AUTHORITY THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIEDcraft (2 PBRts, 1 Boston Whaler) are utilized during daylight hours. At Vung Re Bay, the primary security mission has been the security of petroleum

UNCLASSIFIED

AD NUMBERAD516173

CLASSIFICATION CHANGES

TO: unclassified

FROM: confidential

LIMITATION CHANGES

TO:Approved for public release, distributionunlimited

FROM:

Distribution authorized to U.S. Gov't.agencies and their contractors;Administrative/Operational Use; 31 OCT1970. Other requests shall be referred toOffice of the Adjutant General [Army].Washington, DC 20310.

AUTHORITYOAG ltr, 18 Jul 1975; OAG ltr, 18 Jul 1975

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

ADd 5/6-/73

U'.ASSIFICATION CHANGED

T;,o NCLASSFIED-CONFIDENTIAL

AUTHORITY:

US

UNCLASSIFIED

SECURITYMARKING

The classified or limited status of this report applies

to each page, unless otherwise marked.

Separate page printouts MUST be marked accordingly.

THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OFTHE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS, TITLE 18,U.S.C., SECTIONS 793 AND 794. THE TRANSMISSION OR THE REVELATION OFITS CONTENTS IN ANY MANNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BYLAW.

NOTICE: When government or other drawings, specifications or otherdata are used for any purpose other than in connection with a defi-nitely related government procurement operation, the U.S. Governmentthereby incurs no responsibility, nor any obligation whatsoever; andthe fact that the Government may have formulated, furnished, or in anyway supplied the said drawings, specifications, or other data is notto be regarded by implication or otherwise as in any manner licensingthe holder or any other person or corporation, or conveying any rightsor permission to manufacture, use or sell any patented invention thatmay in any way be related thereto.

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CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY'OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL

WASHINGTON. D.C. 203100/AGDA-A (M) (21 Jun 71) FOR OT UT 704266 8 July 1971

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 93d

Military Police Battalion, Period Ending 31 October 1970 (U)

SEE DISTRIBUTION

I. The attached report is forwarded for review and evaluation in

accordance with para 4b, AR 525-15.

2. The information contained in this report is provided to insure

that lessons learned during current operations are used to the benefit

of future operations and may be adapted for use in developing training

Smaterial.

3. Information of actions initiated as a result of your evaluation

should be forwarded to the Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development,

ATTN: FOR OT UT within 90 days of receipt of this letter.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

1 Incl VERNE . BOWERSas Major General, USA D D C

Comhanding Generals GeeUS Continental Army Command

JUL flUS Army Combat Developments Conmmand o

Commndin Genral 19US Army Materiel Command CoLad UCommandants ID

US Army War CollegeUS Army Command and General Staff College

US Army Armor School This material contains information affecting,

US Army Aviation School thxe national defense of tho United States

US Army Engineer School ,ithin the meaning of the ior,&o La'wUS Army Field Artillery School (T'tle 18, U.s.c., , 793 and 794) 1

US Army Infantry School the transmission or rcTelhton of which iu

US Army Military Police School ay rlarcr to an unauthorized person iiUS Army Ordnance SchoolUS Army Signal School

Regraded unclassified when separatedfrom classified inclosure.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL Z

DISTRIBUTION (Cont'd)US Army Southeastern Signal School

US Army Transportation School

Copies furnished:Office, Chief of Staff,US ArmyDeputy Chiefs of StaffChief of Research and DevelopmentAssistant Chiefs of StaffChief of EngineersThe Surgeon GeneralChief of Military HistoryThe Provost Marshal GeneralOffice, Director of Defense Research & EngineeringCommander in Chief, US Army, EuropeCommanding Generals

US Army, AlaskaUS Army Electronics CommandUS Army Weapons CommandDeseret Test Center

Commander, US Army Forces Southern CommandCommandant of the Marine CorpsDirector, Weapons Systems Evaluation GroupDefense Documentation CenterUSAF Project RAND

Commanding OfficersUS Army Land Warfare LaboratoryUS Army Logistics Doctrine, Systems & Readiness AgencyUS Army Mobility Equipment Research & Development Center

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DEPARW E}Jr OF THE ARMYHEADQUARTES, 93D MILITARY POLICE BATTALION

APO San Francisco 96238

AVBGF-IC 31 October 1970

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned, 93d Mialitary Police Bat-

talion, Period Ending 31 October 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (9)

SEE DISTRIBUTION

. (C) Oerations: Simnificant Activities.

a. Ms . The Comnmding Officer, 93d Military Police Battalionprovides Military Police and Provost Marshal services to sub-area co-ordinators, tactical units, commanders without organic military police,and others, as directed by the Oawmanding Officer, 16th Military PoliceGroup.

b. g i . See enclosed orgdnizational chart.

c. Personnel, Morale and Discihine.

(l) Decorations:

(a) Legion of Merit........ ........ . . . 1

(b) Soldierts Medal . . . . . . 5

(c) Bronze Star with'"V " .... . . . .... . . ...... 18

(d) Bronze Star Meritorious. . .... .. . . . . . . 21

(e) Air Medal. . ....... ........... 0

(g) Ay Commendation Medal ithoro" . . . . . . . . . . 45

(g) Amy Comendation Medal Meritorious.... q ... .. 74

(h) Purple Heart . . . . . . . . • • 9

(i) Brigade Certificates of.Achievement .... . • . . .... 55

FOR OT UT DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS;704266 D.CLASSIE1ED AFTER 12 YEAR&Inclosure CONFIDENTIAL w on Soo.1o

CONFIDENTIAL q.IAVBOF-IC

31 October 1970SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned, 93d Military Police Bat-talion, Period Ending 31 October 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)-

(2) Key Personnel Assignments and Departures:

(a) Assignments:

NAME GRADE JOB TITLE DATE

SIMPSON, MARCINE MSG ISG 17 Aug 70ROBINSON, RAYMOND SFC Plt Sgt 18 Aug 70DUFFY, JAMES P. JR. LTC CO 21 Aug 70COLE, THEODORE R. MAJ S3 15 Sep 70LIVELY, ROBERT CPT Co, 560th 28 Sep 70POTTS, HARRY CPT CO, 66th 19 Sep 70GREENWALD, DONALD MAJ PMO, QNH 17 Sep 70LOG, JAMES CPT 4 15 Sep 70

MANCIL, EDWARD MSG Opns, PMO 5 Oct 70MELE, ACHILLE CSM CSM 20 Oct 70

(b) Departures:

