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The International History Review

ISSN: 0707-5332 (Print) 1949-6540 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rinh20

Austria-Hungary, Unrestricted Submarine Warfare,and the United States' Entrance into the FirstWorld War

Václav Hor[cbreve]i[cbreve]ka

To cite this article: Václav Hor[cbreve]i[cbreve]ka (2012) Austria-Hungary, UnrestrictedSubmarine Warfare, and the United States' Entrance into the First World War, The InternationalHistory Review, 34:2, 245-269, DOI: 10.1080/07075332.2011.626576

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/07075332.2011.626576

Published online: 02 Feb 2012.

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Austria-Hungary, Unrestricted Submarine Warfare, and the United

States’ Entrance into the First World War

Vaclav Horcicka*

This study shows that Austro-Hungarian policy toward the United States ofAmerica was in winter 1917 not primarily dictated by its German ally but by thesober evaluation of its own interests. The separate peace, which was offered by theWilson administration, was not a realistic foreign-policy option for the Austro-Hungarian monarchy. Therefore, this article shows why Austria-Hungary did notaccept US peace feelers. On the other hand, it also demonstrates that in the winterof 1917 Washington did not treat Germany and Austria-Hungary as equals, withthe latter being in a better position. But the monarchy’s acceptance of the Germancourse in the submarine war strengthened the perception of the monarchy as anappendage of the stronger Germany in the United States, and finally caused greatdamage to its reputation across the Atlantic.

Keywords: First World War; Austro-Hungarian foreign policy; US foreign policy,US–Austro-Hungarian relations

The dissolution of the Habsburg monarchy in 1918 was an event whose importancefor the history of Central Europe is not questioned today. A multi-national colossuswas replaced by smaller, more-or-less national, states that continued to cope forseveral years with the consequences of the monarchy’s end in the political, economic,and social arenas. We know so much about the dissolution of the DanubianEmpire that a question may be asked about what new can be said today about theend of Austria-Hungary. In the course of the ninety years which have elapsedsince the fall of the old monarchy, this subject has been treated by a series ofauthors both domestic and foreign, reliable and unreliable, eye-witnesses andprofessional historians. Nevertheless, certain important foreign-policy aspects of theprocess leading to the dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian Empire have not beensufficiently taken into consideration. Among such aspects include the relations ofAustria-Hungary and the United States before the latter entered the war in April1917.

It is so in spite of the fact that, as this study will demonstrate, until theinterruption of diplomatic relations in April 1917, Washington was much more

*Email: vhorcicka@volny.czI would like to thank Igor Lukes, Marija Wakounig, and Jan Zupanic for the valuablesuggestions and support they provided me with during the development of this article. I alsoacknowledge the comments and suggestions of the anonymous readers of The InternationalHistory Review. This article could not have been written without the support of the CzechScience Foundation (research project no. 409/03/P013), Czech Ministry of Education(research project MSM 0021620827), and the J. William Fulbright Commission in Prague,thanks to whom I was able to conduct long-term research in the Austrian and US archives.

The International History Review

Vol. 34, No. 2, June 2012, 245–269

ISSN 0707-5332 print/ISSN 1949-6540 online

� 2012 Taylor & Francis

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interested in Vienna’s official positions and the economic situation of the HabsburgEmpire than in the requests from individual Austro-Hungarian nations andnationalities.

Although we know a lot about the support of Wilson’s administration to ‘theoppressed nations of the Monarchy,’ nearly none of the specialized publications hasdealt with the relations of Austria-Hungary and the United States at the official level.US historians Victor S. Mamatey and later Betty M. Unterberger best achieved thisobjective.1 Nevertheless, these two authors concentrated on US policy vis-a-vis exilerepresentations of discontented nations; the official Viennese and Austrian archivesplayed only a secondary part in their thinking. The latter applies also to amonumental biography of several volumes of President Wilson written by Arthur S.Link.2 This gap continues to exist even in the more recent texts from US andAustrian historians. For example, Kendrick A. Clements, in his biography ofPresident Wilson, mentions Austria-Hungary only twice and even then onlygenerally.3 August Heckscher, in another biography of President Wilson, paidnearly no attention to the relations between the United States and Austria-Hungary in the eventful period of early 1917. In Heckscher’s opinion, it wasalready clear then that ‘there was to be . . . no possibility of saving from finaldissolution an Austro-Hungarian empire’ and therefore Wilson’s talks with themonarchy in the winter 1917 were a mistake.4 Austrian historian ManfriedRauchensteiner, in his book on the dissolution of Austria-Hungary, provides verylittle new information on the subject of Austro-Hungarian-US relations at theinterpretive and factual levels.5

Nor has this gap been filled by studies published in journals. Although thereexists a series of studies on the policy of the Wilson administration vis-a-vis CentralEurope,6 only some of them deal with the relations between Washington and officialVienna. Among these, let us mention an exceptional older study by Davis on thecontext of submarine warfare in 1915.7 The reasons for the United States’ entranceinto the war have been dealt with more recently by Priscilla Roberts, for example,who emphasizes the moral and ideological motives of key participants of US policy.8

However, she has dealt only marginally with relations between the United States andthe Central Powers.

Thus, historians adopted a somewhat unkind attitude regarding Austro-Hungarian relations with the United States, which makes it all the more surprisingsince it involves two Great Powers. Moreover, the two countries maintaineddiplomatic relations until April 1917, and it was not until December 1917 that theUnited States declared war against Austria-Hungary. Historians’ lack of interest isstriking also because there exists quite ample literature on German–US relationsduring the First World War.9

Hence, relations between the two countries continue to be an important topic ofhistorical research, and not just because this topic has received so little attention.Especially for Austria-Hungary, its relations with the United States acquired a fatalimportance during the war. Washington, too, began to deal with matters related tothe Habsburg Empire to an increasingly greater extent. In 1917–8 it was undoubtedlyone of the important subjects of its policy.

This was so in spite of the fact that the monarchy manifested its great viabilityduring the war, contrary to the statements of the exile representations and, as thisarticle will demonstrate, of the diplomatic missions in Vienna and Berlin. USAmbassador at Vienna, Frederic Courtland Penfield, predicted as early as April 1916

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that Austria-Hungary would see its economy collapse; however, the end of themonarchy came more than a year later than he had foreseen.10

The United States played an important part in the decision-making processesthat would determine the destiny of the monarchy. They were the strongest power inthe West, which for several reasons maintained neutrality until 1917. In fact, theUnited States supported the war efforts of the Entente and took a very critical standespecially on Germany whose activities at sea directly endangered the lives of UScitizens. In the summer of 1915, a confidant of President Woodrow Wilson, ColonelEdward House, sent a letter, with Wilson’s approval, to the US Ambassador in Italy,Thomas N. Page: ‘Our hopes, our aspirations and our sympathies are closely wovenwith the democracies of France and England, and it is this that causes our hearts andpotential economic help to go out to them and not the fear of what may follow for usin their defeat.’11

Austria-Hungary realized that its position in Washington was better than that ofGermany, but despite its conviction, it was unable to make use of this for its benefit.A question remains whether the monarchy really enjoyed a better reputation thanGermany or whether it was due to a certain lack of interest of the administration andpublic opinion in Austria-Hungary. Among the reasons could have been the fact thatAustria-Hungary’s activities in the military and diplomatic field were scarcelyinconsistent with the policy of Wilson’ administration as well as with the opinions ofthe majority of the press on the US east coast. Moreover, many influentialAmericans were convinced that Austria-Hungary was dependent on Germany, whichin fact directed its foreign policy, and were not much concerned about it.12 Thiswidespread belief, consistent with the statements of the exile representations of someAustro-Hungarian nations, needs to be further investigated. This study willdemonstrate that not even Wilson’s administration, in spite of what has been saidabove, was sure as to the position of Austria-Hungary vis-a-vis Germany and did itsbest to launch peace negotiations with it.

At the turn of 1916/7 submarine warfare was the key topic of Austro-Hungarian-US relations. That is why this article further responds to the questions:Why did Vienna not do more to distance itself from Berlin in this matter, and whydid it accept the break in diplomatic relations with the United States in April 1917?In the winter of 1917, did the Empire really have an opportunity to accept theproposals of Wilson’s administration that it withdraw from the war in time, thuspreventing the subsequent catastrophe of 1918? So far the general opinion has beenthat although the Habsburg monarchy adopted a more careful position withthe United States than Berlin, it was allegedly not able to win out over itsdominant ally.

This article proves that the key factor in the decision-making process of theEmpire was not pressure from Berlin, but instead a sober evaluation of its owninterests.

I.

The resumption of unrestricted submarine warfare by Germany as of 1 February1917, was from today’s point of view a truly fatal decision. The President of theUnited States of America, Woodrow Wilson, did not hold back this time, insteadissuing a sharp response and interrupting diplomatic relations with Berlin. The era ofUS neutrality in First World War was over. However, with regard to its relations

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with Austria-Hungary, Wilson chose different tactics. There were several reasonsfor that.

Austria-Hungary was undoubtedly a weaker member in the alliance of the‘Central Powers.’ As early as in autumn 1914, interesting but unsuccessful effortswere made regarding a possible US peace mediation between the then Austro-Hungarian Ambassador to Washington, Constantin Dumba, and President Wilson’sadviser, Colonel House.13

In the dispute over the method of waging submarine warfare, Vienna outwardlyadopted the German position, but in reality it attempted to make Berlin modify itspolicy. Austro-Hungarian Ambassador to the United States, Constantin Dumba,had already made an effort in May 1915 to prevent an impending rift between theUnited States and Germany. Relations between Washington and Berlin haddeteriorated after the sinking of the British ocean liner Lusitania, which resultedin the death of about 120 US citizens. With Vienna’s approval, Dumba proposed acompromise to the then US Secretary of State, William J. Bryan – Germany was toguarantee the security of passenger transport and in return, war supplies would ceaseto be transported on passenger ships.14 Unfortunately, Dumba’s intervention failed.Berlin refused a compromise regarding the submarine warfare because at the time itdid not believe the United States would enter the war.15 Dumba’s effort at damagecontrol resulting from the sinking of the Lusitania not only did not bring about thedesired result, but caused a deterioration of the monarchy’s position in the USSecretary of State Bryan, who disagreed with President Wilson’s hardline anti-German stance, was compromised by statements which questioned the seriousness ofthe crisis, which he had allegedly expressed during a conversation with Dumba, andin June 1915 he resigned.16 Dumba’s reputation was also harmed. Bryan’s successoras Secretary of State, Robert Lansing, believed the Ambassador had caused Bryan tomake the precipitate statements by ‘one of (Dumba’s) frank but tricky expressions.’17

Besides the unsuccessful efforts to reduce the tension between the United Statesand Germany, Austro-Hungarian diplomats joined Berlin and participated inactivities intended to reduce US military production. The reason was the growingsupplies of war materials provided to the countries of the enemy Entente. In thismatter, Vienna was even more pro-active than Germany in its diplomatic effortsduring the summer of 1915, and in June 1915 submitted an official protest inWashington.18

American Ambassador to Germany, James W. Gerard, who was certain thatthere existed a vassal/lord relationship between Austria-Hungary and Germany,erroneously thought the real author of the protest had been Berlin.19 In reality, thenote had been prepared on its own initiative by the Austro-Hungarian ForeignMinistry and only the completed text was communicated to Germany.20 This eventclearly shows that the US diplomats had already been convinced about theDanubian monarchy’s dependence on Germany as far back as 1915.

