is the epitome of a combined-armsorganization that focuses all combat forces on onecommon goal . Within the Mar ine Corps ,combined-arms warfare is the full integration ofvarious arms in such a way that to counteract one,the enemy must make itself more vulnerable toanother. We present the enemy with more than oneproblem—a dilemma in which any action theenemy takes makes the enemy vulnerable to attack.

We accomplish combined arms through the tacticsand techniques we use at the lower levels andthrough task organization at higher levels. In sodoing, we take advantage of the complementarycharacteristics of different types of units andenhance our mobility and firepower. Firepowerand mobility are complementary. Firepower aidsmobility by causing the destruction and chaosnecessary to render the enemy helpless to opposeour movement. Mobility enhances firepower byplacing the attacker in a position where the targetcan be more accurately and effectively engaged. Incombat, firepower and mobility are inseparableparts of a larger whole.

Firepower damages or threatens to damage enemypersonnel, facilities, and equipment. Firepowersometimes fulfills the purpose of the mission—todestroy an enemy force or keep them from using acertain resource. Firepower aids our movement;e.g., using an air attack to destroy an enemy em-placement whose fires have immobilized ourground force. The benefits of firepower are notlimited to physical destruction, but include thefear and mental chaos that firepower produces inthe enemy. The appropriate application offirepower can have wide-ranging effects, fromdestruction to intimidation, to outright sub-mission, to surrender. Operation Desert Storm isan example of the integrated application ofaviation firepower in combined arms and itsability to condition and mold the enemy mentally.The innovative application of firepower andmobility in Operation Desert Storm createdconditions for success that allowed coalition

forces to exploit the enemy’s loss of will andmeans to fight.

Combining the effects of all combat resources isessential in achieving a decision. For example,consider the outcomes of Operation Strangleversus Operation Diadem. The difference in theoutcomes illustrates the difference in effective-ness between aviation acting alone and aviationacting as part of a combined-arms team to achievea decisive action.

Conducted in the spring of 1944, OperationStrangle was designed by the Allies to useaviation alone to destroy and disrupt Germanresupply efforts in Italy. Allied aviationassets were used to interdict railway systemsthat delivered supplies to the Germans.Unfortunately, without an Allied groundoperation that supported the air effort, theGerman troops had a low supply expenditurerate and were actually able to stockpileresources during Operation Strangle.

Operation Diadem was conducted imme-diately following Operation Strangle. Withthe ground forces designated as the maineffort, aviation supported the ground effortby interdicting targets in the German rearareas. The combined ground and aviationefforts soundly broke the German resolve andallowed the Allies to liberate Rome.

Within the ACE, the combined-arms concept isapplied to the tailoring of mission packages toensure that each has the appropriate mix ofmutually supporting aviation capabilities, isfocused on a common goal, and are guided by thecommander’s intent. The actual make-up ofmission packages varies significantly and isusually situation dependent. For example, anassault support mission package may includetransport helicopters; attack helicopters; fixed-wing AAW, EW, and at tack ai rcraf t; andcommand and control aircraft that represent allsix functions of Marine aviation.

Success in battle requires the integration of manydisparate efforts. Effective action in any one ef-fort is rarely decisive in and of itself. However,


the overall effect is greater when all efforts arecombined and coordinated toward a single goal.The Marine Corps achieves this combined-armssynergy by organizing and coordinating all ofthese efforts into six warfighting functions: com-mand and control, maneuver, fires, intelligence,logistics, and force protection. The six functions(i.e., capabilities) of Marine aviation are integrat-ed and provide a significant contribution to eachof these warfighting functions. Table 3-1 alignsthe six functions of Marine aviation with the sixwarfighting functions. This alignment is a neces-sary first step in redefining the six functions ofMarine aviation in terms applicable to emergingdoctrinal concepts.

3005. The ACE in Maneuver Warfare

A maneuver element is a distinct force that usesboth fire and movement in engaging the enemy togenerate and exploit an advantage over them as ameans of achieving a specific objective. Using theMarine aviation forces of the ACE as a maneuverelement provides a wide range of possibilities formission accomplishment. It also increases thenumber of courses of action (COAs) available tothe MAGTF commander. Marine aviation forcescan provide essential fires in support of groundmaneuver elements, assault support aviation canvastly enhance ground forces’ mobility andmaneuverability, or Marine aviation forces can also

be used purely or predominantly as a maneuverelement. Aviation leaders and planners should befamiliar with the variety of roles that combat forcescan play in maneuver and think imaginativelyabout ways in which aviation can contribute.

Opportunities to employ and commit the ACEwill depend on the nature of the enemy, theterrain, and the situation. By employing the ACEor its forces as a maneuver element, the MAGTFcommander can fully capitalize on a force’srange, speed, and agility. In that role, aviation canprovide the main effort, provide a supportingeffort, or serve as part of the MAGTF reserve.

Some tactical tasks and/or missions in which avi-ation units or forces may be able to perform as amaneuver element are listed below:Envelopment (single, double, vertical).Block.Rupture.Spoiling attack.Counterattack.Feint.Demonstration.Diversion.Reconnaissance.Raid.Exploitation.Pursuit.Fix.

Table 3-1. Functions of Aviation in Support of Warfighting Functions.

Warfighting Functions and the Type of Support Provided

Functions of Marine Aviation

Command and Control

Maneuver Fires Intelligence Logistics Force Protection

Assault Support Support Primary Support Support Primary Support

AAW Support Support Support Support Support Primary

Air Reconnaissance Support Support Support Primary Support Support

EW Support Support Primary Primary Support Primary

OAS Support Support Primary Support Support Primary

Control of Aircraft and Missiles

Primary Support Support Support Support Support

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Screen.Guard.Cover.

Note: While aviation forces are capable ofperforming the tasks and/or missions listed above,they will seldom execute them alone. MarineCorps doctrine dictates that Marine forcesoperate as a combined-arms team, and most tasksand/or missions will be conducted with a varietyof integrated, mutually supporting forces.

3006. Aviation in Offensive and Defensive Operations

The six functions of Marine aviation each play asignificant role in both offensive and defensiveoperations. Because aviation inherently assumes anoffensive role, it supports either offensive or de-fensive operations in exactly the same way.Aviation can continue offensive operations whilethe GCE is conducting defensive operations. TheACE commander apportions aviation assets asneeded to best support the concept of operationsand its assigned tasks and missions while remainingconsistent with the MAGTF commander’s intent.

a. Offensive Operations The MAGTF conducts four types of offensive op-erations: movement to contact, attack, exploita-tion, and pursuit. It uses five forms of maneuverto effect offensive operations:A frontal attack can create a gap through

which the attacking force can conduct a pene-tration. Aviation forces use fires to create gapsin the enemy’s front or to prevent or delayenemy reinforcements reaching the front lines.

A penetration is accomplished by concen-trating overwhelmingly superior combatpower on a narrow front and in depth in orderto rupture the enemy’s position and widen thegap. Mechanized and aviation forces are usedto rupture the enemy’s position and exploitthe rupture.

A flanking attack is directed at the flank of anenemy. A supporting effort engages the enemy’s

front with fire and maneuver, while the maineffort maneuvers to attack the enemy’s flank.Aviation forces support the main and sup-porting efforts as needed.

An envelopment uses attacking forces to bypassthe enemy’s principal defensive positions tosecure objectives to the enemy’s rear. The opera-tional reach and speed of aviation forces makethem an ideal force to conduct envelopments.

A turning movement uses attacking forces topass around or over the enemy’s principal defen-sive positions to secure objects deep in the ene-my’s rear. Aviation forces may serve as fixingforces or conduct the exploitation and pursuit ina turning movement.

In today’s nonlinear battlespace, it is likely thatseveral combinations of different types of opera-tions and forms of maneuver will occur simulta-neously. The ACE, with an area of operations thatmatches that of the entire MAGTF, must carefullyallocate its assets to ensure a focus of effort that isresponsive to the constantly changing situation.Depending on the circumstances, the ACE cansupport all forms of maneuver. Whether aviationprovides the main or a supporting effort, its con-tribution with the six functions of Marine aviationin all types of offensive operations is significant.The ACE commander ensures that the focus ofaviation remains commensurate with the MAGTFcommander’s priorities.

b. Defensive Operations Defensive operations represent a coordinatedeffort to defeat the enemy and prevent them fromachieving their objective. The purpose ofdefensive operations is to cause an enemy attackto fail and to achieve specific objectives, such asgaining time. These operations act as a prelude tooffensive operations or serve to protect friendlyforces and centers of gravity. An effective defenseis never passive. Commanders at every level seekevery opportunity to seize the initiative and shiftto the offensive. The ACE is no less dynamic indefensive operations than in offensive operations,and it continuously seeks to create and exploitopportunities in order to defeat the enemy. Thetwo fundamental types of defense are mobile


defense and position defense. Commanders willrarely use one type or the other exclusively.

(1) Mobile Defense. A mobile defense is thedefense of an area or position in which maneuveris used together with fire and terrain to seize theinitiative from the enemy. A mobile defensefocuses on the destruction of the enemy bypermitting the enemy to advance into positionsthat expose them to counterattack by a strong,mobile reserve. Minimal force is placed forwardto canalize, delay, disrupt, and deceive the enemyas to the actual location of our defenses. Byretaining the mobile forces until the critical timeand place are identified, the commander can thenfocus combat power in violent and rapid counter-attacks throughout the depth of the battlespace.Marine aviation provides vital support to alldefending forces and may serve as the main oronly counterattack force.

(2) Position Defense. A position defense(sometimes referred to as an area defense) placesthe bulk of the defending force in selected tacticalpositions (where the decisive battle will befought). It denies the enemy critical terrain orfacilities. A position defense focuses on the reten-tion of terrain by absorbing the enemy into a seriesof interlocked positions from which the enemy canbe destroyed, largely by a combination of fire andmaneuver. Principal reliance is placed on theability of the forces in the defended positions tomaintain their positions and to control the terrainbetween them. Marine aviation can provide thefires necessary for this form of defense.

3007. Aviation in Security Operations

Security is an aspect of all operations, whether of-fensive, defensive, or retrograde. Security opera-tions are assigned missions. They involve themeasures taken by a unit to protect itself againstall acts that might impair its effectiveness. Thereare three types of security missions: screen,guard, and cover. Each of these missions entailsplacing a force between the enemy and our main

force. As part of a task-organized security force,Marine aviation can provide various functionalcapabilities that extend a security mission’s reach,responsiveness, and effectiveness. Depending onthe nature of the enemy, weather, and terrain,fixed-wing and/or rotary-wing aircraft may beable to perform the security mission by them-selves. However, most security operations includea mutually supporting mix of forces.

a. Screen A screen observes, identifies, and reports infor-mation. It fights only in self-protection and—Provides early warning of enemy approach.Gains and maintains enemy contact and reports

enemy activity.Conducts counterreconnaissance within its ca-

pabilities.Impedes and harasses the enemy within its capa-

bilities.

A screen provides only surveillance and earlywarning of enemy action, not physical protection.It can be employed as an economy-of-force mea-sure in a low-risk area because it provides securi-ty on a broad frontage with limited assets. Marineaviation combat forces are ideally suited to per-forming a screen because of the large areas to bescreened during rapid and deep offensive opera-tions. However, the cost in resources over time isa factor. For example, a screen consisting of onesection of fighter and/or attack aircraft may re-quire commitment of an entire squadron plus sup-porting aircraft (e.g., to provide EW and targetacquisition) to ensure 24-hour coverage. Also,surveillance from the air has certain limitationsand the enemy may have the ability to concealtheir forces and facilities from aerial observation.

b. Guard A guard protects the main force from attack, di-rect fire, and ground observation by engaging theenemy in order to gain time while also observingand reporting information. It also—Provides early warning of enemy approach.Provides maneuver space to the front, flanks,

or rear of the force.

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Screens, attacks, defends, or delays (within itscapabilities) to protect the force.

An advance guard provides early warning,develops the situation, and provides time andmaneuver space for an attacking force. A flankguard operates to the flank of a moving orstationary force to protect it from enemy groundobservation, direct fire, and surprise attack. Aflank guard must protect the entire depth of themain force’s flank. A rear guard protects the rearof the column from hostile forces. It attacks,defends, and delays as necessary. The commandermay order the guard to hold for a specified periodof time. Marine aviation’s reconnaissance capa-bilities, speed, range, firepower, and mobilitymake it ideal for a guard mission.

c. Cover A covering force operates apart from the main forceto intercept, engage, delay, disorganize, and deceivethe enemy before they can attack the main body. Itprevents surprise during the advance. It also—Gains and maintains contact with the enemy.Denies the enemy information about the size,

strength, composition, and intention of themain force.

Conducts counterreconnaissance and destroysenemy security forces.

Develops the situation to determine enemy dis-positions, strengths, and weaknesses.

Aviation forces assets may provide coveringforces because of their speed, range, recon-naissance, and communications capabilities. Acover screens, guards, attacks, defends, anddelays as necessary to accomplish its mission. It isa self-contained maneuver force that operatesbeyond the range of friendly artillery positionedwith the main force. A covering force may betask-organized (including infantry and aviationforces, artillery, and combat service support) tooperate independently. The cover mission may beexpressed in terms of time or enemy disposition(e.g., delay the enemy for 3 hours before battlehandover or delay the enemy until the advanceguard is defeated).

3008. Aviation in Military Operations Other Than War

MOOTW involves the use of military forces insituations other than large-scale, sustained militaryoperations. MOOTW focuses on deterring war,resolving conflict, promoting peace, and sup-porting civil authorities in response to domesticcrises. As in war, MOOTW’s goals are to achievenational objectives as quickly as possible and toconclude operations on terms that are favorable tothe United States and its allies. MOOTW mayinvolve elements of both combat and noncombatoperations and may occur during either peacetimeor war. JP 3-07, Joint Doctrine for MilitaryOperations Other Than War, lists the following16 types of MOOTW:Arms control.Combatting terrorism.Department of Defense support to counterdrug

operations.Enforcement of sanctions and/or maritime in-

tercept operations.Enforcing exclusion zones.Ensuring freedom of navigation and overflight.Humanitarian assistance.Military support to civil authorities.Nation assistance or support to counterinsur-

gency, which includes— Security assistance. Foreign internal defense. Humanitarian and civic assistance.

Noncombatant evacuation operations (NEOs).Peace operations, which include— Peace enforcement. Peacekeeping. Operations in support of diplomatic efforts

(which include preventive diplomacy, peace-making, and peace building).

Protection of shipping.Recovery operations.Show of force operations.Strikes and raids.Support to insurgency.


NEOs involve the protection and subsequent re-moval of noncombatants from potentially hostile ordangerous situations. Like raids, NEOs involve theswift insertion of a force, the temporary occupationof objectives, and a planned withdrawal. It is themost frequently conducted MOOTW by Marineforces. Marine aviation is a critical resource in theconduct of NEOs.

Marine aviation is versatile enough to deliver secu-rity forces to a remote area, evacuate threatenednoncombatants, conduct rapid force withdrawal,and provide covering and supporting firesthroughout. Its speed and mobility generatetempo, often allowing friendly forces to act beforeopponents can react. The inherent flexibility andcapabilities of aviation, coupled with the forwardpresence of the MAGTF, make Marine aviation anideal asset for MOOTW. For example, duringJanuary 1991, while conducting training forOperation Desert Storm off the coast of Oman, the4th Marine Expeditionary Brigade received ordersto conduct a NEO in Mogadishu, Somalia. Whileelements of the 4th Marine Expeditionary Brigade

were steaming from Oman to Somalia, MAGTFaircraft were launched to begin the NEO. Therebydemonstrating Marine aviation’s flexibility torapidly transition from combat to MOOTW.

Another important consideration is the ACE’slogistic capabilities. The ACE’s logistic capa-bilities will sometimes prove far more importantthan firepower in a MOOTW. On April 29, 1991, acyclone killed more than 130,000 people inBangladesh. The country’s entire infrastructurealong the Bay of Bengal was destroyed, leaving anestimated 3 million people homeless. OperationSea Angel provided MAG-50 helicopters that wereloaded with supplies, food, water, water-makingfacilities, medicine and medical units, communi-cations and liaison teams, area air reconnaissance,and basic air transportation. By the time theamphibious task force departed Bangladesh onMay 29th, Marine aircraft had flown 1,167helicopter sorties in 1,114 flight hours, moved5,485 passengers, and delivered close to 700 tonsof relief supplies.

