Automated National and Local Elections

May 10, 2010

AUTOMATED ELECTION SYSTEM

For the first time in history, the Philippines will be having an Automated Elections Systems (AES) for its national and local elections. R.A. 8436 , An Act Authorizing the COMELEC to use an

AES in the May 11, 1998 National and Local Elections and in Subsequent National and Local Electoral Exercises, etc. (Dec. 1997)R. A. 9369 , Amending RA 8436 (Jan 2007)

R.A. 9369

Covers both Automated and Manual ElectionsCovers voting, counting, consolidating, canvassing, and

electronic transmissionAES -system using appropriate technology which has

been demonstrated in the voting, counting, consolidating, canvassing and transmission of electoral results and other electoral processes.a. Direct Recording Election (DRE); andb. Optical Media Recording (OMR).

R.A. 9369

Benefits:a. There will be less human intervention in the voting,

counting, canvassing and proclamation of winning candidates;

b. The election results will be process more objectively; and

c. Faster election results.

AES Standards and Features Under RA 9369

Most suitable technologyPaper Based or Direct Recording Electronic Ballots are either paper or electronic ballotOne BEI member – Technology capableElection Returns, printed (30 cops) and electronic formCertificate of Canvass, printed and electronic formElectronic Transmission of ResultsContinuity/Back-up Plan

Statistics:

• 16 Regions• 80 Provinces• 120 Cities • 1514 Municipalities• 42,025 Barangays• 342,075 Established Precincts• 50,086,054 registered voters

nationwide as of Sept, 2009

Zambales Voters Profile (01/03/10)

• 13 municipalities + 1 City• Total No. of Brgys > 247• Total No. of polling centers > 227• Total No. of voters > 435,556• Total No. of established precincts > 2,949• Total No. of Clustered Precincts > 595

CITY/MUNICIPALITY

NO. OF ESTAB PRCNT

NO. OF CLUSTERED PRCNT

NO. OF VOTING CENTERS

NO. OF REGISTERED VOTERS( as of 01.10.10)

OLONGAPO CITY 17 855 143 22 1 112,593

BOTOLAN 31 206 47 23 4 31,173

CABANGAN 22 102 25 17 13 13,428

CANDELARIA 16 103 25 15 10 18,353

CASTILLEJOS 14 165 33 16 7 25,483

IBA 14 184 36 10 5 28,477

MASINLOC 13 177 34 14 6 26,360

PALAUIG 19 136 35 20 8 21,633

SAN ANTONIO 14 113 24 11 11 17,957

SAN FELIPE 11 91 19 8 14 12,796

SAN MARCELINO 18 144 32 13 9 20,343

SAN NARCISO 17 108 26 14 12 16,545

STA. CRUZ 25 183 45 26 3 31,237

SUBIC 16 382 71 18 2 59,178

STATISTICS

• 80, 136 Clustered Precincts (estimate)

• 37, 884 Polling Centers (estimate)

• 82, 200 PCOS Machines• 80, 136 PCOS Machines for

distribution to clustered precincts.

• Testing •and

•Sealing •of

•PCOS

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yPublic shall accomplish test ballotsBallots shall be manually countedand election returns accomplishedSame set of ballotsthat was manually counted shall be fed into the counting machine

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yManual countshall be compared withthe print-out of the election returnsIf public is satisfiedthat the manual count is the same as the automated count, the print-out and manually prepared election returns shall be signed-off by the witnesses

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Machines shall be sealed withoutany connection to transmission linksPublic shall be allowed to secure the polling places where the counting machines are installedThe only time that the counting machines shall be openedis on election day in the presence of watchers

Clustered PrecinctsNot more than 7 Precincts in a cluster

Not more than 1,000 voters

986

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ard

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ion

insp

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rs• One (1) BEI for every clustered precinct

• Three regular members–Chairman

– Delivers ballot to voter

–Poll Clerk–Third Member

• Support Staff–Depends on number of precincts clustered–To assist Poll Clerk and Third Member in

managing– List of Voters with Voting Records – Book of Voters

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insp

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rsNo. of Precincts

ClusteredNo. of Support

StaffTotal no. of personnel (BEI + Support Staff)

