The Vietnam Era Antiwar MovementAuthor(s): Mitchell K. HallSource: OAH Magazine of History, Vol. 18, No. 5, Vietnam (Oct., 2004), pp. 13-17Published by: Organization of American HistoriansStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/25163716Accessed: 17/08/2010 10:20

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Mitchell K. Hall

The Vietnam Era

Antiwar Movement

America's military escalation in Vietnam during 1965 generated a rapid and organized public opposition. As the war dragged on, this dissent grew dramatically, becoming one of the largest

social movements in the nation's history. Ultimately as part of a larger

period of unrest, antiwar forces contributed to a general questioning of America's direction and values (1).

The Vietnam Era antiwar movement emerged from existing peace and social justice organiza tions involved in civil rights or antinuclear activi

ties. Mass demonstrations typically organized by broad coalitions of national and local groups attracted the greatest publicity, but most antiwar

efforts took place at the local level. Political liberals represented the movement's largest con

stituency, initially through groups like the Ameri can Friends Service Committee (AFSC), the Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy (SANE), and Women Strike for Peace (WSP). Their mo

tives for opposing the war varied, but liberals were generally proud of America's record in

advancing human rights and retained cold war

suspicions of the Soviet Union. They believed, however, that Vietnam diverted resources from

more important foreign interests and objected to supporting Saigon's authoritarian regimes.

They used education, electoral politics, and peace

ful protest in calling for a negotiated settlement in Vietnam rather than continued fighting (2).

Pacifists, divided into moderate and radical

camps, frequently questioned America's cold war policy. Their international perspective as

signed equal blame to the U.S. and the Soviet Union for global instability. Pacifists often over

lapped with liberals in their views and member

ships, but organizations like the Fellowship of Reconciliation and the Committee for Nonvio

lent Action were predominantly pacifist. Moder

ate pacifists favored electoral efforts, political lobbying, and direct

A peaceful demonstrator protesting the war in

Vietnam displays his sign at the main gate of the

NASA Ames Research Center (MofFet Field) in

California, on February n, 1971. (Image courtesy of the National Archives and Records

Administration NAIL NWDNS-428-KN-19335.)

action to change what they saw as a mistaken policy. Radicals

perceived fundamental flaws in American society of which Vietnam was only a symptom. They viewed electoral politics as nonproductive and often used nonviolent civil disobedience to protest U.S. actions.

Leftists comprised a minority within the antiwar coalition, but

played a visible role as the war continued. The small faction-ridden

Old Left operated through groups such as the Communist and Socialist Workers parties. They fought each other as passionately as they at

tacked capitalists. Despite their radical critique of American society, they favored legal and

peaceful demonstrations, and demanded im

mediate U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam. More

influential was a growing New Left, a student

oriented movement that rejected both Marxist

dogma and capitalist inequalities. The New Left's main outlet, Students for a Democratic

Society (SDS), began as a liberal reform organi zation, but as the 1960s progressed its national

leadership became increasingly radical and advocated violent tactics (3). The leadership

went so far left that it abandoned most of its local membership, which remained predomi

nantly reformist.

Given the broad diversity of the antiwar

constituency, disputes over goals and tactics

were predictable. Two issues proved particu

larly divisive. Liberals distrusted Communist motives and feared association with them would

damage their public credibility. As a result they sought to exclude Communists from antiwar

demonstrations. Pacifists, on the other hand,

desired the broadest possible coalition and ar

gued that democracies should support the rights of all political tendencies. Most mass demon

strations followed a nonexclusionary policy. The second issue was over the preferred solution to getting out of

Vietnam. Moderate pacifists favored negotiating with the North Viet

OAH Magazine of History October 2004 13

namese over a mutually acceptable settlement. Radicals argued that

only the Vietnamese had the right to determine their future and that the U.S. should withdraw immediately.

Complaints about U.S. policy in Vietnam occasionally arose in the

early 1960s. The beginning of the Rolling Thunder bombing cam

paign against North Vietnam in the spring of 1965, however, provided a sharp focus and stimulation for a loose coalition of groups. Among the earliest actions specifically targeting the Vietnam War were a

series of teach-ins held on college campuses. The first to achieve

national attention occurred at the University of Michigan on March

24, 1965. Three thousand people attended a series of lectures and

debates that ran all evening and into the next morning. About one

hundred twenty teach-ins took place on campuses across the country

by the end of the spring semester (4). A national teach-in in Washing ton, D.C., reached one hundred thousand students by television

broadcast. At some universities, the war became entwined with other

issues, including civil rights, institutional bureaucracy, and leftist

politics. Though antiwar activity in 1965 represented a small minority

opinion, the early defection of part of the academic community troubled some members of the Johnson administration.

