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2CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIALDEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

Headquarters, 23d Infantry DivisionAPD San Francisco 96374

AVDF-HL 15 November 1970

SUBJECT: Operational Report--Lessons Learned, 23d Infantry Division, PeriodEnding 31 October 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 kH2) kuj

THRU: CG, XXIV Corpa3, APO San Francisco 96349

TOt Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army

SEE DISTRIBUTION

Location: Chu Lai Base (BT 555035), RVN;eporting Officer: Major General Albert E. MCloyPrepared by: Captain William H. Offutt, Jr., 3d Military History Detach.ent.Map References: Vietnam, 1:50,000, Series L7014, Sheets: 6;Z3 1; 6539 I, I,III, IV; 6638 I, IV; 6639 I, II, IIi, IV; 6640 I, I, II1, IV; 6738 I, II, 11,IV; 6739 I, II, III, IV; 6740 III; 638 III, IV.

I. Section I. Operations: Significant Activities.

A. Command.

1. (C) Background. ThL 23d Infantry Div. continued to conduct combatoperations throughout the division Tactical Area of Interest (TAOI) duringthe reporting period. Contact with enemy units rangea xrom light to moderatethroughout the TAOI. Operations Frederick Hill, Geneva Park, Nantucket Beach,Pennsylvania Square and Iron Mountain continued throughout the period.Operation Elk Canyon terminated on 26 August at which time Operation Elk CanyonII commenced. Elk Canyon II terminated 19 September. On 5 September, the196th Infantry Brigade initiated Operation Nebraska Rapids, a joint operationwith the Ist Marine Division. The opert -on. terimniaied- on 8 -eptenber. On2October the 1-1 Cavalry and the 2-1 Infantry formed Task Force Saint. Thetask force was placed OPOON to the 1st Marine Division for Operation TulareFalls, which lasted thru 15 October. On 21 October, Troop F, 17th Cavalrywas placed in direct support of the 2d IDK Marirne Brigade for an indefiniteperiod. Task Force Burnett, composed of units from I-1 Cay and 2-1 Inf wasformed on 27 October and placed OPCON to the 1st Marine Division for partici-pation in Operation Hoang Dieu. Joint operations with the 2d APVN Division,rice denial and pacification continued suctessfully.

2. (U) Command Chanryes.

a. Colonels. OWW 1AOO AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS;

"CLASS fIEO AFTER 12 YIAIlS1FOR OT UT COFIENIA704121 CONFIDENTIALInclosure

31

I'CONFIDENTIALAVDF-L 15 November 1970SUBJECT: Operational Report.--Lessons Learned, 23d Infantry Division, :Period

ading 31. .ctober 1970, RCS CSFOR--65 "%R2) tU)

(1) COL Hugh F. T. Hoffman, Jr., ass-= ed conidand of the 198th Brigadeon 15 August 1970, vice COL W. B. Richardson, 'who was wounded knun-evac)

,(2) COL Paul B. McDaniel assumed comiand of the DISOM-on 18 August1970 vice ODL Hoffman.

(3) COL William B. RichardsQn assumed command of the 198th Brigadeon 9 September 1970 from COL F. T. Hoffman, Jr.

(4) COL John L. Insani assumed command of the 11th Brigade on 11September, vice O)L K. B. Barlow.

(5) COL J. K. SadLer a.sumed coomand of the Division Artillery on24 September 1970, vice (OL D. M. Dexter, Jr.

(o) COL W. S. Hathaway assumed comand of the 19bth Brigade on 25

October 1970, vice COL E. L. Kennedy.

b. Battalion Changes.

(I) 6b, CLDC, LTC R. W. Fell acsaimed comaand from LTC W. C, Hoganon 7 September 197C.

(2) 5th Bn, 46th Inf, LTC J. R. Henry assumed comnand from LTC H.J. Wereszynski on 9 September 1970.

(3)- 3d Bn, 1st Inf, LTC C. J. Landry assumed comnand from LTC R.A. ,Clbertson on 1! September 1970.

(4) lst Bn 14th Arty, LTC If..L. Ray assumed command from LTC B.P.ooloff on 21 September 1979.

C5) 4th Bn, 31st Inf, LTCCW. 01 Hamell assumed comnand from LTCT. A. Brun on 26 September 1970,

(6) 4th Bn, 3d Inf, LTC A. F. Coast assumed conmnand from LTC P.D. Grimm on 5.October 1970.

(7) 23 S&T Bn, LTC S. R. Levenson assumed command from LTC J,. F.Senna on 7 October 1970.

(8) 00, Combat Center, LTC J. R. Wheaton, Jr., assumed commandfrom MiJqr C. I. Clark on 7 October 1970.

(9) 1st Bn, 52d Inf, Major C. E. Getz assufaed command from LTCJ. E. Clites, Jr. on 7 October 1970.

2CONFIDENTIAL

AVDF-HL 15 Noveuber 1770SUBJECT" Opcrational Report-Lessons Learnedb 23d Infantry Division. Period

aiding 31 October 1910p R0S CSF)R-65 (W) (u)

(10) 6th Bn, l1th Arty, Major G. R. Keech assumed coanand from LTCR. H. Kleinfelder on 14 October 1970.

(1) lot Sqd, t , LTC S. J. Burnett assumed comm and from LTCC. E. Saint on 24 October 1970.

(12) l at Dn, 46th Inf, LTC W. Doyle assumed command from LTC R.

Carvelle on 25 October 1970.

3. (U) Itaff Chanzes.

a. Colonels. OOL Alphus P. Clark assumed duties as Chief of Staffon 11 September 1970, vice OOL John L. Insani.

b. Other

(1) CPT Johnson assumed duties as Division information Officer, viceMajor W. F. Gabella who was medevaced on 20 August 1970.

(2) Major J. S. Peppers assumed duties as Acting ACofS, G3, viceLC L. J. Stottle who . turned to CONUS on emergercy leave and PCS on 23August 1970.

(3) Major T. D. Cox assed duties as Assistant Chief of Staff, viceCPT Q. W. Dutson on 20 August 1970.

(4) Major R. A. Murchinson assumed duties as ACofS, G5, vice LTCG. ft. H. Jonson on 2 Saptezber 1970.

(5) LTC W. H. reszynski assumed duties as ACOofS, G3 from ajorJ. S. Peppers on 9 September 1970.

(6) Major W. E. Gabella returned to duty and assumed duties asDivision Information Officer, on 14 September 1970.

(7) LTC L. W. Roberts assumed duties as ACofS, GI, vice LTC W. E.Henschel on 7 October 1970.

(8) LTC C. E. Saint assumed duties as ACofS, 03 from LTC W H.Wereszynski on 25 October 1970.

4. (U) Distinguiahed Visitors.

3

to

AVDF-HL 5 Nnvemuer 1970SUBJECT: Operational Report--essons Learned, 23d Infantry Divisiony Period

Ending 31 Octover 1970, RcS CSFc--65 (H2) (U)

AW FOSITION PERIOD

BG Heiser 4Dep J-3, MACV I AugTTG Sutherland CG, XXIV Corps I Aug)CC Toan C, 2d ARVN Division I Aug)G. Toan CG, 2d ARVN Division 2 AugM, Baldwin DCG, XXIV Corps 3 AugLTG Sutherland CC, XXIV Corps 4 AugLTG Lam CG, I Corps 4 AugXG Widdecke CC, Ist Marine Division 4 AugCOL Gard AG, XXIV Corps 5 AugLTG Sutherland CC, XAIV Corps 8 AugNG Toan CC, 2d ARVN Division 8 AugLTG Kerwin DCSPR 9 Aug)3 Bald.fin DCG XXIV Corps 9 AugBG Cooper - - 9 AugMG Baldwin DC0, XXIV Corps 10 AugOOL Weyrick G2, USARV 11 AugLTG Sutherland CG, XXr Corps 11 AugBG Schroeder Dep Dir Opns, DA 12 AugOOL Leonard 10, USARV 13 AugLTG Sutherland CO, XXIV Corps 13 AugBG Jackson Dep Senior Advisor, I Corps 14 AugNG Shedd Outgoing C/S, XXIV Corps 16 AugCOL Ramos Advisor, 2d ARVN Division 16 AugCOL Ckm C/S, 2d ARVN Division, 16 AugCOL Luat ADC, 2d AWN Division 17 Aug(OL Ramos SA, 2d ARN Division 17 AugCOL Higgins O, 509th B&R GP, SGN 17 Aug(OL Barber CO. North District Enuneer 19 Aug-M GBaldwin DOG, XXIV Corps 19 AugBG Hemingway CG, Ist Avn Bde 19 AugLTG Sutherland CG, XXIV Corps 20 AugBG McCarthy (Ret USAR) 20th Century Fox 20 Aug

CorporationIG Noble OG, US Army Engineer Comand 21 Aug

RVNCOL Barker US Army Engineer Ond, RVN 21 AugBG Sweeney CG, Qui lhon Depot 22 AugMr. Hardin (GS-18) Asst for SEA to Asst Secret- 22 Aug.:: Neianary of the ArmyCOL Newman USARV Asst C/S) G3 24 AugMG Baldwin DOG, XXIV Corps 24 Aug

4

'7I

________ -.. ...- . - - - - - ----:

L

AVDF-HL 15 November 1970SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessens Learned, 23d Infantry Division, Period

Siding 31 October 1970, RCS CSFOR--65 (R2) (U)

N OSITION PERIQo

REP, Honorable Landgrebe Representative, Indiana 25 AugBG Simmns ADC, 1 st Marine Division 26 AugLTG Sutherland 03, XXIV Corpe 27 AugCSM Copeland SMA Designate 28 AugCOL Vance 00, DNG Support Com.nand 28 AuRHon Krogh Special Asst to the Presideut 29 Aug

for Domestic AffairsOL Kampe J-3, MACV 30 AugCOL Carswell MACDC 30 AugMG Baldwin DOG, kXIV Corps 31 AugLTG Sutherland 03, )XIV Sorps 31 AugGOL McCintyre Incoming 00, 45th Engineer 4 Sep

GroupLTG Sutherland CG, XXIV Corps 6 SepMG Bowers Dep C/S, DCGPA, USARV 6 Sep

MG Norton DOG, Project MASSrER, DA 6 Sep

BG Meyer 0G, XXIV Ccrps Artillery 7 SepM3 Woolwine ADdG-LOG 7 SepGEN Rosson "DOcO XACV 7 SepLTG Sutherland OG, XXIV Corps 7 SepM3Toan CG, 2d ARVN Division 7 SepCOL Ramos Advisor 2d ARYN Division 7 Sep,MG Baldwin DOG, XXIV Corps 8 SepM Baldwin DOG, XXIV Corps 10 SepBG Hume DCS (P&O) USARV 10 SepOL Kotite 10 SepLTG ikyand Dep o baGV (Designate) 11 Sep

__ri a&ier 0tr OBE Het Zc4l-nd Ar--y 12 SepBG Condit CG, Combat Service Support 13 Sep

Group, USACDCNG Gettys C/S (Designate) USARV 13 SepMG Toan CG, 2d ARVN Division 13 SepM Foster 0G, Ist Sig Bde 14 SepLTC Sutherland CG, XXIV Corps 16 SepLTC taford Sti, Quang Tin Provinco 16 SapBG Quinn Asst Wing Command, 1st MAW 16 SepMr. Winship Asst to Ambassador, US 17 Sep

BO Hixon 0/S, XIV Corps 18 Sep(OL Lee G3, UXIV Corps 18 SepGO( Haines CINCUSARPAC 22" Sep

I5V"

-g4

AVDF-HL 15 November 1970SUBJECT: Operational Report--Lessons Learned, 23d Infantry Division, Period

&ding 31 October 1970, RCS csR-65 (R2,) 4U)

NM TO r IOD

COL Hoffan XO, -TEC SA)AC 22 SepBG Ursano Dep Cof$ (F&A), USARV 22 SepCOL Gieen G5, XXrl Corps 24 SepLTC Phien DCS, PO&WAR, MRV 24 SepIGWiddecl CG) 13t Marine D-ivision 24 SepBG Thomas CG, USA WDOOH, VN (P9JV 25 Sep

BG Meyer CG, XXIV Corps Artillery 25 SepOL Conrad CofS, ENG Support Comand 25 SepNG Baldwin DCG, XXIV Corps 26 Sep)G Deane Dirertor, DCPG 28 SepCOL Brandenberg ECFQ Liaison Officer 28 SepCOL Baker MACV-J3-04 28 SepQOL Burr XXIV Corps G2 28 SepD, Schrader OG, 18th Engineer Bde 29 SepLTG Sutherland CG, XXIV Corps 3 OctOL Mason XXIV Corps Engincer 3 OctOOL Baught Senior Liaison Officer, Army 3 Oct

Combat Developnent ComnandProject MASSTElt

LTG Sutherland CG, XXIV Corps 5 OctCOL Kersey US1C, Incoming Dep CofS, XXIV 5 Oct

CorpsLTG McCutcheon C, 1st HAF 6 Oct)G Woolwine Asst CGO Logistics, USARV 6 OctOL Hammack Military Judge, US Army 6 Oct)G Baldwin Dep 01, )XIV Corps 6 OctCOL Vance C, ErNG Support Command 7 OctO)L XjApe USAWI Redeployment Officer 8 OctVice Admiral Gralla USNOOMSC .9 Oct(OL Peyton M, US Army Medical Couwi-d. 10-OCt

COL Noel Dept Comander, Medical 10 OctCommand, JCVN

.OL Bowen USARY Meuropsychiatric 12 OctLiSteolsultantLTG Sutherland G, XXIV Corps 13 OctND Toan GG, .,,d ARYN Division 14 CetMr. Anderson Outgoing Dir. USO RVN I5 Cetiss adth Putolic Relations, USO RVN 15 Oct

Aerical Division

6

F ° ... . -- _ - --- -L -

4 AV L-m 15 Novenber 1970SUJ&JC: Operational hporti--Lsons Learned, 23d infantry T.trisi.fn, Period

siding 31 October 1970, RCS CEFOR-65 (R2) (U)

wIIO PERIOD

ODL Woods Northern District Enit-,er 17 OctG Baldwin DW, )XIV Corps 17 Oct

Chap (COL). Stejgan USAR'" Chpplain 18 OctMr. Hadley' Correspondent 18 OctO)L Cook, COL Oborley, MACV IG Team 18 OctCDR Stohr, & MA StmlanLTG *Caffrey DCG, USARV 19 OctBGHume ep CofS (,?&O), USARV 19 OctNG Baldwin D(X, XXIV :Corps 19 Oct,

r. Wilet Aset Dir, Service to 19 OctMilitary Tnstal, S. E. 'AsiaOfficu

BG Davison Dir Ibliated Peroonnel, DA: 20 OctMr. Lasar 1HR Dep for CORDS 21 PctMr. Doan IlR Anst T~o for OJRDS 21 ,ctChap (LTC) Brooks USARV Dep Chaplain 21 Oct

-LTG Sutherland 02, XAI Corps 21 OctCOL Vance C0, DUNG Support Cozmmnd 21 Octfr. 3teinberg Staff M)mber, Senate Sub- 23 Oct

comittee on JuvenileDelinquency

CHDR Lofarno Chief of S.E. Asia Dept of 26 OctDefense Information 2Oc

OOL Ymingn 'ACofS, G3, XXIV Corps 28 OctCML Doyle A~ofS, GI, XXIV Corps 28 Oct"

7

--. "

AVDF-HL 15 November 1970SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned, 23d Infantr? Division,'Period

Ending 31 October 19709 RCS CSFOR-65 (2) (U)

B. (U) Personnel.

1. (U) Staff Judge Advocate.

a. During the period; MiUiary Justice/Military Affairs continuesto comprise the largest activity area. During the quarter Aug-Oct '70s thiscommand tried 7 general courts-martial, 6 special courts-martial in whicha bad conduct discharge was authorized, 121 special courts-martial, andreceived 126 special courts-martial and 3 summary courts-martial for super-visory review from subordinate commands. In addition, 1,251 Article 15,UCMJ proceedings were received for supervisory review and forwarding toUSARPSSC, Fort Benjamin Harrison, Indiana. Military Affairs actions duringthis quarter included 39 Line of Duty determinations; 45 Article 15, UCKJappeals for advice; 66 Reports of Survey; 11-1 Reports of Investigation; 33elimination proceedings; 24 Congressional inquiries, and 11 CollateralInvestigations forwarded to DA.

Quarterly rates per thousand for general, special (BCD). special, and s-marycourts-cartia-. during this period were .30, .26. 5.26. and .13 respectively.

b. Legal Assistance Section processed 2303 cases during the quarter,

including but not limited to, domestic relations, indebtedness, wills, powersof attorney, income tax, citizenship. and ger.eral counseling and advice.

c. This office continues to provide instruction on the Geneva Con-vention with strong emphasis on war crimes and detainee treatment, to eachgroup of replacemants processed through the 23d lAfantry Div. Combat Center;and to the Division Combat Center Leadership Vourse. Instruction is alsogiven on the, Military Justice Act of 1968, In addition, unit instructionis provided on an on-call basis to officers and senior NCOso

d. During the quarter 90 claims were received for payment for lossor damage of servicemen's property. Foreign claims are monitored at thisheadquarters for substantive and procedural completeness and forwarded tothe Foreign Claims Office for adjudication.

e. During this quarter this section has presented 57 classes on DrugAbuse at the Combat Center and at the -various units to promote the drugamnesty program and awareness of the problems of drug abuse.

2. (U) Division Chaplain.

a:. During the period, the normal schedule of religious services and

AVDF-HL 15 November 1970SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned, 24d Infantry Division, Period

&Iding 31 October 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

counselling was held in tiee field and division rear. The Character GuidanceC1,uncil Was reactivated, and a Drug Amnesty Program activated. Supportcontinued for the Catholic and Protestant orphanages in An Ton and,.theCatholic school and orphanage' in Binh Son. The 23d L'dfantrj Div. participatedin World Prayer Day, held 21 October 1970 with special prayer services observed.Morning Devotions were begun at the Division Chapel along with.regular Sat-urday evening Fellowship and sports fiiovies program.

b. Chaplain (CPT) Phillip Nichols, 1-52 Infantry., was killed inaction 13 October 1970. A memorial service was held for him Sonday 18Oc,ober 1970 at the Stella Mar-s Chapel. USARV and XXIV Corps Chaplains werepresent. On 21 October, a monument in frcnt of the Division Chapel was,e~dicated to the memory of Chaplain Nichols at a special memorial service.Brixadier General Atteberry, ADC (S), gave £he dedication address.

3# (U) Division Fiance Office.

Conversion Day was held 7 October 1970 to change series 681 MPC toseries 692 MPC. The operation concluded, 1030 hours, 9 October 1970.

4. (U) Provost Marshal.

a. The hazards of driving on Highway QL -1, the only major road int k 23d Infantry Wv. AOR, were brought to light by the increasing number

of trafric incidents and accidents. In resoonse to the problem an aerial' military police patrol was inagurated in.July 1970.

(1) Preparations were first made on the ground by marking the high-way, with white blocks 176 feet apart and visible from the air. In thismanner the aerial patrol could clock vehicles on the ground and in coordinationwith patrols located in advantageous positions, apprehend speeders.

(2) During this reporting period approximately 107 hours flight timea ' l~ged in the operation. Widest dissemination of the program was made

to' t%& command to warn speeders of the consequences. Flyers were distributedin tho Division Daily Bulletin and articles were placed in the division news-paper.

(3) Another aspect of 'the patrol was its use along beach areas ofChu Lai Base in an effort to stop individuals from swimming in unmarked andunguarded beaches. Too frequently in the past, swimmers use of the unaccess-able areas resulted in. fatal consequences. The patrol. was able to spot thesepersonnel and quickly notify the Military Police Desk.

9

OVE-HL I 5-10vemb~er 1970SUBJECT: Operational Report--Lessons Learned, 23d infantry Division., Pe iod

Ending 31 October 19WO, RCS CS7'Oi1 -65 (R2) (U)

(4) A third aspect of the patrol was the utilization of the aircraftto check ths countryside for black marketeering or illicit activities. Normalsanctuaries for criminal activity were thus den.ed.

b. in September 1970 a solution to combat the growing drug abumiproblem within thg 23d Infantry 1Xv. TAOR was put into effect. A arugaiesty program was Tormulated under the AIspices of the Office of the ProvostMarshal with goals of education, rehabilitation and medical care for drugabusers. A team, composed ok the Division Provost Marshal, Division Surgeon,Division Chaplain and Division Staff Judge Advocate compiled a lesson planand toured the Divis ion area explaining the drug problem and amesty progrn.Mo location was considered too remote and consequently the team found itselfat brigade base camps and forward firebases talking with soldiera fresh fromthe field. Training aids consisted of a sample of illicit drugs, handbooksand educational films.

(1) The cross-section of experiences which the team members possesswas Jnv1-1 "ble. A daily seminar was held for newly arived troops at theDivision Cmbat Center, with each member contributing his view of the problem.

(2) Operation Aesty was given ide coverage in the classes, andsciee the program was iritiated approximately .5,000 soldiers have been exposedto its advantages, with eighty-seven (87) signing up for assistance.

5. (U) Division Surgeon.

-a. The following figures represent the malaria statistics for the23d Infantry Div. during the period, I August through 31 October 1970.

Month No Cases Rate Mlari* Rate Vivax*

August 163 83.8 26.5

September 165 87.5 23.8

October 168 84.0 28.0

Per 1000 troops per year

b. Both total malaria and vivax malaria rates have remained at a relativelyhigh level during the last quarte '. This reflects the increase in mosquitopopulation dae to the intermittent rainfall during t.ie period resultingin increased mosquito breeding grounds. The vivax rate is about one-thirdof the malaria rate reflecting relatively good anti-malaria tablet discipline.

10

r _

CONF'!bENTIALAVDF-.L 15 Nove, e 1970SUBJECT Operational Report--Lessons Learned, 23d Infantry Division. Pi ixod

10ding 31 October 1970, RCS CSFOR--65 (R2) (U)

C. Intelligence.

1. (C) Intelligence Summary

a. Quang Tin (P)

(1) During the past quarter, enemy activity has been oderate in relationto the pr-vious quarter and has only been harassing in nature. Althoughreports were received indicating that the enexy was planning 9n offensive(H-25) for this period, it tailed to materialise for several reasons:Operation Elk Canyon, the follow-up sweeping operations, and in conjunctionwith these, the enemy's inability to obtain enough food to sustain an offensive.

(2) Oporation Elk Canyon, which was designed to disrupt the enemy'ssupply lines in his rear area, began on 12 July and caused the enemy extrmdifficulty. An indication of how much difficulty was the relocation of K-80NVA Battalion from Kontum province to the Kham Duc area, with the objectiveof forcing Allied troops out of the area. Nguyen Nhanh, a FP lieutenant

from the rear services of Quang Nam (Quang Tin) (P) Headquarters stated thatthe Allied operation at Khan Duc had cut his supply line, preventing himfrom supplying the various provincial units with food. On 25 August, OperationElk Canyon I ended and Operation Elk Canyon II began. The latter was a sweepoperation conducted along the Dak Rose supply route which further disruptedeneffq supply channels.

(a) During these two operations, ens activity was directed towardthe removal of Allied troops from Kham Duc. In what may have been an attemptto draw Allied forces from Kham Duo, the enemy launched several harassmenttype attacks usually attacks by fire, on isolated outposts in EasternQuang Tin (P). In line with these harassment attacks, reports were receivedthat the enemy was planning -an offenaive for the fall and winter months.This offensive was to be in two phases: The first phase was to last from16 August until 31 October. The targets of this offensive were to be resettle-ment hamlets, the GWN pacification program, and GYN officials. The firstphase of the offensive was to be directed against isolated outpot3. RF andPF ,mits with the probable intentions of drawin ARM nd US troops awayfrom the lowlands. -Once the Allied troops were away from the populace, thesecond phase was to begin. It appears now that the harassing attacks thatwee underway at this time were part of the first phase. The second phasewas to bring the people back under VC control by using terrorism. kidnapping,and the destruction of district and province headquarters in. an effort toshow the people that the South Vietnamese Government could not piotect them.

I! NCcAI-FI bENlTIAL

I.\,

CONFIDENTIALAVDF-HL 15 Nove-ml- 1°"9SUBJECT: Operational ftport--Lessons Learned, 23d Jnfantry Division, Period

Ending 31 October 1970, RCS CSfDR-65 (R2) (U)

bports indicate that the offensive was postponed due to supply problems.Various reports stated that the eneum had a severe food shortage, and thatall major attacks were being delayed. Each week new reports stated that majorattacks were to begin the following week. However. when that time came,the attacks failed to materialize. New reports came in stating that thenext week would be the big one, and this continued throughout the quarter.

