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1 5/2019 sp’s land forces

Page 4future Infantry combat Vehicle (fIcV) needs a de novo look

FICV, a key spearhead of the restructured Integrated Battle Groups, cannot be put in a limbo and such a critical capability programme must be classified as project of ‘National Strategic Security Importance”.

lt General a.B. shivane (retd)

Page 7equipment and weapons for Urban warfare

Combat in urban areas can be the most destructive due to densely populated terrain, military weapons not suitable for urban warfare, close quarter battle (CQB), hand to hand combat and ruthless behaviour of non-state forces who do not believe in rules of engagement.

sp’s correspondent

Page 8special forces-challenges and solutionsMajority of the Special Forces have to operate by stealth, in small groups and in enemy territory, involving covert operations.

lt General naresh chand (retd)

Page 11counter-Terrorism

The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), in their first ever open acknowledgement in 2011 in US Court, said that the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) sponsors terrorism in Kashmir and it oversees terrorist separatist groups in Kashmir.

lt General naresh chand (retd)

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PhoToGraPh: Indian army

“army aviation is an important and vital component of all arms combat force”

Interaction of Jayant Baranwal, Editor-in-Chief of SP’s Land Forces with Lieutenant General Kanwal Kumar, Director General and Colonel Commandant of army aviation

Closing in on the Apaches: Lt General Kanwal Kumar, Director General army aviation, standing in front of an apache – “tank in the air” – as the army preps for the attack helicopter role

EXCLUSIVE INTERVIEW

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2 sp’s land forces 5/2019

sp’s land forces (sp’s): what is the signif-icance of the colour presentation to army aviation?director General of army aviation (dGaa): The President’s Colours is a visible symbol of excellence and are earned through dedi-cation and worthy contribution both dur-ing war and peace. Award of the Colours to Army Aviation Corps is an apt recogni-tion of its ceaseless operational involve-ment across diverse terrain, in demanding weather and climate conditions in a vari-ety of challenging situations from the icy heights of Siachen Glacier to the Rann of Kutch in the past three decades of its rela-tively young existence.

sp’s: The vintage chetak-cheetah is believed to have outlived its life. what are the measures being undertaken to ensure the flight worthiness and is there a plan to phase out these helicopters?dGaa: Maintenance and overhaul proce-dures of the fleet are well established. Every aircraft that is flying is fully airworthy. Timely servicings and overhauls are being carried out meticulously to ensure service-ability and availability of the helicopter for all operations. As it is an ageing fleet, man-agement of spares remains work at hand. The Cheetah/Chetak helicopter will be phased out with the induction of Ka-226T and LUH manufactured by HAL which is likely over the next few years.

sp’s: could you elaborate more on acquisi-tions and their progress for army aviation?dGaa: Army Aviation is an important and vital component of all arms combat force. It undertakes combat and combat support tasks. The acquisitions and design and development projects of Army Aviation have been focused to enhance the combat and combat support capability. Towards this, ALH ‘DHRUV’ has been in service since 2001 and its armed variant ‘RUDRA’ got inducted in year 2013. These assets are now available in sufficient number to the field forces and are totally integrated with the field formations. In near future, we will induct more potent combat helicopters like LCH and Apache AH 64E in addition to Ka-226T and LUH for replacing Chetak/Cheetah fleet.

sp’s: India has acquired the status of a helicopter manufacturing country by the development of alH family of helicopters. How is the performance of dhruv and its armed version rudra?

dGaa: The ‘Dhruv’ is steadily emerging Army Aviation’s workhorse and force multi-plier for the Indian Army. The helicopter has proved its mettle in all types of terrain of the country ranging from super high altitude areas to extremely hot and dusty environ-ments. It would suffice to say that ‘Dhruv’ has been successfully inducted into the field formations and is performing all the envis-aged operational roles. ‘Rudra’ is presently being exploited in various terrains and get-ting integrated into the operational role. The heptr would provide the much needed inte-gral aerial combat fire power.

sp’s: what would be the role of rudra, light combat Helicopter and apache in the army aviation corps?dGaa: Combat aviation assets with mod-ern avionics, electro-optics and weapon

systems can perform multiple tasks in the entire spectrum of conflict in varied and inhospitable terrain including high altitude areas. Rudra is a potent combat helicopter with an array of armaments including multiple types of rockets, tur-ret gun and capability to mount anti-tank guided missiles besides state of the art avi-onics. It can perform a multitude of roles raging from armed escort for heli-borne operations to intimate firepower for vari-ous offensive and defensive operations. The LCH has a similar armament profile with enhanced manoeuvrability and armour protection, and is primarily meant for the mountains. The Apache is one of the best attack helicopters in the world, and will be fully integrated with the mechanised forces, providing unmatched fire power and manoeuvrability.

sp’s: do you envisage expansion in the role of women in army aviation?dGaa: Army Aviation already has women officers, who are being directly commis-sioned as Air Traffic Controllers (ATC) officers. Besides this, women Engineering Officers are also being posted in Army Avia-tions units for maintenance of the helicop-ter fleet. The proposal for inducting women officers as aviators is also under examina-tion and is being viewed positively.

sp’s: capability development and mod-ernisation constantly come up against fiscal challenges, especially with a shrinking defence budget. what steps are being taken in this context by the army aviation?dGaa: Army Aviation remains committed to translate its modernisation plans into action in a time-bound and effective man-ner. More emphasis is being laid on priori-tisation, rationalisation and economy of expenditure. Greater value for money is being achieved by encouraging procure-ments from indigenous sources in sup-port of the ‘Make in India’ initiative of the Government.

sp’s: You have been part of army aviation since it got the status of a independent arm and your military career is culminating with the colour presentation to army avia-tion by president of India. Your thoughts on this historic occasion and the changes you have seen with respect to the capabil-ity of army aviation?dGaa: This arm has grown from limited R&O assets to a potent arm with a variety of equipment already inducted and in the offering. I am fortunate to have been a part of the complete journey of the Corps since its raising and have witnessed its qualita-tive and quantitative growth. Capability development of an arm entails acquisi-tions, training, evolving employment phi-losophies and most importantly assimilate the required capability into the combat arms environment. In future battle space major asymmetry against enemy com-bat forces can be achieved by integrated employment of third dimension capabil-ity. In its relatively short journey, the Arm has been fully supported by the organisa-tion and we are now poised to be a game changer in future conflicts. I have no doubt in my mind that this arm will prove to be a decisive war winning conflicts in all the future wars. It has been a honour to have served and headed Army Aviation. SP

INTERVIEW

Recently, the President’s Colours were awarded to Army Aviation Corps in recognition of their contri-bution. Our lead story in this issue is an interview with DG, Army Avi-ation Lt. General Kanwal Kumar on this achievement as well as the role and future of the Corps.

The fate of the Future Infan-try Combat Vehicle (FICV) has undergone many twists and turns since 2004 without seeing the light at the end of a long tunnel. Thus the lead story gives an overview of the project by commenting that the FICV is yet another case history of self-inflicted injury, creating a ca-pability gap with no effort to seek its accountability and responsibil-ity thus taking back the project to its date of birth in 2004.

Combat in urban areas can be the most destructive due to densely populated terrain, military weapons not suitable for urban warfare, close quar-ter battle (CQB), hand to hand

combat and violent behaviour of non-state forces who do not believe in rules of engagement. The current terrorism is mostly fought in urban terrain. The ex-amples of Iraq, Syria and Jammu & Kashmir are very current. The situation becomes more com-plex when own citizens are in-volved and it is difficult to avoid collateral damage. A quote from Vietnam War indicates the na-ture of urban warfare, “it became necessary to destroy the town to save it.” It has also given birth to a new genre of tactics and weap-ons which the article on Urban Warfare amply explores.

Special Forces (SF) have started playing a key role espe-cially in counter insurgency and counter terrorism operations thus their role is more topical. US’ oper-ations in Iraq and Afghanistan has highlighted their role and impor-tance. The recent example is the Delta Force Commandoes of US’

raid on Islamic State leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. Indian Army may have carried out many co-vert operations in the past but the 2016 Surgical Strike has been well publicised. This article on ‘Special Forces’ covers only army SFs like the US Army SFs (popularly called Green Beret) and India’s Para Commandoes. In India the SFs of the Armed Force are also grouped under a single command. Their broad role can include unconven-tional warfare; counter-insurgency; special reconnaissance; counter-terrorism; information operations; counterproliferation of weapon of mass destruction; security force assistance; hostage/POW /civilian rescue and many more.

Acts of terrorism by non -state actors against a legally appointed government has become a global issue and majority of the nations are carrying out counter terror-ism operations in some form or the other. This issue has become

so critical that it is being raised in every fora from UNO to all multi-lateral/bi-lateral talks. India is thus no exception. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), in their first ever open acknowl-edgement in 2011 in US Court, said that the Inter-Services Intel-ligence (ISI) sponsors terrorism in Kashmir and it oversees terror-ist separatist groups in Kashmir. Thus an article is included in this issue which gives an overview of counter terrorism operations.

Read on dear readers and wish you all a Merry Christmas!

ED

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Jayant BaranwalPublisher & Editor-in-Chief

PhoToGraPhS: Indian army

(Top) President Ram Nath Kovind presents colours to the Army Aviation Corps on October 10, 2019, in a ceremonial parade, held at Army Aviation Base, Nashik; (above) DG in the cockpit of Apache.

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LT GENERaL a.B. ShIVaNE (RETd)

The Elusive CapabilityFICV is yet another case history of self-inflicted injury, creating a capability gap with no effort to seek its accountability and responsibility. The Make 1 project seems to be a snakes and ladder game with more snakes than ladders, so the FICV is likely to be back at the starter block of discus-sion stage, that it was in 2004. Thus, FICV remains an illusion marred by frequent changes in procedural stance, bureaucratic apathy, cold feet for honouring promised financial support inspite of an AoN (Octo-ber 2009) and disregard for the last EoI of July 2015 immaculately evaluated and sent to Ministry of Defence (MoD) in November 2016. Termed as a game changer and the biggest catalyst for an indigenous Integrated Defence Eco System and Defence Industrial Base, it has failed as a test case for ‘Make in India’, creating a glaring gap between expectations and outcomes. Resultantly, it has created disillusion in the nascent, yet vibrant indigenous private defence industry. A detailed analysis of the quagmire and way forward was penned in the article appeared in SP’s Land Forces 5/2018 on page number 1. Its time now to find a way ahead with a de novo look in the light of all options of Make1/Make2/SP not making a headway. Given our fragile security matrix, intentions can change fast, but capability building takes time. Thus FICV, a key spearhead of the restructured Integrated Battle Groups, cannot be put in a limbo and the impasse needs a fresh resolution.

Global Fire Power Index and Armoured Fighting Vehicle Ranking2019 Global Fire Power Index recently unrevealed, rates India 4th (after USA, Russia and China) among 137 nations based on 55 individual factors. The criteria used in the rankings to determine military strength, included natural resources, local industry, geographical features and avail-able manpower, besides military capabil-ity in each of the military specific sector. What is revealing is in some hidden analy-sis. While China stood third in the overall ranking, it was second in Armoured Fight-ing Vehicle (AFV) Sector, which primarily includes ICV and APC’s, while India was overall 4th, it ranks 25th in the AFV sec-tor and Pakistan overall 15th ranked 19th in the AFV sector. Thus, not only has India slipped 21 ranks in AFV sector as compared to its overall standing, it ranks below Paki-stan and the gap with China has widened. While it may be argued that numbers can be manipulated but we cannot adopt an ostrich approach to this widening capability gap by the FICV quagmire. Further, in the Global Armoured Vehicles Market Report, Armoured Personnel Carrier (APC) market is estimated to register a CAGR of nearly 6 per cent during the forecast period of 2018 to 2023. Asia-Pacific is projected to be the fastest-growing regional market during the review period. This growth was attrib-uted to the procurement and indigenous

development of these vehicles in countries such as China, and India (FICV). However with FICV been put in a loop, the market trend will need to be reviewed impacting not only the indigenous defence industry but also induction of advance technolo-gies in defence sector. Internally we need to introspect the foundational need to energise ‘Make in India’ in the defence sector, which in turn could resuscitate the FICV.

Energising Make in India – A Driver for FICVAs a self-respecting nation with increasing recognition in regional and global world order, India can ill afford to be dependent on imported weaponry. ‘Make in India’ is not just a sound economic option but a strate-

gic imperative in promoting India as global hub of manufacturing, particularly in the strategic sectors such as defence. As of now the domestic defence industry lacks critical technologies, manufacturing ecosystems for integration of large platforms, supply chain and logistics. Ironically, India is the largest arms importer, accounting for close to 15 per cent of the global arms trade. No Indian defence manufacturing company figures in the top 30 global companies. The closest is the Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) ranked 35th and Bharat Electronics Limited (BEL) ranked 59th. This gap and balance between military might, growing economic resilience and a nascent defence industrial base needs to be addressed for national security and strategic autonomy.

The recent defence policy reforms and speeding up of acquisition process as part of ‘Make in India’ strategy, are most com-mendable but have commensurately not paid off in terms of their potential and out-comes. There exists a gap between expec-tations and deliverance due to a myriad of reasons including budgetary constraints, lacklustre implementation of policies, per-vasive technological backwardness, delayed implementation of projects, skewed offset policies and evasive foreign direct invest-ment (FDI), among other issues. The driver for a vibrant ‘Make in India’ will be the pres-ence of a robust ecosystem, energised and driven by the industry friendly policies, time stipulated outcomes, with clearly defined

MEchaNISEd INfaNTRy

FICV, a key spearhead of the restructured Integrated Battle Groups, cannot be put in a limbo and such a critical capability programme must be classified as project of ‘National Strategic Security Importance”, for its national security sensitivity and multi spectrum operational capability and to address the future operational requirements and envisaged force profile with a de novo concept, design and technologies.

future Infantry combat Vehicle (fIcV) needs a de novo look

(Above) Armoured Assault using BMP-II Sarath;(left) IFV Puma is the most advanced system of its kind worldwide.

The driver for a vibrant ‘make in India’ will be the presence of a robust ecosystem, energised and driven by the industry friendly policies, time stipulated outcomes, with clearly defined accountability

PhoToGraPhS: Indian army, KMW

Artillery Systems | Armored Vehicles | Precision Ammunition

Military Vehicles | Missile Systems |Defense Electronics

We RESPECT the Army

The ARMY values our weaponry

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6 sp’s land forces 5/2019

accountability. Greater focus is also required on an innovative and collaborative ecosys-tem that includes academia, corporate and governmental partners, with user as the primary driver. Such a vibrant, interlock-ing ecosystem of diverse collaborators will prove to be a nurturing environment for the intense creativity in defence technology. ‘Make in India’ is also dependent upon indig-enous R&D in military technology induc-tion, manufacturing and product-technol-ogy & engineering, hence the need to focus on industry-driven R&D. In China nearly 25 per cent of the staff is deployed for R&D. Indian businesses deploy less than 10 per cent. We also need to constitute an Indian equivalent DARPA agency as in USA, to identify current or future advances that have the potential to bend today’s security trajectories with transformational and dis-ruptive technologies. The focus must be on creating an environment that makes Indian firms to be world competitive and where all enterprises can flourish. ‘Make in India’ is indeed the enlightened strategic path which requires hand holding, patience, resilience and energisation by all stake holders. It may well have to traverse the transitory path of ‘Make for India’ (Buy and Make), Design for India and finally reach its true destination of an Indigenously Designed, Developed and Manufactured (IDDM) capability. Indeed, ‘Make in India’ must drive the enlightened path for FICV. Thus FICV programme in turn merits an apex level review, to arrive at alternate approaches for its revival.