NAME GRADE JOB TITLE DATEROUSE, NORMAN ISG ISG 1 Aug 70BRIGHT, ROBERT ISG ISG 3 Aug 70PRICE, AUBREY CPT PMO, PKU 6 Aug 70MILLER, JAMES C. LTC CO 8 Aug 70JONES, RICHARD CPT S3 18 Aug 70BLACKWELL, LEO PSG Plt Sgt 22 Aug 70HARPER, JAMES CPT Phy Sec 26 Aug 70CASSELL, EARNEST PSG Plt Sgt 3 Sep 70MARTINO, DOMINIC SFC S4 Sgt 17 Sep 70WALLACE, KENNETH SFC Act ISG 20 Sep 70LANGBERG, VERNON SFC Opns, PMO 21 Sep 70PETERS, WENTON ILT Plt Ldr 30 Sep 70COLE, KERMIT CPT S2 19 Oct 70HARTING, BRUCE CPT CO, 569th 20 Oct 70

rMEDLEY, NELl 1LT Pit Ldr 23 Oct 70BELL, FRED MAJ CO, 177th 25 Oct 70LYONS, STEVEN CPT CO, 66th 28 Oct 10(3) Casualties:

(a) Battle Losses: OFF WO EM TOTAL

I Killed 0 0 0 0

2 Wounded 3 0 1 4

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[ .... . .

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SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned, 93d Military Police Bat-

talion, Period Ending 31 October 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

(b) Non-Battle Losses: OFF WO EM TOTAL

I Killed 0 0 2 2

2 Injured 0 0 0 0

(4) Reenlistments: Eligible Reenlistments

(a) ist Term RA 29 0

(b) RA Career 4 4

(c) AUS 62 0

(d) Other C 0

(e) Total 95 4

(5) Civilian Personnel: Authorized Employed

(a) Program Six Civilianization 8 8

(b) Augmentation TDA P5-WFPEAA-99

Dated 1 Jan 69 29 26

(c) Total 37 34

(6) R & R: Month %Utilized

Aug 100%Sep 100%

Oct 100%

(7) Strengths:

(a) As of I Aug 70.

AUTH ASG

OFF WO EM TOTAL OFF WO EM TOTAL

24 2 655 681 22 2 508 532

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CONFIDENTIAL

AVBG-IC 31 Octoboer 1970SUBJECT; Oporational Repart-Lesson s 1e6rned c3d 1-litcary Police Bat-

taliQn, Pcriod Knding 31 Octobor 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

(b) As of 31 Oct 70.

AUTH _S

OFF WO EM 'TOTAL OFF WO W TOA

24 2 655 681 25 2 516 543

(8) Extensions of Ovorsc.s Tours:

(a) Total ctensions OFF _i TOL

Aug 0 18 18Sep 0 8 8

Oct 0 16 16

(b) Undcr PL 89-735 (6 no) OFF 4 T

Aug 0 4 4Sep 0 3 3

Oct 0 5 5

(9) Discipline, law and Ordcr:

(a) General Courts 0

(b) Spccial Courts 4

(c) S m ary Courts 0

(d) Article 15, UDiJ 57

(10) Congrossional Inquiries: 7

(11) Publications:

(a) 93d MP Bn Ccmmandor's Policy Statomont #18 (EER), 10 Aug 70.

(b) 93d MP Bn Ccmand Policy and Guidance Letter, 7 Sop 70.

(c) 930. MP Bn C-mmandcr's Policy Stateriont #19 (Drug Amnesty Prcgram).

(d) 93d MP Bn Cowkandcr t s Policy Statmcnt #20 (Reenlistment Program).

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SUBJECT: Operational Rc.Prt-Lessor.s Learned, 93d Military Police Bat-talicn, Period Ending 31 October 1970, RCS OSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

di ju a .

(1) During the reporting period, the 93d Ilitary kbljce Battaliontsarea of responsibility extended from the Cambodian border on the west tothe South China Sen to the east, and from the MR I southern border tothe southern boundaries of the provinces of Phu Yen, Phu Bcn, and Pleiku.The five provinces in the 93d Military Police Battalion t s area of res-ponsibility are Binh Dinh, Pleiku, Kontu, Thu Bon, and Phu Yen.

(2) The 93d Military Police Battalion provided military police re-sources in the following manner:

(a) General support of combat units. The 93d MP Bn rovides one

YP so uad in general support of the 173d Airborne Bde at LZ Uplift.

(b) Control of prisoners of war (PW) in US custody.

I The 93d MP Bn guarded a total of 56 PWts during this reportingperiod at the 17th Field Hospital, An Khe; 67th Evac ospital, Q4 INhon;and the 71st Evac Hospital, Pleiku.

2 A total of 63 Nt's were escorted from PW Hospitals and LZ Engligh

to ARVN I' camps and hospitals by the 93d NP Bn.

(c)Socialized Physical Secuirity Measures.

1 Utilizing resources of the 458th Trans Co (PBR), the 93d MP Rnprovides waterborne security for the Qai I hon Inner arbor and the VungRe Bay Harbor. At Qui Dhon, security is intensified around three (3)large electropower ships (Vinnel Corp), a DeLong Pier, an LST Beach/CanDock area, and the approaches to the harbor causeway. Four watercraft(2 PBR's, 2 Boston Whalers) are used for night security and three water-craft (2 PBRts, 1 Boston Whaler) are utilized during daylight hours.At Vung Re Bay, the primary security mission has been the security of

petroleum ships moored in the bay and their fuel lines running to land-based pumping stations. Buring the hours of darknoss, two watercraft(1 PBR, 1 Boston halor) have been used to perform this mission. Dur-ing the daytime, one watorcraft (PBR) has been utilized. With the as-sistance of VN Mitional Maritime Police an average of 86 Vietnamesewatercraft are searched daily and approximately 20 Vietnamese arc de-tained monthly. During the reporting period, 7 confirnmed enemy werecaptured and released to Vietnamese authorities.