From this early response, local antiwar actions continued until the

war's conclusion. Public awareness of the movement, however, came

primarily through the media's coverage of mass demonstrations (5). The initial major gathering occurred in April at an SDS-sponsored

rally in Washington, D.C. By drawing over twenty thousand partici

pants, it showed that the administration could not rely on silent

acceptance of its decisions. The various antiwar tendencies created

temporary coalitions to organize later events. The first was the Na

tional Coordinating Committee to End the War in Vietnam (NCC), which sponsored the international days of protest in mid-October

1965. The movement's internal tensions were evident when the NCC

refused to endorse a separate antiwar rally in November because its

sponsor, SANE, excluded Communists. The NCC faded over factional

disputes, but local groups like New York's Fifth Avenue Peace Parade Committee carried on the commitment. Among the key figures in

building and maintaining these early coalitions was Christian pacifist A. J. Muste, then nearly eighty (6).

As SDS shifted focus to broader reform issues, liberals and

pacifists dominated antiwar activity during 1966-1967. Hearings by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in February 1966, chaired by

J. William Fulbright, raised new questions from respected Americans

about America's role in Vietnam, and the war occasionally appeared as an issue in the fall elections. Spring street demonstrations comple

mented these efforts. Antiwar activity escalated as new organizations formed or older ones shifted their focus to ending the war.

Clergy and

Laymen Concerned About Vietnam, for example, formed in late 1965 and eventually became the country's largest religiously-oriented anti

war group (7). Greater numbers of people unaffiliated with organized political and social groups attended demonstrations as frustration

with the war grew. A new national coalition, the Spring Mobilization Committee to

End the War in Vietnam, sponsored rallies on April 15, 1967 that

brought liberals, radicals, and pacifists together. The inclusion of

Communists, however, kept some liberals away. Nevertheless, the

demonstrations were among the largest yet: two hundred thousand in

New York and fifty thousand in San Francisco.

While the leadership of the national coalitions fought continu

ally over tactics and ideology, most activists were unaware or uncon

cerned with those debates. Their actions in local communities and

attendance at national rallies were directed toward ending the war.

Activists tended to be middle class and well educated, and college students made up a significant portion of the crowds. While mass

rallies encouraged antiwar demonstrators and offered alternatives to

existing policy, they did not by themselves change the war's direc

tion. Most Americans in 1967 were not willing to pull out and accept a defeat in Vietnam.

The war mixed with the drive for racial equality when Martin Luther King Jr. added his strong dissent in early 1967. His position as the nation's most respected civil rights activist brought added weight to antiwar arguments, though some believed his stand against the war

would compromise civil rights gains. Few national civil rights leaders

or government officials welcomed his antiwar opinion. Boxing cham

pion Muhammad Ali became another visible African American sym bol. He was denied conscientious objector status on religious grounds and convicted of refusing military induction in June 1967. The

Supreme Court overturned the decision three years later.

Liberal antiwar efforts in the summer of 1967 included Negotia tion Now, which supported congressional doves through ads and

petitions in major newspapers. Another project was Vietnam Sum

mer, a door-to-door effort designed to inform citizens of the war's

impact. Vietnam Summer fell short of its hopes, however, meeting

apathy or hostility in working class and poorer neighborhoods. The military draft stimulated a great deal of antiwar activity. The

Selective Service System allowed conscientious objection, though it was

not easy to obtain, and a system of deferments and exemptions favored

the middle- and upper- socioeconomic classes. Antiwar activists estab

lished draft counseling centers to educate men about their options. Thousands resisted the draft through both legal and illegal methods. In October 1967 an antidraft group called The Resistance collected over

eleven hundred draft cards from men who refused induction, a federal

crime. In Oakland, police fought 3,500 radicals attempting to close

down the city's army induction center. Thousands of men avoided the

draft illegally by fleeing to Canada, Sweden, or elsewhere. Ongoing draft resistance, whether organized or conducted individually, con

cerned the government, which tried to punish antiwar activity by

withdrawing exemptions from activists (8). Draft resistance was part of a larger trend within the movement.

Many of those who felt legal protest had proven ineffective in chang

ing U.S. policy shifted to direct action, what they called going "from

protest to resistance." This was apparent when fall antiwar actions

culminated with the October 21,1967 March on the Pentagon. Nearly one hundred thousand people attended a Washington, D.C. rally at

the Lincoln Memorial. Half of the crowd marched to the Pentagon for

a two-day confrontation that brought over six hundred arrests and

focused national attention on the country's disintegrating consensus

(9). Despite the presence of violent elements, the frustrated majority of the movement remained committed to peaceful change.