(b) Recent reports have indicated that immediately after the Kham Dueoperation, the enemy began to rebuild his supply lines. Visual reconnaissanceof the area west of tho Song Tranh River indicated extensive enemy activity.Trails showed signs of heavy use, new defensive positions ware built, numerousareas were under cultivation, and new supply points were being formed, Alongwith this activity, numrous units were reported to be sending transportationelements to K-7 supply area. This area, along the Song Tranh River, has longbeen a VC logistical area. It contains numerous munition factories, storageareas, hospitals, and detention camps. Reports were also received statingthat Quang Nam (Quang Tin) (P) units were sending elements into Qua.g Ngai(P) to obtain food. The enemy also received instructions from higher head-quarters advising them to devote at least 16 p,r cent of their total strengthto food, production because sufficient food co1.i no longer be supplied tothem through normal channels. Since the withdrawal of Allied troops fromKham Duc, the enemy has been searching for food. Recently, numerous cultivatedfields have been sighted in Base Area 117 and Hiep Duc,

(3) In August, the province received a directive from MR-5 that reorganizedthe province force. This Poame now includes three infantry battalions. Theunits mentioned were the 70th LF Battalion, 72d LF Battalion, and D-11 InfantryBattalion. The 70th and 72d LF Battalions have always been province units,but D-i was new. It is now felt that D-il Battalion is one of the two bat-

talions that made up the 36th NVA Pegiment of Front 4. The 36th Regimenthas normally operated in the mountains along the Que Son/Duc Due (D) borderin Quang Nam (PN and was probably disbanded so that its units could be distributedamong the province force to buJld up these units.

(a) D-I Infantry Battalion is currently held at BT 2410 with astrength of 200 men. Since this unit is new, little is known about it. ThreePW'sp, who are from vnit.m Jf-rtified as possible AKA's for D-1I Battalion.stated that their u4it has four companies nunbered 1, 2, 3 and 6. The 6thCompany is the heavy weapons companyc and the other three are infantry companies.The battalion has a probable strergth of 200 men. The only confirmed contactwith D-I 1 occurred on 17 September when RF #195 at BT 255145 engaged an estimatedVC company resulting in 13 killed and one decwbent captured. The captureddocument was roster for D-i 1 Battalion. Since that time, agent reports have

12

CONFIWNITI AL

CONFIDENTIALAVDF-H'L 5 Novtwmber 10Ag

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned, 23d Infantry Division, Period&nding 31 October 1970p RCS CSFOR- 65 kR2) (U)

stated that the unit was staying in this general area and had no mission atthe present time. Visual reconnaissance of this area during the past quarterhas indicated a significant amount of enemy activity ouch as heavy trail use,numerous bunkers, spid-r ho]., and .51 caliber positions. This type ofactivity usually indicates a base area.

(b) V-16 Sapper Battalion has been dongraded to two separatecompanies, V-16 Sapper Company and V-17 Sapper Company. V-17 is operatingin Northern Quang Tin (P) with the 70th LF Battalion. During this quaxterthere has been only one confirmed contact with V-16 Sapper Company. On 3October, Nui Yv outpost at BT ^18171 was overrun. A Hoi Chanh from V-16Sapper Company was taken to the outpost where he identified the enemy deadas being from V-16 Sapper Company.

(c) There were also indications of possible movement of the 3d NVARegiment, 2d NVA Division, into Northern Quang Ngei (P). The 3d NVA Regimentdisappeared approximately the same time D-11 Battalion appeared. Agentreports have stated that D-I1 Battalion has taken the place of the 3d NVARegiment in Quang Tin (P). Not enough information has been received to sub-stantiate the fact that the 3d Regiment has relocated in Quang Ngai (P).A PW from the 3d Battalion, 3d NVA Regiment, 4w was captured a- BT 1125,stated that the regiment moved into Laos after the Hiep Duc campaign andleft a small element in Quang Tin (P) to obtain supplies for the return ofthe unit in January 1971. The last location confirmed for the 3d Battalion,3d NVA 1egimert was BT 0620 on 29 June. It is possible that the unit didmove into Laos.

(d) At the beginning of August, the 70th LF Battalion was locatedat BT 1226 with a strength of 145 men. By the middle of August, the 70thB~ttalion was moving westward, probably into a base camp area. Visualreconnaissance of the area on 12 August indicated numerous huts. It appearsthat the unit spent a few weeks in one area, then moved a few kilometersone direction or another, and then remained there for a period of time.On II October, the 70th Battalion was located at BT 0727 with a strengthof 251 men. The unit has spent this time avoiding contact with Allied units.Information received indicated that there has been only one confirmed contactbetween the 70th Battalion and Allied units. This contact was an Alliedambush bhich killed 5 VO, including the Connanding Officer of the 3d Co.v whilecapturing 2. Paports indicate that this unit has been resting and refittingfor the pasD three months. These reports have also indicated that moraleis low due to the lach 6f food supplies.

(e) The 72d LF Battalion was located at BT 1720 with a strength of

13

CONFIDENTIAL

#,I

CONFIDENTIALAVDF-HL :'5 Nove-ar 1970SUBJECT: Operational bport--Lessona Learned, 23d infantr-y Divinionp Period

Ending 31 October 1970, RCS CSFOR--65 (R2) (U)

160 men at the beginning of August. The un#t haz remained in this area forth pa,.t quarter and is currently held at BT 1819 Aith a strength of 130 men.Allied units have had several contacts with the 72d Battalion. the mostsignificant occurring on 6 September and 15 September. The contact on 6

September was enemy initiated and resulted in 7 NVA killed and one detainee.The detainee was from the heavy weapons company of the 72d LF Battalion.The contact on 15 September was US initiated and resulted ,in 20 NVA killedand one PRC-25 radio captured. Documents and one PW indicated that the unitwas the 72d Battalion. Since these contacts, the battalion has been refittingand awaiting replacements. This umit is also experiencing morale problemsdue to recent losses.

(f) The 74th Heavy Weapons Battalion is the province artillery unit.Wenever a province unit needs fire supportj an element is sent from the74th Battalion to that unit for support. Elements of the 74th Battalionhave been reported throughout the province. Therafore, definite proofof contact with this unit is extremely difficult to confirm. Tim onlyconfirmed contact with this urit was on 31 August uben a mechanical ambushkilled 2 VC and wounded a third. The wounded VC was the Ececutive Officerof the 2d Company, 74th Heavy Weapons Battalion. The headquarters of the74th Battalion is currently located at BT 1717 and has been in this areafor the past quarter. One eleent is beliered to be in Northern QuangTin (P) providing support for the 70th LF Battalion. Another element,possibly the 2d Company, is believed to be operating %ith the 72d LF Battalion.A third element is believed to be in Southern Tam Ky (D) with D-11 Battalion.

(4) The 78th Rockt Battalion, the 402d Sapper Battalion, and possiblythe 409th Sapper Battalion are thought to belong to the Chu Lai Tront.Chu Lai Front headquarters is directly subordinate to HR-5 and its missionis to harass Chu Lai Combat Base. The headquarters of the Chu Lai Frontis apparently colocated with the 78th Rocket Battalion at BT 390)1 Onereport stated that the Front had been disbanded and the 78th Rocket Battalionhad been downgraded to a company-rise unit. However, until more informationis received to verify this, it will be assumed that these two unts are stilloperational.

(a) The 78th Rocket Battalion h.s been unlocated for most of thequarter in Southeastern Quang Tin (P) with a strength of 150 men. Alliedforces have not had direct contact with the 78th Battalion since Nay 1970.However, Chu Lai Base has been rocketed twice during the quarterp andFat City received an attack by fire. These incidents were probably causedby the 78th Battalion, since it is the only unit in the Chu Lai area with

CONFIUENTiAL

~CLNFIDENTIAL

AVDF-HL 15 November. 1970SWIMEC: Operational Popwrt-Iessons Learned, 23d Infantry Diviusions, Period

Inis31 October' 1970y R CS CMwR-65 (R2) (U)

the capability to f. re rockets. The ?fth Rocket Battalion is currentlyhold at BT 3901 wit',. .& strength of 150 man as of 18 October. During thequarter, agent reports hay* stated that the 78th Battalion has been locatedon both sides of the Quang Tin (P), Quarg Xgai (P) border, Like most otherunits, the 7fth Battalion has several base camps and spends a few weeks atone location before moving to another. Visual ratonnaissance during thequarter indicated very little activity in the 78th Battalion area 1)'f operation.The activity sighted was usually small groups of personnel carrying supplies.

(b) The 102d Sapper Battalion was located at BT 3508 on I Augustwith a strrgth of 210 men. Sincs that time, the unit began moving southin an attempt to obtain supplies. By the end to August, the 402d SapperBattalion was located at BT 3802p where the unit remained for a nonth° Itthen continued soth, stopping in the vicinity of BS 3196p where it is believedthey received'supplies from Quang Ngai (P). On 22 Octoberp the 402d Battalionwas re~ortod, tn bo h~ck In Cup= Tin (P) at HT 3M. - t is %ssumd thatthis unit is resupplied and ready to begin offensive operations.Dwuig this repoactin pearioc, the 402d battalion ayoidea cntLacL w3-h Aliedforces, and is oonsidered to still have approximately 200 men. Agent repotse

Shave stated that the 402d Sapper B~ttalion has upto 40 e, but no PW s or

~documts have been captured to confirm this report.I (c) At the beginning c t August, ths 409th Sapper Battalion was

' locatd at BT 2410 with a. strength of 269 men. Agent reports during thequarter hay* indicated that the 409th Battalion is split into two elaeents,One element is believed to be operating in Northern Quang Tin (P)p and theother in Southern Quang Tin (P) . No PW's or documents have been capturedto confirm the presence of the northern element, but several PW's and documentshave confirmed the presence of the southern element. Two different PWI'shave stated that the 409th Sapper Battalin has had extreme difficulty iniresupplying. On 25 September, in Allied ambush captured a number of a trarspovrtation unit of the 409th Sapper Battalion, at BS 539963. This PW stateu-%t the 409th Battalion could not obtain supplies in Quang Tin (P)p so iewas sent into Quang Ugai (P) to obtain them. He also stated that the 409thwas planning to move into Quang Note (P) during October; however, this movehas not yet occurred. M~other PW, captured 25 September at As 994979, fromthe 3d Copay, 409th Ba~ttalion, stated that his company had moved to thisarea to prevent the cir.ians from rallying to GVN. This is in the vicinityof the X-7 supply areo ,and this unit was probably sent there to obtain suppliesfrom K-7, it must send one of its elements to obtain them. The two contactsmentioned were the on1ly confirmed contacts with the 409th Sapper Battalion.The current location of the 409th Battalion is BS 2696 -with a&'probablestrength of 360 men.

~CONFIDENTIAL

,1

QONFIDENTIALAVDF-HL "5 November 19?0SUBJECT: Operational Repat-t-Lessons Learned, 23d Infantry Di'siion, Feriod

J E ding 31 October 1970, RCS CSFOR-6r (R2) tL) j

(51 The district level forces have also continued t- remain in the back-

rquntry of Quang Tin (P). Tam Ky (D) units, V-12 LF Company and V-18 LFCo,any, have seen limited activity.

(a) V-12 LF Company is currently iocaotd at BT 1822 with a strengthof 45 men as of 9 July. There have been no reports received on this unilsince 23 August, when three Hoi Chanhs were received who stated that V-12LF Company has no leadership because their 00, XO and PO have either desertedor been killed. Until the unit hMs been refitted, it will probably remainout of contact .

(b) V-18 LF Company has been reported at BT 2812 with a strengthof 100 men. This strength is probably high for this unit, because themajority of the LF com!arls in Quang Tin (P) have less than 50 men. There

has been no confirmed contact vdth V-18 LF Company during the quarter,Visual reconnaissance of V-18's suspected base area indicated considerableactivity. Several .51 caliber positions, spider holes bunkers, trench-lines, ard trails have been reported during the past three months.

(c) V-15 LF Company and C-9 LF Company wer# lo:ated at BT 1331 andP* 0834 respectively with strengths of 35 men and 40 men at the beginningof August. Since that time both units have boen involved in numerous smallcontacts that have reduced their strengths considerably V-i 5 LF Companywas located at BT 1330, and C-9 was located at BT 1528.

(d) C-7 LF Company, which is a Tien Phuoc (D) unitw as located atBT 0909 with a strength of 10 men. The mission of this unit is to securethe road from Phuoc T.en (V),. BT 155115, to Phuoc Thanh (V), BT 015105.A Hoi Chanh, Nguyen Chi Thanhr i.o returned on 27 September, stated thatC-7 LF Company had lost 25 men from contacts with AWN units° He alsostated that the only contact that the unit initiated was in September whenC-7 attacked Hamlet #, Phuce Tien (V) at BT 174127. The unit is currentlyproviding securityifor the Tinn Phuoc (D) comittee. C-7 LF Company islocated at BT 1310 as of 10 Seplkember.

(e) The 74th LF Company has remained in the vicinity of BT 3807 witha strength of 64 men. Agent reports have indicated that this unit has beenbuying rice from nearby villages for province units; therefore, they havenot been involved in aYy offensive activity. Tie 74th LF Company is heldat BT 3707 as of 23 0ctobrr.

(6) The eneiV has Li.tiated 152 con'.acts with Allied forces during thisquarter. Of the 152 contacts, 74 have beei attacks by fire, 4ith tWe rmeainder

16

CONFIENTIAL

I ICONFIDENTIAL

AVI: -HL 15 November 1970SUBJECT: Operational Report-L4essons Learned, 23d ?hnfantry Divirion, Feriod

Fnding 31 October 1970, RCS CsFOR-65 (~2) JIU)

bing ground attacks/contacts. Significant incidents include:

(a) On 5 August, 2-1 Infantry at Kham Duc airfield vicinity ZO 001092received an estimated 50 rounds of 82mm martar fire, 10 rounds of RPG fire$anaU arms fire, satchel charges, and sapper attacks from an unknown si-eenemy force,, resulting in 16 NVA Killed, 5 individual weapons, 3 crew-tervedweapons, 16 packs, 32 satchel charges, and miscellaneous military equipmentcaptured.

2-1 Infantry at Kh-tm Duc airfield, vicinity ZG 001092, received ?x122mmrockets froman unkiown size enemy force, resulting in no casualties ordamage on 6 August.

On 7 M4_r-4t. 2-6th AMV Regiment vicinity TC 846006, engaged an estimated

VC company zeeulting in 20 VC killed. C/3-16 Arty at Fat City$ vicinityBT 435079, received 35 rounds of 82mm mortar fire and b0mm mortar fire, anunknown number of RPG rounds, amall arms fire, and a ground probe from anunknown size enemy force resulting in I VC killed and 4 satchel chargesdestroyed.

On 15 August, 4-4th IVIN Hegiment vicinity ZC 118016 received 100 roundsof RPG fire from an unknown size enemy force.

RF #722 at BT 126282, engaged 2 platoons of VC, resulting in 1:4 VC killedoT, 25 August.

On 26 August, RF #102, vicinity BT 110300, engaged an estimated 15 VCresultihg in 14 VC killed and. 1 detainee.

(b) On 5 September, RF #928, vicinity BT 2-32188, received 30 roundsI of 60/82mm mortar fire from an unkoiqn size enemy force,

D/1-1 Cavalry, at BT 30'715 , received heavy all ar-s fire from anestimated VC platoon. They returned fire, risulting in 7 NVA killed, Icrew-served waipon captured and I detainee. The detainee stated that hewas from the, heavy weapons company, 72 LF 41ttalion On 6 September.

On 9 September, the Chu-Lai Combat Base, at b' q6 received 9x2Zrockets, resulting in no casualties or damage.

RF #195, at BT 255145, engaged an estimated VC Company, resulti7it in13 VC killed and I document captured on 13 September.

17

"~NFIDENTIAL

)V

IICONFIDENTIAL

AVDF-iL 15 November 1 970

SUBJECT: Operational ReportLessons Learned. 2d Infantry Divisionj "Period(cding 31 October 1970, S CR)--65 (2) (e)

On 15 aptember, A/3-21 Inf, at BT 196178, engaged an unknown size hneiforce, resPting ie 20 NVA killed V kie, S PRC-25 radio, and 2 fieldphones captured. (possibly 72d LF Battalion)

Oc 27 September, t/a-3 5nf with /26 Eginrosee at AT 9616, found250 bunkers. They destroyed 170.

On 30 September, RF #722, at BT 202475, engaged an unknow n!u enemy

force, which returned fire. Results were 21 VC killed and 5 VN detauned.

(c) On 3-4 October, the Nui a8 OF vicinity BT 218171 receivedheavO small arms, -79, and mortar fire followed by a ground attack whichoverran thi OP. Results were 11 V6 killed, 4 US wounded 3 US killed and20 - 30 PF's wounded. Reports receied later indicated that V-16 SapperCompany and possibly the 72d LF Battalion were involved in the ttack.

On 11 October, 4th and 5th ARMN Regiments rceived 20 rounds of 60mm

mortar fire ao BT 2a7, resulting in I AfWN killed and 8 ARVN ounded.

2-th An Rgiment at BT 09o316 received 20 rounds of 6Omm mortar fireon 12 October.

On 13 October, 3-th ARM Regiment engaged an unknown size enemy forceat BT 23849, reAultAng in I Acn killed, I AR21,t wounded 31 VC killed,and 5 Y detained. (PW captured on 12 October at LT 237496 stated that hewas from Q-80 Battalion).

(c Division orces accounted for 68 r killed during the quarter. Aliedforces capturea or destroyed 83,6a2 pounds of rice durnt the quarter.

(8) There have been 160 anti-aircraft incidents during the quarter. Ofthea, ri rnoled .30 caliber fire with for .51 caliber incidents. Allother incidents inVolved mortar, RPG, or miscellaneous type fire. The

majority of anti- raft incidents have occured in four areas: The hamDue airfield, Ba" Area 117 vicilnity BT 2210, the rocket pocket vicinity ofBT 4006, and t1' 1-67 logistical area vicinity of A,1 9301. The other incidentswere scattered throughot, Quang Tin (P). During the period, three aircraft.were lost. One of these losses was especially significant. On 26 August,a CH-47 from 178th Aviation At AT 861064s Owile returning troops from Kh,-IDuc airfield, received griound fir ith an bnknown number of hits. Theaircraft crashed revmating-im 31 killd it-d 9 wounded,

(9) During the past quarter there have been 13 LOC interdictions, the

18

CONFIOENTIAL

9

CONFIIDENTIALAV - L November 1970SUBJEO' Operational Report--Lessons Learned, 23d Infantry Divi*ion-t,-riod

Dading 31 October 1970, RCS CSYR-65 (R2) (Uj

majority on Highway #1 and Tien PhvOc Highway; none were .ificant.

b. Quang Ngai (P)

(1) The ovvrall situation in Quang Ngai (P) at the end of October wasnot significantly different from that at the end of August. In general,the section of the province ccnrolled by the Saigon govemment, largely inthe heavily-populated lowlands of western QUang gai (P), was not greatlyexpanded. On the other hand, the Peoples' Revolutionary Government alsofailed to extend their power base out of the nmuntains and transportationcorridors of the western half of the provInce.

(2) Early in August, the Quwng Ngai Provincial Forward Front outlinedtheir plans for a Fall..Winter offensive to begin in mid-,onth and run throughan unspecified date. 'his campaign, which was to be conducted on the military,economic and political fronts, was the major event of the quarter and theguidelines in this plan, to a great extent, determined eney activity. Thefirst two objectives of the Forward Front's plan for the Thu-Dong (Fall-.Winter) caumpaign indicated the enemy's overall ais. Their first goal wasto penetrate organizations of the Saigon governmaent by dispatching cadre,and the second was to penetrate the Fogional 2nd Popular Forces units. Theplan's third goal was to penetrate American and ARM units through utilizationof legal security cadre and military intelligence spies. The order of importanceof these objectives indicates that both on the political and ailitary .;frot.ts, "penetrating" (as opposed to "defeating") tactics were to be conducted,suggesting that the Provincial Headquarters would attempt to set the stagefor a victory t6 be achieved in the futre. The major political thrust wouldbe directed against GVN organizations and installations (which would includedistrict headquarters and administrative officials) and the major Militarythrust would be Mainst the Regional and Popular Forces elements.

(a) Politically, the enenW attempted to lay groundwork for a provincetakeover by strengthening the infrastructure in villages and hamlets.Training courses for party secretaries and economic cadre were organi,ed,primarily in Mo Duc (D), Son Tinh (D) and Binh Son (D). Reorganizationmeetings for village and hamlet cadre were held -nder the auspices of pro-vincial administrators. Building secret bunkers for meetings and model villagesas counter7arts of CNN resettlement areas were also amo ng the political tasksaccompliohed.

(b) The military phase of the Thu-Dong campaign became known as theT-30 campaign, th6 overall aim of which was to disrupt the Pacification Program.

19

CnN RIDENTIAL.

COUNF IL4JNIVLAVDF-IL Ij INovembt-r 1970SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons" Learned, 3d Z fantry Dilviin, Period

Ending 31 October 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (RZ.) (U)

By waak#n:ig the Regional and Popular Forces strength and will to fight.,the campaign would pave the way for political takeover by the provincialheadquarters. The offensive was subdivided into two phases, each with apreparation and execution period. Agents' c'ollection of information atenemy meetings disclosed the major strate_y of the campaign would be to (a)Absolutely apply guerrilla warfare; priority ust of sapper units and (b)Establish an uprising in each district. The widespread attacks during lateSeptember and early October, and the use of sapper -actics in the w-Jorenemy thrusts (especially in the 8 Sep Tra Bong att ck) were evidence thattese principles were followed. Seize-and-hold tnctics were not used .xtensivelyduring the campaign, nor was a prolonged set-piece battle witn ARVN orAmerical units attempted. Mbst of the attacks by fire against Ameracan unitswere directed against NDP's rather than firebases.

(1) The preparation period for the first phase of the T-30 campaignprobably began during the first week of August. During the preparation perio3,two guidelines were set down by the Provincial Headquarters These were to11iT-Yelov sapper activities by establishing more sapper units" and to "Strengthenone artiiiery -it in ,ach district"a The first guideline was followed bythe enemy's attempt to transfer pRomLsing youth from village guerilla foxoeto local forces units, and by strengthening the 406th MF Sappe, En. Thesecond guideline was followed by units rebuilding their supplies of ammunition.

(2) The attack period of the first phase was to begin on NationalLiberation Day, 19 August, run through the GVN Senate elections on August30, and climax on the first anniversary of Ho Chi Minh's death on 3 September.While this period was one of, increased activity, the majorT incidents of theperiod took place after 4 Se tember. The first notnble attack occurred on24 August, when in MoDuc (D)p D/1-20 was marted and eF #144 remeiveda sharp contact. The province was then quiet until the 30th, when L:Stinson, 4o Duc (D) HQ ana Binh Son (D) PF #l. we.e mortared, the RF/PFTraining Center in Quang Ngai City rocketed, and Kai Loc (H) assaulted.B/1-20 and RF #468 killed ten enemy in a&r inciden in M Duc (D. Cn31 August, Tu My (V), FSB 411, Nui Ong Do U? and An Son OP vere a1lmortared, and Nghia Hanh RF's and PF's received a ground attack. On2 September, 3-1 Bn received the first of six contacts and 15 mortar attackswhich occurred over a three day period in northeast Minh Long (D). On 3and 4 September, RF's in Binh Son () received three ground attacks fromenemy unat.s using W surnortinp fi re. On 5 5^tahv. LZ Stinson was0mortared again, and on 6 September, Son Ha (D) HQ received 50 82mn rounds.The, major Attacks ot the period took place on the morning of 8 September,when Tra Bong (D) HQ was mortared and assaulted, and on the night of 8-9September, when Tra Binh (H), Dai Loc (H) and LZ Stinson received attacks

2C

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFI DENTIALAVDF-HL 15 November 1,970SUBJECT: Operational Report--Lessons Learned, 23d Infantry Division, Periodz

Ending 31 October 1970,_ jRS CSFOR-65 0(2) (U)

4 by fire and combined grotind and sapper attacks. Both hamlets received mortarfire and ground probes again on the night of 10-11 September. Following theseattacks, activity tapered off.

() Agmits' reports indicated that. the enea began, preparation fnrPhase 11 of the campaign around 10 September. ?%1ve, days were to be spentrebuilding forces, eight days in preparati-i; and ten days in ope-ations,Starting date for the second attack period was to be 29 Sep,smbero On thisd Tra- Cau (V) in Mo Duc (D) was assaulted, and on 30 September, Tri B:6H n Binh Son (D), received a ground attack from an estimated' enemy

company. On 2 October, Nui Tho OP in Mo Duc (D) was mortared. On 4 October,Vinh An (H) in Duc Pho (D) was assputed, and An Loc (H) and Phu Hau (H)in Son Tinh (D) received large combined fire and ground attacks. On 6October, Nui Trui OP in Nghia Hanh (D) was mortared. Activity then taperedoff, reaching a normal level on 10 October. The second phase of campaignproved to be less intense than, the first, as fewer attacks by fire werecondccted. Figures for the two attack periods indicate the differencebetween the two Phases.

Fall-Winter Campaign

Phabe i Phase II

30 August-12 September 27 September-10 October

Total attacks by fire 81 32

Against US 36 6Against RFs, PFs and GVN 44 24installations

Total ground attacks/contacts 69 80

Against US 41 42Against RFs, PFs and GVN 26 34inatallations

Total antiair incidents 33 19Aircraft forced to land 5 0Rocket Attacks I IMortar attacks over 25 rounds 6 ,6Mortar attacks 10-25 inounds 8 6

21

mNi VNT1L

cO'**NFIDEN'TIALAVDF-: O o 15 Novexber 1970

SUBJECT: Operational Reort-Lessons Learned, 23d Infanry Divisicn, PeriodEnding 31 October 1970, RCS CWFOR-65 (02) (U)

(4) Probably the major result of this campaign w.s that it derbnsczratedthe enemy's capability, to conduct at, offensive throughout the prov~nce, astargets wtre hit in all ten districts. That the eneir hit sore targets(such as Tu MY (V), LZ Stinson, Tra Binh (H)) tio or three times indicatest Ye enemy still hns staging areas near important installations in which theyare safe from Allied attack for at least a shor period of tire. Theincidents involving 3-1 Inf Bn (2-5 Sep) near Nghia Hanh (D)--M'inh Long (D)--Son Ha (D) border showed tte 21st NVA.Regt had the capability of conductingin effective series of ambushes and harassing mortar attacks. However, Lhewithdrawal of the 60th Battalion after three days indicated the enemy maynot have the equilment or will to engae in a prolorced strugge.