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Chapter 4

Command and Control ofMarine Aviation Operations

“The lines of communication are part of that unity. They link the army toits base, and must be considered . . . its arteries. . . .

These arteries, then must not be permanently cut, nor must they be too longor difficult to use.”4

—Carl von Clausewitz

The ultimate objective of command and controlis to effect the conduct of military action.Command and control includes activities such asgathering and analyzing information, makingdecisions, organizing resources, planning, com-municating instructions and other information,monitoring results, and supervising execution. Theprincipal objectives of the MACCS are to enhanceunity of effort, integrate elements of the commandand control system, and help maintain thecommander’s situational awareness. The MACCSfacilitates these objectives by providing thecommand and control architecture to integrate andexecute aviation operations. It uses both missioncontrol and detailed control, with emphasis onmission control. The MACCS supports theMAGTF philosophy of centralized command anddecentralized control.

4001. Command Relationships

Command relationships consist of the interrelatedresponsibilities between commanders as well asthe authority of commanders in the chain ofcommand. The JFC organizes forces as needed toaccomplish the assigned mission. The organi-zation provides for unity of effort, centralizedplanning, and decentralized execution. The JFCestablishes subordinate commands, establishesappropriate command and support relationships,and assigns responsibilities. Command relation-ships may differ from one operation to another;

therefore, they require clear definition in direc-tives issued at the JTF level.

As clearly stated in JP 0-2, forces, not commandrelationships, are transferred between commands.When forces are transferred, the command rela-tionship the gaining commander will exerciseover those forces must be specified by the JFC.Therefore, when forces are assigned from onecommand to another (which is relatively perma-nent), the combatant commander will exercisecombatant command (command authority) andthe subordinate JFC will exercise OPCON or tac-tical control (TACON) over assigned forces.When forces are attached from one command toanother (which is relatively temporary), the JFCwill exercise OPCON or TACON, as specified,over the attached forces. These same rules applyto forces assigned or attached to the MAGTF.

The following subparagraphs briefly describe rel-evant command relationships. For more details,see JP 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations.

a. Operational Control

OPCON is the authority to perform the functionsof command over subordinate forces that involveorganizing and employing commands and forces,assigning tasks, designating objectives, andgiving authoritative direction necessary to accom-plish the mission.

4-2 _________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-2

b. Tactical Control TACON is the command authority over assignedor attached forces or commands, or over amilitary capability or force made available fortasking, that is limited to the detailed and, usually,local direction and control of movements ormaneuvers necessary to accomplish missions ortasks assigned. A Marine aviation unit can beunder TACON of another component commanderin a joint force even though the Marine compo-nent commander retains command.

c. Support Support relationships are established by a superiorcommander between subordinate commanderswhen one organization should aid, protect,complement, or sustain another force. Establishingsupported and supporting relationships betweencomponents is a useful option that is needed toaccomplish varying tasks. Each subordinateelement of the joint force can support or besupported by other elements. Unless limited by theestablishing directive, the commander of thesupported force will have the authority to exercisegeneral direction of the supporting effort. Generaldirection includes the designation and priori-tization of targets or objectives, timing andduration of the supporting action, and otherinstructions necessary for coordination andefficiency. The supporting commander has theresponsibility to ascertain the needs of the sup-ported commander and to fulfill those needswithin existing capabilities. At the same time, thesupporting commander must stay consistent withpriorities and requirements of other assigned tasks.

MCWP 6-2, MAGTF Command and Control,describes four categories of support: general,direct, mutual, and close. General support is theaction that is given to the supported force as awhole rather than to a particular subdivisionthereof (e.g., the ACE in general support of theentire MAGTF). Direct support is a mission thatrequires a force to support another specific forceand authorizes it to directly answer the supportedforce’s request for assistance (e.g., an attacksquadron in direct support of one subordinate unitof the GCE). Mutual support is the action that

units render each other because of their assignedtasks, their positions relative to each other, andtheir inherent capabilities. Close support is theaction of the supporting force against targets orobjectives that are sufficiently near the supportedforce. This close proximity requires detailedintegration or coordination of the supportingaction with fire, movement, or other actions of thesupported force (e.g., aviation units providingCAS to units in contact).

4002. Aviation Combat Element Command and Support Relationships

Central to the concept of employment for the ACEis the philosophy of centralized command anddecentralized control. The commander needs toplan, direct, and coordinate all aspects of aviationemployment for the MAGTF (i.e., centralizedcommand). The ACE commander also wants tooptimize the flexibility, versatility, and respon-siveness of aviation by allowing control of assetsto be conducted by subordinate agencies. Thesesubordinate agencies are both responsive to thecommander and in touch with the changingdynamics of the battle (i.e., decentralized control).Plans and orders are brief and general. Executiondepends on the sound judgment of well-trainedsubordinates, their initiative, and their under-standing of the commander’s intent. This style ofcommand and control supports rapid decision-making in a time-constrained environment. Itallows the ACE to maintain a high operationaltempo. The tasks that must be accomplished bycentralized command are as follows:Planning aviation operations.Planning use of the battlespace.Planning and coordinating the availability of

aircraft, crews, ordnance, fuel, and facilities.Coordinating Marine aviation with joint and

multinational aviation operations and resources.Tasking Marine aviation.Directing and coordinating the employment of

Marine aviation.


Tasks that the ACE commander expects theMACCS to perform through decentralized controlinclude the following:

Executing aviation operations through the sixfunctions of Marine aviation.

Providing air and missile defense to friendlyunits within the operating area.

Managing and controlling the air portion of theMAGTF battlespace.

Coordinating with joint and multinational aircontrol agencies.

Executing the MAGTF ATO or air plan.Providing timely and accurate information to

the subordinate commanders to support tacticaldecisions.

a. General Support The command support relationship established forthe ACE by the MAGTF commander is almostalways in general support of the MAGTF. Thiscommand relationship supports the philosophy ofcentralized command and decentralized control(see fig. 4-1). Since availability of aviation assetsfor mission tasking rarely meets the demand, theMAGTF commander keeps the ACE in generalsupport of the MAGTF. This allows Marineaviation to fight or to provide support throughoutthe MAGTF area of operations and allows themost efficient and effective allocation of aircraft

to the MAGTF. This process is orchestratedthrough the air tasking cycle, allowing flexibleand prioritized tasking. By using and completingthe air tasking cycle, planners can ensure thatfinite aviation assets are allocated to achievemaximum effect with correct prioritization basedon the main effort.

The ACE will be assigned the role of general sup-port and supports the MAGTF commander’s maineffort. The general support command relationshipis a formal relationship that is established be-tween the MAGTF and ACE commanders. Thisrelationship provides the ACE commander themost flexible, efficient, and effective means ofapportionment, allocation, and prioritization of allaviation assets in support of the MAGTF. TheACE commander retains centralized commandover the subordinate units, including establishingthe priority of their efforts. This prevents support-ing aviation units from dealing directly with vari-ous GCE and CSS agencies. Sorties allocationwill be promulgated through the ATO cycle to re-questing units. The ACE commander exercisesdecentralized control of these sorties through theMACCS. For example, a GCE or CSSE unit willsubmit requests for immediate air support throughthe DASC or preplanned air support requests tothe TACC. The ACE commander maintains flexi-bility in how and when to fill those requests aslong as the MAGTF commander’s apportionmentand prioritization guidance is met.

Centralized

Command

ACE

Commander

(TACC)

Figure does not display all control agencies or executors.

A/C = Aircraft

A/S = Assault Support

ASC(A) = Assault Support Coordinator (Airborne)

Decentralized Execution

Decentralized Control

CAS Stack

A/S Helicopters

ApproachA/C

CAS A/C

CAP A/C

Tanker A/C

DASC

MATCD

ASC(A)

TAOC

FAC(A)/TAC(A)

EW/C

Figure 4-1. Centralized Command and Decentralized Control.

4-4 _________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-2

b. Direct Support

Direct support is a mission requiring a force tosupport another specific force and authorizing it toanswer directly the supported force’s request forassistance. This support relationship is rarelyestablished by the MAGTF commander for avia-tion units due to the scarcity of fixed-wing androtary-wing assets. The ACE will normally be ingeneral support of the MAGTF. With the desig-nation of an aviation unit to the direct support rolecomes the requirement to establish direct liaison,direct communications to receive critical infor-mation, coordination of local security, and logisticsupport from the supported unit.

The MAGTF commander will rarely establish adirect support relationship between the ACE,GCE or CSSE. If a direct suport relationship ex-ists, it is not a command support relationship thatis designated between higher, lower, and adjacentechelon commanders within the MAGTF. Thesetypes of support relationships usually exist onlywithin the context of mission tasking, where indi-vidual sorties are allocated for a specific MAGTFunit conducting a particular mission (usually ofshort duration). Since these sorties do not repre-sent the ACE’s subordinate units, the ACE’s gen-eral support command relationship does notchange. When ACE units are assigned these typesof command support relationships, they will, inmost cases, be aviation ground units.

An ACE unit assigned a direct support role is im-mediately responsive to the needs of the supportedunit. It furnishes continuous support to that unitand coordinates its operations to complement theconcept of operations of the supported unit. Thedirect support role creates a one-to-one relation-ship between supporting and supported units. Thehigher headquarters of the supporting and support-ed units becomes involved only on a “by excep-tion” basis. However, each unit must keep itshigher headquarters informed of its operations andplans. Examples include an attack squadron in di-rect support of one subordinate unit of the GCE, ahelicopter section in direct support of a maneuverbattalion, or a LAAD battery in direct support ofan infantry battalion.

Note: Mutual and close support relationshipsare not usually established within the MAGTFcontext; however, LAAD units may find them-selves in such relationships during joint or multi-national operations.

4003. Marine Aviation Command Relationships in a Joint Force

Within a joint force, JFCs may establish supportrelationships to enhance unity of effort for givenoperational tasks, emphasize or clarify priorities,provide a subordinate with an additional capabil-ity, or combine the effects of similar assets. Avia-tion is often placed in a supporting relationshipbut can be either the supported or supportingforce. The JFC can organize and conduct opera-tions through Service component commanders,functional component commanders, or a combi-nation of the two.

a. Service ComponentsConducting operations through Service compo-nents has certain advantages, including clear anduncomplicated command lines. This relationshipis appropriate when stability, continuity, eco-nomy, ease of long-range planning, and scope ofoperations dictate preserving the organizationalintegrity of Service forces. These conditionsapply when most of the required functions in aparticular dimension are unique to a single-Service force or when Service force capabilitiesor responsibilities do not significantly overlap.

When the JFC conducts joint operations throughService component commanders, the Marine Corpscomponent commander and the other Service com-ponent commanders have OPCON and ADCON oftheir assigned Service forces (see fig. 4-2). Marineaviation forces under this command relationshipfollow the normal MAGTF chain-of-commandrelationship. All Marine forces, including avia-tion assets, come under the command of the MarineCorps component commander. To facilitate opera-tions, the JFC may also establish a support rela-tionship between Service components. In thiscase, the Marine Corps component commandermay provide aviation assets in a support relation-ship such as general or direct support.


b. Functional Components A JFC may also conduct operations throughfunctional components and/or employ them tocoordinate selected functions. Functional compo-nents can be appropriate when forces from two ormore military departments must operate in the same

dimension or medium or the assigned missionbreaks down into distinct functional aspects.

Clear command relationships must be establishedwhen the JFC centralizes direction and control ofcertain functions or types of joint operationsunder functional component commanders. In jointoperations, each Service has its own aviationelement and the JFC may appoint a joint force aircomponent commander (JFACC) (see JP 3-56.1for a detailed discussion on the JFACC). The JFCmay, because of the interrelationship of thefunctions, choose to assign the responsibilities ofJFACC, area air defense commander (AADC),and airspace control authority (ACA) to the sameperson, but not always. The JFC establishescommand relationships that will most effectivelyaccomplish the campaign plan’s objectives.

The JFC must designate the military capability thatwill be made available for tasking by the functionalcomponent commander and the appropriatecommand relationship(s) that the functionalcomponent commander will exercise. For example,a JFACC is normally delegated TACON of thesorties or other available military capabilities. Thecommand and control of Marine Corps aviation isspecifically covered by Joint Pub 0-2 (see below).The MAGTF commander will make available tothe JFC, for tasking through the JFACC, sorties inexcess of MAGTF direct support requirements.

Figure 4-2. Joint Operations Conducted Through Service Components.

The MAGTF commander will retain operational control of organic air assets. The primarymission of the MAGTF air combat element is the support of the MAGTF ground element.During joint operations, the MAGTF air assets will normally be in support of the MAGTFmission. The MAGTF commander will make sorties available to the joint force commander,for tasking through the joint force air component commander, for air defense, long-range in-terdiction, and long-range reconnaissance. Sorties in excess of MAGTF direct support re-quirement will be provided to the joint force commander for tasking through the joint forceair component commander for the support of other components of the joint force or the jointforce as a whole. Nothing herein shall infringe on the authority of the geographic combatantor joint force commander in the exercise of operational control to assign missions, redirectefforts (e.g., the reapportionment and/or reallocation of any Marine Air-Ground Task Force(MAGTF) TACAIR sorties when it has been determined by the joint force commander thatthey are required for higher priority missions), and direct coordination among the subordi-nate commanders to ensure unity of effort in accomplishment of the overall mission, or tomaintain integrity of the force.5

—Joint Pub 0-2, Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAFF)

4-6 _________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-2

Note: Sorties provided for air defense (DCA),long-range interdiction and air reconnaissance,and EW are not “excess” sorties. These sortiesprovide a distinct contribution to the overall jointforce effort and will be covered in the ATO. TheJFC must exercise integrated control of air de-fense, long-range reconnaissance, and interdictionaspects of the joint operation or theater campaign.

The Marine Corps component commander retainscommand of those Marine Corps forces and capa-bilities not designated by the JFC for tasking byfunctional component commanders. The JFACCwill normally not have TACON of Marine avia-tion units, but will have TACON of Marine avia-tion sorties provided to the JFC for tasking. TheMarine Corps component commander advisesfunctional component commanders on the mosteffective use of Marine Corps aviation sorties thatare made available. Marine aviation sorties arethen designated as under TACON of the function-al component commander for operational matters.All Marine Corps forces respond to the MarineCorps component commander for administrativeand logistic support. The JFC may also establish a

support relationship between components to facil-itate operations (see fig. 4-3).

Forward-deployed naval forces (including MarineCorps forces) are usually the first conventionalforces to arrive in an austere theater or area of oper-ations during expeditionary operations. The MarineCorps component commander’s inherent capabilityto command and control Marine Corps forces (andattached or assigned forces of other Services or na-tions) allows command and control of a functionalcomponent. The Marine Corps component com-mander may serve as a functional component com-mander. The JFC can designate the Marine Corpscomponent commander as the joint force maritimecomponent commander (JFMCC), joint force landcomponent commander (JFLCC), or JFACC. If theMarine Corps component commander is assignedas the JFACC, the command and control agency(the joint air operations center [JAOC]) is providedby the MACCS. Figure 4-4 shows the commandrelations for a JFACC.

4004. Other Command Authorities

Administrative control (ADCON) is the directionor exercise of authority over subordinate or otherorganizations in respect to administration andsupport. It includes the organization of Serviceforces, control of resources and equipment,

Figure 4-4. Command Relations for Joint ForceAir Component Commander.

Figure 4-3. Joint Operations Conducted Through Functional Components


readiness, mobilization, personnel management,unit logistics, individual and unit training,demobilization, discipline, and any other mattersnot included in the operational missions ofsubordinate or other organizations. ADCONnormally occurs in conjunction with OPCON.However, a specialized aviation unit could beseparated from its parent unit for a significantamount of time, thereby requiring that ADCONbe given to another headquarters.