In fact, Austria-Hungary was not necessarily more conciliatory vis-a-vis theUnited States than Germany was, neither did it blindly follow Berlin’s course.Whereas it was generally more willing to compromise on the rules of submarinewarfare, it was not so in the case of US war supplies being sent to the enemy.Ambassador Dumba actively took part in the organization of sabotage acts in theUS armament industry in the spring and summer of 1915, which was unlike hisGerman colleague, Count Johann Heinrich von Bernstorff, who put his militaryattache, Captain Franz von Papen, in charge of the activities. Dumba especially

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concentrated on the support of strike movement in armories, which employed manyimmigrants from Austro-Hungarian territories. His plans were supported by theAustro-Hungarian Foreign Minister, Baron Stephan (Istvan) Burian.21

Due to communication problems with Vienna in August of 1915, Dumba madethe decision to confide part of his correspondence with the Foreign Ministry to afriendly US journalist, Francis J. Archibald, who was to deliver them to MinisterBurian. However, pressed for time, Dumba was not able to encode some of hisreports, and the documents were confiscated by Britons during Archibald’s journeyto Europe.22 Later, London used these materials to discredit the Austro-Hungarianmonarchy with the United States. Because of the affair, Dumba was forced to leaveUS territory at the beginning of October 1915.23 The publication of the informationon the Ambassador’s subversive action seriously damaged relations between Austria-Hungary and the United States.24

After Dumba’s forced departure, the position of the Austro-HungarianAmbassador to the United States remained vacant for a year and a half and thediplomatic mission in Washington was headed by Charge d’affaires Baron ErichZwiedinek. His conduct was much more careful than that of his predecessor andespecially, as was appreciated by Robert Lansing, he largely reduced the disreputableactivities of the Austro-Hungarian diplomatic and consular missions in the UnitedStates.25 Nevertheless, shortly after he took up the post, Zwiedinek had to cope withanother serious crisis in mutual relations. The crisis developed after the sinking of anItalian passenger ship Ancona, in the Mediterranean on 7 November 1915 by aGerman submarine sailing under the Austro-Hungarian flag. German submarineshad been operating under this cover with the official approval of the Austro-Hungarian maritime command since the spring of 1915, from bases in Cattaro andPola in the Adriatic Sea. At issue, amongst others, was that Germany, unlikeAustria-Hungary, was not at war with Italy and its submarines were therefore notsupposed to attack Italian ships.26 Nine US citizens died in the attack on theAncona.27 In a protest note to Vienna dated 6 December 1915, the United Statesdescribed the attack as a ‘wanton slaughter of defenseless non-combatants’ andcalled for the punishment of the commander of the submarine along withcompensation for the injured and the families of those killed.28 The President’scounsel, Colonel Edward Mandell House, even recommended that Wilson andLansing interrupt diplomatic relations with Austria-Hungary.29

In the ensuing rift, Vienna decided to take responsibility for the activities of theGerman submarine while at the same time defending them. In reaction toWashington’s harshly worded protest note to Austria-Hungary, reiterating itsearlier views regarding submarine warfare voiced during the rift with the Germansafter the sinking of the Lusitania, Minister Burian proceeded without consultingBerlin, and in a sharp response refused to give in.30

Good news from the battlefields probably also contributed to Vienna’saggressiveness. Austria-Hungary, with the help of the Allies, had just definitivelydefeated Serbia after over a year at war. This moment saw a somewhat paradoxicalsituation as Berlin, which refused to compensate the US for the sinking of theLusitania, urged Vienna to change its position. Otherwise, German Secretary of StateGottlieb von Jagow feared that diplomatic relations between Austria-Hungary andthe United States could be interrupted. Although the Austro-Hungarian Ambassa-dor at Berlin, Prince Gottfried zu Hohenlohe-Schilligsfurst, admitted such a risk, hehoped that ‘Americans would grow wiser rather than risk the interruption of

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relations.’31 The Prince probably expressed the prevailing opinion of theBallhausplatz, the seat of the Austro-Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs – thatthe Monarchy needed to act as an independent power and delimit its position vis-a-vis Germany in spite of the temporary deterioration of relations with the UnitedStates. The Ballhausplatz believed that the Americans would not adopt any drasticmeasures. Luckily, it was not necessary to test this theory.

In the end, Austria-Hungary gave in. The United States had in fact refused toaccept their note of 15 December as a basis for an improvement in mutual relations,instead escalating the mutual controversy. In their second note to Vienna of 18December 1915, they insisted on their requirements.32 The pressure fromWashington and Berlin eventually made Burian change his standpoint. Viennathen prepared the second note with the co-operation of the German Foreign Office.In it, Vienna pledged to punish the captain and compensate the passengers of theAncona and the families of the deceased.33 A question remains whether the UnitedStates would have really interrupted the diplomatic relations with Vienna if theanswer had been less satisfactory. President Wilson hesitated to make such a move.34

Burian’s second note marked a turnaround in Austro-Hungarian policy vis-a-visthe United States. Vienna adopted a much more positive stance regarding submarinewarfare than Berlin. Burian probably came to the conclusion that the risk of aconfrontation with the United States was much greater than the Ballhausplatz hadthought, and continued to maintain his positive conduct after the investigation of theAncona case. He later called on the Germans to stop their submarines operatingunder the Austro-Hungarian flag in attacking ‘enemy and neutral passenger ships.’35

Paradoxically, thanks to pressure from Berlin, Austria-Hungary strengthened itsposition as an independent power by having provided a positive response to thepressure from Washington.36

This trend continued into 1916. In the famous controversy regarding the sinkingof the merchant ship Sussex, Austria-Hungary applied considerable pressure onBerlin, prompting it to submit to the requirements of Wilson’s administration.37

However, the Brusilov Offensive and Romania’s entrance into the war (August 1916)weakened Vienna’s position towards Germany, which in the summer of 1916 vetoedVienna’s efforts on the Austro-Polish solution to the Polish question.38

In spring 1916, the Austro-Hungarian command made a serious mistake byunderestimating the Russians and, despite German protests, weakened the EasternFront due to a planned offensive in the South Tyrol. A catastrophe at the EasternFront was prevented by units the Germans had recalled from the Western Front.The mistake of the Austro-Hungarian command was therefore one of the causes,even if not the most important one, of the failure of the German offensive at Verdun,launched in February 1916 and still in progress in the summer. The disappointmentof the consequences of the Brusilov Offensive, which began in June 1916, led to apartial loss of independence of the Austro-Hungarian command. As of September1916, the Unified High Command took control of the Eastern Front. GermanEmperor William II was named Commander-in-Chief but in reality the commandwas entrusted to the new German General Staff Chief, Paul von Hindenburg, andQuartermaster General of the German Army, Erich Ludendorff. It was a veryimportant decision that reduced Vienna’s room for maneuver.39

In spite of that, Austria-Hungary was not a yielding vassal of Berlin andcontinued the arguments on the method of warfare. It thereby supported theGerman political administration in its fight with the megalomaniac ideas of the army

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command. At Vienna’s Foreign Ministry, a very critical response to the plans ofGerman military circles was to be heard.40

When, at the end of August 1916, Austro-Hungarian Foreign Minister BaronBurian learned about the German Admiralty’s intention to resume the use ofunrestricted submarine warfare, he warned Berlin that the United States wouldimmediately declare war on Germany.41 Because rumors about German prepara-tions did not cease, the Minister decided in October 1916 to intervene directly withthe German Chancellor, Theobald von Bethmann Hollweg. He pointed to thepossible entrance of the United States into the war and called upon the Chancellor towait until the result of the US presidential elections in November.42

Though von Bethmann Hollweg assured Burian that Berlin’s position had notchanged and the use of unrestricted submarine warfare was not on the agenda, Viennadid not forget about this dangerous possibility.43 The discussions between Vienna andBerlin on waging submarine warfare did not remain concealed from the US press. Inmid-November, The New York Times informed its readers that Burian had called forcaution from the Germans and feared a dispute with the United States.44

The reference to the presidential elections was made, in fact, as President Wilsondid not want to give up the opportunity to mediate in the war. Secretary of StateRobert Lansing was in September 1916 ‘almost unhappy’ about the President’scritical stance toward Great Britain which continued breaching the United States’rights at sea. The President allegedly did not realize that the criticism of London wassteering him into Germany’s arms. The Secretary of State was skeptical aboutWilson’s considerations on possible war mediation, which were allegedly supportedby Colonel House.45

In mid-October 1916, when in spite of the Chancellor’s assurance to the contrary,upon receiving news of a possible proclamation of unrestricted submarine warfare,Burian attempted to avoid a catastrophe in the form of the United States’intervention in the war and asked his most important ally to work up a peaceoffering from the Central Powers to the Entente. At the same time, he demanded thatthe Central Powers propose ‘modest’ peace terms. The Germans refused to announcethe terms of peace, but in mid-November 1916 Burian, at a meeting with the Germanadministration in Berlin, re-enforced the idea of a peace proposal.46

Burian told the November conference in Berlin he thought it was a mistake not toannounce the terms of peace. He argued, among other things, that they could affectthe public opinion in neutral countries. In vain did he try during the talks to convincethe Germans to reduce their territorial claims on France and Belgium. Clearly, theAustro-Hungarian minister was not able to change Germany’s position because hepersonally insisted on the annexation of Montenegro by Austria-Hungary and onconvenient (from the monarchy’s point of view) modifications of borders with Italy.German Chancellor and representatives of the German Foreign Office realized theclaims of the Central Powers were greater than the Entente was willing to accept andtherefore insisted on keeping the terms of peace secret, and even questioned thenecessity of their existence for their internal needs. Since the Central Powers had amore optimistic view of the peace conditions with the Entente, Berlin’s decision not tomake them public can be described as more realistic than Burian’s view. Viennawould have been right only if it had renounced all greater annexations andindemnities.

Shortly after the conference in Berlin on 21 November 1916, Emperor FranzJoseph I died in the Schonbrunn Palace in Vienna. His grandnephew Charles

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ascended the throne. The new Emperor was ready to terminate a war for which hewas not directly responsible at the earliest possible moment.47 The Emperor hadintended to make major personnel changes in key offices, but during the first monthof his reign he entrusted Baron Burian with administering foreign-affairs policy.Thus Burian pursued negotiations with Berlin on the peace initiative of theQuadruple Alliance.