(3) The enemy not only used the attacks of the T-30 campaign toattempt to incrase their base of influence, but al so relocated theirmain units in critical areas to place pressure on the pacification program.Shifting the locations of major forces not only permitted the enemy tothreaten friendly forces in different areas, but alloied them to retrainguerrillas in use of boobytraps, mines and terrorism to keep pressure onpacification efforts.

(a) The most important move of a maJ.jr unit involved the shift ofhI of the 44h LF Bn from eastern Binh Son (D) to -estern Son Tinh (D)in early August. The element, approximately 100 men, remained in the areaaround LZ Stinson throughout the quarter. An initial reason for this movewas given by two returnees vho stated the 48th was retraining and resupplying.Another report stated that the road improvement and landclearing operationsof the American engineers in eastern Binh Son (D) made it hazardous to keepthe entire 200-man unit in the eastern area. But the possibility that the48th assisted in attacks en Tra Binr (H) qnd Dai Loc (I1) in the first phaseof the Thu-De 1 cami and the identification of the 48th as the unit whichassaulted Phu tau ( H) in t second phas indicated the 48th moved west foroffensive reasons. The resettliment areas in western Son Tint (D) are, in part,40re the struggle between pacification and infraitructure elements was mostintense during the quarter, and the- shift of the 48th west o this area indicatedthe enoau's intention ief b' di a.~wr base in this area. The shift ceincidadvth n aerous Yepertp of neetiags-by provincial level cadre with local ccmiistsin the area.

(b) Tam 1.h epper Battalio.,ueclassified as a ihLiz l ere unitduring the quarter on evidvnce that ths lsnt is suberdinate to ) -5,shifted east iat Ssa Tinh (D) f.er a per& ef ties. During the -lative17quiet wnb of August, the 4.06th was unleeated in Sen Ha(D) ;4 of theHorseshee. During the first phase ef the Fall-Nnter campaign, part of

22

CQNO 'TAL

I

C-NhFI DENTJALAVDF-HL 15 November 1970SUBJECT: Operational Report--Lessons Learned, 23d Infantry Division, Pe.riod

Eding 31 October 1970, RCS cSmOR-65 (R2) (U)

the unit was believed to be operating with the 48th LF B and an elementof the i07th WVA Hwy Wpns Bn in western Son Tinh (D). However, theidentification by prisoners of the 406th as the Attacker of Tir Bon; (D)headquarters indicated that the 4J'libbattelion, possibly reinforced by *.5,probably moved from northern Son Ha tD) up t, Tra, -ong ku) for tne atack,After the attack, the unit returned to Base Area 1 18. During mid-September,the 406th moved to the Vinh Tuy area, where most reports stated they retrainedwith the 48th. However, this retraining was apparently not intended toprepare the 406th for the second attack phase, since the unit was not reportedin connection with any of the attacks at that time. Aftw the second phaseof the cmpaign, the 406th moved to Base Area 118.

(c) The 39th LF Bn and the 107th NVA Hvy Wpns Bn did not undertakemajor relocations during the quarter, but remained in their traditionalAOs. The 38th may have been the attacker of the Chau Me O, the Nui OngDo OP and No Duc (D) HQ during the first phase of the T-30 campeignp andthe Thach Tru (H) and Nui Tho OP during the second, but confirmizg evidencewas lack~mg in all cases. The 38th spent much time providing secvrity forrice-gathering activities during the period.

(d) The 107th NVA.Hvy Wpns Bn, as usual, operated in elementsthroughout the northern half of the province daring August, Septenber, andOctober. The headquarters of the unit was held near Quang Ngai City atthe beginning of August, and may have been the unit which rocketed theprovincial training center. In late August, this element joved to Base Area121, remaining there until after the second phase of the Fall-Winter campaign,when it relocated near the Horseshoe. One element of the 107th operated inwestern Scn Tinh (D) in support of the 48th and 406th during the first phaseof the oaupaign, and then moved to Base Area 118 with the 406th. After theheadquaters moved to Base Area 121, an element remained near Quang NgaiCity, and after the headquarters moved to the Horseshoe, an element locatednear Vhe Ilnh Lcng-Nghia Hanh--Son Ha border, possibly moved east to attackthe Nghia Hanh (D) headquarters in Mid-October. The 107th, like the 38th,was not identified with any of the attacks during the campaign, but rather,provided support to the province headquarters' sapper units.

(e) The 403d NVA Sapper Bn remained inactive through most of thequarter. The unit was located in Bass Area 124 during August and September,and then split into companies to conduct ground probes in Duc Ph .Toward the end of October, the 403d returned to Base Area 124. The tnreatof an attack in 'Du Pho (D) was present throughout the quartr, becauseof the 403d's presence in the second phase of the Thu-Deng campaign. --Docientscaptured on 19 Octcber contained a roster, battle plans, notes the unithistory, and strength figures for the 403d. During the quarter, the 403d's

23

CONFIDENTIAL

- -o

CONFI, bENTIALAVDF-HL " November 1970SUBJECT: Operational Report--Lessons Learned 23d Infantry Division. Period

Ending 31 October 1970, RCS CSFOR-&og (R2) (U)

strength decreased from 279 to 256 men.

(f) At the beginning of August, the 21st NVA regimental CP and80th Bn were in Bass Area 128, the 60th Bn was in the Yen Ngua ai-.a, whereit wai to remain through most of the period, and the 70th Bn was in thenng Ve Valley. The units remained in these areas until the end of the

month, when the entire regiment moved to the Nghia Hanh - Minh Long borderto attack An Son OP in Nghia Hanh (D). The attak -Itself was made by thel at Go, 60th Bn and the 23d, Sapper Co of the regimental headquarters, withthe 70th and 80th Bns taking up positions to block friendly reinforcements.Following this attack And the three days of engagements with 3-1 Inf, the60th Bn moved back t, the Yen Ngua area, the 70th to the eastern edge ofBase Area 128, and the regimental CP and the 80th Bn along the Nghia Nanhborder to the Song Ve Valley. The 80th moved into Base Area 123 and begana long period of rice collection that lasted through October.

(g) The 21st NVA regimental CP stayed on the west bank of theSong Ve River for a week, and then moved west along the Minh Long - Ba Toborder in early October. The regimental headquarters returned to the westernSong Ve Valley at the end of the quarter.

(4) As most of the major units were operating in the highlands westof the coastal plains, the enemy transportation battalions in the westernsections of the p-ovince were concerned almost exclusively with the economicphase of the cai.paign. While the major units and local forces in NghiaHanh (D), Mo Duc (D) and Son Tinh (D) were attempting to obtain rice fromthese production areas, the main economic policy of the enemy seemed to betoward developing selfsufficiency in the west- This policy was dtwv'-'Aas part of the Quang Ngai (P) Forward Front's campaign wh. se guidelines were;

"Construction of an efftctive transportation line system; constructionof strategic supply reserve caches; construction of modern farm nroductionareas; and establishment of a market price control and black marketorganization in GVN areas."

(a) In fulfilling the first objective, the enemy continued theirheavy use n( the Nuoc Ong, Dak Drinh. Song Re and Dak Selo transportationcorridors. isual reconnaissance noted heavy use of the trails alongthese rie 5A practically every week during the quarter. Numerous sampanswere also observed at various points along the river. The enemy alsoattempted to-develop agricultural areas in the valleys in the western part of theprovince. VR often detected areas of extensii euitivation,_ but defoliation

24

CDNPIhENTAL

CONFIDENTIALSAVDF-HL 15 November 1970

SU&JECT.: Operational Report-Lessns Learned, 23d Infwnty. Division'griod]nding 31 Octb* r 1970, RCS tSaOR--65 (Fa) MU

missions were reported to have taken a heavy toll of crops in the area. Inthe eastern and central areas of the province, local and provincial forcesdelegated production details to the troops. In some districts, entire unitswere converted into production elements as the Provincial Headquarters orderedlower-ranking members of military units to become self-sufficient.

(b) The construction of strategic supply caches was undertaken notonly in the enemy's base areas and in the western sections of the province,but also in the eastern ar~nrx where food had to be procured for cadre andsoldiers. In the east Divis..on nits operated effectively against attemptsto gather rice, capturing over 280,,10 ibs of rice during the quarter. Flooddamage following the heavy rains oi 29 September--2 October also reportedlydamaed much of the enemy's rice suprly.

(5) Significant incidents include:

(a) On 2 August, the Quang Ngai Training Center, BS 604721, received20 rounds of 82=m mortar, 2 rounds of 12imm rockets and a ground attack froman unidentified UNSEF. Results were three Vietnamese trainees killed, eightVietnamese trainees wounded, and 15 VC killed.

F/8 Cay engaged an UNSEF from BS 531',49 to BS 305618 north of the river,killing 26 NVA, and engaged an UNSEF from BS 2Y0643 to BS 305615 south ofthe river, killing 7 NVA on 10 August.

From 30 August to 4 September, Tu My (V). BS 547738, received a groundattack, an attack by fire, and a combined mortar and RPG attack. Totalresults were i PF, 1 RF and 1 civilian KIA, I PF WIA (M), 2 RF WIA, 2 civilians

T4IA NM and I I VC KIA.

On 8 September, Tra Bong (D) HQ and the ARVN Ranger compound at B 342879and BS 347881 respectively received over 100 rounds of mortar fire, heavySA and AW fire, and a coordinated ground and sapper attack from the 406thMF Sapper Bn. Official results from the Quang Ngai (P) SIA list 21 friendlykilled (inciuding the subsector 00), 31 friendly wounded (including twoofficers), 1 American advisor killed and three wounded. 24 VC we killedand 6 werA detained. Reports state the district HQ was 75% destroyed, theCI1X compaemd 25-30% destroyed, the RF camp 50-75% destroyed, and the RD cadrearea 50t destroyed.

From 8 September to 9 September, LZ Stinson, BS 538824, received 82 rct.ndsof 60 and 82mm mortar (including 7 CS rounds), heavy SA and AW fire, and asapper attack from an unidentified UNSEF, resulting in 2 PFs killed, 18 wounded

25

CONFIDENTIALii

CONWI bENTIAL,AVDr-HL 5 November 1970StJE67: Operational Report -Lessons Learned, 23d Infantry Di isimm Period

Ending 31 October 1970, RCS CSOR--65 (R2) (U)

and 2 structures destroyed. Dai Loc (H), BS 598809, received 20 rounds of60 and 82am mortar, an unknown amount of RPG, SAF and a ground attack froman umidefitified-UNSEF?_ Results were 4 PFs, I PSDj? and I civilian killed,and 3 PFs, I PSDF and 12 civilians wounded, and 115 structures destroyed.

(b) On 4 October, Phu Nau (H)_ BS 404863, received 50 rounds of 82mmmrtar fizt and a ground attack from an unidentified UNSEF. Results were6 PFs and 8 VC killed.

'From 11 - 12 October, B, C and D/1-20 Inf received heavy SAF, ChicomH/Grenades, RPG and mortar fire at BS 670590. Results were 3 US KIA, V USMIA, i1 US WIA (B), and 4 US WIA (H),

On 13 October, Nghia Hanh (D) HQ ani the MACV compound at BS 616644received two 122mm rockets, 25 rounds of 82mm mortar and 4 B-40 rockets.Results wre:1 US KIA, 4 US WIA (2 evacuated), I PF WIA, 1 RF WIA, Iinterprvter WIA, I generator operator WIA.

D and R/1-51 Inf, BS 494836, BS 520860 and BS 517873 respectively engagedcompany size VC force, resulting in 26 enetr, killed and 10 detained on

19 October.

On the Tra Dng I!ad, BS 451873 and BS 555893, there were 28 incidentsof LOC interdiction. Total results were 15 Vietnamese civilians KIA, 7 USKIA, 12 US WIA (E), I PF WIA (W), 3 RF WIA (E), 1 Vietnamese civilian WIA (E),and 1 US WIA (M) from 12 August to 16 October.

2. (C) G2 Section: Summary of Significant Activities.

a. As of 31 October 1970, tht 23d Infantry Div. 5ensor Unit (TargetMission Force) had a personal strength of xo) officers anad sixty-two(62) enlisted men. TMF continues to operate as reported on 31 July 1970.A total of 221 radio-linked and seventy-two line sensors are being monitoredin the AD. Orientation and familarization training on Phase 11 equipment14as completed on 27 August 1970. Forty-four US and one ARVN attended thiatraining. During the reporting period, I,907 intruders were detected and692 actions were initiated, resulting in 1 1VC/NVA KIAO I VC/NVA WIA, andfive IWC.

b. The G-2 Air section's reconnaissance missions continue to obtaintimely information of enemy locations and infiltration routes. During thereporting period 338 Infrared missions, 112 APD missions, 191 Photo missionsand 856 VR missions were flown. The infrared missions produced a total

26

CONFI ENTIAL

ru.2 -- '

CONFIDENTIALAV1W-iL 1# Noveiviber 1970

BJCT: Operational Report--Lessons Learned, 23d bkitry- iion, PeriodEnding 31 October 1970, RCS CSFOR--65 (W) (U)

of 561 targetp; of those, 210 were engaged by artillery fire.

3. (C) Military Intelligence Copany: Summary of Significant Activities

a. Counterintelligence Section.

(1) During the reporting period there were no reportable incidents ofknown sabotage, subveraion, or espionage.

(2) Investigations concerning Vietnamese Nationals showed a marked in-crease during this quarter as compared to last quarter. During the reporting,

period this OIffice conducted 217 :bestigationsp as compared to 50-reported

last quarter. Of this number 45 involved separate Investigations ofprostitutes, apprehended for unlawful entry into the Chu Lai Bass.

(3) This office provided th 'ollowing CI services:

Announced CI Insaptions 37Unannounced C Inspetions 40Ceurtesy CI Inspections 10DAMS Asists 63K.lcellaneous Investigations 36PSI 17AGI 14,

(4) During the reporting period the CI Section Case Officers conducted

113 p urce Hsitings and turned-in 46 Information Reports. During the-previous qurter there were 192 Source Meetings and 542 Information Reportsprepared.

Mnth Infermation Evaliution

11 ! 2 3 IL 5 6 Unrated TetAl

AUG 0 32 70 :b 10 9 9 150

3V 19 106 18 3 9 23 179

OCT 1 28 -76 5 1 0 21 132

TOTAL 2 79- 252 A3 Ia I8 53 kt1

.. 17,1 5L7 9.3 3.1 IL 11.5 100

27

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIALAVDF-HL *- -November 1 0

SUBJM Oprional Report--essons Learned, 23d Infantry Division, PeriodEnding, "I 3 tober 1 0, RCS CSJFR--65 (X2) (U)

t (¢.;) Interrogation Section

(1)' During the reporting period, the IPW Section interropated andclassified 1,177 detainees. The breakdown of detainees by classification incompari i4 the previous psiod reveale, that there were significantproportional changes in- detainee levels in th3 categories VCIPW andCivil Defendant.

May 70-Jul 7o Aug 70 - Oct 70

XVA/PW 50 27

VC/PW 146 56

Civil Defendant 698 779

Innocent Civilian 234 248

Unclaisified 14 12

-bturnee 39 55

(2) Forty-six (46) man days were spent in support of tactical, cordenand search, and screening operations and other actions in which interogia-tion teams worked directly with units in 'the field. Of the 46 man days,thirty-five (35) were spent Jn supoort of operation ELk Canyon.

13) Information frar 129 Interrogations resulted in responses bytactical units. The breakd em by classification of detainees providingsuch information is as follows:

Returnee 25

Pw 37

CD or IC 611

Tactical units reacted to such information as locations of food and weaponscaches, identification of VCI, rocket and mortar firing positions and enemybase areas.

c. ImAgery Interpretation Section.

(1) The Imagery Interpretation Section was relocated to the Chu Lai *st

28

CONFIDENT IAL

CONFIDENTIALAV/D-IL 15 Novemnbr, 1970SUBJECT: Operational Report--Lesionr Learned, 234 Infantry Division, Nriod

Ending 31 October 1970, RCS CSR r-65 (R2) (U)

Airfield, next to the passenger terminal. Although all' the aeriO,surveillance assots from the 131st RAG wert consoli.dated at Phu Bai nodegradation of support is anticipated.

(2) Daring the reporting period, this section conducted the followingmissions:

Visual Reconnaissance Missions 90Hand held missions 10Infrared missions 54Photomissions 39

(3) In addition the II Section completed several special projects such

as area and fire support base studies, overlays, trail studies and mosaics.

d. Order of Battle Section.

(i) The Order of Battle Section has made no major changes during thisrseporting period. The only cange that has been made dealt with expandingweekly summaries. Thio&%pansinn provides a complete weekly recap ef enemyactivity by unit throughout t,- Division AOR.

(2) During the reporting period, the Order of Battle Section wastasked through the G-2, by order of the Commanding General, with two majorprojects:

(a) The first dealt with a detailed study of lapper attacks againstAllied forces and installations in the. Division TADR. This study presentedinformation collected frxm documents, FW reports and other intelligencegathering sources. It'n purpose w*s to show the increasing emphasis theVC/NVA units are placing on sapper tactics and the subsequent need forbackground knowledge to aid in the prevention and early detection of futuresapper attacks. As a result of the study, a briefing was prepared and presentedto ADC-X and all CLDC Sub-sectors. A t~raining film of sanper techniquesis also being produced in order to provide commanders with a teaahing aid

for the x units.

(b) The second project concerne" VC Infrastructure in the TA)R.. ~The sources used to obtain the data required Arm as fol-le"

(1) OB files for the pazt 6 morthsof Agent Reports, PW reports

and ARM sumarios.

29

GA L

0i.i

CONFIIDENTIALf.Ar,#-HL III Novemer 19?70 -.

SUBYICT: Operat~ional Report-4Aesions Learned, \236 InfantV7 Division, Period14iP. 31 October 1970, 'RCS Cso-65 AX.2) u)

(2) Questionmaires from the Kit Carc . Scout Section and" Chieu H4 Center.

(3) Lies-on visits with Province Hqs, XXIV Corps, and MAC-J2.

*hP Ufr--%..n obtained from these sources was compiled and presentedto C 23d Iafantry Div. and General Staff; q-3 aid 01RD's Adv. frqIXXITCerpL., Lne boo , s of the 198th and 11th &Li. and the 0O I/IIt Car.These briefivgs are continuing. The purpose #f this study is to bring to

flig b t e rtant role that VCI play in the eneny' s overall operationalPlns. As a result of the information cbtained, erecific areas in theDiviion '.OR ore targeted 4n order of priority.

4a, (C) Kit Carson Scout Section

(1) KCS Training Center graduated three classes of 20, 11 and 8Scouts, respectively, during this period. The number of Scouts per classuse substantially reduced to provide for more intensive individual training.Racent reports indicate the Scouts are extremly effective as interpretersand interrogators.

(2) During the month of October, possible infiltrators with fAISCChieu Hoi papers were discovered. The tvo suspects were turne over toVietnamese authorities for further questioning.

(3) During the month of August, 2 Scouts received Bronze Stas.Terminations during. the past thrie months were for the following causes:

(a) 8 unesaisfactory performance

(b) 7 excessive AWOL

(c) 7XIA

(d) 3'VC suspects

(0) 2 WIA (amputees)

(f) I resigned

(,g) I joined PF

(h) I failure in class

INCONH L)ENTIAL

CONFIDENTIALAVIW-1HL 5 Noveniior IfC MSBJECT': Operational Piport,--ssons Learned, 23d Infantry Division, 4Priod

Biding 31 October 1970, RCS CSFOR--65 (H2) (U)

(i): 1 marijuana violation

4,- (C) Co G (RANGER), 75th Infantry: Sunx-ma of Significant Activities

During the poriod 1 Aug - 31 Oct 1970 there .ere 50 long range reconnaissanct,patrols deployed within the Division AO including 28 area riconnaiusancemissions and 11 observation post missions. These patrol3 accounted Tor152 sightings of 497 persomnel. s lts, were 18 eneiv KIA, I US KIA and11 US WIA. On numerous eccasions, the LIRRP teams adjusted artillery oneneP7 locations with unnowin result..

5. (c) R1ema Unit Locations and Noyemnts: Based on PW interrogations,documents, aisd other reli-he -t 7rcs. the following, locations are given formajor enemy units in th 23d Infintry Div. ThJIz

MB-5 HQ (C) 650 TRI-WkD1ER AREA42d NVA Div HQ (C) 200 UIUOCATED

GK-30 EVA signal &Bi (C) 27-3 U1lg0CATBDGK-31 NVA AA.i (0 250 UKI/CATEDG-32 NVA RR Bn (C 200 UNLOCAND(LU-33 NVA Mortgr Bn (C) 350 ULOCATEDGK-35 EVA Sap/Recon Bn (C) 30 UKLOCAT'M(K-37 EVA Trans Rn (C) 200 L.N T0CATEDGK-38 WA Medcal Bn (C) 200 UWJOCATEDGK-4O WA Ingineer Bn (C) 800 MNJICA TM,

lot XF Rogt Q (C) 1-2i I i0C)TED40th M? Sn (C) Z38 UNL-OCATh'D60th V Bn, (C) 170 UNLOCATED90th N? Bn (C) 300 UNLOCATED

3d IVA Rbgt HQ (C) 150 IMLOCATEDlit NVA P4 (C) 109 UNIC{ATED

E2d NVA 11, (C) 350 !UNCATED3rd NVA Bn. (C) 200 UNLOCATED

21 at A Hot HQ (C) 707 BS 605360th EVi 2n (C) 150 BS 536376th VA Bn (C) 120 BS 50468thVA Bi (C) 125 BS 6550

QAGTIN (P) FORCE++ 70th LF Ef (C) 251, BT 092674th LF Hvy Wxns Bn (C) 250 BT 17177fth MY fclot., (C) 1 O BT 3901

31- CONFID ThAL

GONEI DENTIALAVDF-JHL 15 Novenber 1970SUBJECTr: 'perational Raport--Lessons Learned, 23d Infantry Diviaion, Period

L'dirn 31 October 1970, RCS CSPOR--65 (R2) (U)

409th KF Sapper Bn (Cs 269 BS 2696V-16 LF Sapper Co tC) 30 BT 2110V-17 LF Sapper Co (C) 30 UNLOCATED'72d LF Bn (C) 130 BT 1819,C-7 LF Co (C) 50 BT 1310C-9 LF Co (C) 20 BT 1528,V-12 LF Co (C) 45 BT 1822V-14 L4 Co (C) 62 UNLOCATED

V-15 LF Co (C) 15 BT 1128V-18 LF Co (C) 100 BT 281274th LF Co (V-20) (C) 64 BT 3707

/402d Sapper Bn (C) 210 BT 3606')-11 Inf Bn (C) 200 BT 2410

QUANG NGAI (P) FORCES403d NVA Sapper Bn (C) 270 BS 7333107th NVA Hry Wpns Bn (C) 250 BS 5065120th LF Montgd Bn (C) 300 BS 3575406th LF Sapper Bn (C) 2B US 4185

38th LF Bn (C) 160 BS 675648th LF Bn (C) 200 BS 5684C-18 LF Co () 60 BS 6461T-.18 LF Co (71Z) (C) 45 BS 6983C-19 LF Co (C) 18 BS 755721st LF Sapper Co (C) 70 BS 5780P-31 LF Co (C) 30 BS 6595K-51 LF Wpns Co (C) 15 BS 7191C-65 LF Co (C) 45 BS 7470C-75 LF Co (C) 22 BS 747281s LF Co (C) 70 BS 556695th A LF Sapper Co ,(C) 47 BS 689195th B LF Sapper Co (C) 40 BS 509012Oth LF Sapper Co (C) 30 BS 8831-212 LF Co (C) 50 BS 5238-219 LF Co [C) 30 BS 7741506th A LF Sapper Co (C) 65 B3 5'780506th B LF Sapprr Co (C) 65 BS 5465

32

CONFIDENTIAL

--i CDNFIbZI'TIALAVCFNHL 15 November 1970

SUBJECT: Operational Report--Lessons Learned, 23d Infantry Division., PeriodWding 31 October 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

D. Operations.

1. Operations Summary:

a. General: 23d Infantry Div. forces continued to conduct combat,operations throughout the Division Tactical Area of Interest during theperiod 1 August 1970 to 31 October 19'-r with contact ranging from lightto moderate throughout the AD. Opera .ons Frederick Hill, Geneva Park,Nantucket Beach, Iron Mountain and Pennsylvania Square conti-,ied throughoutthe period. Operation Elk Canyon terminated on 26 August at which timeOperation Elk Canyon II commenced. Elk Canyon II was terminated on 19September. On 5 September, the 196th Bde initiated Operation NebraskaRapids, a joint operation with the I st Marine Division. The operationterminatud on 8 September. On 2 October the 1-I Cavalry and the 2-1 Infantryformed Task Force Saint. The Task Force was placed OPCON to the Ist MarineDivision for Operation Tulare Falls and terminated on 15 October. On 21October, Troop F, 17th Cavalry was placed in direct support of the 2nd HOKMarine Brigade for an indefinite period. Task Force Burnett, composed ofHeadquarters, A and D Troops 1-1 Cavalry and B, C, D, R/2-1 Infantry wasformed on 27 October and placed OPCON to the 1 st Marine Division for partici-pation in Oper-ation Hoang Dieu.