4005. The Marine Air Command and Control System

The MACCS consists of various air commandand control agencies that provide the ACE com-mander with the ability to monitor, supervise, andinfluence the application of Marine aviation’s sixfunctions (see fig. 4-5). The ACE commanderuses the MACCS to plan and direct ACE opera-tions and to employ aviation assets in a respon-sive, timely, and effective manner. The MACCSprovides facilities to control aircraft and missilesas well as to establish links with joint, multina-tional, other Services, and civil air command andcontrol systems. Another function of the MACCSis to advise the MAGTF commander and JFC on

the application and employment of Marine avia-tion. The design of the MACCS allows the ACEcommander to conduct centralized planning andoptimize the use of limited resources. At the sametime, the MACCS allows the subordinate com-manders of the ACE to execute the plan in a de-centralized manner. The MACCS provides thecapability to conduct airspace command and con-trol and deconflict aviation assets through central-ized planning of airspace control procedures. Itexercises air direction and decentralized execu-tion of the airspace control plan through its subor-dinate agencies.

a. Air DirectionAir direction is a form of aircraft control used bythe MACCS. It is the authority to regulate the em-ployment of air resources by balancing an air re-source’s availability against its assigned prioritiesand missions.

b. Air ControlAir control is a form of aircraft control used bythe MACCS. Air control is the authority to directthe physical maneuver of aircraft in flight or todirect an aircraft or surface-to-air weapons unit toengage a specific target. Air control is composedof airspace control and terminal control. Airspacecontrol directs the maneuver of aircraft to use theavailable airspace effectively. It is made up ofpositive control and procedural control. Terminalcontrol directs the delivery of ordnance, cargo, orpersonnel by aircraft to a specific geographiclocation or target. MCWP 3-25.3, Marine AirCommand and Control System Handbook ,contains detailed discussions and definitions onthe various forms of aircraft control.

c. Airspace Management Airspace management is distinct from airspacecontrol. Airspace management is the coordi-nation, integration, and regulation of airspaceusage in a defined dimension that results in theoptimal use of available space. The MACCS useseffective airspace management to maximizefreedom of use within the airspace while re-maining consistent with the level of operationalrisk that is acceptable to the commander.

Figure 4-5. Marine Air Command and ControlSystem Organization.

4-8 _________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-2

d. Marine Air Control Group The MACG establishes, operates, and maintainsthe MACCS. The MACG contains subordinateunits that provide the major agencies of theMACCS (see fig. 4-6). MEU support is providedto the ACE through task-organized MACG de-tachments. These detachments typically consistof a MASS, a MACS, a LAAD Stinger Section,and a MWCS. The MACG normally consists ofthe following:MACG headquarters.MTACS.MASS.MACS.LAAD battalion.MWCS.VMU.

e. Tactical Air Command Center The principal air command agency for the ACE isthe TACC. It provides the command post fromwhich the ACE commander and staff plan,supervise, coordinate, and execute all current andfuture MAGTF air operations, including deep op-erations. The TACC integrates these functions withthe MAGTF command element through linkagewith the MAGTF FFCC and combat operations

center (COC). The TACC is operated and main-tained by personnel from the MTACS, withaugmentation from the ACE staff and the MACG.

Although the TACC is primarily a commandfacility, it will also control the execution of deepoperations from the deep battle cell in currentoperations. It provides the capabilities necessary tointegrate, coordinate, and direct air operations insupport of the MAGTF. The TACC interfaces withthe other ACE command and control agencies,other MAGTF elements, and external civil andmilitary air control organizations. Its primaryinterface with the MAGTF command element isthrough the force fires coordination center (FFCC)at the MEF level and the FSCC at levels belowthe MEF. The TACC’s primary external interfacesare with the U.S. Army’s tactical operationscenter (TOC), the U.S. Navy’s tactical air controlcenter (also called the TACC), and the U.S. AirForce’s airfield operations center (AOC). Ifanother Service component commander has beendesignated as the JFACC, then that commander’srespective operations center will become the jointair operations center (JAOC). At that time, theJAOC becomes the TACC’s primary externalinterface. In addition to serving as the ACEcommand post, the TACC provides the capabili-ties necessary for the ACE commander to serveas the JFACC, at which time the TACC willbecome the JAOC. Detailed information on theTACC can be found in MCWP 3-25.4, TacticalAir Command Center Handbook.

f. Direct Air Support Center

The DASC is the principal MACCS air controlagency responsible for the direction of air opera-tions directly supporting ground forces. It pro-cesses and coordinates requests for immediate airsupport and coordinates air missions requiring in-tegration with ground forces and other supportingarms. The DASC is usually the first principalMACCS agency ashore. It functions in a decen-tralized mode, but is subordinate to and directlysupervised by the TACC. MCWP 3-25.5, DirectAir Support Center Handbook, contains detailedinformation on the DASC.Figure 4-6. Notional Marine Air Control

Group Organization.

MASSVMU

DASC

MTACS

TACC

LAAD MWCS

MACS

(REIN)

TAOC

MATCD

EW/C

MACG

HQ


The DASC is established by the MASS and pro-cesses immediate requests for air support, coordi-nates aircraft employment with other supportingarms, and manages terminal control assets such asFAC(A) and assault support coordinator (air-borne) (ASC[A]) in the support of ground forces.It will provide procedural control of assigned air-craft, UAVs, and itinerant aircraft transitingthrough its assigned area. The DASC can employa DASC(A) aboard a KC-130 that will provideextended line of sight communications with lowflying aircraft. In amphibious operations, theDASC normally lands in the same scheduled oron-call wave as the senior FSCC phased ashore.

The DASC will normally be collocated orelectronically linked with the senior FSCC withinthe GCE. In a MEF operation that consists ofmultiple maneuver elements (divisions) within theGCE, the MEF commander may assume the roleof GCE commander and require the MEF FFCC toalso function as the senior FSCC of the GCE. Inthis instance, the DASC may be located with theMEF FFCC or the senior GCE FSCC in order tocentralize management of CAS and assaultsupport between the GCE maneuver elements(d iv i s ions ) a nd to s uppor t t he M AGTFcommander’s intent. DASC support of a multi-division GCE requires the assets and personnelfrom more than one MASS. In the multi-divisionGCE, there will be a DASC employed at the seniorFSCC of the GCE and a DASC or air supportelement (ASE) for each division’s FSCC. Thecircumstances that may require an ASE to beemployed at the division level will be dictated byoperational necessity, although ASEs are normallyonly employed with a MEU. These subordinateDASCs or ASEs provide the necessary links to theMACCS in order to request and coordinate directair support. The size and composition of eachDASC and ASE varies and can be expanded orreduced as the current situation requires and assetsare available. Only the DASC and ASE have thecapability to provide procedural control foraircraft operating in its area of responsibility.

The DASC has several employment optionsavailable, including an airborne configuration in aKC-130. MASS assets are tailored to provide

support based on the mission. A MEF couldrequire a task organization that uses the assets ofmore than one MASS. At the MEU level, a MASSdetachment would be task-organized as an ASEand would have a reduced capability due to itssize. The size and capability of the MEF’s DASCdepends on the number of units that will berequesting air support and the number of aircraftexecuting air support missions. The DASC main-tains communications connectivity with the otherMACCS agencies, the FSCC, the FFCC, aircraftunder its control, and joint and other Services’ airsupport organizations. The DASC also requiresconnectivity with forward-based air assets torequest a launch in support of ground forces.

The DASC operates through several air controlorganizations (see MCWP 3-25.3 for detailed in-formation). These air control organizations arediscussed in the following subparagraphs.

(1) Tactical Air Control Party. A tactical aircontrol party (TACP) is a subordinate operationalcomponent of a tactical air control system. It pro-vides air liaison to land forces and provides forthe control of aircraft. In the Marine Corps,TACPs are organic to infantry divisions, regi-ments, and battalions. TACPs establish and main-tain facilities for liaison and communicationsbetween parent units and airspace control agen-cies, inform and advise the ground unit command-er on the employment of supporting aircraft, andrequest and control air support. The TACP is anagency of the MACCS, but administratively it isnot part of the MACG. It is located within theGCE and provides ground commanders with themeans to access direct air support.

(2) Tactical Air Coordinator (Airborne). ATAC(A) is an officer who coordinates, from anaircraft, the action of combat aircraft engaged inclose support of ground or sea forces. Within theMACCS, the TAC(A) is a naval aviator and/ornaval flight officer. The TAC(A) is the senior aircoordinator and has air authority over all aircraftoperating in an assigned area. The TAC(A)’s pri-mary mission is to act as an airborne extension ofthe DASC, TACC, and/or FSCC. The TAC(A)contributes to coordination among TACPs,

4-10 ________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-2

FAC(A)s, and the fire direction of artillery andnaval gunfire.

(3) Forward Air Controller (Airborne). AFAC(A) is a specifically trained and qualifiedaviation officer who exercises control from the airof aircraft engaged in close air support of groundtroops. The FAC(A) is normally an airborneextension of the TACP. Within the Marine Corps,the FAC(A) is a naval aviator and/or naval flightofficer who is specifically trained, qualified, anddesignated to perform air reconnaissance andsurveillance, conduct terminal control of aircraftengaged in OAS operations, control artillery andnaval surface fire support missions, act as a radiorelay, and control landing zone preparations.

(4 ) Assa ul t Suppor t Coord inator(Airborne). An ASC(A) is an aviator whocoordinates, from an aircraft, the movement ofaviation assets during assault support operations.The ASC(A) is an experienced aviator withextensive knowledge of the MACCS who acts asan airborne extension of the DASC. This indivi-dual assists in providing situational awareness tothe assault force, relays requests to the DASC,exercises launch authority for immediate and on-call missions, coordinates with the TAC(A), andprovides routing recommendations to the airmission commander.

(5) Helicopter Support Team. A helicoptersupport team (HST) is a task organization formedand equipped for employment in a landing zoneto facilitate the landing and movement of heli-copterborne troops, equipment, and supplies, and toevacuate selected casualties and enemy prisoners ofwar. Within the Marine Corps, HSTs are sourcedfrom the force service support group (FSSG),specifically, the landing support company of thesupport battalion.

g. Tactical Air Operations CenterThe TAOC is responsible for airspace control andmanagement. It provides the ACE with real-timesurveillance of assigned airspace; the capability todetect, identify, and control the interception ofhostile aircraft and missiles; and the direction,

positive control, and navigational assistance forfriendly aircraft. The TAOC collects and displaysinformation from its own sensors, other MarineCorps sources, and external sources that can beused to enhance the ability of the TACC to prose-cute the ACE’s support of deep operations.

Although collocated with the TAOC, the SAAWCis not an air command and control agency. He/Sheserves as an extension of the TACC, focusing onair defense planning and management. TheSAAWC is the MAGTF’s air defense battlemanager. The SAAWC manages and coordinatesall active defense weapons within an assignedsector, plans air defense operations, manages airdefense resources, supervises the employment ofair defense assets, and coordinates with higherand adjacent air agencies and activities.

The MACS provides the equipment and personnelneed to operate the TAOC. MACS personnelassigned to the TAOC use specialized informationsystems, sensors, and dedicated communicationslinks to search the MEF’s airspace and tocoordinate air defense. The TAOC controlsfriendly aircraft in the interception of hostile air-craft and assists missile units in locating anddestroying hostile aircraft. Information gainedthrough radar assets and tactical digital informationlinks is transmitted to the TACC to update the airpicture for the ACE commander. The TAOC alsointerfaces with the Air Force air operations centerand its control and reporting center to coordinatejoint air defense efforts.

The TAOC is movable, but not mobile. It islocated in the rear of the MEF area of operations.The TAOC, with its organic sensors, is located tobest facilitate surveillance coverage of theMAGTF sector. A MEF will normally deploy withone reinforced MACS that is task-organized tooperate and maintain the TAOC. Normally, aMEU has no requirement for a TAOC, but an earlywarning and control capability may be task-organized as part of a SPMAGTF if required. Foradditional MACS information, see MCWP 3-25.6,Marine Sector Antiair Warfare CoordinatorHandbook, and MCWP 3-25.7, Tactical Air Oper-ations Center Handbook.


h. Marine Air Traffic Control Detachments

The MATCD is the primary terminal ATCorganization within the MACCS. It is organizedand equipped to satisfy the ATC requirements forEAFs and FOBs. The detachment providesairspace control, management, and surveillancefor its designated sector or area of responsibility.MATCD services include all-weather radarapproach and departure control, en route ATCservices within assigned controlled airspace,precision and instrument approaches, controltower operations, and tactical air navigation.Additionally, the MATCD contributes to theoverall air surveillance effort. It coordinates airdefense activities within designated base defensezones by assisting in the detection of hostileaircraft for LAAD Stinger teams assigned toairbase defense. The detachment serves as theMAGTF’s liaison with host-nation, national, andinternational civil ATC agencies.

ATC detachments are components of the MACS.The MACS usually has four ATC detachments.All four detachments would be required to sup-port a MEF operation in which four EAFs and upto four other air facilities or sites could be estab-lished. Large radar systems, support equipment,and shelters are used to provide MEF-level sup-port. Deployment options include a mobile teamcapability. The mobile team is task-organized toprovide an initial rapid response capability for theestablishment and control of tactical landingzones. At the MEU level, the MACG detachmentcontains a task-organized MATCD mobile team.More detailed information on the MATCD can befound in MCWP 3-25.8, Marine Air Traffic Con-trol Detachment Handbook.

i. Low Altitude Air Defense

The LAAD battalion provides close-in, low-altitude, surface-to-air weapons fires in defense offorward combat elements, vital areas, andinstallations. It also provides surface-to-airweapons support for units engaged in special orindependent operations. The battalion uses man-portable Stinger missiles and a pedestal-mounted

vehicular version (Avenger) that furnishes a shoot-on-the-move capability. LAAD units provide earlywarning to other elements of the MACCS throughappropriate communications nets.

The LAAD battalion establishes a COC fromwhich the battalion commander exercises overallcommand and control of battalion operations. TheLAAD battalion COC is usually collocated withthe SAAWC facility at the TAOC to receivecueing and increase situational awareness. Thebattalion comprises two batteries, with threeplatoons per battery and three sections per platoon.A section, which is the smallest employableLAAD element, has five Stinger teams. These mayemploy either the man-portable Stinger or thevehicle-mounted Avenger system. A MEF isnormally supported by the entire battalion and aMEU is normally supported by one reinforcedsection. LAAD units are routinely task-organizedto support various contingencies.

When the LAAD operates in general support ofthe MAGTF, its collocation with the TAOC is de-sirable to facilitate integration into the overallMEF air defense effort and to provide access tothe air defense picture. When the LAAD operatesin direct support of the GCE, its collocation withthe DASC is a more effective location to receivethe air defense picture and cueing from MACCSsensors. When information from other MACCSsensors is not available, the section employs alightweight, short-range organic radar to detectaircraft and cue Stinger teams.

The LAAD battalion provides the MAGTF’sonly organic surface-to-air defense. MarineCorps forces have no organic means of ground-launched medium- or high-altitude air defense ortheater missile defense, which was formerlyprovided by the Hawk missile system. TheMAGTF depends on naval or another Servicessupport to provide those requirements. Moredetailed information on the LAAD battalion canbe found in MCWP 3.25.10, Low Altitude AirDefense Handbook.

4-12 ________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-2

j. Marine Wing Communications Squadron The MWCS provides communications for theACE. It is not an agency of the MACCS, but theMWCS provides the backbone for ACE communi-cations. It is responsible for the installation,maintenance, and operation of two distinct com-munications structures. These communicationsstructures provide the ACE commander with themeans to direct the efforts of subordinatecommanders and provide connectivity among thesub-elements of the MACCS.

The MWCS installs, operates, and maintainsexpeditionary communications for the ACE,including the phased deployment of task-organized

elements. It provides digital backbone communi-cations support; tactical automated switching andtelephone services; electronic message distri-bution; single-channel radio communications;and WAN, deployed LAN, and server support.The headquarters and one detachment normallydeploy and collocate with the ACE headquarters.When required, personnel and equipment fromoperational platoons are used to support the in-tegration of MACCS agencies as well as supportthe ACE headquarters. At the MEU level, theMACG detachment consists of a task-organizedMWCS communications team. More detailedinformation on the MWCS can be found inMCWP 3-25.9, Marine Air Command and ControlSystems Communications Handbook.

Chapter 5

Aviation Planning

“A good plan violently executed now is better than a perfect plan nextweek.”6

—Gen George S. Patton, Jr.

