Audit of Construction Supervision

Office of the Auditor General / Bureau du vérificateur général

AUDIT OF CONSTRUCTION SUPERVISION

2012

VÉRIFICATION DE LA SURVEILLANCE DE LA CONSTRUCTION

Audit of Construction Supervision

Office of the Auditor General 2012 Annual Report

Table of Contents

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ....................................................................................................... i RÉSUMÉ ........................................................................................................................... xxxiii 1 BACKGROUND ................................................................................................................ 1

2 SCOPE ................................................................................................................................ 1

3 OBJECTIVES ...................................................................................................................... 5

4 FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ................................................................... 7

5 AREAS OF POTENTIAL SAVINGS ............................................................................ 43

6 CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................ 44

7 ACKNOWLEDGEMENT............................................................................................... 44

APPENDIX A – CHANGE ORDER TABLES ................................................................... 45


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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Introduction

The Audit of Construction Supervision was included in the 2012 Audit Plan of the Office of the Auditor General (OAG), approved by City Council on December 14, 2011.

Background

Council Members brought nine projects to the attention of the Auditor General, for review. The projects examined were constructed in 2010 and 2011, except for two that were constructed in 2004 and 2006. A sample was selected from the projects completed in 2011 and 2012.

Audit Objectives

Audit Objective No. 1 - Examine and evaluate the processes and methodologies pertaining to the Construction Supervision Procedures followed by the City.

Criteria: Review of tender documents

Examination of tendering process, including design/build projects

Procedures for selection of contractor

Review of contract documents

Construction administration files

Assignment of project manager, project supervisor and inspectors

Construction inspection tasks and procedures

Procedures for management of change orders and extra work orders

Claims process procedures

Audit Objective No. 2 - Determine whether the processes and methodologies are consistent and compliant with all relevant policies, procedures, legislation and regulations.

Criteria:

Project management procedures

Procedures for transfer of project from design to construction

Tendering process



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Contract administration process

Cost control

Management of change and extra work orders

Inspection procedures

Management of claims by contractor

Audit Objective No. 3 - Examine nine specific projects and specific issues brought to the attention of the Auditor General by Members of Council, to determine if they are consistent with relevant policies, procedures, legislation, and regulations.

Criteria:

Review of specific projects and issues indicated by Councillors

Selection of type of contract






Quality control and quality assurance procedures

Claims management

Cost control

Audit Objective No. 4 - Examine a sample of ten construction projects completed in 2011 to determine if they are consistent with relevant policies, procedures, legislation, and regulations.

Criteria: Review of ten sample projects









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Claims management

Cost control

AUDIT SCOPE

The audit scope consists of a review the construction supervision process used during construction of capital works projects by the City.

The audit examined the following projects that have been brought to the attention of the Auditor General by Councillors. The review focussed on the specific concerns raised by the Councillors, as follows:

Transitway – Installation of manhole covers along the travelled lanes and on the path of the bus wheels.

Gloucester Hornets Nest – Review of cost compared to the size of the project; review the procurement process.

Townline Bridge Replacement, Structure 433080 – Contractor with poor performance was awarded the contract, previous project not completed on time, increase in risk to City. Note that this project was completed in 2004.

Cavanagh Bridge (John Shaw Road), Structure 433040 – Contract awarded to same contractor as Structure 433080, the issues are the same. Note that this project was completed in 2006.

Dunrobin Road Culvert, Structure 338180 – Culvert was flooded, was rehabilitated, flooded again, and was replaced completely in 2011.

King Edward Avenue Reconstruction – Concerns with basement cracks in a number of properties.

Woodroffe Avenue Watermain Replacement – Following a watermain break in January 2011, construction did not start until April 2011. The concern is whether the work could have been done in the winter or early spring. Summer construction affected the residents, including water restrictions due to the temporary water service.

John Leroux (Stittsville) Arena Upgrades – The roof repairs were delayed until late 2009 because the materials would not fit the curvature of the roof. Work was not completed until 2010. In addition, the use of design-build in comparison to conventional design-tender-build projects to be assessed.

Goulbourn Recreation Complex – Ice pad addition was started in 2011 and completed in 2012. There is a concern with quality assurance and control, and how it may affect the project warranty.


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To provide context of the overall process to the review of the projects raised by the Councillors, the following ten projects completed in 2011 and 2012 were examined, representing a total construction value of $123,766,000, which constitute approximately 11% of the total budget value of the projects that were active in the City in 2011. The ten projects include projects of small, medium and large size. The following projects were selected as a representative sample based on these criteria:

Figure 1: Selected Projects Reviewed

Per Infrastructure Services Department

Projects

Estimate at Completion Cost ($000s)

1 SW Transitway Extension (North) Stage 1 - Fallowfield to Berrigan

$17,568

2 Woodroffe Ave. Watermain Replacement (Baseline to Navaho) $4,827

3 Sandridge Rd (Hillsdale Rd to Merriman Ave) - Road, Watermain & Sewer

$8,000

4 Centrepointe Theatre Expansion $11,850

5 West Nepean Collector Sewer - CIPP Rehabilitation $3,800

6 Campeau Dr. Water Pumping Station $3,500

7 Strandherd Dr. (Crestway to Prince of Wales) incl. widening of Prince of Wales

$35,000

8 3W Feedermain Link - Phase 1, Part 1 (Ottawa River Pkwy to Moodie)

$32,000

9 Cave Creek Collector, Phase 1 (Harmer to Faraday) $6,000

10 Prince of Wales Roundabout Reconstruction at Central Experimental Farm

$1,221

TOTAL Estimate at Completion Cost of Projects Examined $123,766

Change orders were reviewed in the projects listed in Figure 1 and five of the projects raised by Councillors, where change orders were applicable. In total change orders of 15 projects were reviewed.

In all projects, we reviewed the costs in comparison with the authorities.

The audit encompassed the following tasks:

Review legislative framework;

Review City‟s policies, procedures, standards and practices;


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Review industry procedures, standards and practices;

Review background data;

Obtain and review all files for the project;

Conduct interviews with individuals involved in the various projects;

Conduct site visits, as required;

Prepare draft report for fact verification;

Conduct additional interviews for confirmation of issues, as required; and,

Submit draft report for management review.

Summary of Key Findings

General Findings

The findings below are related to Audit Objectives No. 1 - Examine and evaluate the processes and methodologies pertaining to the Construction Supervision Procedures followed by the City; and, Audit Objective No. 2 - Determine whether the processes and methodologies are consistent and compliant with all relevant policies, procedures, legislation and regulations.

1. The City uses a procurement process for construction services that requires public solicitation of bids for the work. The procurement process is carried out by Supply Branch. Bidding opportunities for construction projects are sent to the Ottawa Construction Association (OCA), who publishes them and administers the issue of tender documents for interested contractors. Solicitations are not published in other tender advertising sites unless the project requires highly specialized contractors, in which case the City uses MERX1.

2. Projects posted at the OCA are available for viewing on site or online by members of the OCA. Non-members can purchase the tender documents at a higher cost than members. The City has advised that tenders are published by OCA in Link2Build, a new electronic bid advertisement board that has been in use by OCA since 2012. Link2Build is a website that publishes construction bid opportunities (primarily non-residential) published by local and regional construction associations across Canada. During the audit, the solicitation document process for non-members was tested by registering and downloading the documents for one project. The process was clear and relatively straightforward.

3. Information provided by OCA indicates that approximately 9% of the total Infrastructure Services Department tenders (110 out of 1,271) had tender

1 MERX is a well established and well-known electronic tendering service with Canada-wide scope, which has been in operation since 1997.


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document takers that were from outside of the Ottawa and surrounding area (defined as 50 km from the City‟s boundary). Of these, five tenders were awarded to contractors from outside the Ottawa and surrounding area, comprising less than 1% of the total value of construction contracts awarded by the City ($363,200,000).

4. The concern with the method of tender advertising is that the City only posts tenders with the OCA (who publishes them in Link2Build, as noted above). Consequently, tenders do not get a wide distribution outside of the City of Ottawa. Tenders would receive wider distribution if they are published in more general sites, such as MERX. It can be expected that advertising tenders in a wider area will result in the City getting more bids which could result in lower prices for the City contracts. It is noted that the City uses MERX for other solicitations, including non-construction related request for proposals and request for standing offers.

5. In its annual report to Council, Supply Branch analyzes the Delegation of Authority reports to identify contracts awarded to and/or performed by local companies. According to the annual report, when adjusted to remove goods and services not available locally (e.g., transit buses are not manufactured in Ottawa, nor is winter rock salt mined locally), approximately 94.5% of the City‟s annual purchasing dollar was spent in Ottawa and the surrounding area.

Figure 2: Analysis of Local Purchasing by Quarter

Per Supply Branch

Q1: 2011

Q2: 2011

Q3: 2011

Q4: 2011

BEFORE removing purchases not available locally: 69.6% 85.7% 78.9% 80.7%

AFTER removing purchasing not available locally: 91.4% 92.9% 97.6% 93.7%


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Figure 3: Geographical Vendor Breakdown for 2009 to 2011 Contracts Awarded Under Delegation of Authority

Per Supply Branch

2011 2010 2009

Region Dollar Value % of Total Dollar Value % of Total Dollar Value % of Total

Ottawa and area $898,901,307 94.5% $754,027,060 94.6% $732,055,748 95.4%

Ontario $22,897,121 2.4% $18,187,233 2.3% $24,918,710 3.2%

Quebec $10,522,412 1.1% $13,028,587 1.6% $5,796,562 0.8%

All Others $18,607,380 2.0% $12,077,843 1.5% $4,805,783 0.6%

Total $950,928,220 100.0% $797,320,723 100.0% $767,576,803 100.0%

Supply Branch did a 2011 “buy local” analysis isolating only construction contracts. Based on this analysis, 808 of the total 884 construction contracts awarded in 2011 (91.4%) were awarded to local firms. When considering dollar value, this figure rises to 96.6%.

Figure 4: 2011 “Buy Local” of Construction Contracts

Per Supply Branch

Region # of

Construction Contracts

Dollar Value % of Dollar

Value

Ottawa & Area 808 $397,711,493 96.6%

Ontario 50 $11,995,007 2.9%

Quebec 21 $1,845,407 0.4%

Other 5 $226,940 0.1%

Total 884 $411,778,847 100.0%

6. It is our opinion that savings may be achieved by advertising construction project bid opportunities in widely used site that would reach a broader audience outside of Ottawa.

7. The City‟s procedures for assignment of project managers and inspectors are similar to the practice in other Ontario municipalities.

8. Contract administration and inspection tasks are well documented in the Inspection Manual prepared by Infrastructure Services.

9. The projects examined, with one exception, were constructed using a design-tender-construction format of procurement. The Dunrobin Road culvert replacement was constructed using a time-and-materials basis.

10. The City carries out a bid analysis for all tenders, comparing the cost estimate prepared before tendering with the various bids. This procedure is similar to that used generally by other Ontario municipalities.


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11. The City uses formal contract documents for all the construction contracts examined.

12. The Branch Manager and Program Manager assign the project manager to the contract based on his/her experience. Inspectors are assigned from a pool of inspectors, supplemented with consultants as required by workload or expertise.

13. Purchasing By-law No. 50 of 2000 – A By-law of the City of Ottawa Respecting Purchasing of Goods, Services and Construction. As noted on the City‟s website, the Purchasing By-law has the objective of obtaining the best value when purchasing goods, construction and services for the City, while treating suppliers equitably. The guiding principle is that purchases be made using a competitive process that is open, transparent and fair to all suppliers. We examined the application of the By-law to the process of acquiring construction services.

14. The Project Manager Manual (PMM) provides detailed guidance and instruction on requirements for tendering of the projects. Supply Branch coordinates with the Ottawa Construction Association to place the Request for Tenders, and the project manager provides input during the tendering period.

15. The PMM makes provisions for the steps to be taken when the construction administration and inspection is done by a consultant.

16. The PMM contains directions regarding questions during tendering and addendum procedures.

17. Once the tender has closed, the bids are reviewed by the City for clerical errors and compared to estimates and budget. A rationale is provided for any gross inconsistencies in unit prices.

18. The contractor is selected based on the methodology identified in the solicitation. In the case of the projects examined, this was based on lowest responsive bid.

19. The City does not have a policy and procedures to enable explicit evaluation of the past performance of contractors on previous City contracts when determining the award of a new contract. The City advises that a prequalification process is used in large complex projects, and that the City has the right to request a firm‟s experience in successfully completing projects of similar size and complexity. However, the City does not always use these methods, and past performance does not enter explicitly into the bid evaluation. As a result, contracts are awarded to the lowest bidder meeting the mandatory requirements identified in the solicitation, including bonding and insurance requirements.


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20. The City has developed a document for reporting supplier performance during the course of a contract. However, if the contractor completes the contract without default, they are eligible to bid in future City contracts; even if the contract process was fraught with difficulties, delays, and extra costs caused by poor performance. The only penalty considered is if Supply Branch barrs the contractor from bidding on future City projects. A performance evaluation method that is taken into account in the evaluation of future bid opportunities is necessary to distinguish between contractors who perform well from those who do not.

21. Past performance of contractors should be documented and a rating system established to enable the City to take the contractor‟s past performance into account when they are competing for new work. The City currently has a Contractor Performance Appraisal Form to document performance; the form is included in Appendix X-2 of the Project Manager Manual. This form, with some modifications, would be a good basis for contractor performance evaluation, as discussed in the previous point. We note that the Contractor Performance Appraisal Form was found in the project files of only one project (Townline Bridge) and not in other project files reviewed.

22. The contract administration functions are well documented and are followed by the project managers.

23. Review of the change orders in the various projects examined demonstrated that the City has a proper method of checks and balances to confirm the need for the change order, review the amounts proposed by the contractor, and negotiate as required a fair price for the change order amount.