0 none 32 none 33 1 44 2 5

5 to 7 3 6

votin

g• Voting period

–7:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m.• Unless there are voters waiting for their turn to

vote or within the school premises– Poll Clerk lists down names voters queuing

– Poll Clerk calls voter to cast ballot

– Voter who fails to appear after being called twice shall not longer be allowed to vote

–Precinct set up• At least 10 voters can cast ballot at any one time

votin

g• Before voting starts

–Show that ballot box is empty• Transparent plastic

–Turn on and initialize PCOS

–Print “Zero Report” • To show that there

is no entry/vote in machine’s memory

1

Paraan ng Pagboto(Voting Process)

Magpakilala sa Board of Election Inspectors (BEI) sa presinto kung saan kayo nakarehistro. Matapos mapatunayan ang inyong pagkakilanlan, bibigyan kayo ng balota na may mga pangalan na ng mga kandidato.

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of v

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r• LIST OF VOTERS WITH VOTING RECORDS

–Photograph

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est

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en

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of v

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r• If identity cannot be established through

photograph–Compare signatures

• Use Book of Voters– Contains applications for registration

» Includes specimen signature of voter

–Other methods to challenge identity

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lots

• Pre-printed names of candidates

• 300 candidates can be accommodated– 150 names per side

of ballot

Paraan ng Pagboto (Voting Process)

2Gamit ang marker, itiman o i-shade ng buo ang bilog na nasa tabi ng pangalan ng inyong mga napiling kandidato.

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• Ovals opposite names of candidate

• Shade oval opposite name of chosen candidate

Tamang Paraan ng Pag-shade sa balota. (Correct way of shading a ballot)

|

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)• One unit per clustered precinct• Voter personally feeds ballot into machine• Ballot can be fed at any orientation• Ballot scanned both sides simultaneously

CAN FAKE BALLOTS BE FED INTO THE PCOS?

• No. The ballots contain several security features thateliminate fraud. Ballots flagged by the machine asinvalidwillbereturnedandwillnotbecounted.

Note: As per COMELEC we won’t utilize the BallotDiversionSlot andtheballot boxwon’thavedifferentcompartments.

WHAT ARE THE SECURITY FEATURES OF THE BALLOT?

• PositionIdentifiers/Markers: Onallsidesoftheballotarepositionidentifiers,whoseintersectionpointswouldindicatetheplacementofanoval.Thisallowsthesystemtoaccuratelylocatethepositionofamark,andevaluateitaccordingly.

• BarCode. Eachballothasauniquebarcode. Thismakessurethateachballot is countedonly once, andat the canvassing level, canidentify thedetails of theballot (theprecinct it wascastedin, themachinethatevaluatedtheballot,etc.

• UVInk: EachballotisalsomarkedwithaUVink,whichisnotreadilyapparent oncasual scrutiny. Thismarkisvisibletothespecial lensand light of the AutomatedCountingMachine, whichverifies firstthepresenceoftheUVinkbeforecastingavote.

WHAT SHALL VOTERS USE TO MARK THEIR BALLOTS?

• COMELEC / SMARTMATIC-TIMwouldbeprovidingspecial ballotmarkers to each precinct, which will be used for the votingprocess. The Automated Counting Machine can accommodatepencil marks, but for reasons of securingtheprocess (as pencilmarkscanbeerasedandreplaced),blackmarkerswillbeused.

NOTE:Pencilmarksareeditable,andthereforenotrecommended.Inan extreme case where marks are maliciously edited after theballotshavebeencasted,countedandtransmitted,andanaudittakesplace, thiscouldleadtoalotofsuspicionandconfusionintheprocess.