At the time of the change on the throne in Vienna, the Germans were informedthat the newly re-elected President Wilson soon intended to come up with his ownproposal for the termination of the war in Europe. According to someinterpretations, von Bethmann Hollweg and especially the newly appointedSecretary of State, Arthur Zimmermann, wanted to prevent the President’s initiativeand hence agreed with their partners in the Central Powers on the speedytransmission of a peace note.48 This version was confirmed also by reporting fromthe US embassy in Berlin.49 In reality it was Austria-Hungary that insisted on thespeedy transmission of the peace note.50

In spite of Burian’s repeated reminders, it was the Germans who won the play fortime, and the peace offering was submitted after the fall of Bucharest on 8 December1916. From the point of view of Austro-Hungarian–US relations, the mostimportant fact was that for the US administration, the peace note of the QuadrupleAlliance could not be (or was not supposed to be) a surprise. Thus, on 12 December1916 President Wilson was confronted with a sudden, but not surprising, move byone of the parties in the war.

The White House was annoyed with the offer of the Central Powers.Nevertheless, the President decided to continue the preparation of his own peaceinitiative.51 Fears of a possible joining of the two initiatives are clearly demonstratedin Lansing’s 18 December 1916 note to the governments of the warring countriesthat introduced the President’s action plan for peace. The President did not officiallypropose the convocation of a peace conference nor did he offer himself as amediator. He merely asked the countries at war to declare their terms of peace.52

A response to the President’s action was already being prepared by the formerenvoy to Bucharest, Count Ottokar Czernin, whom the Emperor had appointedForeign Minister on 22 December 1916. He and the Emperor agreed on the need fora speedy termination of the war.

Czernin was not a career diplomat who had come up through the ranks. Hisappointment as an envoy to Bucharest shortly before the war was due to thepatronage of the successor to the throne. His ties to the assassinated ArchdukeFrancis Ferdinand irritated Hungarian governing circles.53 He was authoritative,moody, and often nervous; he ‘constantly oscillated between pessimism andoptimism, one day he viewed the situation as promising and the next day asclearly lost.’54 He was, however, an excellent speaker and partner in conversationwho was able to captivate his listeners. In the summer of 1916 Czernin hadproclaimed the termination of the war on the basis of the territorial status quoante bellum, and he became a confidant of the then successor to the throne,Archduke Charles.55

After taking up his post, Czernin, in line with his previous statements, made aneffort towards a compromise general peace.56 Together with the Emperor theycriticized the German war policy and requested the conclusion of peace. In March1917 the new Foreign Minister allegedly told one of the leaders of the Hungarianopposition, Count Mihaly Karolyi, he would do anything to maintain its

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independent position of the Monarchy in its dealings with Germany. Thiscommitment was one of the reasons why the Emperor chose Czernin for the post.57

Czernin’s relatively weak position in Hungarian governing circles caused theastonishment of the US embassy and even very well informed people in Viennaabout his nomination.58

During the year 1917, relations between Charles I and his Foreign Ministergradually deteriorated. Therefore, Czernin was not informed in advance about the 2July 1917 amnesty of political crimes.59 As a result, the Czech leaders Karel Kramarand Alois Rasın, who were in 1916 sentenced to death for treason, but not executed,were released from prison.

Czernin came from an old Bohemian aristocratic family yet did not support therequirements of the Czech political representation for self-government. Instead, he,along with many Bohemian/Austrian aristocrats, clearly sided with Austria. In thewinter and spring of 1917, Czernin encouraged the policy of centralization, whichwas pursued by his personal friend, Austrian Prime Minister Count Heinrich Clam-Martinic.60 Despite the many sudden changes in his political tactics, he was not infavor of concessions which the young Emperor had made to the politicalrepresentation of the various nations of the Habsburg monarchy. In summer 1917,Czernin opposed Charles’ decision to summon a special parliamentary committee fora revision of the Austrian (Cisleithanian) constitution. He was afraid that this andother liberalization measures could provoke a revolutionary situation, thusbeginning a decomposition of the whole state.61

Charles’s and Czernin’s start in their posts was closely watched on the other sideof the Atlantic. It was to be expected that the Emperor would change the Empire’sforeign policy. Attention was drawn to the fact the brothers of the new Empress Zita,princes Sixtus and Xavier of the Parma Bourbons, served in the Belgian Army.62 Theattention paid to the princes was justified. The first was later used by the EmperorCharles as an intermediary to the governments of the Entente, to whom the Emperorin the winter of 1917 made large concessions, especially at the expense of his Germanally; he confirmed, among other things, France’s claim to Alsace-Lorraine. Whenthis fact emerged in public in April 1918, it caused the crisis that gave a final blow tothe monarchy’s reputation in the United States.63

Vienna accepted Wilson’s move with mixed feelings. Czernin viewed it as‘gratifying,’ but at the same time feared an excessive influence of the neutralcountries, especially the United States, on possible peace negotiations with theEntente, which he hoped would be initiated on the basis of the offering of the CentralPowers. Unlike Burian, Czernin was radically against making the terms of peacepublic before the launch of the negotiations. Just like the Germans, he thought theirpublication would completely thwart the seriously meant debate with the Entente.64

Yet, he did not share German fears that Wilson’s move had been arranged withGreat Britain in order to provide an opportunity for the Entente to withdraw fromthe ‘current difficult situation.’65

These concerns were not fully ungrounded. On 21 December Secretary of StateLansing declared the United States was approaching the end of the war. Lansingaimed to assure the Entente there was no reason to worry and that the United Stateswould eventually intervene militarily in its favor.66 Lansing was personallyconvinced that ‘when we do go into this war. . . we must go in on the side of theAllies, for we are a democracy.’67 The economics clearly played only a minor role forhim, as well as for House and even for Wilson.68 Though Wilson’s initial angry

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reaction was to remove Lansing from office, he later contented himself with forcinghim to issue an explanatory statement.69

The reaction of the Entente to Wilson’s initiative was, as Lansing hadanticipated, an adverse one.70 Still, the Entente sent an official reply to Wilson aslate as mid-January 1917. Before that, the Entente had rejected the peace offering ofthe Central Powers. The Entente did not want to accept the ‘German peace’ at aninopportune moment when fighting was conducted mainly on its territory.71 Thechances of success of Wilson’s initiative were unquestionably thwarted by the peaceoffering of the Central Powers with which the initiative was associated even inneutral European countries. Wilson’s assertions that it was neither a peace offeringnor an attempt for peace mediation were not taken seriously.72

Austria-Hungary responded to Wilson’s initiative on 26 December 1916. Vienna,along with the Germans, suggested calling for a conference of the representatives ofboth parties on neutral ground.73 The rejection of the Central Powers’ peace offeringby the Entente, together with the unwillingness of the Central Powers to present theirterms of peace to Wilson, formed a very dangerous situation at the end of 1916. TheGermans decided to launch their unrestricted submarine warfare while Wilsoncontinued to hope for ending the war through negotiations until its officialproclamation at the end of January 1917.

II.

Owing to rapid changes in the foreign-policy situation, Count Czernin had toimmediately take control of Austro-Hungarian foreign policy. Directly after he tookup his post, he asked for an elaboration of the current assessment of the course of thesubmarine campaign.74 Czernin was not surprised by the adverse position of theEntente. Nevertheless, he agreed with the intention of continuing discussions withthe governments of the enemy countries with the neutral countries acting asintermediaries. His principal goal was ‘not to tear the tissue woven by Baron Burianand to be able to pursue the support of the world-spread peace movement.’ He hadgrounds in fearing that the military command would again take over in Berlin.75 TheGermans indeed refused to co-operate.

On 9 January 1917, still prior to the publication of the Entente’s response toWilson’s peace initiative, in a victory over Germany’s political leadership, theGerman army command reached their goal and put through the resumption of theunrestricted submarine warfare. The decision was made with no regard to the well-known adverse statement of the Danubian monarchy. Czernin was most alarmed.The second sectional head of the Foreign Ministry, Baron Ludwig Flotow, wasimmediately sent to Berlin. Secretary of State Zimmermann, in a conversation withFlotow, promptly admitted that the resumption of unrestricted submarine warfarewas being considered in order to mitigate the Entente’s expected offensive at theWestern Front. Flotow warned Zimmermann that in case of the United States, ‘wehave got to do with the Anglo-Saxon race which – when it decided for a war – wagesit energetically and tenaciously.’76

The monarchy’s situation was also badly affected by the 10 January 1917response of the Entente to Wilson’s peace initiative, in which it stated its warobjectives. The Entente requested, among others, the restitution of Belgium, Serbia,and Montenegro, and especially the ‘liberation of the Italians, Rumanians, Slavs andCzechoslovaks’ from foreign government. The Entente’s war objectives represented a

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direct danger to the further existence of Austria-Hungary. Czernin believed theenemy aimed to ‘destroy the Austro-Hungarian monarchy and Turkey.’77 Theresponse the countries of the Entente gave to Wilson’s peace initiative boostedBerlin’s erroneous assumption that the United States would not get into a world wardue only to unrestricted submarine warfare.78

In this situation, relations with the United States gained importance and for themoment, the US President was not planning to support the Ententes requirements.He did not view his December initiative as failed and decided to make a speech in theSenate in which he would outline his ideas on the post-war world order. Wilsondeclared that peace enforced on the defeated could not be permanent, called for theconclusion of ‘peace without victory,’ and attempted to revive his unsuccessful peaceinitiative from December 1916. These were not just ‘real political’ considerations; thespeech can be described as very ideological. The President spoke amongst otherthings about the equality of small and large nations and repeated, in a moremoderate form, his previous requirement for the right of self-determination ofoppressed nations.79

Vienna considered the President’s speech ambiguous and definitely did not intendto give the Monarchy’s nations the right to self-determination. However, Viennawelcomed some passages of the President’s speech, namely the access to the seawhich it might lose if the war objectives of the Entente in the Balkans were realized,and it was especially content with the key requirement to conclude peace withoutvictors and vanquished. Czernin was convinced Wilson had adopted a moralobligation to influence the Entente to agree with peace based on this principle.80

The Austro-Hungarian press published the full text of Wilson’s speech. Thecomments were mostly skeptical, though. For example, the paper Pester Lloyd wrotethat peace without the victorious and the defeated was not possible. His unjustifiedargument against Wilson’s focus on the rights of small nations was that Hungary is acountry that enjoyed peaceful harmony among its nations.81

However, Vienna’s official reaction to Wilson’s speech of 22 January 1917 was awelcoming one. To Berlin’s great dissatisfaction, Czernin agreed with the President’sproposal to conclude peace without victors or vanquished, annexations orindemnities.82 Zimmermann viewed Czernin’s move as an incentive for Wilson tomake distinctions among the Central Powers and to drive a wedge between them.83