Although public support for the war gradually eroded, antiwar activists never achieved widespread popularity. The presence of

countercultural clothing and hair styles, plus radicals' display of

North Vietnamese flags and anti-American rhetoric at antiwar pro tests antagonized many moderates. The government's deliberate

and misleading attacks on the movement added further to its

negative image. Throughout the war, administration officials and

conservatives accused antiwar forces of being controlled by commu

nists, but the movement was clearly indigenous and too broad and

loosely organized to be manipulated by any single element (10). The

movement was a constantly shifting coalition that attracted or re

14 OAH Magazine of History October 2004

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By 1969, antiwar protest marches, like this one in Washington, D.C., brought together thousands of people. (Image courtesy of Kenneth Hoffman, Department of Communication, Seton Hall University.)

pelled activists depending upon events in Vietnam and at home. The vast majority of antiwar activists came from the broad political and cultural mainstream.

The 1968 Tet Offensive was a rude awakening to the realities of the war that prompted a reevaluarion of the nation's commitment. Having been repeatedly told by political and military leaders that the Commu nists were fading and that there was "light at the end of the tunnel," the public was stunned to find the enemy still capable of such an effort.

The new reality reinforced public discontent with the war. In the wake of Tet, the American media took an increasingly

unfavorable view of U.S. policy. Both print and television journalists

questioned America's commitment, perhaps best summarized in

Walter Cronkite's February 27 broadcast: "To say that we are mired in

stalemate seems the only reasonable, yet unsatisfactory conclusion"

(11). When the New York Times reported that General William Westmoreland had requested 206,000 more troops, additional public protests followed. Despite criticism from Westmoreland and others that a hostile media turned the public against the war, numerous

studies refute the charge (12). The press reflected rather than led

public opinion. Congress reacted as well. In March, the Senate Foreign Relations

Committee conducted hearings on the war and members of the

House of Representatives called for a complete review of Vietnam

policy. These responses reinforced the Johnson administration's

belief that additional escalation would prove increasingly divisive. Public opinion polls indicated a growing lack of confidence in the

president's handling of the war. This disaffection found a political outlet in Senator Eugene McCarthy's challenge for the Democratic

presidential nomination. Running largely unnoticed as the year

began, his campaign received a significant boost from the Tet Offen sive. His strong support in the New Hampshire primary also enticed

Robert Kennedy to enter the race as an antiwar candidate (13). Largely because of his dwindling support on the war, President Johnson

withdrew from his reelection campaign.

Although antiwar sentiment in 1968 increas

ingly moved into electoral politics, violence captured

many of the headlines. On several occasions au

thorities called out military forces to control demon

strations. Martin Luther King Jr. and Robert Kennedy were assassinated. At the Chicago Democratic na

tional convention, fifteen thousand protesters clashed with police, leading many people to con clude that "the war in Southeast Asia... was causing a kind of civil war in the United States" (14). With the Democratic Party in disarray, Richard Nixon won

the election by a slim margin.

Antiwar activists were unimpressed with Nixon's

efforts, and after a brief interval escalated their pro tests. The idea of a Moratorium, a suspension of

normal activities, appealed to moderates by building local actions around a one-day protest, with actions

expanding one additional day each month until the war ended. The first Moratorium on October 15, 1969 exceeded the most optimistic expectations. At least one

million participants made it the largest, most diverse and pervasive protest of the entire war. Citizens con

ducted vigils, distributed literature, attended religious services or discussion groups, showed films, held

public readings of the names of the casualties, or joined candlelight marches. Many of the rallies featured the repeated lines of a John

Lennon song; "all we are saying is give peace a chance" (15). Nixon struck back during a televised speech on November 3,

blatantly attacking antiwar forces and appealing for support from the "silent majority." Vice-President Spiro Agnew followed up with in

creasingly bitter and divisive attacks on protesters and the news media. Press coverage of antiwar actions became more negative (16).

The administration's rhetorical assaults failed to deflect protest. In fact, it drove the different ideological wings of the movement closer

together. Moratorium organizers coordinated their November actions

with the more radical New Mobilization Committee. Meeting in

Washington from November 13-15, the Moratorium sponsored a

religious "mass for peace" and a thirty-six hour March Against Death,

one of the era's most moving actions. The Mobilization's rally on

November 15 attracted perhaps five hundred thousand people. The fall 1969 antiwar demonstrations proved to be the high

point of organized dissent. Both the Moratorium and the New Mobilization Committee faded by the following spring. Vietnamization brought U.S. troop levels down, and this combined

with declining U.S. casualties helped defuse domestic protest, si lence congressional critics, and strengthen Nixon's support. They

also, however, limited American military and political options, and efforts to end the war continued.