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CONFDENTIAL

AVBGF-IC 31 October 1970SUJECT: Operational Report-4ssonm Learned, 93d Military Police Bat-

talion) Pericd Ending 31 October 1970, RCS FOR-65 (R2) (U)

2 The 93d NP Bn provides on-board security for ships carryingAAFEX supplies sind amwo ships loading and unloading in the Qui I onInner Harbor. DLring this reporting period, the 93d MP Bn providedtwo 14P security personnel per ship to guard an average of four shipsper month. Each ship remains in the harbor approximately three days,

. The 1st platobn, 981st M-P Co (SD) at Phu Tai, attached to the66th 1P Co, has provided an average of 36 sentry dogs each night, walk-ing 10 posts per shift at the ASP, Phu Tai; 6 posts per shift at laneArmy 4$rfield, An Son; and 2 posts per. shift at Tank Farm #2, Qai Mon.The 3rd platoon, 981st MP Go ZSD) at Pleiku, attached to the 560th I-Co, has provided an average of 34 sentry dogs each night, walking 3

posts per shi-t at the POL storage area, ?leiku; 8 posts per shiftat tho ISk area, Dleiku; and 6 posts per shift at Camp Holloway inFleiku. In An Khe, 16 sentry dogs have been utilized each night walk-ing 4 posts per shift at the ASP; 1 post per shift at the Class I yard;1 -post Der shift at the Class II & IV yard; and 2 posts per shift atthe FOL Tank Farm.

The 66th MP Co and the 560th IMP Co have had unit responsibilityfor convoy escort within their areas of responsibillty. These u-nitsutiloze ?,2 armored cars (M4 706) and 30 i-ton scout jeeps in escort-ing c'nvoys, They provide escort for convoys on Q-l, QL-14, and QL-19 throughout MR 2 (North). These units have escorted 2,236 convoysover 158,09Q.8 miles during the reporting period.

During this reporting period, the 93d 14? Bn provided 14 VIP es-corts. Fach escort consisted of one or two -ton vehicles with two tofour -military policenen. Combined Police patrols were used on occ-as-ions when VIP visits were off US installations.

During the reporting period) the 93d MP Bn supported a construe-tion operation with defile and traffic control in Qui Mhon, using Conj-binod Police patrols at a rate of one patrol (1 MP, 1 UP. and one QG)per day. The project was the laying of a railroad spur from Gia LongStreet, Qiii 1Nhon to the Armle Pier, Qui Mlon Port, by R-M ConstructionConpany.

(d) Discipline, law and Order.(D4.0).

I The 93d IMP Bn utilized a toti.l of 35 day/nighttino military pol-ice patrols throughout its area of operations. These patrols performtraffic control, highway patrol, and general DL&O missions.

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AVBGF-IC 31 October 1970SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned, 93d Military Police Bat-


bb

2 The 93d HP Bn utilized a total of 22 day/nighttime combined pa-trols throughout its area of operation.

3 Military police reports initiated during the reporting quartertotaled 2,278.

4 Radar and mircor boxes have been utilized daily throughout the93d TP Bn's area of responsibility. As a result, 1,46i traffic cita-tions were issued. Of 2 radar units assigned, 1 is non-operationaldue to a faulty transistor.

5 The 93d MP Bn processed 175 Serious Incident Reports (SIR) dur-ing the reporting period.

6 The 93d MP Bn established a program of Aerial Detection and Iden-tification of Speeders (ADIOS). Aircraft are being used to augment andsupport traffic operations by monitoring convoy movements, identifyingcongestion, measuring speed of individual vehicles, and providing a ver-satile deterrent to hazardous driving. Every effort is made to employaircraft 4 hours per day, 7 days per week. Priority employment is alongQL-l from the northern border of MR 2 to Tuy Hoa, a distance of about200 road miles. Secondary employment is along the eastern portion ofQL-19 from Qui Nhon to, but not including, the An Khe Pass, a distanceof about 30 miles. Combined Police patrols have been integrated intothe program. Road markings at 176' intervals are being used to clockvehicles from the air. During the reporting period, 1,296 vehicleshave been timed. Citations have been issued to 179 US military drivers,20 ROKts, and 21 ARVN. Publicity has been aggressively undertaken throughbriefing of local commanders, AFVN radio spot announcements, and coor-dination through 18th MP Bde for Stars & Stripes newspaper coverage.Drivers appear to be cognizant of the program. The psychological im-pact on driver behavior is the single most important benefit of theADIOS program.

(7) On 24 Oct 70, military police activities at Kontum were closedout and all resources returned to the 560th MP Co.

e. Training. I(1) Guardmount training is conducted daily by all units.

(2) The 66th Military Police Company has the responsibility forproviding indirect fire support for Camp Gheradhini Compound, wherethey are located. Utilizing an 81 mm mortar, they have trained per-sonnel in the operation of the weapon and in fire directional controlprocedures.

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AVBGF-ICSUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned, 93d Military Police Bat-


(3) OJIT training of FIfWF military police i acUc fi :thrughthe use of combined patrols. Combined patrois aie rarij ift mirrorbox operation and other traffic control and lav ehf'rcazent tech iques.

f, Inp.1.ligence - Og:Mnte rpi genc.

(1) 'The primary sources of combat intelligence ape. the individualmilita:&y policemen; elements cf YACV, and tactical upit:,y

(2) The priirry sources of police intelligence are local hrovestMarshals, CID detachments, 16th MP Gp, and 18th1i NP Bae -4 i'epaqseNtional and military pol7ite •).

(3) A weekly intelligence surmrary is publ-ished ky the b ttalionS2/3 section. This suruaarizes enemy activity for the past k thataffects MP operations in cities or along ihvaya ceaigsa brief analysis of general enemy activity in tlie 93d NP Bn 4 .ad anestimate of enemy intcntions.

(4) Following are the sources of intelligence:

(a) Individual military policemen.

.?(b) .Daily intellience s umr-aries of II oTZ, .4th Inf D!,v$,,,LASUIM.r,3Qui o .on and the five province MACV advisory teams

(c) Periodic Intelligence Report, IFFORCEV.

(d) Interrogation Reports from KAV Sectors and 22nd ARVN Div.

() Liaison with Various intelligence units in the area of opera-tions- ioe., 172d MI Dot, 524th MI Dot, 525th MI Dot.

g, Fo re Doveiorent. On 15 Oct 70, the 66th MiP Co relocated 2

squads to Tuy Hoa AFB as an initial step in assuming PLO respQnsibilityfor that location. Furthor deployments and relocations are planned dur-ing the next reporting period.

h. __i .

(1) During the reporting period, additional radio relay stations

were established at location Blackhawk, about 15 miles east of Pleiku

and at Song Cau; thus providing radio conmunications capability between

all Bn locations.

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CONFIDENTIAL

AVBGF-IC 31 October 1970SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lesons Learned, 93d liilitary Police Bate-

talion, Period Ending 31 October 1970, ROS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

(2) Two RTT units assigned to the battalion were located at CompSchu.idt, P-loiku, and Camp Keystone, Qui Mhon. A total of 490 messageswere sent and 2 85 nessagc3 rcccived during this reporting period. Dif-ficulty has been experienced in keeping the unit at Pleiku operationaldue to mechanical/eloctrical failures.