In the meantime, the Germans continued to insist on the start of unrestrictedsubmarine warfare and their stance was not changed even by the top-levelnegotiations held in Vienna on 20 January 1917. Czernin, Hungarian Prime MinisterCount Istvan Tisza, Austrian Prime Minister Count Heinrich Clam-Martinic andothers urgently warned the German delegation lead by Zimmermann of theconsequences of the United States’ possible entrance into the war and were skepticalabout the capabilities of German submarines. Czernin proposed continuing the useof submarine warfare in its existing, limited form. It was in fact thanks to the use ofmore submarines that the Germans, in spite of certain limitations, were in theautumn of 1916 able to largely increase the volume of tonnage sunk.84 On the otherhand, German admirals had to take into account the immense importance of USsupplies to the war efforts of the Entente. Priscilla Roberts writes that at the end of1916, a total of 60 per cent of British war material ‘came from North Americansources.’85

As no consensus was agreed upon, Czernin left it up to the two Emperors todecide.86 At the meeting of the joint Ministerial (sometimes referred to as ‘Crown’)

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Council it was decreed, in the presence of the Emperor, that the Monarchy wouldjoin the Germans, although in fact against its will.87

The fact that the Emperor and Czernin did not seize the opportunity and openlydisavow the unrestricted submarine warfare was later criticized by former ForeignMinister Burian, among others. But the question remains whether such a movewould have been appropriate.88 It is very likely that a serious rift with Germanywould have followed, as without Germany’s bases in the Adriatic Sea, the submarinewarfare would not have been effective. Moreover, it was necessary to take intoaccount the opposition of the Hungarian Prime Minister Tisza who, although he hadnot agreed with the launch of unrestricted submarine warfare, believed openresistance to it would not make German military circles change their position, andeven an ostentatious non-participation would not bring anything positive for theMonarchy.89 It was namely for the above reasons that Austria-Hungary consentedto the unrestricted submarine warfare enforced by Germany and not because, asVictor Mamatey, among others, wrote, that it had been ‘completely dependent’ onGermany.90

The declaration of unrestricted submarine warfare offended the US President, asshortly before that he had made his unprecedented peace speech in the Senate. On 1February 1917, after Wilson learned about the content of the German note (he hadnot yet received the Austro-Hungarian note), he became depressed. At a meetingwith Lansing and House Wilson decided to curtail diplomatic relations withGermany, in light of the shock he had received. To House’s great surprise, Lansingagreed with his and the President’s intention of maintaining contacts with Austria-Hungary. The participants of the meeting came to the same conclusion: that it wouldbe worth trying to engage Vienna in talks on a separate peace.91

For Lansing, the move of the Central Powers came as no surprise. Soon after thePresident’s speech in the Senate, he wrote down in his diary that the declaration ofunrestricted submarine warfare was approaching. He counted on a crisis in relationswith Germany and believed the Unites States was, unlike his criticized Decemberstatement according to which they were merely approaching the war, ‘on the verge ofwar.’92 He even hoped Germany would declare unrestricted submarine warfare‘because . . . the Allies in the West are having a hard time and Russia is notsucceeding in spite of her manpower. The Allies must not be defeated. It would meanthe triumph of Autocracy over Democracy, the shattering of all our moral standards,and a real, albeit remote, peril to our independence and institutions.’93

It was in these most tense times that the new Austro-Hungarian AmbassadorCount Adam Tarnowski von Tarnow arrived in the United States. His appointmentto the office had been considered by Vienna since the spring 1916.94 The Count hadjust turned fifty years old and had had a flourishing diplomatic career. In 1899–1901he served as counselor to the mission in Washington and unlike his predecessorDumba, knew about US life and its institutions. He had a very good reputation.Count Czernin writes about him in his memoirs, ‘he was one of the best and mostcompetent Austro-Hungarian diplomats.’95

Lansing and Penfield considered Tarnowski a good choice.96 Wilson agreed tothe official Austro-Hungarian request on 30 October 1916, and the Austro-Hungarian Foreign Ministry announced to the press.97 However, the Ambassador’sdeparture for the United States was delayed, and happened only after the newEmperor’s accession to the throne and after the replacement of the Foreign Minister.Though ready to head for Washington in mid-December, this plan was hindered by

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the Entente’s unwillingness to allow him passage.98 Lansing insisted that the UnitedStates uphold its rights as a neutral country in the matter.99 The British eventuallygave in.100

Owing to these delays, Tarnowski finally arrived in the United States on 1February 1917, on the very day Wilson’s administration learned about the Germandeclaration of unrestricted submarine warfare. He was badly surprised by thedevelopment and declined to respond to questions from the press.101 TheAmbassador’s position in the United States was very difficult from the beginning,despite the State Department’s support for him.

Lansing saw Tarnowski immediately after his arrival in Washington. TheSecretary of State’s impression of the meeting was that Tarnowski was ‘muchdisturbed over the attitude of the German Government’ and did not haveinstructions for this eventuality. It really was so. It is bewildering that Tarnowskihad not been informed before his departure about the risk of the declaration ofunrestricted submarine warfare by the Germans, of which the Ballhausplatz wasaware. The Ambassador’s frank conduct convinced Lansing it would not have beensuitable in this situation to respond to the Austro-Hungarian note on the declarationof unrestricted submarine warfare.102

Tarnowski decided to do his utmost to preserve mutual diplomatic relations andin this was supported by the views of his superior.103 Minister Czernin, in reaction tothe news about the interruption of US–German diplomatic relations, telephonedPenfield and assured him he wished to negotiate a (general) peace on the basis ofWilson’ s December initiative as well as expressed his interest in keeping the Austro-Hungarian embassy in Washington.104

In spite of Tarnowski’s initial, and indeed justified, fears that as soon as the finalAustro-Hungarian statement as to the use of unrestricted submarine warfare wasmade public, the United States would sever diplomatic relations with Vienna,105

Wilson’s administration decided to continue with the peace efforts. The StateDepartment, having adopted a welcoming position, tried ‘to aggregate him[Tarnowski] from von Bernstorff and not break off relations with Austria.’ ColonelHouse announced this intention to the British who allegedly agreed entirely.106

However, some top-level officials of the State Department had doubts about the newattitude of Austria-Hungary. Lansing’s deputy William Phillips was of the opinionthat Czernin had merely repeated Berlin’s arguments. According to Phillips, Lansingwanted to differentiate between a ‘Prussia’ responsible for the problems on the onehand, and a moderate Austria-Hungary on the other. Phillips considered this a wildgoose chase.107

Vienna was prepared to negotiate with the Americans and with the Entente butonly under certain conditions. On 5 February 1917 Penfield announced that Czerninwas open to discussion should the Entente rescind its recently announced intentionto break apart the Danubian monarchy.108 Yet, the most important thing was thatthe Minister was not willing to consider a separate peace.109

Lansing considered Czernin’s first condition – he had not been informed aboutthe second- justified.110 With Wilson’s approval he contacted the US Ambassador atLondon, Walter Hines Page, and instructed him to convince the British that in orderto achieve a separate peace with Austria-Hungary, they would have to guarantee itsterritorial integrity. ‘It is the President’s view,’ the instruction wrote, ‘that the largemeasure of autonomy. . . is a sufficient guarantee of peace and stability in that part ofEurope. . .’111

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Nevertheless, it was not easy to convince British Prime Minister David LloydGeorge. The Prime Minister argued that the Austro-Hungarian guarantee wouldirritate Italy, and thus he refused to grant it. He noted, though, that he was notagainst the Emperor retaining Hungary and Bohemia. He attributed only littleimportance to a separate peace with Vienna because, in his opinion, the monarchywas a German vassal.112

This statement made by Lloyd George has been accepted at face value by somecontemporary authors. For instance, August Hecksher, in his biography on Wilson,basically accepts it, explaining that the British Prime Minister had allegedlyanticipated that Austria-Hungary’s economic dependence on Germany would in thefuture stand in the way of German war efforts.113

The real reason for Lloyd George’s hesitation was the effort to communicate withVienna independently. Although Italy’s claims remained a problem until the end ofthe war, in winter 1917 the British Prime Minister expressed his hope that theHabsburg monarchy would exit the war. This is why he did not object to Charlesretaining the Czech Lands, although shortly before that the Entente had declared theliberation of the Czechoslovaks one of its war objectives. The British Prime Ministerwaited for the results of peace efforts being conducted in Scandinavia and elsewhere.He therefore did not need US mediation and moreover, he did not agree withWilson’s vision of future peace without winners and losers.114

Although Washington was much more confident in its contacts with Vienna thanLondon was, the initial Austro-Hungarian agreement regarding unrestrictedsubmarine warfare left negative consequences. President Wilson refused to acceptTarnowski’s credentials until there was a clarification of the Monarchy’s position.Tarnowski was not too concerned and began a debate with Phillips on the Austro-Hungarian position regarding the use of submarine warfare. Lansing’s deputyindicated a possible way out by asking Tarnowski whether Austro-Hungariansubmarines operated in the danger zone round Great Britain and France.115

In the meantime, Lloyd George had surprisingly changed his opinion and agreedwith providing Austria-Hungary a confidential assurance that its core territories(Austria, Bohemia, and central Hungary) would not be spun off. He also agreed tolaunch peace negotiations if Vienna requested them. US Ambassador to LondonWalter Hines Page thought this concession had been required by the British militaryand army command, which were not in favor of the Monarchy’s dissolution.116 TheAmbassador was right. The Chief of British Imperial General Staff WilliamRobertson in mid-January 1917 said at a meeting of the war cabinet that Austro-Hungarian withdrawal from the war could become a decisive advantage for theEntente. The main reason for Lloyd George’s sudden approval of the US initiativewas likely the failure of his own attempt to negotiate with Austro-Hungarianemissaries in Scandinavia, which negotiations had been uncovered by theGermans.117

Wilson and Lansing could thus address Vienna with a confidential statement.Ambassador Penfield was instructed to tell Czernin at the earliest suitable occasionand in strict confidence that the Entente agreed with preserving the core of theMonarchy. This guarantee was to last only for a certain time period and Penfield wasto invite the Minister to quickly show interest in negotiations with the Entente.118

Already the first talk of Penfield and Czernin showed it would be extremelydifficult to force the Minister to launch talks on a separate peace. Although theCount showed great interest in the statement from Washington, he clearly indicated

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to Penfield that he would not accept secret talks behind Berlin’s back.119 Althoughthe promise of the British Prime Minister as mediated by the Americans capturedCzernin’s attention, it would certainly not have driven him into a risky dispute overthe alliance with Germany or into talks on a separate peace. In fact, it was obviousthat although London was not planning to insist on the fulfillment of the relativelyvague war objectives defined by the Entente on 10 January 1917, it was going torespect its pledges to Italy, Romania, and Serbia.120 However, the monarchy was notyet in such military and economic peril as to resort to suing for peace in return formajor territorial concessions to the enemy. London’s promise also revealed theposition of Washington, which made do with the guarantee of the inviolability of themonarchy’s core lands.121

To Czernin’s great relief the US initiative showed Washington for the momentwas not planning to break off diplomatic relations with Vienna as a result of Austro-Hungarian participation in the submarine warfare as he had feared.122 Yet, the USinitiative, in spite of Lansing’s original plan not to respond to the Austro-Hungariannote on submarine warfare, still kept this method of pressure in mind. After anagreement with Wilson, Lansing authorized Penfield to ask Czernin for aclarification of the Austro-Hungarian position vis-a-vis the submarine warfare. On19 February 1917 at the Ballhausplatz Penfield delivered the relevant aidememoire.123

Czernin decided not to respond to Washington’s query for the moment. Uponthe delivery of the US aide memoire he excused himself and said he had to consultwith the marine command and both Prime Ministers. He in fact considered the USrequest most dangerous. He reported to Berlin that he would delay his response forten to fourteen days in order to gain time. It was clear, though, that Austria-Hungary would have to again declare in favor of unrestricted submarine warfare.Czernin considered the severance of diplomatic relations with the United States verylikely.124 The future of mutual relations was extremely uncertain.