24. In general terms, change orders in large new building projects can be expected to have a value ranging between 2% and 3% of the contract value on very well coordinated projects; however, average values can be as high as 5%. On projects that are additions to other buildings the value of change orders is expected to be higher. For heavy construction projects, such as roads, watermains, sewers, and bridges, acceptable values of change orders range from 5% to 10% of the contract value. The changes are expected to be the result of site conditions. The range of generally accepted values were determined based on the experience of a senior architect with more than 20 years of experience, and was used as a typical experience. Construction Delay Claims, B. Bramble & M. Callahan, Construction Law Library, 2005, p. 5-26 states that change orders can range from -5% to +10%. The American Institute of Architects (AIA), The Architect’s Handbook of Professional Practice, 1994 states that the changes could be as high as 7%. AIA Best Practice document, Managing the Contingency Allowance, David Hart, 2007, indicates a value of 5% is commonly used. Columbia University Facilities (http://facilities.columbia.edu) provides a range of 5% to 10%. In addition, the


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acceptable range of change orders can be supported by the usual range of contingency allowances that are provided in civil construction projects.

25. Review of the change orders for the various projects examined showed that several were the result of design issues or design errors and omissions. Work performed under a change order is generally more costly than if the same work is performed under the original tender bid. The reason for the higher cost is that the contractor will charge full price for labour, materials, and equipment required to carry out the work, since there is no competitive process, plus the contractor is entitled to mark up the cost by 15% in the case of work done by the contractor or 10% for work done by a sub-contractor for overhead and profit. The percentages of mark-up were determined based on the change orders reviewed during this audit. In contrast, contractor‟s overhead and profit are distributed throughout the project items in a bid.

26. In some instances, the cost of the entire change order was the result of consultant‟s errors and omissions. The City paid the entire cost, without requiring the consultant to cover the additional costs.

27. On two of the projects reviewed, the respective project manager classified the change order into categories (e.g., design errors and omissions, coordination, owner request, site conditions, and others). This procedure is important to assist in recording the amounts that could be recovered from the consultants. Not all project managers follow this procedure. This process should be followed by all project managers.

28. Figure 5 summarizes the costs of change orders for the various projects, and the portion of the cost that was due to design errors and omissions by consultants. Details on individual change orders for each project are provided in Appendix A of the full report.

29. The amount of the change orders suggests that there may be issues with this matter. This will be explored further in our 2013 Audit of Infrastructure Services.


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Figure 5: Contract Amounts and Change Orders

Per the above table, the percentage of the change orders due to design errors and omissions is 22% of the change order value.

30. The City does not have a consistent approach to encourage the project managers to recover from the consultant the cost of change orders when these are caused by errors and omissions in the design.

Project Name Original Contract Amount

Change Order

Amount

Percentage of Change Orders in

Relation to Original Contract

Amount

Portion of the Change

Orders Paid by the City Relating to

Design Errors

1 Gloucester Hornets Nest Fieldhouse

$298,253 $35,097 11.8% $30,816

2 Cavanagh Bridge $751,100 167,918 22.4%

3 Woodroffe Avenue Watermain ISD11-5046

$4,110,700 $1,065,830 25.9%

4 John Leroux Arena (Stittsville Arena)

$493,300 $64,562 13.1%

5 Goulbourn Twin Ice Pad

$6,635,000 $346,501 5.2% $50,562

6 Southwest Transitway Extension

$12,457,000 $1,196,238 9.6% $696,881

7 Woodroffe Watermain ISB09-6001

$6,327,937 $246,716 3.9%

8 Sandridge Road Reconstruction and Hillsdale Road

$6,878,000 $248,026 3.6%

9 Centrepointe Theatre Expansion

$9,343,824 $424,159 4.5% $63,292

10 West Nepean Collector Sewer Rehabilitation

$3,470,297 $595,180 17.2%

11 Campeau Drive Pumping Station

$4,478,000 $379,595 8.5% $198,075

12 Strandherd Drive Extension ISB09-5009

$14,892,000 $2,064,769 13.9% $660,470

13 3W Feedermain Phase 1, Part 1

$11,867,325 $762,817 6.4% $30,204

14 Cave Creek Collector Relocation

$3,505,330 $367,888 10.5% $70,980

15 Prince of Wales Roundabout

$1,191,778 $57,560 4.8%

TOTAL ALL PROJECTS

$86,699,844

$8,022,856

9.3% $1,801,280


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Projects Raised by Councillors

The findings listed below pertain to the nine projects that were brought to the attention of the Auditor General by Councillors. The projects were reviewed in accordance with Audit Objective No. 3 and the associated criteria.

Transitway

The “Transitway Design Manual, October 1993” has provisions for the placement of manholes on the Transitway, specifically stating that manholes and other ironwork shall not be placed on the travelled portion of the Transitway. The Sewer Design Guidelines, SDG001, November 2004 states that “attempts should be made to avoid locating manholes in the path of vehicle tires, subject to the location requirements of the Guidelines for the Placement of Utilities in the Right-of-Way", which takes precedence. Review of the provisions show that they are adequate. Spot examination of the Transitway disclosed that its design follows these provisions.

Gloucester Hornets Nest

1. The project was tendered using Supply Branch standard procedures. The bids received ranged from $298,937 to $581,333. The lowest bidder was awarded the contract.

2. Review of the cost of the building shows that the cost per square metre of building was $2,310 ($215 per square foot). Based on average construction cost per unit area of similar buildings, the unit cost for the building is competitive.

3. The cost of change orders due to design errors or omissions was $30,816. Although the work was necessary, when work is done as a change order the cost to the City is higher than if it is included in the original tender. In this particular case, the additional costs calculated based on 15% overhead and profit markup is $4,019 [$30,816*(1-1/1.15)].

Townline Bridge Replacement

1. The issue in this contract is whether the contractor had performed prior work for the City and their performance was not taken into account in awarding them this contract. The audit found that the contractor had completed a smaller culvert replacement, in which they made a major mistake in setting the elevations of the culvert footings. However, the resulting problems were corrected by the contractor at their cost and at no cost to the City.

2. In the bid for the subject bridge contract, the contractor met all the bid requirements, including provision of a bid deposit and agreement to bond, and subsequently met all insurance and bonding requirements.

3. Upon completion of this contract, in July 2004, it could be concluded that the contractor completed the work satisfactorily, but had schedule problems.


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4. The contract work was delayed so the City applied liquidated damages to the contractor and deducted them from the payments.

5. In 2007, the contractor took legal action against the City on the basis of a claim for extras that was rejected by the City. This action is ongoing.

Cavanagh Bridge

1. Contract ISB04-7018 was awarded in April 2005, after the completion of the Townline Bridge Replacement, discussed in Section 4.3.3 of the full report. The contractor work started on July 4, 2005; was substantially completed in January 6, 2006; and, was completed on June 27, 2006.

2. At the start of the contract, the City discussed with the contractor the problems associated with various deficiencies, non-performance and supervisory issues on previous contracts carried out by the contractor. The City and the contractor agreed that their performance would be monitored during the execution of this contract.

3. The City attempted to apply a formal contractor evaluation form for future use, based on a form similar to the Contractor Performance Appraisal Form that is presently included in the Project Manager Manual.

4. Supply Branch working with departments developed a document for recording supplier non-performance, by progressive escalation of contract issues. The document provides general instructions for enforcing the provisions of the contracts, including notice of default and for termination of the contract. However, it is a general document intended to be applied to all City procurement, and is not sufficiently specific to construction.

5. The procedures do not include a method for recording past performance of contractors on City projects. There is no specific method for applying the results of past performance of a contractor to the selection process in future City contracts.

6. The Contractor Performance Appraisal Form included in the Project Manager Manual could form the basis for contractor evaluation. However, we noted that it was not found in the files of the projects that were reviewed during the audit.

Dunrobin Road Culvert

1. The original culvert was a 1.8 m diameter corrugated steel pipe (CSP) culvert, which had corroded substantially. In 2007, the City arranged to rehabilitate it by installing another culvert through the barrel of the CSP culvert to extend its useful life. The process of installing the culvert through an existing culvert is called sliplining.


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2. On August 15, 2010, the road was overtopped at the culvert and part of the road embankment was washed out by the flood. On April 11, 2011, the road was overtopped during another storm, which caused damage to the northbound lane and shoulder, although not to the same extent as in the August 2010 flood. Following the flood, the road was repaired under emergency work procedures and reopened on April 16, 2011.

3. Following the flood, a hydraulic analysis of the culvert showed that the lining done in 2010 had reduced the hydraulic capacity of the culvert. The consultant recommended that the culvert be replaced with a larger one.

4. On June 24, 2011, the road was overtopped a third time in less than one year. On this occasion, the City decided to keep the road closed and to replace the culvert with a new one selected on the basis of the consultant hydraulic recommendations and the pipe that was available from the manufacturer for rapid delivery.

5. The June 2011 work was done on a time and material basis, using the contractor that had been called in to repair the damaged road.

6. The issues with this project are that the initial renewal process, which concluded in the sliplining rehabilitation in 2007, did not follow the formal procedures for evaluation of renewal alternatives of bridges and bridge-culverts. The hydrology and hydraulic calculations were not sufficiently thorough to permit the City to recognize that the hydraulic capacity had been reduced, or the implications of this reduction.

King Edward Avenue Reconstruction

1. The project comprised reconstruction of King Edward Avenue and connecting streets between York Street, Sussex Drive and Macdonald-Cartier Bridge. The work comprised relining the existing collector sanitary and storm sewers; reconstruction of underground utilities; removal of existing road bed, excavation, granular and hot mix asphalt; rehabilitation of the Red Path structures; demolition of one structure and three new landscape wall structures with a stone facing.

2. As part of the process, the City required the contractor to conduct a pre-construction survey of buildings and structures that could potentially be affected by construction activities and vibration.

3. The contractor retained a specialized firm to complete the pre-construction survey. The limits of the pre-construction survey are determined by the contractor, and not the City. This contracting procedure protects the City as the responsibility for damages is the contractor‟s. The procedure is a standard procedure used by practically all project owners, since the project owner (the City in this case) does not have control over the contractor‟s methods and operations.


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4. The specialized firm carried out a pre-construction survey of 100 buildings; of these, 44 were inspected both inside and outside. The remaining 56 were surveyed only on the outside because the owner refused entry to the survey company representatives.

5. The property owners of nine buildings claimed that their buildings had been damaged as a result of construction. Of the nine buildings, four are located outside of the pre-construction survey limits.

6. The property owners discussed the matter with the City‟s project manager, who referred the matter to the contractor. The contractor referred the matter to his insurance company.

7. The issue on this project arose from the fact that the City contract documents transfer the responsibility for damages that occur during construction to the contractor. A number of the property owners brought the matter to the attention of the Mayor, who had the City Solicitor review the contract documents. The City Solicitor advised the property owners that the matter should be pursued with the contractor.

8. The property owners have taken issue with the fact that the City transfers to the contractor the entire responsibility and risk for any damages caused by construction. The reason the City and practically all other project owners in North America pass this responsibility is that, as previously noted, the City does not have control or responsibility for the methods and procedures used by the contractor.

9. We reviewed contract documents issued by several other municipalities and the Ministry of Transportation. In all cases, the Ontario General Conditions of Contract, part of the Ontario Provincial Standard Specifications, which transfer the responsibility for any damages caused by the contractor to the contractor, were used. Public Works Canada in its contracts uses similar language.

10. The City‟s contract provisions meet the current standard for handling of damage claims. As well, the manner in which the project manager addressed construction damage claims was correct.

Woodroffe Avenue Watermain Replacement

1. In 2007, a watermain failure on Woodroffe Avenue south of Hunt Club Road occurred. The City carried out a non-destructive pipeline condition assessment of the watermain from Hunt Club Road southerly to Fallowfield Road in November 2008. The condition assessment found that 18 of 558 pipes inspected (3.2%) had broken prestressing wires. A failure risk analysis of the data collected in the condition assessment was completed to calculate the risk of failure of the prestressed concrete cylinder pipes and the repair priorities for the maximum pressures. The failure risk analysis results, reported in February 2009, indicated that of the 18 pipes with broken prestressing wires, 3 were in Repair


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Priority 1 (immediate action required) and 1 pipe in Repair Priority 2 (replace within 3 years). The other 14 pipes were in Priority 3 and 4 (moderate and low risk for the next 5 years).

2. The 1.2 m diameter watermain on Woodroffe Avenue failed on January 14, 2011 between Medhurst Drive and Hunt Club Road. This section of the watermain was constructed in 1975 and 1976 using concrete prestressed pipe.

3. The section of watermain that failed in January 2011 is located north of Hunt Club Road. It was constructed using the same type of pipe which had a similar failure in the fall of 2007, but about 1 to 2 years earlier.

4. The February 2009 failure risk analysis report states that pipes in Repair Priorities 1 and 2 are in high to moderately high risk of failure. The report recommended that the four pipes in Repair Priorities 1 and 2 be excavated and inspected externally to confirm the level of distress, and to replace the pipes accordingly.

5. The 2009 failure risk analysis report defines Priority 1 projects as those where the maximum pressure in the line exceeds the pressure that produces the ultimate strength with (Priority 1a) and without (Priority 1b) the contribution of soil resistance. The failure can occur at any time. Repair should be performed as soon as practical and in less than 1 year.

6. Accordingly, pipes in Priority 1 should have been replaced, at the latest, before February 2010.

7. The design for the replacement of the four pipes south of Hunt Club Road in Priority 1 and 2 started in December 2009, with the original schedule of construction start date of October 2010, which is 8 months later than the Priority 1 failure risk indicated. The original design schedule was to have the design completed and the tender package ready before June 2010.