Planning is a continuous, anticipatory, interactive,and cyclic process. There are many planningcycles that take place within the context of theforce commander’s overall planning, decision,execution and assessment (PDE&A) cycle. Someof the cycles that relate to aviation planning areshown in figure 5-1. However, these planningcycles are not conducted separately, but collec-tively, and often simultaneously. They are inevi-tably linked together, with the inputs and outputsof each cycle interacting with other cycles on acontinuous basis. All of these processes supportthe overall goal of producing a plan—a vital toolused to prosecute a campaign.

The process of planning is of utmost importancebecause it drives operations. Planning cannot bedone to or for an organization; it must be done byit. Any commander or organization affected by aplan should have the opportunity to contribute tothe planning process. This provides users anunderstanding of how and why the plan wasconstructed and provides an opportunity to affecthow the commander will accomplish the as-signed mission.

There are two major aspects of aviation planning:support of the operation plan (OPLAN) and/orfragmentary order (FRAGO) development andproduction of a daily ATO. Both allocate aviationassets, munitions, and support. Marine Corps op-erations and their requisite OPLANs are missionfocused, intent driven, and event and/or conditionbased. ATO production is a continuous cyclebased on assets and time. Aviation planning is thetranslation of the MAGTF commander’s event-and/or condition-based plan into a time-basedplan of action for the ACE.

This chapter describes the ways in which aviationplanning reflects and interacts with other cyclesand planning concepts to produce the force’soverall operation order. It addresses the cyclicalprocess that produces the ATO or air plan.MCWP 5-11.1, MAGTF Aviation Planning ,contains a detailed discussion on all aspects ofaviation planning, which culminate into an ATOor air plan.

5001. The Commander’s Role in Planning

The commander—whether the JFC, amphibioustask force (ATF) commander, or MAGTFcommander—is responsible for providing top-down planning guidance. Detailed aviationplanning must embody the supported commander’soverall intent and concept of operations. The ACEcommander is the MAGTF commander’s chiefaviation expert and advisor and must simul-taneously participate in the aviation planningprocess at three levels: within the ACE, within theMAGTF command element, and at the naval orFigure 5-1. Linked Planning Cycles.

ACE

Air Tasking

Cycle

MAGTF

PDE&A

Cycle

MAGTF

Fires

Cycle

Joint

Air Tasking

Cycle

JFC/CINC

PDE&A

Cycle

5-2 _________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-2

joint force headquarters (if any). The ACEcommander directs the ACE staff in the executionof the aviation planning process. The ACEcommander’s inputs are key to the development ofMarine aviation planning documents. The ACEbattlestaff assists the ACE commander in exe-cuting duties by providing specialized expertiseand advice. The ACE battlestaff (see fig. 5-2)consists of the chief of staff, the principal staffofficers (i.e., G-1, G-2, G-3, G-4, G-6, and aviationlogistics division [ALD] representative), andspecial staff officers (e.g., staff judge advocate,surgeon, chaplain) required by the situation or theACE commander. The ACE commander’s respon-sibilities include—Acting as the MAGTF commander’s principal

Marine aviation advisor.Advising and assisting the MAGTF command-

er and staff in developing the overall conceptfor the employment of aviation in support ofthe MAGTF.

Coordinating air operations with the GCE andthe CSSE.

Coordinating with the naval expeditionaryforce and joint task force as necessary.

Developing the MAGTF ATO or air plan and/or Marine input to the joint ATO through theair tasking cycle.

5002. Staff Organization for Aviation Planning

From the TACC, the ACE commander conductsfuture operations planning and current operationsmonitoring. Each Marine aviation function (OAS,AAW, assault support, air reconnaissance, EW,and control of aircraft and missiles) has represen-tatives in the TACC. The future operations sec-tion produces the air plan, ATO, or Marine inputto the joint ATO. The current operations sectionmanages the execution of the air plan or ATO.The G-3 or a senior G-3 representative serves asthe senior watch officer within the current opera-tions section. Key inputs to overall aviation plan-ning are developed by the relevant organizations.

The TACC is organized as a fully integratedfacility to promote the intra- and inter-staff coor-dination necessary for responsive and synchro-nized MAGTF air operations. The TACC enablesthe ACE staff to align functionally and orga-nizationally with the MAGTF staff (see figs. 5-3and 5-4). This facilitates inter-staff coordination,which is critical for effective planning and execu-tion of MAGTF air operations. See MCWP 3-25.4for detailed information on TACC organizationand functioning.

Figure 5-2. The ACE Battlestaff.

ACE

Commander

Chief of Staff

G-1 G-2 G-3 G-4

G-6 ALD Special Staff*

* As required


Figure 5-3. TACC Organizations and Command Relationshipsto the ACE Battlestaff.

Figure 5-4. MEF-ACE Staff Alignment.

G-3

TACC

Future Plans

ACE Staff &

G-3

Current Ops

Executes current

OPORD/FRAGO

G-3

Future Ops

Plans next major

subordinate command

mission change

(OPORD/FRAGO)

G-5

Future Plans

Plans next MEF

mission change

(OPLAN/CONPLAN)

G-3

TACC

Current Ops

Executes current

ATO and

OPORD/FRAGO

G-3

TACC

Future Ops

Plans next ATO(s)

and ACE subordinate

unit mission change

(OPORD/FRAGO)

Plans next ACE

mission change

and develops ACE

estimates and support

plans

MEF

ACE

5-4 _________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-2

5003. Planning Cycles

All aviation planning takes place within the plan-ning cycles of larger organizations: the JTF, theATF, and the MAGTF. Planners at those levelswill require inputs from aviation elements at eachphase of their own planning, and their planningproducts will drive aviation planning. Moving fromthe general to the specific, key planning cycles andplanning concepts include the following:

a. The Planning, Decision, Execution, and Assessment Cycle The commander and staff use the PDE&A cycleto plan operations, make accurate and timely deci-sions, direct the effective execution of operations,and assess the results of those operations. It is aseries of continuous, interrelated processes thatframe military operations.

The PDE&A cycle is a continuous cycle—frominitial receipt of the mission through missionaccomplishment. It is both time- and event-driven.It supports the commander’s effort to assimilateinformation in the chaotic environment of war toincrease tempo through timely and decisive action.For example, the ATO is critical to planning andexecuting operations and is produced in a cyclethat requires timely input from subordinates.Planning the next operation also requires a con-stant flow of information from current operations.

b. Integrated Planning Through the Warfighting Functions The integrated approach to planning provides afunctional approach that is systematic, coordinated,and thorough. It is based on the six warfightingfunctions: command and control, maneuver, fires,intelligence, logistics, and force protection. Thewarfighting functions encompass all activities inthe battlespace.

Focusing on warfighting functions instead of spe-cific arms or organizations allows the commanderto fully integrate all actions into supporting themission of the force as a whole. This helps theforce achieve focus and unity of effort across all

organizational lines. For example, the GCE doesnot concern itself solely with maneuver, nor doesthe ACE concern itself solely with fires. Rather,each organization considers how it can contributeto each warfighting function in order to accomplishthe force’s overall mission. When all warfightingfunctions are focused to accomplish the desiredstrategic objective in the shortest time possible andwith minimal casualties, the MAGTF can obtainmaximum impact. The key to integrated planningwithin the command is the use of representativesfor each warfighting function on the planning staffand between commands the warfighting functionsare represented by liaison officers.

c. The Marine Corps Planning Process Within the PDE&A cycle, specific MAGTF op-erations and supporting aviation operations areplanned by using the standard framework ofmission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops andsupport available, time available (METT-T) andthe cyclical, six-step Marine Corps Planning Pro-cess (MCPP) (see fig. 5-5). MCWP 5-1 discussesthe MCPP in detail.

Figure 5-5. Marine Corps Planning Process.


The MCPP provides a logical and orderly methodfor planning operations. Each successive step inthe process is linked. The output from one stepbecomes the input for the next. Interactions amongvarious planning steps allow a concurrent, coor-dinated effort that maintains flexibility, makesefficient use of available time, and facilitatescontinuous information sharing. Aviation planninguses the MCPP and adjusts it as necessary toaddress the specific requirements associated withthe planning and execution of air operations. Byapplying the MCPP to ACE planning, the tenets ofthe MCPP (single-battle concept, top-downplanning and integrated planning) are also incor-porated into ACE operations. The following sub-paragraphs provide a brief description of the sixsteps of the MCPP.

(1) Mission Analysis. Mission analysis is thefirst step in planning. The purpose of missionanalysis is to review and analyze orders, guid-ance, and other information provided by higherheadquarters and to produce a unit mission state-ment. Mission analysis drives the MCPP. The avi-ation commander will advise the commander onthe aviation implications of the mission assigned.

(2) Course of Action Development. DuringCOA development, planners use the missionstatement (which includes higher headquarters’tasking and intent), commander’s intent, andcommander's planning guidance to developseveral COAs. Each prospective COA is examinedto ensure that it is suitable, feasible, different,acceptable, and complete with respect to thecurrent and anticipated situation, the mission, andthe commander’s intent. In accordance with thecommander’s guidance, approved COAs aredeveloped in greater detail. Each fully developedCOA will include a concept of air employment.

(3) Course of Action War Games. DuringCOA war games, each friendly COA is examinedagainst selected threat COAs. This analysisinvolves a detailed assessment of each COA as itpertains to the threat and the environment. COAwar games assist the planners in identifyingstrengths and weaknesses, associated risks, andasset shortfalls for each friendly COA. It is also

used to identify branches and potential sequelsthat may require additional planning. Short ofactually executing the COA, COA war gamesprovide the most reliable basis for understandingand improving each COA. For the war game ofeach COA, aviation planners must supply anestimate of supportability. The format for theaviation estimate of supportability can be found inMCRP 5-11.1A, Aviation Planning Documents.

(4) Course of Action Comparison and De-cision. In COA comparison and decision, the com-mander evaluates all friendly COAs againstestablished criteria. The COAs are then evaluatedagainst each other. The commander selects the COAdeemed most likely to accomplish the mission.

(5) Orders Development. During ordersdevelopment, the staff takes the commander’sCOA decision, intent, and guidance and developsorders to direct the actions of the unit. Ordersserve as the principal means by which thecommander expresses his/her decision, intent, andguidance. Aviation planners produce an opera-tions order and participate in the preparation ofmany other higher level orders.

(6) Transition. Transition is the orderly handover of a plan or order as it is passed to thosetasked with execution of the operation. It providesmission executors with the situational awarenessand rationale for key decisions that are necessaryto ensure a coherent shift from planning to execu-tion. For aviation units, transition occurs at theaviation confirmation brief, during which the avi-ation plan is fully briefed to the commander, thestaff, and key participants.

5004. Aviation Planning as an Element of MAGTF Planning

Aviation planning is conducted concurrently andin coordination with other MAGTF planning byusing the steps of the MCPP and integrating thefunctions of aviation into the warfighting func-tions. While the MAGTF command element isplanning overall MAGTF operations, the ACE

5-6 _________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-2

commander and staff are concurrently planningair operations in support of the MAGTF and coor-dinating with other elements of the MAGTF todetermine their aviation support requirements.This concurrent, parallel approach to planning ispossible through the use of mission-type orders, aclear understanding of the MAGTF commander’sintent, and close and continuous liaison amongthe MAGTF command element, ACE, GCE, andCSSE and external organizations. Concurrent,parallel planning provides aviation planners withthe time necessary to execute the air tasking cyclewhile enhancing the tempo of MAGTF opera-tions. This form of planning also ensures thatACE operations are focused on attainment ofMAGTF objectives in concert with the MAGTFcommander’s concept of operations.

a. Aviation Planning and the Operation Order Because aviation contributes to so many of thewarfighting functions, aviation planners mustprovide input to the overall MAGTF operationorder in many areas, including intelligence, op-erations, and logistic annexes. For example, theoperations order, Annex C, contains an appendixon fire support that contains a tab on the air fireplan. MCWP 5-1 provides the full structure of anoperation order. Details on the aviation operationsannex can also be found in MCWP 5-11.1 andMCRP 5-11.1A.

Aviation planners produce numerous subordinateplans and documents, such as the airspace controlplan (ACP) and the ATO. Annex W incorporatesthe aviation concept of operations (see MCWP 5-1for an example) and may include any or all of thefollowing appendixes (most of which include sev-eral subordinate tabs):Appendix 1, Air Defense/Antiair Warfare.Appendix 2, Offensive Air Support.Appendix 3, Assault Support.Appendix 4, Reconnaissance and Surveillance

Plan.Appendix 5, Supplementary Air Operations.Appendix 6, Aircraft Armament.Appendix 7, Air Control.Appendix 8, Air Communications.

Appendix 9, Air Movement Plan/Flight Ferry.Appendix 10, Aircraft Schedules.Appendix 11, Air Tasking.

This information may be included in Appendix 17(Aviation Operations) to Annex C (Operations) ofthe MAGTF operations order for smaller scaleoperations such as MEUs or SPMAGTFs.

b. The Air Tasking Order The JFACC or the ACE commander generates theATO (MCRP 5-11.1A contains the ATO format).The ATO is used to task and disseminate tocomponents, subordinate units, and command andcontrol agencies the targets and specific missionsof projected sorties, capabilities, and forces. Itnormally provides both general instructions andspecific instructions, including call signs, targets,and controlling agencies (see JP 3-56.1). The ATOmay include the airspace control order or theairspace control order may be issued separately. Italso includes special instructions that provideamplifying notes, important details, and changes.The ATO, airspace control order, and specialinstructions provide operational and tactical direc-tion at appropriate levels of detail. The level ofdetail should be very explicit when forces operatefrom different bases or when multi-componentand/or composite missions are tasked. In contrast,less detail is required when missions are tasked to asingle component or base. See JP 3-52, Doctrinefor Joint Airspace Control in a Combat Zone, forfurther discussion.

Each ATO covers a 24-hour period. There are usu-ally four ATOs at any given time. They include—The ATO undergoing assessment (yesterday’s

plan).The ATO in execution (today’s plan), which is

monitored by the current operations staff.The ATO in production (tomorrow’s plan).The ATO in planning (the following day’s

plan) by the future operations staff.

Because input to the joint ATO must be provided3 to 4 days in advance, the ATO can represent on-ly a starting point for daily flight operations. It isimpractical to predict every need in advance. The


MAGTF commander must have the flexibility tolaunch or to divert any aircraft as necessary tocomplete the mission, even if this requires short-notice deviations from the ATO.

In accordance with the character of maneuverwarfare, the ATO must be flexible enough tochange with the needs of the force as the situationchanges. It is not a rigid constraint on operationalflexibility. Because the ATO represents a greatdeal of necessary coordination and deconflictionof air assets and airspace, necessary deviationsfrom the ATO should be well justified and rele-vant headquarters should be informed as quicklyand as fully as possible. The JFC directs howchanges are made to the ATO.

During Navy and Marine Corps operations afloat,an ATO may not exist, rather a consolidated flightschedule or ship’s air plan is used. All squadronflight schedules are consolidated with the needsof the MAGTF, ship, amphibious ready group(ARG), or carrier battle group (CVBG) at an airboard. The air board works on current and futureplans for air support. The results are published asthe ship, ARG, or CVBG air plan. The air boardalso provides the input for the joint ATO.

Most, if not all, missions involving squadronflight schedules and air plans will appear on the

joint ATO. This includes all MAGTF fixed-wing,rotary-wing, and UAV flights that operate withinthe JTF’s airspace. This is necessary in order tocoordinate airspace and minimize risk of fratri-cide. Those flights which may or may not be in-cluded in the joint ATO are usually routinehelicopter functional check flights or ship-to-shipor ship-to-shore logistic flights. These routinefights have a negligent effect on airspace coordi-nation and have been pre-approved and/or coordi-nated to be conducted on a regular basis.

Ships (particularly aircraft carriers) may also op-erate outside of the JTF’s airspace. Missions thatdo not enter JTF airspace will not appear on thejoint ATO. Nonetheless, every mission that issubmitted and approved for the joint ATO mustappear on squadron flight schedules and theMAGTF, ship, ARG, or CVBG air plan.