4e

2. (G) Lessons Learned: Comn ter1 s Obacrvations. Evaluations andRoeco emledations.

a. Personnelj:

(1) The loss of potential Army career men.

(a) O VAMION: Through the programs offered by the VeteransAdministration and the GI Bi~lq the United States Government is makingit more and more beneficial for the young soldier to leave the service.As a result, the service is losing many personnel of high caliber.

(b) VJALUATION: Mnay personnel are leaving the service aftera normal two year obligation because there is a better opportunity forthem to continue their education after separation from the Army. Al-though the Army has many educational programs available to qualifiedcareer soldiers, none of them can compare to the educational oportun-ities offered by the GI BiJJ and the Veterans Administration. Unlesshe is selected for an Army sponsored schooling progran, the active ser-vice member iust attend school during non-duty hours and pay 50% of thetuition. Many times it is impossible or impractical to attend this typeof program due to duty comnitnents. The individual with initiative anddesire to seek self improvement leaves the service to take advantage ofthe schooling available to him.

(c) RECOMENDATION: The existing degree completion programIshould either be broadened or liberalized and made available to morepersonnel, or a siniliar program should be initiated that would offerthe potential career sold-icr the same opportunity available to the in-dividual who sometiies grudgingly spends two years in the service andmakes no worthwhilc contribution. The program should obligate the manfor a specific period of time for each ycar that he has spent away from

active duty. The abovc 7rogran would encourage more men to rake a car-cor out of the nilitary servico and would inprove the quality of thecareer voldier as well.

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(2) Reassignment for newly promoted Sergeants E5.

(a) OBSERVATION: Newly promoted sergeants E5 often have a dif-

ficult time extracting themselves from the familiar relationship theyhave established with their former peers and elevating themselves tothe position of authority their newly acquired rank dictates. They also

have a difficult time associating with and developing a comfortable work-ing relationship with fellow NCO's who were formerly their superiors.

(b) EVALUATION: Because of this difficulty in exerting auth-ority over former peers, the new sergeant may not be as efficient or

effective as he otherwise might be. The challenges inherent in the newpositon of responsibility are compounded by personal stresses thatmight lead to compromising the new NCO's objectivity and thereby losingthe respect and cooperation of his superiors and subordinates.

(c) RECOMMENDATIONS: Upon promotion to sergeant E5, the indi-

vidual should be transferred to another unit or another job. This pol-

icy could be easily implemented within a Battalion or Group. This would

eliminate the ramifications of too close a relationship with subordin-

ates and allow him to establish rapport with a different group of NCO's.

b. Intelligence:

(1) Enemy tactics.

(a) OBSERVATION: The enemy employed a coordinated attack onboth QL-19 and the local fire support bases during the reporting period.A westbound convoy escorted by the 560th Military Police Company cameunder heavy enemy fire at the base of the Miang Giang Pass (BR 245506).Simultaneously, LZ Action (BR 267476), the nearest location containinga reaction force, received 7 rounds of 82 mm mortar fire; thus hampering

artillery and reaction support for the ambushed convoy.

(b) EVALUATION: The enemy has changed their tactics to effect

coordinated attacks.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That firebases in the near proximity tomain supply routes be made aware of this change in enemy tactics.

(2) Security of Billets.

(a) OBSERVATION: Sappers continue to employ new methods in

attempts to incur personal injuries and billet destruction to US personnel.

10

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Sappers, through the use of satchel chargcs, destroyed the doors of sox-* oral troop billets and then sprayed the floor area Qith autmatic seall

arms fire.

(b) EVALUATIOi: Sappors are aware of the W practico of lock-ing all billets doors, and when under attack getting as low as possibleto the ground.

(c) RECO! hlATION: That when possible, all troop areas to in-clude billcts' doors be well-illuminaited, and that all troop billets belooked, with a guard on duty inside at all times during the night.

c. Oera.tions.

(1) Convoy Escort.

(a) OB2ERVATIOH'J: Convoy escort and security personnel are re-

rmining at the scene of an ambush after the convoy has cleared the killzone, thus leaving it unprotected for the repaindor of its movement to

its destination.

(b) EVALUATIOn: The onery has initiated ntrierous sniper inci-dents at convoys in an attempt to evaluate the actions of all organic

and reaction security forces. Noting that the organic security forces

remined at the scene of the sniping incident and abandoned their con-

voy, the enemy changed his tactics. His new plan called for a snipingincident on a convoy, thus drawing off the convoy's organic security,and then the initiation of a full scale 6mbush a few railes farther dowmthe road. An ambush, such as that mentioned above occurred with the

sniping incident taking place off QL-19 Bridge 31 (BR 097552), with afull scale anbush being initiated at Bridge 33 (BR 032513). Fortunatelythe tactical error of the convoy's security forces had been observed

and corrected, thus proventinr a successful arbush on the part of theenerly,

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That the enemy's new tactic be broughtto the attention of all units securing and e~corting convoys on mainsupply routes, and that this tactic be incorporated in the LOI of allconcerned branch schools.

(2) Traffic Control Using Aircraft.

(a) OBSERVATION: UHIB helicopters are being used to supportaircraft traffic control and enforcement operations.

I I

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AVBGFIC 31 October 1970SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned, 93d Military Police Bat-


(b) EVALUATION: One current criticisma of the program concernsthe cost of operating helicopters for this purpose. There is some "over-kill", since the helicopter requires a crew of four and has space forfour passengers.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: A Light Observation Helicopter (WH), ro-quiring only the pilot and one space for a 1Mlitary Policran, would beadequate and permit more economical operation.

(3) Convoy Security.

(a) OBSERVATION: The enemy has boon emlpying harassing fireon the highway quite frequently.

(b) EVALUATION: The enemy has conducted numerous sinall scaleambushes on Highway QL-19 between BN 30 (BR 144535) and BN 33 (BR 033514).These ambushes have incurred little, or no damage, thus leading one tobelieve that there is some other reason for the action. Most of the an-bushes have consisted of a few B-40 rockets and small arms fire. Itwould appear the enemy is attempting to establish a rattern of reactionon the part of convoys and road security vehicles.

(c) RECOI4IPNDATION: That all convoy escort and road securityvehicles be conscious of amnunition econoay. Thus, if the enemy shouldstage one of these small scale ambushes, these vehicles would net c:p)endall of their organic anunition, leaving the road vulnerable to a largerarmbush.

(4) Detention of Deserters by Military Police.