8. At a scheduling meeting on January 12, 2010, the City decided to postpone the project, but that the design should be ready for construction in case that an emergency required the work to proceed. This was communicated to the project manager by a senior watermain rehabilitation engineer on May 19, 2010, who indicated that the delay was due to other potentially conflicting demands on the system, that the watermain and transient pressures would be monitored by Operations, and that the design should proceed to completion in case that an emergency repair became necessary. The City has indicated that the decision to delay the repairs was made based on other risks to the water system that would not have been apparent to the consultant doing the inspection at the time of the condition assessment. Drinking Water Services carried out a transient analysis (maximum water pressure analysis) in 2009 to assess the likelihood and magnitude of transients that could affect the pipes. The City has explained that the decision to postpone the repairs in Priority 1 was based on managing overall


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water system risks, and that the contract for the repairs on Woodroffe Avenue were scheduled to proceed after the completion of the 2W/2C watermain, which would provide a third feed into the area.

9. At the time of the January 2011 watermain break, construction of the Zone 2W 2C feedermain was in progress, so the City‟s Design and Construction explored the possibility of extending the contract to include the watermain north of Hunt Club Road. However, Asset Management and Drinking Water Services suggested that a condition assessment of the Woodroffe Avenue watermain be done first to identify areas of concern. The scope of the January/February 2011 condition assessment was broader than the 2008 condition assessment, and included the section from David Drive to Hunt Club Road, in addition to the section done in 2008 (Hunt Club Road to Fallowfield Road).

10. On February 24, 2011, Asset Management provided Design and Construction -West with a Scoping Document based on the findings of the condition assessment. When comparing the 2008 and 2011 conditions assessments, it was found that the number of pipe sections with wire breaks was similar on a per km basis, but a greater number of pipes had more severe deterioration. They did find substantial increase in deterioration in the prestressed concrete pipe watermain from 2008.

11. The project manager was aware that procurement of the pipes could take a substantial length of time and therefore proposed to sole-source the procurement of the pipes from a manufacturer who could deliver the required quantity of pipe within the required schedule, in order to expedite construction. He requested pricing for the replacement pipes from the supplier and received it on February 24, 2011.

12. On March 1, 2011, the project manager informed the pipe supplier that the City would proceed with buying the pipe and appurtenances required from the supplier selected. On March 10, 2011, the project manager sent an Estimated Spending Plan Authority (E-SPA) to Purchasing for the pipe. The project manager indicates in the email that Supply Branch had been kept apprised all along, but review of the files found no documentation to confirm that this was the case.

13. On March 16, Purchasing asked the project manager for the reason for sole sourcing the pipe and for selecting the company. The discussion about sole sourcing the pipe extended to March 30th, at which time the decision was to proceed with a standard tender.

14. The correspondence shows that at the time of the break in January 2011, the City repaired the broken watermain and it scheduled the required replacement of the remaining pipes to tender the project for work in the fall of 2011. However, the condition assessment of the watermain from David Drive to Fallowfield Road disclosed that sections of the watermain had deteriorated substantially since


Page xviii Office of the Auditor General 2012 Annual Report

2008 and that there was similar deterioration in the segment north of Hunt Club Road. Based on the results, the City decided to not return to service the section of watermain from Knoxdale Road to Vaan Drive until the required watermain replacement was completed. On this basis, the City decided to carry out the watermain replacement and repair work as soon as possible, instead of returning the watermain to service immediately and risking another break.

15. While the pipe was out of service, supply to the Barrhaven and Riverside South service areas was being provided through a single 406 mm watermain along Merivale Road, supplemented by in-line pumping. The temporary supply met the demand at the time, but hydraulic modelling indicated that it would meet only 75% of the maximum day demand.

16. At the end of February 2011, the results of the condition assessment and the hydraulic modelling showed that construction could not be postponed until the fall, and the project was scheduled for tendering as soon as possible.

17. A number of alternative means of operation and/or repair were examined, including repairs by leaving the pipe in place, such as sliplining or reinforcing the pipe. The analysis concluded that the preferred solution is open cut construction along Woodroffe Avenue. Any of the alternatives would only advance completion by, at most, two weeks and the resulting watermain condition would not be as satisfactory.

18. As a result, it was necessary to impose a complete outdoor water ban in Barrhaven, Riverside South and Manotick until completion of the project, in order to avoid running the system dry and possible boil water advisories and inability to meet firefighting requirements.

19. Review of the change orders for this project found that they were fully documented and were reviewed by the contract administrator and project manager. In general terms, the change orders were necessary to expedite the project.

20. “Police assistance at intersections” item is a concern. Due to the level of traffic congestion on Woodroffe Avenue, it was necessary to have point duty police on a daily basis. The original tender did not anticipate this amount of point duty for the project. The additional cost was $247,637, paid by variation in the tender quantities at the tender price. The total price paid was $313,638. Review of the invoices to the contractor for 1,140.5 hours of police service show that the cost was $214,346 based on $188 per hour. The contractor was paid $99,292 or 46% mark-up on police cost.

21. The project manager should have negotiated the cost of this item, as it clearly was a very significant variation in the quantities, and the general conditions of contract contain provisions for such eventuality. In addition, the manner in which the item is paid provides the contractor with a profit on a service


Office of the Auditor General 2012 Annual Report Page xix

provided by one City Service to another. In fact, the profit margin is 46% even if the number of hours in the contract is not exceeded.

22. Rather than include an item with unit prices, the City should provide an allowance for the cost of the services, with only an administration markup for the contractor. A better option would be to have Ottawa Police invoice the City directly for the services.

John Leroux (Stittsville) Arena Roof Replacement

1. The design for the arena upgrades comprised replacing the existing arena roof with a new one. The total fees paid for the design were $6,827.

2. The design drawings showed that the roof had variable slope, ranging from 10º near the apex to 17.4º near the fascia. The specifications required a specific product and model of sheet metal roofing and cladding. During the tender, a second manufacturer requested to be included as an approved alternate, and was in an addendum.

3. After the contract was awarded, the contractor informed the City and the consultant that the roofing manufacturer selected by the contractor (from the approved suppliers provided in the tender documents) had advised that the specified roof replacement could not be installed on the arena roof because of the curvature of the roof.

4. The roofing manufacturer selected by the contractor suggested that an alternate product manufactured by them would be suitable for the site. The City accepted the alternative, which resulted in additional costs due to differences in colour and additional liner. However, the alternate product also could not be installed on the roof.

5. The City, the consultant and the contractor worked several weeks on resolving the matter, including construction of „mock-ups‟ to determine if alternatives would work. The contractor suggested that a roofing membrane would fit the roof configuration. In June 2009, the City accepted that the consultant design would not work and asked the contractor to proceed. However, the arena scheduling conflicted with the contractor‟s work methods. In November 2009, the City rescinded the purchase order.

6. The City considered taking legal action against the consultant, but did not.

7. In February 2010, the City offered the contractor to reinstate the purchase order, and the project was completed in September 2010, using the roof membrane design proposed by the contractor in June 2009.

8. The project was completed in September 2010, using the revised roof design. The total additional cost was $39,314 due to the change of the roof and the delays.


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9. Analysis of the project timeline shows the following issues:

The design consultant did not carry out sufficient due diligence to confirm that the roofing system provided in the tender documents would actually work.

The design consultant refused to accept that the roofing system proposed would not work until the contractor and the roofing supplier showed that it was not a feasible system for this project.

The City considered claiming against the consultant for the additional costs due to the change in roofing system and the delays, but decided against it.

The City advised that it received services from the consultant on another project to compensate for the consultant costs to the City on this project. However, the extent of compensatory services is not fully documented.

Goulbourn Recreation Complex

1. The construction of the Twin Ice Pad at the Goulbourn Recreation Complex commenced in January 2011. The Chief Building Official issued a Partial Occupancy Permit on March 29, 2012; the Final Occupancy permit has not been issued.

2. The original schedule for the project in 2010 was for the contract to be completed in January 2012. The schedule provided by the contractor during the initial stages of the project required completion by the end of November 2011. In September 2011, it was obvious to the contractor that the project would not be completed in accordance with the original schedule, and a revised schedule was issued with a planned completion date of January 30, 2012.

3. The main reasons for the setback were the result of delays with the manufacturing, delivery and erection of the structural steel for the project. The manufacturer initially would not start the shop drawings until he received the signed and sealed structural drawing issued for construction. The original schedule was for 25 working days, but the work required 75 days. In addition, the structural steel was delivered to the site before the shop inspection required by the contract documents, and with defects in some of the pieces. The City had the structural steel inspected on site and the defects were corrected by the contractor.

4. The City imposed on the contractor liquidated damages of $117,000 for the delays, by deducting the sums in three payments.

5. Inspection and testing was carried out by the architectural firm and the structural, mechanical, and electrical engineering firms retained by the City, which provided general review of construction. In addition, the City retained an inspection company to inspect the structural steel and welding, and carried out testing of concrete and compaction in accordance to standard practice.


Office of the Auditor General 2012 Annual Report Page xxi

6. Review of the file showed that all deficiencies found in the building were corrected before final payment.

7. The issues that were found on this project were mainly

The structural steel fabricator created an adversarial relationship from the very beginning and did not follow the requirements of the contract.

The structural steel was delivered without the required shop inspection and with defects in some pieces (these were corrected on site).

Selected Projects Reviewed

The findings below correspond to ten projects that were selected as a sample to provide context of the overall process to the review of the above projects. These projects were reviewed in accordance with Audit Objective No. 4 and the associated criteria.

Southwest Transitway Extension (North), Stage 1

1. This project comprised the construction of the Southwest Transitway Extension from Berrigan Drive to Oriska Way, Highbury Park Drive Underpass Structure, and the Longfield Station. The contract value for the project based on the tender was $12,457,000. The value of change orders was $1,196,238, for a total final contract value of $13,653,238.

2. Several change orders in this project were the result of an error in the storm sewer elevations shown on a record as-built drawing on file at the City. The resulting additional cost was $440,831.

3. The issue in this project is the accuracy of the record drawings and whether the design consultant should have checked the inverts of the storm sewer given that the crossing was critical. It appears that the City has not investigated whether it could recover any costs of this extra work from the respective consultants.

4. During construction of the Highbury Overpass it was found that the rock at the design foundation elevation was not adequate. This finding necessitated additional rock explorations and testing, and re-design of the footing. The total cost of the change orders was $86,132, which could have been saved if the geotechnical investigation had been completed thoroughly.

5. The City publishes Standard Tender Documents for Unit Price Contracts, which include a typical section for the trench for sewer and services (Standard Drawing No. S6). However, the design drawings showed a typical trench width for two sewers instead of using the standard drawing. As a result, a change order was issued for the additional rock excavation required. The total cost of the additional rock excavation was $18,069.


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6. In total, change orders for $696,881 were the result of design errors. Of this, it is estimated that $559,174 can be classified as payments that the City made which could have been avoided during design. There is no indication that the City considered recovering the additional costs from the consultants (prime consultant and geotechnical sub-consultant).

Woodroffe Avenue Watermain Replacement (2009 contract)

1. This project comprised the replacement of a watermain to accommodate the construction of the Transitway on the west side of Woodroffe Avenue south of Baseline Road. The contract value of the project was$6,327,937.

2. This project progressed without major problems. Thirteen change orders were the result of site conditions or requirements of Drinking Water Services; the total value of change orders was $246,716. The largest change order comprised construction of a new valve chamber and installation of the valve as requested by Drinking Water Services ($166,509). A credit of $50,000 was applied for early abandonment of the old watermain.

Sandridge Road (Hillsdale Rd to Merriman Ave.)

1. This project comprised the reconstruction of Sandridge Road, including replacement of the watermain and sewers between Hillsdale Road and Merriman Avenue. The contract value of the project was $6,878,000.

2. This project progressed without major problems. During the project there was a total of $248,026 in change orders that were the result of site conditions or additional requirements of the Operations department. The Hydro Ottawa change orders were reimbursed by the utility.

Centrepointe Theatre Expansion

1. This project comprised construction of the expansion to Centrepointe Theatre. The building addition comprised 2,630 square metres, including a rehearsal studio, dressing rooms, lounge area, volunteer room, workshop, interior loading dock and storage rooms, plus a loading ramp, and landscaping. The total contract value was $9,343,824.

2. A total of 129 change orders were issued for a total value of $424,159, including a credit of $80,995 to close out the cash allowances ($250,000) in the contract. Some changes were required due to design coordination. The largest modifications were due to changes to the roof to match the existing building‟s roof, hydro substation modifications, and specialty items that were required after substantial completion.

3. The value of change orders in this project constituted about 4.5% of the total project value. On that basis, it is concluded that the value of change orders for this project was within the accepted range.


Office of the Auditor General 2012 Annual Report Page xxiii

4. The value of change orders resulting from omissions on the tender documents was $62,949. Although the value is considered to be within the industry-accepted margin of 3%, the fact that they were omissions and not coordination changes should be taken into account.

5. It is noted that the project manager in this contract identified in the change orders the reasons for each change order, and included a classification for them, including design errors and omissions. This is important to identify as it may assist in the potential recovery of costs.

6. The project was constructed without major problems and was completed within budget and on time.

West Nepean Collector Sewer CIPP Rehabilitation

1. The rehabilitation of the West Nepean collector sewer was undertaken under the Federal Stimulus Funding Program for infrastructure projects (Stimulus Program). It was originally scheduled to be completed before the deadline of March 2011, but with the extension of the deadline by the federal government, the project was completed in June 2011.

2. The original contract value was $3,470,297. The project was expanded and the completion date extended when the Federal government extended the Stimulus Program deadline. The final contract value was $3,804,902.