5005. The Air Tasking Cycle

The air tasking cycle (see fig. 5-6) is the key toolused by aviation planners to plan air operationsthat support the MAGTF’s mission and producethe MAGTF ATO or air plan. The six-phaseMAGTF air tasking cycle is compatible with thesix-phase joint air tasking cycle. The six phases of

Figure 5-6. MAGTF Six-Phase Air Tasking Cycle.

5-8 _________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-2

the air tasking cycle are command aviation guid-ance, target/air support mission development, al-location and allotment, tasking, force execution,and combat assessment. JP 3-56.1 addresses thejoint air tasking cycle. JP 3-09 and MCWP 3-42.1address the targeting cycle.

a. Command Aviation Guidance The MAGTF air tasking cycle begins when thecommander assigns a mission to the ACEcommander. The MAGTF commander providesguidance through mission orders, clearly con-veying the mission intent and designating theMAGTF main effort. In preparing this guidance,the MAGTF commander will normally consultwith subordinate commanders to assess the resultsof the warfighting effort to date and to discussfuture OPLANs. This provides subordinatecommanders with an opportunity to introducerecommendations, describe their ability to supportother elements, and list support requirements.

The commander’s guidance and objectives identi-fy targeting priorities, procedures, joint fire sup-port coordinating measures, rules of engagement,and a definition of direct support sorties. The de-velopment of the concept of fires and targetingguidance is the responsibility of the MAGTFforce fires coordinator and is based on the com-mander’s intent and input from the major subordi-nate element commanders.

The MAGTF commander uses the recommen-dations of the ACE commander and staff and theMAGTF force fires coordinator to make appor-tionment decisions. These decisions identify thetotal level of effort that should be dedicated toaviat ion tasks in order to accomplish theassigned mission. As the battle progresses, theMAGTF commander revises apportionmentdecisions to meet the requirements of the currentsituation. Apportionment is usually expressed asa percentage of the total aviation effort and helpsto ensure the efficient use of limited aviationresources. If the MAGTF is part of a joint force,the MAGTF mission statement may include theJFC’s apportionment guidance for Marineaviation if Marine sorties are to be provided tothe joint force. The following is an example of

the MAGTF commander’s apportionment for anamphibious assault operation:

Pre-Assault Operations DAS, AAW, or SEAD sorties = 70% (a

portion of these will go to the joint ef-fort).

CAS sorties = 0%. Assault support sorties = 10%. EW sorties = 10%. Command and control = 5%. Excess sorties (any type) = 5% (will go

to the joint effort).During the Initial Assault DAS, AAW, or SEAD sorties = 10% (a

portion of these will go to the joint ef-fort).

CAS sorties = 30%. Assault support sorties = 45%. EW sorties = 5%. Command and control = 10%. Excess sorties (any type) = 0% (there

may be no excess sorties available).

Note: Excess sorties are those sorties availablefor tasking, but are not needed by the MAGTF.Sorties provided for air defense, long-range inter-diction, and long-range reconnaissance are notexcess sorties and will be provided up front to theJFC as required. These sorties provide a distinctcontribution to the overall joint force effort. TheJFC must exercise integrated control of air de-fense, long-range reconnaissance, and interdic-tion aspects of the joint operation or theatercampaign. Excess sorties are in addition to thesesorties (see JP 3-56.1 for more details).

b. Target/Air Support Mission Development The specific objectives described by the com-mander are used to focus specific target and airsupport mission development. All potential targetsand air support requests are processed through theappropriate staff sections, which will identify, pri-oritize, and select specific targets/air support mis-sions that meet the commander’s objectives andguidance and support the concept of operations.


Overall target planning is the responsibility of theMAGTF force fires coordinator. The ACE com-mander and staff assist in this effort and provideessential guidance in the evaluation and selectionof aviation targets. Targets are selected from jointtarget lists (if any), requests from all elements ofthe MAGTF, intelligence recommendations, EWinputs, and current intelligence assessments.

Air support mission development (including thosemissions involving the attack of targets) is also anessential component of this phase of the ATOdevelopment cycle. Air support mission requestsare generated, evaluated, and prioritized in thesame manner as targets. Since all of these mis-sions require the allocation of ACE assets andthose assets are usually finite, the ACE command-er and staff play a central role in their evaluation.The MAGTF commander will ultimately approvethe prioritization of both the target list and the airsupport mission list.

In accordance with the commander’s objectivesand component targeting/air support mission re-quirements, the ACE staff develops air OPLANsto employ all available and appropriate capabili-ties and forces. The end product of this phase ofthe ATO cycle is a MAGTF prioritized list of tar-gets and air support missions.

c. Allocation and Allotment After receiving the commander’s apportionmentdirective and understanding the targeting/air sup-port mission requirements, the ACE commanderallocates the planned effort. Allocation (air) is thetranslation of the air apportionment decision intothe total numbers of sorties (by aircraft type)available for each operation or task. Allocation(air) includes the submission of all air support re-quests (OAS, DAS, AAW, assault support, andcommand and control) to the MAGTF FSCC and/or air center. When all air support requests havebeen received, the ACE commander presents theallocation request to the MAGTF commander.Once the allocation request has been approved,the allocated sorties are distributed, or allotted, tosupport the MAGTF and its elements. Allotmentdecisions allow MAGTF elements to plan and co-ordinate the integration of sorties into their fire

and maneuver efforts. The GCE and CSSE com-manders determine the appropriate distribution ofthese sorties.

d. Tasking Tasking is the process of translating allocationand allotment decisions into an ATO or air planand then passing the tasks to the units involved.The MAGTF ATO or air plan assigns missionsand mission support responsibilities to specificsquadrons.

If a Marine headquarters is designated as theACA and/or JFACC, ATO interoperability withother Services depends to some degree on theContingency Theater Automated Planning System(CTAPS). CTAPS is a hardware and softwaresystem composed of a variable number of work-stations on a LAN that are linked with geographi-cally remote terminals. The focus of CTAPS isthe ATO that tasks operational units to fly speci-fied combat and combat support missions and tomaintain aircraft and aircrews at specified alertstates. CTAPS functions are currently scheduledto be replaced by modules of the U.S. AirForce’s Theater Battle Management Core Sys-tems (TBMCS) program. TBMCS is an umbrellaprogram that assimilates the ATO’s production,dissemination and execution that currently residentin CTAPS. Additionally, TBMCS contains soft-ware modules that automate the DASC and theatermissile defense planning functions. TBMCS is in-tended to resolve those problems of compatibilityand interoperability associated with CTAPS.TBMCS links the organizational levels of com-mand with automated tools as they relate to airoperations, creating the functional capabilities forplanning, intelligence, and operational execution.Ultimately, TBMCS will receive, display, and in-tegrate a common space, air, ground, and mari-time situation for all forces.

e. Force Execution Aircraft squadrons assign individual aircrews andaircraft to specific mission numbers and issuesquadron flight schedules once they receive theATO or air plan. Actual mission planning andcoordinat ion with the MAGTF command

5-10 ________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-2

element, ACE, GCE, and CSSE staffs are per-formed by the designated mission commander.Task-organized flights of aircraft then execute theassigned missions. During execution, the ACEcommander exercises command and control ofaviation forces through the MACCS, includingthe dynamic re-tasking of assets to meet thechanging situation.

f. Combat Assessment Effective campaign planning and executionrequire a continuing evaluation of the impact ofcombat operations on the overall campaign.Combat assessment is focused at the MAGTFlevel; however, it is done (in varying degrees) at alllevels. Normally, the ACE G-3/S-3, assisted by theG-2/S-2, is responsible for coordinating combatassessment of ACE missions. The G-3/S-3’sassessment is forwarded to the MAGTF staff forfurther evaluation.

Combat assessment evaluates a combat opera-tion’s effectiveness in achieving commandobjectives. The ACE staff continually evaluatesthe results of air operations and provides theseevaluations to the MAGTF commander for

consolidation and overall evaluation of currentoperations. Combat assessment assesses theeffects, relative to friendly objectives and stra-tegy, of both specific air support missions and airoperations in general against the specific targetsattacked, whole target systems, and remainingenemy warfighting capabilities. It should includeBDA, munitions effects assessment, and reattackrecommendations. It must take into considerationthe capabilities, forces, munitions, and attacktiming employed.

Assessors should weigh future enemy COAs andremaining enemy combat capabilities againstestablished targeting/air support mission prioritiesto determine future objectives and reattackrecommendations. The ACE staff assessment isforwarded to the force commander to determineoverall mission success and to recommend changesregarding COAs. Combat assessment marks theend of the air tasking cycle, but it also provides theinputs for the next air tasking cycle and subsequentcommand guidance, target/air support missiondevelopment, allocation and allotment, tasking,force execution, and combat assessment.

Chapter 6

Aviation Logistics

“I don’t know what the hell this ‘logistics’ is that Marshall is alwaystalking about, but I want some of it.”7

—Adm Ernest J. King

ACE commanders and logisticians must plan andexecute both aviation ground support operationsconducted by the MWSS and aviation logisticsoperations conducted by the MALS. The MALSprovides aviation-peculiar logistic support and theMWSS provides aviation ground support (EAF,aircraft rescue and fire fighting, etc.) as well asground-common combat service support. A CSSdetachment from the CSSE provides ground-common logistic support beyond the capability ofACE’s organic CSS units. These logistic opera-tions must sustain the ACE, which in turnprovides worldwide expeditionary support to theMAGTF. Direct support for naval aviation (Navyand Marine) is sourced and funded by the Navy,therefore components of the ACE use two sets ofprocedures for supply and maintenance op-erations: aviation logistic functions are pre-scribed by naval publications and aviation groundsupport logistic functions are prescribed byMarine Corps publications.

6001. Strategic Aviation Logistics and Aviation Ground Support

Within the Marine Corps, the Deputy Chief ofStaff for Aviation is responsible for planning andcoordinating staff activities for all matters relativeto the organization, equipment, manpower, train-ing, and support of Marine Corps aviation unitsand installations, including all aviation logisticand/or aviation ground support matters. SinceMarine Corps aviation is an integral part of navalaviation, the Deputy Chief of Staff for Aviation (aMarine Corps designation) is also designated as aOPNAV (N88M) (the Navy equivalent). This

makes the Marine Corps’ Deputy Chief of Stafffor Aviation equal to the Navy’s Head, Air War-fare Division OPNAV (N88). In this capacity, theDeputy Chief of Staff is responsible to the Chiefof Naval Operations to ensure that Marine Corpsaviation is in consonance with the overall navalaviation program.

Within Headquarters Marine Corps the Depart-ment of Aviation, Aviation Logistics SupportBranch is responsible for the equipping, support-ing, and maintaining of aircraft and aviation unitsand installations across the logistic spectrum. TheAviation Logistics Support Branch coordinateswith the Chief of Naval Operations (OPNAV)staff and numerous Naval Systems Commands toplan needed aviation logistic support of MarineCorps forces. Specifically, it plans the aviation lo-gistic and aviation ground logistic support in mat-ters of policy, management, procurement, supply,and distribution of materiel (including the acqui-sition, planning, programming, construction,management, maintenance, and disposition of realestate and facilities).

6002. Operational Aviation Logistics and Aviation Ground Support

The MAGTF’s power-projection capability isbased on its ability to move rapidly to and operatefreely within an objective area anywhere in theworld. To maintain this power-projection capa-bility, the MAGTF requires responsive air supportduring all phases of its operations. To provideresponsiveness in austere expeditionary environ-ments, Marine aviation must consider basing

6-2 _________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-2

options and available logistic support. Marineaviation basing selections must consider versa-tility, capability, vulnerability, footprint, andsustainability regardless of whether it operatesfrom the sea or from shore-based airfields locatedclose to or in the area of operations.

a. Seabasing Aviation logistic operations from aircraft carriers,aviation-capable amphibious ships, and aviationlogistics support ships (TAVBs) can eliminate theneed to establish vulnerable, relatively immobilesupport facilities ashore. This reduces footprintsashore and translates into greater freedom of ma-neuver and operational flexibility and a lessenedvulnerability for the ACE. Seabasing of Marineaviation also eliminates the political problems as-sociated with obtaining host nation permission touse airfields and facilities. However, the opera-tional situation may be such that the limited spaceand facilities aboard ship are overtaxed or the dis-tance from the ship to the operating area is great.In those cases, aviation forces may require a FOBand retain as much of the aviation logistic supportas possible at sea.

b. Forward Operating Bases When it is necessary to meet operational demands,the ACE can operate from shore-based, FOBs. AFOB is any airfield used to support tacticaloperations without establishing full support facili-ties ashore. FOBs include main air bases, airfacilities, air sites, and air points. FOBs increaseresponsiveness by decreasing the distancesbetween the aviation base and the supported unit.Whenever possible, shore-based ACE operationsexploit existing facilities in the area of operations.Host government airfields are used when availableand tactically acceptable. Abandoned or capturedairfields are also used to reduce construction andinfrastructure requirements. If existing airfieldsare not adequate or suitable, roads and highwaysmay be used to provide austere runways. Finally,if facilities are inadequate or nonexistent, Navyand Marine units can be utilized to build an EAF.The MALS/MWSS uses task-organized supportpackages (see para. 6002c) to provide aviationlogistics and aviation ground support for FOBs.

ATC support is provided by task-organizedMATCD or mobile teams resident within theMACG or MACS (see chap. 4).

(1) Expeditionary Airfields. EAFs areportable airfields that can be constructed, used,dismantled, and moved to another site for reuse.They are constructed on-site by the MWSS andNavy mobile construction battalions. The EAFcan be used to support the full range of FOBs,from small austere sites to large main bases. TheEAF system is unique and flexible. It permitsMarine aviation to operate from captured ordamaged runways, parking lots, or roads and toestablish bases where none previously existed.This flexibility allows the ACE to adjust to anever-changing operational situation. The develop-ment of EAF technologies and the storage of theseassets on maritime prepositioning force (MPF)ships have reduced the U.S. deployment time toany theater of operations in the world from 9 or10 weeks to 2 or 3 weeks.

(2) Forward Arming and Refueling Points.Since existing air bases or air facilities may notexist in a dynamic, nonlinear battlespace, theACE commander can deploy a FARP to providethe required aviation support. It is temporary and,it is established for a specific mission. A FARP issometimes referred to as a laager point.

A FARP permits combat aircraft to rapidly andsimultaneously refuel and rearm from a forwardlocation. It provides the fuel and ammunitionnecessary for employment of aviation maneuverunits in combat. To reduce response time andmaximize aviation’s capabilities, the FARP ispositioned as close to the objective area as thetactical situation allows.

(3) Austere Forward Operating Sites. Insome situations, particularly when operating inunderdeveloped areas of the world, Marine avia-tion forces may be forced to use extremely austeresites as bases for aviation operations. Such sitespossess a minimal ground support capability.They may be nothing more than a jungle clearingthat is large and firm enough to support helicopteror V/STOL operations, or they may be a stretch of


highway that is sufficient to accommodate fixed-wing aircraft.

c. The Marine Aviation Logistics Support Program

Navy-funded aircraft logistic support is providedunder MALSP and administered and maintainedby the MALS. MALSP, together with TAVB andassets prepositioned aboard MPF ships, providesthe supporting MALS the ability to support eitherfixed-wing or rotary-wing aircraft of the ACE.

While the MEU ACE is embarked aboard an air-capable ship (e.g., LHA, LHD), aviation logisticsis the responsibility of the aircraft intermediatemaintenance department (AIMD) and the ship’ssupply department rather than the MALS. WhileMarine Corps aircraft squadrons operate from acarrier, they receive aviation logistic support fromthe AIMD and the carrier’s supply department.Maintenance and supply personnel from both theMALS and Marine Corps aircraft squadrons aug-ment the ship’s AIMD and supply department.

MALSP provides flexible and effective aviationlogistic support to the deployed MAGTF ACE. Itenables ACE logisticians to rapidly and efficient-ly identify, marshal, and deploy aviation logisticelements needed to support a task-organized mixof ACE aircraft.

By structuring aviation logistic support into forcemodules, MALSP provides credible and replen-ishable sustainment packages while reducing liftrequirements and force closure times. Requiredaviation logistic elements (personnel, spares, sup-port equipment, and mobile facilities) are formedinto specific support packages that are retainedwithin every MALS. Specific support packagesconsist of fly-in support packages (FISPs), contin-gency support packages (CSPs), and follow-onsupport packages (FOSPs). They are sized andtailored to meet the aviation logistic requirementsof each type, model, and series aircraft. Thesepackages are used in a “building block” fashion tomaintain aircraft availability during every phaseof an operation.