In the complicated situation surrounding the American aide memoire from 18February 1917, Tarnowski again asked the State Department about his legalposition in the United States.125 Czernin wanted Tarnowski to remain inWashington at nearly any price and even despite Berlin’s reservations. Therefore,he refused the request of the German Ambassador at Vienna, Count Botho Wedel,that Tarnowski should not present his credentials until relations between Germanyand the United States became clear. He complied only with the German request thatthe Ambassador to the United States be recalled in the event that a war betweenGermany and the United States broke out.126

During that time Czernin discussed with the US Ambassador the establishmentof contact with the Entente and was uncertain how Washington would accept theAustro-Hungarian response to the aide memoire regarding submarine warfare.127

That is why he instructed Tarnowski not to complicate mutual relations by insistingon being received by Wilson.128

Zwiedinek informed the Counselor of the Department of State, Frank LyonPolk, about this unexpected and temporary turnaround. In that discussion they bothmentioned terms under which Austria-Hungary could preserve its territorial integrityafter the war. They considered, among other subjects, the claims of the ‘Bohemiansand others.’129

It is noteworthy that Polk mentioned the complicated nationhood problem of themonarchy which had been until then almost neglected by US representatives in

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official and private documents, perhaps with the exception of the Poles, althoughthat situation went beyond the monarchy’s borders. Until the interruption ofdiplomatic relations in April 1917 Washington was much more interested in Vienna’sofficial position and in the economic situation of the Habsburg Empire than in therequests of the individual Austro-Hungarian nations and nationalities. Penfield didnot deal with the problem of nationhood at all, nor is there any trace of it in House’s,Lansing’s, or Phillips’ diaries. This problem was similarly ignored by PresidentWilson even though he had been speaking in public about the rights of small nationssince the spring of 1916. The influence of foreign representatives of these nations onthe politics of the United States until their entrance into the war remained (againperhaps with the exception of the Poles) negligible. Wilson had as yet not reacted tothe efforts of some of his confidants, such as Charles Crane and Norman Hapgood,to acquaint him with the claims of the individual Austro-Hungarian nations.130 Theprobable reason why the top officials of the administration were not interested inthe small nations’ issues was most likely not, as Victor S. Mamatey believed, that ‘thepresident apparently still thought of the Austrian problem in terms of the old ‘state’srights issue,’131 but rather the fact that the territory of the Danubian monarchyremained quiet and the activities of the anti-Austrian exiles were not that obviousyet. Compared with the submarine warfare, events at the war fronts, the situation inRussia and the economic troubles of the Entente, they lacked importance and wereneglected by these top officials.

Washington continued its efforts to reach an agreement with Austria-Hungary.In early March 1917 Lansing sent Vienna a second invitation to start negotiationswith the Entente. In a comment to the latter statement, Wilson noted that he hadmade such adaptations to his text so as not to cause the impression that the UnitedStates was trying to separate Austria-Hungary from Germany.132 Wilson thusreacted to Penfield’s report of 27 February that Czernin refused to act behindBerlin’s back.

The interest of the US administration in an agreement with Vienna still persistedand was not even hampered by the unsatisfactory Austro-Hungarian response to theAmerican aide memoire from 18 February 1917, which was submitted to Penfieldlate, on 2 March 1917. Vienna was not willing to disavow Berlin’s moves though itdid not approve of them. The Austro-Hungarian Foreign Ministry tried to make iteasier for Washington to accept the response by pointing to the fact the Austro-Hungarian Navy operated only in the Adriatic and Mediterranean seas and‘therefore it is not necessary to fear the threat of American interests.’133 In fact,nothing else could have been expected at that moment. US offers were too vague forthe monarchy to enter into an open conflict with Berlin, which Czernin and theEmperor did not wish. In spite of that, Berlin was disconcerted by the Austro-Hungarian response to the United States and also the Hungarian Premier Tiszawarned against a too-obliging position vis-a-vis Washington.134

As mentioned previously, Czernin was aware the Austro-Hungarian responsemight not be received by Washington in a positive light. His worries only partiallycame true. Lansing was willing to give Vienna time for consideration and decided notto publish the Austro-Hungarian response although Vienna did it on its own.135

The unwillingness of Austria-Hungary to modify its disapproving stance onseparate peace was not changed in any of the four strictly confidential meetings ofPenfield and Czernin. The Minister, in spite of Lansing’s new call for negotiationswith the Entente, basically maintained his present stance.136 He was for peace but

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only in an agreement that included the Germans. Simultaneously he was prepared tonegotiate informally with the United States through confidants. Perhaps Czernin wasaffected by the ongoing revolution in Russia. According to Austrian historianIngeborg Meckling, the fall of Tsar Nicholas II made Czernin believe general peacewas well on the way.137 The question is, though, whether that was really so. Czernin,in his memoirs, referred to the fall of tsarism as a cause of the turnaround in USpolicy, which later lost interest in an agreement with the monarchy.138

Lansing thought that the growing dependence on Berlin could encourageAustria-Hungary to conclude a separate peace, thanks to which it would avoidGermany’s domination to which it would be exposed in case it won the war; in theevent Germany lost the war, it would be exposed to the dictates of the Entente.139 Inorder to underline his interest in further negotiations with Austria-Hungary, theSecretary of State was preparing to reply to the Austro-Hungarian aide memoirefrom 2 March 1917.140

Lansing’s recommendations to the President were left unanswered. Wilson didnot continue with his peace initiative. The reasons for this decision can be found notas much in the Russian factor, which had an effect mainly in relation to Germany,but more likely in the rapidly deteriorating relations between Washington and Berlinas well as in the monarchy’s unwillingness to continue diplomatic relations with theUnited States even after the possible entry of the United States into the war againstits German ally. Besides, Wilson probably came to the conclusion that talks withCzernin had no chances for success at the time. In a conversation in mid-April 1917,Wilson expressed the opinion that Austria-Hungary had been forced by Germany tobreak off relations with the United States.141

The unsatisfactory development of mutual relations was marked by the destinyof Ambassador Tarnowski. Due to the content of the Austro-Hungarian response itwas ruled out that Wilson would accept Tarnowski’s credentials. Czernin, however,now decided to press for Tarnowski’s acceptance at any rate and disregarded theassurance of the US embassy that Wilson would accept Tarnowski as soon as it waspolitically viable.142 In spite of internal doubts, Tarnowski carried out the Minister’sinstruction. Although the Secretary of State understood the Ambassador’sdifficulties, this delicate matter had to be decided by the President himself.143

Wilson pressed his point and refused conclusively to accept Tarnowski. In order to‘gild the pill’ for Vienna, he agreed to recall Penfield for consultations.144

Czernin accepted this solution and on April 1 told Penfield that Tarnowski hadbeen instructed to leave the United States as soon as possible. Owing to thecontinuing deterioration of German–US relations he warned that, in the event theUnited States enters the war, Tarnowski would be followed out by other diplomaticand consular staff.145

Washington still did not wish to break diplomatic relations. On the contrary,they consolidated their mission in Vienna where they had moved staff from thedefunct mission in Berlin and elsewhere. Counselor of Embassy Joseph C. Grew,who became Charge d’affaires after Penfield’s departure, was considered the UnitedStates’ best first secretary in Europe.146

Yet Grew could not continue to remain in Vienna for much longer. Relationsbetween the United States and Germany continued to worsen. Wilson still tried tokeep the United States out of the conflict and said a war would be declared only ifthe United States became the victim of an attack. At the same time he asked theCongress to authorize the arming of civilian ships.147 Soon after that the affair of the

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Zimmermann Telegram came out, in which the German Secretary of State offeredthe Mexicans a military alliance against the United States.148 Czernin was takenaback and Ambassador Hohenlohe in a personal letter called the Telegram a‘colossal stupidity.’149

Wilson hesitated in responding to this act of hostility by the Germangovernment. Under the pressure of his environment he changed his opinion andcalled a meeting of the cabinet for 20 March 1917 in the course of which all thosepresent recommended declaring war against Germany. Wilson agreed.150 After theRussian February Revolution, nothing stood in the way of presenting US entry inthe war as a fight of progressive and free countries against militaristic Germany.

Tarnowski had no idea of this decision. He did not believe the United Stateswould risk that much and declare war on Germany. Although he wrote to Czerninthat the situation worsened following the sinking of three US ships on 21 March1917, he believed it would not become casus belli.151 Only later did he describe thereasons for the President’s progressive transition into an advocate of war.152

The Secretary of State met with Tarnowski on 29 March 1917. Firstly he told himthe President would not accept him because Austria-Hungary had joined Germanyin the submarine warfare. The Count regretted having to leave the United States.Lansing’s reaction was to point out the inevitability of it, because the United Stateswas about to declare war on Germany. Tarnowski was very surprised.153

His fellow countryman from the Russian part of Poland and Lansing’s confidant,General George J. Sosnkowski, spoke with Tarnowski along the same lines.154 Onthe recommendation of the State Department, he urged Tarnowski to prevent thesevering of diplomatic relations with Vienna. This was Lansing’s last-ditch attemptto split Austria-Hungary from Germany and to fulfill the February plan.Sosnkowski carried out his instructions, but the Austro-Hungarian Ambassadorremained skeptical.155

Lansing’s words of warning came true. President Wilson’s speech before the jointsession of both chambers of Congress on 2 April 1917 signified not only the UnitedStates’ entrance into the war against Germany, but was also an immensely importantmoment in Austro-Hungarian/US relations. Although the President emphasized thatsince Austria-Hungary was not taking part in war actions against US citizens, it wasnot necessary to declare war against it.156 On 6 April 1917, the United States enteredthe fight for the destruction of the ‘Prussian autocracy’ an integral part of which theybegan to consider the Austrian autocracy as late as the spring 1918.