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Ballots go in here …

… and get dropped into the ballot box thru

this chute …

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… and there they are. :)

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• At close of polls– Perform close

function• To prevent

additional ballots from being inserted

– After close function, PCOS automatically• Starts counting

process• Prints election

returns after completion of automated count

– Eight (8) copies

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• Electronically transmitted results–Used as basis for canvassing/consolidation and

proclamation of winning candidates for• City/municipal officials• Provincial officials• Members, House of Representatives• Senators and Party-list

–Congress will also receive electronically transmitted results• Constitution authorized the Congress to promulgate

rules for canvassing of results for President and Vice-President

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• Insert transmission cable–After printing first eight (8) copies of ER

• To eliminate doubts that the PCOS can be manipulated remotely

• Perform electronic transmission function• Print additional twenty-two (22) copies of ER

– Automatically performed by PCOS after completion of transmission

HOW WILL THE ELECTION RETURNS BE TRANSMITTED?

• TheBEIthenconnectstheTransmissiondevicetothePCOSviatheEthernetport.TheAutomatedCountingMachines isonly “connected” onceattheendofthevotingday,andthendisconnectedaftertransmission.

• Thetransmissionprocesstakeslessthan2minutes/designation.

• Asinthemanualprocess,theresultsfromtheprecinctswillbetransmittedtotheMunicipalCanvassingServer/Station.

• The municipal canvassing server canvasses all the results fromthe precinctsunder its jurisdiction. Onceall theresultsarecanvassed, theMBOC(MunicipalBoard of Canvassers) can generate and print out the Municipal Certificate ofCanvassaswellastheStatementofVotes.Thisprocessisrepeated,transmittingthe results and printing the necessary reports in the Provincial and NationalCanvassingStations.

HOW SURE ARE WE THAT RESULTS CANNOT BE INTERCEPTED AND ALTERED DURING TRANSMISSION?

• PriortotransmittingtheElectionReturns,thePCOSdigitallysignsthefilesusingtheSHA256algorithmandencryptsthemusingtheAES128algorithm.

• This encryptionlevel is as good, if not better than mostonlinebanking transactions, which are “connected” 24 hours a day,sevendaysaweek.

• Bycontrast, theAutomatedCountingMachinesisconnectedonlyattheendofthevotingday,onlyfortheshortperiodneededtosend the information. This makes therisk of “hacking”virtuallyimpossible.

Municipal/City Board of

Canvassers

Provincial Board of

Canvassers

National Board of Canvassers

Congress COMELEC

PrecinctElection Returns

Mun./City COC

SOVP

Prov. COC

SOVM/C

Physical transport

Physical transport

Physical transport

Manual System of Canvassing

Municipal/City Board of

Canvassers

Provincial Board of

Canvassers

National Board of Canvassers

Congress COMELEC

Precinct

Physical transport

Physical transport

Physical transport

Electronic Transmission

ComelecCentral Back-up Server

Advance Results/

Monitoring

Server for Dominant Majority/ Minority

Parties, Citizens Arm, KBP

Advance Results

Secured Public

Website

Election Returns

Mun./City COC

SOVP

Prov. COC

SOVM/C

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• Security measures under a manual election system still applicable

• Strengthen security through automation–Password–PIN–Digital signatures–Encryption

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(12

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2• 2 = 4• 2 = 8• 2 = 16• 2 = 32• 2 = 64• 2 = 128• 2 = 256

128

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• 2 = 512• 2 = 1024• 2 = 2048• 2 = 4096• 2 = 8192• 2 = 16,384• 2 = 32,768

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• 2 = 65,536• 2 = 131,072• 2 = 262,144• 2 = 524,288• 2 = 1,048,576• 2 = 2,097,152• 2 = 4,194,304

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• 2 = 137,438,953,472• 2 = 274,877,906,944• 2 = 549,755,813,888• 2 = over One Trillion combinations• 2128= 340 undecillion, 282 decillion, 366 nonillion,

920 octillion, 938 septillion, 463 sextillion, 463 quintillion, 374 quadrillion, 607 trillion, 431 billion, 768 million, 211 thousand and 456

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340,282,366,920,938,463,463,374,607,431,768,211,456

• 128-bit encryption–Same security system used by banks

• Random Encryption–Temperature of machine–Voltage–Unique machine identity–User identity

• No single/master decryption code

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• Time needed to decrypt one precinct result will be same amount of time needed to decrypt next precinct result

• Transmission takes at most 2 minutes• Copies for distribution

–30 copies of election returns at the precinct level–30 copies of certificate of canvass at municipal

level–14 copies of certificate of canvass at provincial

level

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• Audit Log– Activities– Time– Date

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IS THERE ANY ASSURANCE THAT THE HARDWARE AND SOFTWARE THAT THE AES WILL USE ARE SAFE AND SECURE?