Alternate Approach 1: De Novo ModelThe first and foremost critical aspect for progressing FICV is to have a demonstrated intent at the apex level, to develop the capa-bility by all stake holders. Second, the intent must be matched by an assured budgetary support based on benchmarks achieved and

spread over the development cycle. Third, a de novo look is only required if there is no scope to carry forward the last EoI based on Make 1 of DPP 2016. Keeping in mind the national objective of self-reliance and focus on ‘Make in India’, the options of ‘Buy and Make’, ‘Buy Global’ or ‘G to G’, can only be a fall back option should all other avenues fail. Therefore, the design and development of FICV has to done in India.

Such a critical capability programme must thus be classified as project of ‘National Strategic Security Importance”, for its national security sensitivity and multi spectrum operational capability. It will also lead to an infusion of critical and emerging technologies for which we are presently import dependent. The need of the hour, therefore, is to look at a de novo approach, which will be based on collab-orative convergence and a “Risk Sharing – Gain Sharing” formula. It also must not necessarily be restrained by the DPP, and achieve the design and development pro-cess at the desired pace.

The first criteria is to demystify the developmental approach of FICV, based on an evolutionary or revolution-ary approach. While the evolutionary approach will be based on essentially an upgrade plus capability, the final product will be a modernised version of the existing BMP-2 within its design constrains. Thus, not the best option for a long term solu-tion for FICV and at best can be an interim solution to bridge the existing capability gap with upgradation of BMP-2. The revo-lutionary approach as opposed to above is ordained to address the future operational requirements and envisaged force profile with a de novo concept, design and tech-nologies. Again, the option under revolu-tionary approach is either to have a ‘Green-field’ option or a ‘Hybrid’ option. However,

pragmatism demands that the develop-ment be based on the Hybrid option, where in the programme is user-driven, involving leading AFV design agencies of the world, duly incorporating the experience and expertise of DRDO as technology partner, the Indian Academia (IITs, IIS, NIAS, etc) and other private defence industries to design and develop the FICV. The selected design can be developed and produced by select agency(s) in India. The key would, of course, be evolution of a design capable of being developed, and thus, the inter-face and ownership of both the design and development agency. The design and development of FICV and the management programme must include an “Empowered Apex Project Management Committee”. This approach must ensure short and quick decision cycles with adequate finan-cial support, oversight measures, flexibility to review and refine at each stage, spiral approach based on mature technologies initially and subsequent development pro-cess to incorporate the latest and emerging technologies. The project must visualise and be institutionalised based on a “womb to tomb” concept. The project being on national strategic security importance must not be bound by DPP regulations but shaped by an “Apex Project Management Team,” with responsibility, delegation of authority and accountability dovetailed and clearly defined. This would ensure it to be outcome oriented under an enabling mechanism and broad guidance, with del-egated powers to make informed decisions, for timely delivery of the desired FICV.

Alternate Approach 2: Public-Private -Partnership (PPP) ModelIf India is to attain self-reliance in the defence industry, better infrastructure is needed to build, sustain and improve upon

the present capabilities. Public-private partnerships (PPP) could meet this chal-lenge. Private defence manufacturers could use the PPP route to build critical defence equipment like FICV for the country.

The private sector defence firms which evinced interests in the ambitious FICV project included L&T, Tata Motors and Bharat Forge Ltd. According to the original proposal, the FICV were to be manufactured under the ‘Make (high tech) category’ of the Defence Procurement Procedure (DPP). Under this plan, the government was to select state-run Ordnance Factory Board and two other private firms for separately developing prototype of the FICV.

Larsen and Toubro Armoured Systems, recently inaugurated by Prime Minister Narendra Modi in Gujarat, showcased the first glimpses of its Futuristic Infantry Combat Vehicle (FICV) as a fully indig-enously developed Infantry armored fight-ing vehicle which aims to replace the old BMP-2/2K infantry combat vehicle (ICV) fleet in the Indian Army. Tata Motors led consortium’s Futuristic Infantry Combat Vehicle (FICV) is aimed at providing a fully indigenous ICV as a replacement to Indian Army’s existing fleet of BMP-2s. Similarly, Bharat Forge is prepared to come out with Future Infantry Combat Vehicle (FICV). Rajinder Singh Bhatia, the President and CEO of Defence and Aerospace Division of (Kalyani Group’s) Bharat Forge said, “We are fully prepared to come out with FICV, which will meet all the requirements of the customer and the aspirations of the future of Indian Army”.

Public-private is the principal way in which the private sector through financial investment, talent sharing, management skill transfer, joint ventures and provision of additional resources can join hands, optimising government assets like OFB, wherein infrastructure and experience already exists. Even cost sharing could be based on a mutually agreed arrangement of risk sharing and gain sharing. However, it must be ensured that the levers of com-prehensive ToT and IPR rests with Indian firm. In general, PPP model for FICV will provide a strong impetus for technological innovation and outcome oriented arrange-ment, where in competition and associated negative trends, give away space for hand holding collaboration and cooperation. Implementation of PPP model will thus contribute to the evolution of a domestic ‘techno-industrial’ capability for the pro-duction of FICV. PPP arrangements will also offer distinct advantages both to the private sector and DPSU/OFB, leading to win-win situations with mutual benefit for all participants. For the FICV, the partner-ship model could be OFB as the principle integrator, with active participation in design and development by private defence industry/DPSUs and their JVs, and DRDO as technology partner, all collaborating together. The necessary integration of academia could also be done. The govern-ment could play the role of a catalyst. Such a model has several success stories world over. Of course, it entails the risk of putting all your eggs in one basket, and thus, must have a fall back option inbuilt.

Concluding ThoughtsFICV programme must not be allowed to fig-ure in the obituary columns. Indian Army restructuring, particularly the Integrated Battle Groups, mandate matching platform capabilities like the FICV. We need to be a part of the solution and not the problem, to stymie the present status quo. If Make 1, inspite of all the progress and merit, is doomed to be meet its death knell, then other options including a De Novo approach merits consideration. SP

The author recently retired as Director General, Mechanised Forces, Indian Army.

(Top) Prime Minister Narendra Modi at the L&T Armoured Systems Complex in Hazira, Gujarat; (above) An artist’s impression of FICV from Tata.

PhoToGraPhS: Narendra Modi/Twitter, Tata

MEchaNISEd INfaNTRy

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75/2019 sp’s land forces

URBaN WaRfaRE

SP’S coRRESPoNdENT

eARLIER BATTLES WERE FOUGHT in open terrain but since World War II, urban warfare (UW) has become increasingly dominant and decisive. The reasons for this are many like a

weak defender’s attempts at overcoming the asymmetric advantage of a more pow-erful opponent, insurgency (revolution) and shift of population from rural to urban area. Combat in urban areas can be the most destructive due to densely populated terrain, all military weapons not suitable for UW, close quarter battle (CQB), hand to hand combat and ruthless behaviour of non state forces who do not believe in rules of engagement. A quote from Vietnam War indicates the nature of urban warfare, “it became necessary to destroy the town to save it.” In the Iraq and Afghanistan war many towns held by ruthless terrorist organisations had to be destroyed to save the innocent population from further harm. Urban fighting increases the attrition rates on people and equipment through enemy action, environmental wear and tear and non-battle injuries. It includes looting, civil disturbances, insurgences, and other levels of conflict where military forces may be sent to conduct stability operations, such as counterterrorism, counterinsurgencies and peacekeeping.

DefinitionThe US census defines an individual urban area as one with 50,000 or more residents but this will differ from country to country. No one city is the same and so will be the tactics required to be followed. Similarly equipment may also differ depending on the type of terrain, opposition and population. Sometimes dictators like Hitler cause geno-cide and urbicide while taking control of cities. Aleppo in Syria and Mosul in Iraq are two examples of urbicide in modern times. Mosul, the second largest city in Iraq, was reduced to rubble during the nine-month battle to reclaim it.

Brief profile of Urban WarfarelPhysical impact of the urban environ-

ment.lComplex and diverse nature of urban

operations.lImpacts of war on the environment and

people. lCriticality and challenge of sustainment

and resilience by leaders.lComplexity of UW when multiple actors

are involved. lExpect “confused melees” demanding

precision fire and ‘moment-to-moment’ decisions by individual soldiers.

lAggressor is always at a disadvantage.lExtremely destructive and rudimentary

type of operations as seen in Raqqa, Aleppo, Marawi, and Mosul in the Mid-dle East. Stalingrad (now Volgograd) was the largest and longest UW con-frontation between Germany and Russia during World War II from August 23, 1942- February 2, 1943 (164 days).

lMastering the fundamentals of entering and clearing rooms and buildings.

lIn difficult situations crossing a street safely becomes a major challenge.

lUS experience is that 90 per cent of urban targets are engaged at a distance of only 50 yards (about 45 m) or in nar-row areas.

TrainingUrban terrain differs from city to city. It may include well embedded opposition with sympathetic population. It may have air-ports, railway stations, utilities like electric power stations, radio and TV stations which require good planning with prioritisation of targets to be cleared and captured. US infan-try and platoon levels train in 14 basic drills like ‘entering and clearing a room; clear-ing a bunker, urban assaults’ and so on. It is required to train fighting inside a room as much on the street. Training is required to overcome and breech the obstacles spe-cially laid to impede the operations or there will just be debris of destroyed buildings or destroyed tanks. At times in UW it is nec-essary to fight for every step forward and every block. Soldiers are taught to avoid

open areas, deploying smoke to conceal troop movements and providing suppressive fire to carry out movement. Reaching at the objective and fighting to get to the building are often challenging. It is required to train in off-loading vehicles under fire and using the vehicles as cover. An essential part of training is clearing bobby traps and IEDs. Engineers can be called but infantry should also be trained in this aspect due to critical-ity of time. In conjunction with practicing urban movements, soldiers should train to conduct hasty obstacle reduction and breaching. While typically this is a core function of engineers, the ability to rapidly reduce obstacles in urban terrain is a skill every soldier should practice. Urban terrain is uniquely suited to adversaries’ emplace-ment of street-blocking obstacles; burning tires or wood piles; concrete walls or parked vehicles with the aim of impeding move-ment or channelising the soldiers into an ambush. The density of cities also means that both friendly and enemy artillery and air strikes produce unplanned obstacles in the form of rubble. Train friendly civilians if possible to provide warning, intelligence of terrain and any other suitable task. Other

aspects of training are riot control; detect and annihilate snipers; prevention of bank robberies; kidnapping and suicide attacks.

Equipment and Weapons for UWAs brought out earlier UW will differ from place to place and whether the UW is tak-ing place within own country or in another country. Troops now have advanced preci-sion weaponry allowing them to target a single floor of a single building of a crowded block that minimises collateral damage; drones for aerial surveillance and weapons delivery; military satellites for signal intel-ligence and electronic warfare and even cyber offensive and defensive capabilities.

Whaling harpoon gun and winch cable. This is to pull away destroyed or inca-pacitated vehicles to clear routes.

Equipment for opening doors or breaching walls. US forces use picks and shovels to rip open doors; ropes with grap-pling hooks and explosives to punch through walls. Combat engineers would move in to destroy key targets and infrastructure, using bulldozers if required. Vehicles can be selectively fitted with ploughs to clear debris and routes.

Helicopter-style helmet for Infantry Fighting Vehicle weapons systems and selected soldiers. This provides instant situation awareness.

Industrial foam thrower. Instead of having to enter and clear tunnels and holes prevalent across the urban terrain, soldiers could seal entrances with a quick-drying sealing foam.

Communications. Each soldier should be able to communicate with each other for quick response. Building debris will cause obstruction in communication thus there should be means to overcome this.

EW and Jamming. This is essential to jam the opposition’s communications, bobby traps and IEDs.

Robotics. Can save casualties by remov-ing booby traps and IEDs. Can also assist in logistic support.

UAVs. Specially designed UAVs, rotary UAVs and disposable UAV swarms can be of immense help in gathering intelligence, snooping around high rise buildings, dis-rupting insurgent operations or indicate what lies ahead.

Intelligence gathering. Acoustic, seis-mic, electro-magnetic, and video sensors are now small enough and sufficiently rug-ged to be deployed in UW.

Protection for the soldier. Suitable gear should be provided to protect the soldier but it should also not impede his mobility.

Weapons. US has an expeditionary force thus they have maximum experience in UW spanning from Vietnam to Kosovo to Middle East, however every army has its own requirement. Some examples are:

M16 assault rifle /M4. The US infan-try carries the M16 assault rifle or the M4, a newer, shorter variation. Like the Iraqis’ counterpart — the AK-47 – the M16 can deliver rapid bursts of automatic fire. It has

PhoToGraPhS: Cornorshot, US army

Urban Warfare is required to train fighting inside a room as much on the street

Combat in urban areas can be the most destructive due to densely populated terrain, military weapons not suitable for urban warfare, close quarter battle (CQB), hand to hand combat and ruthless behaviour of non-state forces who do not believe in rules of engagement

equipment and weapons for Urban warfare

Continued on page 14...

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SPEcIaL foRcES

Majority of the Special Forces have to operate by stealth, in small groups and in enemy territory, involving covert operations

special forces—challenges and solutions

LT GENERaL NaRESh chaNd (RETd)

sPECIAL FORCES (SFS) ARE elite units who are specially selected, and super trained to carry out dirty and dangerous mission in enemy territory. SFs can be from

the army, navy and the air force. More than 90 countries have SFs on their order of battle. This article refers to only army SFs like the US Army SFs (popularly called Green Beret) and India’s Para Comman-does. US also has US Rangers which come directly under the US Army while US Army SFs come under the US Special Operations Command (USSOCOM). In India the SFs of the Armed Forces are also grouped under a single command.

Majority of the SFs have to operate by stealth, in small groups and in enemy ter-ritory, involving covert operations. Their broad role can include unconventional warfare; counter-insurgency; special reconnaissance; counter-terrorism; infor-mation operations; counterproliferation of weapon of mass destruction; security force assistance; hostage/POW/civilian rescue and many more. Information Operations, also called influence operations, are the integrated employment of the core capa-bilities of electronic warfare, computer network operations, psychological opera-tions, military deception and operations security in synergy with specified support-ing and related capabilities, to influence, disrupt, corrupt or usurp the adversar-ies. SFs have to be ready to be deployed at short notice; train in junior leadership to lead small squads and are prepared to use various means to infiltrate into dangerous and hostile territory. Most of the coun-tries train them as para commandoes but some like the US also train them in SCUBA, sniper, jumpmaster (expert para troopers who train others in para jumping) and for-eign languages. Every country designs the training as per the projected role.