Severe tropical storms and Typhoons Kate and Joan seriously curtail -4military operations during the period 15 October to 26 October as 23d InfantryDivision Troops and materiel assets we-i diverted tv engage in disasterrelief operations with the 2d ARVN Division.

b. Major &Agagements: During the three month reporting period,Division forces were not included in. any major engagement with enenforces. The majority of the operations wore pre-emptive in nature tooffset enemy initiated actions against pacified areas during the nationalelection cama!gn period. Deemy initiated RPG fires on 26 October againsta troop carrying CH-4? helicopter resulted in the most significant casualtytoll during the reporting period with terminal reports of 31 US KIA and9 US WIA (E).

c. Operations by AO:

(1) Operation Frederick Hill, conduc d by the 196th Infantry Brigadein close cocperation and coordination with the 5th ARVN Regimient, continuedthroughout the reporting period. Emphasis was on combat operations to increaseth. level of iecurity of pacification operations near the coastal area andthe destruction of :ain force and NVA units in the w1-esbrn portion of the

33 KAC FI)ENT I A L

CONFIUENTIALAoIW1 Nwvernber 1.970SUBJECT: Operational Rap rt--Lessons Learned) 23d Infantxy Diviviou; Period

Ending 31 October 1970, hCS CSFOR--65 (R2) ,U)

combined TADR. Contact was light, to moderate throughout the reporting period.On 4 A~ug, D/4-31 found graves of 6 NVA in the vicinity of AT'913271. latee-

that morning D/4-51 found a weapons cache, containing 4 individual awd-2x crewserved weapons. The next day C/1-46 received small arms and automatic weaponst.ie resulting in 2 US KIA, 2 US WIA (E) and I US WIA (M) at AS 981966.At BT 123237, on the 6th of Aug, D/3-21 found graves of 5 NVA. 0/1-46 receivedsmall arms fire which resulted in 5 US KIA and 5 US WIA (E) on 8 Aug atAS 971958. A/3-21, on 19 Aug, found 10 graves with 10 VC killed by artilleryfires in the vicinity of BT 167211. On the last day of the mmnth, 0/3-21detonated a homeimade boobytrap at BT 141270 causing 5 U1 WIA (E). On the10th day of Sep, A/3-21 engaged 5 VC killing h and detaining I in the vicinity

of BT 091272. Three dya later D/3-21 observed and engaged 6 VC resultingin 5 enemy killed and 2 individual weapons captured in the vicinity of

IBT 086235. On 1 5 Sep 3-21 engaged an unkmown size enemy force killing,10 NVA, capturing 4 individual weapons and detaining I VN at BT 196178.Later that afternoon, A13-21 engaged 10 NVA killing all 10 in the vicinity

of BT 194177. At 1314H that afternoon 116th Avn gunships engazed an unknownsize ernemy force killing 9 NVA in the vicinity of BT 196178. At BT 145217on the 19th of Sep, C/3-21 detonated an unknon type Lvebytrap resulting in

US WIA (E). On the morning of the next day, at BS 115978, 0/2-1 detonateda 10 lb carge resulting in 1 US KIA and 4 US WIA (B). That. evening A/3-21received 1 RPG round which wouded 3 at BT 18525. ft tl, A of-Sep,D/1-46 engaged 20-30 VC killil 3 ana sustaining I US KIA and 4 lDb WrA (E)in the vicinity of BT 294177. A/1-46 found 15 graves contining 15 NVA atAT 9500.2. Three days later, A/4-31 received friendly artillery fire resultingin I US WIA (E) at AT 817264. In the late aftrnnonn n 28 Sev A/3-21 founda camouflaged cache along a tridl at BT 108289. The cache contained 4 crewserved weapons and 1 individuaj. weapon. On the f.rst ay_ nr October at1ICOH, W3-21 engaged 6 NVA killing 4 and capturing 2 individual weaponsat BT 083295. Forty minutes later R3-21 detonated a boobytrap and sustained5 US WIA (E) at BT 069290. At 1340H on 5 Oct R./5 AWN found 6 VC killedby artillery at BT 105268. On 13 Oct A/ii Gay found a total of 3600 lbsof unpolished rice and 300 lbs of potatoes at BT 104462 and BT 091454. At1055H on 14 Oct 196th Bde Arn observed 7 NVA with packs in the vicinity ofAT. 817256. 'C/3-82 Artillery engaged the enenr and killed 2. Late in the

( afternoon the same day at AT 833242, 116th Avn engaged 6 NVA, killing 4,, On 18 Oct, the 196th Inf Bde reported light contact in their combined AO

with the 5th ARVN Regt. US/GVN forces combined in one operation as D/4-31Inf and National Police conducted search and clear operations South of 'HiepDuc. Light contact was reported on 20 Oct. US/GVN forces further combinedin one operation as 2-1 Inf and PF'd conducted search operations vicinityBT 2811-59. Enemy losses were reported. as 10 VC killed and three individualweapons captured. On 26 Oct D/3-21 received 3 60=am mortar rounds inside

34 AL

CONFIDENTALAVDX;HL .1 November 1970'SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned, 23a Infmtp..Y-J iuon, .P*Ipd

Ending 31 October 1970, RCS CSFOR--65 (R2) (U)

I their perimter. As a result the unit sustained 7 US WIA E) and 2 US WIA

(M). The next day, B/2-1 on patrol, detonated a boobytrapped 82imi mortarround resulting in 4 US WIA (E). No significant contact was reported, forthe remainder of the reporting period. The results of O.neration "rederickHill are:

52 KIA 580 KIA (C.F)229 WIA (E) 0 KIA (PaB)44 WIA (M) I DET0 MIA 13 PW/VC

7 PW/NVA16 R EE/VcI R72IE/NVA

196 CIF nWF90 fl. CIV

198 IWC22 CSWC

(2) Operation Geneva Park continued throughout the reportinf periodas the 198th Infantry Brigade and the 6th ARYN Regiment concentratedon the security of major lines of coumunication and the destruct.in ofenmy forces attempting to &ttack Quang Ngai City or the Chu Lai Base conplaex.Activity was light as Divisionvnits searched the Rocket Pocket around ChuLai, targeted against e±eents of the 78th Main Force Rocket Bn and the 48thLocal Force Bn. Saturation patrolling, extensive night ambushess preplanneda'r strices, scheduled artillery fires and sensor devices were used to inhibitattempts to attack 'th populated areas. During the reportin period GenevaPark saw light contact in their AD until 5 Aug. On that day, C/1-52 was hitby two claymores resulting in 2 US KIA and 9 US WIA (N) at BT 376072. Inthe morning of the next day, at BT 083328, H/17 Cay killed 3 VC and captured3 individual weanons, in the same action detaining 18 individuals. Laterihat morning in the vicinity of BT 363066, C/1-52 received small arms firesustaining 8 US WIA ,E). On the 7th of Aug B/1-52 detonated a BeuncingBetty mine resulting in I US KIA and 5 US WIA (E) at BS 503863. Actionremained light until the night of the 11th. 7/8 Cay (Night Hawk) engagedan unknown size enemy force killing 26 of the eney. In the early morninghours of 13 Aug, H/17 Car killed 5 VC and caut.red 2 individual weaponeat BS 579851. On 18 Aug LIRP Team !tf*asee at BS 375)8 engaged a--inkrownsize enemy force resulting in 4 NVA KIA an 3 Ub WtA (P). On 24 Aug A/1-52received and returned small arms fire resulting in 1 VC KIA, 1 detainee WIA(E), 2 individual weapons captured and 3 US WIA (E). Action in the AO was

CONFIDENT IAL

CONFIDENTIALAVDF-IHL 15 Uovember 1970SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned, 23d Infantry Diri-don- Nriod

Ending 31 October I0, HCS CSFOR--65 (I2) kuj"

F light until the last day of the month -when H/17 Cay detonated a 50 lb mineresulting 4n 5-US 1IA E). Later that afternoon D/1-52 detonated a 155 roundmitaining 2 US KIA and 3 US WIA (E). On 6 Sep, at BT 307158, a ,D/-1 LOHreceived small arms fire and returned fire killing 7 of the oneW. TheLO4 crashed as a result of hits received during the action causing thedeath of 1. US. Two days later FSB Stinson received an urknown amount, of noortarfire and a ground attack resIiting in,?, US WIA (E) and,5 US WIA (M). On 9Sep a UH-IC from 176th Avn received small arms rire and crashec- at BS 408804killing the 4 US aboard'. On i5 Sep F/a Cay gunships killed 5 VC in thevicinity of BS 5i5822. Five days later, C/1-52. engaged an unknown sizeenemy force killing 6 at BS 533895. On the 26th of Sep C/i-52 received smallarms fire resulting in 6 VC KIA, 2 individual weapons captured and I US WIA (E).On 29 Sep F/8 Cay engaged an unknown size enemy force at DT 7I17. Tw ofthe enemy were ]daled and one detainee was wunded. F/8 Cay sustained 1 USWIA (E). On tno 4th of Oct, C/5-46 engageu 7 VC kill ing 3 and eaptuvin63 indPridual weapons. Two days later, 123d Avn engaged an unknown sizeenemq force a BT 297133 killing 14 of the enemy. On 7 Oct, C/5-46 detonatedan unknowi type boobytrw resulting in 8 US WIA (E). That afternoon, A/1-52received small arms U31, mortar, RPG's and a ground attack, in which 2 VCwere killed and 5 US wounded. On the 9th of Oct, G/75th (Rangers) engagedan unknown size enemy force resulting in 3 US WIA (H) and 2 NVA KIA atBS 456891. C/1-52 with 174th Awvn engaged a VC platoon on 12 Oct, resultingin 11 VC KIA, 2 crew served weaons captured and I US WIA. C/1-52 on thenext day, found a cave :ontainirtg 5 VC KIA. They also found 3 handgrenades, I SKS and 14 RPG rounds at BS 569865. In the early afternoon ofthe same day C/1-52 found and evacuated 1 60ram mortar tube with baseplate,1 baseplate for an 82am mortar and 7 42mm mortar rounds. At 1940H thatevening, B/1-52 sustained 8 US KIA, 5 US WIA (E) and 1 ARVN KIA when anunknown type mine detonated in their NDP. On an Eagle Fnight in the earlyafternoon of 19 Oct, R/1-52 was inseited into an LZ at BS 494836, wherethey engaged -to VC, killing one and detaining the other. On a later insertion,at 114OH, R/I-52 engaged 6 VC killing four and capturing another with anindividual weapon. Later the pilot of the AMC aircraft observed 30 VC withweapons and packs at BS 517873. Company D and R/1-52 were iniede while

F174-th Avn gunships engaged the enemy force. The ground elements *adscontact with the enemy force killing 21 of the enemy, capturing ,8 individalweapons and detaining 8 VI. There were no significant activities for theremainder of the reporting period. Pasults for Operation Geneva Park were:

36 KIA 341 KIA (OONF)216 WIA (19) 0 [IA (PROM)24 WIA (M) 3 DET

HF 36CONFIDENTIALV

CONFIbENTI A LAVOD-Ii 1.5 November 1970SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned, 23d Infantry Diviuion, Period

siding 31 October 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 Hf2) kU)

0 MIA 8 PW/VC3 PWINVA4 RTEM/VC0 RTh EWWNA

105 CIV DE

7 CSWC

(3) Operatian Nantucket Beach was conducted on the Batangan Peninsulain thi 198th Infantry Brigade TAOR by elements of the 6t6i"ARVN Regiment andthe 1-6 Infantry targeted against eleents of the 4.8th Local Force Bn.Operations were conducted on a continuirg basis throughout the reportingperiocd in support of the GVTN pacification~ program. Contact Yvmained lightand scattered as numeroua casualty-preducing boobytraps and mines werereported. Operation Nantucket Beach saw light action until I11 Aug whenA/1-6 detonated an unknown type mine resilting in 13 US WIA (E) at BS 703904.On 30 Aug at BS 639966, 176th Avn engaged 15 VC killing 6. Light actionprevailed until the 20th of Sep -ohen C/l-6 arb*usod 7 VC at flS 687so6killing 4, detaining I WIA and capturing I individual weapon. OperationNantucket Beach again saw light-action until the 19th of Oct. One US waskilled and three wounded when B/1-6 detonated an unknown type boobytrap.At 18151 on 27 Oct, HH11/1-6 received fourteen rounds of'82nzumortar. All.rounds impacted to the East and West of the perimeter. There were nofurther significant activities for the remainder of the reportirg period.Results for Operation Nantucket Beach for the repo-rting period were:

2 KIA 105 KIA (CONF)81 WIA ( E) 0 KIA (PROB)

1 WIA (Ms) 1 DET0 NIfA 16 ?N/V0

O PW/NVA18 RTNEBVC

40 CIV DEF

41 IN CMI

37

C~' )NR'R)FNT1 A

o -,

L CONFIDENTIALAVDF-HL 15 November 1970SUBJECT: Operationa. Report-Lessons Learned, 23d Infantry Diviiion, Period

iding 31 "October 1970, RCS C R R-65 (R2) (U)

(4) Operation Iron Mountain continued throughout the reporting periodas the 11th Infantry Brigade and the 4th ARYN Regiment concentrated onsecurity uf major lines of comunication and supply as well as combatoperations to increase the level of security of the pacification operationsbeing conducted along the coast. Enemy activity ranged from light toheavy during the reporting period. Two major engagements with enemy forcesoccured. One on 1 Sep near Nghia Hanh (BS 617643) and tme other on 12 Oct4- the SongVe Valley (BS 668587). In the early afteimon of 3 Aug, 174thAvn engaged an unknown size enem force, at BS 440770, resulting in 16 VCKIA. Later that night D/3-1 engaged a campan killing 6 VC in the vicinityof BS 445759. On th. morning of the next day, B/3-1 detonated an unknowntype bo6bytrap, killing I US and wounding 7 US at BS 470785. Action waslight in the 11th Bde AO until the night of 9 Aug. F/8 (Night Hawk) engag-1an unknon size enemy force, -killing 6 NVA xt 13S 252622. Later that evening,7/8 (Night Hawk) killed 8 more IVA at BS 272620. On 14 Aug, 174th Avnkilled 5 VC at BS 560824. However, at BS 771438, C/1-20 detonated anunknown type mine which resulted in I US KIA and 30 US WIA (0). 3 dayslater, C/4-3 received mortar rounds from D/4-3 resulting in 2 US KNF and3 S WKB. Action rewmiir- liW' until the early morning hours of the 30th.A total of 15 VC/NVA were killed before 0400H. Ff8 Cav (Night Hawk) accountedfor 5 VC at B 713581. 174th Avn engaged and killed 3 NVA at BS 751502while B/1-20 killed 5 VC and captured 2 individual weapons after receivinghand grenades and RPG fire. 6iN I Sep A/4-3 had one of their mechanicalambushes detonate resulting in 5 NVA [IA and 3 individual weapons and Icrew served weapon captured at BS 725337. A short time later at BS 556633,B/123d Avn engaged an un\,ion size enemy force resulting in 15 NVA KIA, 1US KZA, and 2 US WIA (.>. On the morriXt of 2 Sep, D/1-1 and E/1-1 Cavreceived 50 RPG rounds which re sulted,-n 2 W KIA and 9 U& WIA (.&)-at BS559639. That evening, C/3-1 received I U2m morvar round retiuaing in )US WIA (M) at BS 616643. In the afternoon of 3 Sep, C/3-1 suffered 9 US WIA(E) due to smal arms fire and RPO fire at BS 561634. On 7 Sep, R/4-21engaged an unknown size enemy force at BS 908299 resulting in 2 VC KIA, 2detainees, I individual weapon captured and 3 US WIA CE). On 11 Sap, B/3-1found 10 NVA killed by gunships at BS 561636. On 15 Sep, B/3-1 receivedheavy mall armsi morter and RPG fire resulting in 1 NVA KIA, 2 individualweapons captured, I US KIA, 2 US WIA (E) and 2 US YIA (M). The AD saw lightaction until 28 Sep when a rocket from a supporting gunship fell short ontoA/3-1-' location at BS 519658. Casualties were 5 US WIA (E) and 1 US WIA (M).Action was light intil 2 Oct when D/4-21 found a large baie camp at BS 742308.In the ensuing battle, 1 NVA was killed and 5 US were wounded. The next day,C/1-20 with 123d Avn killed 7 VC at BS 785506. On 4 Oct, there was anincrease in ene activity directed towards GVN outposts and villages.Seven vrLlag4es ,znd outposts were attacked. A RF outpost at Nul Yq was attacled

38

CONFIbENTIAL

I

CONFIDENTIALSUJ T: Operational bport - sons-Learned$ 23d Infantry Division, TPer pdo

*1ndin 31 October l97j RCS CSKOR--65 (R2) (U)

I resulting in 3 US [IA, 4 USWIA (z), 2 4? KIA and 10 RFWIA (E). On 5 C-t,B/1-20 killed '5 VC, capturing 3 indiiidual weapons ax jiustained 2 US WIAat BS 7529. Two dqs, later B/1-20 detonated a 60ii mortar round resultingin I US KIA, 3 US WIA (3) ard I US WIA (1). On I I Ot, /3-i wit4, 174thAyn killed 5 VC at BS 447730. On the follo4ig day, :B/1-20 engaged anunknown size enemy fore* at 1230H resulting tn 3 US[IA, 7 US WIA (E),1 US MIA and I NVA KIA. During a surge ojurat0 n on 12 Oct, elements ofB/1-20 were inserted Jito a hot LZ vicinity BS \5867. During the inseticn,one, helicopter was shot dow. The 3rd plat-oon oi' P/1-26 was insgrt4d intoa hot LZ-i¢e nity BS 667587. As the 3rd platon vxth company commandelements aswpt toward the, down helicopter, they rec'eAved intense small armsand RPG fire resulting in 4 US KIA (includLng to -ra,"n arnder). 1, USMIA, I1 US WIA (E) ani I US WIA (M). At 101,5H 19 Oct., T -20 while on patrol,uncovered a cache containing 1000 lbs of unpolished rice ,,n four sacks markedConnell's kJtra Long Grain and Sugar Cd, INCi Dallas, Tsxaix Three tags weremarked "Fertilizer Donated by the U.S." In the early wvsnin . of 20 Oct.C/1-20 found a tunnel, coxiex in the vicinity of BS 72i623, cot',aining six.155- artillery rounds and two PO rounds. 1h the afternoon ,of "3 Oct,A/1-1 on a search missior, found a base camp with indications of recent use.Further searching revealed a cache consisting of 200 lbs of rice, twounknom type foreign rifles, tw AK-47's, twD Thowmon Sub-machine gti~,2 10O roundi, 1 B-40 rocket and uiscellaneous mall. arms amimnitiorn, blastingcaps, medical supplies and clothing and an NVA flagp red with, gold letteringand a jold star in the center. 1here ware no further significant, contseatduring the remainder of the reporting period. The results of Operation Iron*untain were:

30 KIA 397 XIA (CONF)305 WIA (3) 27 KIA (PROB)

51 Wii (M) 2 D91'I iMI 15 ?W/NvI PW/ VA

210 IN OIV123 1Wq

5 CSW0C

(5) Operation Pennylvania Square, continued throughout the reportingperiod, concentrUing on vsirity of major lines of coudication arid ilipyas well as combat operations to increase the level of sedurity of 'the pacd-

39

CCNFI D[NTIAL

CONFI DENTIALA1DF-IL 5 Novl.-Mht 1970SUBJFCT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned. , Jd ifantry Divisiorn, ke,d

&Edirig 31 October I970, RCS .CSFOR-b5 (R2) (U)

fication operations being conducted along the coast. Inemy activity continuedto be light throughout the reporting period as the I-I Cavalry continued itsoperations. On 6 Aug, A/1-I Cay made contact ith an unknown sine enemyforce resulting in 4 VC KIA and 2 individual weapos captured at BT 083328.In the earl,y evening of the next day, F/17 Cav detonated a '40 lb nitro st~arohmine resulting in 7 US WIA (E) in the vicinity of BT 232229. B/I-1 Cay onthe morning of the 8th, -engaged 0 NVA killing 6 and captizing .6 individualweapons. The ne-xt mrigat BT 109305, A/ 1Cav detonated &nitro starchmInfe resulting in- 4 US KIA and 8 US WIA (E). Operarion Pennsylvania Squaresaw light action until 17 Aug when C/1-1 Cay engaged an unknown size enemLyforce at BT 147287 vhich resulted in I NVA and 2 VC XIA, 2 individual weaponscaptured and 4 detainees. They also received I H-i Chanh in the action.On the morning of the 2ot. F/17 Cay detonated a 30 lb mine at BT 205236redulting in 5 US N1IA (E). On the 27th, B/i1 Cay detained 3 VN Teceiyed4 Roi Chanhs and captured 1 individual weap n. On )0 Au, A, D/I-I C - in ,thevicinity of BT 27212b engaged 17 NVA. The action resulted in 14 VA 9i,

detainees and 3 individual weapons captured. The first day of $eptemberwitnissed D/1-1 Car kill 2 WlA and detain 7 inividuals in the vicinityof BT 246145. The foll oing afternoon, D/1-1 Blues engaged an unknown sizeenemy force at BT 08033}, killing 9 of the eney. detaining 4 wovnded VNand capturing 3 individual weapons. On the 1I4th of Sep, B/I-1 Cay detonateda boobytrap hand grenade wounding 5 US at BT 17,5274. At midday on the 17th,

< 71st Avn engagad an unknown size eneWy force killing 7 VC and captaring 3individual weoions and I crew served ieapon in the action. On 25 Sep, 07Cav detonated a mine at DT 130320. Casualties sustained were 4 LS WIA (E)and 6 US WI. (H). On the first day of Oct, in the vicinity of BT 138328,F/17 Cay detonated a mine resulting in I US KIA and 3 US WIA (E). On 4 Oct., acombined 1-1 Cav/RF outpost received a ground attack from an estimated VC Company inwn.Lun 3 US 'Are Jalledc wi 4 '. unea-. The next inyrning ,vi ACAV from 4/1Cay hit a 65 lb petna rat,. resulting in 5 US WIA (W) at BT 255187 On9 Oct D/1-I obsered and engaged S VC. Four of the enemy were killed bygunships and 3 individual weapons were captured. Tio US we.- wociided. Therewvre no significant activities until the morning of 24 Oct around 41120H nearBT 20o7.0o when a Sheridan from E/i Cav detonated an 8D lb mine resultingin four soldiers WIA (E) and I Kit Carson Scout WIA (Z). The Sheridan wasa combat loss. Lat.er at 115511, at the same location. another Sheridan detonatedan 8) lb nitro starch mine., T- US were wounded and again the Sheridan wasa caibat loss. On 27 Oct, Task F~rce Burnett was organized as follows:HQ/I-1 Cay; A T-oop, 1-1 Car and D/2-1 Infantry, The Task Force is underoperational cdntrol of the 5th Marine Regiment, First, Narine Division. B/i-1Cavalry and ,Ii Cavalry continue operations in Pennsylvania Square. BothTroops are" undei operational control of the 196th Infantry Brigade. Therewere no further significant activities for the reminder of the reporting period.

ho

CDNFIDENTIM L

CONF(FENJ7ALAVDF-HL '5 Noveitber,19W6UBJECT: Operational Report--Lessons Learned Z3d TnfantrY Division, Perod

iEnding 31 October 1970, RCS GSFOR-o5 (R2) (U)

hsults for Operation Isnisylvania Square were ,

10 KIA 143 KIA (CONF)126 WIA (E) 3 KIA (PO1)13 WIA (W) 0 DET0 WA 5 PW/VC

2 P*111 V A7 R7NEV oI RThEE/NVA

66 CIV WE71 Vl CIV47 IWCI CSVC

(6) Operation Elk Canyon continued with operations to interdict theenemy's lines of commwtication and the destru-tion of main force units.On 26 Aug, the initial phase ,of the oper'ation was teriinated, redesignatedELk Canyon I and Elk Canyon 11 was initiated to continue operations in anew AO until it was terminated on 19 Sep. 'T the Elk Canyon AD, vicinityYC 845009, in the early afternoon of 2 Aug , A/1-82 lrtillerZ firing in supportof 2/I ARWN Regiment engaged an unknown size enemy force and accotAited for15 enemy KIA. In a mortar and rocket attack on 4 Aug at 0610H.f A/1-82received seventy to eighty rounds of 82= mortar rounds, 10 B-40 r.cketsand 3 120mn mortar rounds coupled with a sapper attack, The rtnults of theaction were 16 NVA KIA, 5 individual and 3 crew served weapons captilred.Friendly losses were 2 US KIA, 9 US WIA (E) and 5 US VIA (M). Later contactswere light until 1220H on 11 Aug when i/?-' made contact with an unknown sizeenemy force. The results of this contact -ere 4 NVA KIA and 1 Anct.Lvidualweapon captured. There was I US KIA and 3 US WIA (E . The contact waf madein the vicinity of YC 998111. On 13 Aug, D/2-1 again made contact at ZC 012102when they received 10 60rm mortar rounds and an unknown amount of smallarms fire. The results o' this action were 2 NVA KIA. 2 individual and 1crew served weapon captured while our losses were i US KIA, 9 US WIA (E)arld'3 IU WIA (M). On 16 Aug a- YC 993100, at approximately 1650H, A/2-1was eaged by an A-knoi size force. Rner losses are unknown. Friendlycasualties were 8 US WIA (E). Operation Elk Canyon terminated at 240H 26Aug 1970 as units redeployed from Kham Duc to vicinity landing zone Judy(AT 861064). Wile making an ar mve from Kham Duc to LZ Judy in 26 1-a CH-47 helicopter received RPG ground fire causing the helicopter to crashwith a terminal report of 31 US KIA and 9 US WIA (E). Ther6 were ao ILnLrersignificant events util 4 Sep at AS 798996 in the early morning hours, A/3-82

41

CONFIDENTIA L! I "

S'- -~ 1*

F CONFIDENTIALAV-F L1-5 November 1970SUBJ=: Operational Report-Lessons Learqedj 23d Infw.tLry Division, Period

Andin& 31 Oxtober 1970, RCS CSOR-5 (R2) U)

Artillery engaged an enemy :orce, resulting in 6 .NVA killed by artilleryfire. .D1-46 detonated two M-16 lmin/s on 12 Sep, vicinity BS 048978 at 15001Hwith 4 US WIA (E). Elk Canyon II --as terminated at 2=OH on 19 Sep D.Cumulative totals for Elk Canyon and Elk Canryon II will be includ in thecmulative totals of Operation Frederick All i96th 1nfiP ti -Qrade.