• Yes.• Security andsystemintegrityare overriding

concerns before, during, and after theelections.

A. PRE-ELECTIONS• Source-CodeAudits–Thesystemwillundergothenecessarysource-codeaudits

(by an Independent International Source Code Auditor, political parties andinterestedparties)asprescribedbylaw.

• Testing – Before the Automated Counting Machines are deployed for theelections, the technology will be tested and certified by the DOST and willundergo2-3FieldTeststofine-tunethesystem,andaMockElectiontosimulatetheactualconditionsintheelections.

• Pre-SealingEvent–ThreedaysbeforetheElections,alltheAutomatedCountingMachines will have been deployed to all the voting centers throughout thecountry.DuringthePre-SealingEvent, theBEIs, witnessedbytheWatchersandrepresentativesof thepolitical parties involved, will test the systemandmakesurethatthetechnologywillfunctionasexpected.

B. DURING • Accessing the System– The BEIs access the administrative menu of the systemby

positioningtheSecurityKeyonthecontactpointfirmly.TheBEIwouldthenbeshownanewpageintheTouchScreenpanel---theAdministrativeMenu.

– Openingof theElections–ToopentheElections, theBEI wouldpress theSTARTbutton on the touch screen. The systemwould then prompt the BEIs for twopasswords succcession. Upon opening, the systemwould automatically print theZEROVOTEDOCUMENT.

– ZEROVOTEDOCUMENT- ThisreportisbasicallyanERshowingzerovotesforeachcandidate ineachcontest. This is the automatedversionof publicly inverting theballot box in themanual process, showing that the box has not been previouslystuffedwithvotes.ThereportwouldthenbesignedbytheBEIsandthewatchers.

• The Automated Counting Machines captures an image of each of the ballot cast.Furthermore,thatsameimagewouldbeappendedwithahuman-readablereportofhowtheAutomatedCountingMachines interpretedthemarks. Incasesof recounts,wecanreviewtheballotimages,andseeataglancehowthemarkswereevaluated.

WHAT HAPPENS IF A VOTER SELECTS LESS CANDIDATES THAN EXPECTED?

• It’s called an under-Vote. Under-votes are validvotes, and will be interpreted by the systemaccordingly. For example, for a contest where thevoter can select a maximum of 12 candidates,choosing a number of candidates less than theexpected12isstillvalidandwillbecounted.

WHAT HAPPENS IF A VOTER SELECT MORE CANDIDATES THAN EXPECTED?

• It’s called an over-vote. The systemwill not acceptover-votingforanycontest.Shouldtherebeaninstanceof over-vote for a particular contest (for example,voting for 2candidates in thePresident contest), thatcontest will not be counted. However, the othercontestswouldstillbeevaluatedandcounted,providedthatthosecontestswerenotover-votedin.

IN CASE OF MASSIVE BLACKOUTS ON MAY 10, COULD IT LEAD TO FAILURE OF ELECTIONS?

• NO. TheDepartmentof EnergycanandshouldprioritizeMay10,2010 NationalElections.

• Therearealwaysportablegeneratorsprovidedbythepollwatchers,politicalparties,amongothersduringelections.

• Comelec'sserviceprovider,Smartmatic-TIM, is requiredtohave12hourback-upbatteries. Sparesarealsoavailableatstrategiclocationsfromitstechnicalsupportstaff.

• The machines are essentially laptops which require lowpowerconsumptionand whichcaneasilybeconnectedtoa variety of power sources including rechargeablebatteries,invertersandportablegenerators.

• Rechargeablebatteriesarereadilyavailable incommercialretailstoresnationwide.

• TELCOs have, as standard practice, 2 standby powergeneratorsetsintheirstations/facilities.