(a) OBSERVATION: Several deserters were apprehended and de-tained by military police pending disposition. Zach deserter was de-tained from 8 to 10 days. Units from which they desorted are under theimpression that once an individual is dropped from the rolls, the unitis relieved of all responsibilities, even though the deserter is returnedto military control. Tho tiie lapse takes place when USARV has to becontacted for assistance. USARV then notifies the unit through channelsto receipt for the detainee.

(b) EVALUATION: MosL Unit Comnanders are not receiving properinstructions relative to the disposition of deserters returned to mili-Lary control.

(c) RECOMI-1ENDATION: That appropriate directives and/or guidancebe published.

12

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d. Organizati on: ,onO.

c. TraininR:

(1) Training of MP's.

(a) OS.RVATION: Military policcnen arriving in RVN are def-icient in the basic skills required to perfonn DLW duty and traffic ar-cident invcstigation,

(b) 2LUATI0N: Either a lack of motivation or a lack of DroD-er training is rcsulting in a large number of sub-standard rilitary pol-icemen arriving in Vietnam. Since the present rmnpoer level and requiredcnrmi'ments necccsitatc continuous 12 hour shifts the only possible train-ing tjnpe avail7blo is at night, during the man's off duty hours. Whilethis unit has oune it nece.ssary to follow this plan for a tbreo weekcoursc in basic nilitary police skills, consteat use cf the individuals'off duty hours for training will invariably result in a lowering of mor-ale and efficiency. A nan cannot be expected to be alert in class afterworking a 12 hour shift.

(c) RECOMNEfDATIO:

(1) Efforts be intensified at AIT level to screen out thoseindividuals who have por motivation or potential.

(2) More oetensivo training be given to AIT students in thearea of traffic accident investigation. In Vietnm, traffic accidentsconstitute a ,major rArt of a patrolnants duties.

(3) Ilanctry training subjects be drastically reducedin Vietnam since time available for training is almost non-existent.

f. ja;?Lti9g:

(1) M-73 Machinc Guns.

(a) OBSERVATIO.N4 The 560th Military Police Company has expor-ionccd problms witn the M-73 machine runs.

(b) EVALUAYlON: Tho sjpot i:clds of the feed tray assembly areconstaitly cracking, cau,'i-g tho g ns to malfunction.

(c) RECOI0 iD , If O : That tLis information be *:assed on to themanufacturor as a deficiency.

CONFIDENTIAL23

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AVBGF-IO 01 October 2970SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned, 93d Military Police Bat-


(2) Barrel locling lever on the .60 machine gun. 4

(a) OBSERVATION: Often the barrel locking lover on the K-60machine gun is inadvertently moved into an upright position during trar-.sportation or utilization of the weapon. Unless carefully observed justprior to firing, the barrel locking lever could be in an upright positionwhich disengages the barrel fi'om the weapon.

(b) EVALUATION: The upright position of the barrel lockinglever is easily unnoticed. Therefore, an operator of the 14-60 -aabinegun mnight fire the u:eapon with the barrel disengaged resulting in ser-ious bodily harm to the ooerator and dam'age to the weapon.

(c) REOMV!IDATION: A type of locking device should be devel-oped on the barrel locking lever to insurB that it could not accident-ally be pushed or jarred into the upright position. Also, the undersideof the barrel locking lever should be mainted a bright color so as to beconspicious to the operator before firing the weapon.

(3) Windshields for MI-706 armored car.

(a) OBSWVATION: Drivers of the armored car DL-706 arc con-stantly exposed to dust, insects, pebbles, rain, and mud.

(b) EVALUATION: Although the drivers wear goggles, this offersonly l-aited protection. The rest of their face is still exposed to in-sects and rocks and the dust makes breathing difficult. One unit is cur-rently employing a home-made windshield consisting of a one foot squarepiece of plexiglass welded in front of the driver. This offers excel-lent protection against insects, rocks, dust, rain, and mud. The wind-shield is tilted slightly to the rear to allow the airstrown to keepthe glass free froq raindrops.

(c) RECO4EINDATICN: Consideration be given to developLig astandard windshield for the DL-706. For opti.num utilization, this wind-

shield should be mountsd so it can be dropped down when hot required.

(4) Mirror Boxes.

(a) OBSERVATIONS: Mirror boxes art frequently rendered inoper-

ative because of broken mirrors or broken stop watches.

(b) EVALUATION: Usually, the only means of replacing broker

mirrors is to buy them on the local economy. Stop watches are prdctic-

ally ippossible to repair in Vietnam, or to procure from normal supply

sources since they are not included in MP unit TO&Els.

14

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

A VBGF-IC 31 October 1970

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned, 93d Military Police Bat-talion, Period Ending 31 October 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

c) RECOMIENDATIO: That sheets of' polished metal be used torepalce the mirrors in the boxes, This ill eliminate the mirror break-age. Such devices have bon successfully employed by units of this Bat-talion. Stop watches should be added to the MT03's of 14P units or PMDetachmnents.

(5) Slave cylinders for XM'706 armored car.

(a) OBSERVATION: A repair part for the amored oer V_,706,aslave cylindorh as been requisitioned through normal rilitary channels.The slave cylind..rs received had been modified and do not assemble prop-erly on the vehicle.

(b) EVALUATION: The slave cylinder FSU 2520-934-2340 differsfrom the original nodcl Installation of the modal received requiredthat it be mounted at a 90 deg-ce angle difer.3nt from the slave cylin.-der it rc'placed. Due to the lack of space and the difference in the A

mounting angle, the new models now being received through supply che.n-nols cannot be installed. An Equipment Improvenent Recorv-endation hasbeen submitted through channels. Modification at unit level can be madoon the slave cylinder to fit the ML-706 but it requires wolding thatsoneti cs distorts the cylinder and makes it non-repairable.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: A study be made to determine why the cyl-inder bracket u-s modified and how the old model can be obtained.

(6) Personnel Stretchers.

(a) OBEOATION: There is a need for armored cars D.706 to: carry :personnel stretchers.

(b) EVALUATION: The 560th MP ConDany has had two incidents dot-onstrating the need fXr t:.o stretcher. On one occasions an intoxicated

r ARVN soldier was struck by a UB Aznny vehicle. An 2-706 was on the scene.

An RF squad was ambushed near BN 34 on QL-19, with one man being crit-ically injured. Since a Dustoff helicopter could not be made availableSimmediaely, an Y-M706 transported the injured man to a imedical facility.

[ (c) RECOMI4ENATION: That personnel stretchers (litters) bemade an integral part of the arored car XA-706. They are easily mount-ed on the front of the vehicle.