Tarnowski regarded the President’s speech as masterly written, especially the partemphasizing the difference between the German nation and Prussian autocracy; healso tried at the last minute to prevent the breaking off of diplomatic relationsbetween Austria-Hungary and the United States.157 He warned Czernin: ‘The largestand most progressive country wants to make use of the attractiveness of democracyand after three years in war wants to throw on the pans of the scales itsimmeasurable richness and energy to achieve what it wants, to prevent the victory ofGermany.’158 However, Czernin decided otherwise, and on 8 April 1917 announcedto Grew the decision to break off of diplomatic relations.159

Vienna thus took action from which there would be no turning back, althoughthe two powers stayed in contact through intermediaries in the coming months andyears, and new talks were held on the withdrawal of the monarchy from the war.However, Wilson came to expect less and less from peace with Austria-Hungary andin the end gave up his efforts.

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US diplomats had anticipated the severing of diplomatic relations although itwas not clear who would initiate it. In early March 1917, the embassy in Viennaasked US citizens to leave the territory of Austria-Hungary.160 Grew and theemployees of the American mission and consulates were accorded a very politefarewell.161

The Austro-Hungarian diplomatic and consular staff left the United States inearly May 1917. With Czernin’s approval and at the last moment, Tarnowskithought he could remain in Washington as a private person but he was unable toovercome US objections and ultimately left.162 Nevertheless, in his farewell audiencewith Lansing, Tarnowski was assured that war would not be declared between theUnited States and Austria-Hungary.163 As an experienced diplomat, though,Tarnowski attributed little importance to these words. In his opinion, themonarchy’s position in the United States was directly related to the administration’swillingness to distinguish between Austria-Hungary and Germany.164 The percep-tion of the monarchy as an appendage of the stronger Germany caused great damageto its reputation across the Atlantic. Dissociating itself from Germany while notbreaking their agreement, as Czernin and even more the Emperor Charles wished,signified seeking the squaring of the circle.

Conclusion

From a US point of view, the First World War was a conflict of two worlds. It soonacquired an ideological dimension, becoming a struggle of good versus evil, a fight ofdemocracy against autocracy. This study shows that in the winter of 1917,Washington did not treat Germany and Austria-Hungary as equals, and the latterwas in a better position there. According to Phillips, Lansing wanted to differentiatebetween ‘Prussia’ on the one hand and moderate Austria-Hungary on the otherhand.165 Only in the spring of 1918, after the ‘Sixtus Affair,’ was Austria-Hungarydefinitively ranked in the category of autocratic powers resistant to progress. In thisrespect it was not important whether and to what extent the Habsburg monarchyhad democratized before the war.

For many Americans, the monarchy and other countries entered into the warprimarily for the purpose of gaining the ‘spoils’ of Europe – that the monarchy caredmostly about prestige, about the dubious honor of power and, above all, about thecondemnable ambition of controlling the others. At the same time, within Vienna’sgovernment and diplomatic circles, the United States’ power became increasinglyapparent and feared their entrance into the war. They did not agree with the GermanAdmiralty’s claim that US assistance to the Entente was already so massive that itwould not be substantially increased even after an open conflict broke out.Subsequent events proved Vienna to be right. In winter 1917 Germany launched theunrestricted submarine warfare and shortly afterwards, in April 1917, the UnitedStates declared war on them.

Neither Burian nor Czernin wanted either the unrestricted submarine warfarenor a conflict with the United States. Both Austro-Hungarian foreign ministerssought an acceptable way out of the war. Neither one of them was a puppet inGermany’s hands. Although they respected the reality that Germany was a dominantCentral European power, in the winter of 1916–17 it was not a lord/vassalrelationship. Besides, German fears of Austria-Hungary’s independent actions vis-a-vis the United States and the concerns of German government circles concerning the

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monarchy’s peace feelers testify to the fact that even Berlin conceived its alliancewith Vienna differently. Although the monarchy was clearly a weaker partner ofGermany, at the turn of the years 1916 and 1917, they were not completelydependent. Above all, Austria-Hungary had its own foreign policy. As has beendemonstrated, opposing statements, which can be found in older works of UShistorians,166 were often part of the propaganda of the countries of the Entente andlacked an unbiased evaluation of the situation.

Count Czernin, irrespective of Germany’s displeasure, insisted on carrying outCount Tarnowski’s mission in the United States even after the announcement ofunrestricted submarine warfare in February of 1917 and his policy vis-a-vis theUnited States often provoked Berlin’s ire. Shortly before he left office, Czernin’spredecessor, Baron Burian, had persuaded Germany into making a peace offering tothe Entente. It is not important that his ideas of the specific peace conditions wereoverly optimistic. Though Czernin was generally more realistic in this regard, hestubbornly insisted that Austria-Hungary not betray the Germans and not concludea separate peace. I agree with Francis R. Bridge that on the one hand, Czernin ‘wasnot a slave of Germany: on the contrary, he hoped to use the German alliance inorder to strengthen the Monarchy, and ultimately to make it independent ofGermany,’ and on the other, that his German-Austrian Weltanschauung preventedhim from agreeing with the needed interior reforms of the monarchy and later forced‘him to turn away from a possible peace with the Western Powers and to commit themonarchy’s fate to a gamble on the success of German arms.’167 We must not forgetthat Wilson had provided Austria-Hungary with very little specific offers, apart fromthe British guarantee of retaining parts of its territory. Consequently, Vienna wouldhave taken an exceptionally risky course had it accepted Washington’s vague offers.Even if a separate peace had been successfully concluded, it would probably havebeen rejected by Austrian Germans and most likely by the Hungarians too. Themonarchy’s interior policy would probably not have been able to put up with thebetrayal of its German ally. Disregarding the ideas of possible German intervention,a separate peace was not a realistic foreign-policy option for the Monarchy,therefore Czernin’s persistent refusal to comply with US demands was in line withthe sober evaluation of its own interests. The fact that the monarchy did not acceptthe offers of a separate peace and instead worked towards a general peace does notconfirm the thesis of Vienna’s dependence on Germany because, under thecircumstances, such a move was not in the monarchy’s interests.

It explains why in winter 1917, Wilson’s attempt to negotiate the monarchy’swithdrawal from the war failed. Later peace efforts ended up the same. In the spring of1918, Wilson eventually favored dismantling the monarchy, whose dependence onGermany was at that time indisputable. The demise of the oldmonarchy was inevitable.

Notes

1. V. S. Mamatey, The United States and East Central Europe 1914–1918: A Study inWilsonian Diplomacy and Propaganda (Princeton, 1957); and B. M. Unterberger, TheUnited States, Revolutionary Russia, and the Rise of Czechoslovakia (Chapel Hill, 1989).

2. See A. S. Link, Wilson. Confusions and Crises, 1915–1916 (Princeton, 1964).3. K. A. Clements, The Presidency of Woodrow Wilson (Lawrence, 1992).4. A. Heckscher, Woodrow Wilson. A Biography (New York, 1991), 427.5. M. Rauchensteiner, Der Tod des Doppeladlers. Osterreich-Ungarn und der Erste

Weltkrieg, 2nd edition (Graz, Vienna and Cologne, 1994).

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6. See for example D. Kelly, ‘Woodrow Wilson and the Creation of Czechoslovakia’, EastEuropean Quarterly, xxvi (1992), 185–207.

7. G. H. Davis, ‘The ‘‘Ancona’’ Affair: A Case of Preventive Diplomacy’, The Journal ofModern History, xxxviii (1966), 267–77.

8. P. Roberts, ‘The Anglo American Theme: American Vision of an Atlantic Alliance,1914–1933’, Diplomatic History, xxi (1997), 333–64.

9. R. R. Doerries, Washington—Berlin 1908/1917. Die Tatigkeit des Botschafters JohannHeinrich Graf von Bernstorff in Washington vor dem Eintritt des Vereinigten Staaten vonAmerika in den Ersten Weltkrieg (Dusseldorf, 1975).

10. Penfield to Lansing, 15 April 1916, no. missing, Lansing to Wilson, December 1915,[Papers Relating to the] F[oreign] R[elations of the] U[nited] S[tates], The LansingPapers 1914–1920 (Washington DC, 1939), i. 654–5.

11. House to T. N. Page, 4 Aug. 1915, [Washington DC,] L[ibrary of] C[ongress], WoodrowWilson Papers, Series 2, Reel 72.

12. Colonel House reported to the President that Ambassador Penfield, whom he hadpersonally met in February 1916 in Geneva, ‘confirmed our belief that Austria-Hungaryand Turkey are now but little more than provinces of Germany.’ Three Lettres fromEdward Mandell House, 3 Feb. 1916, [The] P[apers of] W[oodrow] W[ilson], ed. byA. S. Link, vol. 36 (Princeton, 1981), 126.

13. The efforts failed owing to Germany’s unwillingness to let fall of the annexation ofoccupied territories. Dumba to Berchtold, 7 Oct. 1914, M[oravsky] z[emsky] a[rchivBrno] (Moravian Land Archive), fond G 138, Kt. 464 and Berchtold to Dumba, 31 Oct.1914, H[aus,-] H[of,- und] Sta[atsarchiv Wien], P[olitisches] A[rchiv], K[ar]t[on] 952 P.A. I Liasse Krieg 25b-i Friedensverhandlg (hereafter Kt. 952 P. A. I).

14. Bryan to Wilson, 17 May 1915, N[ational] A[rchives and] R[ecords] A[dministrationCollege Park, Maryland], R[ecord] G[roup] 59, Microcopy 367, Reel 141.

15. Hohenlohe (Austro-Hungarian Ambassador to Berlin) to Burian, 8 June 1915, no. 51/P–B, HHStA, PA, Kt. 843 Liasse Krieg 4c Deutschland 1915.

16. M. B. Bryan, The Memoirs of William Jennings Bryan (Philadelphia, 1925), 377.17. Lansing, Notes, Character Sketches, Constantin Theodor Dumba, May 1916, LC, The

Papers of Robert Lansing, vol. 63.18. Note der k. und k. Ministers des k. und k. Hauses und des Aussern an den Botschafter der

Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika in Wien, 29 June 1915, HHStA, PA, Kt. 843 P. A. I.19. Gerard told the German Secretary of State Gottlieb von Jagow he ‘exactly knew the

imperial and royal government would not do anything without asking here (Berlin).’Hohenlohe to Burian, 20 July 1915, no. 323, HHStA, PA, A[dministrative]R[egistratur], Fach 36, Kt. 359 Krieg 1918–1918 Dep. 7 Affaire Kolischer Amerik.Kriegslieferungen (hereafter F 36/359).