The U.S. invasion of Cambodia in April 1970 produced some of the war's most extensive and tragic protests. Nixon underestimated

the fury that this controversial decision would unleash. The antiwar

movement reacted quickly to this expansion of the war, particularly on

college campuses. At Ohio's Kent State University, on May 4 National

Guardsmen fired into a crowd and killed four people. Over five hundred college campuses closed down in the following days, and

nearly one hundred thousand protesters converged on Washington

on May 9. The next week, Mississippi police killed two more students at Jackson State University. Although polls showed that many Ameri cans supported the Cambodian invasion, the massive public demon

OAH Magazine of History October 2004 15

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National Guard troops advance on Taylor Hall at Kent State University in Ohio after firing tear gas into the crowd. May 4,1970. (News Service Photographs.

Image courtesy of the May 4 Collection, Kent State University Libraries Special Collections and Archives.)

stations limited Nixon's options. The public would not tolerate any

expansion of a war they believed was winding down (17). Congress reacted to the invasion with a rare rebuke. In June, the

Senate overwhelmingly voted to repeal the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution. The Cooper-Church amendment proposed cutting off U.S. funds for American troops in Cambodia after June 30, and the Hatfield

McGovern amendment called for withdrawing US forces from Viet

nam by the end of 1971. President Nixon survived this crisis by pulling U.S. troops out of Cambodia by late June, defusing most of the

congressional and antiwar pressure. The House of Representatives

rejected the Cooper-Church amendment, while both the Senate and House voted down Hatfield-McGovern.

The American-supported invasion of Laos in February 1971 stimu

lated further protests. Coalition demonstrations in late April preceded the radicals' May Day attempt to block city streets and shut down the

capital. The radicals failed, but the courts ruled illegal the massive

government sweep that arrested over twelve thousand protesters. Antiwar activism in the 1970s continued to draw from diverse

constituencies. Vietnam Veterans Against the War (WAW) con

ducted a few highly dramatic events, and their presence at mass

protests brought increased notoriety and legitimacy to the antiwar movement. The publication of The Pentagon Papers beginning June 13,

1971, leaked by Defense Department analyst Daniel Ellsberg, dam

aged the government's credibility on the war, created greater public

disillusionment, and decreased tolerance for an extended commit

ment in Vietnam. The advertising community created a campaign to

"Unsell the War," which consisted of antiwar print ads and radio and

television commercials in 1971 and 1972. Many of these aided dovish candidates during the 1972 elections. The Indochina Peace Cam

paign, organized by Tom Hayden and Jane Fonda, criticized the war with a

traveling show from 1972 until the war's end (18). The U.S. ended its direct military involvement in Vietnam with the

Paris Peace Agreement in January 1973. Nixon lost some flexibility in

shaping Indochina policy as Congress asserted greater control. Re

flecting a national weariness with Vietnam, it condemned the ongo

ing bombing of Cambodia as illegal, and the House of Representatives cut off funds for additional air missions. Though Nixon vetoed a bill

immediately ending all military operations in Indochina, Congress forced a compromise deadline of August 15.

By the time of the Paris Agreement, activists had been fighting for

eight years to stop the war. Some continued their work until the war's

conclusion in 1975, monitoring government policy to prevent any new

escalation and advocating amnesty for draft resisters and military deserters. The movement's diverse composition was an extraordinary achievement as it united people of numerous occupations, ideologies,

ages, and backgrounds into a sometimes uneasy and fragile coalition.

That they struggled together for so long and against great odds attests to their commitment. Ultimately, they earned partial victory. The public largely accepted the movement's message even as it often rejected the

activists themselves. Unable to end the war directly, the movement was

strong enough to alarm the government, creating social conditions that

limited policy options and made stopping the war possible.

Endnotes i. Excellent overviews of the Vietnam antiwar movement are Charles

DeBenedetti and Charles Chatfield, An American Ordeal: The Antiwar

Movement of the Vietnam Era (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press,

1990); Melvin Small, Antiwarriors: The Vietnam War and the Battle for America's Hearts and Minds (Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources,

2002); and Tom Wells, The War Within: America's Battle Over Vietnam

(Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1994). 2. DeBenedetti and Chatfield explain the ideological differences. For indi

vidual organizations, see Amy Swerdlow, Women Strike For Peace:

Traditional Motherhood and Radical Politics in the 1960s (Chicago: Uni

versity of Chicago Press, 1993) and Milton Katz, Ban the Bomb: A History

of SANE, the Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy, 1957-1985 (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1986).