• SO MANY ALTERNATIVE SOURCES OF POWER. POWERFAILUREWILLNEVERLEADTOELECTIONFAILURE.

THERE MIGHT NOT BE ENOUGH TIME TO ACCOMMODATE ALL VOTERS. COULD THIS LEAD TO MASSIVE DISENFRANCHISEMENT?

• NO. AES process is actually shorter. No ballot serialnumbers to log and perforate. No going throughseveral pages of candidate list. Candidates are listedalphabetically,easytochoose.

Illiteratesdon’thavetowriteanything– they just shadeovals.

JUST HOW LONG DOES IT TAKE TO CAST A BALLOT? HOW MANY BALLOTS CAN THE PCOS PROCESS IN 11 HOURS?

• Based on informal Comelec time-and-motion study, it takes anaverageof 8secondsforacompleteballotcastingcycle.

• Evenif wedoublethisnumberanduse15secondsasanestimateforasingleballottobecast;

• 15secondsperballotcast =Fourballotscastperminute;

• At50%machineutilization, this is reducedtotwoballotscast perminute;

• Twoballotscastperminute = 120ballotscastperhour;

• 120ballotscastperhourfor11hours = 1,320ballotscastfortheentireElectionDay; and

• Assuming 100% voter turnout, the PCOS machine can cast onElectionDayis1,320ballots

WHERE WILL COMELEC/SMARTMATIC-TIM FIND THE 50,000 IT TECHNICIANS IT NEEDS FOR ELECTION DAY?

• The ICT industry associations have volunteered to join efforts to assistCOMELECinthedeploymentofITtechniciansnationwide.

• InstituteofElectronicsCommunicationsEngineersof thePhilippines(IECEP)the Philippine Electronics and Telecommunications Federation (PETEF), thePhilippineComputerSociety(PCS), theInformationSystemsSecuritySocietyof thePhilippines(ISSSP), theChief InformationOfficersForum(CIOForum)fromallgovernmentITdepartments,andothers.

• Likewise, PPCRV, NAMFREL, CER, schools, universitiesarealsobeingtappedto assist by providing their graduating students in the IT, science andengineeringfield.

• THERE IS NOSHORTAGE OF FILIPINOSWHO WOULD LIKE TO BE PART OFHISTORY. THERE WILL BE ENOUGH ITTECHNICIANS ON THE GROUND TOENSURESUCCESSOFTHE AUTOMATEDPOLLS.

WHAT IF THERE IS NO SIGNAL TO TRANSMIT THE RESULTS?

• COMELECenbanchadcreatedaTechnicalWorkingGroupfor Transmission composed of representatives from theNational Telecommunications Commission (NTC),Telecommunications Office (TELOF),the telecommunications carriers PLDT/Smart,Globe/Innove, Digitel/Sun including the provincialtelephonecompaniesandthecableTV internetproviders.

• Thisassures therewillbeinternetaccessfromatleast2to3carriersperpollingprecinctnationwide.

• Intheremoteislandprecinctswherethecarriersmayfinddifficulty inextendingtheir servicecoverageandas back-up,mobilesatellitetechnologywillbeused.

• It isexpectedthattheseremoteislandprecinctswill coverless than 1%of the 40k polling centers with an averagevotingpopulationof 200to400per clusteredprecinct, atotalofapproximately200kvotes.

• With the multiple redundancies and servers at themunicipal,provincialandnationallevelsincludingaserverfor media and the political parties and watchdogs, asystemlossishighlyimprobable.

CAN DAGDAG-BAWAS STILL OCCUR?

• No. The counting, canvassing and proclamationprocessforthe2010NationalandLocalElectionswillbecompletelyautomated.ThereisabsolutelyNOHUMANINTERVENTION. Nomore roomformistakesandfraud.

WHAT ABOUT THE FLYING VOTERS?

• Asmentioned,registrationandauthenticationofvotersis outside the scope of the Automation Project.However, the technology can limit the instances offlying voting, as each and every clustered precinct’scorresponding number of voters is programmed intothevotingmachinetobeused.Therefore,forexample,aprecincthas453voters(includingtheBEIs),thevotingmachinedeployedtherewouldonlyaccept453castedvotes.