3. A major sewer surcharge caused by the operation of the Real Time Control System for the combined sewers resulted in additional $221,346 costs. The concern with this event is that the sewage by-pass plans prepared by the contractor were reviewed by the project manager and Operations.

The contract documents should have included a caution regarding operation of the Real Time Control System and its potential effect on the West Nepean Collector.

During the review of the by-pass plan submitted by the contractor, Operations should have noted to the contractor that the tunnel could be flooded during a rainfall event.

Although no changes to the by-pass plans may have avoided the back-up of sewage into the subject section of West Nepean Collector, if the contractor had been advised of the possibility of flooding they would have had the opportunity to change procedures to avoid damages to the lining and the by-pass setup that were caused by the flooding.

4. In one of the by-pass plans, the contractor assumed that the by-pass could use lands owned by NCC. However, the City did not have an easement on those lands and had to obtain a temporary easement from NCC. The time required to obtain the NCC permission resulted in a delay claim by the contractor, plus they used an alternate by-pass route. This situation could have been avoided if the contract documents had the following requirements:


Page xxiv Office of the Auditor General 2012 Annual Report

The contractor shall use for by-pass only existing right-of-ways and existing easements.

The by-pass methods are determined by the contractor, but the by-pass routes are specified by the City.

Use of an alternative by-pass route by the contractor is subject to approval by the City. If the alternative is not approved by the City, the contractor shall use the specified routes.

Campeau Drive Water Pumping Station

1. The Campeau Drive Water Pumping Station forms part of the Zone 3 West (3W) Feedermain system. The original contract value was $4,478,000, which was the lowest bid. It is notable that the second and third lowest bids were within $255,000 of the lowest bid, which indicates that the City obtained a reasonable price for the work.

2. Approximately $165,700 of additional cost was the result of changes needed to meet the Building Code requirements or other design issues. The final value of the contract was $4,807,853.

3. Construction of the project proceeded without a major issue until the project was ready to commission.

4. The City‟s Drinking Water Services found that the SCADA (supervisory control and data acquisition) control system installed by the sub-contractor did not meet the City‟s standards.

5. The sub-contractor built and installed the Area Control Panel (ACP) without providing shop drawings or seeking input from Drinking Water Services for the design. Minutes of Deficiencies Meeting No. 1 show that the Factory Acceptance Testing for the ACP was not completed and that the ACP was not CSA certified. Shop drawings were submitted for the components, but not the entire ACP.

6. Resolution of the issues with the ACP took from April 2010 to February 2011 (ten months).

7. Given that the contractor was able to install the wrong Area Control Panel and that the consultant recommended payment for the work, it can be concluded that there was a gap in the inspection process. It is reasonable to expect that the consultant should have realized that the ACP was being installed without following the required steps, as stipulated in the contract documents. Consequently, the consultant is partly responsible for the delays in completion of the pumping station.

8. As a result, the project was delayed substantially, as it was completed almost 1½ years later than scheduled.


Office of the Auditor General 2012 Annual Report Page xxv

Strandherd Dr. (Crestway to Prince of Wales) incl. widening of Prince of Wales

1. The extension of Strandherd Drive from Crestway to Prince of Wales was started in August 2009 and completed in September 2011. The contract value was $14,892,000. Change orders with a value of $2,064,769 were approved and paid, for a final project value of $15,997,123.

2. Based on a review of the change orders, $700,175 were due to changes due to items that were missed in the design of the project. Change orders for work for Hydro Ottawa amounted to $244,654, of which $234,084 was reimbursed to the City by the utility.

3. The City paid a $16,500 change order for installation of seismographs for vibration monitoring of construction activities. This should not have been paid by City.

4. The project was completed on time, within the overall budget. However, there were a considerable number of changes due to omissions in the design.

3W Feedermain Link - Phase 1, Part 1 (Ottawa River Pkwy to Moodie Drive)

1. The 3W Feedermain Link is a major component of the water distribution system for the City of Ottawa. The section included in this project was started on May 20, 2010, with a contract price of $11,867,325.

2. Change orders with a value of $762,817 were approved and paid, for a final contract value of $11,739,514. The reason why the final cost is similar to the initial contract value is that provisional items were estimated to cost $785,000 and only $13,815 of the provisional item budget was spent.

3. The major issue with this project is that a substantial proportion ($297,161) of the changes required during construction was due to design issues. Most of the problems that arose during construction related to unresolved conflicts with existing services and utilities. The largest change order, with a value of $216,000, related to the provisions that were necessary to connect the feedermain to the remainder of the system; this was not a design error, but was the result of a contingency plan requested by the City at the Carlington Heights Pumping Station, which required piping and pump modifications to ensure uninterrupted water supply in case of failure of the existing transmission main during the hot tap. This is considered a design issue as the consultant should have made provision for a contingency plan to come into effect for the connection of the new watermain to the system.

4. In the next phase of this project, carried out in subsequent contract designed by the same consultant, the consultant failed to provide for the extensive volumes of groundwater; the cost of which exceeded $1.6 million. As a result, the City has commenced legal action against the design consultant and the geotechnical consultant.


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Cave Creek Collector, Phase 1 (Harmer to Faraday)

1. This project comprised construction of the new Cave Creek Collector, Phase 1 on Harmer Avenue and Faraday Road. The contract was awarded on August 18, 2010. The tender documents required that the work be substantially performed by December 21, 2010, with completion by May 15, 2011.

2. The Certificate of Authorization from the Ministry of the Environment was not received until September 14th. The work was further delayed due to work by Bell which was scheduled to leave the site in September 2010 but did not until November 2010.

3. The contract value at the project start was $3,505,330. Change orders for the project amount to $367,888.

4. Approximately $332,000 of the additional costs was the result of the delay in starting construction.

5. The City paid $61,930 for box culvert storm sewer. However, an item, for the supply and installation of the same size culvert, was already in the contract. The City has explained that this particular section could not be paid based on the unit prices because the section of storm sewer replaced was a cast-in-place concrete section; replacement required demolition of the existing concrete sewer, placement of two sections of precast concrete box, installation of dowels to tie into the existing concrete culvert, and construction of a new cast-in-place section.

Prince of Wales Roundabout Reconstruction at Central Experimental Farm

1. This project comprised the reconstruction of an existing traffic circle to configure the intersection based on a roundabout.

2. The Commence Work Order was issued by the City on May 18, 2011. The contract required substantial completion by July 15, 2011 and completion of the work by September 16, 2011. The contract value when work started was $1,191,778.

3. The cost of change orders was $57,560, of which $36,135 was due to the need to change the connection of catchbasin leads to the existing storm sewer owned by Public Works Canada. The method of connection had been agreed between Public Works and the City, but the agreement was not provided to the designer. As a result, the method of connection shown on the drawings and used in the field did not meet the requirements of Public Works and Government Services Canada (PWGSC). The City instructed the contractor to remove the connections done per the design and to redo them based on the instructions from PWGSC.

4. The issue created by making the wrong connection should have been prevented through coordination between project managers from different departments (Infrastructure Services and Planning & Growth Management).


Office of the Auditor General 2012 Annual Report Page xxvii

Areas of Potential Savings

The following areas of potential savings were identified in this audit:

Police assistance at intersections: The City should pay for police assistance at intersections directly to Ottawa Police Service. If the average hourly cost of police assistance is $188 and the unit price in tenders is $275 per hour, the City could save more than $435,000 in contractor mark-up fees based on a total annual utilization of 5,000 hours of police assistance.

Recovery of costs from consultants when change orders are the result of errors and omissions in the design: Based on the sample, the average value of change orders was 9% of contract amounts, and the average value of change orders due to design errors and omissions was 22% of the total change orders. The value of the sample projects ($123,766,000) was about 30% of the total value of the projects awarded by the City in 2011 ($412.4 million). Using the average change order values, the change orders in all contracts could amount to $37.1 million. If 22% of these change orders are the result of design errors and omissions, this represents $8.2 million. Even recovering only the 15% contractors‟ overhead and profit markup on the change orders, the savings to the City could be approximately $1.2 million.

Recommendations and Management Responses

Recommendation 1

To provide a wider circulation of tenders, that the City, in addition to posting tenders with the Ottawa Construction Association, ensure that all tenders are posted on “Link2Build” and retain documentation of this.

Management Response

Management agrees with this recommendation and it has been implemented.

Supply Branch now retains documentation on the procurement file confirming that the requirement was also posted on “Link2Build”.

Recommendation 2

That the City formalize its relationship with the Ottawa Construction Association and “Link2Build”, including ensuring that the City’s rights to review and audit the processes are documented.

Management Response

Management agrees with this recommendation.

Supply Branch will formalize the City‟s relationship with the Ottawa Construction Association (OCA) and “Link2Build” including ensuring that the City has the right to review and audit the documented processes, by the end of Q4 2013.


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Recommendation 3

That the City develop a policy to require project managers to formally document design errors and omissions found during the construction supervision process. The documentation should include the requirement for project managers to classify change orders into categories, such as design errors and omissions, design issues, site conditions, etc., to facilitate the recovery of costs from the consultants.

Management Response


Management will develop a policy and/or procedures to document design errors and omissions found during the construction supervision process by Q2 2014.

It should be noted that some categories, (i.e., site conditions) will not result in cost recovery from consultants. (See Management Response to Recommendation 4 with regard to cost recovery).

Recommendation 4

That the City develop a policy and procedures to be followed to recover the costs of construction changes and original engineering costs related to the specific component from the consultants when the additional costs are caused by design errors or omissions.

Management Response


Management will develop a policy and/or procedures to recover the costs of construction changes and original engineering costs related to a specific contract component when the additional costs are caused by design errors or omissions. This work will be completed by Q2 2014.

Recommendation 5

That the City develop a system to record contractor performance in City contracts, and that the City expand the construction bid evaluation process to include formally the past performance of the bidder in the evaluation and award of contracts, so that contracts are awarded on the basis of past performance, experience, and staffing in addition to lowest cost.

Management Response


Currently, City of Ottawa construction bid solicitations include a provision whereby a firm must have experience successfully completing projects of similar size and complexity. Firms that are unable to demonstrate this experience are deemed non-responsive and are not awarded the contract.


Office of the Auditor General 2012 Annual Report Page xxix

A project has been initiated within Supply Branch to develop an electronic system to record and act on a Contractor‟s past performance. This system will be implemented by Q4 2014. ISD will be working with Supply Branch on how contractors‟ past performance will be affecting future award of contracts.

Recommendation 6

That the City ensure that for culverts where a reduction in conveyance capacity is being considered, the renewal process includes undertaking the required hydrology and hydraulic design.

Management Response


Since February 2011, the Asset Management Branch has modified its practice to include a hydraulic assessment for culvert renewal options that would result in a reduction in the hydraulic conveyance capacity.

Recommendation 7

That the City undertake a program for inspecting its critical water transmission mains where they are known or suspected to be exposed to corrosive environment, and that it takes action based on the results of the inspection findings.

Management Response


In June 2012, Environmental Services presented to Environment Committee a report on a condition assessment program for drinking water transmission mains (ACS2012-COS-ESD-0014). This report outlines a risk-based approach to the inspection and management of water transmission mains.

Recommendation 8

That the City submit to Council as part of the Drinking Water Quality Management System annual report a summary of inspections on critical water transmission mains, including an action plan for correction of pipes identified to be in very poor condition.

Management Response


A summary of inspections on critical water transmission mains, including an action plan for correction of pipes identified to be in poor condition, will be reflected in the 2013 Drinking Water Quality Management System (DWQMS) Annual Report to be presented to Council in Q2 2014.


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Recommendation 9

That the City modify the payment method for services from other City services so that they do not provide an unwarranted profit to the contractor.

Management Response


Management will conduct a review of the requirements that will modify the payment method for City services from other City services so that they do not provide an unwarranted profit to the contractor. Unless specific restrictions are identified, this will be implemented by Q2 2014.

Recommendation 10

That the City ensure that operational constraints such as the operation of the Real Time Control System are fully described in the contract documents and that the risk for monitoring weather forecasts is transferred to the contractor.

Management Response


Management will work with staff in the Environmental Services department to ensure that operational constraints are fully described in contract documents and that the risk for monitoring weather forecasts is transferred to the contractor. This will be built into contract standard specifications by Q2 2014.

Recommendation 11

That the City specify, in sewer renewal projects, the location for sewer by-passes and require the contractor to use by-pass locations on existing right-of-ways or appropriate existing easements. Sewer by-pass plans proposed by the contractor using other locations must be at the contractor’s risk and expense, including the consequences of delays.

Management Response


In all future sewer renewal contracts, the City will specify the location for sewer by-passes on existing right-of-ways and appropriate easements. Should the contractor propose other locations, the contract will specify that this will be at the contractor‟s risk and expense, including the consequences of delays. This will be built into contract standard specifications by Q2 2014.

Recommendation 12

That the City modify the Scoping Document so that commitments made by all departments are explicitly discussed in the document.


Office of the Auditor General 2012 Annual Report Page xxxi

Management Response


Management will amend the scoping document to ensure that commitments made by all departments are explicitly expressed. This work will be complete by Q2 2014.

Recommendation 13

That the City instruct the project managers that the liquidated damages are provided to assist in keeping the contractors on schedule, but are not effective unless the project manager actually charges them to the contractor.

Management Response


In Q3 2013, management issued a directive to ensure that project managers impose liquidated damages on contractors pursuant to the City‟s Standard Tender Documents.

Conclusion

The City‟s Construction Supervision process is complete and comparable to the process and procedures used by other municipalities and the Ministry of Transportation in Ontario.

The audit found a substantial amount of cost increase caused by change orders resulting from consultants‟ errors and omissions, which the City is not recovering from the consultants. The City is currently recovering costs resulting from changes required by Hydro Ottawa, and should be able to recover costs for changes required by consultants‟ errors and omissions.