20. Hohenlohe to Burian, 23 June 1915, no. Z. 56/ P—B, HHStA, PA, AR, Kt. F 36/359.21. Burian to Dumba, 25 Aug. 1915, no. missing, HHStA, PA, Kt. 897 Liasse Krieg 7a U.

S. A. 1914–1917, 7b USA 1915–1916 (hereafter 897 P. A. I).22. Austrian and German Papers Found in Possession of Mr. James F. J. Archibald,

Falmouth, August 30, 1915 (London, 1915).23. Dumba to Burian, 1 Oct. 1915, no. 2043, HHStA, AR, Kt. F4/78 Personalia Dum-Dun.24. On the Dumba (Archibald) Affair see: V. Hor�ci�cka, ‘On the Brink of War: The Crisis

Year of 1915 in Relations Between the US and Austria-Hungary’, Diplomacy andStatecraft, xix (2008), 187–209.

25. Lansing, Notes, Character Sketches, Baron Erich Zwiedinek, Nov. 1916, LC, ThePapers of Robert Lansing, vol. 63.

26. H. H. Sokol, Osterreich-Ungarns Seekrieg 1914–18 (Zurich, Leipzig, and Vienna, 1933),337.

27. ‘Nine Americans Lost on the Ancona’, New York Times, 15 Nov. 1915, and T. N. Pageto Wilson, 18 Dec. 1915, FRUS 1915, Suppl. (Washington DC, 1928), 646.

28. Lansing to Penfield, 6 Dec. 1915, FRUS 1915, Suppl., 623–5.29. House, journal entry, 28 Nov. 1915, [Yale University Library] Edward Mandell House

Papers, Reel 3.30. In reality, Berlin had not provided Austria-Hungary with its correspondence with the

United States regarding the Lusitania and the ship Arabic sunk in August 1915 until 21

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Dec. 1915. Hohenlohe to Burian, 21 Dec. 1915, no. 112 A–C/P, HHStA, PA, Kt. F 36/365. Text of the Austro-Hungarian note from 15 Dec. 1915 see: Penfield to Lansing, 15Dec. 1915, FRUS 1915, Suppl., 638–9. Berlin was informed about the content of thenote on 14 Dec. 1915.

31. Hohenlohe to Burian, 16 Dec. 1915, no. 534, HHStA, PA, AR, Kt. F 36/365.32. From Robert Lansing, 17 Dec. 1915, PWW 35, 364.33. Burian to Lansing, 29 Dec. 1915, FRUS 1915, Supp., 655–8.34. To Robert Lansing, 29 Dec. 1915, PWW 35, 406–7.35. Chancellor of the German Reich, von Bethmann Hollweg, really promised to

stop the attacks. Hohenlohe to Burian, 31 Dec. 1915, HHStA, PA, AR, Kt. F 36/365.

36. An earlier comment of the New York Times wrote that if Austria-Hungary were not aGerman vassal, they would comply with the second US note and apologize for thesinking of the Ancona. ‘Austria’s Opportunity’, New York Times, 19 Dec. 1915, 16.

37. Hohenlohe to Burian, 24 April 1916, no. 133, HHStA, PA, Kt. 844 Liasse Krieg 4cDeutschland 1916–1918, 5a Italien 1915 (hereafter 844 P. A. I). Germany eventuallypledged it would not sink passenger ships without warning.

38. ‘A Paper Kingdom of Poland’, New York Times, 7 Nov. 1916, 10.On Austro-Polish aspirations of Vienna see J. Zupani�c, Rakousko-Uhersko a polskaotazka za prvnı svetove valky [Austria Hungary and the Polish Question in First WorldWar], (Prague, 2006), 84.

39. See G. W. Shanafelt, The Secret Enemy: Austria-Hungary and the German Alliance,1914–18 (New York, 1985), 86–8.

40. Molden, memo, 4 Oct. 1916, no. missing, HHStA, PA, Kt. 503 P. A. I Liasse XLVII/3(15–16): Krieg 1914–1918 (hereafter 503 P. A. I).

41. Burian to Hohenlohe, 1 Sept. 1916, no. 4272, HHStA, PA, Kt. 503 P. A. I. Buriansinformer was the Chief of the General Staff (AOK) Conrad von Hotzendorf, whohowever, unlike the Minister, backed up German plans. Conrad to Burian, 31 Aug.1916, no. Op. Geh. Nr. 97, HHStA, PA, Kt. 503 P. A. I.

42. Burian to Bethmann Hollweg, 9 Oct. 1916, no. missing, HHStA, PA, Kt. 503P. A. I.

43. Bethmann Hollweg to Burian, 14 Oct. 1916, no. missing, HHStA, PA, Kt. 503 P. A. I.44. ‘Austria Concerned Over U-Boat War’, New York Times, 18 Nov. 1916, 1.45. Lansing, Notes, Sept. 1916, LC, The Papers of Robert Lansing, vol. 63.46. Burian, Aufzeichnung uber die Verhandlungen in Berlin am 15. und 16. November

1916, no. missing, HHStA, PA, Kt. 503 P. A. I.47. E. Feigl, Kaiser Karl I. Ein Leben fur den Frieden seiner Volker (Vienna and Munich,

1990), 86.48. Doerries, Die Tatigkeit, 229–32.49. To Edward Mandell House, with Enclosures, 21 Nov. 1916, Enclosure I, Grew to

Lansing, 17 Nov. 1916, [The] P[apers of] W[oodrow] W[ilson], ed. by A. S. Link, vol.40 (Princeton, 1982), 21. Burian in the report on the conference did not mention aconnection to developments in Romania.

50. From a series of Burians urgent reminders I have picked, for example, Burian toHohenlohe, 5 Dec. 1916, no. 5841, HHStA, PA, Kt. 955 P. A. I Liasse Krieg 25 p.Friedensverhandlg (hereafter 955 P. A. I).

51. P. Devlin, Too Proud to Fight: Woodrow Wilsons Neutrality (New York and London,1975), 575.

52. Lansing to Embassies and Legations of warring countries, 18 Dec. 1916; FRUS 1916,Suppl., 97–9.

53. O. Czernin, Im Weltkriege (Berlin and Vienna, 1919), 103–4.54. November 1918 auf dem Balhausplatz. Erinnerungen Ludwigs Freiherrn von Flotow des

letzten Chefs des Osterreichisch-Ungarischen Auswartigen Dienstes 1895–1920, bearbei-tet von Erwin Matsch (Vienna, Cologne and Graz, 1982), 317–8.

55. I. Meckling, Die Aussenpolitik des Grafen Czernin (Munich, 1969), 7–8.56. Meckling, Die Aussenpolitik des Grafen Czernin, 27.57. M. Graf Karolyi, Gegen eine ganze Welt: Mein Kampf um Frieden (Munchen: Verlag fur

Kulturpolitik, 1924), 185.

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58. Penfield to Lansing, 26 Dec. 1916, no. 2331, NARA, RG 59, Microcopy 695, Reel 5.F. Fellner, Schicksalsjahre Osterreichs 1908–1919: Das politische Tagebuch JosefRedlichs (Graz and Cologne, 1954), ii. 172.

59. C. Kosnetter, Ministerprasident Dr. Ernst Ritter v. Seidler (Dissertation, Vienna, 1963),35.

60. L. Valiani, The End of Austria-Hungary (London, 1973), 181.61. Meckling, Die Aussenpolitik des Grafen Czernin, 77ff.62. ‘Emperor Francis Joseph is Dead after 68 Years on Austrias Throne’, New York Times,

22 Nov. 1916, 1; ‘New Empress Brothers Fighting in Belgian Army’, New York Times,23 Nov. 1916, 1.

63. See R. A. Kann, Die Sixtus Affare und die Geheimen Friedensverhandlungen Osterreich-Ungarns im Ersten Weltkrieg (Vienna, 1966).

64. Czernin to Hohenlohe, 24 Dec. 1916, no. 365, HHStA, PA, Kt. 954. P. A. I.65. Anonymous, 23 Dec. 1916, no. missing, HHStA, PA, Kt. 954 P. A. I.66. D. M. Smith, Robert Lansing and American Neutrality 1914–1917 (Berkeley, 1958), 150–1.67. Notes, 3 Dec. 1916, LC, The Papers of Robert Lansing, Vol. 63.68. Many other US statesmen, including the previous President Theodor Roosevelt, acted

similarly. Roberts, ‘The Anglo–American Theme’, 343.69. From the Diary of Colonel House, 11 Jan. 1917, PWW 40, 445–46.70. Walter Hines Page to Robert Lansing, 22 Dec. 1916, PWW 40, 319.71. Sharp to Lansing, 29 Dec. 1916, FRUS 1916, Suppl., 123–5.72. Van Dyke (US Minister in the Netherlands) to Lansing, 30 Dec. 1916, no. missing,

NARA, RG 59, Microcopy 367, Reel 373.73. Czernin to Penfield, 26 Dec. 1916, no. missing, HHStA, PA, Kt. 954 P. A. I. See also

Penfield to Lansing, 26 Dec. 1916, FRUS 1916, Suppl., 118–19. Turkey was outraged bythe response because the Central Powers practically had not consulted its contents withit. Pallavicini to Czernin, 30 Dec. 1916, no. 99/ P–A, HHStA, PA, Kt. 954 P. A. I.

74. Macchio, Unterseebootkrieg, 31 Dec. 1916, No. missing, HHStA, PA, Kt. 503 P. A. I.75. Czernin to Hohenlohe, 1 Jan. 1917, no. 1, HHStA, PA, Kt. 954 P. A. I.76. Flotow, Aufzeichnung, 15 Jan. 1917, no. missing, HHStA, PA, Kt. 503 P. A. I.77. Czernin to the Emperor, Jan. 1917, no. 1., HHStA, PA, Kt. 261 P. A. XL Interna, Korr.

d. Ministers 1911–1918 (hereafter 261 P. A. XL).78. Czernin, Im Weltkriege, 156.79. An Address to the US Senate, 22 Jan. 1917, PWW 40, 533 and ff.80. Czernin to Larisch (Berlin), 5 Feb. 1917, no. 58, HHStA, PA, Kt. 1047 P. A. I Liasse

Krieg 81a U-Boot Krieg (hereafter 1047 P. A. I).81. Coffin to Lansing, 24 Jan. 1917, no. 1132, NARA, RG 59, Microcopy 367, Reel 374.82. Penfield to Lansing, 4 Feb. 1917, FRUS 1917, Suppl. 1, 113.83. Shanafelt, The Secret Enemy, 115.84. At the time, German submarines followed the ‘cruiser rules’ of international maritime

law, according to which they had to resurface before attacking an enemy vessel andallow the crew to leave the ship under attack. Already in September 1916, Germanyattained the results from April 1916, which was the last month of the first unrestrictedsubmarine warfare. See Devlin, Too Proud to Fight, 547.