Operational Challenges and SolutionsThe key challenges and solutions for their role are:lInformation about the area of opera-

tions. Precise and accurate informa-tion of the projected area of opera-tions including terrain, obstacles, and strength and deployment of the enemy.

lInfiltration or Insertion. SFs are trained in parachute operations thus they often parachute on to the objective but they are also trained for other types of infiltration like from water, land or rappelling from an helicopter. More than often the infiltration will be through dangerous and hostile territory. The key aspect of SFs’ operation is to carry out their role with surprise and shock.

lExplosive Obstacles. Training of spe-cial forces to defang booby traps and other forms of explosive obstacles like mines, IEDs etc.

lSituational Awareness. Continuous situational awareness from infiltration to exfiltration. May require aerial recon-naissance by aircraft, UAVs or even sat-ellites.

lFire Power. Fire arms which are light, quick to aim and fire, have night firing capability and have immense destruc-tive power. May need silencers and selectively have sniper capability. May use various types of grenades including stun grenades. If the situation so war-rants to be able to call for artillery fire or air strikes.

lCommunications. Reliable and inter/intra-squad communications.

lExfiltration. This is a critical part of the operation as the enemy may have already been alerted and launched their reinforcement units including heliborne troops thus may need to fight back into own territory, require aid of back up forces, heliborne infiltration (sup-pression of enemy air defence may be required), call for artillery or air suppres-sive fire and diversionary operations. For long term operations like that of the Green Berets, marrying up with the con-ventional forces can be an option.

lRaids. Special operations raids are designed to seize, destroy or capture enemy facilities or material and require detailed planning and execution.

lTraining. It is needless to say that the special forces should be super fit both mentally and physically. They should be crack shots and be proficient in using a variety of fire arms, explosives and neutralising obstacles like booby traps, mines and IEDs. Brief aspects of train-ing of US Army SFs is given below to indicate the high, level physical fitness, special skills, handling of a variety of arms and explosives, high level of intel-ligence and split second reaction in a dangerous situation. A high standard of selection and good training will con-tribute immensely for the success of the

mission. Unclassified training aspects are only covered briefly. Training is car-ried out in the following phases:Pre-selection. In addition to Basic Com-

bat Training, soldiers must have completed Advanced Individual Training and US Army Airborne School (Para trooper) to be eligible for SFs training.

Special Operations Preparation Course. The duration of this course is two weeks which prepares potential Green Berets for Special Forces Assessment and Selection (SFAS) and, thus focuses heavily on physical fitness and proficiency in land navigation.

SFs Assessment and Selection. This is Phase I, which is designed to test survival skills and places an even stronger emphasis on intense physical and mental training.

SFs Qualification CourseThis course consists of five phases (Phase II-VI) lasting approximately 61 weeks. Each phase is designed to foster an expertise in small unit tactic; advanced SFs tactics; sur-

vival skills; language and cultural training; unconventional warfare; survival, escape, resistance and evasion (SERE) and advanced combat survival tactics. During the Mili-tary Occupation Speciality (MOS) Qualifi-cation Phase (III), training is imparted for the newly assigned SFs role. Training for this phase lasts about 16 weeks, and covers additional language training, SFs common tasks, Advanced Special Operations Tech-niques (ASOT) and interagency operations.

Collective Training (Robin Sage). Robin Sage (Phase IV) is the training phase that serves as the litmus test for soldiers hop-ing to earn the Green Beret. Candidates are organised into squads and inserted into a fictional country known as Pineland which is rife with political turmoil, and soldiers must navigate the region and complete a specified mission.

Language and Culture. During this 25-week phase (Phase V), candidates will fine-tune their skills in the language to which they have been assigned.

Graduation Phase. All of the major work and training is completed by phase VI which involves a week of out-processing. Candidates will finally become member of the elite SFs (Green Beret).

Operations in Iraq and AfghanistanThe wars in Iraq and Afghanistan saw the use of several extremely effective SFs units, including ‘Task Force Dagger’ (Task Force Dagger Foundation) provided assistance to wounded, ill, or injured US Special Opera-tions Command (USSOCOM) members and their families); ‘Task Force K-Bar’ was led by the US and comprised of special operations forces from seven nations which undertook the first major ground deployment in the War in Afghanistan. In a classic Special Forces Unconventional Warfare operations ‘Task Force Viking’ joined up with some 70,000 Kurdish Peshmerga forces (forces of Kurdish autonomous region of Iraq) and took on 13 Iraqi Divisions.

US Army RangersArmy Rangers is an elite light infantry unit skilled to carry out missions like direct action raids, airfield seizure, special reconnaissance, personnel recovery, often killing or capturing high value targets, clandestine insertion and site exploitation. Their training skills are mix of infantry and special forces. Green Berets may perform operations or campaigns that lasts for months or years; Ranger missions are usually short and decisive.

US Army SFs’ EquipmentA SFs soldier carries the most advanced equipment as follows:lThe Ground Mobility Vehicle (GMV) is a

lightweight, all-terrain vehicle that can be used for a variety of missions. It is a modi-fied High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle also called Humvee. It has many variants modified for specific roles.

lSea-Doo SAR water craft is rugged and durable which is easy to manoeuvre in open water, rivers and floodwaters.

lM17 Scar is a 7.62mm x 45mm shoul-

most of the countries train sf as para commandos but some like the Us also train them in scUBa, sniper and foreign languages. every country designs the training as per the projected role.

PhoToGraPh: US army

Iraqi Special Operations Forces (ISOF) soldiers clear a simulated mine.

Continued on page 14...

WHO WILL BENEFIT?

REGIONAL SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

DEFENCE BUSINESS

MILITARY TECHNOLOGIES OF THE FUTURE

ARMED FORCES MODERNISATION PLANS

DEFENCE BUDGET ANALYSIS

MAJOR DEFENCE R&D AND PRODUCTION PROGRAMMES IN INDIA

ARMED FORCES, CAPF & POLICE

POLICY & DECISION MAKERS

DEFENCE & HOMELAND SECURITY INDUSTRY

ACADEMIA & THINK TANKS

ASPIRANTS FOR ARMED FORCES & CENTRAL SERVICES

GEOPOLITICAL ENVIRONMENT

DEFENCE ECONOMICS

FUTURISTIC TECHNOLOGIES

MODERNISATION PLANS

ANALYSIS OF BUDGET

INDIA’S MAJOR RESEARCH & DEVELOPMENT AND PRODUCTION PROGRAMMES

ASIA-PACIFIC SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

ECONOMICS OF DEFENCE BUSINESS

TECHNOLOGIES OF THE FUTURE WITH MILITARY APPLICATIONS

MODERNISATION PLANS OF INDIAN ARMED FORCES

INDIAN DEFENCE BUDGET ANALYSED

DEFENCE R&D AND MAJOR PRODUCTION PROGRAMMES IN INDIA

UNDERSTANDING GEOPOLITICS & STRATEGY

ELEMENTS OF MILITARY POWER

CURRENT AFFAIRS

UNDERSTANDING OF BUDGETS

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

INDIA’S MAJOR RESEARCH & DEVELOPMENT AND PRODUCTION PROGRAMMES

BUSINESS OPPORTUNITIES & TECHNOLOGY TRENDS

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE ORGANISATION STRUCTURES & CONTACT DIRECTORY OF MAJOR BUYER COUNTRIES INCLUDING INDIA

WHO’S WHO, GDP, MILITARY EXPENDITURE, MILITARY EQUIPMENT LISTING OF ABOUT 45 COUNTRIES

PROCUREMENT POLICIES

ANALYSIS OF BUDGET INDIA’S MAJOR

RESEARCH & DEVELOPMENT AND PRODUCTION PROGRAMMES

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CONFLICTS TO WATCH

ASIAN WHO’S WHO

BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENCE CHINA’S DEFENCE WHITEPAPER

REGIONAL BALANCEINDIAN DEFENCE

The ten most important global conflicts to watch particularly from the point of view of India and

this region.

Who’s who in 44 countries in Asia and Pacific along with the MoD organisation structures and contacts of

13 largest buyers of defence equipment in the region.

Ballistic missile proliferation poses great threat to the region. All about BMD and how the S-400 will

defend India.

China’s tenth Defence Whitepaper, released on July 24, 2019, after a gap of nearly 5 years is analysed

by a Military Expert.

GDP, military expenditure, security environment and listing of current military hardware of 45 countries in Asia

and Pacific.

Everything there is to know about Indian Armed Forces, Ministry of Defence, Defence Industry, Defence R&D and Central Armed Police Forces including Who’s who,

organisation structures, profiles and contact details.

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STRATEGY & PERSPECTIVE

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CONFLICTS TO WATCH

carries risks, as unregulated and relatively inexperienced contrac-tors may exacerbate security problems. There are indications that China’s Marine Corps could become its principal ready response force in the region. A Marine company is already deployed to the Chinese base at Djibouti (which has facilities to accommodate up to 10,000 personnel). There are reports of Chinese security pres-ence in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir to protect transport infrastruc-ture and construction units, and there has been speculation about future deployments to Gwadar. Several Chinese military exercises in the Indian Ocean region are openly focused on using Chinese forces to protect BRI projects. But in protecting people and assets, China may also increasingly find itself drawn into the local secu-rity affairs. As China’s Global Times recently argued, “China has always adhered to the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries, but that doesn’t mean Beijing can turn a deaf ear to the demands of Chinese enterprises in protecting their overseas investments.”3

South China SeaChina claims sovereignty over the South China Sea, estimated to have 11 billion barrels of untapped oil, 190 trillion cubic feet of nat-ural gas and fishing areas. Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Taiwan, and Vietnam have competing claims. Since the 1970s, countries began to claim islands and various zones in the South China Sea, such as the Spratly Islands.

China maintains that under international law, foreign militaries are not allowed to conduct intelligence-gathering activities, such as reconnaissance flights, in its exclusive economic zone (EEZ).

According to the United States, claimant countries, under UN Convention of the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), should have freedom of navigation through EEZs in the sea and are not required to notify claimants of military activities. In July 2016, the Permanent Court of Arbitration at The Hague issued its ruling on a claim brought against China by the Philippines under UNCLOS, ruling in favour of the Philippines on almost every count. While China is a signatory to the treaty, which established the tribunal, it refuses to accept the court’s authority.

In recent years, satellite imagery has shown China’s increased efforts to reclaim land in the South China Sea by physically increas-ing the size of islands or creating new islands altogether. In addi-tion to piling sand onto existing reefs, China has constructed ports, military installations, and airstrips—particularly in the Paracel and Spratly Islands, where it has twenty and seven outposts respec-tively. China has militarized Woody Island by deploying fighter jets, cruise missiles, and a radar system. China’s claims threaten SLOCs, which are important maritime passages that facilitate trade and the movement of naval forces.

The United States has challenged China’s assertive territorial claims and land reclamation efforts by conducting FONOPs and bolstering support for Southeast Asian partners. Japan has sold mil-itary ships and equipment to the Philippines and Vietnam in order to improve their maritime security capacity. The US defense treaty with Manila could draw them into a potential China-Philippines conflict over the substantial natural gas deposits or lucrative fishing grounds in disputed territory.4

India supports freedom of navigation and over flight, unimped-ed commerce, based on the principles of international law. India believes that States should resolve the disputes through peaceful means without threat or use of force and exercise self-restraint in the conduct of activities that could complicate or escalate disputes affecting peace and stability.

Civil War in SyriaThe civil war in Syria started in 2011 as protests against President Assad’s regime. It quickly escalated into a full-scale war between the Syrian government—backed by Russia and Iran — and anti-government rebel groups—backed by the United States, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and others in the region. Currently, there are three campaigns driving the conflict; coalition efforts to defeat the Islamic State, violence between the Syrian government and opposition forc-es, and military operations against Syrian Kurds by Turkish forces.

The Islamic State began seizing control of territory in Syria in 2013. After a series of terrorist attacks coordinated by the Islamic State across Europe in 2015, the United States, the United Kingdom, and France—with the support of Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and other Arab partners—expanded their air campaign in Iraq to include Syria. Together, these nations have conducted over eleven thousand air strikes against Islamic State targets in Syria, while the US-led coalition has continued its support for ground operations by the SDF. Turkish troops have been involved in ground operations against the Islamic State since 2016, and have launched attacks against armed Kurdish groups in Syria. Meanwhile, at the request of the Syrian government in September 2015, Russia began launching air strikes against what it claimed were Islamic State targets, while Syrian government forces achieved several notable victories over the Islamic State, including the reclamation of Palmyra. According to the US-led coalition against the Islamic State, 98 per cent of the territory formerly held by the group in Iraq and Syria, including Raqqa and Deir al-Zour, has been reclaimed by Iraqi security forces and the SDF.

CONFLICTS TO WATCH

the face of Pakistan’s military incursions. In December 2007, the existence of the TTP was officially announced, under the leadership of Baitullah Mehsud. In 2014, former Pakistan Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif ’s attempts to negotiate a peace agreement with the TTP failed as they attacked the international airport in Karachi. In Jun 2014 the Pakistan government launched an offensive against TTP strongholds in North Waziristan. The TTP responded with several attacks, including the December 2014 attack on the Army Public School in Peshawar that killed nearly 150 people, mostly school children, in the deadliest terrorist attack in Pakistan’s history.

Following the Peshawar school attack, Pakistani political par-ties agreed on a comprehensive National Action Plan to combat ter-rorism and extremist ideology across the country, and Sharif lifted the death penalty moratorium to allow the execution of convicted terrorists. After nearly two years, in June 2016 the Pakistani military declared that the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) had been cleared of militants. Pakistan Army claimed that roughly 3,500 militants were killed and 500 Pakistani soldiers had died in the clearing operations.

Despite Pakistan Govt’s declaration of success; on the one hand TTP and other militants continue to carry out major attacks e.g. March 27, 2016, Lahore Gulshan-e-Iqbal Park Easter suicide attack and the 8th August 2016 suicide bombing in the Quetta Govt hospital; on the other hand Pakistan Army and ISI provide support to the Haqqani network, Lashkar-e-Taiba, and other militant proxy groups that carry out attacks in Afghanistan and India. Attacks claimed by the Islamic State in Pakistan are also a cause of concern as many fighting under the Islamic State’s banner in Afghanistan are believed to be former TTP militants who fled across the border, a phenomenon that has raised fears of an Islamic State-inspired campaign of violence inside Pakistan.