FISPs are considered enabling packages. Theyprovide the organizational-level spare parts (re-move and replace) that allow Marine aircraft tobegin flight operations immediately upon arrivalin theater. FISPs are airlifted to the operating siteas part of the fly-in echelon (FIE). When com-bined with aviation support equipment and classV(A) ammunition transported aboard MPF shipsor flight ferry aircraft, FISPs provide the criticalaviation support required for 30 days of combatflying. If flight operations are too extensive inscope or duration (i.e., longer than 30 days), thenext building blocks, CSPs, are transported intotheater. CSPs augment FISPs by adding the com-mon and peculiar aviation logistics needed forsustained aviation maintenance, supply, and ord-nance operations. CSPs integrate the supportequipment, mobile facilities, spares, and person-nel to sustain deployed aircraft for up to 90 days.

FOSPs are the final MALSP building block. AFOSP provides the support that the FISP and CSPdo not provide. It provides ACE aircraft with thesame support that is would receive in garrison andincludes first degree engine repair.

Training squadron allowances are built to supporta 30-day endurance period at peacetime flyinghours. It consists of separate, aviation logisticssupport items added to the allowances of a garri-son MAG. Training squadron allowance items areseparate from contingency support packages sothat during times of extended expeditionary oper-ations, CONUS-based training squadrons will re-tain the necessary aviation logistic elements thatwill enable them to continue training operations.

d. Aviation Logistics Support ShipThe TAVB’s primary mission is to providededicated sealift for movement of I-level aviationlogistic support for use in the rapid deployment ofa MAGTF ACE. It is designed to transport criticalI-level maintenance and supply assets to a forwardoperating area as part of a MEF-sized MAGTFcontingency. The TAVB’s primary concept ofoperations is to support MPF operations, but it canalso be tasked to support an amphibious operation.Traditionally, an amphibious operation exerts aforcible entry into an objective area, however a

6-4 _________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-2

TAVB requires an unopposed entry into an objec-tive area (similar to an entry required for a MPF)before offloading the MALS and its compositedcontingency support packages ashore. If theembarked MALS is phased ashore, the TAVB canbe used to perform a secondary mission of servingas a strategic sealift asset that is controlled by thecommander in chief.

To enhance MALS responsiveness, one ship(USS Wright, TAVB 3) is berthed on the eastcoast (Baltimore, MD) and another ship (USSCurtiss, TAVB 4) is berthed on the west coast(Por t Hueneme, CA). On not i f ica t ion ofmovement, the TAVB is expected to arrive in theobjective area within 30 days to marry withsupported aircraft squadrons, personnel, andaviation logistic assets already in theater. Bothships can be configured to provide I-level supportoperations while underway, in stream, or pierside.In consonance with the operational concept and ifconditions permit, The MALS can be transferredashore upon arrival.

e. Maritime Prepositioning ForceAircraft that are part of an ACE can be supportedin combination by one, or more, of the threeMPS squadrons. Each MPF squadron containsthe following operational and logistic supportassets: class V(A) munitions, O-level and limitedI-level aircraft support equipment, EAF mattingand airfield lighting, and ground common CSSassets for utilization by the supporting MWSS.These assets are required to support the notionalMPF ACE aircraft mix as defined by MCBul3501, Maritime Prepositioning Force (MPF)Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) ForceList. See MCWP 3.32, MPF Operations, formore information.

6003. Tactical Aviation Logistics and Aviation Ground Support

Logistic support for the ACE may be categorizedas either aviation logistics, aviation ground support(e.g., EAF, aircraft rescue and fire fighting), orcombat service support. Aviation ground support

and combat service support are primarily fundedby the Marine Corps. Aviation logistics (aviation-peculiar) is primarily funded by the Navy. Thefollowing subparagraphs provide an overview ofthe unique tactical aspects of aviation logisticsupport of the ACE. See MCWP 3-21.1, AviationGround Support, and MCWP 3-21.2, AviationLogistics, for an in-depth discussion of aviationground support,

a. Aviation-Peculiar Logistic SupportEach MALS is organized to provide a core groupof supervisory and support personnel that, whenaugmented by aircraft-specific maintenancepersonnel from aircraft squadrons, provide anintermediate maintenance capability for eitherfixed-wing or rotary-wing aircraft. Aircraftsquadrons are responsible for organizational-levelmaintenance. The following comprise the corecapabilities of a MALS:Provide intermediate-level (I-level) mainte-

nance for aircraft and aeronautical equipmentof all supported units, when authorized, per-form first degree repair on specific engines.

Provide aviation supply support for aircraftand Navy-funded equipment to all supportedunits.

Provide class V(A) ammunition logistic sup-port to ACE squadrons. This support encom-passes the requisitioning, storage, handling,assembly, transportation, inventory reportingof class V(A) ammunition, and planning forand operating an ammunition issue point at ex-peditionary sites.

Interpret, implement, audit, inspect, andprovide oversight for the MAG commandingofficer for all policies and procedures relatingto the administration and management of oper-ations and maintenance, Navy (less TAD)funds, aviation supply, aircraft maintenance,cryogenics, aircraft ordnance, avionics, anddata processing for all units within the MAGand the ACE.

Coordinate with the MWSG, MWSS, MACG,and other supporting Navy and Marine Corpsactivities in planning for the support requiredto execute aviation logistics.


Screen and inspect nonservicable aeronauticalequipment and material for testing and repair,shipment to another repair facility, or disposal.

Maintain the capability to deploy and to pro-vide MALSP packages as integral units or astailored aviation logistic elements assigned toanother MALS to support aircraft assigned to ahost MAG, MALS, or ACE.

Conduct individual and unit training to qualifyorganic and supported squadron personnel forperformance of assigned missions and tasks.

Provide data processing support to facilitateexecution of aviation supply, maintenance, andNavy-funded financial functions of the MAGand ACE.

b. Aviation Ground SupportThe MWSS provides aviation ground support andCSS functions for airfield operations. Specific ser-vices include EAF, explosive ordnance disposal,weather services, military police support, engi-neering support, materials handling equipment,motor transportation, intra-airfield communi-cation, aircraft rescue and fire fighting, utilitiessupport and maintenance, field messing, medicalsupport, and aircraft and ground vehicle refueling.The MWSS rout inely performs the campcommandant functions and provides the nucleusfor rear area security and air base defense. MWSSs

are designed to support either fixed-wing orrotary-wing operations; however, a single MWSScan be task-organized to simultaneously supportfixed-wing and rotary-wing operations.

c. Combat Service Support DetachmentA CSSD from the CSSE provides additionalcombat service support to the ACE. CSSD capa-bilities include—Transporting fuel, ordnance, and other supplies

required by the ACE from the point of entry inthe MAGTF area of operations to the EAF sitefor distribution by a MWSS and/or MALS.

Performing third echelon maintenance on engi-neer, motor transport, and communicationsequipment that is supported by the MarineCorps and operated by the ACE.

Providing postal, disbursing, exchange, legal,civil affairs, and graves registration services.

Providing supply, general engineering, healthservices, and other support that cannot be satis-fied by a MWSS.

CSSDs will be formed from the CSSE to providethe required support based on specific support re-quirements that are determined, requested, andcoordinated by the ACE G-4/S-4.

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Chapter 7

Marine Aviation in Navy, Joint,and Multinational Operations

“When a team takes to the field, individual specialists come together toachieve a team win. . . .

But they all must also believe that they are part of a team, a joint team, thatfights together to win.

This is our history, this is our tradition, this is our future.”8

—Colin L. Powell

The Marine Corps’ most significant contributionto a Navy, joint, or multinational operation is theMAGTF. Marine aviation is normally committedas the MAGTF’s ACE, but individual units mayalso be assigned to support other operations.These units may function as an integral part of aNavy carrier force, or they may provide specificfunctions (e.g., EW) in general support of a JTF injoint or combined operations.

7001. Navy Fleet Operational Support

The primary mission of Marine aviation is toparticipate as the air component of the MAGTF inthe seizure and defense of advanced naval basesand to conduct land operations that are essentialfor the prosecution of a naval campaign. Acollateral mission for Marine aviation is to parti-cipate as an integral component of naval aviationin the execution of other Navy functions as fleetcommanders direct. In this role, they normallybecome part of the Navy component of a jointforce. In either case, Marine aviation assets arepart of an integral force and are not normallyseparated from that force.

7002. Joint Operations

Joint operations are military actions conducted byjoint forces or Service forces in relationships(e.g., support, coordinating authority) that ofthemselves do not create joint forces. Joint opera-tions are conducted in support of the JFC’s cam-paign and the commander in chief’s theatercampaign plan.

The MAGTF has a unique, self-contained air-ground capability. However, Marines must beprepared to become a self-sustaining, contributingpart of joint operations ashore under the com-mand of a JFC. A JFC synchronizes the actions ofair, land, sea, space, and special operations forcesto achieve strategic and operational objectivesthrough integrated, joint campaigns and major op-erations. Their goal is to increase the total effec-tiveness of the joint force, not necessarily toinvolve all forces or to involve all forces equally.

The job of planning and tasking Marine aviationto support the MAGTF commander becomesmore complex when operating in a joint environ-ment. MAGTF planners and operators mustunderstand the MAGTF planning and operating

7-2 _________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-2

environment, the joint planning and operatingenviron-ment, and how the two interface (seechap. 4 for more information).

The JFC organizes forces to best accomplish theassigned mission: along Service lines conductingoperations through Service component comman-ders, along functional lines (air, ground, etc.)conducting operations through functional compo-nent commanders, or a combination of the twoapproaches and assigning functional commandsto the Service component that is best prepared tocontrol each function. Examples of functionalcomponent commanders include the joint force aircomponent commander (JFACC), joint force landcomponent commander (JFLCC), and joint forcemaritime component commander (JFMCC). TheJFC can also use other functional commanders,such as the AADC, joint special operationsforces commander, and joint force informationwarfare commander.

Normally collocated with the JFC, the JFACCfunctions as a coordinator of the JTF’s aviation re-sources to deliver direct support to certain compo-nents while exploiting the flexibility of airoperations to achieve campaign objectives. TheJFACC recommends apportionment of the joint aireffort to the JFC for approval or revision and trans-lates the JFC’s apportionment decision into sortieallocation. The JFACC determines allocation bymission, but individual components assign mis-sions to specific units. The JFACC is also responsi-ble for tasking available component air sorties forsupport of the joint campaign, normally throughthe ATO. Tasking is done at the JFACC level forjoint targets and missions and at the MAGTF levelfor Marine Corps targets and missions. There is asingle ATO for all joint air operations.

The MAGTF’s expeditionary nature, coupled withMarine aviation and its associated command andcontrol capabilities, allows the Marine componentcommander to function as the JFACC in small-scaleoperations. The Marine component commandermay also initially serve as the JFACC at the earlystages of a larger conflict. As forces continue tobuild up in theater, the JFC normally designatesthe commander with the preponderance of

aviation assets and the ability to command andcontrol all aviation assets as the JFACC.

In joint operations, the JFC normally tasks theMAGTF commander to provide certain types ofsorties for tasking through the JFACC. But theMAGTF commander retains OPCON of allMAGTF ACE assets. This tasking normally in-cludes sorties for air defense (DCA), long rangeair interdiction and air reconnaissance, and EW.

It is important to understand that the MAGTFcommander will retain operational control oforganic air assets (TACAIR) during joint opera-tions. This entire policy is outlined in chapter 4,page 5, and described in more detail in JP 0-2,UNAAF. This policy will allow the MAGTFcommander to meet the needs of the JFC whilemaintaining the tactical and operational integrityof the MAGTF component. Key to this arrange-ment is the premise outlined in JP 3-0, Doctrinefor Joint Operations, which states: “The JFC (andCINCs) should allow Service tactical and opera-tional groupings to function generally as they aredesigned.” Further, JP 3-56.1 states that one of themost important aspects of this guidance is therequirement for an air capable component to“provide the JFACC a description of their directsupport plan (DSP) to allow for coordination anddeconfliction of targeting efforts between eachcomponent and the JFC staff and agencies.”

The DSP is crucial in clarifying to the JFC at theoutset of the joint campaign what the CommanderMarine Corps Forces (COMMARFOR) requires tosustain Marine Corps operations in support of thejoint campaign plan. It should comprise the follow-ing key elements as stated by the COMMARFOR: The intent to retain OPCON of aviation capa-

bility/forces; That all Marine sorties should be made available

to the JFC for tasking by the JFACC in supportof the JFC's overall objectives and campaignplan prior to assignment of ground combatresponsibilities since the MARFOR requires nodirect support sorties or shaping operationsduring this period. This includes long range airinterdiction and air reconnaissance, electronic


warfare and air defense (defensive counter air)sorties when required by the JFC;

Intent to use organic aviation assets in directsupport of his/her forces in order to accomplishthe JFC-assigned mission in the designatedMARFOR area of operations (AO). CriticalDSP sub elements to this are: Intent to consolidate, deconflict, prioritize and

nominate targets to the joint targeting coordina-tion board (JTCB) to be included on the jointintegrated prioritized targeting list (JIPTL).

Provide a MAGTF generated direct supportATO to merge with the JTF joint ATO viaCTAPS/TBMCS.

Allocate sorties in excess of COMMARFOR’sdirect support requirements to the JFC fortasking by the JFACC for use in execution ofjoint operations.

Recommend to the JFACC, if designated asthe ACA/AADC, airspace control measures(ACM) that enhance integrated commandand control in COMMARFOR's AO/areasof responsibility. This includes establishingthe MACCS within the MARFOR's AO toprovide airspace control functions in theMARFOR's airspace control sectors as desig-nated by the ACA. These details must be in-corporated in the air control plan (ACP) andcoordinated with the ACA to ensure consis-tency with JTF airspace control guidance, di-rectives and procedures. COMMARFOR willforward all ACM requests to the ACA via theMARFOR liaison team at the JFACC.

Normally, any sorties in excess of MAGTF directsupport requirements are also made available to theJFC. The JFACC uses MAGTF sorties to supportthe JFC’s campaign objectives, often through sup-port to other components of the joint force. In turn,the MAGTF commander can also request aviationsupport from the JFC when organic Marineaviation assets do not meet the MAGTF’s aviationrequirements. See MCWP 3-25.4 and JP 3-56.1 fora discussion of the contingency theater automatedplanning system, which governs the developmentof the ATO.

Note: Sorties provided for long-range interdic-tion, air defense, and long-range reconnaissanceare not “excess” sorties. These sorties provide adistinct contribution to the overall joint force effortand will be covered in the ATO. The JFC mustexercise integrated control of air defense, long-range reconnaissance, and interdiction aspects ofthe joint operation or theater campaign.

7003. Multinational Operations

U.S. military operations are often conducted incooperation with the armed forces of other nationsin pursuit of common objectives. Multinationaloperations, both those that include combat andthose that do not, are conducted within thestructure of either an alliance or a coalition. Analliance is created by formal agreements amongtwo or more nations in pursuit of broad, long-termobjectives. Some alliances (e.g., NATO) havedetailed interoperability arrangements, protocols,and procedures. A coalition is a temporary ar-rangement among two or more nations for aspecific purpose. There is no universal doctrine forcoalition warfare; protocols and operating agree-ments are designed to suit the circumstances.Technically, only alliance operations are combinedoperations, but in common usage the word“combined” is often used to describe any multi-national operation.

Joint operations that are part of an alliance or coali-tion require close cooperation among all forces.Well-managed combined operations can serve tomutually reinforce strengths, reduce vulnerabili-ties, and provide legitimacy. Effectively plannedand executed mult;inational operations should, inaddition to achieving common objectives, facilitateunity of effort without diminishing U.S. freedom ofaction. Multinational operations should also pre-serve unit integrity and uninterrupted support.