Results of Operations Elk lanyontand Elk Canyon II tor reporting periodvero:

Us

36 KIA 78 KIA (CONF)70 WIA, (E) 0 KU' (PROB)20 WIA (M) ngrSoMIA 0 PW/VC

I PWNVAo R7mW~ECO RTfl?-NVA0 Civ DEF0 IN CIV39 IWC

8 CSWC

Total results of Operations Elk Canyo I and Elk Csnyon II for period 1"21200HJuly - 192400H Sep 70 .re.

37 KIA 107 KIA (WJNF)99 WCA (N) 0 KA (P L23 WIA (M) I D L0oMiA O P i('c

0 RMF;E/vc

0 Olv, DEF

56 IA

----C.ONF-ID -~bAL

CDNFI 1ENTIALAYEF-HL 15 November 1970SUBJECT: Operational bport-Lessone Learnedi 23d Infantry Division, Period

Ending 31 October 1970, RCS CSR--65 U4) (U)

2 (C) Plans

a. The following operation plans and orders were in effect or initiatedduring this reporting period.

(1) OPORD 6-70 (Combined Summer Military Campaign Plan) was publishedon 5 Aug 70, OPORO 7-70 (V.k Canyon II) was ptiished on 21 A 70, OPORD8-70 (Nebraska Rapids) was published on 2 Sep "; , OPORD 9-70 Comtiined Fall-Winter Campaign 2lan) wais published on 9 Oct 70.

(2) OPLAY- 4-69 (Golden Valley - felef/finforcement of CID Camps),OPLAN , "9 (Noncombatant -ergenq A7Jlocation and Nvcuation), OPLAN 11-69,OPLAW 12-69 (Golden Valley Rheargal), OPLAN 13-69 (Rapid Reaction), OFLAN14-69 (High Threat Counterasures), OPLAN 1-70 (Security for High RankingOfficial ), 01?M 3-70 (Defense of Major Cities), OPLAN 7-70 (Typhoon/TropicalStorm Cmotingency Plan) and OFLAN 20-70 (Reinforcement of MR 1) remained ineffect as published contingoncy plans. OPLAN 5-70 (PW Recovery Operations)ws published on 16 Aug 70,

(3) Numerous Frag 2.1rs, a;plizable to Opert4ome FrdarickHill, Geneva Park, NantuckeL Beach, Iron Mountain and 'eansylvania Squarehave been published.

b. linitoring of the Combined Unit Pacification Program (CUPP) continued.

3. (U) Organization

Effective 20 September 1970, Troop 9, let Cay was relieved from attachmentto 11th Brigade and attached to lt Squadron, let Cavalry

4. () Training

a. The Division-Gosbat Center atthed thu mission of conducting in-country orientation and replacement training for 11 indivi-]lo .through thegrade of 03 who are assigned or attached to the Division. Dui ing ili reporting.period, 85 cours iwre completed for 8,965 personnel.

b. Th Division Combat Center ccnleted 3 Combat Leadership Courses for143 students ana 2 Support Leadership ourass for 44 students.

c. 2 Unit Peconnaismce 0ourses were completed, graduating 70 personnel

d. The Division Sniper School graduated 3 classes totalling 70 students,

43

CDNFI PENTIAL

V

CONFI UENTIALAVi-1 1 Nove.iber 1970SUBJECT: Operational Heort,- s sons Learned, 23d InfantrY Divisax, fwtpd

Ehding 31 October 190, RCS CSFOR-65 (H2) (U)

e. Training of Territorial Forces Junior Officers continud. 5 classes-were conducted during the reporting period with a total of 141f RF/PF JuniorOfficers completing the course.

f. Te Livision Combat Ceter continued support of a Hine and BoobytrapMobile Train ig Team that conducted classes on rou;ntering enenmy mines and'boobyti ps for units of the division.

g. The 16th Combat. Aviation Group conducted QH-I47 Operations classesduring; the month of August for interested personnel.

h. Insti.actors from the Division Sniper School conducted marksmanshiprefresher training for elements of the Ist Bn 6th Infantry and the Ist Sqdn,1 st Cavalry.

i. The Division Support Coamnd continued to conduct a monthly P L ClerksCourse fc)r all elemants of the division. A total of 76 personnel attondedthis course.

Tj. Th Division Support Comand also .oniucted its onthly'TAYKS Courseduring the perlocl with a total of 84 studenta attending.

k, 234 Infantry Div. Artilery conducted 4 classes in Advanced FireDirection Tchniques Irr Division Artillery personnel.

l A Marksmanship Training Clinic was conducted by the Division SniperSchool in order to improve marksmanship in division units with 54 studentsattending.'

t5t (C) Close Air Support

a. During the period I Aug through 31 Oct 1970, 720 close air support(CAS) and 38T Cobat Sky Spot (CSS) missions for a total of 1-107 air missionstbilizing 1701 aircraft, oorties were flown in support of the 23d Infantry Div.

This is a decrease from 1,815 missions utilizing 2226 aircraft sorc4as 1±oanduring the Previous qurter.

(1) CSS Missions

During the reporting peiod, 387 CSS mission utilizing 309 aircraftsorlies were, flown.. The USAF flew 40 u~isions- utilizing 64 sorties; theU. flew 3 missions using 6 sorties; ahA the US4C flew 344 missions using239 sort!is. This is a decrease from the previous quarter when 1057 CSmissions utilizing 1 175 aircraft sorties were floi in support of the Division.

44

CON]-ENTIALI)FV

(ONFI DENrALfVDF-HL 15 November 1970SUBJ2CrC Operational Report-Lessons Learned, 23d hfatqT 1k-Tiu1.n Period

Ending 31 October 1W0, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

The decrease can be attributed to the Marine ASRT sky spot control facilitybeing removed from Chu Lai.

(2) CAS Missions

A total of 72D close air support missions -wey flown using 1392 sorties.This is a slight decrease in missions and a slht increase in sorties fromthe previous qxrter in which 794 CAS missionu using 1051 sorties were flown.1h decrease in missions can be attributed to the Marine air wing being removed

from Chu Lai and bad weather. The USA? flew, 368 missions using 689 sorties,an increase of 183 missions and 328 sorties. USW flew 243 missionse using482 sortieos, a decrease of 309 missiops and 539 sorties. VNAF flew 13 missionsusing 30 sorties, a decrease of 21 missions and 46 sorties. USN flew 96missions using 201 sorties.

(3) Ofdance Ex:pended

There was a total of 47,p974 tons of bombs used during the reporting period.This was a decrease of 1 996 tons of bombs from the last reportirg period.

Twohunredandone(20 jtons of napalm and 58 rockets were used.. a decreaseof 99 tons of napalm and 168 rockets. The sharp decr&s in rocket expenditures-can again be attributed to the increased control of their uae by I DASO.

b. There were no Arclight strikes flown in support of the 23d InfantryDivision in the last three months.

c, Bomb damage assessments made by forward air controllers (FAC's) duringthe period indicated the following: 327 structures destroyed, 135 strmcturesdamaged, 99 secondary explosions, 132 secqndary ard sustained fires, "1 5fighting positirrs and spider holes destroyed, 32 tunnela destroyed, 8 cavescollapsed and 26 enemy killed by air strikes ([BAS).

45

COAF1 E4INTI A L

CONFI DENTIALAVtV-I. 15 November 1970SUBJECTs Operational Rport-Lessons Learned, 23d Infantry Division, Period

Ending 31 October 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

6. (C) rtilleryi Division Artillery continued to support theentire Division AO, providing tire support to all operations. Artillerywas required to perform moves to support these operations. Artillerymoves during the period are as follows:

a. The direct support unit of the 196th Infantry Brigade remained the3d Battalion, 82d Artillery. On 29 September the Battalion fire directioncenter moved from 'W7ST AT 990250) back to HAW. HrL (BT 225312) to rejointro* Battalion Headquartvrs.

(1) A/3-82 was sp.it, with Lhe Battery HQs und four howitzers or1MARY .1% AAo n998) and 2 how&tbers at TAM KY (BT 292232 . On 26 Augustt6he hoitzeis on WIAIY V1 moved to JUDY (AT 86IO5) in support of operationEK CANYON I, which was being conducted by elemerts of 1-46 and 2-1Infantry and 5th AWN Raginent. On 8 September the two howitzers at T&J

nr moved back to HAWK HILL, continuirg support to 1-1 Cav. On 13 Septemberfthe howitzers on JUDY wre split, with two moving to HAW HILL and twojoing B/1-14 on HARY ANN to continue support of forces in ELK CANYON !I.On 19 September howitzers -were moved from HANK HIlL to NiW HAU DUO (BT048043), from -hich they could support elemento of 2-1 Inf in an operationto reopen LZ BOXER (BS 116978). The naxt day these two howitzeru and twofrom MARY ANN moved to LZ BOXM in support of 2-1 Infantry which was bperatingin the &ae until 4 October. On this dateithe four howitzers moved from BOXERto Grid.BT 048507 i- support of Task Force Saint, which wa3 eaged in operationTulare TAlIs In the 5%h Marine bgt area. On 15 October TdIare Falls ercAdand the howitzers returned to HAWK HILL, consolidating the battery at thatlocation. On 17 October four howitzers moved to LZ YOWG- (BT 188158) to supportoperations of 2-1 Inf. On 27 October the two remaining howitzers at HAWK H3LLmoved to LZ BALDY (BT 133453) to support Task Force Burnett. At present thebatter FDC and four howitzers are at LZ TO1W and two howitzers are at BALDYo

(2) B/3-82 ccntinued to support 3-21 Infantry from split iccations, wit-Allthv. HQ and three howitzers ai; LZ CiaITER (BT 0502!0) and three howitzers onPREP (AT C07 148). On 10 August, one howitzer.was moved from PREP to TIPI1Pinxc (ar 1021LO) to support 3-21 Inf operations N-NE of TIEN PHUOC. On 12Atgust, the two remaining howitsers moved to CENTER clestng FA°. When, tiwoperation ended at. TI3V PHU13C on 15 Atust, the howitors, returned t 1 CTERconsolidating the batVery. Between 17 August and 21 August, two howitzers-wereagAin moved to TIWN PHUOC to support operations. On 24 August, t1. hawitferswere moved to HAWK HILL' (BT 225312) to support operations to the West; on9 September, they returned to CS TER from HIK HILL. From 9 Septe i&e'to 23

September, two howitzers were again moved to TIEN PHUDC: on,* "Se tmber thebattery was consjlidated at CITER-

(3) At the booinning of tbw pwded, C/3 82 provid". sapport to 4-31 Inrantry.Its HQ 4ad throi howitzrs ere at BUIA (AT 90382)_j Vith tie hsitmriit )"C (AT 802181) and ciw bhowitze at LX PmV(A;?1xn148) &Mling s12ppez 4 7to B.Utry. .twen 7 AuVuwt Md 15 Agw Vit i1m h*tsMr" froa FRV misd te

CDNFItNT1AL

COJF1DE?'4TALAVDF-HL 15 November 157OSUTJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned. 23d Infantry Division Period

&iding 31 October 1970, RCS CSFOR-6; (R2) ,U)

TIM' PHQDC (BT 102140) and then to SIBERIA (AT 032112),. 'On 24 August, t.-att!sry was consolidatnd at SIBEHIA, with the arrival of the two howitzersfroU, M*LON, and remaihed conso'lidated for the rest of the period.

(4) B Btry, let Sn, 14th Arty remained attached to 3-82 Artillery,4d provided suppport to 2d Bn, I at Inf, initially from FS KHA( DUC

(,ZC 009085). ' n 26 August, as operation ZXL CANYON I ended, the batterymoved to MARY NIK (AS 961998) and has remained at that location supporting1-4 6 Inf during ELK CANYON II and subsequent operations west and east of

b. Ths 1 s Battilion, 14th Artillery remained in direct support bof t he

198th 1hf Bda in the Geneva Park and Nantucket Beach Areas of Operation.The battalion headquatr and fire direction center remained at BAYON(BT 500) until. 17 Octobr, ihn they moved ithin the Chu- Lai perimeter.

( ) A/1-14 continued, to provide Pupport to 1st Bn, 6th .Thf from splitpoIltlons. The battery headqu otr+ and X*aur houitzera were ,ocated at LZBAYONET', and -four ho' 1tzer at L TTI tDS 630853),

TA 2) C/1-14 re~ne vealy pplit been EAT CMT (B11 440077) and KYTRA/,_), Bo $ 5h , B 46tth Inf.

UT x k. ri*L' :nvued- to, povide support to lt Bn, 52d InC_ A t A- a 0-t-pt .. Vhe batery headquarters and three howitzers wert located.--_ ~ ~At S Ito B- a3 d ) u hrto howitzers were at CHIPPEWA (BS 483967),

On kgi pj-as' 1--52 oolee ert.4ons auth-south-wn-st ok CH11PEWA" -thesij4 rs tatred t6 3;NV% On 18 Augg*t. the two hwitzers were raW, ,

t. V (Sk- B (s IS, sd _j kUird kks ' ved on 19 Augist. to support 1-52_hf in qpera.iono suth oI RA n Tem vmaponi returned to STINSON b

2itptber as operations erded. T4,lkowitzers rain were moved to " RA-O30Hce 9:- o s 9 ptmber to support. 1-15 15f d retili.-ed asoperations terminated-

on 20 Saptembar. The sa =Y* confteted on 27 Septenbqr and 4 06tpbero-etween 1,2 Odtober and 19 October, "tw howitzers were again moved to THASMIG, this tim'to surpo-t operations -by J-I3 Irnf rath-northeast of TJRA O.Gn. 20 october, lio h-;ritzers were ,=&d to NUI PW rIfl. 8(S36) fxSTINSON. At present t1* battery rei Ains "lit 16*V ,een OTMSM ~and NUI P OtrINH.

c. The 6th Battalion, 11th .Art lery -ontinrd t poviide diect, sqppoxrtto -the 11th nf Bde at BRO(W(I )(S 812'y6)o

,6-11 proviled support to lith Bbi 21st riftt frf D1M (BS891 with its headquarters and four -1o4tzers' .and1 frop .,G.AMIE ElB)(BS928220)' with &io howdtzer On 2 Sept---be---tio IkOWA7es -were lve" I:4

4.

OONV1 ENTI L

/

I-*I

W_'NHDENTIAK IAVDY L 5 Novemb-' 1970SUBJECT: Operat it. L.!. : i.s.;ons Lear-oed. 23d Infantr' Division, Period

Ending 31 October 1970, RCS CS1I-65 (R2) (U)

from DEBBIE to NGHIA HAiN (B 616642) to support District Forces during aperiod oC increased enemy activity, returning on 12 September. .0n 4 0epteiber,the two howitzers at CHARIE BU191J roved to DMBIE as operations ended. On14 September, two howitzers returned to CHARLIE BROW'. On 28 September, thetwo howitzers froid CHALIE BF041 and on 30 September tuo from DEBBIS movedto RIJBD (s 764Z277) to support 4-21 operations around FSB REED. Thehe fourhowitzers departed R:D on 14 October as ope-ations ended, and returned toDEBBIE ad CHAIVEI BFX14.

(21 DB t-1 provided artillery support to 4th Bn. 3d Itf frojR $WJ-W1HILL (B3 6343SO). On 7 August. three howitzers y ye tv 5wYMF (BS 731328)in suppo.(t of 4-;5-operations to the -at and southwest, and r*turnd to SANJUAN HE12 ais op-ratioi ended on 23 August. On 3 September, two howitzers,

moveT to B5 453443 to participate in a mini-]rtillery Raid in support ofCIDG forces; they roturned on the ra dzy. On 5 September, two howitzer6moved to KINH LONG (BS '.37512) in 3utport of 1-20 Inf, -- ich was operating

to the east. This operation ended on I1 September and the howitzers returnedto SAN JUAN HILL. From 29 Septe-ber to 6 October, two howitzers again werelocatod at H11NH LONG. On 10 October, four howitzers were placed tnderoperation control or lot Bn, lth Arty when they moved to OP GEORGE (uS 470866)to support 4-3 Inf in operatione to the northeast.

(3) 0/6-II provided support to 1-20 Inf, initially with its headqurters

and four howitzers at BRONCO0 WS 812396), and two howitzers at SNOOPY (BS'708610). On 20 August, the battery headquarters and four howitzers-movedfrom BRONCO to LIZ (BS 757432) to establish a new fire base The battery

provided support from LIZ &nd SOFY for the remainder of the period.

(4) D/6-11 supported 3d Bn, 13t Inf initially from HILL 411 (BS 539731)-Between I I August and 16 August, t-o howitzers w-re moved to MIJi LONP .(BS537512) in support of operations west-southwest of NGHIA HANH. F, '.kAugtt to 25 August, three howitzers were located at BS 458763 in support of3 - operations Nest of OP I. On 28 August, tvo howitzers were moved to NGHIAHAH to support paramilitary forces during a high threat period. Thehowitzers returned to HILL 4lI on 26 September. On 28 September, twohowitzers were moved to DRAWON (BS 730529) to support 1-20 Inr operations westof DRAWON, and returned to HILL 411 on 3 October as operatins ended. (in 28October., two howitzers were moved to NGHIA HAIH (BS 616642) in support 'of)-1 int operations west of NGHIA H1011.

d. The Ist Battalion, 82d Artillery provided general support reirforcingfires for the southern half of the AO (Iron Mountain, Nmtucket Beach andGeneva Park Operations). with its battalion headquarters and operations centerlocated at HURRICANE (BT- 537033).

48

hCONPI DENTIAL

C0NFI DENTIA LADVp-'L 5 November 1970SU3J FM: Operati,,n.. R&pot-Lessons Learned 23d [hfa,,try Divie1on. Period

&idirg 31 0ctobx r 1970, RCS CMFR-0tiU tu

'(1) W/I-82 Artillery r~inforce4 the i.aes 9f 1-14 Artill-ry from FATCITY (BT 440077) with tour howitzers, and from D0QTE (bs 680853) with tu-howitzers.

(2) 8/i-82 Artillery provided reinforcing fires to both 1-14 rtilleryand 6-11 Artillery, with its headquarters and fowe howitzers at M01-Y (PS708610) and tso howitzers at STLOSON (BS 539824). On 3 Septemberv two howitzerswere coved to- NGHIA HMWH JBS 61664-2) to increase supporting fires for units westof NGHIA HANH. The howitzers returned on 15 Septenber as operations ended.

(3) C/1-82 Artil-ry reinforced the tires of o-il Arti2.lery5 with itsheadquarters and tou" howitzers at LIZ (BS 770h32) and tic .howitzerr at DEBBIE(BS 869319). On 7 Augst, tio howitzers wved from DMIE to DWARF'BS ?31328),providing- fire support to 4-21 Int. T1w howitzers returned on 22 August asoperations ended.

(4) D/1-82 Artillery (8-inch) provided support to both 1-14 and 6-11Artillery from DOTIRE (B 630853) and BOU0W (BS 8123-9o). On 13 Sept.ember,the -t.o weapons from BIRMIC0 ver v ved to DO1=14 (US 7.30529) for a one-dayoperation to dentroy a VC-infested swa=p.

e. The 3d Battalion, 16th Artillery provided reinforcing fires to 3-82Artillery cn Frederick Hill 4O, And provided d&rec support to forces operatingin rNunsylvania Square. Initill7 the headqu.rtere and fire dirction centerwre located at ArfILLMRY H1. (BT 51500), and on 30 August mved within theChu, Lai pe.rimter.

(i) A/3-16. Atillery provided both direct support and rvinforcing firesfrom its. split locatians. The headoi,-ters and tuo hoitzers, which are locatedat HAWK HL , provided direct svppor ',) 1-1 Cav. Three howitzers loc&ted at

TES' (AT 990250) provided rintorclng fires. The rt~aining howitzer Wa" co-located at SIBEIA (AT !P3 32) with one howitzer frcf C Btry. On 29 August,the two howitzers moyrd from SIfMIA to HAW HILL to increase support forcobined operatio;ns of 1-1 Cav and 3-21 Infantry. At present the batteryis split beatw-n HAAX HILa nd WEST.

(2) B/3-16 Artillery provided fire supbort from split locations at TMJNPM)C (BT 102140) and NEW HAU DUO (BT 070062). On '8 September, a shift ofprsonnel was conducted between NEW HAU D1IC and MATY ANN (AS 961998). Thebattery currently is evenly split between T10l PHUOC and MARY ANN.

(3) C/3-16 Artillery iniflally provided reinforcing fires to operationELK CAMN7N I with three howtzers at, KHAM DUC (ZC C09085), while tic howitzerswere located at MARY PIN (AS 96,1998) and one at SIBE4A (AT 903232). On 24

.49

-CONFt )ENT! A,

y

C.ONF i)LITI AL 15 Kcosuai~r 1970

S--UBJU2 ± 'p.~ Ls~n Learred, 23Clnfantry Division# 'Period4 r- '- *,. L 1 K 0 t a J

-zt I Jtr31 * il~er- P-NX Ned tc JM1Y t., i'-atl5) as B11X C.,Yu1N Isn4 :i JVTL*101( 11 -,s zitUlte . Vrse hwuitzers were i.niti.14y 41

irae. ,4PrM --f 6Lt a f th AXiN Regt, ii&acb yas etperztting to thta West.

of O tjrrtdt enoc n a On .- -~,ti h-irro

3IBZLIIA uvdto UJA Hifl.t O~T 22Y5312), ad;zana ~p to A ftry. On iZ

hb-r 5fhe-Wtzer3 ertohe.Onj Sept.snber uhn MCKM leneNlhW th-: 1bC.4k,%tr QM ."JD mzv-d to Hal HI W%;J t'U 3 "24977), and en 1P5tember,. there wsit shil': 'qt p-rxnrt.1 bzt-ien M'AIY ZI and WiA4 iX Z C,

:ons:tUWAp_-i the Patte.y v. 0-7. 1-t tirn..

f. V-6 ld Bat% -U-r. !Pth '"ttfery 3upedcnr~ 1portingf irer~for th'.t Adr.-a TANJ, Ath -'t4 h 1aqitera and ope-rations centw locateQ

n~taly t ArZIL{( HimL (11? sO2j, -- then ei. Chu Lai beginning 8a tb ar.

(1) A/3-18 Artlltery zt4.Vart-d c,;4rktions in the 198th flr4.ade AD rrowLZ oTMn' (1 34UAZ) d.Lring the I-rkrA. It raao provided direct support,~ toAMRanhxger Operations. cor4.xcted4 in and tround TitA 130140 and HA THOJH.

'2) B/3-8 "411rr rir-iined a'. 'TJ1 VWXC 03T 101140) suprting

Specil~ F\orce3 dperAtions in the TIMf PHO n4I HAU D~q p~re&3 ~And resp61OnCkdto numeri:)us sensor rai~sion., In the arna.

(3) C/3-18 Artillery c ~.oto sujp utt thie I Ith flriende AO from LZCRU~CH B~ 3~t) A~ j~ovFcd u~p~rtto RV1I vL,;g r Oprr;tionrs in the CIA

<A VMo, bA 70, and IMi LON4 areas.

g. Aniunition expenlitures by cAliber for the 1^fiod I August to 31October wmrel

1 1 ,O24

T- 33 ADtzhn"(MRdr was initiall located at OP I

k&-,N 'lENTIL

A4

'-~ k

CONFID ENTIA L5UBJWcrz Operatonal Hert-Lessons Learned, 23d Infaftrr 5tvi-son, lPAod

Ending 3' October 1970, RCS c909R-4-5 (112) (U)

radar was moved t, FAT CIT (B? AA0071) to prqyide co~yage for the tNorth~rn.Rocket focket, thereby providing protection for-the norwhern portion of ChuLai B a., The detachment also paticipated in registration for artilleryUnits t.hat, were within rnge.