In 2018 the US administration suspended security assistance to Pakistan over their continuing unwillingness to target militants who receive sanctuary in Pakistani territory and carry out attacks in Afghanistan. More than $800 million in security assistance was suspended or redirected in 2018, and the US has cut off access for Pakistani military officers to US military training and education programmes, in an effort to pressure the Pakistani government to change policy. In June 2018 the Financial Action Task Force placed Pakistan on the so-called “grey list” of countries not doing enough to stop money laundering and terrorist financing.

The withdrawal of US forces from Afghanistan could increase regional instability by allowing militants from Pakistan to estab-lish safe havens in Afghanistan. Additionally, acute instability in Pakistan has security implications for neighboring Afghanistan and India. The TTP is closely allied with the Afghan Taliban in its battle against Afghan troops, and India fears that anti-state and state-sponsored Pakistani terrorists could be diverted against India. Moreover, the vulnerability of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal to attack or theft by nonstate actors remains a major concern for US and Indian policymakers.2

Balochistan ConflictHistorically Balochistan covers the southern part of Sistan and Baluchestan Province in Iran, the Pakistani province of Balochistan, and Afghanistan’s Helmand Province. The Gulf of Oman forms its southern border. Mountains and desert make up much of the region’s terrain. Balochistan is the largest province of Pakistan (comprising 44 per cent of the country’s total area), but it is the least inhabited, with only 5per cent of total population of Pakistan.

Rich in natural resources like natural gas, oil, coal, copper, sulphur, fluoride and gold, this is the least developed province in Pakistan. Sunni Islam is the predominant religion.

The conflict in Balochistan is one of “nationalist/self-determi-nation”. The Balochistan Liberation Army, designated as a terrorist organisation by Pakistan and Britain, is the most widely known Baloch separatist group. Other separatist groups include Lashkar-e-Balochistan and the Baloch Liberation United Front (BLUF).

Pakistan repeatedly alleges involvement of India and Afghanistan in supporting the Balochi movement. The former American Af-Pak envoy Richard Holbrooke said in 2011 that Pakistan had failed to provide any evidence to the United States that India was involved in separatist movements in Balochistan. He did not consider Pakistan’s accusations against India credible. Holbrooke also strongly rejected the allegation that India was using its consulates in Afghanistan to facilitate Baloch rebel activity, say-ing he had “no reason to believe Islamabad’s charges”, and that “Pakistan would do well to examine its own internal problems”. India too has categorically denied the allegations.

The stakes in Balochistan have gone several notches higher due to the development of China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) and the Gwadar Port. Resource-rich Balochistan is at the heart of the Beijing’s ambitious CPEC, which connects Gwadar Port in Balochistan with China’s Xinjiang province. The BLA is opposed to the CPEC, alleging that the project was aimed at exploiting the resources of the province. On November 23, 2018, three heavily-armed suicide bombers stormed the Chinese consulate in Karachi. The attack was claimed by the Baloch Liberation Army (BLA) which said it would not tolerate “any Chinese military expansion-ist endeavours on Baloch soil”. On May 12, 2019, Baloch militants carried out an assault in the heart of CPEC, the luxury Pearl Continental hotel in Gwadar. The attackers were killed, but only after killing five people inside the hotel and a soldier.

Pakistan has raised a special security force of around 15,000 troops to protect CPEC and Chinese projects. As this force proves to be inadequate, Chinese companies are expected to rely heavily on private security contractors, especially Chinese contractors that employ former PLA personnel. Use of security contractors also

Territorial Claims

China

Vietnam

Philippines

Malaysia

Brunei

Reefs built by China

into artificial islands

CHINAUN Convention’s 200 nautical mile limit

VIETNAM

PARACEL ISLANDS

Spartly Oslands

MALAYSIA

MALAYSIAINDONESIA

TAIWAN

PHILIPPINESScarboroughShoal

Itu Abu Island

BRUNEI

CAMBODIA

LAOS

South China

SeaTHAILAND

BalochistanDelhi

IslamabadKabul

Arabian Sea

Sindh

Punjab

INDIA

IRAN

CHINA

PAKISTAN

AFGHANISTAN

Areas dominated by different major ethnic groups

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Prime Minister

Minister of Defense

State Minister of Defense

National Security Council

(up to three people)

Cabinet

Special Advisers to the Minister of Defense

Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense (two)

(Excluding temporary or special positions.)

Administrative Vice-Minister of Defense

Private Secretary of the Minister of Defense

Acquisition, Technology and Logistics Agency

Defense Council

Regional Defense Bureaus

Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs

Special Advisers to the Minister of Defense

The Inspector General’s Office of Legal Com

plianceDefense Intelligence Headquarters

Air Staff OfficeChief of Staff, Air Self-Defense Force

Maritim

e Staff OfficeChief of Staff, M

aritime Self-Defense Force

National Institute for Defense Studies

National Defense M

edical College

National Defense Academ

y

Defense Personnel Review Board

Central Council on Defense Facilities

SDF Ethics Review Board

(Internal bureaus)us)

Bureau of Local Cooperation

Bureau of Personnel and Education

Bureau of Defense Buildup Planning

Bureau of Defense Policy

Minister’s Secretariat

Ground Staff OfficeChief of Staff, Ground Self-Defense Force

Joint StaffChief of Staff, Joint Staff

Cooperative Organizations

Provincial Cooperation OfficesSDF Regional HospitalsSDF Central Hospitals

SDF Physical Training School

Cooperative Units

Self-Defense Forces (SDF) Supervised Units of Com

munication System

s

SDF Intelligence Security Com

mand

Units and organisations of the Air Self-Defense Force

Joint Staff College

Units and organisations of the Maritim

eSelf-Defense Force

Units and organisations of the Ground Self-Defense Force

JAPAN: MoD Organisational Structure

MOD ORGANISATIONS & CONTACTS OF ASIAN COUNTRIES: JAPAN

Ministry of Defence

Inspectorat General Secretariat General

Structure Organisation of Defence Ministry of Indonesia

Director General Planning of Defence

Director General Strategic of Defence

Director General Potential of Defence

Director General Strength of Defence

Department of Education and Exercise

Department of Research and Development

Centre of Data and Information

Centre of Finance Centre of Public Communication

Centre of Rehabilitation

Department of Media Defence

INDONESIA: MoD Organisational Structure

MOD ORGANISATIONS & CONTACTS OF ASIAN COUNTRIES: INDONESIA, JAPAN

JAPAN: MoD Contact DetailsContact Desiganation Organisation Address

Takeshi IWAYA Minister of Defense Ministry of Defense 5-1 Honmura-cho, Ichigaya, Shinjuku-ku, Tokyo 162-8801, Japan

Kenji HARADA State Minister of Defense Ministry of Defense 5-1 Honmura-cho, Ichigaya, Shinjuku-ku, Tokyo 162-8801, Japan

Takako SUZUKI Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense

Ministry of Defense 5-1 Honmura-cho, Ichigaya, Shinjuku-ku, Tokyo 162-8801, Japan

Hiroshi YAMADA Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense

Ministry of Defense 5-1 Honmura-cho, Ichigaya, Shinjuku-ku, Tokyo 162-8801, Japan

General Koji YAMAZAKI Chief of Staff, Joint Staff Ministry of Defense 5-1 Honmura-cho, Ichigaya, Shinjuku-ku, Tokyo 162-8801, Japan

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nLASER program based on a gas-dynamic carbon dioxide LASER that could reach 500 kilowatts. Scaling it up in power while maintaining the beam quality would be the challenge.

nFeasibility of particle beams for missile defence is yet another promising technology.

nSpace based tracking & Surveillance System for detection & tracking of ballistic missiles. Interceptors to engage incoming missiles earlier in flight than would be possible with other mis-sile detection system.

BMD for IndiaMissile defence is an essential component of national secu-rity and defence strategies. It contributes to the deterrence of adversary aggression and assurance to allies. Apropos, bigger nations with expeditionary forces would require these two kinds of BMD systems where as smaller nation can do it with an Integrated Air Defence system capable of neutralising multiple kind of targets in TBA. Drawing a corollary, it is evident that India would require two distinct kind of systems, one to protect the population/command and control/economic centers and second to protect its forces in TBA. System akin to Ground based Mid Course Missile (GMD) can be deployed in hinterland and Integrated Air Defence system akin to S-400 is required for the Air Defence for field formations.

BMD development involves high risk and brings a burden on the national exchequer. International collaboration with friendly nations which are willing to enter in mutually beneficial agree-ments and to develop ballistic missile shields for the future. India must identify its envisaged threats, evaluate its own technological constraints to face them and collaborate with international players to build a missile defence architecture to enhance its air defence & nuclear deterrence capability and ensure nuclear stability in the subcontinent. Ballistic missile proliferation poses the greatest threat to regional security and needs an unfailing & perfect missiles shield against burgeoning nuclear weapons & missiles threats.

The US is offering to sell systems to India. As India is pursuing its own BMD, it welcomes any assistance from US and Arrow II system is the most sought after technology. India wanted to buy the Israeli Arrow-II System from Israel. MRSAM/Barak-8 is a long-range anti-air and anti-missile defence system being developed jointly by Israel Aerospace Industries and DRDO of India. The Spada 2000 kill probability is high, even against highly agile crossing targets & can engage upto four targets simultaneously with Aspide Missile. As offensive missile capabilities continue to proliferate, missile defense cooperation with allies and partners has gained increas-ing importance to advance missile defence architectures for our protection, deterrence and assurance deepening interoperability in missile defence systems.

BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENCE: AFFORDABLE OPTIONS AND TECHNOLOGIES

How the S-400 will defend India

INDIA

Himachal Pradesh

Jammu & Kashmir

S-400 Specifications:Role: Long-range anti-access/area denialEquipment: Each S-400 battalion has eight launchers, a command centre, two radars, mast and up to 72 missilesRange: 120 to 400 km, depending on missiles deployedTargets: Hostile aircraft, missiles, stealth jets, dronesMissile speed: 17,000 kmph. Faster than any aircraftReaction time: Vehicle stopping to missile firing is 5 minutesNumbers ordered: 5 systems

Punjab

Haryana

Islamabad

Lahore

Karachi

Quetta

Sargodha

Arabian Sea

PAKISTAN

CHINA

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Today, with their interests and securi-ty intertwined, peo-ple across the world are becoming mem-bers of community

witha shared future. China is at a critical stage of completing the building of a moderately prosperous society in all respects and embarking on a journey of building a modernised socialist coun-try in an all-round way. Socialism and Chinese characteristics

has entered a new era.The Chinese government

is issuing China’s National Defense in the New Era to expound on China’s defensive national defence policy and

explain the practice, purposes and significance of China’s efforts to build a fortified national defence and a strong military, with a view to helping the international community better understand China’s national defence.

THE STATE COUNCIL INFORMATION OFFICE OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA JULY 2019,

FIRST EDITION 2019

The tenth Defence Whitepaper was released by China on July 24, 2019. From 1998 to 2010 China has issued a defence white paper every two years. The previous Whitepaper was published in 2015.

Lt General Subrata Saha (Retd), Military Expert and Consulting Editor, SP’s Military Yearbook analyses the White Paper put out by China.

17

CHINA’S NATIONAL DEFENCE IN THE NEW ERA

Some distinct inferences can be drawn from the 2019 Whitepaper: 1. China is keen to position itself as the pivot for “world peace,” but with clear red lines defined on its core

“sovereignty, security, and development interests.” There is an endeavour to balance peaceful intentions and great power aspirations

2. China believes that “configuration of strategic power is becoming more balanced”. There is new found confidence in China’s military power, consequent to technological advancements, modernisation, structural changes in command and control and extensive training of the PLA.

3. At the same time the paper also highlights China’s perceived risks from technological surprise and growing technological generation gap. It acknowledges PLA’s lagging mechanisation and it has to develop capabilities moving ahead from ‘informationization’ to ‘intelligent warfare’. China’s rapid progress in developing unmanned systems, AI and robotics manifests in its outlook for future wars.

4. The paper emphasizes on “intensification of global military competition” and blames US for “undermining global strategic stability”.

5. Modernisation and restructuring of the armed forces is in line with Xi Jinping’s thinking of China’s future. In addition to evolving threats, priority is on loyalty to the Chinese Communist party, with emphasis on core military functions, discipline and curbing corruption.

EXPERT COMMENT

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2019 | 46TH ISSUE | 491

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JORDAN

DefenceTotal Armed Forces : Active: 1,00,500 (Army: 74,000; Navy: 500; Air:

12,000; Special Operations 14,000) Reserves: 65,000 (Army: 60,000; Joint: 5,000)Paramilitary Forces : Gendarmerie: 15,000 est, Civil Militia

‘People’s Army’: 35,000 est

Security EnvironmentKing Abdullah II of Jordan has had every reason to be pleased with him-self lately. Following the January 2017 inauguration of President Donald Trump, he was the first Arab Leader invited to Washington to meet with the new administration. The visit was hailed a success by all involved—not only in terms of US-Jordan relations, but also as an opportunity for the King to caution Trump against moving the US embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem.

The visit, however, was only a temporary distraction from the ongo-ing security and political crisis that has been unfolding in Jordan for the last year. Jordan has witnessed a rising number of homegrown terrorist attacks and security incidents. Additionally, the king’s apparent inabil-ity or unwillingness to institute substantive socio-economic reform, end corruption, and increase citizens’ rights has led to spiraling protests.

The growing threat of ISIS spillover from the conflicts in Syria and Iraq—as well as evidence of rising militancy at home—has increased con-cerns that Jordan faces new security risks. While Jordan has long faced the threat of terrorism, recent incidents have renewed and heightened fears.

Some in the Hashemite royal circle fear that Washington may not fully appreciate the challenges they face. In 2017, US approved $ 450 million in military assistance, paling in comparison to $3.8 billion in military assistance to Jordan’s neighbor Israel. King Abdullah repeat-edly clashed with the Obama administration’s narrow focus on ISIS in Syria (and drew Jordan into that part of the strategic plan). However, the King never appeared to persuade the president to his view for a broader push. This is the challenge that Abdullah faces again with the Trump administration, and it may be that the rise in Jordan’s own domestic security challenges—coupled with the pressures that ISIS is putting on the border with Syria and Jordan—proves effective. Indeed, the US-led campaign against ISIS cannot succeed if Jordan’s role as the pivotal Arab state on the front lines of the crisis in Syria is imperiled.