Acknowledgement

We wish to express our appreciation for the cooperation and assistance afforded the audit team by management.

Vérification de la surveillance de la construction

Rapport annuel 2012 du Bureau du vérificateur général Page xxxiii

RÉSUMÉ

Introduction

La vérification de la surveillance de la construction a été inscrite dans le plan de vérification de 2012 du Bureau du vérificateur général (BVG), approuvé par le Conseil municipal le 14 décembre 2011.

Contexte

Les membres du Conseil ont porté neuf projets à l‟attention du vérificateur général pour qu‟il en fasse l‟examen. Les projets à examiner ont en grande partie été réalisés en 2010 et en 2011, sauf deux qui se sont déroulés en 2004 et en 2006. Les échantillons de projets ont été sélectionnés parmi ceux qui ont été réalisés en 2011 et en 2012.

Objectifs de la vérification

Objectif 1 - Examiner et évaluer les méthodes et les processus associés aux procédures de surveillance de la construction utilisées par la Ville.

Critères

Examen des documents d‟appel d‟offres

Examen du processus d‟appel d‟offres, y compris les projets de conception/construction

Procédures de sélection des entrepreneurs

Examen des documents contractuels

Dossiers administratifs en matière de construction

Affectation des gestionnaires de projet, des superviseurs de projet et des inspecteurs

Procédures et tâches en matière d‟inspection de la construction

Procédures pour la gestion des demandes de modification et des commandes de travaux supplémentaires

Procédures des processus de réclamation

Objectif 2 - Déterminer si les méthodes et les processus sont cohérents avec les politiques, les procédures, les lois et les règlements pertinents et y sont conformes.

Critères

Procédures de gestion de projet

Procédures de transfert de projet de la conception à la construction


Page xxxiv Rapport annuel 2012 du Bureau du vérificateur général

Processus d‟appel d‟offres


Processus d‟administration des contrats

Contrôle des coûts

Gestion des demandes de modification et des commandes de travaux supplémentaires

Procédures d‟inspection

Gestion des réclamations des entrepreneurs

Objectif 3 - Examiner neuf projets précis et les problèmes particuliers portés à l‟attention du vérificateur général par les membres du Conseil afin de déterminer s‟ils sont conformes aux politiques, aux procédures, aux lois et aux règlements pertinents.

Critères

Examen de projets précis et des problèmes indiqués par les conseillers

Choix du type de contrat






Procédures de contrôle et d‟assurance de la qualité

Gestion des réclamations


Objectif 4 - Examiner un échantillon de dix projets de construction réalisés en 2011 afin de déterminer s‟ils respectent les politiques, les procédures, les lois et les règlements pertinents.

Critères

Examen d‟un échantillon de dix projets

Choix du type de contrat




Rapport annuel 2012 du Bureau du vérificateur général Page xxxv




Procédures de contrôle et d‟assurance de la qualité

Gestion des réclamations


Portée de la vérification

La portée de la vérification consistera à examiner le processus de surveillance de la construction utilisé pendant la réalisation de projets d‟immobilisations de la Ville.

Les vérificateurs ont examiné les projets suivants, lesquels ont été portés à l‟attention du vérificateur général par les conseillers. L‟examen a été axé sur les préoccupations suivantes des conseillers.

Transitway – Installation de plaques d‟égout le long des voies de circulation et là où passent les roues des autobus.

Hornets Nest, Gloucester – Examen du coût par rapport à la taille du projet; examen du processus d‟approvisionnement.

Remplacement du pont Townline, structure 433080 – Un entrepreneur au rendement médiocre a obtenu le contrat; projet antérieur non réalisé dans les délais; augmentation du risque pour la Ville. Il convient de noter que ce projet a été achevé en 2004.

Pont Cavanagh (chemin John Shaw), structure 433040 – Contrat octroyé au même entrepreneur que pour la structure 433080; les problèmes sont les mêmes. Il convient de noter que ce projet a été achevé en 2006.

Ponceau du chemin Dunrobin, structure 338180 – Le ponceau a été inondé, réparé, inondé de nouveau, puis a été remplacé complètement en 2011.

Reconstruction de l‟avenue King Edward – Préoccupations relatives à des fissures dans les sous-sols d‟un certain nombre de propriétés.

Remplacement de la conduite d‟eau principale de l‟avenue Woodroffe – Une rupture de la conduite principale a eu lieu en janvier 2011, mais les travaux n‟ont débuté qu‟en avril 2011. La préoccupation est de savoir si les travaux auraient pu être réalisés en hiver ou au début du printemps. Les travaux effectués en été ont dérangé les résidents, notamment les restrictions de l‟approvisionnement en eau en raison du service d‟aqueduc temporaire.


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Modernisation de l‟aréna John-Leroux (Stittsville) – La réparation du toit a été retardée jusqu‟à la fin de 2009 parce que les matériaux de couverture ne seraient pas s‟adapter à la courbure du toit. Les travaux ont été finalement achevés en 2010. Il convient d‟évaluer l‟utilisation du modèle conception-construction par rapport au modèle classique conception-soumission-construction.

Complexe récréatif Goulbourn – L‟ajout d‟une patinoire débuté en 2011 a été achevé en 2012. On soulève des questions quant à l‟assurance et au contrôle de la qualité et aux répercussions possibles sur la garantie du projet.

Pour établir le contexte de l‟ensemble du processus d‟examen des projets soulignés par les conseillers, les dix projets suivants, achevés en 2011 et en 2012, ont été examinés; ceux-ci représentent des travaux de construction d‟une valeur totale de 123 766 000 $ soit environ 11 % de la valeur totale du budget des projets réalisés dans la ville en 2011. Les dix projets examinés comprennent des projets de petite, de moyenne et de grande envergure. Les projets suivants ont été sélectionnés pour constituer un échantillon représentatif à partir de ces critères.

Figure 1 : Sélection des projets passés en revue

Par Services d’infrastructure

Projets Estimation du Coût des projets à l'achèvement

(milliers $)

1

Prolongement de la partie sud-ouest du Transitway (nord), Phase 1 - de Fallowfield à Berrigan

17 568 $

2

Remplacement de la conduite d‟eau principale de l‟avenue Woodroffe (de Baseline à Navaho)

4 827 $

3

Chemin Sandridge (du ch. Hillsdale à l‟av. Merriman) - route, conduites d‟eau et d‟égout

8 000 $

4 Agrandissement du Théâtre Centrepointe 11 850 $

5 Égout collecteur de Nepean-Ouest - remise en état par chemisage 3 800 $

6 Station de pompage de l‟eau de la promenade Campeau 3 500 $

7

Prom. Strandherd (de Crestway à Prince of Wales), y compris l‟élargissement de Prince of Wales

35 000 $

8

Conduite principale reliant 3W - Phase 1, partie 1 (de la promenade de l‟Outaouais à Moodie)

32 000 $

9 Égout collecteur de Cave Creek, Phase 1 (de Harmer à Faraday) 6 000 $

10

Reconstruction du carrefour giratoire sur Prince of Wales à la hauteur de la Ferme expérimentale centrale

1 221 $

Coût total des projets passés en revue

123 766 $


Rapport annuel 2012 du Bureau du vérificateur général Page xxxvii

Les demandes de modification ont été examinées dans les projets énumérés à la figure 1 et cinq des projets soulevés par les conseillers, où des demandes de modification étaient applicables. Au totale les demandes de modification de 15 projets ont été examinées.

Dans tous les projets, la vérification a permis de comparer les coûts aux autorisations.

La vérification englobait les tâches suivantes.

Examen du cadre législatif.

Examen des politiques, des procédures, des normes et des pratiques de la Ville.

Examen des procédures, des normes et des pratiques de l‟industrie.

Examen des données de base.

Obtention et examen de tous les dossiers associés au projet.

Tenue d‟entrevues avec les personnes participant aux différents projets.

Tenue de visites des lieux au besoin.

Préparation du rapport préliminaire pour la vérification des faits.

Tenue d‟entrevues supplémentaires pour la confirmation des problèmes au besoin.

Présentation du rapport préliminaire à la direction à des fins d‟examen.

Résumé des principales constatations

Constatations générale

Les constatations qui suivent sont liées aux objectifs de vérification no 1 (examiner et évaluer les méthodes et les processus associés aux procédures de surveillance de la construction utilisées par la Ville) et n° 2 (déterminer si les méthodes et les processus sont cohérents avec les politiques, les procédures, les lois et les règlements pertinents, et y sont conformes).

1. La Ville utilise, pour les services de construction, un processus d‟approvisionnement qui prévoit la publication d‟appels d‟offres pour les travaux. Le processus d‟approvisionnement est régi par la Direction de l‟approvisionnement. Les appels d‟offres pour les projets de construction sont envoyés à l‟Association de la construction d‟Ottawa (ACO), qui les publie et gère la distribution des documents d‟appel d‟offres aux entrepreneurs intéressés. Les invitations à soumissionner ne sont pas publiées sur d‟autres sites


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de diffusion d‟appels d‟offres, sauf si le projet exige la participation d‟entrepreneurs hautement spécialisés, auquel cas la Ville utilise MERX1.

2. Les projets publiés par l‟ACO peuvent être consultés sur place ou en ligne par les membres de l‟ACO. Les non-membres peuvent acheter les documents d‟appel d‟offres à un coût plus élevé que celui exigé des membres. La Ville a affirmé que les appels d‟offres étaient publiés dans Link2Build, un nouveau site utilisé à cette fin par l‟ACO depuis 2012. Link2Build est un site Web qui publie les appels d‟offres (principalement pour des projets de construction non résidentiels) des associations locales et régionales de construction du Canada. Pendant la vérification, on a examiné le fonctionnement du processus d‟invitation à soumissionner pour les non-membres – inscription et téléchargement de documents pour un projet. Le processus était clair et relativement simple.

3. Les renseignements fournis par l‟ACO révèlent que, pour environ 9 % de tous les appels d‟offres des Services d‟infrastructure (110 sur 1271), des entrepreneurs de l‟extérieur d‟Ottawa et des environs (au-delà de 50 km des limites de la ville) ont demandé les documents de soumission. Parmi ceux-ci, cinq contrats ont été attribués à des entrepreneurs de l‟extérieur d‟Ottawa et des environs, soit moins de 1 % de la valeur totale des contrats de construction octroyés par la Ville (363 200 000 $).

4. Ce qui soulève des préoccupations avec la méthode de publication des appels d‟offres, c‟est que la Ville ne publie ses appels d‟offres que par l‟entremise de l‟ACO (qui publie dans Link2Build, comme susmentionné), ce qui fait en sorte que les appels d‟offres n‟obtiennent pas une grande diffusion à l‟extérieur d‟Ottawa. Les appels d‟offres profiteraient d‟une plus grande diffusion s‟ils étaient publiés dans des sites plus généraux, comme MERX. On peut s‟attendre à ce qu‟une plus vaste diffusion des appels d‟offres de la Ville se traduise par le dépôt d‟un plus grand nombre de soumissions. On peut également s‟attendre à ce que cela entraîne une baisse des prix pour les contrats de la Ville. Il convient de noter que la Ville utilise MERX pour d‟autres invitations à soumissionner, y compris des demandes de propositions et d‟offres à commandes qui ne sont pas en lien avec la construction.

1 MERX est un service électronique d‟appels d'offres bien établi et bien connu de portée

pancanadienne qui existe depuis 1997.


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5. Dans son rapport annuel au Conseil, la Direction de l‟approvisionnement analyse les pouvoirs délégués pour déterminer les contrats attribués à des entreprises locales ou exécutés par ces dernières. Selon le rapport annuel, après ajustements pour éliminer les produits ou les services qui ne sont pas disponibles localement (p. ex. les autobus ne sont pas fabriqués à Ottawa, pas plus que le sel de voirie), environ 94,5 % de chaque dollar d‟approvisionnement annuel de la Ville a été dépensé à Ottawa et dans les environs.

Figure 2 : Analyse des approvisionnements locaux, par trimestre

Par Direction de l’approvisionnement

T1 : 2011

T2 : 2011

T3 : 2011

T4 : 2011

AVANT d‟éliminer les achats non disponibles localement :

69,6 % 85,7 % 78,9 % 80,7 %

APRÈS avoir éliminé les approvisionnements non disponibles localement :

91,4 % 92,9 % 97,6 % 93,7 %

Figure 3 : Ventilation géographique des fournisseurs pour les contrats de

2009 à 2011 octroyés en vertu de pouvoirs délégués Par Direction de l'approvisionnement

2011 2010 2009

Région Valeur en dollars % du total Valeur en dollars % du total Valeur en dollars % du total

Ottawa et

environs 898 901 307 $ 94,5 % 754 027 060 $ 94,6 % 732 055 748 $ 95,4 %

Ontario 22 897 121 $ 2,4 % 18 187 233 $ 2,3 % 24 918 710 $ 3,2 %

Québec 10 522 412 $ 1,1 % 13 028 587 $ 1,6 % 5 796 562 $ 0,8 %

Toutes les autres 18 607 380 $ 2,0 % 12 077 843 $ 1,5 % 4 805 783 $ 0,6 %

Total 950 928 220 $ 100,0 % 797 320 723 $ 100,0 % 767 576 803 $ 100,0 %

La Direction de l‟approvisionnement a effectué une analyse des « achats de produits locaux » en 2011 portant uniquement sur les contrats de construction. D‟après cette analyse, 808 contrats de construction sur un total de 884 attribués en 2011 (91,4 %) l‟ont été à des entreprises locales. Si l‟on considère la valeur en dollars, ce pourcentage atteint 96,6 %.