12)- Thi, 252d PA D.thmnt, (c2 Raar) initially proyided support forARTILE2T HILU, (BT 5110 L) ith a priwury sector of scan to the west into ,.heXrtlwrn kbcket" Focket. On 29 Augst, the detactmnt mwvd to the vicirityof QUANO' NGAI (03 61.7 35) wh-re it is xianod Jointly by 23d Infantry DivisionArtwillry pirsonnr'! and 2d AM Division Artfllery perisomel. The raiarcontinues to- a3hit AM/N and Americal artillery units uit n range to conductregistrations.

i. Ground Sxveillance Midar Detachment

() The organic AX/TPS-25 continued surveillance from OP 1 (BS 516778)with a pri.ary sctor of scazn to the west over the Song Tra Khuc IUi.irer,

(2) The 7IAt ?A ot&:ahnt (Rwiar) romaimed at OP 3 (BS 75442). Itsprimary vector of search ~s %ast covering the primary infiltration -mutesinto the districts of MD DUO and DUO PHD.

J. Qua'd . u

B,%,ttoZy U, 35th Artillery (M) oontinued to be deployed 'throughout the23d Infantry M.r. 10 i:. support. of ground defensive-.plans of fire bases.In add~i-tbonp ,he unit- provides security on all road convoys.

k. Yeteorological Stations

(I)- Initially, the metoorelocal section of 3-18 Artillery providedmetro data for the north and contil coastal ara, from ARTAIMrT HLL (P.S515042). On 10 October, the station moved to Chi Lai and continues toprovids 4upport from that location,

The utoorological station of 3-16 Artillery remained at TIM PHJO(BT 102140). provrding mtro data to the northwstern portion of the -A66

(3) The 2-11 Artillery meteorological station remained attached to the6-|1 Artillery until 8 October, and wVs located at DW1 PHO (BS 814382) whereit provided mtio data to the southern porto-im f the A0. On 8 Octobw. these&tion was returned to the 201st AirAorne DIslan, and th2dKIinfsntry Dit.Artillery organized a section which continued to operate from- DUC FI

CNPI DE NTI'A L

K,

\ ,,

ji

CoNFI UENTthLAYDL -LL, *,Novemb~er 19.70

SUBJ&ET' Oprational, Rlprt-LsscrisA'earr -d, 23d Infantry fliviaini, Period.i 3.J October 19?0, RCS CS10.---65 (n-- k ,)

a. (U) Aydrton . sSperat OS d for for tii be submitted,,by t16th 1oo Ayiation Group on 1l u oseiber 1970.

8. ( ) Chemical. During th* period I Agust -31 October 197P, .theDiviaion, Cheoical Section, the 276h Chemical Detaqhment, the 87th Chemical

Detachment and the m th Cheical Detachewn ~on~ducted the followin -chemicalact ivitie s

a- 130 dr ow of pirsistefi C3 uere dropped for terrain contamination.

b. 12 Z1,58 Tacticel CS Cluster Bombs werv eMployed for temporary denialSof terrain to the enery.

e c. 1,14 , D misaion3 ue t flun.

d. 3 Mf P were defoliated by ground spray of 935 ,&;1ons of agent Blue

ca- 3L FSB'a wre defoUated by helicopter e'pray of 220 gallons of agentBlue and 1420 gall~ns of diesel.

t. Approx.zat.ly 16,825 acrts of enexy crops were destroyed by helicopterspraying usinw 13,80 OUons of harbicide.

gj. 354 druns oif thickened fuel wri dropped on suspected erotmy positionsA d minefields.

h. 440 drums of thickaned fuel 4re dropped tor land cleariig operations,

9. (C) Engineer

a. Activitlus for the quarter consisted of the divisional engineereffor being devoted primarily to direct combat support of the division.while non-divisional units devotd primary efforts to the construction ofsecondary LOG's and operational support construction One change in engineer"troop dispo -,ition ottured during this reporting period. CBK' 301 rideployedto the United States in September.

b-. LOG Program. Darir the reporting period paving of QL-1 was completedin tih Diviaioh TOI. Maximum horizontal effort. remained committed to theconstrW.tion of tactical an6 "Yam to Market" roads; and to road openingoperations to aupport tactical convoys.

(I) JN-L

G 0NF iu) EN T AL

CONFI D ENTIA LSUBJ=C" Operattonal Be rt-L4ssons Learrsed, 23d J[fwiFTy AyV13.U, Fitrid0

buting 31 October 1970, Rc. CsCR--65 (12) (U)

(a) The, 26th Ehgr Bn continued to provide tactical bridge support forrestoration of Q'-1 vithin tht, MI.,

(b) The 39th 3r B provided expedient maintenance from the 'II Corpsboundary 'BS 9071 D) to Tai 4y (B? 310225). The battalion continued constructionof concrete beadwalls on QL-I betueen Binh Son and J)uc Pho.

(c) Elements of tt* 32d NCR coleted paving operations north of TsAKy to the northern AD boundary and paying of the Tam Ky City Streets duringthis reporting period.

(d) Construction Battalion Mintenance- Unit 301 continued to providemin -al products for engineer constr-ction until their redeployment 27Sep.

(2) Secondary LOC'n(a) Incrve comitzent of ongino;)r effort on the t~ictical LOCI e continued

through this reporting period; houvsr, construction waa nampered due toheavy rains during Oct. 10 km ure completed during this reporting peziodbringing the total kil1eters co loted in thu Tactical Road Program toka. 83 km are still under conatruction.

(b) The 39th Ehgr Bn continued to be tw primary unit committed to up-grads of secondary LOC's, with signiticant contributions being made by Ihoe26th Rigr Bn, IO3d ARIN Dngr Bn and Ministry of Public *rks, Quang NgaiProvince.

c. Land Clearing

(A) The 26th Engr Be Land CLMearing Team conducted No Iuc Phase IXIclearing operations 5-30 Aug in an area pest of No Duc Village. 957 acres[ were cleared.

(2) The 26th Engr Bn Land Clearinp Team initiatd clearing cperationsin dniinjcutnion -d.h r-ad constructIon operations along thw Tra Bong Road~~on 5 Sep 70. 630 acres were cleared prior to 30 Sep -When the operation *waReuspended due to inclement weather.t

(3) Clearing operations on the Batog .ri continued during this reporting,

period. On 21 Aug, a 3d platoon joined the 59th Land Clearing Company, a45th 1gr 6p ihdt- 11, 55 acres were cleaiid during this reporting period.

53

CONFI ENTiAL

F t

CO ID NTIAL, I

AYD- 15 November 1970SU&BJF&; Operational Repor-Lessons Learned, 23d Iatantry Mvision, Period

Ending 31 October IMO, RCS CGSR--65 (R2) (U)

d. Airfield Emhabilitation

(1) Dic Pho. Approxl.eately o ft of runway was rehabilitated during

, this reporting period.

(U) Ka Thanh, On 23 Oct, 32d XCR coxnleted this airfield to Type 11,C-123 standavd.

(3) Ba To. The P.4d ICR completood upk? -* s sugrade --,o- f th ...at Ba To on 20 Oct. An -AIM trang4portatio unit is priently hauling )48,matting to FS8 Brnc-. The matting wiUl be airlifted to Ba To by CH-$4airci-aP. V

a. Combat - upport

(1) FSB/LZ Constructin. During ttda reporting period tialv (12)" t, ere opened. Numerous TWS/3It were upgraded during this reporting

period.

[ (2) Kineswee.p Activities. Transfer of QL-I minesweep responsibilitie,to Territorial Forces was complete during this rervrting period. ThangBinh, District asmimd resronsibil tA -n rn A kg and DuiPk Fr r N -rct on14 ii-;9 to complete Ihe turnover. Pt-i-r to ttu-nover, 1ho 2Xth &ir Bnconducted a training program for tU* xispective distrtcts.

(3) Road Opening Operatimim Dur no this ieriod M1. rq. fr-i B13inh Sonto Trs, Bong ias or-ned to support selen (7) Diision/Provrihe ConroyrsHL 516/517, from Ngai Hwinh to it-Ai Long w" upeneo ance, Tio- 4ti Mgr rh

I provided technical assistance, equipment and, material support to the 2d ARVN,In r Bn for a road opifr operation to convoy foodstuffs to Hiep Duc. Five(51 PVARTY/MACV Convoys wre conducted from Tien Pnuoc to FSB Pleasntvilleand New Hau Due. L 533 from Tem Ky to Tien Phuoc was opened six (6) timedurirw -the r*porting period.

f. Engineer operations in the T%)I

(1) 26th Engineer Battalion (Combat)

(a) Combat Engineer Support:

1. LZ Preparation. Twelve (12) L7/P7.' s have been constructed 4uringthis period employin; engineir A,, B, and C teams. C teams utilizing the

CONF R NTI AL1

CONF I DENTI ALVILF-HL 5 Noomer 1970

SLIAJECMi Uperaticnal & pcrt,-Les4ns Leamed) 23d anf~n'try Divisions-PeriodEhding 31 October 1970, RCS CMrOa-65 ( 2) (u)

Case 450 aircmabile oz ere e=Ioyed at fiva(5) locations and expandedLZ's Into fire support ba~S6 to Sk:,JOrt MdIti-battalion sited operatiuns

such as those &t FE Boxer.

"j. Daily minese-eps of Liz, Fat City and Sniper Range aacess roadscontined.

Sb. C- mlneswv-p rescnsibilities %4re transferred to TerritorialForces in Th.g M.ng and Duc Pko on 8 -rd 14 Aug 70 respoctively. Prior tothis turnover, 0-26 and C/ conitcted ext.nqive traininzg on sweep tecliniquiuand demolitLons for the istrict Forcea, TKis training Vcluded Joint sweepoptratIon. foe' a period of ten (10) days.L, Operation Elk Canyon. The recuirwont for engineersupport was termInated &_ 24. ku 70. Dring the operation, A/26-supportodlry MCB-62 Maltainad Kham .4 Air-i le)d to allow c¢ontinuous 0123 and 0139tratfic. Nagineer comltents also L.ludd protective construction 'at theKham Duo Artillery FM-, clearing LZ'a and 158's for the 6th ARW Regimnt,

nd direct combat auplozt to the Z-1 Jnfa.ntry Battalion.

(b) Land Clearing:

1. Mo Duc Phase MIl. This operation was conducted by C/26 during theperiod 5-30 Aug 70 and was dLrectad at denyirg use of a known bass area forthe 38th Locil Force Battalion. Totals for the operation included: 957acres cleared, 190 bunkers and 815 Im of tunnel deatrayed, 29 mines/boobytraporound and destroyed and 21 detonated. Casualties were: six (6) US, two (2)PF and one (1) civilian wounded.

. ra Bong Route Clearing. Route clearing uas initiated by B/26 on5 Sep 70 and was condcted in ccnjunction with road construction operations,Clering wns to enhance security along If 529 and to reduce mining incidentsdirected at US a. Gntl forces by the 48th Local Force Battalion 'and localguorrfl.Ias. Totals for the operaqtiort were: 650 acres clearec', 65 Tm of f unnel.

I destroyed And seven (7) miner dA boobytrops found and destroyed. There wereno accidertal detonations diunir- the, operation and no US casualties sustained.On 20 Sep 70, five (5) dozers were er~nql.yed An a combinzed cordon and searchoperation vic An Dinm (2) along with elements of 1-52 Inf, Binh Son DistrictForces and W17 Cv. During the operation, enemy ntrongholds were destroyedincludirg 4qLO Im trenches and tunnels, fifteen (1i spider holes uLd five (5)mines. On 3)0 Sep, land clearing opiratien along the Tra BoPZ roaci wtre tiuspendeddue to inclement i*'Ather.

1c) Boad Construction'.

55C- -NFIDENTI AL

t

CONFI IENTAFwAVDF-HL 15 Noi*mbei 1970SUBJECT: Operational Report -Lessons Learned, 23d Infantry Division, Period

Ending 31 October 1970, RCS CSFR--65 (R1) (U)

1.. Tra Bong ()HL 529). D/26 in conjunction with B/103 ARVN Engr Bncontinued upgrade 6perations of this vital Secondary LOC. During the reportingperiod 12,620 cu yds of laterite and 8,610 cu yds of 2" (-) bastrock werehauled upgrading 11 m of road from QL-1 west. In addition, 393 lin ft ofCHP were installed. During this period there were 45 mine/boobytrap incidentsresulting in two (2) US and seven (7) VN civilian KIA and nine (9) US WIA.Work has been suspended on this road due to weather.

2. Hawk Hill Access Road. On 24 Sep 70 upgrade of the access road fromQL-1 to Hawk Hill was initiated by A/2o supported by HHC, B C and D/26 andthe 103d ARVN Egineers. A total of 0.85 miles of road have been graded andditched 2,680 cu yds laterite fill hauled, 420 fin ft of CMP installed and2,300 cu yds of 6" (-) baserock hauled from Da Nang,, placed and compacted.Rock haul was completed on 24 Oct.

3. Tien Phouc - New Hau Duc Road. This 14 kTt road was ompleted by D/26to a Dry Weather standard on 17 Sep and the first convoy to LZ Pleasantvilleconducted on 21 Sep. Up rade operations will continue during the monsoonseason. On 23 Oct, one (1) platoon D/26 moved from LZ Pleasantville to TienPhoir to consolidate construction forces. Also on that date, a 23'4" M4T6Dry Span, was airlifted and placed across a break in the Tien Phouc RiverBridge to allow resumption of both civilian and limited military traffic.Subsequent to the I Oct flood, effort was diverted to assist the 39th Bagrsin the repair of HL 533.

A. Duc Hai Road. Construction continued on this Dry Weather pacificationroad during the reporting period. The 10 km road was completed on 24 Sep70 by C/26 after hauling 5,330 cu yds of fill, 200 cu yds of rock and installing264 lin ft of CMP. The completed road has facilitated the rapid developmentof the Duc Hai new settlement area.

(d) Road Openings:

. Tra Bong. Seven (7) Division/Province resupply convoys wre conductedduring this period. B/26 supported each of these convoys with minesweeps,and upgrade, as required. Csualties from B/26 include five (5) US KIA andseven (7) US WIA. One () CiO and one (I) M48 with mine roller were combatlosses due to mining.

2. Minh Long. On 12 Aug 70, C/26 commenced road opening operations fromNgia Hanh to Minh Long. Supported by airmobile equipaent from HHC/26 andMCB-62, the road was upgraded to allow passage of a Division convoy on 15Aug. There were one (1) US KIA ard three (3) US WIA during this operation.

CONFIDENTIALI

CONFI )ENTIALAVDF-hL 1 5 November 1970SUBJECT: 0pational Report.-Lessons Learned 23d Infantry Division, Period

&iding 31 October 190, RCS CSFOR-b5' kx2 (U)

. Hiep Duc. On 2-6 Sep 70, A/26 provided tecinvical assistance andequipment anA material support to the 2d ARVN Engr Bn during the road openingand 6 Sep cefnroy nc-.erment to Hiep Due. This marked the first opening ofthat road ssijceNov ? and provided vital food supplies to the civilian-in the area. Assistance by the lst Ehgr Bn (Marine) from Ross to the DivisionAD boundary facilitated the 3 Sep move to Nui Lac Son iiom which ARVN n reffort was initiated. There were no incidents.

°lea-antville. Beginning with the initial convoy on 21 Sep, D/26supported with mines9%,eps and general ungrade five (5) combined DIVARTY/MAVconvoys to LZ Pleasantville and to New Hau Duc. These convoys resuppliedboth US Artillery a-1 VN civilians 4th necessary ammunition anJ foodstuf s

allowing critical airlift assets be diverted to priority division combatsuppor) misslBois,

1.LZ Young. On 17 Oct, /26 assisted by D/39 f Bmaieswyep teamsemployed two (2) AVLB's to open tho road from Tam Ky to LZ i )ung. Thisoperation was conducted in support of a rapid move to that location byelements of the 1-14 Arty Bn to support combat operations. There were no

t incidents.

(s) Tactical Bridingi Support:

.On 6 Oct, C/2( supported by E/26 installed a 70 ft DS Bailey Bridgeon CJ-1 at coordinate s BS 685658 to replace a timber bridge that had burned.emoval was conducted on 22 Oct after reconstruction of the timber bridge

by the 3Mt Engr Bn.

2. On 13 Oct, B/26 initiatod bridging operations vic My Lai to support

extraction of 39th Eftgr personn:al and equipment from LZ Minuteman. Thisoperation included the installation of a 45 ft M4T6 Dry Span with trestlebent and a 4-float normal M4T6 raft. The latter was airlifted from Chu Laion 18 Oct. Rafting operations were completed on 21 Oct and all elements returnedto Chu Lai on 24 Oct. lighli~ht of the operation was the raft movement oftwo (2) 290M tractor-scraper rated (ass 52.

(f) Contingency Operations:

I_. Flood Damage/Civilian Relief. On 1 Oct a 19.5 inch rain resulted inthe first flood ot the y'tar. Due to this, priority battalion operations wre

directed toward civilian relief, flood damage recon and repair, and ext.racti.nof the land clearino, te.i from the Tra Bong Road. Assault boits, o&tboardmotors, and operato.,s wfre dispatched to Binh Son, Tu Nghia and Nghia Hanhand canducted civilian rescue operations for a period of fcur (4) days.

57

CON F1 DENT) Lf

CONF i>NTI A LSbiJECT: Oprratonal Report-Lessons Learned,, 234 i1a5ntry oivisionb Pri9od

Ending .31 October 170, RCS CSFVR--65 (R2) (U)

"First-ligh'! groiurd rezons augmented aer.inl V/R2 for early warning ofcritical auas. &gineer repair teams performudculvert repairs on HL 518,HL 533 and the Liz access road; one (1) 23 1" Dry Span was installed on-QL-iat BS b3580I, in support of 39th Engr expedient repair/maintenance operationsand general upgrade was conducted on the Dac Hai and Hai Kn IRoads, as wellas interio reads at all accessible firebases.

2. Typhoon Preparation.

A. On 15 Oct, assigned projects and missions were discontinued due towarnings of Typhoon Joan. Companies orepared for emergency evacuation ofthe area and emargency rescue/relief nissions in accordance with DivisionOPLAN 17-70 (Typhoon/Tropical Storm Coatingency Plai). On this date, B/26operating in conjunction with H/17 Car and supported by E/26 conducted anemergency road opening operation to extract -he Land Clearing Team from theTra Borng Road. Opating under adverse weathekr conditions, and at night ina VC/NVA infested arsa, this difficult operation was successfully completedwithout incident and serves as a tribute to the professionalism and competenceof all personnel involved,

b. On 24 Oct, preparations were again made, this time for Typhoon Kateand as of this date emrgency/evacuation teams and equipment are ready forrapid employment.

(g) Firebase/OP Construction

I. NUl Yon. On 5 Sep, D/26 supported by HHC/26 commenced clearingoperations for a Duster position at Nui Ton. The project included clearingfor placement of two (2) tracks, and construction of an access road fromL 533 for land resupply. As of this date final gradeiwrk is being conducted

to maintain the mad during the monsoon season.I2. LZ Pleasantville. This project commenced on 5 Aug 70 in supportof 3-16 Artillery Bn and suspended on 23 Oct when the D/26 work force wasrelocated to Tien Phuoc. To date construction has included: seven (7) livingbunkers, one (i) FDC, six (6) amno bnkers, six (6) 155 Howitzer emplacements,one (i) messhall, two (2) helipads and emplacement of tactical wire.

3. Ky Tra. On 19 Oct, B/26 supported by HHC and E/26 commenced clearingoperations for the 5-46 Inf Bn forward FSB at Ky Tra. Since initiaiionithe area has beer cleared, helipads and gun pads constructed,. and- tacticalwire installed. This'1FM provies security for the populated area and

* fire support for combat operations in the vicinity.

CLN FI ENT A L

AVDF-IL 15 Noweebr 1WlO-"BJZ3,t"t Operational .!sport--Lessons Learred, 234f nfa ry Wvi.i ' Peri.od

Ending 31 October 1970, RCS CSKCR--65 (12) (U)

j. Dai Loc. During the period 6-12 Oct, B/26 supported by 4HC/# 6 andelewnts of 1-6-Inf Bn cleared and constructed a ber vic Dai Loc, BS 579014,for a-PF outpost. The outpoot will 'provide security for the valley settle-merits in the area as veU as the planned road construction into Stinson.

(h) Firebae Upgrade. Upgrade of existing firebases during this periodincluded bunker construction at West, Siberia, Mary An, Liz, Debbie, HawkHill and Chu Lai; road constiuction at:Liz, Debbie, Mary Ann, Hawk Hill andheNpad repair at Bronco using sand-cement and sand-asphalt stablization.

(i) Support of Unit iklocation. With the turnover of Bayonet and ArtilleryHill to ARVN and the resettlement of the Cu Lai Units, B, D and 9/26 havebeen, engaged in relocation of units within the Chu Lai area. Supportingprojects have included rehabilitation of t.o 198th Inf Bde Hqs, construction6f an FDC/TOC for the 1-14 and the 3-18 Artillery Bns, construction of air-craft rearm revetments and refuel pads for the 16th CAG, and assistance inrelocating seventeen (17) SEA Huts.

(J) The Battalion's disposition at the end of the reporting period was

as follow.3.

.. HK, B Co, D Co, E Co- ChuLai

2. A Co - F8 Hawk Hill

. C0 Co - FSB Bronco

2. 39th Egineer Battalion

a. LOU Upgrade.

1. The priority of the battalion continued to be concentratedon LOC's.Thi majority of the eff6rt was committed to HL 533, HL 521, IL 522, HL 524/523and HL 52 5.

2. A total of 123 km were tasked to the battalion. 14 Km (HL 525) were

completed during the reporting period and another 54 km are unde rc!nstruction.

b. Maintenance and 11pirade of QL-1.

1. A major repair effor', was required during the month of Oct due tothe heavy rains received int Southern I MR. During this reporting e iiod,1,65C meters of washed out shoulders were repaited and upgraded, si (6)bridges repaired, two (2) culverts and headwalls replaced and a multi-culvertcomplex initiated.

59

CDN bEN TIAL

CONI bENTI A LA'I.H 15 Ncvember 1970

SUBJE a: Opixationeal Report,- 4 ons Ltarned, 23d Infantry Division, Periodjxtng 31 October 1970, RCS CSFOlR-5 (U)

2. The 6onstruction of a 60 foot Timber Bent Bridge at bridge I-B-100

civ4lians on the nig4t of 5 Oct.

c. Land Clearing Operations.

1. The battalion .'t'hdr~w its dozers and personnel from the Provisional

Land Clearing Companydrirt operation )bo Due III to prepare for an equiljht

turnover to the 1 18It ARYN Land Clearing Company.

2. The 59h Land Clearing Company continued clearr4 operations on the

Batwwan Peninavpla with 5, 176 acrs being cleared, 186 bunkers destroyed,6,505 !in mwtrof tunnels destroyed, 33 mines and boobytraps were found

and destroyed and 15 mines and boobytraps detonated.

d. Airfield and Hlelipad bhabilitation.

I. The airfield at FMB Bronco was repaired during Aug. This included the

removl of 75 pieces of MX19 matting, the sub)griAe reworked ana lie mattirgreplaced.

2. Welding of the airfield matting at Kinh Long is still in progress.

Five (5) refuel pads for th- 178th Msault Helicopter Company at

Chu La were rehabilitated during this reporting period.

e. Vertical Construction.

1. The battalion completed construction of the msshall for the 23d NedBn anid began construction of a Class I Warehouse at FSB Bronco.

2. Living and amrwuition bunkers at Tien Phuoc were completed during

this reporting period.

. he battalion provided material support and technical assistance

for the construction of a TOG binker at Son Ha District Headquarters.

. Construction was begi on three (3) bunkers and a latrine for the

Tra Bong District Headquarters during this reporting period.

f. *ll Drilling Operations. The 49th Well Drilling Detachment copleted

tfe drilling of a second vell at r 411.

U6I

CoNV--Ek-I- -

C0NFI bENTIALAVDF-.!L 5 November 1970,SUBIMT: Operational Jkport--Uesons<Loam~ed. 23 Infotry, lyiTini Periodhding. 31 October 19'o, AS CSM--6"5 V.)A(U)

g. The battalion's diaposition at the end of thia .rvportinWg period was

j!. 10, A co cco, 137th (Li),, 522 (U) - Chu Lai

2. B Co- FSDottie

2. D Co - TaxKy

k. 59th Land Clearing Ciopany - Batangan Peninsula

61

coN FDENTIAL

A

CONETDbENTAK_AVf-I' " November 1970SUBJECT:' Operational Report-Lessons Learned, 23d Intantry Division, Period

Biding 31 Octhber 1970, RCS CSMR--65 (R2) (U)

E. Logistics.i i 1 (U) Genei-al; I e period I Auust 1970 - 31 October 1970 was highlighted

by intensive preparation for the monsoons, stocking of forward fire support

[7 1base-. increasing the capacity of road transport, increased emphasis onec. nomy 'tth n'merous itess coxing under allocation, continued reduction ofexceb.,.,z and further improved maintenance posture.