ARMYStrength : 74,000Force by RoleManoeuvreArmouredArmd Div : 1 (strategic reserve) (3 armd bde, 1 arty bde, 1

AD Bde)Armd Bde : 1MechanisedMech Bdes : 5LightLt Inf Bdes : 3Combat SupportArty Bdes : 3AD Bdes : 3MRL Bn : 1Equipment by TypeArmoured Fighting VehiclesMBTs : 572: 390 FV4034 Challenger 1 (Al Hussein); 182

M60 Phoenix; (274 FV4030/2 Khalid in store)Lt Tks : (19 FV101 Scorpion; in store)ASLT : 141 B1 CentauroRecce : 153: 103 FV107 Scimitar; 50 FV701 FerretIFVs : 678: 13 AIFV-B-C25; 31 BMP-2; 321 Ratel-20;

311 YPR-765 PRIAPC : 800+APC (T) : 650+: 370: M113A1/A2 Mk1J; 200 M577A2

(CP); some Temsah; 77 YPR-765 PRCO (CP); 3 AIFV-B

Area : 89,342 sq kmCapital : AmmanCoastline : 26 kmMaritime Claims Territorial sea : 3 nmPopulation : 1,02,48,069(Note: increased estimate reflects revised assumptions about the net migration rate due to the increased flow of Syrian refugees (July 2017 est.))Ethnic Divisions : Arab 98 per cent, Circassian 1 per cent,

Armenian 1 per cent Religions : Muslim 97.2 per cent (official; predominantly

Sunni), Christian 2.2 per cent (majority Greek Orthodox, but some Greek and Roman Catholics, Syrian Orthodox, Coptic Orthodox, Armenian Orthodox, and Protestant denomi-nations), Buddhist 0.4 per cent, Hindu 0.1 per cent, Jewish <0.1, folk religionist <0.1, unaffili-ated <0.1, other <0.1 (2010 est.)

Languages : Arabic (official), English widely understood among upper and middle classes

Literacy : 95.4 per centGovernment : Parliamentary Constitutional MonarchySuffrage : 18 years of age; universalAdministrative Divisions : 12 governorates

 General Information

WEST ASIA AND NORTH AFRICA: JORDAN

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INDIAN DEFENCE

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THE INDIAN ARMY

nmajor misreading of the prevailing geopolitical climatentotal disconnect between the military and political leadershipninability of some in the military leadership to see the situation

in the right perspectivenand serious inadequacies in weapons and equipment

The result of Sino-India Conflict of 1962 encouraged Pakistan to seek a military solution of the Kashmir problem. A modernised Pakistan Army with an edge over India in armour, artillery and air-power prompted her to plan aggression on Kashmir in 1965. It was a three-phased programme. In the first phase the Indian capacity to

react was tested in the Rann of Kutch. In the second phase trouble was fomented in Kashmir. In the third phase an attempt was made to bottle up the Indian Army in Jammu and Kashmir by sealing the supply line in Chhamb-Jaurian sector of Jammu. Pakistan’s adventurism was foiled as Indian Army succeeded in making gains across the international borders and along the Line of Control (notably Hajipir). A cease-fire was agreed upon with effect from September 23, 1965 with UN efforts. The Tashkent Declaration and the subsequent agreement between the two countries led to the dis-engagement of forces and their withdrawal to positions occupied

THE INDIAN ARMY

by them before August 5, 1965. In the 1965 War, Pakistan suffered heavily in men and material with an estimate that Pak Army lost 5988 killed and many more wounded. Pakistan also lost 475 tanks.

The 1971 war between India and Pakistan was fought both on the eastern and the western fronts. India adopted aggressive strategy on the eastern front and a defensive strategy on the west-ern front. On the Eastern front the Indian Army ably supported by the Mukti Bahini defeated four divisions and 30,000 para-military forces of the Pakistan Army in the thirteen days’ war. In the west, a large area of Pakistani territory was occupied by Indian troops. On 16 December, Lt General Niazi of Pakistan Army surrendered to Lt General Aurora of Indian Army with 93,000 regular and para-military men. War on the Eastern front ended in a complete victory for India and liberation of Bangladesh.

The period after 1971 War saw the steady modernisation of the Indian Army with equipment for modern war. The Expert Committee under the Chairmanship of Lt General K.V. Krishna Rao submitted its report in 1976. Some of its major recommenda-tions started getting implemented in the eighties. The expansion of mechanized forces was achieved as a result of this report.

On April 13, 1984, 34 soldiers of the Indian Army landed west of Siachen glacier and occupied the Bilafond La pass. This was the opening move in what is referred to as Operation Meghdoot between India & Pakistan which continues till date. During the period July 1987 to March 1990, Indian Army saw action in Operation Pawan where the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) was deployed in Sri Lanka in accordance with the Indo-Sri Lankan accord of July 29, 1987. On November 3, 1988, the Indian Army launched Operation Cactus in Maldives to prevent mercenaries from overthrowing the

Government of Maldives and while it did not involve much fighting, it demonstrated to the World the speed and efficiency with which the Indian Armed Forces could react. This period (1989 onwards) also saw the start of the terrorism and insurgency in Kashmir and deployment of additional troops in J&K.

As indications of Pakistani intrusions came in starting from May 1999, it became clear that India was facing an attempt by the Pakistan to change the LoC using its regular troops. Air and artil-lery (155mm Howitzers) was employed with devastating effect to repel the intrusions and claim back the lost territories. Thereafter, a massive build-up by Indian Army was ordered in the wake of the December 13, 2001, terrorist attack on Parliament House. This 10-month-long mobilisation along the border with Pakistan gener-ated high levels of tension, led to some positive changes in India’s military doctrine and hastened its military modernisation together with organizational changes.

The influx of terrorism from Pakistan continued unabated. On September 18, 2016, four terrorists from Pakistan struck a brigade headquarters administrative base at Uri and killed 17 unarmed and unsuspecting soldiers in their tents. On the night of September 28-29, Indian Army’s Special Forces struck at seven launch pads of the terrorists across the line of control along a frontage of about 200 km in two different Corps Zones thus achieving complete surprise over the Pakistani military establishment and inflicted considerable casualties on the terrorists and military personnel in the area.

Indian Army continues to face four types of threats and chal-lenges including traditional threats from China and Pakistan; contemporary threats in the form of terrorism; internal chal-lenges; and out of area contingency threats. Indian Army

Chain of Command

Regional Commands(Northern, Western, Southern,

South Western, Central and Eastern)

Army Training Command (ARTRAC)

HQ Corps HQ Areas/Sub-Areas

HQ Divisions (Armoured/Infantry/Mountain/Artillery)

HQ Independent Brigade (Armoured/Infantry/Mountain/Parachute/Artillery/

Air Defence Artillery)

HQ Sub-Area

Static Establishments

Training Establishments

Sub-Area HQ/Static Establishmentsand Designated Sector HQ

Army Headquarters(Integrated Headquarters of the Ministry of Defence-Army)

Army Headquarters Reserves

Reserve Formations

HQ Brigades(Armoured/Infantry/Mountain/Artillery)

Diagrammatic Layout of the Army’s Chain of CommandIndia’s Land Border Map

Border with China:

3488 km

Border with Nepal:

1751 km

Border with Afghanistan:

106 km

Border with Pakistan: 3323 km

Coastline: 7516.6 km

Source: MHA Annual Report

Islands: 1197 with 2094 km

with additionalcoastline

Border with Bhutan: 699 km

Border with Myanmar: 3323 km

Border with Bangladesh:

4096.7 km

INDIA

A SNEAK PEEK...

AND MORE...

CRYSTAL GAZING THE GLOBAL SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

West Asia – Ticking Time Bomb ASEAN Centrality – In Trap of China China’s footprint from Indo-Pacific to Africa Challenges Before India’s Maritime

Diplomacy Pakistan Factor in India and Afghanistan Indian Navy and Indo-Pacific –

Realism vs Posturing Turnaround in India-Russia Relations

TECHNOLOGY

Cyber Warfare Nuclear Calculus Satellites – The Force Multiplier Hypersonic Weapons Future Super Soldier Future Submarines Artificial Intelligence

MODERNISATION

IAF Full Replacement by 2035 Indian Army Right Sizing Indian Army Modernisation India’s Maritime Interests in the

Indo-Pacific India’s Defence Budget India’s Business Environment Strategic Partnership in Defence

Production

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11-12_SP's Naval Forces 5-2019.indd 11 06/11/19 6:59 PM

>>

115/2019 sp’s land forces

For more details, log on to:

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A Set of Kind Words from Dr S. Radhakrishnan, 2nd President of India, addressed to our Founder Editor-in-Chief, in March 1966.

CONFLICTS TO WATCH

ASIAN WHO’S WHO

BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENCE CHINA’S DEFENCE WHITEPAPER

REGIONAL BALANCEINDIAN DEFENCE

The ten most important global conflicts to watch particularly from the point of view of India and

this region.

Who’s who in 44 countries in Asia and Pacific along with the MoD organisation structures and contacts of

13 largest buyers of defence equipment in the region.

Ballistic missile proliferation poses great threat to the region. All about BMD and how the S-400 will

defend India.

China’s tenth Defence Whitepaper, released on July 24, 2019, after a gap of nearly 5 years is analysed

by a Military Expert.

GDP, military expenditure, security environment and listing of current military hardware of 45 countries in Asia

and Pacific.

Everything there is to know about Indian Armed Forces, Ministry of Defence, Defence Industry, Defence R&D and Central Armed Police Forces including Who’s who,

organisation structures, profiles and contact details.

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STRATEGY & PERSPECTIVE

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CONFLICTS TO WATCH

carries risks, as unregulated and relatively inexperienced contrac-tors may exacerbate security problems. There are indications that China’s Marine Corps could become its principal ready response force in the region. A Marine company is already deployed to the Chinese base at Djibouti (which has facilities to accommodate up to 10,000 personnel). There are reports of Chinese security pres-ence in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir to protect transport infrastruc-ture and construction units, and there has been speculation about future deployments to Gwadar. Several Chinese military exercises in the Indian Ocean region are openly focused on using Chinese forces to protect BRI projects. But in protecting people and assets, China may also increasingly find itself drawn into the local secu-rity affairs. As China’s Global Times recently argued, “China has always adhered to the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries, but that doesn’t mean Beijing can turn a deaf ear to the demands of Chinese enterprises in protecting their overseas investments.”3

South China SeaChina claims sovereignty over the South China Sea, estimated to have 11 billion barrels of untapped oil, 190 trillion cubic feet of nat-ural gas and fishing areas. Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Taiwan, and Vietnam have competing claims. Since the 1970s, countries began to claim islands and various zones in the South China Sea, such as the Spratly Islands.

China maintains that under international law, foreign militaries are not allowed to conduct intelligence-gathering activities, such as reconnaissance flights, in its exclusive economic zone (EEZ).

According to the United States, claimant countries, under UN Convention of the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), should have freedom of navigation through EEZs in the sea and are not required to notify claimants of military activities. In July 2016, the Permanent Court of Arbitration at The Hague issued its ruling on a claim brought against China by the Philippines under UNCLOS, ruling in favour of the Philippines on almost every count. While China is a signatory to the treaty, which established the tribunal, it refuses to accept the court’s authority.

In recent years, satellite imagery has shown China’s increased efforts to reclaim land in the South China Sea by physically increas-ing the size of islands or creating new islands altogether. In addi-tion to piling sand onto existing reefs, China has constructed ports, military installations, and airstrips—particularly in the Paracel and Spratly Islands, where it has twenty and seven outposts respec-tively. China has militarized Woody Island by deploying fighter jets, cruise missiles, and a radar system. China’s claims threaten SLOCs, which are important maritime passages that facilitate trade and the movement of naval forces.

The United States has challenged China’s assertive territorial claims and land reclamation efforts by conducting FONOPs and bolstering support for Southeast Asian partners. Japan has sold mil-itary ships and equipment to the Philippines and Vietnam in order to improve their maritime security capacity. The US defense treaty with Manila could draw them into a potential China-Philippines conflict over the substantial natural gas deposits or lucrative fishing grounds in disputed territory.4

India supports freedom of navigation and over flight, unimped-ed commerce, based on the principles of international law. India believes that States should resolve the disputes through peaceful means without threat or use of force and exercise self-restraint in the conduct of activities that could complicate or escalate disputes affecting peace and stability.

Civil War in SyriaThe civil war in Syria started in 2011 as protests against President Assad’s regime. It quickly escalated into a full-scale war between the Syrian government—backed by Russia and Iran — and anti-government rebel groups—backed by the United States, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and others in the region. Currently, there are three campaigns driving the conflict; coalition efforts to defeat the Islamic State, violence between the Syrian government and opposition forc-es, and military operations against Syrian Kurds by Turkish forces.

The Islamic State began seizing control of territory in Syria in 2013. After a series of terrorist attacks coordinated by the Islamic State across Europe in 2015, the United States, the United Kingdom, and France—with the support of Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and other Arab partners—expanded their air campaign in Iraq to include Syria. Together, these nations have conducted over eleven thousand air strikes against Islamic State targets in Syria, while the US-led coalition has continued its support for ground operations by the SDF. Turkish troops have been involved in ground operations against the Islamic State since 2016, and have launched attacks against armed Kurdish groups in Syria. Meanwhile, at the request of the Syrian government in September 2015, Russia began launching air strikes against what it claimed were Islamic State targets, while Syrian government forces achieved several notable victories over the Islamic State, including the reclamation of Palmyra. According to the US-led coalition against the Islamic State, 98 per cent of the territory formerly held by the group in Iraq and Syria, including Raqqa and Deir al-Zour, has been reclaimed by Iraqi security forces and the SDF.

CONFLICTS TO WATCH

the face of Pakistan’s military incursions. In December 2007, the existence of the TTP was officially announced, under the leadership of Baitullah Mehsud. In 2014, former Pakistan Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif ’s attempts to negotiate a peace agreement with the TTP failed as they attacked the international airport in Karachi. In Jun 2014 the Pakistan government launched an offensive against TTP strongholds in North Waziristan. The TTP responded with several attacks, including the December 2014 attack on the Army Public School in Peshawar that killed nearly 150 people, mostly school children, in the deadliest terrorist attack in Pakistan’s history.

Following the Peshawar school attack, Pakistani political par-ties agreed on a comprehensive National Action Plan to combat ter-rorism and extremist ideology across the country, and Sharif lifted the death penalty moratorium to allow the execution of convicted terrorists. After nearly two years, in June 2016 the Pakistani military declared that the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) had been cleared of militants. Pakistan Army claimed that roughly 3,500 militants were killed and 500 Pakistani soldiers had died in the clearing operations.

Despite Pakistan Govt’s declaration of success; on the one hand TTP and other militants continue to carry out major attacks e.g. March 27, 2016, Lahore Gulshan-e-Iqbal Park Easter suicide attack and the 8th August 2016 suicide bombing in the Quetta Govt hospital; on the other hand Pakistan Army and ISI provide support to the Haqqani network, Lashkar-e-Taiba, and other militant proxy groups that carry out attacks in Afghanistan and India. Attacks claimed by the Islamic State in Pakistan are also a cause of concern as many fighting under the Islamic State’s banner in Afghanistan are believed to be former TTP militants who fled across the border, a phenomenon that has raised fears of an Islamic State-inspired campaign of violence inside Pakistan.