Each multinational operation is unique. Planningand the conduct of operations vary with the inter-national situation and the perspectives, motives,

7-4 _________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-2

and values of the operations’ members. Whereasalliance members typically have similar politicaland economic systems and common long-termgoals, coalitions often bring together very diverseelements and cultures for a limited period of time.Typically, if coalition members perceive theirmembership and participation to be advancingtheir individual interests, the coalition remains in-tact. If their objectives or priorities diverge, thecoalition may break down. Therefore, militaryleaders of member nations must emphasize com-mon objectives as well as mutual support. Follow-ing, contributing, and supporting are importantroles in multinational operations, therefore, the

MAGTF is prepared to operate within the frame-work of an alliance or coalition that is led by a na-tion other than the United States.

The inherent flexibility of the Marine Corps’combined-arms doctrine, maneuver warfare phi-losophy, expeditionary nature, and versatile com-mand and control system create a MAGTF that iswell-prepared for the complexities of coalitionwarfare. Of great concern to the MAGTF, and tothe ACE in particular, will be the problems offorce protection, command and control of vastlydissimilar units, and the avoidance of fratricide.

Chapter 8

Emerging Concepts

“In brief, the whole future of warfare appears to me to lie in the employ-ment of mobile armies, relatively small but of high quality, and rendereddistinctly more effective by the addition of aircraft . . . .”9

—Gen. Hans von Seeckt

Operational maneuver from the sea (OMFTS) isboth the operational foundation and the capstoneof the Marine Corps’ concept of operations for thefuture. From this foundation flows supportingconcepts such as ship-to-objective maneuver, sus-tained operations ashore, MPF 2010 and beyond,and the Marine aviation concept paper, MAGTFAviation and Operational Maneuver From theSea. These concepts define the Marine Corps’,and therefore Marine aviation’s, future role interms of capabilities, operational employment,and joint relationships. These concepts also re-flect the Marine Corps’ understanding of andcommitment to maneuver warfare.

All of these concepts rely heavily on seabasing.The Marine Corps and the Navy currently con-duct OMFTS and seabasing operations, but not tothe degree outlined in recent concept papers. Al-though Marine aviation has a long tradition ofship-based operations, future, large-scale sea-based Marine aviation operations will be far morecomplex and demanding. If the Marine Corps andNavy are to conduct OMFTS as it is now envi-sioned, they will require substantial advances inaircraft, ships, command and control systems, andlogistic capabilities, as well as organizational anddoctrinal refinements to meet the proposed capa-bilities. This chapter explores the key new con-cepts and their implications for Marine aviation.

8001. Operational Maneuver From the Sea

The Marine Corps’ capstone operational conceptof OMFTS was published in January 1996. It was

built on the foundation provided in . . . From theSea” and “Forward . . . From the Sea. This con-cept encompasses more than how Marines willconduct power projection operations in the 21stcentury, it is a naval concept developed by theMarine Corps and designed to be executed in con-cert with the Navy. OMFTS places unprecedentedemphasis on operations in the world’s littorals,demands greater integration of naval operations inmaneuver warfare, and capitalizes on a navalforces’ ability to use the sea as a maneuver space.It is, in fact, a marriage between maneuver war-fare and naval warfare. The philosophy of maneu-ver warfare provides an understanding of thedynamic nature of military conflict and the re-quirement for skillful operations at a high tempo.The underlying ideas of naval warfare reflect theadvantages inherent in seaborne movement andseabased logistics. OMFTS requires enhancedbattlespace mobility, intelligence, command andcontrol, fire support, and sustainment. It enablesforward-deployed forces to provide the appropri-ate response to events throughout the range ofmilitary operations.

A key element in OMFTS is the seabasing ofcommand and control, logistics, and most firesupport functions. The seabasing of command andcontrol greatly reduces the force’s vulnerabilityand footprint ashore. By reducing logistic require-ments ashore and relying heavily on naval surfacefires and aviation fires, ground forces are per-mitted greater mobility. Seabased fire supportenhances and complements the effectiveness ofground-based fire support. Seabased forces enablecommanders to providing CSS assets to fightingunits without being distracted by the rear areasecurity concerns inherent in shore-based logistic

8-2 _________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-2

operations. Seabasing thus allows the ATF to putthe “teeth” ashore while leaving the support “tail”afloat, significantly enhancing the flexibility andtempo of land maneuver operations.

Marine aviation plays a vital part in OMFTS.From staging areas over the horizon, aviation willprovide responsive and sustained fires and logis-tic support directly into objective areas ashore.The concept of seabased aviation is not a newone. Marines have used helicopters to resupplyground forces since fielding the helicopter in theearly 1950’s. ACE aircraft have always beenbased on and supported by the ships of the am-phibious ready group. In OMFTS, however, ACEaircraft will depart from over the horizon, with theassault support forces embarked, and proceed toobjective area landing zones deep inland. Themain differences are the sizes of the assault forcesto be lifted, the distances to be transited, and themagnitude of the operations to be executed. TheMV-22 tilt-rotor will provide the speed, endur-ance, combat radius, payload, and survivabilityneeded to permit true maneuver warfare from thesea on a scale that supports the OMFTS concept.

8002. Ship-to-Objective Maneuver

OMFTS requires new tactical concepts for amphi-bious operations. Historically, amphibious opera-tions have been constrained by the requirement toestablish a lodgment ashore and by reliance onNavy command and control during the assault.Although amphibious-based vertical assault hasbeen a MAGTF maneuver technique for morethan 30 years, amphibious operations have notexploited the full potential of maneuver warfare.STOM takes advantage of emerging mobility andcommand and control systems to maneuverlanding forces in their tactical array from themoment they depart their ships in order to projecta combined-arms force by air and surface meansdirectly against inland objectives. True STOM isnot aimed at seizing a beach. Its goal is to thrustcombat units ashore at their decisive place, intheir fighting formations, and in sufficientstrength to ensure mission accomplishment.

Landing forces will engage enemy units only asnecessary to achieve the freedom of action re-quired to accomplish operational objectives.STOM replaces the preponderous ship-to-shoremovement of current amphibious warfare withtrue amphibious maneuver.

Although STOM’s focus is on the operationalobjectives ashore, the sea becomes an essentialmaneuver space for the landing force to generatethe tempo it needs to exploit enemy weaknesses.STOM provides the opportunity to achievetactical as well as operational surprise, which hasbeen hard to obtain in past amphibious operations.Operations will progress with a speed andflexibility of maneuver that will deny the enemywarning and reaction time. Vulnerabilities will beexploited before they are corrected, opportunitiesseized before they vanish, and traps sprung beforethey are discovered. Tactical flexibility that iscombined with reliable intelligence will allow thelanding force to bypass, render irrelevant, orunhinge and collapse the enemy’s defensivemeasures. Opposing forces will not be able toreact effectively or in time.

STOM operations will rely on highly capablemulti-role aircraft with assault support assets thatare capable of much longer ranges and greatercombat payloads. These operations will alsorequire a substantially improved aviationcommand and control system. Control of aircraftand missiles in this environment will requiregreatly enhanced information integration, coordi-nation, and execution.

Command, control, communications, computers,and intelligence will become even more critical astraditional lines of coordination become less dis-tinct and/or overlap in the widely dispersed,dynamic, and fluid operations of tomorrow. In anonlinear battlespace, advanced command andcontrol and information systems and the sharedsituational awareness that they create amongMarine leaders will have an increasingly pro-found impact on all operations. Accurate, real-time information will enhance weapon accuracy,aircraft survivability, friendly maneuver, and all


aspects of force protection. It will also reduce thepossibility of fratricide.

The Common Aviation Command and ControlSystem (CAC2S) will integrate the functions ofaviation command and control into an inter-operable naval system that supports OMFTS. Inconjunction with organic sensors and weaponssystems, CAC2S will bring Marine aviationcommand and control fully on line with otherjoint command and control systems and supportMACCS missions with a suite of scalablemodules. CAC2S components are specificallydesigned to be operated in an expeditionary mode,thereby providing the equipment to support anyoperational contingency.

8003. Sustained Operations Ashore

Although the MAGTF will continue to possessthe capability to conduct initial forcible entrythrough OMFTS, the MAGTF’s full potential liesin its capability to function as an operationalmaneuver element for the JFC in sustainedoperations ashore. The employment, organization,and basing of the MAGTF will be responsive tothe requirements of the JFC and to specific cir-cumstances within the area of operations. TheMAGTF of the future will provide the JFC withan agile, versatile, and responsive force that isable to strike directly at operational centers ofgravity or critical vulnerabilities. Therefore, theMAGTF will be one of the JFC’s principal toolsfor conducting decisive maneuver. In sustainedoperations ashore, the MAGTF will be primarilyseabased, but some elements of the MAGTF willgo ashore to create or exploit an operational ad-vantage, achieve greater integration with Army orAir Force components, or provide increased depthin aviation support or sustainment.

Future basing options during sustained operationsashore must support both fixed-wing and rotary-wing tactical aircraft with a mobile, self-deploy-ing capability. This will significantly reduce deckcycles and transit time from amphibious shipping

to an inland objective area. Reduction of refuelingand rearming times is as critical as minimizingflight time from bases to the objective area. Thetime that ground personnel can save refueling andrearming will equate to greater responsivenessand increased aircraft time on station, which sup-ports the MAGTF over the entire objective area.

To support OMFTS, the MAGTF must continueto use FOBs to increase its depth of support andsustainment of aviation forces ashore. The pur-pose of the FOB is to decrease response time andto minimize turnaround time in support ofsustained operations ashore. EAF operations arekey to the Marine Corps’ ability to establishFOBs in austere locations ashore. FARP opera-tions can further extend the reach and responsive-ness of aviation forces and can be run from anexpeditionary FOB. The introduction of shorttakeoff and vertical landing aircraft, with theirability to operate from shorter runways, willreduce the need for conventional runways andtheir associated arresting equipment. These air-craft must be designed to operate from anycombination of expeditionary fields, existingrunways, hard surface roads, or sea based.

8004. MPF 2010 and Beyond

OMFTS requires a more robust ability to conductin-stream offloading and to accommodate variouslevels of combat loading than currently exist.Existing technologies must be exploited and newtechnologies pursued that will permit the nextgeneration MPF to contribute to operationalemployment of MAGTFs across the full range ofoperations, including the rapid reinforcement offorward-deployed amphibious forces. MPF 2010and Beyond is the concept under which the nextgeneration MPFs will contribute to forwardpresence and power projection. These capabilitieswill remain central to U.S. deterrence and conflictresolution strategies. MPF 2010 and Beyond willprovide indefinite sustainment by serving as aseabased conduit for logistic support. Thissupport will flow from bases located in the UnitedStates or overseas via the seabase provided byMPF 2010 and Beyond then on to Marine unitsconducting operations at sea or ashore. This may

8-4 _________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-2

be accomplished as part of a larger, seabasedlogistic effort that includes not only MPSs, butalso TAVBs, hospital ships, and offshore petro-leum distribution systems.

Future MPSs will not have a true forcible entrycapability, but they will be able to reinforce thestriking power of an ATF. Future MPFs will par-ticipate in OMFTS by using selective offloadingcapabilities to reinforce the assault echelon of an

ATF. MPSs will be multipurpose and will providefacilities for the tactical employment of assaultsupport aircraft, surface assault craft, advancedassault amphibious vehicle, and the ships’ ownorganic lighterage. The ships’ communicationssystems will be fully compatible with the tacticalcommand and control architecture of the ATF.This will allow access to the advanced capabili-ties and shared situational awareness of futurecommand and control systems.

Appendix A

Marine Aviation Organization

Figure A-1. 1st Marine Aircraft Wing.

Figure A-2. 2d Marine Aircraft Wing.

A-2 _________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-2

Figure A-3. 3d Aircraft Wing.

Figure A-4. 4th Marine Aircraft Wing.

Appendix B

Glossary

Section I. Acronyms and AbbreviationsAADC . . . . . . . . . . . area air defense commanderAAW. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . antiair warfareACA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .airspace control authorityACE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . aviation combat elementACP. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . airspace control planADCON . . . . . . . . . . . . . . administrative controlAIMD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . aircraft intermediate

maintenance departmentALD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . aviation logistics divisionAOC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . airfield operations centerARG . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .amphibious ready groupASC(A) . . . assault support coordinator (airborne)ASE. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .air support elementATARS . . . . . . . . . . . . advanced tactical airborne

reconnaissance systemATC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . air traffic controlATF. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . amphibious task forceATO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . air tasking order

BDA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . battle damage assessment

CAC2S . . . . . . Common Aviation Command andControl System

CAS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . close air supportCE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . command elementCOA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . course of actionCOC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . combat operations centerCONUS. . . . . . . . . . . . . continental United StatesCSAR . . . . . . . . . . . . . combat search and rescueCSP . . . . . . . . . . . .contingency support packageCSS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . combat service supportCSSE. . . . . . . . . .combat service support elementCTAPS . . . . . . . Contingency Theater Automated

Planning SystemCVBG . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .carrier battle group

DAS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . deep air supportDASC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . direct air support centerDCA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . defensive counterair

EA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . electronic attackEAF. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . expeditionary airfield

EP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .electronic protectionES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . electronic warfare supportEW . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .electronic warfareEW/C . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . early warning/control

FAC. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . forward air controllerFAC(A) . . . . . . . forward air controller (airborne)FARP . . . . . forward arming and refueling pointFFCC. . . . . . . . . . force fires coordination centerFIE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . fly-in echelonFISP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . fly-in support packageFMF . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Fleet Marine ForceFOB. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .forward operating baseFOSP. . . . . . . . . . . . . .follow-on support packageFRAGO. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .fragmentary orderFREST . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Fleet replacement

enlisted student trainingFSCC. . . . . . . . . fire support coordination centerFSSG. . . . . . . . . . . . . force service support group

GCE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ground combat element

HMH . . . . . . . .Marine heavy helicopter squadronHMLA. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Marine light/attack

helicopter squadronHMM . . . . . Marine medium helicopter squadronHST. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . helicopter support team

JAOC . . . . . . . . . . . . . .joint air operations centerJCSAR . . . . . . . . joint combat search and rescueJFACC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . joint force air

component commanderJFC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . joint force commanderJFLCC. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . joint force land

component commanderJFMCC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . joint force maritime

component commanderJP. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . joint publicationJSTARS . . . . . . . . . . . . joint surveillance, target

attack radar systemJTF . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . joint task force

B-2 _________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-2

LAAD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . low-altitude air defenseLAN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . local area networkLHA . . .general purpose amphibious assault shipLHD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .multipurpose amphibious

assault ship (with internal dock)

MACCS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Marine air commandand control system

MACG . . . . . . . . . . . . . Marine air control groupMACS . . . . . . . . . . .Marine air control squadronMAG . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Marine aircraft groupMAGTF . . . . . . . . Marine air-ground task forceMAG VF/VA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . fixed-wing MAGMAG VH . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . rotary-wing MAGMALS . . . . . . Marine aviation logistics squadronMALSP . . . . . . . . . . . .Marine Aviation Logistic

Support ProgramMASS . . . . . . . . . . . Marine air support squadronMATCD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Marine air traffic

control detachmentMAW . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Marine aircraft wingMCDP . . . . . . Marine Corps doctrinal publicationMCPP . . . . . . . . Marine Corps Planning ProcessMCRP . . . . Marine Corps reference publicationMCWP . . .Marine Corps warfighting publicationMEF . . . . . . . . . . . . . Marine expeditionary forceMETT-T . . . . . . . . . . mission, enemy, terrain and

weather, troops and supportavailable—time available

MEU . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Marine expeditionary unitMEU(SOC) . . . . . . . . . Marine expeditionary unit

(special operations capable)MOOTW. . . . military operations other than warMPF . . . . . . . . . . . maritime prepositioning forceMPS . . . . . . . . . . . maritime prepositioning shipsMTACS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Marine tactical air

command squadronMWCS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Marine wing

communications squadronMWHS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Marine wing

headquarters squadronMWSG . . . . . . . . . . . Marine wing support groupMWSS. . . . . . . . . Marine wing support squadron

NATO . . . . North Atlantic Treaty OrganizationNDP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . naval doctrine publicationNEO . . . . . . noncombatant evacuation operationNGF . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . naval gunfire

OAAW . . . . . . . . . . . . . offensive antiair warfareOAS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . offensive air supportOCA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . offensive counterairOMFTS . . . . . operational maneuver from the seaOPCON. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . operational controlOPLAN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .operation plan