I!(7) Rear Ens n i706 aiorod credodtefrn o th vhile

ing lr(ar o n rVoTION: Difficut vas boon experienced in Lvintain-

ing rear differentials on the 714-706.

[II CONFIDENTIAL

L

CONFIDENTIAL

AVBGF-IO 31 October 1970SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned, 93d Military Police Bat-


(b) EVALUATION: The M-706 roar difforential, Fodoral stocknxrtbor 2520-934-1736, Is unavailable through support nrintainnco char-ns,. A 2-ton truck rear differential, Federal stock nunber 2520-792-6098, has boon used as the replacement part. Although these have provedto be satisfactory, they do not have the saue life span as the ML-706rear differential.

(c) RECNEINDATION: That extra efforts be made to ra:e theXM-706 rear differential available.

(8) Tire rims for M4-706.

, CBSER-UVATIO;. Every time a unit has requisitioned tire,rim F S S 2530-287-5701, it h-as received a truck rim FSN 2530-934-2360.

(b) EVALUATION': Vhilo the truck rim is the sane size as theV!-706 rim, it has a different nunber of bolts and ill not fit the r-ored car, "Do Not Substitute" codes on requisitions and letters to themaintenango facility have brought no results.

(c) MCOM EUMTION: Determine at what level this substitute

item is listed and make necessary corrections.

g. Cc muncations:

(1) Improvement of the RT 524 radio.

(a) OBSERVATION: The A5100, A5200, or the A4300 modules inthe squelch or powor circuit on the RT 524 radio burn out if the vc-bicle is started whilo the rr.dio is on.

(b) EVALUATIQN: Often the operator of a vehicle forgets to'turn off the RT 524 radio before starting the vehicle. The startingof the raotor sends a surge of power into the RT 524 radio which de-stroys one of the modules in the s-uelch or power circuit. The replace-ment of this module cannot be accomplished at the orrnizatiohal leveland must be sent to support naintonanco for rejiaconent, thus doadlin-ing the radio up to 20 days.

(c) RECOM1EN4ATIO: That the followin- be studied:

(1) Incorporate a fuse in the power cable assembly set to blowat a lower ampora-e thon the modulos.

16CONFIDENTIAL

~i3

CONFIDENTIAL

AVBGF-IC 31 October 1970S1JBJE~T: poritiotnal Popei t-I,-- onls 1ccirnc, 3dIilitr Police Bat

tali., Pen :.' RndinF 31 October lc)'70, ROS OSPOP.-65 (-R2) (UI)

(2) Rcr-Autv tieo p-wer cable throughi the igniti!n systera so thatpower is divertoc~ froii the. raaio while the st~xtor solenoid is en1gagedas in covntional autcmtobiles,

(3) Inccrrc-ratc a su tch on the. dashbotrd that nust be in theposition "1on"' for the r:Aio) tc be operative but nu~t be in the "off"positicn fc-r tho strnrter srelonAci to bo-eoperative,

(2)Rolcat ~nof he ntcr n2 base and base q.-tension- .n the 11 51A

jeep,L

()OBSERVATION: When the antenhia is sceured forward, as isnorr-4a-ly tho caso for in-city driving, it is in continuous contact withthe canvrcs top at the rcar brace. The rai s not 'esigned for theantenna to be tio2. C-n nvirtholoss, it is Zeon,.;ally utilized in thatnanner.

(b EVALUATcON: The rubbin,7 of the antenna- against the cainvastop iill ocate a h :lo in a xvry short period2 of tine rendering the topun-serviccable or at a P.inimum will require consta nt re.pair,.

(c) RJEcoMIENDATIONS: That the antenna base and base extcnsionbe 'acunted to the sid~t of the vehicle instead of t the roar. In thisositinn thc. antenna dxsnot cor-e in contact writh the canvas top andbrace. It wiould net reouires side clearance anymore than is presentlyrequired by the side mirror.

(3) Cen'ao on T1-706 armored car.

(a)0MERVATIOIN: Problcms hnve been encountered in corzunica-tions on rmorpli earz, flue06 D to the radio's close ,,roxirxdty' to

teogisre, the RTC'z local-on in relatic-n to the radic , and the loudnoisc caused by an armrod vehicle, some type of ccrnunication helaictor headset nust be ttilizc, to elixrinate excessive noise and allow every.'enbor of t~o crow to nx-nitor the radio, and to c=;zranicato between then-

selves.

Wb EALUATION: 1lombero of the crews have utilized CVC hoj-nots,M4K 10303-6 fi thlesand H-14+0 G/R heAdsets with M-.80 C/V miicro-phones. Variouas prol-lemrs have boon ,ncc'untcrod in their usc:

(1) Tho G77C helmIjot (tanker's hchiot) has been found to be ox-tre' ely iinenfoi't blr, to tlcooo utii{n,:, it for an extended poricd oftine.

17

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL



(2) The 11K 1039-6 flight helmet has proven to bc the most prac-

tical and cornfortable. However, theso hol)nts utilize aximum outputof the amplfficr, thus overworking the entire intercom system.

(3) The H-140 G/R headset and microphone I1,480 C/V has been foundto be extromely uncomfortable, due to the fact that a stcol hek-ot mustbe worn over the head tand.

(c) RECENDATIO1: Thxt the Y1K 1039-6 flight hoLnet bo auth-orized and adopted by the United States Arny as an organic olanont ofthe M4-706 oc-munication system. It is further rec'mendod that thehelmet and the intercom control box of the armored car be nodifiod torender them adaptable to each ether.

1 Incl JAKM PJOrganization,l Chart LTC, MFC

Cawn-anding

DISTRIBUMTON:2 - Comandr-In-Chief, USIURPAC, ATTN: GROP-DT, APO 965583 - Conmranding General, USARV, ATTh: AVHGC-DST, APO 963075 - Commanding Oflicer, 16th IQ Gp, ATTh: AVBGF-B, APO 96349

18CONFIDENTIAL

I4

-AVBGF-B ~ ~ A -rOc 0 ltmSUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned, 93d Military Police Bat-


DA, HEADQUARTERS, i6TH MILITARY POLICE GROUP, APO 96349 16 November 1970

TO: Commanding General, 18th Military Police Brigade, ATTN: AVBGC-O,APO 96491

1. (U) The ORLL for the quarterly period ending 31 October 1970 for the93d Mlitary Police Battalion, APO 96238 is submitted.