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Figure 4 : Analyse des « achats de produits locaux » des contrats de construction en 2011

Par Direction de l'approvisionnement

Région

Nombre de

contrats de

construction

Valeur en dollars % de la valeur en

dollars

Ottawa et environs 808 397 711 493 $ 96,6 %

Ontario 50 11 995 007 $ 2,9 %

Québec 21 1 845 407 $ 0,4 %

Autres 5 226 940 $ 0,1 %

Total 884 411 778 847 $ 100,0 %

6. Nous croyons qu‟il est possible de réaliser des économies en publiant les invitations à soumissionner pour des projets de construction sur des sites largement utilisés et susceptibles d‟atteindre un vaste public à l‟extérieur d‟Ottawa.

7. Les procédures utilisées par la Ville pour affecter les gestionnaires et les inspecteurs de projet sont semblables à celles utilisées dans d‟autres municipalités ontariennes.

8. Les tâches concernant l‟administration et l‟inspection des contrats sont bien documentées dans le manuel d‟inspection élaboré par les Services d‟infrastructure.

9. Les projets examinés, à une exception près, ont été réalisés selon le modèle de marchés publics conception-soumission-construction. Le remplacement d‟un ponceau sur le chemin Dunrobin a été réalisé selon un modèle temps et matériaux.

10. La Ville procède à une analyse des soumissions pour tous les appels d‟offres en comparant le coût estimé établi avant l‟appel d‟offres aux différentes soumissions. Cette procédure est similaire à celle utilisée en général par les autres municipalités de l‟Ontario.

11. La Ville utilise les documents contractuels officiels pour tous les contrats de construction examinés.


Rapport annuel 2012 du Bureau du vérificateur général Page xli

12. La désignation des gestionnaires de projet est assurée par le gestionnaire de la direction et le gestionnaire de programme, et ce, en fonction de l‟expérience du gestionnaire de projet à l‟égard des travaux prévus au contrat. Les inspecteurs sont choisis parmi un groupe d‟inspecteurs et sont appuyés par des consultants au besoin, selon la charge de travail ou l‟expertise exigée.

13. Règlement no 50 de 2000, Règlement sur les achats - Règlement municipal en matière d‟acquisition de biens, de services et de travaux de construction par la Ville d‟Ottawa. Comme il est indiqué sur le site Internet de la Ville, le Règlement sur les achats a pour but d‟obtenir le meilleur rapport qualité-prix dans l‟acquisition de biens, de services et de travaux de construction par la Ville tout en assurant un traitement équitable de tous les fournisseurs. Le principe directeur du processus d‟approvisionnement veut que les acquisitions soient effectuées par voie concurrentielle ouverte, transparente et équitable à l‟égard de tous les fournisseurs. La présente vérification porte sur l‟application du Règlement au processus d‟achat de services de construction.

14. Le manuel du gestionnaire de projet contient des orientations et des directives précises sur les exigences concernant les appels d‟offres pour les projets. La Direction de l‟approvisionnement assure une coordination avec l‟Association de la construction d‟Ottawa pour publier les demandes de soumission, et le gestionnaire de projet est mis à contribution au cours de la période de soumission.

15. Le manuel du gestionnaire de projet précise les mesures à prendre lorsque l‟administration et l‟inspection de travaux de construction sont réalisées par un consultant.

16. Le manuel du gestionnaire de projet contient également des directives au sujet de questions pouvant être soulevées pendant les processus d‟appel d‟offres et pour les addenda.

17. À la clôture de l‟appel d‟offres, la Ville passe en revue les offres afin de relever les erreurs d‟écriture, puis les compare aux estimations et au budget. On tente de trouver une explication logique aux écarts importants dans les prix unitaires.

18. Le choix de l‟entrepreneur est effectué en fonction de la méthode de sélection indiquée dans la demande; dans le cas de projets examinés, la méthode de sélection reposait sur l‟offre recevable du soumissionnaire moins-disant.


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19. La Ville ne dispose pas de politique et de procédures permettant l‟évaluation explicite du rendement antérieur des entrepreneurs sur des contrats municipaux précédents lorsque vient le temps de décider de l‟attribution d‟un nouveau contrat. La Ville affirme qu‟un processus de préqualification est mis en œuvre pour les grands projets complexes et qu‟elle a le droit de demander qu‟un entrepreneur démontre qu‟il a réalisé avec succès des projets d‟une envergure et d‟une complexité similaires. Cependant, la Ville n‟a pas toujours recours à ces méthodes et ne tient pas explicitement compte du rendement antérieur dans l‟évaluation des soumissions. En conséquence, les contrats sont attribués au soumissionnaire moins-disant si celui-ci répond aux exigences obligatoires indiquées dans l‟appel d‟offres, y compris les exigences en matière de cautionnement et d‟assurance.

20. La Ville a élaboré un document pour préparer les rapports sur le rendement des fournisseurs au cours d‟un contrat. Toutefois, si l‟entrepreneur termine le contrat sans manquement, il devient admissible pour soumissionner sur des contrats futurs de la Ville; même si le processus contractuel est marqué par des difficultés, des retards et des coûts supplémentaires attribuables au rendement médiocre de l‟entrepreneur. La seule sanction considérée est la radiation du fournisseur, par la Direction de l‟approvisionnement, de la liste des soumissionnaires pour les projets de la Ville. Il faut disposer d‟une méthode d‟évaluation du rendement qui sera utilisée dans l‟évaluation des possibilités de soumission futures afin de distinguer les entrepreneurs qui ont un bon rendement de ceux dont le rendement est médiocre.

21. Il faut documenter le rendement antérieur des entrepreneurs et mettre en place un système de notation pour que la Ville puisse tenir compte du rendement antérieur de l‟entrepreneur lorsque celui-ci est en compétition pour un nouveau projet. La Ville dispose actuellement d‟un formulaire d‟évaluation du rendement des entrepreneurs; ce formulaire est inclus à l‟annexe X-2 du manuel du gestionnaire de projet. Ce formulaire, après quelques modifications, constituerait un excellent point de départ pour l‟évaluation du rendement des entrepreneurs, tel que mentionné au point précédent. Nous notons que le formulaire d‟évaluation du rendement des entrepreneurs n‟a été trouvé que dans les dossiers d‟un seul projet (pont Townline) et qu‟il était absent des dossiers des autres projets examinés.

22. Les fonctions d‟administration des contrats sont bien documentées et sont suivies par les gestionnaires de projet.

23. L‟examen des demandes de modification dans les divers projets examinés a démontré que la Ville a une bonne méthode de freins et de contrepoids pour confirmer la nécessité d‟une telle demande, examiner les montants proposés par l‟entrepreneur et négocier au besoin un juste prix pour le montant correspondant à la demande.


Rapport annuel 2012 du Bureau du vérificateur général Page xliii

24. De façon générale, la valeur des demandes de modification pour les nouveaux projets de construction devrait osciller entre 2 et 3 % de la valeur du contrat pour les projets très bien coordonnés; toutefois, les valeurs moyennes peuvent atteindre 5 %. Dans le cas des projets qui constituent des agrandissements de bâtiments, la valeur des demandes de modification devrait être plus élevée. Dans le cas des grands travaux de génie civil, tels que les routes, les conduites d‟eau principales, les égouts et les ponts, les valeurs acceptables des demandes de modification sont comprises entre 5 et 10 % de la valeur du contrat. Les demandes de modification sont habituellement requises en raison des conditions rencontrées sur le chantier. La plage des valeurs généralement acceptées a été établie par un architecte principal cumulant plus de 20 ans d‟expérience et utilisée à titre d‟expérience type. Construction Delay Claims, B. Bramble et M. Callahan, Construction Law Library, 2005, p. 5-26, précisent que les demandes de modification peuvent varier de -5 à 10 %. The Architect‟s Handbook of Professional Practice, 1994, de l‟American Institute of Architects (AIA) stipule que la valeur des demandes de modification pourrait atteindre 7 %. Le document des pratiques exemplaires de l‟AIA, Managing the Contingency Allowance, David Hart, 2007, mentionne qu‟une valeur de 5 % est couramment utilisée. Columbia University Facilities (http://facilities. columbia.edu) parle d‟une plage de 5 à 10 %. En outre, la plage acceptable pour les demandes de modification peut être corroborée par la plage habituelle des fonds pour éventualités qui sont prévus dans les projets de génie civil.

25. L‟examen des demandes de modification présentées pour les divers projets examinés a révélé que plusieurs de ces demandes découlaient de problèmes ou d‟erreurs de conception ou, encore, d‟omissions. Les travaux effectués conformément à une demande de modification coûtent généralement plus cher que les mêmes travaux effectués conformément à une soumission originale. Cette hausse des coûts s‟explique par le fait que l‟entrepreneur facturera le plein prix pour le travail, les matériaux et les équipements qui seront requis puisqu‟il n‟y a aucun concours et que l‟entrepreneur peut prendre une marge de 15 % sur les coûts dans le cas des travaux qu‟il effectue lui-même ou de 10 % pour les travaux effectués par un sous-traitant pour les frais généraux et le profit. Les pourcentages de majoration ont été déterminés à partir des demandes de modification examinées dans le cadre de la présente vérification. En revanche, dans une soumission, les frais généraux et le profit de l‟entrepreneur sont répartis dans l‟ensemble des éléments du projet.

26. Dans certains cas, le coût total de la demande de modification était le résultat d‟erreurs et d‟omissions de la part du consultant. La Ville a payé la totalité de ces coûts, sans exiger du consultant qu‟il assume les coûts supplémentaires.


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27. Dans deux des projets examinés, le gestionnaire de projet a comptabilisé les demandes de modification par catégories (p. ex. erreurs et omissions au moment de la conception, coordination, demande du propriétaire, conditions du site et autres). Une telle façon de procéder facilite les choses lorsque vient le temps d‟établir les montants pouvant être recouvrés auprès des consultants. Il convient de noter que ce ne sont pas tous les gestionnaires de projet qui procèdent ainsi. Ce processus devrait être appliqué par tous les gestionnaires de projet.

28. La figure 5 résume les coûts des demandes de modification des différents projets et la portion des coûts attribuable à des erreurs et à des omissions au moment de la conception de la part des consultants. Des détails supplémentaires sur chaque demandes de modification pour chaque projet sont présentés à l'annexe A du rapport intégral.

29. La valeur des demandes de modification semble indiquer qu‟il pourrait y avoir des problèmes. Cette question sera étudiée plus en profondeur dans notre vérification des Services d‟infrastructure de 2013.

Figure 5 : Montants prévus aux contrats et demandes de modification

Nom du projet Montant initialement

prévu au contrat

Montant des demandes de modification

Pourcentage des demandes

de modification par rapport au

montant initialement

prévu au contrat

Partie de la demande de modification payée par la

Ville en raison d‟erreurs de conception

1 Pavillon du parc Hornets Nest, Gloucester

298 253 $ 35 097 $ 11,8 % 30 816 $

2 Pont Cavanagh 751 100 $ 167 918 $ 22,4 %

3 Remplacement de la conduite d‟eau principale de l‟avenue Woodroffe - ISD11-5046

4 110 700 $ 1 065 830 $ 25,9 %

4 Aréna communautaire John-Leroux (Stittsville)

493 300 $ 64 562 $ 13,1 %

5 Complexe récréatif Goulbourn (deux patinoires)

6 635 000 $ 346 501 $ 5,2 % 50 562 $

6 Prolongement de la partie sud-ouest du Transitway

12 457 000 $ 1 196 238 $ 9,6 % 696 881 $

7 Conduite d‟eau principale de l‟avenue Woodroffe - ISB09-6001

6 327 937 $ 246 716 $ 3,9 %

8 Reconstruction du chemin Sandridge et chemin Hillsdale

6 878 000 $ 248 026 $ 3,6 %

9 Agrandissement du Théâtre Centrepointe

9 343 824 $ 424 159 $ 4,5 % 63 292 $

10 Remise en état de l‟égout collecteur de Nepean-Ouest

3 470 297 $ 595 180 $ 17,2 %


Rapport annuel 2012 du Bureau du vérificateur général Page xlv

Nom du projet Montant initialement

prévu au contrat

Montant des demandes de modification

Pourcentage des demandes

de modification par rapport au

montant initialement

prévu au contrat

Partie de la demande de modification payée par la

Ville en raison d‟erreurs de conception

11 Station de pompage de la promenade Campeau

4 478 000 $ 379 595 $ 8,5 % 198 075 $

12 Prolongement de la promenade Strandherd - ISB09-5009

14 892 000 $ 2 064 769 $ 13,9 % 660 470 $

13 Conduite principale reliant 3W, Phase 1, partie 1

11 867 325 $ 762 817 $ 6,4 % 30 204 $

14 Relocalisation de l‟égout collecteur de Cave Creek

3 505 330 $ 367 888 $ 10,5 % 70 980 $

15 Carrefour giratoire de la prom. Prince of Wales

1 191 778 $ 57 560 $ 4,8 %

TOTAL DE TOUS LES PROJETS 86 699 844 $ 8 022 856 $ 9.3 % 1 801 280 $

Le pourcentage des demandes de modification ci-dessus associé à des erreurs et à des omissions correspond à 22 % de la valeur des demandes de modification.

30. La Ville n‟applique pas une approche cohérente pour inciter les gestionnaires de projet à recouvrer auprès des consultants le coût des demandes de modification qui découlent d‟erreurs et d‟omissions au moment de la conception.

Projets dégagés par les conseillers

Les constatations qui suivent concernent les neuf projets qui ont été portés à l‟attention du vérificateur général par les conseillers. Les projets ont été examinés conformément l‟objectif de vérification no 3 et aux critères connexes.