85. Roberts, ‘The Anglo-American Theme’, 342.86. Aufzeichnung uber eine am 20. Janner im k. u. k. Ministerium des k. u. k. Hauses und

des Aeussern stattgehabte Besprechung, 20 Jan. 1917, no. missing, HHStA, PA, Kt.1092a P. A. I Nachlass Czernin, Nachlass Demblin (hereafter 1092a P. A. I).

87. Ministerrat, 22 Jan. 1917, no. G. M. K. P. Z 532, HHStA, PA, Kt. 313 P. A. XL Interna– Gemeins. Ministerrats. Prot. 1916–1917 III.

88. S. Burian, Drei Jahre aus der Zeit meiner Amtsfuhrung im Kriege (Berlin, 1923), 179.89. Czernin, Im Weltkriege, 178.90. Mamatey, The United States and East Central Europe, 56.91. From the Diary of Colonel House, 1 Feb. 1917, PWW 41 (Princeton, 1983), 86–9.92. Lansing, Notes, 24 Jan. 1917, LC, The Papers of Robert Lansing, Vol. 63.93. Lansing, Notes, 29 Jan. 1917, ibid.94. Tarnowski’s predecessor Constantin Dumba had to be removed from the post in

September 1915 on the request of the United States.

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95. Czernin, Im Weltkriege, 143.96. Two Letters from Robert Lansing, 26 Oct. 1916, PWW 38, 544–5.97. Wilson to Lansing, 30 Oct. 1916, NARA, RG 59, Box 6333; Penfield to Lansing, 9 Nov.

1916, FRUS 1916, Suppl., 801.98. Penfield to Lansing, 13 Nov. 1916, FRUS 1916, Suppl., 802. Tarnowski planned to leave

Rotterdam on 6 Dec. 1916.99. Lansing to W. H. Page, 28 Nov. 1916, no. 4097, NARA, RG 59, Box 6333.100. W. H. Page to Lansing, 15 Dec. 1916, FRUS 1916, Suppl., 806.101. ‘Tarnowski Here as Austria’s Envoy’ [sic], New York Times, 2 Feb. 1917, 5.102. Lansing to Penfield, 4 Feb. 1917, no. 1526, NARA, RG 59, Microcopy 367, Reel 31.103. P. Proks, ‘Politicke rozcestı vale�cneho vyvoje Rakousko-Uherska (prosinec 1916–rıjen

1917)’,[‘Political crossroad of war development of Austria-Hungary (December 1916–October 1917’], Slovansky prehled, xcii (2006), 509–31.

104. Penfield to Lansing, 4 Feb. 1917, no. 1680, NARA, RG 59, Microcopy 367, Reel 31.105. Colonel House had already suggested it to the president on 6 Feb. 1917. From Edward

Mandell House, 6 Feb. 1917, PWW 41, 149.106. House, Diary, 4 Feb. 1917, Edward Mandell House Papers, Reel 4.107. Phillips, Diary, 7 Feb. 1917, [Harvard University Library], William Phillips Papers,

1878–1968, diaries, Box 1.108. Penfield to Lansing, 5 Feb. 1917, FRUS 1917, Suppl. 1, 38–9.109. Shanafelt, The Secret Enemy, 110.110. Two Letters from Robert Lansing, 10 Feb. 1917, PWW 41, 185.111. To Walter Hines Page, 7 Feb. 1917, PWW 41, 158–9.112. From Robert Lansing, with Enclosure, 13 Feb. 1917, PWW 41, 211–4.113. Heckscher, Woodrow Wilson, 426.114. Fest, The Habsburg Monarchy and British Policy, 60–1.115. Phillips, Diary, 9 Feb. 1917, William Phillips Papers, Box 1.116. Page to Lansing, 21 Feb. 1917, no. 5725, FRUS 1917, Suppl. 1, 56.117. Fest, The Habsburg Monarchy and British Policy, 53.118. From Robert Lansing, with Enclosure, 21 Feb. 1917, PWW 41, 267–8.119. Unterredung Czernin-Penfield, 26 Feb. 1917, no. missing, HHStA, PA. Kt. 1092a P. A.

I. Penfield reported almost the same to Washington, Penfield to Lansing, 27 Feb. 1917,no. 1730, FRUS 1917, Suppl. 1, 62–3.

120. Mamatey, The United States and East Central Europe, 60.121. Heckscher, Woodrow Wilson, 426.122. Czernin to Hohenlohe, 21 Feb. 1917, no. 94, HHStA, PA, Kt. 1047 P. A. I.123. Aide memoire, 18 Feb. 1918, HHStA, PA, Kt. 1047 P. A. I.124. Czernin to Hohenlohe, 21 Feb. 1917, no. 94, HHStA, PA, Kt. 1047 P. A. I.125. Lansing to Penfield, 23 Feb. 1917, no. 1567, FRUS 1917, Suppl. 1, s. 143.126. Czernin to Hohenlohe, 12 Feb. 1917, no. 74, HHStA, PA, Kt. 1047 P. A. I.127. Czernin to Tarnowski, 27 Feb. 1917, no. 20, HHStA, PA, Kt. 1047 P. A. I.128. Czernin to Tarnowski, 26 Feb. 1917, no. 19, HHStA, PA, Kt. 1047 P. A. I.129. Polk, diary entry, 3 March 1917, [Yale University Library], Frank L. Polk Papers,

Group 656, Series III, Box 22.130. From Norman Hapgood, 29 Feb. 1917, PWW 41, 56–7. In an attachment, Hapgood

sent a memorandum written by T. G. Masaryk to Wilson supporting the dissolution ofthe monarchy.

131. Mamatey, The United States and East Central Europe, 58.132. To Robert Lansing, 3 March 1917, PWW 41, 312.133. Aide-Memoire, 2 March 1917, no. missing, HHStA, PA, Kt. 1047 P. A. I.134. Czernin, Im Weltkriege, 172–3.135. Phillips, Diary, 6 March 1917, William Phillips Papers, Box 1.136. The negotiations were so confidential that the Counselor of Embassy Grew, who

participated in them, wrote in his otherwise open diary he could not mention them. Grew,Letters, 26 Feb. 1917, [Harvard University Library], Joseph Clark Grew Papers, vol. 9.

137. Meckling, Die Aussenpolitik des Grafen Czernin, 46.138. Czernin, Im Weltkriege, 193.139. From Robert Lansing, 17 March 1917, PWW 41, 421–422.

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140. ‘Washington Holds Off Break With Austria’, New York Times, 18 March 1917, 3.141. A Memorandum by John Howard Whitehouse, 14 April 1917, PWW 42 (Princeton,

1983), 65–9.142. Memorandum of Mr. Grew, date and no. missing, HHStA, PA, Kt. 1047 P. A. I.143. From Robert Lansing, with Enclosure, 27 March 1917, PWW 41, 476–77.144. To Robert Lansing, 27 March 1917, PWW 41, 477–78.145. Penfield to Lansing, 1 April 1917, no. 1800, FRUS 1917, Suppl. 1, 193–94.146. From Edward Mandell House, 3 Sept. 1916, PWW 38 (Princeton, 1982), 41. Grew

served in Vienna in 1911–12 as First Secretary. He came from a rich Boston businessfamily, studied law at Harvard University, then entered diplomatic services and marriedthe cousin of John Pierpont Morgan, Jr.

147. Devlin, Too Proud to Fight, 652.148. Ibid.149. Hohenlohe to Berchtold, 11 March 1917, MZA, fond G 138, Kt. 464.150. President Wilson, meeting with his cabinet, 20 March 1917, no. 27, in M. H. Hunt,

Crises in US Foreign Policy: An International History Reader (New Haven and London,1996), 49–51.

151. Tarnowski to Czernin (via Stockholm), 21 March 1917, no. E, HHStA, PA, Kt. 1048 P.A. I Liasse Krieg 61a U-Boot Krieg (hereafter 1048 P. A. I).

152. Tarnowski to Czernin (via Stockholm), 24 April 1917, no. Z (Stockholm) 173, HHStA,PA, Kt. 1047 P. A. I. In late April 1917 the Ambassador correctly said Wilson hadalways wanted to prevent the loss of the war by the Entente but originally wanted toachieve this goal using pacific means. He was forced to declare war after the worseningof conflicts at sea.

153. Lansing, Notes, 29 March 1917, LC, The Papers of Robert Lansing, Vol. 63.154. Sosnkowski came to the United States in the second half of 1915 on the order of

Russian Minister of War, Alexei Polivanov. Shortly thereafter he left Russian serviceand arrived in Washington 6 March 1917 to see Tarnowski and tried to gain his supportin establishing a United States of Europe.

155. Williams, Memorandum on a Meeting with Sosnkowski, 31 March 1917, NARA, RG59, microcopy 367, reel 374.

156. An Address to a Joint Session of Congress, 2 April 1917, PWW 41, 519–27.157. Le Gendre to Williams, 3 April 1917, LC, The Papers of Robert Lansing, Vol. 25.158. Tarnowski to Czernin, 4 April 1917, no. K, HHStA, PA, Kt. 1047 P. A. I.159. ‘Der Kriegszustand zwischen der Union und Deutschland’, 10 April 1917, Pester Lloyd,

evening edition, 1.160. Notiz, 5 March 1917, no. missing, HHStA, PA, Kt. 1047 P. A. I. The information was

monitored by the authorities (Kriegsuberwachungsamt) from a letter of an Americanliving in Smıchov, Prague.

161. Czernin to Storck, 11 April 1917, no. 80, HHStA, PA, Kt. 1047 P. A. I.162. Tarnowski to Czernin (via Stockholm), 7 May 1917, no. (Stockholm) 222, HHStA, PA,

Kt. 1047 P. A. I. In a report to Czernin, Tarnowski said he had had to speak withLansing as he received the instruction as late as on 7 May or the day before leaving forEurope. It was thus impossible to fake an illness and avoid the departure. In reality,though, he had discussed everything with The Secretary of State on 4 May. He mayhave wanted to avoid additional instructions from Vienna which could havecomplicated his departure from the United States, which he thought was inevitableafter the severing of diplomatic relations.

163. Tarnowski to Czernin (via Stockholm), 14 April 1917, no. Q (Stockholm) 135, HHStA,PA, Kt. 1047 P. A. I.

164. Tarnowski to Czernin (via Stockholm), 5 May 1917, no. KK (Stockholm) 211 bis,HHStA, PA, Kt. 1047 P. A I.

165. Phillips, Diary, 7 Feb. 1917, William Phillips Papers, 1878–1968, diaries, Box 1.166. Mamatey, The United States and East Central Europe, 56.167. F. R. Bridge, The Habsburg Monarchy Among the Great Powers, 1815–1918 (New York

and Oxford and Munich, 1990), 360–1.

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