2. (U) Services Division: u. On 18 July 19'70 the division was assignedan allocation of small-sized ltaber and plywood. A request for an increasedallocation was submitted on t August 1970. The division received an iclocationgreater than the original but still about 35% below that requested on 4

September 1970. The final allocation was particularly small for 4x lumberwidely used in bunker construction. The division has had sufficient materialfor tactical construction. A request for additional material was grantedfor construction of new tower bunkers on Chu Lai West. This was to fillthe gap left by LZ Bayonet.

b. The division allocation of lumber was based on tactical use only.TPhilco"Foii 1z t_-zke with Repairs and Utilities for Chu Lai, LZ Hawk Hilland LZ Bronco. This headquarters received ni-erous requests for materialfrom unitswbo~Rs U Job Order Requests could not be met by Philco-Fotd.IDivision asets were ued if the request was deemed urgent.

c. USARV released 600,000 sandbags above the monthly allocation of500,000 on 10 August 1970. One-half of these have already been issued andthe remainder are being issued during the monsoon season in addition to themonthly allocation.

d. During the quarter the division accumulated a large nAzber of unsupported-rations. This can be reduced by combat-lossing rations -Hhea appropriate.Units must also submit headcountsihat correspond with the rations tequired.

e. Beginning with the second quarter FT 71, USARV allocatea bulk' POLdown to corps level. As of 21 October, the division had not received itsallo-Altion. The division's request was based on past usage of JP-4, DF-2,and Mogas. The division ill be reimbursed by a like amount for POLissued to non-divisional units if proper accounting is maintained.

3. Supply Division: a. Preparation for the monsoon season highlightedthe supply ativity during the quarter. Wet weather suits, ponchos, fieldjackets, blankets, poncho liners, nylon rope, and snap links were orderedand available for all units prior to the rainy season. Distribution of the

62

CLNF1T)ENTIAL

,~ ~ 0 b OI ENTIA L . !"AVDF-L 15 Noember 1970SUBJEC': Operational Report-Lessois Learned, 23d Infantry Division, Period

Ending 31 October 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (ne, UJ

new footgear for Ari.ndatod are" wa mi t6o Rll Infantry Battalions and tothe Artillery Battaliona. for. Forward Observers.

b. An additional step taken to prepare for the monsoon season was toincrease the stockage levels at Fire Support Bases resupplies exclusivelyby air. Increased stockage levels wer, as follows:

Class I: Minimum 6 dayf,; maximum 12 days.

Class III: 6 days.

Class IV: For all kiown projects.

Class V: (1) Artillery, Double basic load.

(2) Infantry: Basic load plus operational load.

c. Emphasis on the tactical resupply of forward units by fixed wingaircraft and road convoy continued in order to release helicopters fordirect support of maneuver battalions. During Operation Elk Canyon I, theTien Phuoc JP-4 refuel point was successfully resupplied by road. Resupplyof JP-4 at Ninh Long is now being accomplished by fixed wing aircraft.

d. DISCOM furnished a ?orward Support Element (FSE) at Kham Dic tosupport Operation Elk Canyon I. This FSE furnished a shower point, GR Pointand received and distributed over 5,773,000 lbs of cargo delivered by fixedwing aircraft. A re-arm point and JP- refuel point which dispensed 392,000gallons was established by 16th Aviation Group (CombAt).

e. A new item of equipment received was the M203 Grenade Launcher.2 d Jnfanta .Wv. eceived 807 of the authorized 1207 during the third weekui Optmber. After assembly by the 723d Maintenance Battalion, these weredi~ributed to units prior to 1 October. The remaining APO X203's willbe -eeived during the next quarter. A-K-79 Grenade Launcher is being t;urnedin fi, each M203 Grenade Launcher received.

f. Status of JP-4 refueling equipment continues to remain criticql.Attbe end of the quarter the division was short fot 5,000 Callon taniers,four 350 GPM pume, thirteen 330 GPM fitter separators and ,fourteen 10,OOQgallon bladders. All shortages are on CCIL awd request for assistance hasbeen sitmitt;ed to USAL.

63

': C, b ET4TI A L

AVIF-HL 5 Novembe- 1970SUBJECT: Operational Report--Lessons Learned, 234 Infantry Division, Period

4 Ending 31 Octcober 1970, RCS CSFOR--65 (R2) (U)

g,,, Support provided by the Chu Lai Self Service Supply Center continuesto Ve Aneatisfactorv. Constant coordination with 57th Transportation Battalionyiei,16 "eligible results. Reqvests forwuded directly to Da NMg Supportcomm&A leviatea -a few critical shortages but did not mateiallv improvet&% o'tarall support. The ADC/S presented this as a support problem areato tljf USARV G4.

h Supply actions processed by G4 remained at a high level. Account-ability for previous unreported equipment valued at $39,257 °00 was estab-libe i in accordance with the Vietnam Asset Reconciliation Progran. Equip-mei \Iued at $7,718.00 was reduced from authorization levels under the,pio±n of USARV Regulation 310-32. Forty-nine Reports of Survey werepretssed on equipment valued at $86,735.00. Ten initial requests and tenreroial requests for temporary loans were t orwarded to 1JARV. Fifteeni*.eti, -. re submitted to USARV on the Division CG' s CCIL.

i. Headquarters, USARV, directed reduction of ASL stockage has reducedthe nmber of lint: on hand at the 23d S&T and 723d Maintenance Battalions.The new requirement of 6 demands in 180 days has reduced the on hand quanti-

t .,ea a3 follows:

UNIT PREVIOUS # LINES CUENT # LINE,

23d vT Bn 1,248 1,055' 2 3t Mai-it Bn 8,841 4,964

4, Maintenance Division: a. The 23d Infantry Liv. CKM4 Team conducted17 courtesy and 11 record inspections during the quarter. Two units received

* satisfactory rating on the second inspection. The 723d Maintenahce Battalionc ond .c ed 627 Roadside Spot Check Inspections during the quarter.

c. A complete 100% M16AI muzzle bore erosion ct'eck was initiated. Ascf31 October 1970, the check was 74o7% complete with 16081 of 2i,528 weapoths

ihecked. 2,932 barrels were changed.

d. E&cessively high failures of 2OH: 1OKW generator engines indicate aneed for increased operator training. Commanders 'Ehould insure:

". That only properly trained and licen*d operators operate equipment.

2. That equipment is not operated continuously for long periods withoutakpand rotation to permit cooling! maqintenance, and oil change.

64

f

ICONFI LEk I1A LAVDF-HL 15 Novenber 1970SUBJECT: Operational Report-LessonsLearned, 23d Infantry Division, Period

Ending 31 October 1970, CS CSFOR--65 (R2) kU)

3. That generators are not overloaded.

k. That sufficient TM's arm on hand and used.

S 0That requests for replacements are submitted in accordance withTB 5-6100-201-15.

6. That echelons of repair are not exceeded in the using unit.

e. During the quarter, the division retrograded a total of 429.3 service-able tons excess and 1,448.7 unserviceable tons excess which amounted to a37.65 million dollar value shipped.

A 6.

-0N L

I

AVDF-HL CIfAn 15 November 1970

SUBJECT: Operational Report--Lessons Learned, 23d nfantry Division, PeriodEding 31 October 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

F. Civil Military Operations

1. (U) Organization

a. During the month of August the following persons were assigned to'the G5 Section: MAJ Richard 'A. Murchison, G5; CPT John L. Lansdale, DeputyG5; CPT Royd M. Nuckols Jr., CA/CA Officer; ILT Allen R. Polachowski, AssistantPSYOP Officer; ILT Paul S. Minarik, Assistant PSYOP Officer. In SeptemberWTu3illy C. Boyd was assigned as the Assistant CA/CA Officer and in October

CPT *Joe L. Hill was assigned as the PSYOP Officer and 2LT Walter S. Thayeras Administration Officer.

b. The 23d Infantry Div. continued their active participation inCommunity Relations. Triendship Councils are currently operating in theChu Lai Installation area and in each Brigade, A.0. The purpose of thi counci Lis to foster better relations and understanding between the 23d Infantry Div.and 'the local comamities and provide a. cnmmin ground for discussion ofproblems affecting both parties. At Council meetings, problems are discussedand solved which if otherwise ignored could possibly generate friction andseriously damage U.S. relations.

2. (U) Operations:

a. In order to improve US/VN relations and promote civil affairs/civicactions, units have been assigned responsibilities for villages surroundingthe Chu Lai Installation. To adjust for unit redeployment, responsibilitieshave been realigned and are now as follows:

(1) Ly Tin District

Ky Khuong (V) - 26th Engr Bn

Ky Sanh (V) - 5/46 Inf Bn

Ky Lien (V) - 5/46 Inf Bn

Ky Ha (V) - DIVARTY

Ky Hoa (V) - DIVARTT

Ky Xuan (V) DISCOM

An Tan Protestant Orphanage - 16th CAG

~66

CO4FIbENTIA L

cosm )ENTIALAVDF41 15 November 197.0SUBJECT: Operational Report--Les ons Learned, 23d Infantry Division# Period

Eiding 31 October 1970, ACS CSFOR--65 (R2) (U)

Chu Lai Catholic Orphanage - Headquarters Commandant

(2) Bin Son District:

* Binh Thang (V) - 1/52 Inf Bn

to Binh Nghia (V) - t/o Inf Bn

Binh Sa (V) - 1/6 Inf Bn

b. Rice Denial: The 23d Infantry Div* continues to support the programto deny vital xaoumts to the enetq. -burivifthe reporting period, 132.76

tons of rice were captured.

c. Refugees: The refugee population in the 23d Infantre ts. TAOInumbers approximtely 84,000 as of 31 October 1970.

d. Civil Operations and Rural Development Support (OORDS) materialThis office continued to coordinate the shipment of CORDS material to

Quang Ngai (P) ard Qng Tin (P) during the reporting period.

-Health and Medical'Supplies 55D ibs

Cement Z78 bas. -

Tin Sheets a 402 sheets

Paint 64 gals

..... a. Gfvi-i-i~tary Actions:, Wrinig the reporti* period, the 23d

Infantry Div' 'colicited civic action -projects from Quang -74= andeAouang:Ngai.:.provinces. The provinces submitted a total of 228 projects and assi-gnedeach a priority, 'for completion. An OORD was published tasking each jwtor .subordinate command with the idssion of assisting GQN Authorities in thecompletion oii ktse'se projects in their'respective A.O. Y-. l,

3. (C) CivIl'Affairs Pacification:5 ,- ,

a. T *d,,Ihfantr Mi. contids to support the GVN Facification nd,-Development Program throu,hout Quang Tin and Quang Ngai province.

67

ooNFI E' T1AL.

I'

C.L)FIAENTIALAVDF-HL 15 November 1970SUBJM: Operational -Rport--Lessons Learned, 23d Infantry Division, Period

3ding 31 October 1970, RCS CSFOR-5 (R2) (U)

b. Progress in the pacification program in thr Division TAOI duringthe reporting period:

(1) Security of Population (apq of 30 September 1970, A, B, and C status):

(a) Quang Tin 358,100 94.9%

(b) Quang Ngai 576,200 83.4%*

* Sept HES Shows 83.4%. Quang Ngai Deputy Province Chief reports 88.1%

(2) VCI Neutralized (as of 24 October 1970):

(a) Quang Tin 1620

(b) Quang Ngai 1274

(3) Peoples Self Defense Force (as of 23 October 1970):

Province Oranied Traine

(a) Quang Tin 92,436 92,336 14,166

(b) Quang Ngai 104,760 89,459 16,05C>

c. The 23d Infantry Div. is continuing its support of pacificationand development through MWAP II.

1. 196th Bde -.26 15,335

2. 198th Bde 160 10,186

3. 1lth d 327 9,612

4. DIVARTY 223 11,978

5. 26th ftr On 30 3,634

6. 1,-1 Cav 3D9 6,064"

68

CORTI bFNTI L

'S

CONFI EN TIA AVDF-HL l"5-Novembeic. 1970SUBJECT: Operational Report--Lessons Learned, 23d Infantry Division, Period

Ending 31 October 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

4. PSYOP Activities (Aug - Oct 70):

a. Leaflets dropped by aircraft by campaign:c n AUG

Chieu Hoi 6,842,000 12,892,000 7,078,0o0

Pro-.GVN 477,000 162,000 1,050,000

Anti-VC/NVA 2,758,000 3,322,000 1,324,000

VIP 1, 427,000 6,592,000 6,262,000O

Family bunion 2,591,000 3,897,000 4,387,000

Rice Denial 572,00 b ,000 ,530,000

b. Total leafl et drop missions flown by 9th SOS in support of the.23d Infantry Division.

AUG

1,967 1.301 738

c. Aerial Loudspeaker Targets during this-period:

AUG /

Aerial type targets 1,484 1,321 390

AerbffI type im 1:79:47 MOO: :4

Early "Wbrl Targets 19 1L., 10

'Early Word Timia 6:20 4:40 3:00

Helibo me Tad-gets 505 '675 320

Heliborne Tape Tim 93:00- 92:15 55:18

Gd. round loudspealer broadcasts:

69

CF NF ItENTI AL

I)

COFIDENTFIALAVDF-Hi. 15 November 1970SUBJECT: Operational Report--Lessons Learned, 23d nfantry Division, Period

.ding. 31 October 1970, RCS C FOR--65 (Re) (U)

AUG S

Misbions 41 67 44

Broadcast hours 162 hr 30 min 199 hr 30 min 105 hr 45 min

e. Water borne Loudspeaker broadcast:

2 2 0

3hr 3 hr 0

f. Movie missions conducted during period:

AUG L2 OC_

Movie Missions 41 20 17

Movies Lhown 2,5 40 is8

Movie hours 21:30 24:40 9:00

Attendunce 10,150 11,000 3,500

g. Number of Hoi Chanho in, the 23d-'Iifintry Div. TAOI:

229 167 128:

- InclUdes+ only Hoi Cianhe processed through Chicu Hoi Centers at Tan Kyand Quang Ngai.

5. (U). 1cnt Developments:

a. During the reporting period, the 23d Infantry Div. has revisedtargeting procedures to improve efficiency. I5YOP planning ii, closelycoordinated with G2 to insure that secific erep units are targeted.In additlon, a system using the ILES report has been initiateld to improvethe targeting of the local population throughout the- Division T%)R.

70

CONFIDENTIAL

- C

cON~iDENT IA LAVD-IL

15 Vovmber 1970SUBJW: Opftationa Report--Leasons Learned, 23d Ihfantry ivision, Iu±.dlhding 31 Octuber 1970 RCS CSM -65 (R2) (U)

b. Thire haA been incrfeasd emphasis on night PSIOP aerial missiogiiflowp 'by ojganic 'licopters. A total of 1500 missions were flown dsaiii-inating 15,269,00Q leaflets and broadcasting 240 hours. Thiv organicsuIOdA VXPAJs thi PSYOP program over the,entirm Division T jp.

c. To offset the loss of aerial PSY0r missions during periods ofinclent wather, two mefhods of leaflet diwseffAaton wer* employed.Cb=Aand d control aircraft dropped 1,T0S2,0O0 leaflets vihJle oonducting,daily inspection tours. ;a aJdUitic, artillery propanganda rouiue wreused for preplanned targets against VC and MVA units. A total of 153propaganda roands wore fired diseminating 76,500 leaflets.

d. The 7th PSYOP Battalion, Detacl'ewt #3 Team has made a major con-;tribution to the success of the VP program. H8 teams have increased VI,.jbroadcasts by 50%. In addition, special leaflets have been produced in-structi ,inhabitants to turn in munitions to the broadcast teams.

e. A 4usstionnaire has been distributed to the Chieu Hoi centers InQuang Agai and Quarg Tin to determine %ty Hoi Chanhs have rallied and ,toevaluate the effectiveness of the divJsions PSYOP program.

71

ONFI [)ENT IAL

/

~CONFIDERTI M-

AVDF-HL 15 Novembier 1970SUBJE : Operational Repo r-Lessons-Learnedi 23d infantry Diviion, Period

Ending 31 October 1970, RCS CS oR-65 (R2) (U)-

II. Section I, LESS LEA09E0: Q9San~krI-a.O.bervations. Evaluations

A- Personnel.

I. (U) SUBJECT: Saill Unit Leadership

a. O: Although there has been an improvement in smal unitleadership as a result of a nonsiderable increase in the assignent ofJunior officers, there is still a shortage oC qualified non-commissionedofficers to fill leadership positions. Gzaduates of the -non-coumissionedofficers candidates ccirse are technically proficient, but generally lackthe leadei ship experience necessary to perform the duties of platoonsergeants and squad leaders.

b. E. l : The main problems ar" the lack of experlence in graduatesof the non-conissioned officers cLndidate course and too few promotionallocations for E-41s or E-5's who have demonstrated both leadership abilityand technical proficiency.

c. ic-nmnendation: Evenrf effort. should be made to identify and insureexperienced NO's with MOS 1lB in the grades E-6 or E-7 are. assigned tomaneuver battalions and that an increase of E-4 and E-5 allocations areaide available for 11 series 'WS' s.

S2. (U) SUBJCT: Fi nance Operation: Conversion Day

a. Observatioq: Units serviced by the Division Finance Office weregenerally unprepardd for the 7 October 1970 conversion day operation.

b. E ption: (1) Anerical Regulation 37-10 requires a semiannualMilitary Pavment Certificat.e Conversion !R;ad.e;= 'P-t %" be ub-Irtted- itACofS, GI /-n 1 March and 1 September each year. This report reflects the

state o readiness to' accomplish conversion of MPC's to include the following:

(4) Conversion officers and alternate conversion officers are currently,

tAJinted on orders.

(b) Conversion day SOP's of subordinate units are written, current,

available and have been reviewed.

(c) Ar adequate supply of blank conversion forms are on hand.

(d) Conversion officers have been oriented on conversion day procedures.

72

CONFI DENTIAL

CONFbENTI AL-AVD-A15 oveter 1970SUBJECT: Operational Report--Lessons Learned, 23d infantry Division, Period

biding 31 October 1970, RCS CSFOR-- 5 (,4 WUj

I))- .Despite the foregoing, the early hours following the announcementof conversion day were spent ,"h acquiring forms, briefing conversion officersand taking action to bvircome inadequate unit SOP's.

c. e: (1) Recommend emphasis be given to conversion dayreadiness during unit inspections, staff visits and comand visits to sub-ordinate units.

(2) Sib-Zone Coordinator Regulations should govern conversion dayoperatilons to insuw coverage is extended to all units'.

3. (U) SU JSGT: Mccess WC

a. Q0bser.gn: Individuals serviced by the Division Finance Officegenerally had subetanital sums of MPC in their possession.

b. jkAlaJIM: Recognizing that conversion day followed close tiponpayday, many personnel converted sums in excess of $150.CO, requiring specialcertificates.

c. bo n 1: (!) That commanders emphasizj to their men thepitfalls connected with holding large sums of money on their person or inun-it safes.

(2) Finance Offices should prepare and distribute a handout explaining

the options available to members for sat' handling and transmission of funds.

4. .UJE: Handling of Funds

a. O: Some conversion officers failed to exercise due carein the collecting and bandling of funds.

b. k i& : Conversion officers reported to the Division FinanceOffice with old series MPC anc conversion records that were not in agreement.Consequently, these officers made up shortages from personal funds or spentneedless hours attempting to reconcile overages.

c. fecoLndation: Finance Offices should reproduce and distribute theconversion readiness checklist printed in MACV Directive 37-10 to assist unitconversion officers.

5'. SUBJECT: Conversion Status Report

a. Observation: Ourrent proceddres do not provide timely status reports.

73

-CONG bENT1AL

cON= I bENTt ALAVDF- 11 November IWOSUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned, 23d ]nf~nry Division,, period

aIding 31 October 970, RCS CSF0R.--65 (M2) t U)

b. Ealuation, Status reporting during the cofiversion period wasL unresponsive to the need3 of the cormad because procedures were mot establish(,to provide the information required. Status reports were coliectedcon anexceptions basis by several agencies resulting in confusion and duplicationof effort.

c. Recomendation: That reporting procedures be incorporated intoappropriate regulations.

6. (U) SUBJECT:' Utilization of Finance Building during Conversion Day

a. Observation: All transactions, conversions, and processing replacemente/losses were handed in the Main Finance Building.

b. Evauation: There were too many transactions taking place in theMain Finance Building at the same time. This caused 8 great deal of trafficand confusion in a location already at a high level of activity. Processingalid paying all replacements/losses in tother area wou)d tend to equalizethe traffic flow and uork load within the Finance Office.

c. Reoq dti: Recom.-mend that an additional building be used forprocessing and paying all financial transactions, other than conversion,during the conversion period.

7. (U) SUBJECT: Procedures for Transient Personnel

a. Obseva'M: Procedures with regards to transient personnel werenot clearly understood and were slows in being disseminated to conversionofficers.

b. Evalu ion: Detailed procedures regarding transient personnel werereceived in the message announcing conversion day. These procedures werepassed, but did not always reach all unit conversion officer%,. Consequently,a greaE deal of confusion surrounded the MPC conversions associated withtransient peraonnel.

c. Recommendation. Procedures pertaining to transient personnel beincorporated into the conversion day regulation.

B. Intelligence

74

CL)NFI bENTtAL

AVDF-L 15~F DEjvtnbrT197SAJECT: Operationg i tro--rL.s3onu Lta,naA 23d Inf.i..? Div'4.np Fe,'1&df 31 October' 1979, 43 CIFORI-=65 0R~ MU

t, (C) W EICT: Vo!utc-r Informnt PFrcram (VIP)

?. Obs :'aA Spenditv -i:nder the VZI continued at the level of the°4Lh .qA.rtor Pf 70 until late August or early Septenber, The 'l 111• -3.t was net .eceived tl mid - Augut, and it uab r'etd d by %th Ft 70 buigce,. Thin caused problum.s in administration ind disburse-

,n-rt of tL FY 71 /Allotment. To afford ma:imum use of the FY 70 funds)accountt. r,: LJl,,bi*o).d down to battalion level. Prior to receiptof tUN. FY 71 budget, a Change had uegun to reduce th nunber of accountto brigade ,nd tulvalent size units. By I Sopteber 1970$ the chanqiiovcrwas gon.rally c,-.pleted, with the new system in effect to control thefci by baying acc,-ints with the Brigade S-2's and reduclh, the arzu.,tUtc 12,000 MWU tc be maintaincd on a reimbursable basic,

b. k.juatie r: The VIP has had limited success as an intelligence:llection prograi, Personnel untrained in intelligence were buy-ingammunition. Donr.sidcrablc tirm del~y existed between issuance a-nd iipnminb..ation of inst |tctions; Qhich caused either under or over spending.Brigades o.nd s4par-ato units wore provided with a funds ceiling whichshould assist in adjusting spending.

c. a jai : ( 1) The program continued to b idminiatcred throughIntelligcnco channels.

(2) That VIP officers clear the account immediately upon transferti another job, prior to going on leave outside of Yietnam4 or for -nyother reason that would not permit hin to fuly control the fund.

2- (.c tl sIsJE01'- Inv fdArution of Proatltuns

a., Observation: Approximqtely twi - man hours every other dzvtre boitn up-ed in intirviewng prostitutes who are of no conter-intelligence interest.

75

CO NFl DENTAL

: , : ,

K ,'

I.i'

CONFI bENTIALAVDF-HL 15 November 1970SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned, 23d Infantry Dj~ison, Priod

Ending 31 October 1.W, RCS CSFUO'-65 (R2) (1)

b. E_ i: One or two prostitutes every other day are apprehendedinside the Chu Lai Base perimeter. During the month of October, ;3 prostitutes

were interrogated, half of whom Were repeaters, and none were of CI interest.Since September 1969, none of the prostitutes interviewed has been found tobe of CI interest.

c. Reconmendtion: A brief interrogation should be conducted by theMilitary Police and if nothing of intelligence interest is uncovered, theprostitute should then be turned over to the National Police.

3. (C) SUBJECT: Marking and Location of Rice Cache

a. Jse /a . During the evening an element heard digging in thevicinity of their location. In the morning the element located 8 barrels ofrice7 which had been partially uncovered by unknown persons. A more detailedsearch located another 18 buried aluminumn cylinders, 4 feet wide by 3 feetdeep, covered with approid-uttely 12 inches of dirt. The cache site was inan area of sandy soil ane scattered vegetation. In the area were numeroussmall knolls 14 inches to 30 inches in height. It was discovered throughdigging up all knolls that the caches were located in a random fashion. Sincesome knolls contained rice -hile nt."ers did not, it was noticed that thoseknoils which contained rice also had a shrub growing near the center of theknoll. This shrub was marked near the base of the trunk with three cut notches.The marked shrubs did not blend with the area and were obviously unnaturalto the surroundings. These shrubs were approximately 4 feet high and 3 feetin diameter and from 6 to 8 months old. The area also contained numeroustrails which led into the vegetation and sudden).y terminated.

b. Evaluation: Although it is understood that in other areas the VCmay use very divergent techniques to mark and place caches, it is hopedthat this information may assist other units in locating rice caches.

c* Recommendtion: That all units be informed of how these caches werelocated and instruct their personnel in the techniques used.

4, (C) SUBJECT: -Trail Systems Data Base Record

a. Obs a : Numerous requests fftm tactical. uits for specificinformation concerning enemy trail ana waterway transportation use hasprompted the need for a system which provides for the recording and rapidand accurate dissimination of this information to requesting units.

76

ScONFI tbENTI k.