Transitway

Le manuel de conception du Transitway (Transitway Design Manual), octobre 1993, contient des dispositions concernant l‟emplacement des trous d‟homme sur le Transitway et précise que les trous d‟homme et autres dispositifs en métal ne doivent pas se trouver dans la partie carrossable du Transitway. Les lignes directrices en matière de conception des égouts (SDG 001) de novembre 2004 précisent qu‟il « faut tenter d‟éviter de placer les plaques d‟égout là où passent les pneus des véhicules, sous réserve des exigences en matière d‟emplacement des lignes directrices relatives à l‟emplacement des appareils de service public dans l‟emprise », qui ont préséance. L‟examen des dispositions révèle que l‟emplacement est adéquat. L‟examen ponctuel du Transitway a révélé que la conception de ce dernier respectait ces dispositions.


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Pavillon du parc Hornets Nest, Gloucester

1. Le projet a fait l‟objet d‟un appel d‟offres conforme aux procédures standard de la Direction de l‟approvisionnement. Les soumissions reçues variaient de 298 937 $ à 581 333 $. Le plus bas soumissionnaire a obtenu le contrat.

2. L‟examen du coût de la construction démontre que le coût par mètre carré du bâtiment était de 2 310 $ (215 $/pi2). Selon la moyenne des coûts de construction par unité de surface de bâtiments semblables, le coût unitaire du bâtiment est compétitif.

3. Les demandes de modification associées à des erreurs ou à des omissions ont totalisé 30 816 $. Même si les travaux étaient nécessaires, le coût pour la Ville est plus élevé lorsque ceux-ci sont effectués en vertu d‟une demande de modification que lorsqu‟ils sont inclus dans l‟offre initiale. Dans ce cas particulier, les coûts additionnels, calculés en fonction d‟une majoration de 15 % pour frais généraux et marge de profit, s‟établissent à 4 019 $ [30 816 $*(1-1/1,15)].

Remplacement du pont Townline

1. Le problème avec le présent contrat est de savoir si l‟entrepreneur retenu a déjà exécuté des travaux pour la Ville et que son rendement n‟a pas été pris en considération au moment de l‟attribution du contrat. Les vérificateurs ont constaté que l‟entrepreneur avait effectivement exécuté un contrat de remplacement de ponceau de moindre envergure pour la Ville et qu‟il avait commis une grave erreur en établissant les élévations des assises du ponceau; cependant, les problèmes avaient été corrigés par l‟entrepreneur à ses frais et sans frais pour la Ville.

2. Dans la soumission pour le pont en question, l‟entrepreneur remplissait toutes les conditions indiquées, y compris le dépôt de soumission et une promesse de caution, et a par la suite respecté toutes les exigences en matière de cautionnement et d‟assurance.

3. Au moment de l‟achèvement du contrat, en juillet 2004, on a pu conclure que l‟entrepreneur avait exécuté le travail de façon satisfaisante, mais qu‟il n‟avait pas respecté les échéanciers.

4. Les travaux ont été achevés en retard et la Ville a imposé des dommages-intérêts à l‟entrepreneur, qu‟il a déduits des paiements versés.

5. L‟entrepreneur a poursuivi la Ville en 2007 relativement à une réclamation de coûts supplémentaires qui a été rejetée par la Ville. La cause est présentement devant les tribunaux.


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Pont Cavanagh

1. Le contrat ISB04-7018 a été attribué en avril 2005 à la suite du remplacement du pont Townline (voir section 4.3.3). L‟entrepreneur a commencé les travaux le 4 juillet 2005, les avait en grande partie terminés le 6 janvier 2006 et les a achevés le 27 juin 2006.

2. Au début du contrat, la Ville a discuté avec l‟entrepreneur de problèmes liés à diverses lacunes, à un manque de rendement et à la supervision de contrats antérieurs effectués par l‟entrepreneur. La Ville et l‟entrepreneur ont convenu que le rendement de l‟entrepreneur ferait l‟objet d‟un suivi pendant l‟exécution du présent contrat.

3. La Ville a essayé de créer un formulaire d‟évaluation officielle des entrepreneurs aux fins d‟utilisation ultérieure en se fondant sur un formulaire semblable au formulaire d‟évaluation du rendement des entrepreneurs qui est inclus dans le manuel du gestionnaire de projet.

4. La Direction de l‟approvisionnement, de concert avec les services, a élaboré un document pour documenter les lacunes dans le rendement des fournisseurs, en soumettant les problèmes constatés aux échelons supérieurs. Le document contient des directives générales pour l‟application des dispositions des contrats, y compris les avis de défaut et de résiliation de contrat. Toutefois, il s‟agit d‟un document général destiné à l‟ensemble des processus d‟approvisionnement de la Ville et qui n‟est pas suffisamment spécifique à la construction.

5. Les procédures ne comprennent pas de méthode d‟enregistrement du rendement antérieur des entrepreneurs pour les projets de la Ville, et il n‟existe pas de méthode précise pour appliquer les évaluations du rendement des entrepreneurs pour un contrat donné aux processus de sélection ultérieurs pour les contrats de la Ville.

6. Le formulaire d‟évaluation du rendement des entrepreneurs inclus dans le manuel du gestionnaire de projet pourrait servir de fondement pour l‟évaluation des entrepreneurs. Cependant, nous avons remarqué qu‟il ne se trouvait pas dans les dossiers des projets examinés lors de la vérification.

Ponceau du chemin Dunrobin

1. Le ponceau original comportait un tuyau en acier ondulé de 1,8 m de diamètre qui était passablement corrodé. En 2007, la Ville a pris des mesures pour le réparer en insérant un autre tuyau dans le tuyau en acier ondulé original afin de prolonger la durée de vie du ponceau. Ce processus d‟installation d‟un tuyau dans un autre tuyau s‟appelle tubage.


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2. Le 15 août 2010, l‟eau est passée au-dessus de la route vis-à-vis du ponceau et une partie du remblai routier a été emporté par l‟inondation. Le 11 avril 2011, l‟eau est également passée par-dessus la route au cours d‟un orage, ce qui a causé des dommages à la chaussée et à l‟accotement en direction nord, bien que dans une proportion moindre qu‟à l‟occasion de l‟inondation d‟août 2010. Après l‟inondation, des réparations d‟urgence ont été effectuées sur la route, qui a été rouverte le 16 avril 2011.

3. Après l‟inondation, une analyse hydraulique du ponceau a démontré que la doublure installée en 2010 avait réduit la capacité hydraulique du ponceau. Le consultant a recommandé que le ponceau soit remplacé par un plus grand.

4. Le 24 juin 2011, la route était inondée une troisième fois en moins d‟un an. À cette occasion, la Ville a décidé de garder la route fermée et de remplacer le ponceau par un nouveau ponceau selon les recommandations hydrauliques du consultant et le tuyau que le fabricant pouvait livrer rapidement.

5. Les travaux de juin 2011 ont été effectués dans le cadre d‟un contrat temps et matériaux par l‟entrepreneur qui avait été appelé à réparer la route endommagée.

6. Les problèmes liés à ce projet sont que la réparation initiale (tubage effectué en 2007) n‟avait pas été réalisée conformément aux procédures officielles qui doivent être respectées pour l‟évaluation des options de renouvellement des ponts et des ponceaux. Les études d‟hydrologie et les calculs hydrauliques n‟étaient pas suffisamment approfondis pour permettre à la Ville de constater que la capacité hydraulique avait été réduite ou d‟entrevoir les conséquences d‟une réduction de la capacité hydraulique.

Reconstruction de l’avenue King Edward

1. Le projet comprenait la reconstruction de l‟avenue King Edward et les rues s‟y rattachant entre la rue York, la promenade Sussex et le pont Macdonald-Cartier. Les travaux comprenaient : le rechemisage du collecteur d‟égouts sanitaires et pluviaux; la reconstruction des installations de service public souterraines; l‟enlèvement de la chaussée, des travaux d‟excavation, la mise en place de matériaux granulaires et l‟asphaltage de la chaussée; la réparation de la structure Red Path; la démolition d‟une structure et l‟érection de trois structures murales paysagères à revêtement en pierre.

2. Dans le cadre du processus, la Ville a exigé que l‟entrepreneur mène une étude des bâtiments et des structures qui pourraient être affectés par les vibrations et les activités de construction avant la construction.


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3. L‟entrepreneur a engagé une firme spécialisée pour effectuer l‟étude préalable à la construction. La portée de l‟étude préalable à la construction a été déterminée par l‟entrepreneur et non par la Ville. Cette façon de procéder protège la Ville, car la responsabilité relative aux dommages incombe à l‟entrepreneur. Il s‟agit d‟une procédure standard utilisée par pratiquement tous les maîtres d‟ouvrage (la Ville en l‟occurrence), ce dernier n‟ayant pas de contrôle sur les méthodes et les activités de l‟entrepreneur.

4. L‟étude préalable à la construction de la firme spécialisée a porté sur 100 bâtiments; parmi ceux-ci, 44 ont fait l‟objet d‟une inspection à l‟intérieur et à l‟extérieur. Les 56 autres bâtiments n‟ont été inspectés qu‟à l‟extérieur, les propriétaires refusant l‟entrée aux représentants de la firme.

5. Les propriétaires de neuf bâtiments ont fait valoir que leurs immeubles avaient été endommagés par les travaux de construction. Des neuf bâtiments, quatre sont situés en dehors des limites de l‟étude préalable à la construction.

6. Les propriétaires ont discuté de la question avec le gestionnaire de projet de la Ville, qui a transféré le dossier à l‟entrepreneur. L‟entrepreneur a pour sa part transféré le dossier à sa compagnie d‟assurance.

7. Les problèmes associés à ce projet découlent du fait que les documents contractuels de la Ville transfèrent à l‟entrepreneur la responsabilité des dommages qui surviennent au cours de la construction. Un certain nombre de propriétaires ont porté la question à l‟attention du maire, qui a demandé au chef du contentieux d‟examiner les documents contractuels. Le chef du contentieux a avisé les propriétaires fonciers que le dossier devrait être réglé avec l‟entrepreneur.

8. Les propriétaires ne sont pas d‟accord avec le fait que la Ville transfère à l‟entrepreneur l‟entière responsabilité et les risques de dommages causés par les activités de construction. La raison pour laquelle la Ville et pratiquement tous les autres maîtres d‟ouvrage en Amérique du Nord transfèrent cette responsabilité est que la Ville n‟a pas de contrôle ni de responsabilité à l‟égard des méthodes et des procédures utilisées par l‟entrepreneur.

9. Nous avons examiné les documents contractuels de plusieurs autres municipalités et du ministère des Transports. Dans tous les cas, ceux-ci utilisent les conditions générales des contrats de l‟Ontario (spécifications standardisées de l‟Ontario) qui transfèrent la responsabilité des dommages causés par l‟entrepreneur à l‟entrepreneur. Travaux publics Canada utilise un libellé similaire dans ses contrats.

10. Les dispositions du contrat de la Ville respectent les normes actuelles en matière de traitement des réclamations pour dommages. Le gestionnaire de projet a donc traité les réclamations pour dommages dus aux travaux de construction de façon appropriée.


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Remplacement de la conduite d’eau principale de l’avenue Woodroffe

1. En 2007, la conduite d‟eau principale de l‟avenue Woodroffe s‟est rompue au sud du chemin Hunt Club. En novembre 2008, la Ville a effectué une évaluation non destructive de l‟état de la conduite d‟eau principale à partir du chemin Hunt Club jusqu‟au chemin Fallowfield, au sud. L‟évaluation a révélé que 18 des 558 tuyaux inspectés (3,2 %) présentaient des fils de précontrainte rompus. On a effectué une analyse du risque de défaillance avec les données recueillies au cours de l‟évaluation pour calculer le risque de défaillance des tuyaux cylindriques en béton précontraint et établir les priorités de réparation pour les pressions maximales. Les résultats de l‟analyse du risque de défaillance, divulgués en février 2009, ont indiqué que des 18 tuyaux présentant des fils de précontrainte rompus, trois affichaient une priorité de réparation de niveau 1 (remplacement immédiat requis) et un, une priorité de réparation de niveau 2 (remplacement dans trois ans). Les 14 autres tuyaux affichaient une priorité de réparation de niveaux 3 et 4 (risque modéré et faible pour les cinq prochaines années).

2. La conduite d‟eau de 1,2 m de diamètre de l‟avenue Woodroffe s‟est rompue le 14 janvier 2011 entre la promenade Medhurst et le chemin Hunt Club. Cette section de la conduite d‟eau principale faite de tuyaux en béton précontraint a été installée en 1975 et en 1976.

3. La section de la conduite d‟eau principale qui s‟est rompue en janvier 2011 se trouve au nord du chemin Hunt Club. Elle a été construite avec le même type de tuyau que la section qui a connu un bris similaire à l‟automne 2007, mais environ 1 à 2 ans plus tôt.

4. Le rapport d‟analyse du risque de défaillance de février 2009 indique que les tuyaux affichant une priorité de réparation de niveau 1 et 2 présentent un risque de défaillance d‟élevé à modérément élevé. Le rapport recommande que les quatre tuyaux affichant une priorité de réparation de niveau 1 et 2 soient excavés et inspectés à l‟extérieur afin que l‟on puisse confirmer le niveau de faiblesse et remplacer les tuyaux en conséquence.

5. Le rapport de l‟analyse du risque de défaillance de 2009 définit les projets avec priorité de réparation de niveau 1 comme étant ceux où la pression maximale dans la conduite est supérieure à la pression qui produit la résistance ultime avec (priorité 1a) et sans (priorité 1b) contribution de la résistance du sol. Le bris peut survenir à tout moment. La réparation doit être effectuée dès que possible et dans les douze mois.

6. En conséquence, les tuyaux de priorité 1 auraient dû être remplacés au plus tard avant février 2010.


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7. Les travaux de conception pour le remplacement des quatre tuyaux au sud du chemin Hunt Club (priorité 1 et 2) ont commencé en décembre 2009, le calendrier initial des travaux de construction débutant en octobre 2010, ce qui est de huit mois plus tard que prescrit en raison du risque de défaillance de priorité 1. Le calendrier de conception initial prévoyait la fin des travaux de conception et la préparation des documents d‟appel d‟offres avant juin 2010.