2. (U) The report is considered adequate. The following comments referto the parts of the report indicated.

a. Reference paragraph 2a(l): Concur. A conscientious effort shouldbe made to make active service as attractive as possible to the individualserviceman and a comprehensive in-service education program would be astep in the right direction. This is particularly true at this time whenthe service is pushing an all volunteer army.

b. Reference paragraph 2a(2): Concur. Newly promoted E-5's shouldbe given an opportunity to sever the close friendships of his prior ser-vice by transferring to a new unit where he can establish the properrelationship with his subordinates.

c. Reference paragraph 2b(1): Concur. New tactics employed by enemyforces should be dieseminated to all forces in Vietnam on a continuingbasis.

d. Reference paragraph 2b(2): Concur. Billet areas should be illu-minated and guards should be posted when possible for security.

e. Reference paragraph 2c(l): Concur. New enem'y tactics should bedisseminated to all effectid branches on a continuing basis.

f. Reference paragraph 2c(2): Concur. Utilization of LOR aircraftis acceptable for this mission.

g. Reference paragraph 2c(3)- Concur. Convoy commanders should beaware of this tactic used by the enemV.

h. Reference paragraph 2c(4): Concur. Guidance should be publishedon the appropriate ievel to make units aware of their responsibilitiesfor deserters apprehended by the Military Police.

i. Reference paragraph 2e(l): Concur. An effort should be madeduring AIT to insure that only properly motivated and trained persennelare sent to the combat sone. Training in Vietnam should be held to theminimum essential to meet mandatory DA and USARV requirements.

19

iI

AVBGF-B (31 Oct 70) lot Ind 16 November 1970 -

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned, 93d ilitary Police Bat-taLin, Period Ending 31 October 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

J- Reference paragraph 2f(1): Concur. Defects in equipment shouldbe corrected by the manufacturer.

k. Reference paragraph 2f(2): Concur with need to develop a lockingdevice on barrel locking lever of M-60 machine gun. However, it is alsoincumbent on gunners to properly check equipment before beginning a mis-sion. This lever would then be found unsecure and could be secured.

1. Reference paragraph 2f(3): Concur. V-lOO's need same type wind-shield that can deflect rain and debris away from the drivers face. ]

a. Reference paragraph 2f(4): Concur. Poliahec steel mirrors wouldbe more practical for mirror boces. Stop watches should be added to MPunit TOE's as expendable items.

n. Reference paragraph 2f(5): Concur. AMC should make every effortto assure that proper repair parts are available for V-IO0's.

o. Reference paragraph 2f(6): Concur. Stretchers should be carried

on V-lOO's for use in handling casualties. This is being done by unitsof this Group and they have proved invaluable during enemy ambushes formoving casualties to safety in armored vehicles.

p. Reference paragraph 2f(7): Concur. Sufficient quantities ofproper repair parts shouid oe made available to preclude necessity forissue of substitute items.

q. Reference paragraph 2g(l): Concur. The instailation of therecanded modifications would preclude many time consuming deadlinesfor this critical communications equipment.

r. Reference paragraph 2g(2): Concur. This modification wou.Ldpreclude damage to vehicle canvas and save money.

s. Reference paragraph 2g(3): Concur. A headset incorporated intoa protective helmet is essential to proper and effective communicationson the V-sOO.

/t RLEN A. ILL'

COL~, 1MPC</ Commanding

CF: CO, 93d MP Bn

F20

rI

[]

IAWIGC-0 (31 0u 70) 2nd IndSU.JCT Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 93d Military Police Battalion,

Period Ending 31 October 1970, RCS CSFGR-65 (R2) (U)

afith ADQUARTIPS, 18TH MILITARY POLICE BRIGADE, APO 96491 19 December 1970

T,. Co _anding General, United States Army Vietnam, ATTk. AVHDO-DO, APO963,75

Ekzg- 8, paragraph 1g. The information in this paragraph, pertaining to then,2a:cn of the 66th nP Go as listed under Force Development should have beenn, under the Operations section (para id). The Force Development sectionaumo be re-tricted to actions pertaining to the restructure of units and the:,r-n'aticn of personnel and equipment authorizations IAW AR 310-49, TAADS.

Fnas been notified.

. Concur with all Lessons Learned.

Basic correspondence has been reviewed and is considered adequate.

-C.- THE COMAiDER:

GE ZF.o P2UUDFOTL

Go!,cnel, .0CDeput, Commander

0, 16th 1P GpGO, 93d MP Bn

21

AVHDO-DO (31 Oct 70) 3d IndSUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned, 93d Military Police Bat-


Headquarters, United States Army Vietnam, APO San Francisco 96375 ,

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT,APO 96558

1. This Headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learnedfor the quarterly period ending 31 October 1970 from Headquarters, 93dMilitary Police Battalion and comments of indorsing headquarters.

2. Comments follow:

a. Reference item concerning "The Loss of Potential Army Career Men,"page 9, paragraph 2a(l) and 1st Indorsement, paragraph 2a: concur with therecommendation stated in the 1st Indorsement, paragraph 2a. The current trendwithin the Army is towards more liberalized degree completion programs. Noaction by USARPAC or DA is recommended. Unit has been so advised.

b. Reference item concerning "Reassignments for newly promoted SergeantsE-5," page 10, paragraph 2a(2) and 1st Indorsement, paragraph 2b: concur withthe action proposed as stated in 1st Indorsement, paragraph 2b. No action byUSARPAC or DA is recommended.

c. Reference item concerning "M-73 Machine Guns," page 13, paragraph 2f(l)and 1st Indorsement, paragraph 2j: concur. The deficiency should be reportedto USA Weapons Command through submission of an Equipment Improvement Rec-ommendation (EIR) by the unit concerned. The unit has been informed to submitan EIR. Also, a technical representative from LAOV will &lso look into theproblem in the unit. No action by USARPAC or DA is recommended.

d. Reference item concerning "Barrel Locking Lever on the M-60 machine

gun," page 14, paragraph 2f(2) and 1st Indorsement, paragraph 2k: concur inpart with the recommendation. As part of prefiring procedures, firers shouldcheck to insure that the barrel is properly locked into position prior tofiring. This should be included as a part of unit operator training.Additionally, the unit has been informed to submit an Equipment ImprovementRecommendation (EIR) on the barrel locking lever for USA Weapons Command'sevaluation. No action by USARPAC or DA is recommended.

e. Reference item concerning "Windshields for XM4-706 Armored Car," page14, paragraph 2f(3) and 1st Indorsement, paragraph 21: concur. TACOM has

been testing such a windshield in Korea and reports of its use are favorable.TACOM plans a modification for vehicles in the future. No action by USARPACor DA is recommended.