WHAT HAPPENS IF A VOTER MAKES A MISTAKE?

• Currently, theCOMELEC is considering giving theBEIsthe authority to issue replacement ballots in certaincases, under their discretion (if the voter makes anhonestmistake, forexample). Thefinalpolicywillbedetermined by the COMELEC. However, we shouldhighlight the importance of conducting a very goodVoter Education Campaign. Voters should beencouragedtoprepareacodigobeforehand.

WHAT HAPPENS IF A BEI LOSES HIS KEY?

• The technicians at the municipal level will encrypt anewkeytoreplacethemissing one. Theoldkeywillbe disabled and can no longer be used foranymachine.

HOW MANY SPARE KEYS WILL BE PRODUCED?

• Thedistributionisdoneaccordingtothenumberofprecincts inthemunicipality; thosewithmorePCOSgetmoresparekeys. Thecomputationwillbe done when final POP (Project of Precincts)becomesavailable.

DOES THE PCOS PRODUCE RECEIPTS SHOWING THE SELECTIONS THE VOTER MADE, AS AN AUDIT TRAIL?

• No.ThethermalprinterisusedtoprintouttheElectionReturnsandother reports. Theballots themselvesarethepaperaudittrail.Forpurposeofauditsorrecounts,wecouldcomparetheballotsintheballotboxwiththeresults intheERandwiththeballot images storedinthe machine. The thermal paper to be used for theelections will be manufacturer guaranteed to last atleast5yearsinoptimumconditions.

• NOTE: Receipts generated by the systemuponeachvote, tobekept by thevoter,would be against some basic aspects ofElections: voter-anonymity and vote-secrecy.

• AT WHAT LEVEL WILL THE SERVERS ASSIGNED FOR THE WATCHDOGS AND

THE MEDIA RECEIVE THE ELECTION RESULTS? WILL THIS BE FROM THE PRECINCT OR FROM THE NATIONAL

LEVEL?

• Itwillbedoneattheprecinctlevel.TheBEIshallexecuteacommandto:

• -ElectronicallytransmittheER,togetherwiththeprecinct’sstatisticalreportandthePCOSunit’sauditlogreporttothefollowingdestinations:

-city/municipalBOC; provincialBOC;-NBOCsofCOMELECandCongress;-Dominantmajorityparty,Dominantminorityparty;-Accreditedcitizens’arm,andKBP;and-Centralserver.

CAN MALICIOUS ENTITIES INSERT A VIRUS INTO THE PCOS?

• No.Firstofall,physicalaccesstothesystemislimitedto2memory cardslots, whichwill be securedusing a seriallylabeledlock.Theselockswouldprevent,ormakeitobviousthat themachine has been tamperedwith. Furthermore,theOperatingSystemusedinthePCOSisLinux,whichasaplatformisverysecure, employingaccesscontrols tolimitthe activities of profiles. This Operating Systemenvironment will not tolerate the presence of virus andmalware, or at the very least, prevent such maliciousprogrammingfromrunning.

HOW SOON WILL THE WINNERS BE DETERMINED?

• Based on experience, 90% of results would arrivebetween4to6hours after thecloseof polls. Factorsthat maydelay theprocess aredelays in transmissionduetonetworkunavailabilityandtheneedtoundergocontingency procedures (contingency transmissionsystem).Furthermore,notallpollingplacesarereadytoattheexactclosingtime,dependingonvoterpresenceandaccommodationofvotersbeyondtheclosingtime,asprescribedbylaw.

CAN A FAILURE OF ELECTIONS HAPPEN?

• NO. It isnotpossible.Asthevoterswill still bevotingusingpaper(it is stilla“paper-based”elections), thereis nochanceof failureof elections. Shouldthevotingmachines, despiteall theprecautionsandcontingencyprocedures inplace,still fail intheprecinct, thevoterscan still resort to “manual” elections --- using theballots.Theholdingofelectionsarenotdependentand“held hostage” by the performance of the votingmachines.

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• Vigilance of citizenry• Cooperation• Coordination• Support

Salamat po!