7-

C-ONFI 1LENTIALAVDF-HL 15 November 1970SUBJECT: Operational .Repbrt--Les0onsLearned., 23d Infaitry Divisionp Period

Ending 31 October 1970, RCS CS(fO--65 (2) (U)

b. E" Previously, used methods for the dissemination of trailand waterways activities were ,found inadequate. Information was enteredwithout segrigating the reports ,from various agencies. Chronological dataconcerning date of entry were not included and degree of transportation systemuse was not noted.

c. Recommendation: That the solution found by this umit, described below,be considered by other units. The Iagery Interpretation Section has initiateda, data 'base system specifically for recording information concerning enerxtransportation systems to include trail systems and waterways. Intelligencederived from this data. base will include: (1) kact coordinates of ,trailsand waterways; (2) The degree of use of trails on a varying scale, from lightto heavy; (3) The exact date of the entry and dates of subsequent activitiesnoted., Information will be disseminated by means of a clear acetate overlayto include all activity recorded withir, the requested coordinates. Overlayswill be keyed to 1 :50,000 scale maps compatible with those used by tacticaluniTtn

5 (C) SUBJECT: Mosaic Construction of Photographs

a. Oberato: The construction techique used in making photographic,

mosaics in some casc did not allow for the degree of accuracy required bynits corducting ftL'e support base studies and such specialized projects as

power line trac.s for engineer units.

b. Evaluation: The method used in mounting the photographs of the mosaichindered the overall clarity of the finished product. The, previously, usedconstruction technique in certain cases (large area coverage) caused a noteableloss of overall accuracy and lack of coverage.

c. ecomrendition: That the technique now used by this unit, described-below, be considered by other units. The uncontrolled construction techniquewa& adapted with the addition of rubber cement adhesive to mount the photo-',16"'; The resolution benefits greatly incrensed readability for the untrainedinterpreter. Increased. accuracy of ground et dl on, the finished productcaused- a general lessening of the APPAPM photo distortion which occurs inlarge area& coverage& (.those requiring more than 3 flight lines).

6 (C) SUBJECT: V0I Neutrali, ation Elemen'

a. O There is no agency within the Division specificallycharged with targeting the Viet Cong Infrastructuret-.

b. Eauio: In October 1970, a study was conducted on the organization

CON fIENTIA L

CDN F I bETIA LAVDF-L 15 November 1970SUBJECT: Operational Report--Lessons Learn,.J, 23d Infantry Division, Period

Ending 31 October 1970, RCS CsFOR--65 R2) (U)

and operation of the VCI within the Division AO. Information relative toVCI strengths, locations, activities, and personalities was obtained fromnumerous ,sources hoih from within and outside of the Division. In order toproperly focus attLntion on VCI-activity, the establishment of a Division VCIneutralization element was initiated. The functionsof this element are:

(1) To establish a system for maintaining and updating information relativeto VCI strength, locations, activities and personalities.

(2) To establish coordination and liaison with DIUCC's, PIOCC's and[ ARVN units to facilitate flow of VCI information and coordination of operations.

(3) To provide recommendations concerning likely VCI target areas.

(4) To assist in planning and conduct of VCI programs. The VCI Neutralizatic.Element, consisting of two officers and one EM, operates under the staff

supervision of the ACofS, G2 and serve as the focal point for counter-VOIactivities within the Division.

c. Recommendation: The VGI Neutralization lement has been organizedas the Division coordinating agency for counter-VOI operations. Subordinateunits retain responsibility for active VCI neutralization operations in theirrespective AO's and should closely coordinate with DIOCC's, PIOCC's and theDivision VCI Neutralization Eement. A similar element may prove useful toother units.

C. Operations.

1. (C) SUBJEC: Actions taken in negotiating streAm crossings

a. Observation: Due to the Armored Cavalry Squadron's maneuverability,all natural streams and river crossing sites in the Squadron's TAOR havebeen used. Once a stream crossing site has been used, use at a later datecan not be considered safe.

b. Evaluation: When a crossing site is approached that has been previouslyused it should be assumed that the crossing and its approaches have been mined.

c. Recommendation: When the tactical situation requires that a streammust be crossed, previously used crossings and their approaches should beavoided, if at all possible. If this is not possible and an old crossingsite must be used, the following steps should be taken:

(1) ApprOaches should be cleared with either 152 cannister rounds or

76

CoN FbENT AL

o

CoN FI bENTIPIL KAVDF-HL 15 November, 1970SUBJECT: Operational Report--Lessons Learned, 23d Infantry Division, Period

Ending 31 October 1970, RCS CSFOR--65 (R2) (U)

Bangalore Torpedoes and swept with organic mine detectors.

(2) The crossing proper should be cleared with demolitions or BangaloreTorpedoes.

(3) Only the driver should be in the first and second vehicles to crossthe stream. Other crew members should be dismounted.

2. (C) MU : Casualties During Medevac Operations

a. O ion. During operations in an area where numerous boobytrapsare employed by the enemy, an incident, occurred which resulted in a largenumber of cazualties. An infantry platon moved to an area near an old NDPfor resupply. An- individual of the platoon stepped on a pressure-releaseboobytrap that wounded him and four other soldiers.. A comand and conTrolhelicopter flying in the vicinity of the incident landed in the area to conductthe medevac. Personnel from the comnand and control aircraft got off toassist in loading the wounded. One of the individuals detonated anotherpressure-release boobytrap resulting in fifteen additional wounded.

b. &&.aUga: Fewr casualties would have resulted if evacuation ofthe wounded had been more closely controlled, and if personnel from the medevacship had been informed of the situation and guided by someone on the ground.

c. Rtion: (1) Maintain dispersion of 15 to 20 meters betweenmen at all times.

(2) When medevac helicopters land in the area of a boobytrap or mine incident,personnel from the aircraft should not get off to assist the wounded unless

the area has been cleared by someone in control of the LZ.

(3) Specific individuals should be designated to load tht woumded andso to control the flow of persorfnel to and from the medevac aircraft. "Safe

lanes" should be established and one casualty brought forward at a time toavoid large groups forming around the helicopter.

3. (C) SUBJECT: VC use of smoke grenade fuses

a. b nio: The VC are removing fuses and percussion caps fromused smoke grenades and rousing the assembly as a fuse for their boobytraps.

b. Evaluation: At least 15 boobytraps recently found and destroyed havebeen fused with M201AI fuse assemblies from U.S. smoke grenades. A box of

79

CINIOENTIA L

C ----.- ---. -

CoDNFI bENTIAL[VFH 11; November 1970SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned, 23d Infantry bivision, Period

Ending 31 October 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 t.iI2), tUj

tools have been captured which appeared to be used for making boobtraps.It contained 10 M201 Al fuse assemblies and 10 blasting caps which could befitted on the! smroke grenade fuse.

c. Reomn~in The M2-1A1 fuse assembly for the szmoke grenadebe replaced by a device vhich is conswned~or destroyed when the grenade hasbeen used. Units sho uld habitually remove the M01 fuses from used ismokegrenades and destroy them.

14. (C) JU ET Action to be taken vhen a vehicle detonates a mine

the area, his ACAV detonated a mine. Whiile attempting to securrc the damaged

re sulting in numerious casualties. A mtine dog team was brought in and a care-ful search of the area was conducted with organic mine detectors. Two additionamines were discovered.

b. kjlulio. VC/NVA units are aware of the American Soldierstendenc-y tp rush to the aid of wounded personnel. ThLs.characteristicis exploited by employing anti-tank and anti-personnel mines in groups.

:.Reconendation: Only the minimum number of personnel necessary 'toevacuate injured should enter a mined area. Footsteps and tracks made byru.~rsonne). and vehicles -that have already entered the area should be used.

Mir2 Dog Teams, scout dogs and mine detectors should also be employed tothe miaximumi extent possible

5,. (C) SUBJECT: Equipment and Personnel losses from enemy mines and* boobytraps emplaced in vicinity of friendly M'echanical Ambushes.

Za* Observation: Incidents have occured where the area around friendlyMechanical Ambushes has been boobytrapped and/or mined.

b. j~gu ctionc Mechanical. Ambushes are emplaced early in the eveningand retrieved the following morning. This procedure is known by enemy unitsand if a mechanical ambush is detected, it is a logicial place for boobytrapsor mines to be employed.

c. .MMftndtio : Personnel responsible for emplacing and retrievingmechanical ambushes should be briefed on the posaibility of encountering minesand boobytr&aps. Movemrent to the mechanical ambush site shouild be accomplishedin a slow, deliberate manner with each member of the unit being alert for

CJDNFbEINTIALK

Ik IANDF-PL 15 November 1970

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned, 23d Infani ry Divixoa, PeriodEnding 31 October 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

boobytraps and sis of mine emplacement. If the area inuak-.diately surroundingthe mechanical ambush yields signs that the device may have been truperedwith, the' mine should be destroyed in place.S D Organizationt None

E. Training, None

F. Logistics

i. (U) SUJBJET: Mobile TOC/CP Organization

a. .btMtJQ: During the disengagement/Vietnamization period infantrybattalions will rely less upon permanent home fire bases and will, by necessity,assume a more mobile role, moving to areas of greatest need.

b. Mat : Multiple battalion level missions, involving successiveopez ations in widely separated areas and requiring the construction of successivefire bases requires a compact TOC/CP Kit, able to be airlifted to a sit/. andmade operational in minimum time. Lack of such pro-planned and pre-loadedkits delays the command/control of combat operations.

c. Recorendation: A kit conr sting basically of four mrdified ODNEcontainers, augmented by a standaid.oad of PSP/RPG screen/engineer stakespoffers a highly flexible air-mobile CP/MC set up. Two OONEX's, fitted, withI medical, stretchers arranged in a bunk-bed configuration,, provide 1iving quartersfor the TOC personnel; one CONGA, containing two cots, houses the commanderand operations officer. The fourth ONEX, containing a built-in counter Vditwith radio racks. battery-powered emergency lighting, wall map boards, seats,storage boxes, and control power terminal box, houses a TOC capable of

operation immediately uponlanding at a forward site. The unit may be arrangedin a number of configuarations depending upon terrain and availability.Most suitable is an arrangement in which the OONFX's face each other in pairs,two to a side, with 8 foot separation. The gap may then be spanned with PSP,creating a central briefing area.

'2. (U) SUBJc:T; iEMA Reonclitation

a. Oh-Arvation: A problem exists in getting complete PEMA reconcilationfrom ICC-V.

b. ZKA %tJioa: in an attempt to get a complete PEMA reconciliation, ourDSU submitted punched cards for all open requisitions to ICC-V. ICC-V was

81

CONbTENT, AI;,

/'

*'

CoNFI NTIA LAVDF-HL 15 November 1970SUBJECT: 1perational Report--Iesons Learned, 23d infantry Diviaion, Period

1nding 31 October 1970, RCS CSFOR--65 (R2) U)

to bounce these cards against their deck and furnish the 23d Supply and Trans-portation Batalion with complete status . The reconciliation has not beenreturned. Sikty days have elapsed during this p-riod, this time is extremelycritical, as LSU's can not submit AFI cards and the monthly status providedby ICC-V is incomplete and inaccurate for the majority of the lines.

c. kb¢ommention: Quarterly reconciliation be compiled by IOC-V andthe time between the cut-off date and the printout not exceeding fifteendays. If this is not feasible, it is further recommended that units beauthorized to submit AFI cards.

G. Communications

1. (U) SUBJECT: Power for comunications sites

a. Observation: This unit has been experiencin excessive system downtime at outlying sites.

b. Evaluation: This situation occurs at the outlying sites served principallyby air. The monsoon season has caused increasing difficulty in getting serviceablegenerators to the sites and evacuating the unserviceable items. One of theprimary causes is the can.ellation of fixed wing and helicopter flights dueto inclement weather.

c. Recognendation: Three recent actions by the Division Signal Battalionhave, to a great degree, alleviated the problem.

(1) A minimum of five generators are maintained at each site which isservedc primarily by air.

(2) eplacement and evacuation procedures have been consolidated so thatserviceable generators are flowin to the site each time unsarvicwable generatorsmust be evacuated.

(3) Consideration is being given to installing rotary converters at thesites to provide an additional method of emirgency back-up power. With therotary converters installed, any 24 volt vehicle may be used to supply powerto sites using tho AH/C 112 or AN/GRC-163 configuration.

82

cNFP bENIA L

CONIDENT IALSUBJECr Optrtiona1. Porp:,t-Letio13 Learned~, Zi-i .if~ntry Divir:m, If.Kori

FC.A THE fOVN.iDwj:

2Tncl23d Infantry Div1i,.n Troop List

4Inc 1 2 wd HQ DA

rasnamr- ur L!CZ CU3A.'h1Cr, AtIN: '101-DT --03, 6th 0n 1 -th Arty

3.CUSARV, XLi't: AVO-DO 1-00, 1ot 3) Vm. Ith Arty,I"!,d! -D A I-a,, 3d B3rio 821 Arty

i-CC,) X:IV ropa ATTI.: .V11-GCr 1-CC, 3d Bn, 16th ArtyI-O W-.) Inf 9di 1-CC, 3d Bn 18'.' Arty

2-0C, 196th Int Ude I-C3 1:;t Un, 812d ArtyT:'-CO. 19PILh Inf Bde 1-CC, E Troop) ~ Cuv

Z.0CC 23d Infantry Di~vsion Arty I -OD, F Troop, 171h 1 Ca',8-40, 2,3d inf'antr'y DISOIWI 1-CC, )i Troop, 17th Cay'-02. 16th CAG I-CC, 12?d kin Bn-COy Iit Sqdn, I zt Cay 1-CC, 14th A'rn Bn

1-X, ".6th &.r Bn 12-CC, 3d MAI3 Hist Det.LCC 5231I Sip, Bn I-AC"WS, GI

I-CO. 21i MP1 Co 1O-.1CWS, G2I-CC), HHC, 23d Infwntry Xivision 1O-ACofS, G31- XC, .1d Bn, 1st Thf 1-hAoS, G4;-CO, hth BSn, 3d Thf 1-hAoS, G51-00, 4th Bri, 21st Thf 1-Oh Nlica3.I-CC , 14t Bn, 20th Inf 1ingieeri-00, 4th Bn, 31 at 111f 1-Signalf -al, Ist Un, 6th Inf 1 -Aviation1-CC, lIs Sn, labth Inf 1-Provoot Marshall3-00, 5th D-n. 46th Inf I-Staff Jud1ge Advo,t*1-00. 2d Bn, 1st inf 1-Infornation Of 'icer

I at Din., 52d Inf I- Inspector General1 -Surgeon1'-Chaplain#-Adjutant Genieral.i-XXIV Corps LU~C2-TACP (jL.O)j 23d Jnf Dii:

CONFIDE NT IAL

CONFIDENTIAL

AVII-GCT (15 Nov 70) lst IndSUBJECTs Operational Report - Lessons Ui4arned, 23d Infantry Dlrision,

Period Ending 31 October 1970, RCS CsoRt-65 (R2) (U)

DA, HQ, XM Corps, APO 96349 8 DEC 1970

TO: Cowunding Generalt United States Arzr, Vietnax,, APO 96375

1. (U) This headquarra has roviewed the Operational Rtrt - LessonoLearned, for the quartely period ending 31 October 1970 f-oo Head-quarters, 23d Infantry Dirision, and concts ex.cept an indicated inparagraph 2g belou.

2. (C) Cow. ,,nte folloin

a. Referene item concerning wExcess MP.,0 'page 73 paragraph

II A3: concur, Information should be prorided pernonnel prior todeparture on R&R or out-of-country leave renindrg them that &U. mnes

must be taken vith the m&en leaving country. Hany instances aroseuhere personnel w_ re out-of-country on C Dy, and upo arrival in HVNmore requested to appear before a board in order to convert the NPCleft in-country, This overburdned the boards, and could have beenprevented had Rf azd leave instructions indicated not only the minimmaount of money to be taken on Ria/leave, but that no MPG could beleft in-country.

b. Reference item concerning "Volunteer Informant Program (VIP),"pae 75, paragraph II Bi: Administration of VIP funds is the res-ponibility of military intelligence personnel, since the funds areprovided by the Intelligence Contingency Funds. Intelligence personnelshould continue to provide guidance to Brigade WX's concerning use ofthe VIP funds and should emphasize collection of informtion abovecollection of ordnance.

c. Reference item concerning "Trail Systems Data Base Record,"page 76, paragraph II B4s concur, The best source of this type in-formation is photography. To oope uith the anticipated increase infrequency of missions, a vystem of individual route folders is sug-gested. The folder could monsist of a 1:50,000 ap (out doic) toshow route aligment and a log to show route history. If frequentVR is available it can be uted to pinpoint areas of most current in-terest along selected routes to provide a better indication of routestatus. A more accurate portrayal is provided by plotting directlyon terrain features of a map instead of an acetate overlay, thus a-voiding the possible mal-alipnnt inherent in the use of overlaye,.

84

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

AVII-GCT (15 Hoy 70) lst IndSUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 23d Infantry Division.

Period Ending 31 October 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

do Reference itea concerning NVCI Neutralization Elemnt, " pag77, paragrapb II B6. concnr. The involvement of all tactical vmitsin the neutxalization of the Vietcong Infrastructure is both desirableand necessary. The reaent Phoenix/Phung Hoang Program requires care-ful coordination of all intelligence input to assure successful tar-geting. All similar elemente uhich are establiched in military unitsshould stress the necessity of establishing coordination and liaisonuith the appropriate DIOCC and/or PIOCC, to permit the proper flowof VOl information and coordination of operations. Every effort shouldbe made to keep the appropriate PIOCC inforred as to the ststus ofall neutralization operations. Iforration on enemy prisoners of vsrand enemy killed in action, should be iwrediately reported to Phoenix/Phung oang offies, to assist in the identificaticn and neutralisationof knoia VCI.

e. Reference item concerning Xquipmt and Personnel lossesfrom enery mines and boobytrapt emplaced in vicinity of friendlyMechanical Ambushes," page 80, para~raph II C5: concur. Personnelshould also avoid using the sam routes to and from mechnical axnfshsites. A boobytrap/LdAe symposium %dl be held at XXIV Corps to susistin dissemination of information on enbe techniques and ways to counterthug,

f. Reference item concerning "Mobile TOC/CP Organization," page81, paragraph II Fli concur. Howreer, serviceable CONEX containersshould nnt be %idthdraw from the transportation system for any pur-pose other than specifically authoriiea by competent &,thority. USARYRegulation 55-7 states that CONEX containers ill be emtied and ex-peditiously returned to the transportation system. The regulationalso authorizes the CO, THA, HLCV, to make appropriate dinposition ofuneconomically repairable CONEX containers. Many of these could bereturned to useful service as mobile MOC/CP's. Other material thatmeets the requirements for a mobile TOC/CP should also be ew Jaed.

g. Reforence iter concerning "PFEA Reconciliation," page 81,paragraph II F2: nonconcur. USARY unclassified message 210907Z Nov 70

85

CONFIDENTI AL

CONFIDENTIAL

AVfI- T (15 Nov 70) let IndSBJZTs Operationul Report - L4ssons Lbarnxd, 23d Ibfat-ry Division,

- P _4 Eding 31 October 1970, RS CEOR-65 (R2) (U)

establishes polici.es fro US ArxV depots and ICC-V- to provide timelyprintout of requisition status to DSV/GSU' a every 30 days ftras uichthe DSU/GSU's uin fumijJi status to the units.

FOR THE CO IIWDE.

Cop101P, AGCLa' A0141n1 Genetl

00p -3d m Div

r

L

86

CONFIDENTIAL

[r

AVAHDO-O (>15 NQV' 70) 2d. IndSUBJECTs Operational Report--Lesswxis Learned, 236, Infantj,y Dixsion, Period

HeadquarteiA, United States AM Vietnam, APO tian FrancJsco 96375 2 8 JAN 1171

TOt Commander in Chief, United States Army Pacific, ATTN- CPO?-DT,

'S , APO 96558

1. This Headquarters has reviewed the Operational :Report-,e4,%s Leaniedfor tne quarterly period ending 31 October 1970 from Headqu prs, 23Infantry Division and comments of Indorsing headquarters.

2. Reference item concerning "PEA Reconcilation," page .81, paragraph II F2 and Ist' Indorsement, paragraph 2g. The authority to releaseqand back-order PDIA items has now been changed to the depot' level. USA4V Reg 700-35dated 5 October 19,70 prescribes the procedures 1 performing backorderreconciliations with the Direct Support Units. fnis regjlition incorpor-ates the suggestions of the 23rd Infantry Divis,on. Unit has been soadvised.

FOR THE COMMANDEM

XXIV CorpsGener

23rd Inf Div

87

' I ; , f

GPOP-T (15' Nov 70) 3d Ind (U)SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, 23d Infantry Division for Perioo

Ending 31 October 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2)

HQ, US Army, radific, APO San Francisco 96558" 2 MAR t71

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of theArmny,,Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters concurs in subject report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

L.M.OZAKCPT,Asst AG

88

I!

-3

CONFIIENTIAL23d MWAXTRY DIVISION THDOP LIST

.Cv c 31 oct .r ,M )

1.HEADQUAJRTE.RS2d NATCI

HHC, 23d Infantry Division

1st Sqdn, ' t Cav (-),Trp 1, 1 st CayTrp F, 17th Cay

26th Fngr En

523d Sig BnCOMSEC CONTACT TEAM #2

23d ) Co146th MPPlat, 504th MP Bn

328th RR Co

,635th MI Co

3d Kil Hist Dot

OL 7, 5th Weather Sqdn, USAF (-)

2. 23d INFARTH1Y DMISIO_ A_ tU

4MB, Div Arty

6th Bn, 11th Arty

lst Bn, 14th Arty -)

3d Bn, 16t.h Arty"

3d Bn, 18th Arty

Ist Bn, 82d Arty

3d Bn, 82d ArtyBtry B -), lst Bn, 14th Arty

,Btry G, 55th Arty (.-0 Cal)

251st FA Det (Radar)

-4wN t :oureCO)NFr1 NT1AL~

QONEIbE NTI AL252d FA Det (Radar)

271sat FA Det .(Radar)

3. 2M ADIFAINr DIVISIDIP C AMD

HHC and Band

23d Ned Bn

23d S&T Bn

723d Maint Bn (-)

23d Atin Co

Co G, 75th Inf (anger)

63d Inf Plat (CTT)

23d Infantry Division Coat Center (PROV)

Chu Lai Defense Lonmzd (PRO)

4. 16TH COMBAT AVIATION GROUP

HHC, 16th CAG

14th Combat Avn Bn71sA Ar. Co (Aeit He].)116th 'Avn, Co (Aslt 11I (OPODN)132d An Co (Aslt Spt Hl)174th An Co (A9lt He1)176th On Co (Asit He.)178th An Co (Aslt Spt 11])196th Awn Co '(.4slt Spt lI) (OPO)N)534th hd Det756th Ned Dot

123d Awn Bn (Cbt) (Int MY)frp D, ist Sqdn, lst CarTrp F, 8hUCvCoI9, 723dN tint Bn"

335th Trans Co362dAin ot

-t

-90

COUFIT:NTIALrL

UN RNDETIAL5. l1ITH I DFAT 1WADh~

HHC, 11th It Pde

3d Bn, ISt Ifif

4th Bn, ,4 Inf

[ lt Bn, 20th Ihr

4thBn, 21st Int

59th Inf Plat (Scout Dog)

31st Public Information DIt

90th Chem Dot

327th Ayn Det

Combat Weather Team I

6. 196T INFANRY BRIGADE

HHC, 196th Inf Bds

2d En, let Inf

3d i, 21st Int

4th Bn, 31st tIf

1St Bn, 46th Int

48th Inf Plat (Scout Dcg)

10th Public Information Dot

27th Chem Dot

7. 198 _ 4RY BRIG&E

HHC, 198th Inf Bde

Ist Bn, 6th inf

5th Bn, 46th Inf

91

IL> -! ' -C...ON F 5J-

CON F I b i ALlet Bn, 52d Inf

Trp i4, 17th Cav

87th Chim Det V8. NDIDIVISIONAL W!NITS V

6th CA'Plat, 29th CA Co (DS of Div)

Dot 3, 7th PSYP Bn (DS of Div)

USAS3G, ACSI,DA

92

NFIbEN-.AL

UNCLU.SSIIED 9C~NCMRLDT

CQNFIDtNTIAL ______

Operational Report - lessons Learned, 11Q, 23d Infan~try Division4. OE~C~PTcIVmv NOTy(~p. 1ips MIew *

Experiences of nilt enaged fr. counterinsurpency operations, I Aug to 31 Oct 70.a. AtJTIOR)(iP mme , a.id.. fo 11 m les n..

CC, 23d Infantry Division4. AltPORT OATEL 70 TOTAL NO. Or PAGC Vb. NO. or PtCFS

15 November 1970 95CONTRACT OR GRANT NO, ~ 1:;a9GIdATOftRCPRUMDR

bPROJECT No.7041,21

N/A 4.OTeI4 REPORT 140111 (AOW 00kotnma.,. hot seer be moolpt"

10. DISTRIBUTION STAT19MENT

I-. XUPPLI[MENTANY NOr~ 1 93 11flONWP1ING MILITARV ACTIVITY

/A OACSFOR, DA, Washington, D. C. 20310

1). ASSTRACT

93

D D 9?O'V'.1473" UNCLASSIFIED- Secutity Classification