In 2018 the US administration suspended security assistance to Pakistan over their continuing unwillingness to target militants who receive sanctuary in Pakistani territory and carry out attacks in Afghanistan. More than $800 million in security assistance was suspended or redirected in 2018, and the US has cut off access for Pakistani military officers to US military training and education programmes, in an effort to pressure the Pakistani government to change policy. In June 2018 the Financial Action Task Force placed Pakistan on the so-called “grey list” of countries not doing enough to stop money laundering and terrorist financing.

The withdrawal of US forces from Afghanistan could increase regional instability by allowing militants from Pakistan to estab-lish safe havens in Afghanistan. Additionally, acute instability in Pakistan has security implications for neighboring Afghanistan and India. The TTP is closely allied with the Afghan Taliban in its battle against Afghan troops, and India fears that anti-state and state-sponsored Pakistani terrorists could be diverted against India. Moreover, the vulnerability of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal to attack or theft by nonstate actors remains a major concern for US and Indian policymakers.2

Balochistan ConflictHistorically Balochistan covers the southern part of Sistan and Baluchestan Province in Iran, the Pakistani province of Balochistan, and Afghanistan’s Helmand Province. The Gulf of Oman forms its southern border. Mountains and desert make up much of the region’s terrain. Balochistan is the largest province of Pakistan (comprising 44 per cent of the country’s total area), but it is the least inhabited, with only 5per cent of total population of Pakistan.

Rich in natural resources like natural gas, oil, coal, copper, sulphur, fluoride and gold, this is the least developed province in Pakistan. Sunni Islam is the predominant religion.

The conflict in Balochistan is one of “nationalist/self-determi-nation”. The Balochistan Liberation Army, designated as a terrorist organisation by Pakistan and Britain, is the most widely known Baloch separatist group. Other separatist groups include Lashkar-e-Balochistan and the Baloch Liberation United Front (BLUF).

Pakistan repeatedly alleges involvement of India and Afghanistan in supporting the Balochi movement. The former American Af-Pak envoy Richard Holbrooke said in 2011 that Pakistan had failed to provide any evidence to the United States that India was involved in separatist movements in Balochistan. He did not consider Pakistan’s accusations against India credible. Holbrooke also strongly rejected the allegation that India was using its consulates in Afghanistan to facilitate Baloch rebel activity, say-ing he had “no reason to believe Islamabad’s charges”, and that “Pakistan would do well to examine its own internal problems”. India too has categorically denied the allegations.

The stakes in Balochistan have gone several notches higher due to the development of China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) and the Gwadar Port. Resource-rich Balochistan is at the heart of the Beijing’s ambitious CPEC, which connects Gwadar Port in Balochistan with China’s Xinjiang province. The BLA is opposed to the CPEC, alleging that the project was aimed at exploiting the resources of the province. On November 23, 2018, three heavily-armed suicide bombers stormed the Chinese consulate in Karachi. The attack was claimed by the Baloch Liberation Army (BLA) which said it would not tolerate “any Chinese military expansion-ist endeavours on Baloch soil”. On May 12, 2019, Baloch militants carried out an assault in the heart of CPEC, the luxury Pearl Continental hotel in Gwadar. The attackers were killed, but only after killing five people inside the hotel and a soldier.

Pakistan has raised a special security force of around 15,000 troops to protect CPEC and Chinese projects. As this force proves to be inadequate, Chinese companies are expected to rely heavily on private security contractors, especially Chinese contractors that employ former PLA personnel. Use of security contractors also

Territorial Claims

China

Vietnam

Philippines

Malaysia

Brunei

Reefs built by China

into artificial islands

CHINAUN Convention’s 200 nautical mile limit

VIETNAM

PARACEL ISLANDS

Spartly Oslands

MALAYSIA

MALAYSIAINDONESIA

TAIWAN

PHILIPPINESScarboroughShoal

Itu Abu Island

BRUNEI

CAMBODIA

LAOS

South China

SeaTHAILAND

BalochistanDelhi

IslamabadKabul

Arabian Sea

Sindh

Punjab

INDIA

IRAN

CHINA

PAKISTAN

AFGHANISTAN

Areas dominated by different major ethnic groups

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Prime Minister

Minister of Defense

State Minister of Defense

National Security Council

(up to three people)

Cabinet

Special Advisers to the Minister of Defense

Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense (two)

(Excluding temporary or special positions.)

Administrative Vice-Minister of Defense

Private Secretary of the Minister of Defense

Acquisition, Technology and Logistics Agency

Defense Council

Regional Defense Bureaus

Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs

Special Advisers to the Minister of Defense

The Inspector General’s Office of Legal Com

plianceDefense Intelligence Headquarters

Air Staff OfficeChief of Staff, Air Self-Defense Force

Maritim

e Staff OfficeChief of Staff, M

aritime Self-Defense Force

National Institute for Defense Studies

National Defense M

edical College

National Defense Academ

y

Defense Personnel Review Board

Central Council on Defense Facilities

SDF Ethics Review Board

(Internal bureaus)us)

Bureau of Local Cooperation

Bureau of Personnel and Education

Bureau of Defense Buildup Planning

Bureau of Defense Policy

Minister’s Secretariat

Ground Staff OfficeChief of Staff, Ground Self-Defense Force

Joint StaffChief of Staff, Joint Staff

Cooperative Organizations

Provincial Cooperation OfficesSDF Regional HospitalsSDF Central Hospitals

SDF Physical Training School

Cooperative Units

Self-Defense Forces (SDF) Supervised Units of Com

munication System

s

SDF Intelligence Security Com

mand

Units and organisations of the Air Self-Defense Force

Joint Staff College

Units and organisations of the Maritim

eSelf-Defense Force

Units and organisations of the Ground Self-Defense Force

JAPAN: MoD Organisational Structure

MOD ORGANISATIONS & CONTACTS OF ASIAN COUNTRIES: JAPAN

Ministry of Defence

Inspectorat General Secretariat General

Structure Organisation of Defence Ministry of Indonesia

Director General Planning of Defence

Director General Strategic of Defence

Director General Potential of Defence

Director General Strength of Defence

Department of Education and Exercise

Department of Research and Development

Centre of Data and Information

Centre of Finance Centre of Public Communication

Centre of Rehabilitation

Department of Media Defence

INDONESIA: MoD Organisational Structure

MOD ORGANISATIONS & CONTACTS OF ASIAN COUNTRIES: INDONESIA, JAPAN

JAPAN: MoD Contact DetailsContact Desiganation Organisation Address

Takeshi IWAYA Minister of Defense Ministry of Defense 5-1 Honmura-cho, Ichigaya, Shinjuku-ku, Tokyo 162-8801, Japan

Kenji HARADA State Minister of Defense Ministry of Defense 5-1 Honmura-cho, Ichigaya, Shinjuku-ku, Tokyo 162-8801, Japan

Takako SUZUKI Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense

Ministry of Defense 5-1 Honmura-cho, Ichigaya, Shinjuku-ku, Tokyo 162-8801, Japan

Hiroshi YAMADA Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense

Ministry of Defense 5-1 Honmura-cho, Ichigaya, Shinjuku-ku, Tokyo 162-8801, Japan

General Koji YAMAZAKI Chief of Staff, Joint Staff Ministry of Defense 5-1 Honmura-cho, Ichigaya, Shinjuku-ku, Tokyo 162-8801, Japan

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nLASER program based on a gas-dynamic carbon dioxide LASER that could reach 500 kilowatts. Scaling it up in power while maintaining the beam quality would be the challenge.

nFeasibility of particle beams for missile defence is yet another promising technology.

nSpace based tracking & Surveillance System for detection & tracking of ballistic missiles. Interceptors to engage incoming missiles earlier in flight than would be possible with other mis-sile detection system.

BMD for IndiaMissile defence is an essential component of national secu-rity and defence strategies. It contributes to the deterrence of adversary aggression and assurance to allies. Apropos, bigger nations with expeditionary forces would require these two kinds of BMD systems where as smaller nation can do it with an Integrated Air Defence system capable of neutralising multiple kind of targets in TBA. Drawing a corollary, it is evident that India would require two distinct kind of systems, one to protect the population/command and control/economic centers and second to protect its forces in TBA. System akin to Ground based Mid Course Missile (GMD) can be deployed in hinterland and Integrated Air Defence system akin to S-400 is required for the Air Defence for field formations.

BMD development involves high risk and brings a burden on the national exchequer. International collaboration with friendly nations which are willing to enter in mutually beneficial agree-ments and to develop ballistic missile shields for the future. India must identify its envisaged threats, evaluate its own technological constraints to face them and collaborate with international players to build a missile defence architecture to enhance its air defence & nuclear deterrence capability and ensure nuclear stability in the subcontinent. Ballistic missile proliferation poses the greatest threat to regional security and needs an unfailing & perfect missiles shield against burgeoning nuclear weapons & missiles threats.

The US is offering to sell systems to India. As India is pursuing its own BMD, it welcomes any assistance from US and Arrow II system is the most sought after technology. India wanted to buy the Israeli Arrow-II System from Israel. MRSAM/Barak-8 is a long-range anti-air and anti-missile defence system being developed jointly by Israel Aerospace Industries and DRDO of India. The Spada 2000 kill probability is high, even against highly agile crossing targets & can engage upto four targets simultaneously with Aspide Missile. As offensive missile capabilities continue to proliferate, missile defense cooperation with allies and partners has gained increas-ing importance to advance missile defence architectures for our protection, deterrence and assurance deepening interoperability in missile defence systems.

BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENCE: AFFORDABLE OPTIONS AND TECHNOLOGIES

How the S-400 will defend India

INDIA

Himachal Pradesh

Jammu & Kashmir

S-400 Specifications:Role: Long-range anti-access/area denialEquipment: Each S-400 battalion has eight launchers, a command centre, two radars, mast and up to 72 missilesRange: 120 to 400 km, depending on missiles deployedTargets: Hostile aircraft, missiles, stealth jets, dronesMissile speed: 17,000 kmph. Faster than any aircraftReaction time: Vehicle stopping to missile firing is 5 minutesNumbers ordered: 5 systems

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Today, with their interests and securi-ty intertwined, peo-ple across the world are becoming mem-bers of community

witha shared future. China is at a critical stage of completing the building of a moderately prosperous society in all respects and embarking on a journey of building a modernised socialist coun-try in an all-round way. Socialism and Chinese characteristics

has entered a new era.The Chinese government

is issuing China’s National Defense in the New Era to expound on China’s defensive national defence policy and

explain the practice, purposes and significance of China’s efforts to build a fortified national defence and a strong military, with a view to helping the international community better understand China’s national defence.

THE STATE COUNCIL INFORMATION OFFICE OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA JULY 2019,

FIRST EDITION 2019

The tenth Defence Whitepaper was released by China on July 24, 2019. From 1998 to 2010 China has issued a defence white paper every two years. The previous Whitepaper was published in 2015.

Lt General Subrata Saha (Retd), Military Expert and Consulting Editor, SP’s Military Yearbook analyses the White Paper put out by China.

17

CHINA’S NATIONAL DEFENCE IN THE NEW ERA

Some distinct inferences can be drawn from the 2019 Whitepaper: 1. China is keen to position itself as the pivot for “world peace,” but with clear red lines defined on its core

“sovereignty, security, and development interests.” There is an endeavour to balance peaceful intentions and great power aspirations

2. China believes that “configuration of strategic power is becoming more balanced”. There is new found confidence in China’s military power, consequent to technological advancements, modernisation, structural changes in command and control and extensive training of the PLA.

3. At the same time the paper also highlights China’s perceived risks from technological surprise and growing technological generation gap. It acknowledges PLA’s lagging mechanisation and it has to develop capabilities moving ahead from ‘informationization’ to ‘intelligent warfare’. China’s rapid progress in developing unmanned systems, AI and robotics manifests in its outlook for future wars.

4. The paper emphasizes on “intensification of global military competition” and blames US for “undermining global strategic stability”.

5. Modernisation and restructuring of the armed forces is in line with Xi Jinping’s thinking of China’s future. In addition to evolving threats, priority is on loyalty to the Chinese Communist party, with emphasis on core military functions, discipline and curbing corruption.

EXPERT COMMENT

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2019 | 46TH ISSUE | 491

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DefenceTotal Armed Forces : Active: 1,00,500 (Army: 74,000; Navy: 500; Air:

12,000; Special Operations 14,000) Reserves: 65,000 (Army: 60,000; Joint: 5,000)Paramilitary Forces : Gendarmerie: 15,000 est, Civil Militia

‘People’s Army’: 35,000 est

Security EnvironmentKing Abdullah II of Jordan has had every reason to be pleased with him-self lately. Following the January 2017 inauguration of President Donald Trump, he was the first Arab Leader invited to Washington to meet with the new administration. The visit was hailed a success by all involved—not only in terms of US-Jordan relations, but also as an opportunity for the King to caution Trump against moving the US embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem.

The visit, however, was only a temporary distraction from the ongo-ing security and political crisis that has been unfolding in Jordan for the last year. Jordan has witnessed a rising number of homegrown terrorist attacks and security incidents. Additionally, the king’s apparent inabil-ity or unwillingness to institute substantive socio-economic reform, end corruption, and increase citizens’ rights has led to spiraling protests.

The growing threat of ISIS spillover from the conflicts in Syria and Iraq—as well as evidence of rising militancy at home—has increased con-cerns that Jordan faces new security risks. While Jordan has long faced the threat of terrorism, recent incidents have renewed and heightened fears.

Some in the Hashemite royal circle fear that Washington may not fully appreciate the challenges they face. In 2017, US approved $ 450 million in military assistance, paling in comparison to $3.8 billion in military assistance to Jordan’s neighbor Israel. King Abdullah repeat-edly clashed with the Obama administration’s narrow focus on ISIS in Syria (and drew Jordan into that part of the strategic plan). However, the King never appeared to persuade the president to his view for a broader push. This is the challenge that Abdullah faces again with the Trump administration, and it may be that the rise in Jordan’s own domestic security challenges—coupled with the pressures that ISIS is putting on the border with Syria and Jordan—proves effective. Indeed, the US-led campaign against ISIS cannot succeed if Jordan’s role as the pivotal Arab state on the front lines of the crisis in Syria is imperiled.