3. An Old Left perspective is Fred Halstead, Out Now!: A Participant's Account

16 OAH Magazine of History October 2004

of the American Movement Against the Vietnam War (New York: Monad

Press, 1978). For the New Left, see Kirkpatrick Sale, SDS (New York:

Random House, 1973).

4. Louis Menashe and Ronald Radosh, eds., Teach-ins, U.S.A.: Reports, Opin ions and Documents (New York: F.A. Praeger, 1967).

5. Melvin Small, Covering Dissent: The Media and the Anti-Vietnam War

Movement (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1994), argues that mainstream media presented an unsympathetic and misleading

picture of the antiwar movement, especially early in the war.

6. Jo Ann Ooiman Robinson, Abraham Went Out: A Biography of A. J. Muste

(Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1981).

7. Mitchell K. Hall, Because of Their Faith: CALCAV and Religious Opposition to

the Vietnam War (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990). 8. For draft resistance, see Michael Ferber and Staughton Lynd, The Resistance

(Boston: Beacon Press, 1971); Michael S. Foley, Confronting the War

Machine: Draft Resistance During the Vietnam War (Chapel Hill, NC:

University of North Carolina Press, 2003); and Lawrence Baskir and

William Strauss, Chance and Circumstance: The Draft, the War and the

Vietnam Generation (New York: Knopf, 1978).

9. Norman Mailer, The Armies of the Night: History as a Novel/The Novel as

History (New York: New American Library, 1968). 10. Charles DeBenedetti, "A CIA Analysis of the Anti-Vietnam War Move

ment: October 1967," Peace <? Change 9 (Spring 1983): 31-41. 11. Walter Cronkite, Who, What, When, Where, Why: Report from Vietnam hy

Walter Cronkite, CBS, February 27, 1968, transcript reprinted in Robert

J. McMahon, ed., Major Problems in the History of the Vietnam War, 3rd ed. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 2003), 321.

12. Daniel C. Hallin, The "Uncensored War": The Media and Vietnam (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986); William M. Hammond, Reporting

Vietnam: Media and Military at War (Lawrence, KS: University Press of

Kansas, 1998); Clarence R. Wyatt, Paper Soldiers: The American Press and

the Vietnam War (New York: W. W. Norton, 1993).

13. Jeremy Larner, Nobody Knows: Reflections on the McCarthy Campaign of 1968

(New York: Macmillan, 1970); Jack Newfield, Robert Kennedy: A Memoir

(New York: E.P. Dutton, 1969).

14. Nancy Zaroulis and Gerald Sullivan, Who Spoke Up? American Protest

Against the War in Vietnam, 1963-1975 (Garden City, NY: Doubleday,

1984), 200.

15. Paul Hoffman, Moratorium: An American Protest (New York: Tower

Publications, 1970). 16. Melvin Small, Johnson, Nixon, and the Doves (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers

University Press, 1988), 190.

17. Peter Davies, The Truth About Kent State: A Challenge to the American

Conscience (New York: Farrar, Straus, Giroux, 1973). 18. Andrew Hunt, The Turning: A History of Vietnam Veterans Against the War

(New York: New York University Press, 1999); David Rudenstine, The

Day the Presses Stopped: A History of the Pentagon Papers Case (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1996); Mitchell Hall, "Unsell the

War: Vietnam and Antiwar Advertising," Historian 58 (Autumn 1995):

69-86.

Mitchell K. Hall is a professor of history at Central Michigan University. He is the author of Because of Their Faith: CALCAV and Religious Opposition to the Vietnam War (1990) and The Vietnam War (2000), plus many journal articles. He is currently Vice-President of the Peace

History Society, and is the former editor of the journal Peace & Change.

^ft Carr's Compendium 0/^ Vietnam ^^r

Represents over 20,000 pages of Vietnam War

official records reproduced on CD-ROM & DVD-ROM

AVAILABLE TITLES:

A Study of Strategic Lessons Learned in Vietnam

A Systems Analysis View of the Vietnam War 1965-1972

Defense Attache Saigon: RVNAF Quarterly Assessments

Military Assistance Command^ Vietnam Command Histories 1964-1973 (Sanitized)

Project RED BARON L: Air-to-Air Encounters in Southeast Asia

Vietnam Pacification Studies #1

OAH Magazine of History October 2004 17