2 2

AVDO-DO (31 Oct 70) 3d IndSUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned, 93d Military Police Bat-


f. Reference item concerning "Mirror Boxes," page 14, paragraph 2f(4)and 1st Indorsement, paragraph 2m: concur with comment that stop watchesnot be repaired in Vietnam. They can be obtained through supply withauthorization. Recommend 93d Military Police Battalion request MTOE.Nonconcur with comment that mirrors need be purchased on the economy.Recommend unit coordinate with supply support to find substitute item orreport the equipment on EIR as unsuitable for field use. Substitution ofpolished metal is considered an adequate field substitute. Unit has beenso advised.

g. Reference item concerning "Slave cylinders for XM-706 armored car,"page 15, paragraph 2f(5) and 1st Indorsement, paragraph 2n: concur. TACOMis currently studying this problem. ARVN V100 vehicles have been experiencing

the same difficulty. It appears that the newer cylinders procured under thesame FSN have different part numbers. This is further complicated by thevarious models of M-706 produced by Cadillac Gage. TACOM will inform this

command as soon as the problem is resolved. Unit has been so advised.

h. Reference item concerning "Personnel Stretchers," page 15, paragraph2f(6) and 1st Indorsement, paragraph 2o: nonconcur. While it is recognizedthat in some instances, a personnel stretcher could be a valuable asset,all the uses of the XM-706 vehicles would not justify this item. Commanders

at battalion or higher levels could authorize use of this item with theirown equipment if deemed appropriate. No action by USARPAC or DA isrecommended. Unit has been so advised.

i. Reference item concerning "Rear Ends on XM-706 armored car," page15, paragraph 2f(7) and 1st Indorsement, paragraph 2p: concur. Theseitems have been short in-country. ICCV currently has these items back-ordered in CONUS. TACOM is currently investigating the short life experiencedon this assembly. USARV is attempting to expedite shipments to fillrequisitions. Unit has been so advised.

J. Reference item concerning "Tire rims for XM-706," page 16, paragraph

2f(8): concur in that FSN 2530-287-5701 was an incorrect substitution forFSN 2530-934-2360. This discrepency was corrected by the CONUS NICP and a

contract for FSN 2530-934-2360 was let in November 1970. ETA of 62 eachFSN 2530-934-236o in USARV is May 1971. No action by USARPAC or DA isrecommended. Unit has been so advised.

k. Reference item concerning "Improvement of the RT 524 radio," page 16,paragraph 2g(l) and 1st Indorsement, paragraph 2q. Information and recommenda-tions have been submitted to USAECOM Area Office, RVN for evaluation.Recommend that all operators of Radio Sets AN/VRC-46 and AN/VRC-47 be giventraining and instruction on proper operation of radio sets to precludedamage to RT 524. Unit has been so advised.

23

AVHDO-DO (31 Oct 70) 3d IndSUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned, 93d Military Police Bat-


1. Reference item concerning "Relocation of the antenna base and baseextension on the M151A1 jeep," page 17, paragraph 2g(2) and 1st Indorse-merit, paragraph 2r. Information and recommendations have been submittedto USAECOM Area Office, RVN for evaluation. Recommend that a portion ofsplit rubber hose or similar material be placed on the canvas to preventdamage until proper evaluation can be made by USAECOM. Unit has been soadvised.

m. Reference item concerning "Commo on XM-706 armored car," page 17,paragraph 2g(3) and 1st Indorsement, paragraph 2s: nonconcur. The inter-communications system utilized in the M4-706 is the AN/VIC-l. Headset -Microphone H-161/U or H-161A/U is issued as part of the installation unitfor this intercom system. Use of Headset - Microphone H-161/U has notbeen attempted according to ORLL. TM 11-5965-262-13 dtd February 1966indicates that the H-161/U is designed to be worn under the M1 Infantry

Helmet. Unit has been so advised.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

r .Stevens Jr.

4GC; s I~,J, \Ajit~nt Gemnea.

Cy furn:18th MP Bde93d MP Bn

24

GPOP-DT (31 Oct 70) 4th Ind (U)SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, 93d Military Police Battalion for

Period Ending 31 October 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 4MAY 1971

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of theArmy, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters concurs in subject report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMIANDER IN CHIEF:

CPT., AGO

25

- 4

L

ORGANIZATrIDAL CHAPT

93 MS1

66D I 1271 M 560 MP 17 7

Qu NonFh jai~An Khe Qui NhonQu Io h I Ta u Ilo

l2fP 91 1 458 3 14' 981 I(SD) (PDR) ,(SD)

Phu Tai Qui N'hon Tuy Hoa

LEGEND

__________As!)iped

At tached

26

UNCLASSIFIED fiato i iisecurity ClassificFtio

DOCUMENT CONTROL DATA -R &D(Socurity classification, of filli. body of abstrcti and indexing '.notation munst be entered when the o,'et *epart is classified)

1. ORIGINATING ACTIVITY (Corporate *uthor) Ia.. REPORT SECURITY CLAiSIFICATION

11Q, OAGSFOR, DA, Waihington, D. C. 20310 4, GOU

J. REPOtR TITLE

Operational Report - Lessons Learned, HIQ, 93d Military Police Battalion4. DESCRIPTIVE NOTES (2yps of report and Inclusive date&)

Experiences of unfit engag edi oneis ency operations, 1 Aug to 31 Oct 70.5. AUTHOR(S (First noe...e,middle Initil, last no=#.)

CO, 93d Military Police Battalion

6. REPORT DATE 7a. TOTAL NO. OF PAGES j7b. No. OF REFS

31 October 1970 29114. CONTRACT OR GRANT NO. 5ORIGINATOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)

b. PROJECT NO.

704266NI

C.A 9b. OTH4ER REPORT NO( Any other rmmbors that zrisy be assigned

d.

10. D1STRIBUTION STAYZIJENT

F It. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES 12. SPONSORIONG MILITARY ACTIVITY

N/A OACSFOR, DA, Washington, D. C. 20310

13. ABSTRACT

RI

27

~3JFOR" A'D D-NOVIIII 73UNCLASSIFI ED

Security Classificton]

THIS REPORT HAS BEEN DELIMITED

AND CLEARED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE

UNDER DOD DIRECTIVE 5200.20 AND

NO RESTRICTIONS ARE IMPOSED UPON

ITS USE AND DISCLOSURE,

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A

APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELIASE;

DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED,

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AUTHORITY THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIEDcraft (2 PBRts, 1 Boston Whaler) are utilized during daylight hours. At Vung Re Bay, the primary security mission has been the security of petroleum