ARMYStrength : 74,000Force by RoleManoeuvreArmouredArmd Div : 1 (strategic reserve) (3 armd bde, 1 arty bde, 1

AD Bde)Armd Bde : 1MechanisedMech Bdes : 5LightLt Inf Bdes : 3Combat SupportArty Bdes : 3AD Bdes : 3MRL Bn : 1Equipment by TypeArmoured Fighting VehiclesMBTs : 572: 390 FV4034 Challenger 1 (Al Hussein); 182

M60 Phoenix; (274 FV4030/2 Khalid in store)Lt Tks : (19 FV101 Scorpion; in store)ASLT : 141 B1 CentauroRecce : 153: 103 FV107 Scimitar; 50 FV701 FerretIFVs : 678: 13 AIFV-B-C25; 31 BMP-2; 321 Ratel-20;

311 YPR-765 PRIAPC : 800+APC (T) : 650+: 370: M113A1/A2 Mk1J; 200 M577A2

(CP); some Temsah; 77 YPR-765 PRCO (CP); 3 AIFV-B

Area : 89,342 sq kmCapital : AmmanCoastline : 26 kmMaritime Claims Territorial sea : 3 nmPopulation : 1,02,48,069(Note: increased estimate reflects revised assumptions about the net migration rate due to the increased flow of Syrian refugees (July 2017 est.))Ethnic Divisions : Arab 98 per cent, Circassian 1 per cent,

Armenian 1 per cent Religions : Muslim 97.2 per cent (official; predominantly

Sunni), Christian 2.2 per cent (majority Greek Orthodox, but some Greek and Roman Catholics, Syrian Orthodox, Coptic Orthodox, Armenian Orthodox, and Protestant denomi-nations), Buddhist 0.4 per cent, Hindu 0.1 per cent, Jewish <0.1, folk religionist <0.1, unaffili-ated <0.1, other <0.1 (2010 est.)

Languages : Arabic (official), English widely understood among upper and middle classes

Literacy : 95.4 per centGovernment : Parliamentary Constitutional MonarchySuffrage : 18 years of age; universalAdministrative Divisions : 12 governorates

 General Information

WEST ASIA AND NORTH AFRICA: JORDAN

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nmajor misreading of the prevailing geopolitical climatentotal disconnect between the military and political leadershipninability of some in the military leadership to see the situation

in the right perspectivenand serious inadequacies in weapons and equipment

The result of Sino-India Conflict of 1962 encouraged Pakistan to seek a military solution of the Kashmir problem. A modernised Pakistan Army with an edge over India in armour, artillery and air-power prompted her to plan aggression on Kashmir in 1965. It was a three-phased programme. In the first phase the Indian capacity to

react was tested in the Rann of Kutch. In the second phase trouble was fomented in Kashmir. In the third phase an attempt was made to bottle up the Indian Army in Jammu and Kashmir by sealing the supply line in Chhamb-Jaurian sector of Jammu. Pakistan’s adventurism was foiled as Indian Army succeeded in making gains across the international borders and along the Line of Control (notably Hajipir). A cease-fire was agreed upon with effect from September 23, 1965 with UN efforts. The Tashkent Declaration and the subsequent agreement between the two countries led to the dis-engagement of forces and their withdrawal to positions occupied

THE INDIAN ARMY

by them before August 5, 1965. In the 1965 War, Pakistan suffered heavily in men and material with an estimate that Pak Army lost 5988 killed and many more wounded. Pakistan also lost 475 tanks.

The 1971 war between India and Pakistan was fought both on the eastern and the western fronts. India adopted aggressive strategy on the eastern front and a defensive strategy on the west-ern front. On the Eastern front the Indian Army ably supported by the Mukti Bahini defeated four divisions and 30,000 para-military forces of the Pakistan Army in the thirteen days’ war. In the west, a large area of Pakistani territory was occupied by Indian troops. On 16 December, Lt General Niazi of Pakistan Army surrendered to Lt General Aurora of Indian Army with 93,000 regular and para-military men. War on the Eastern front ended in a complete victory for India and liberation of Bangladesh.

The period after 1971 War saw the steady modernisation of the Indian Army with equipment for modern war. The Expert Committee under the Chairmanship of Lt General K.V. Krishna Rao submitted its report in 1976. Some of its major recommenda-tions started getting implemented in the eighties. The expansion of mechanized forces was achieved as a result of this report.

On April 13, 1984, 34 soldiers of the Indian Army landed west of Siachen glacier and occupied the Bilafond La pass. This was the opening move in what is referred to as Operation Meghdoot between India & Pakistan which continues till date. During the period July 1987 to March 1990, Indian Army saw action in Operation Pawan where the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) was deployed in Sri Lanka in accordance with the Indo-Sri Lankan accord of July 29, 1987. On November 3, 1988, the Indian Army launched Operation Cactus in Maldives to prevent mercenaries from overthrowing the

Government of Maldives and while it did not involve much fighting, it demonstrated to the World the speed and efficiency with which the Indian Armed Forces could react. This period (1989 onwards) also saw the start of the terrorism and insurgency in Kashmir and deployment of additional troops in J&K.

As indications of Pakistani intrusions came in starting from May 1999, it became clear that India was facing an attempt by the Pakistan to change the LoC using its regular troops. Air and artil-lery (155mm Howitzers) was employed with devastating effect to repel the intrusions and claim back the lost territories. Thereafter, a massive build-up by Indian Army was ordered in the wake of the December 13, 2001, terrorist attack on Parliament House. This 10-month-long mobilisation along the border with Pakistan gener-ated high levels of tension, led to some positive changes in India’s military doctrine and hastened its military modernisation together with organizational changes.

The influx of terrorism from Pakistan continued unabated. On September 18, 2016, four terrorists from Pakistan struck a brigade headquarters administrative base at Uri and killed 17 unarmed and unsuspecting soldiers in their tents. On the night of September 28-29, Indian Army’s Special Forces struck at seven launch pads of the terrorists across the line of control along a frontage of about 200 km in two different Corps Zones thus achieving complete surprise over the Pakistani military establishment and inflicted considerable casualties on the terrorists and military personnel in the area.

Indian Army continues to face four types of threats and chal-lenges including traditional threats from China and Pakistan; contemporary threats in the form of terrorism; internal chal-lenges; and out of area contingency threats. Indian Army

Chain of Command

Regional Commands(Northern, Western, Southern,

South Western, Central and Eastern)

Army Training Command (ARTRAC)

HQ Corps HQ Areas/Sub-Areas

HQ Divisions (Armoured/Infantry/Mountain/Artillery)

HQ Independent Brigade (Armoured/Infantry/Mountain/Parachute/Artillery/

Air Defence Artillery)

HQ Sub-Area

Static Establishments

Training Establishments

Sub-Area HQ/Static Establishmentsand Designated Sector HQ

Army Headquarters(Integrated Headquarters of the Ministry of Defence-Army)

Army Headquarters Reserves

Reserve Formations

HQ Brigades(Armoured/Infantry/Mountain/Artillery)

Diagrammatic Layout of the Army’s Chain of CommandIndia’s Land Border Map

Border with China:

3488 km

Border with Nepal:

1751 km

Border with Afghanistan:

106 km

Border with Pakistan: 3323 km

Coastline: 7516.6 km

Source: MHA Annual Report

Islands: 1197 with 2094 km

with additionalcoastline

Border with Bhutan: 699 km

Border with Myanmar: 3323 km

Border with Bangladesh:

4096.7 km

INDIA

A SNEAK PEEK...

AND MORE...

CRYSTAL GAZING THE GLOBAL SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

West Asia – Ticking Time Bomb ASEAN Centrality – In Trap of China China’s footprint from Indo-Pacific to Africa Challenges Before India’s Maritime

Diplomacy Pakistan Factor in India and Afghanistan Indian Navy and Indo-Pacific –

Realism vs Posturing Turnaround in India-Russia Relations

TECHNOLOGY

Cyber Warfare Nuclear Calculus Satellites – The Force Multiplier Hypersonic Weapons Future Super Soldier Future Submarines Artificial Intelligence

MODERNISATION

IAF Full Replacement by 2035 Indian Army Right Sizing Indian Army Modernisation India’s Maritime Interests in the

Indo-Pacific India’s Defence Budget India’s Business Environment Strategic Partnership in Defence

Production

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INTERNaL SEcURITy

LT GENERaL NaRESh chaNd (RETd)

THE TERMS “TERRORIST” AND “terrorism” originated during the French Revolution in the late 18th century but became popular due to the conflicts in Northern Ireland,

the Basque Country and Palestine. Counter terrorism can be defined to prevent and eradicate terrorism. In the current interna-tional scenario every country is vulnerable to terrorism. Closer home in South Asia, several countries have been facing terror-ism, especially India who has got affected by this plague from Pakistan on a daily basis. In fact Pakistan has made it a state policy to achieve their objectives. Terrorism is an evolving phenomenon, with new terrorist organisations continuously sprouting and changing their modus operandi. It is an ille-gal way of waging a war. UN has listed Iran, North Korea, Sudan, Syria, Cuba, Libya, South Yemen and Pakistan as countries which are the source of terrorism.

PakistanIn the US annual report published in July 2017, which was mandated by the Congress titled “Country Report on Terrorism”, the State Department listed Pakistan among the nations and regions providing “safe havens” to terrorists. It stated that terror groups like the Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) and Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM) continue to operate, train, organise and fundraise inside the country in 2016. Pakistan was accused by the US, UK, France, and India for supporting external groups, such as LeT and JeM in 2016, which continued to operate, train, organise, and fundraise in Pakistan. Former Pakistan Pres-ident General Pervez Musharraf in October 2014 said during a TV interview that, “we have source (in Kashmir) besides the (Paki-stan) army… People in Kashmir are fighting against (India). We just need to incite them.” The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), in their first ever open acknowledgement in 2011 in US Court, said that the Inter-Ser-vices Intelligence (ISI) sponsors terrorism in Kashmir and it oversees terrorist separatist groups in Kashmir.

Terrorism Threat to IndiaThe main threat is in J&K from terrorists across the border. Left Wing Extremists (LWE) are in a few states like Chhattisgarh, Odi-sha, Bihar, West Bengal, Andhra, Telengana and Maharashtra. Currently it is very much under check. Some of the key Islamic terror-ist organisations operating in Kashmir are:

Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), whose name means “Army of the Pure,” is a militant Islamist group operating in Pakistan as well as in Jammu and Kashmir.

Jaish-e-Muhammad, meaning “Army of Mohammed,” is another Pakistan-based terrorist group operating in Jammu and Kashmir.

Harakat ul-Mujahadeen (HuM), or the “Islamic Freedom Fighters’ Group,” was founded as an anti-Soviet group fighting in Afghanistan but when the Soviet withdrew, the Pakistan-based HuM shifted its focus to Jammu and Kashmir. HuM seeks to battle “anti-Islamic forces.”

Hizb-ul-Mujahideen. Hizb-ul-Mujahi-deen is a pro-Pakistani militant organisation that seeks for the integration of Jammu and

Kashmir with Pakistan as an Islamic state.Al-Badr. Al-Badr is an Islamic militant

group operating in the Jammu Kashmir region. The group was allegedly formed by the Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence in June 1998.

Harakat ul-Jihad-I-Islami (HUJI) was founded in 1980 to fight Soviets in Afghani-stan but has since concentrated its efforts in Jammu and Kashmir.

Jamiat ul-Mujahadeen is a small group of pro-Pakistan Kashmiri separatists oper-ating in or near Pakistan.

Counter-TerrorismThe UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strat-egy is in the form of a resolution and an annexed Plan of Action (A/RES/60/288) composed of 4 pillars(2006)as follows:lAddressing the conditions conducive to

the spread of terrorism.lMeasures to prevent and combat ter-

rorism.lMeasures to build states’ capacity to

prevent and combat terrorism and to strengthen the role of the United

Nations system in that regard.lMeasures to ensure respect for human

rights for all and the rule of law as the fundamental basis for the fight against terrorism.European Union members are more

biased towards human rights thus ‘Terror-ism constitutes a serious threat to human rights and democracy. While action by states is necessary to prevent and effec-tively sanction terrorist acts, not all means are justifiable. There is a compelling duty for states to protect the general interest of public security and the rule of law without jeopardising the core of human rights’.

The Four Ps of Counter TerrorismFinally there are the four Ps-‘Prevent, Pur-sue, Protect, and Prepare’. Prevent implies long term and short term intelligence, both of which failed in Pulwama where 42 CRPF personnel lost their life in suicidal car attack on February 14, 2019, 25 km short of Sri-nagar. Apart from failure of intelligence, pro-tection measures which are routinely taken on the Jammu-Srinagar highway failed as nobody detected the car or prevented it from mingling with the CRPF convoy.

Financing TerrorismThe terrorist funding cycle is to raise, move, store and spend money. Money laundering is a three-step process consisting of place-ment, layering and integration. Funds are raised through donations, self-funding or criminal activity which can include drug trafficking, kidnapping, robbery etc. Poppy grown in Afghanistan is a big source of drug revenue for the Taliban. Nation who support terrorism, fund it through their covert agencies like Pakistan does through Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI).

Money laundering is a process for dis-guising the proceeds of crime and integrat-ing it into the legitimate financial system. Before proceeds of crime are laundered, it is problematic for criminals to use the illicit money because they cannot explain where it came from and it is easier to trace it back to the crime. Money laundering term is also loosely used when undisclosed funds are transferred to tax havens.

Financial Action Task Force (FATF)FATF is an inter-governmental body estab-lished in 1989 by the Ministers of its Member jurisdictions. The objectives of the FATF are to set standards and promote effective imple-mentation of legal, regulatory and opera-tional measures for combating money laun-dering, terrorist financing and other related threats to the integrity of the international financial system. The FATF’s decision mak-ing body, the FATF Plenary, meets three times per year. ATF sub-group held a review meet-ing with Pakistani officials on issues of anti-money laundering and combating financ-ing of terrorism (AML/CFT) regimes. Of the 27-point action plan of the FATF, Pakistan has cleared only six. Pakistan is currently answering a 125 point questionnaire.

Indian Anti-Terrorist OrganisationMinistry of Home Affairs deals with all aspects of internal security including coun-ter-terrorism.

Department of Internal Security is part of the Ministry of Home Affairs. It deals

The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), in their first ever open acknowledgement in 2011 in US Court, said that the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) sponsors terrorism in Kashmir and it oversees terrorist separatist groups in Kashmir

counter-Terrorism

PhoToGraPh: US army

In many of the Indian States, Central Armed Police Forces like the CRPF have the main responsibility to fight terrorists with the support of the local police.

national Investigation agency is a central agency created by the Government of India following the terror attack in mumbai on december 26, 2008. It was created mainly to specialise in investigations into innumerable incidents of terrorist attacks and bomb blasts in various parts of the country.

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with the Indian Police Service, Central Police Forces, internal security and law and order, insurgency, ‘terrorism, Naxal-ism, activities of inimical foreign agencies, terrorist financing’, rehabilitation, grant of visa and other immigration matters, security clearances, “Protection of Human Rights Act and also matters relating to National integration and Communal Har-mony and Ayodhya”, etc. Under this depart-ment is a division which specifically deals with counter-terrorism.

Counter-terrorism and Counter Radi-calization Division deals with all matters relating to terrorism, counter-terrorism, radicalization, counter-radicalization, Unlawful and Prevention act (UAPA,) National Investigation Act (NIA Act), Fake Indian Currency Note (FICN) and Financial Action Task Force. FICN is a term used by officials and media to refer to counterfeit currency notes circulated in the Indian economy. A Joint Secretary heads this divi-sion and deals with Counter Terrorism (CT); NIA; Combating of funds for terror-ism (CFT); the Unlawful Activities (Pre-vention) Amendment Act, 2008 aimed at effective prevention of unlawful activi-ties associations in India. This division deals with seven Acts which include – The National Investigation Agency (Amend-ment) Act, 2019; The Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Amendment Act, 2019; The National Investigation Agency Act, 2008; The Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967; The Unlawful Activities (Preven-tion) Amendment Act, 2004; The Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Amendment Act, 2008 and The Unlawful Activities (Pre-vention) Amendment Act, 2012. These acts are amplified by rules. They have the mandate to ban organisations and so far 42 organisations have been banned by them.