PDE&A. . . . . . . . . planning, decision, execution,and assessment

SAAWC . . . . . sector antiair warfare coordinatorSAM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . surface-to-air missileSEAD . . . . . . .suppression of enemy air defensesSPMAGTF . . . . . . . . . . special purpose MAGTFSTOM . . . . . . . . . . . . ship-to-objective maneuver

TAC(A) . . . . . . tactical air coordinator (airborne)TACC . . . . . . . . . . . . tactical air command centerTACON. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . tactical controlTACP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . tactical air control partyTAOC . . . . . . . . . . . tactical air operations centerTAVB . . . . . . . . . . aviation logistics support shipTBMCS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Theater Battle

Management Core SystemTOC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . tactical operations center

UAV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . unmanned aerial vehicleUNAAF. . . . . . . . . Unified Action Armed Forces

VMA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Marine attack squadronVMAQ . . . . . . . . . . . . .Marine tactical electronic

warfare squadronVMAT. . . . . . . . Marine attack training squadronVMFA. . . . . . . . . Marine fighter/attack squadronVMFA(AW) . . . . . . . . . . . . Marine fighter/attack

(all weather) squadronVMFAT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Marine figher/attack

training squadronVMGR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Marine aerial refueler

transport squadronVMGRT . . . . . . . Marine aerial refueler transport

training squadronVMM . . . . . . Marine medium tilt-rotor squadronVMMT . . . . . . . . . . . . Marine medium tilt-rotor

training squadronVMO-6 . . . . . . . . . Marine Observation Squadron

(Fixed-Wing)-6VMU . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Marine unmanned aerial

vehicle squadron

Aviation Operations ______________________________________________________________________________________ B-3

V/STOL . . . . . vertical/short takeoff and landing WAN. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . wide area network

Section II. Definitions

aviation combat element—The core element of aMarine air-ground task force that is task organizedto conduct aviation operations. The aviation com-bat element provides all or a portion of the sixfunctions of Marine aviation necessary to accom-plish the Marine air-ground task force’s mission.These functions are antiair warfare, offensive airsupport, assault support, electronic warfare, airreconnaissance, and control of aircraft and mis-siles. The aviation combat element is usually com-posed of an aviation unit headquarters and variousother aviation units or their detachments. It canvary in size from a small aviation detachment ofspecifically required aircraft to one or moreMarine aircraft wings. The aviation combat ele-ment may contain other Service or foreign militaryforces assigned or attached to the Marine air-ground task force. The aviation combat elementitself is not a formal command. Also called ACE.(approved for next edition of MCRP 5-12C)

air board—In Navy/Marine Corps operations, allsquadron flight schedules are consolidated withthe needs of the MAGTF/ship/ARG/CVBG at anair board. The air board meets every day in theSACC. It works on current and future plans for airsupport. The results are published as the ship/ARG/CVBG air plan. The air board also providesthe input for the joint ATO. (proposed definitionfor MCRP 5-12C)

air superiority—That degree of dominance in theair battle of one force over another which permitsthe conduct of operations by the former and itsrelated land, sea and air forces at a given time andplace without prohibitive interference by theopposing force. (JP 1-02)

air tasking cycle—The cyclical planning processthat Marine aviation planners use to plan air oper-ations in support of the MAGTF mission and toproduce the MAGTF ATO or air plan. The sixphases of the MAGTF air tasking cycle are com-mand aviation guidance, target/air support mis-sion development, allocation and allotment,tasking, force execution, and combat assessment.(The parallel six-phase joint air tasking cycle isdescribed in JP 3-56.1.) (proposed definition forMCRP 5-12C)

allocation (air)—The translation of the air appor-tionment decision into total numbers of sorties byaircraft type available for each operation or task.(JP 1-02)

allotment—The temporary change of assign-ment of tactical air forces between subordinatecommands. The authority to allot is vested in thecommander having combatant command (com-mand authority).

apportionment—In the general sense, distributionfor planning of limited resources among competingrequirements. Specific apportionments (e.g., airsorties and forces for planning) are described asapportionment of air sorties and forces for planning,etc. (JP 1-02) See also allocation (air); apportion-ment (air). (JP 1-02)

apportionment (air)—The determination andassignment of the total expected air effort by per-centage and/or by priority that should be devotedto the various air operations and/or geographicareas for a given period of time. (JP 1-02)

B-4 _________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-2

base defense zone—An air defense zone estab-lished around an air base and limited to the engage-ment envelope of short-range air defense weaponssystems defending that base. Base defense zoneshave specific entry, exit, and identification, friendor foe procedures established. (JP 1-02)

battlespace—All aspects of air, surface, subsur-face, land, space, and electromagnetic spectrumwhich encompass the area of influence and area ofinterest. (MCRP 5-12C)

battlespace dominance—The degree of controlover the dimensions of the battlespace whichensures friendly freedom of action and deniesenemy freedom of action. It permits force sustain-ment and application of power projection toaccomplish the full range of potential operationaland tactical missions. It includes all actions con-ducted against enemy capabilities to influencefuture operations. (MCRP 5-12C)

carrier battle group—A standing naval taskgroup consisting of a battle group command andcontrol element organized and trained to commandnaval, joint and combined operations. It consists ofan aircraft carrier with embarked air wing, surfacecombatants, submarines, and other assigned forceswith organic combat logistics, operating as a cohe-sive, task-organized unit to achieve battlespacedominance over designated areas both ashore andafloat and to project power ashore. Also called aCVBG. (Navy proposal for revision of JP 1-02)

centers of gravity—Those characteristics, capa-bilities, or localities from which a military forcederives its freedom of action, physical strength, orwill to fight. (JP 1-02)

close operations—Military actions conducted toproject power decisively against enemy forceswhich pose an immediate or near term threat to thesuccess of current battles or engagements. Thesemilitary actions are conducted by committed forcesand their readily available tactical reserves, usingmaneuver and combined arms. (MCRP 5-12C)

coalition force—A force composed of militaryelements of nations that have formed a temporaryalliance for some specific purpose. (JP 1-02)

combined arms—The full integration of combatarms in such a way that to counteract one, theenemy must become more vulnerable to another.(MCRP 5-12C)

critical vulnerability—An aspect of a center ofgravity that if exploited will do the most signifi-cant damage to an adversary’s ability to resist. Avulnerability cannot be critical unless it under-mines a key strength. (MCRP 5-12C)

deep operations—Military actions conductedagainst enemy capabilities which pose a potentialthreat to friendly forces. These military actionsare designed to isolate, shape, and dominate thebattlespace and influence future operations.(MCRP 5-12C)

flight ferry—The self-deployment of aircraftfrom one station to another. Although conduct ofthe movement is administrative in character, itspurpose may be operational.

force sustainment—Capabilities, equipment, andoperations that ensure continuity, freedom ofaction, logistic support, and command and control.(MCRP 5-12C)

joint force—A general term applied to a forcecomposed of significant elements, assigned orattached, of two or more Military Departments,operating under a single commander authorized toexercise operational control. (JP 1-02)

joint force air component commander—Thejoint force air component commander derivesauthority from the joint force commander who hasthe authority to exercise operational control,assign missions, direct coordination among subor-dinate commanders, redirect and organize forcesto ensure unity of effort in the accomplishment ofthe overall mission. The joint force commander

Aviation Operations ______________________________________________________________________________________ B-5

will normally designate a joint force air compo-nent commander. The joint force air componentcommander’s responsibilities will be assigned bythe joint force commander (normally these wouldinclude, but not be limited to, planning, coordina-tion, allocation, and tasking based on the jointforce commander’s apportionment decision).Using the joint force commander’s guidance andauthority, and in coordination with other Servicecomponent commanders and other assigned orsupporting commanders, the joint force air compo-nent commander will recommend to the joint forcecommander apportionment of air sorties to variousmissions or geographic areas. Also called JFACC.(JP 1-02)

main effort—The designated subordinate unitwhose mission at a given point in time is most crit-ical to overall mission success. It is usuallyweighted with the preponderance of combat powerand is directed against a center of gravity through acritical vulnerability. (MCRP 5-12C)

maneuver warfare—A warfighting philosophythat seeks to shatter the enemy’s cohesion througha variety of rapid, focused, and unexpected actionswhich create a turbulent and rapidly deterioratingsituation with which the enemy cannot cope.(MCRP 5-12C)

Marine air-ground task force—The MarineCorps principal organization for all missionsacross the range of military operations, composedof forces task-organized under a single com-mander capable of responding rapidly to a contin-gency anywhere in the world. The types of forcesin the Marine air-ground task force (MAGTF) arefunctionally grouped into four core elements: acommand element, an aviation combat element, aground combat element, and a combat service sup-port element. The four core elements are catego-ries of forces, not formal commands. The basicstructure of the Marine air-ground task force nevervaries, though the number, size, and type ofMarine Corps units comprising each of its four ele-ments will always be mission dependent. The flex-ibility of the organizational structure allows forone or more subordinate MAGTFs, other Service

and/or foreign military forces, to be assigned orattached. Also called MAGTF. (approved for nextedition of MCRP 5-12C)

operational level of war—The level of war atwhich campaigns and major operations are planned,conducted, and sustained to accomplish strategicobjectives within theaters or areas of operations.Activities at this level link tactics and strategy byestablishing operational objectives needed toaccomplish the strategic objectives, sequencingevents to achieve the operational objectives, initiat-ing actions, and applying resources to bring aboutand sustain these events. These activities imply abroader dimension of time or space than do tactics;they ensure the logistic and administrative supportof tactical forces, and provide the means by whichtactical successes are exploited to achieve strategicobjectives. (JP 1-02)

power projection—The application of measured,precise offensive military force at a chosen timeand place, using maneuver and combined armsagainst enemy forces. (MCRP 5-12C)

rear operations—Military actions conducted tosupport and permit force sustainment and to pro-vide security for such actions. (MCRP 5-12C)

rules of engagement—Directives issued by com-petent military authority which delineate the cir-cumstances and limitations under which UnitedStates forces will initiate and/or continue combatengagement with other forces encountered. Alsocalled ROE. (JP 1-02)

sortie—In air operations, an operational flight byone aircraft. (JP 1-02)

special purpose Marine air-ground taskforce—A Marine air-ground task force organized,trained and equipped with narrowly focused capa-bilities. It is designed to accomplish a specific mis-sion, often of limited scope and duration. It may beany size, but normally it is a relatively smallforce—the size of a Marine expeditionary unit orsmaller. It may contain other Service or foreignmilitary forces assigned or attached to the Marineair-ground task force. Also called SPMAGTF.

B-6 _________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-2

strategic level of war—The level of war at whicha nation, often as a member of a group of nations,determines national or multinational (alliance orcoalition) security objectives and guidance, anddevelops and uses national resources to accom-plish these objectives. Activities at this levelestablish national and multinational militaryobjectives; sequence initiatives; define limits andassess risks for the use of military and otherinstruments of national power; develop global

plans or theater war plans to achieve these objec-tives; and provide military forces and other capabil-ities in accordance with strategic plans. (JP 1-02)tactical level of war—The level of war at whichbattles and engagements are planned and executedto accomplish military objectives assigned to tac-tical units or task forces. Activities at this levelfocus on the ordered arrangement and maneuver ofcombat elements in relation to each other and tothe enemy to achieve combat objectives. (JP 1 02)

APPENDIX CREFERENCES AND RELATED PUBLICATIONS

Joint Publications (JPs)

0-2 Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)1-02 Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms2-0 Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Joint Operations2-01.1 Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Intelligence Support to

Targeting (under development)3-0 Doctrine for Joint Operations3-01.5 Doctrine for Joint Theater Missile Defense3-04.1 Joint Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for Shipboard Helicopter Operations3-07 Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War3-09 Doctrine for Joint Fire Support3-09.3 JTTP for Close Air Support (CAS)3-50.2 Doctrine for Joint Combat Search and Rescue3-52 Doctrine for Joint Airspace Control in a Combat Zone3-56.1 Command and Control for Joint Air Operations5-0 Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations

Naval Doctrinal Publications (NDPs)

1 Naval Warfare3 Naval Operations4 Naval Logistics

Marine Corps Publications

Marine Corps Doctrinal Publications (MCDPs)

1 Warfighting1-1 Strategy1-2 Campaigning1-3 Tactics2 Intelligence3 Expeditionary Operations4 Logistics5 Planning6 Command and Control

C-2 _______________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-2

Marine Corps Warfighting Publications (MCWPs)

0-1 Marine Corps Operations (under development)0-1.1 Componency2-1 Intelligence Operations2-11 MAGTF Intelligence Collection (under development)2-15.4 Imagery Intelligence (under development)3-16 Fire Support Coordination (under development)3-21.1 Aviation Ground Support (under development)3-22 Anitair Warfare3-22.1 Multi-Service Procedure for Antiradiation Missile Employment in a Joint

Environment (ARM-J)3-23.1 Close Air Support3-24 Assault Support3-24.1 Helicopter Operating Procedures for Air-Capable Ships3-25 Control of Aircraft and Missiles3-25.1 Integrated Combat Airspace C2 (ICAC 2) Manual (under development)3-25.2 Multi-Service Procedures for Theater Air-Ground Systems (TAGS)3-25.3 Marine Air Command and Control System Handbook3-25.4 Marine Tactical Air Command Center Handbook3-25.5 Direct Air Support Center Handbook3-25.6 Marine Sector Antiair Warfare Coordinator Handbook3-25.7 Tactical Air Operations Center Handbook3-25.8 Marine Air Traffic Control Detachment Handbook3-25.9 Marine Air Command and Control Systems Communications Handbook (under

development)3-25.10 Low Altitude Air Defense Handbook3-25.11 Low Altitude Air Defense (LAAD) Gunner's Handbook (under development)3-35.7 MAGTF Meteorology and Oceanography (METOC) Support4-11.7 MAGTF Supply Operations5-1 Marine Corps Planning Process5-11.1 MAGTF Aviation Planning (under development)6-2 MAGTF Command and Control (under development)

Marine Corps Reference Publications (MCRPs)

3-22A Multi-Service Procedures for EA-6B Employment in the Joint Environment(J-PROWLER)

3-23A Multi-Service Procedures for Joint Air Attack Team Operations3-25A Multi-Service Procedures for Joint Air Traffic Control (JATC)3-25B Multi-Service Air-Air, Air-Surface, and Surface-Air Brevity Codes5-11.1A Aviation Planning Documents (under development)5-12A Operational Terms and Graphics5-12C Marine Corps Supplement to the Department of Defense Dictionary of Military

and Associated Terms5-12D Organization of Marine Corps Forces

Aviation Operations ____________________________________________________________________________________________ C-3

Marine Corps Bulletin (MCBul)

3501 Maritime Prepositioning Force (MPF) Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) Force List

Miscellaneous

. . . From the SeaForward . . . From the SeaMAGTF Aviation and Operational Maneuver From the Sea

Notes

1. Robert Debs Heinl, Jr., Col, USMC, Ret., Dictionary of Military and NavalQuotations (Annapolis, MD: United States Naval Institute, 1978) p. 6.

2. Gen Carl E. Mundy, Jr., USMC, “Reflections on the Corps . . . Marine Tac-tical Aviation,” Marine Corps Gazette (May 1992) p. 15.

3. FMFRP 12-34-IV, History of U.S. Marine Corps Operations in World WarII: Western Pacific Opeations (August 1989) p. 347.

4. Carl von Clausewitz, On War (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press,1976) p. 345.

5. Joint Publication 0-2, Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF) p. IV-4.

6. George S. Patton, Jr. War As I Knew It (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Compa-ny, 1947) p. 354.

7. Heinl, p.175.

To Our Readers

Changes: Readers of this publication are encouraged to submit suggestions and changes thatwill improve it. Recommendations may be sent directly to Commanding General, MarineCorps Combat Development Command, Doctrine Division (C 42), 3300 Russell Road, Suite318A, Quantico, VA 22134-5021 or by fax to 703-784-2917 (DSN 278-2917) or by E-mail [email protected]. Recommendations should include the following information:

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Additional copies: A printed copy of this publication may be obtained from Marine CorpsLogistics Base, Albany, GA 31704-5001, by following the instructions in MCBul 5600, Ma-rine Corps Doctrinal Publications Status. An electronic copy may be obtained from the Doc-trine Division, MCCDC, world wide web home page which is found at the following universalreference locator: http://www.doctrine.usmc.mil.