National Investigation Agency (NIA) is a central agency created by the govern-ment of India following the terror attack in Mumbai on December 26, 2008. It came into being on December 31, 2008, with the passage of the NIA Act of 2008. NIA was created mainly to specialise in investiga-tions into innumerable incidents of terror-ist attacks and bomb blasts in various parts of the country. Majority of such incidents were found to have complex inter-state and international linkages while at the same time being linked to drug and arms smug-gling among other activities. It acts as the Central Counter Terrorism Law Enforce-ment Agency and is empowered to deal with terror related crimes across states without special permission from the states. It has branches in Hyderabad, Guwahati, Kochi, Lucknow, Mumbai, Raipur, and Jammu. As per media reports, until Novem-ber 2016, the NIA has registered and inves-tigated 93 cases, out of which convictions have been made in 11. In December 2016, a special court of the NIA awarded death sentence to Indian Mujahideen co-founder Yasin Bhatkal and four others for the 2013 Hyderabad twin blasts.

Other Intelligence Agencies like IB, RAW, Intelligence organisations of the Defence Forces and states provide inputs to the NIA where ever possible/required.

Counter-Terrorism ForceThere is no special force organised for this role. Central Armed Police Forces like the CRPF have the main responsibility to fight terrorists with the support of the local police. Many states have raised their own special forces like the commandoes for fighting the terrorists. At time this line gets blurred spe-cially in J&K where on the border and other critical situations Army pitches in. Insur-gents and terrorists both engage in violence in order to attain certain goals like political; politico-religious; independence, an Islamic form of government, restoration of the Caliphate, etc. Terrorism can be a strategy for insurgency which is being followed in

Jammu and Kashmir. Rashtriya Rifles (RR) is a branch of the Indian Army which is a counter-insurgency force for J&K. It has five Counter Insurgency Force organisations deployed in critical areas of J&K and is very effective in countering terrorism/insurgency.

Equipment for Counter-Terrorism – A SnapshotEquipment for counter-terrorism can be divided under the following categories:lSurveillance and intelligence gather-

ing. Electronic intelligent (ELINT); night vision systems; UAVs and quadcop-ters (the stealth and reach of the UAVs is phenomenal); electronic jamming devices, radars which can penetrate heavy foliage; sniffer dogs etc.

lProtection. Shields to take on stone pelting; bullet proof vests; light hel-mets with visor; bullet proof vehicles; mine resistant and ambush protection vehicle; sand bags; bomb disposal equip-ment including robot; Radio controlled Improvised Explosive Device (IED) Jam-mer for defeating the IEDs etc.

lLethal and non- lethal equipment. The riot police have numerous other equip-

ment which includes tear gas, tasers etc. The firearms are 7.62 1A Self Loading Rifles, and SAF Carbine 2A1s which now have been replaced by AK-47 and INSAS rifles. Some special units in the state and CAPF use automatic weapons such as AK-47, AKM, INSAS assault rifles and Bren guns. Police Special Forces and SWAT units use Heckler and Koch MP5s, Brügger and Thomet MP9s, AK-103s, and M4A1 Carbines and many more. Pepper Ball (A pepper-spray projectile that irritates the eyes and nose); A stun grenade, also known as a flash grenade or flash bang which is ideal in a hostage situation; Pellet guns use of which in J&K has caused loss of eyesight and adverse comments globally thus India needs to modernise to catch up with rest of the world in equipment for the law enforcement agencies. SP

INTERNaL SEcURITy

Terrorism is an evolving phenomenon, with new terrorist organisations continuously sprouting and changing their modus operandi. It is an illegal way of waging a war.

98,721

Total attendance

(exhibitors, visitors,press, organisers)

696journalists

227 Official delegations

from 94 countries

and 4 organisations(representing 760 delegates)

1,802exhibitorsfrom 63 countries

65,9% of international

+14,7%

2018 key figures

75 Conferences

2,102 Business meetings made

from 44 countries

65 startups at Eurosatory LAB

L A N D A N D A I R L A N D D E F E N C E A N D S E C U R I T Y E X H I B I T I O N

08-12 JUNE 2020 / PARIS

THE UNMISSABLEWORLDWIDEEXHIBITION

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THIS YEAR MIKHAIL KALASHNIKOV`S centennial will be widely celebrated on Novem-ber, 10th. The great small arms designer worked for the Russia’s

sole state-owned arms trade company Roso-boronexport for many years as chief adviser to the Director General on small arms and personally brought the company hundreds of contracts with foreign customers for the supply of weapons of his own design.

The Kalashnikov jubilee combines a variety of events including a high-ranking conference which was held on Septem-ber, 17th in the city of Izhevsk where the master’s most famous product AK-47 was born at the local plant. Being one of the event sponsors, Rosoboronexport signed an agreement on cooperation and partnership

with the “Kalashnikov Union of Russian Gunmakers” non-profit organization.

The document signature aims to increase export volume of non-military and service weapons and related ammuni-tion. Besides, the agreement is to improve cooperation between the main Russian exporter and manufacturing enterprises for better marketing.

“The market of non-military and ser-vice weapons is the new area of our work. Nevertheless, by now Rosoboronexport has already fulfilled one contract on this subject matter and has prepared over 30 commercial offers to partners from 20 countries in the amount of around 2.5 bil-lion roubles. I am confident that by means of our joint efforts with the Union of Rus-sian Gunmakers we will be able to increase

considerably the share of Russian prod-ucts in this fairly concentrated market segment and to support our enterprises,” said Rosoboronexport’s Director General Alexander Mikheev, who also holds a posi-tion of deputy chairman of the Union of Russia’s Machine Builders.

Rosoboronexport has been aggres-sively pushing civil arms to international customers. The new spectrum of related products include Saiga carbines, guns MR-18, MR-135, MR-156, MR-27 and MR-43, Viking pistols, ORSIS T-5000M rifles, Vepr carbines, related cartridges and accessories. Foreign customers may be interested in civil modifications of the Dragunov sniper rifle under the trade-mark of Tigr.

Following recent amendments to the

National Law on Weapons, Rosoboronex-port was granted the right to sell non-military weapons in the interests of law-enforcement agencies of partner nations, which are now able to get whatever they need from a single reliable source. This new type of services is also applicable to numer-ous shooting sports and hunting associa-tions worldwide.

Rostec Corporation subsidiary Rosobo-ronexport is one of the leading players at the international market working out over 85 percent of the total defense export from Russia. The company serves to over 700 national enterprises to establish reliable ties with more than 100 countries worldwide. The recent decision on civil arms export should extend the company geography and contracts portfolio. SP

MaRkETING fEaTURE

rosoboronexport extends sales spectrum

TIGR 308Saiga-9

Vepr-COK-95Vepr-12

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14 sp’s land forces 5/2019

a superior sighting system which is simple to handle- hitting a target is a matter of sim-ply lining up two dots and firing or, at night, projecting the dot onto a target and pulling the trigger. On the other hand AK-47 aimer must manually line up a target in the sights. It is easier for an M16 to shift from safety to semi-automatic mode, which allows for greater accuracy than the long bursts of automatic fire from AK-47. M16 can be used with an attachment that fires 40mm grenades which are effective in engaging buildings or other close-in targets. M6 is the latest version.

FN P90. FN P90 is designed and manu-factured by FN Herstal in Belgium for counter terrorism and is currently in service with mili-tary and police forces in over 40 nations.

PP-90. The PP-90 is a Russian 9mm folding submachine gun, developed by the KBP Instrument Design Bureau for use with special units for CQB.

Corner Shot. The Corner Shot’s shoot-ing range is claimed to be accurate and effective to 100 m in 9×19mm, 0.40 S&W, and 0.45 ACP pistols, and is claimed to be effective to 200 m with a 5.7×28mm pistol. The device is available in several variations, including the Beretta 92F. It can also mount various accessories such as detachable cam-eras, audio/video transmission kits, visible and IR lasers and tactical flashlights, sup-pressors and rubber bullets.

Heckler & Koch G36C. It is ultra-short assault rifle with the dimensions of a sub-machine gun and terminal ballistics of the 5.56mm NATO round. Developed for special tactical applications by police and military special forces.

Rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs). RPGs are a hand held anti-tank weapon but very effective in UW. It has been used effec-tively in all major UW operations.

Special weapons and tactics (SWAT). UW also use close-range weapons and tac-tics used by SWAT teams, city police and fire-fighters, especially when it’s desirable to min-imise civilian casualties. SWAT weapons are

Assault rifles, AR15s such as M4A1, CQBR, and Colt Commando guns, Shotguns, Sub-machine guns and Semi-automatic pistols.

Grenades. Apart from 40mm grenades the US also use blasts of smoke, phosphorus or explosive noise designed to confuse, blind or stun, a tactic used by SWAT teams in hos-tage situations.

Tear Gas. Although banned in some countries it can be effectively used to flush out the insurgents.

Ballistic shields. Can be used where armed threat exists as most shields can withstand 7.62mm bullet.

Psyops. Psychological operations is very effective in carrying out propaganda and playing mind games with the opponents.

Indian perspectiveIn India the focus is on Jammu and Kashmir where terrorist take refuge in houses with the tacit support of the population. Clearing oper-ations are hampered by the locals. Terrorists also incite the local population to carry out insurgency and crowd then resort to agitation and stone pelting. Indian security forces try not to use lethal weapons against own civil-ians and terrorists take advantage of this. Use of rubber bullets has caused injury and blind-ness and adverse comments. Security forces also have to move through the streets in mine resistant and ambush protected vehicles. This scenario is not a classic UW environment. SP

URBaN WaRfaRE / SPEcIaL foRcES

der-fired, gas-operated, select fire modu-lar weapon system with a free-floating barrel. It is designed as a battle rifle for mid-range engagements beyond the capability of the M4 carbine.

lGlock 19 is small in size thus can easily be carried concealed during a mission. It is meant for self-defence and is used as a last resort to evade hostile personnel.

lHigh-Altitude Low-Opening (HALO jumps are made from extreme heights, requiring an oxygen supply. The high altitude allows entire teams, undetected by radar, to infiltrate a combat area.

lAdvance Ram Air Parachute is specially designed for HALO jumps and can func-tion reliably in severe environmental conditions.

lAdvance night vision devices allows the soldiers to see during night operations or in dark environments. There is a large variety to choose from like BAE Sys-tems’ Enhanced Night Vision Goggles (ENVG) III and Family of Weapon Sight

Individual(FWS)-I; Leonardo DRS’s ENVG III; L3’s ENVG-B (binocular); Har-ris’s AN/PSQ-20 ENVG and many more.

lThe Re-Breather is a simple underwater breathing device allowing SF soldiers to navigate rivers and streams unnoticed. It allows you to breathe your own air over and over again and produces no bubbles.

lThe M4 Carbine rifle is lightweight and customizable, making it the SFs soldier’s ideal choice for a wide variety of small-unit missions.

lNett Warrior (NW) is the US Army’s next generation US integrated soldier system that replaces Land Warrior. It is an integrated dismounted leader Situa-tional Awareness (SA) system used dur-ing combat operations. The system pro-vides unparalleled SA to the dismounted leader, allowing for faster and more accurate decision-making during com-bat. With advanced navigation, SA and information-sharing capabilities, lead-ers are able to avoid fratricide and are

more effective and lethal in the execu-tion of their combat missions. The sys-tem is connected through secure, tacti-cal radios, and other means that share information from one NW to another. Additionally, the NW smart device dis-plays leader locations, tactical imagery and tactical graphics.

India PerspectivePara SFs is the special operations unit of the Indian Army. They played a pivotal role in capturing Tiger Hill from the Pakistanis dur-ing the 1999 Kargil War. They have a choice of all infantry weapons and gear depending on the mission. Modernisation plans include new long-range sniper rifles; man-porta-ble anti-tank weapon systems and hand-launched micro drones. It was reported that contracts for new Finnish Sako sniper rifles, Swedish Carl Gustaf Mark-4 lightweight rocket-launchers, Italian Beretta pistols with silencers have been finalised.

India’s Surgical Strike. The Indian Army has been carrying out covert opera-tions across the line of control (LOC) earlier but they were not publicised like the ‘Surgi-cal Strike’ conducted by the Indian Army on September 29, 2016 across the LOC against terrorists launch pads in POK.

Integrated Organisation of SFsThe Armed Forces Special Operations Divi-sion has been set up by the government to undertake joint operations by three services and will have elements from the Army’s Parachute Regiments SFs, Marine Com-mandos (MARCOS) of the Navy and the Garud Commandos of the Indian Air Force. Major General A.K. Dhingra has been appointed as its first commander.

Ghatak ForceGhatak (which means ‘killer’ in Hindi) pla-toon is part of the infantry battalion and only the most physically fit and motivated soldiers which are well-trained, superiorly-armed and equipped to handle situations like terror strikes, hostage situations and counter insur-gency operations. It is not classic SFs. SP

Indian Special Forces in action

equipment and weapons for Urban warfare...Continued from page 7

special forces—challenges and solutions...Continued from page 8

Urban terrain differs from city to city. It may include well embedded opposition with sympathetic population and is uniquely suited to adversaries’ emplacement of street-blocking obstacles

PhoToGraPh: Indian army

publisher and editor-in-chiefJayant Baranwal

deputy managing editorneetu Dhulia

senior editorial contributorLt General P.C. Katoch (Retd)

senior Technical Group editor Lt General naresh Chand (Retd)Air Marshal B.K. Pandey (Retd)

Group executive editorVishal Thapar

contributorsIndia

General V.P. Malik (Retd), Lt General Vijay Oberoi (Retd), Lt General R.s. nagra (Retd),

Lt General s.R.R. Aiyengar (Retd), Major General Ashok Mehta (Retd), Major General G.K. nischol (Retd), Brigadier Gurmeet Kanwal (Retd),

Brigadier s. Mishra (Retd), Rohit sharma

chairman & managing directorJayant Baranwal

executive Vice president(Planning & Business Development)

Rohit Goel

manager – Hr & adminBharti sharma

assistant manager – Hr & adminPooja Tehlani

deputy manager – circulationRimpy nischal

Group research associatesurvi Massey

creative directorAnoop Kamath

designVimlesh Kumar Yadav, sonu singh Bisht

Group director – sales & marketingneetu Dhulia

deputy director – salesRajeev Chugh

sp’s websitesr. Web Developer: shailendra P. AshishWeb Developer: ugrashen Vishwakarma

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