8. Lors d‟une réunion de planification tenue le 12 janvier 2010, la Ville a décidé de reporter le projet, mais d‟achever les travaux de conception au cas où une situation d‟urgence l‟obligerait à procéder aux travaux de remplacement. Le gestionnaire de projet a été informé de cette décision par un ingénieur principal chargé de la remise en état de la conduite d‟eau principale le 19 mai 2010, lequel a précisé que le retard était attribuable à d‟autres besoins potentiellement conflictuels pour le système, que les pressions sur les conduites d‟eau principale et transitoires seraient surveillées par les Opérations et que la conception allait se poursuivre jusqu‟à la fin advenant qu‟une réparation d‟urgence soit nécessaire. La Ville a indiqué que la décision de retarder la réparation était fondée sur d‟autres risques pesant sur le système d‟aqueduc qui n‟auraient pas été relevés par le consultant qui a effectué l‟inspection au moment de l‟évaluation de la conduite. Les Services de gestion de l‟eau potable ont effectué une analyse des pressions transitoires (analyse des pressions d‟eau maximales) en 2009 afin d‟évaluer la probabilité et l‟ampleur des pressions transitoires qui pourraient imposer des contraintes aux tuyaux. La Ville a expliqué que la décision de reporter les réparations de priorité 1 reposait sur la gestion des risques pour l‟ensemble du réseau d‟aqueduc et que le contrat concernant les réparations sur l‟avenue Woodroffe allait se poursuivre après l‟achèvement de la conduite d‟eau principale 2W/2C, laquelle deviendrait une troisième option pour alimenter le secteur.

9. Au moment de la rupture de la conduite d‟eau principale, en janvier 2011, la mise en place de la conduite de la zone 2W 2C était en cours, et c‟est pourquoi la Direction de la conception et de la construction de la Ville a étudié la possibilité de modifier le contrat afin d‟inclure la section de la conduite d‟eau principale au nord du chemin Hunt Club. Cependant, Gestion des biens et Gestion de l‟eau potable ont proposé d‟évaluer en premier l‟état de la conduite d‟eau principale de l‟avenue Woodroffe afin de relever les points préoccupants. La portée de l‟évaluation de l‟état de la conduite de janvier/février 2011 était plus vaste que l‟évaluation de l‟état de 2008 et incluait la section allant de la promenade David jusqu‟au chemin Hunt Club, en plus de la section évaluée en 2008 (du chemin Hunt Club jusqu‟au chemin Fallowfield).

10. Le 24 février 2011, Gestion des biens a fourni à Conception et Construction-Ouest un document d‟orientation fondé sur les conclusions de l‟évaluation de l‟état de la conduite. En comparant les évaluations de l‟état de la conduite de 2008 et de 2011, on a constaté que le nombre de sections de tuyau présentant des


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ruptures de fils était similaire par kilomètre, mais qu‟un plus grand nombre de tuyaux présentaient une détérioration plus grave. On a en effet constaté une augmentation importante de la détérioration du tuyau en béton précontraint de la conduite d‟eau principale par rapport à 2008.

11. Le gestionnaire de projet, qui était au courant que le processus d‟acquisition des tuyaux pourrait s‟échelonner sur une longue période, a donc proposé l‟achat des tuyaux auprès d‟un fournisseur unique qui pourrait livrer la quantité requise de tuyaux dans les délais requis afin d‟accélérer l‟avancement des travaux. Il a demandé le prix des conduites de remplacement au fournisseur et a reçu sa réponse le 24 février 2011.

12. Le 1er mars 2011, le chef de projet a informé le fournisseur de tuyaux que la Ville lui achèterait les tuyaux et les accessoires requis. Le 10 mars 2011, le gestionnaire de projet a envoyé une autorisation du plan des dépenses estimatives (E-SPA) au Service des achats pour les tuyaux. Le gestionnaire de projet a mentionné dans le courriel que la Direction de l‟approvisionnement avait été tenue au courant tout au long du processus, mais l‟examen des dossiers n‟a pas permis de trouver de documentation confirmant que c‟était bel et bien le cas.

13. Le 16 mars, le service des achats a demandé au gestionnaire de projet pour quelle raison on avait opté pour un fournisseur unique et pourquoi le fournisseur en question avait été choisi. Les échanges sur le choix d‟un fournisseur unique se sont poursuivis jusqu‟au 30 mars, date à laquelle on avait décidé de procéder à un appel d‟offres standard.

14. La correspondance révèle que, au moment de la rupture, en janvier 2011, la Ville avait réparé la conduite d‟eau principale et envisageait d‟aller en appel d‟offres pour le remplacement requis des tuyaux restants en vue du début des travaux à l‟automne de 2011. Cependant, l‟évaluation de l‟état de la conduite d‟eau principale entre la promenade David et le chemin Fallowfield a révélé que des sections de la canalisation s‟étaient dégradées considérablement depuis 2008 et qu‟il y avait une détérioration similaire dans le segment situé au nord du chemin Hunt Club. D‟après ces résultats, la Ville a décidé de ne pas remettre en service la section de conduite d‟eau principale allant du chemin Knoxdale à la promenade Vaan jusqu‟à ce que le remplacement prévu de la conduite d‟eau principale ait été achevé. Ainsi, la Ville a décidé d‟effectuer le remplacement de la conduite et les travaux de réparation dès que possible au lieu de remettre immédiatement la conduite d‟eau principale en service et de risquer un autre bris.

15. Pendant que la conduite était hors service, l‟alimentation en eau des zones de service de Barrhaven et de Riverside-Sud a été assurée par une conduite d‟eau principale unique de 406 mm enfouie le long du chemin Merivale et complétée par pompage. L‟alimentation temporaire a répondu à la demande pendant cette


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période, mais la modélisation hydraulique a révélé qu‟elle ne comblerait que 75 % de la demande journalière maximale.

16. À la fin de février 2011, les résultats de l‟évaluation de l‟état de la conduite et de la modélisation hydraulique ont démontré que les travaux d‟installation ne pouvaient être reportés jusqu‟à l‟automne et que le projet devrait aller en appel d‟offres dès que possible.

17. Un certain nombre d‟autres modes de fonctionnement ou de réparation ont été examinés, y compris les réparations laissant le tuyau en place, comme le tubage ou le renforcement de la conduite. L‟analyse a conclu que la solution à privilégier était de creuser une tranchée le long de l‟avenue Woodroffe et de remplacer la conduite. Les autres options envisagées n‟auraient raccourci l‟échéancier des travaux que de deux semaines tout au plus, et l‟état de conduite d‟eau principale après ces travaux n‟aurait pas été aussi satisfaisant.

18. En conséquence, il a fallu imposer une interdiction totale d‟utilisation de l‟eau à l‟extérieur dans les secteurs de Barrhaven, de Riverside-Sud et de Manotick jusqu‟à l‟achèvement des travaux afin de ne pas mettre le réseau à sec, d‟avoir à faire bouillir l‟eau et d‟être incapable de répondre aux exigences en matière de lutte contre les incendies.

19. L‟examen des demandes de modification associées à ce projet a révélé que ces demandes étaient entièrement documentées et avaient été passées en revue par l‟administrateur du contrat et le gestionnaire de projet. En règle générale, les demandes de modification étaient justifiées pour accélérer l‟avancement des travaux.

20. La question de l‟assistance policière aux intersections a soulevé des préoccupations : en raison de l‟importance de la congestion sur l‟avenue Woodroffe, il a fallu qu‟un policier soit affecté à la circulation de façon quotidienne. L‟offre initiale ne prévoyait pas le coût d‟un agent en poste pour le projet. Les coûts supplémentaires se sont établis à 247 637 $, payés par la variation des quantités prévues à l‟appel d‟offres, et ce, au prix de l‟appel d‟offres. Les coûts totaux payés étaient de 313 638 $. L‟examen des factures de l‟entrepreneur pour 1140,5 heures de service d‟un policier indique que le coût était de 214 346 $, à raison de 188 $/heure. L‟entrepreneur a été payé 99 292 $, soit un supplément de 46 % sur le coût des services policiers.

21. Le chef de projet aurait dû négocier le coût de cet article, car il s‟agissait manifestement d‟une variation très importante des quantités, sans compter que les conditions générales du contrat contiennent des dispositions pour parer à de telles éventualités. En outre, le mode de paiement de l‟article permet à l‟entrepreneur de faire un profit sur un service fourni par un service de la Ville à un autre service de la Ville. En fait, la marge de profit est de 46 %, même si le nombre d‟heures prévu au contrat n‟est pas dépassé.


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22. Plutôt que d‟inclure un article avec des prix unitaires, la Ville devrait fournir une allocation pour le coût des services ne comportant qu‟une marge pour frais d‟administration pour l‟entrepreneur. Il serait préférable que l‟assistance policière aux intersections soit facturée directement à la Ville par le Service de police d‟Ottawa.

Remplacement de la toiture de l’aréna John-Leroux (Stittsville)

1. Les plans de modernisation de l‟aréna comprenaient le remplacement de la toiture actuelle. Les frais de conception ont totalisé 6 827 $.

2. Les dessins de conception montraient que le toit présentait une pente variable, allant de 10° près du faîte à 17,4º près de la bordure. Le cahier des charges exigeait un produit et un modèle précis pour la couverture et le bardage en tôle. Pendant le processus d‟appel d‟offres, un second fabricant a demandé d‟être approuvé comme suppléant, ce qui fut fait dans un addenda.

3. Après l‟attribution du contrat, l‟entrepreneur a informé la Ville et le consultant que le fabricant de matériaux de couverture qu‟il avait retenu (dans la liste des fournisseurs approuvés fournie dans les documents d‟appel d‟offres) lui avait indiqué que le type de toiture choisi ne pourrait être installé en raison de la courbure du toit de l‟aréna.

4. Ce fabricant a proposé un autre produit de sa fabrication, qui serait plus approprié. La Ville a accepté cette solution, ce qui a entraîné des coûts supplémentaires en raison des différences de couleur et du revêtement supplémentaire requis. Cependant, ce nouveau produit n‟a également pas pu être installé sur le toit.

5. La Ville, le consultant et l‟entrepreneur ont travaillé pendant plusieurs semaines pour résoudre le problème et ont notamment construit des « maquettes » pour évaluer des solutions de rechange. L‟entrepreneur estimait qu‟un revêtement d‟étanchéité pourrait convenir à la configuration du toit. En juin 2009, la Ville a convenu que l‟idée du consultant ne pouvait être retenue et a demandé à l‟entrepreneur de procéder aux travaux requis. Cependant, le calendrier des activités de l‟aréna entrait en conflit avec les méthodes de travail de l‟entrepreneur. En novembre 2009, la Ville a annulé la commande d‟achat.

6. La Ville a envisagé la possibilité de poursuivre le consultant, mais n‟a finalement pas donné suite.

7. En février 2010, la Ville a offert à l‟entrepreneur de rétablir la commande d‟achat, et le projet a été achevé en septembre 2010. Le concept proposé par l‟entrepreneur en juin 2009 pour le revêtement d‟étanchéité a finalement été utilisé.


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8. Les travaux, reposant sur le plan de conception révisé de la toiture, ont été achevés en septembre 2010. Les coûts supplémentaires ont atteint 39 314 $ en raison du changement de système de couverture et des retards que celui-ci a engendrés.

9. Une analyse du calendrier du projet fait ressortir les points suivants.

Le consultant en conception n‟a pas fait preuve de diligence raisonnable en ne vérifiant pas si le système de couverture présenté dans les documents d‟appel d‟offres pourrait être effectivement installé.

Le consultant en conception a refusé d‟admettre que le système de couverture proposé ne pourrait être installé jusqu‟à ce que l‟entrepreneur et le fournisseur de matériaux de couverture aient démontré que l‟installation de ce système n‟était pas réalisable pour ce projet.

La Ville a envisagé la possibilité de demander au consultant un remboursement des coûts supplémentaires engendrés par le changement du système de couverture et les retards que celui-ci a engendrés, mais a décidé de ne pas donner suite à cette réclamation.

La Ville a mentionné avoir reçu les services du consultant sur un autre projet en compensation des frais payés par la Ville sur ce projet. Toutefois, l‟étendue des services offerts en compensation n‟est pas pleinement documentée.

Complexe récréatif Goulbourn

1. La construction des deux patinoires du complexe récréatif Goulbourn a débuté en janvier 2011. Le chef du service du bâtiment a délivré un permis d‟occupation partielle le 29 mars 2012; le permis d‟occupation définitif n‟a pas été délivré.

2. D‟après le calendrier établi initialement pour le projet en 2010, le contrat devait prendre fin en janvier 2012. Le calendrier des travaux fourni par l‟entrepreneur pendant les étapes initiales du projet prévoyait que les travaux seraient terminés avant la fin de novembre 2011. En septembre 2011, il était évident pour l‟entrepreneur que le projet ne pourrait pas être terminé conformément au calendrier initial. Un calendrier révisé a été présenté, avec une date d‟achèvement prévue au 30 janvier 2012.

3. Les principales raisons de ce retard étaient imputables à des délais touchant la fabrication, la livraison et l‟érection de la charpente en acier. Au départ, le fabricant ne voulait pas commencer les dessins d‟atelier avant d‟avoir reçu le dessin de charpente, signé et scellé, délivré en vue de la construction. Le calendrier initial était de 25 jours ouvrables, mais les travaux ont pris 75 jours. En outre, l‟acier de construction a été livré sur le site avant l‟inspection en atelier requise par le dossier contractuel, et certaines pièces présentaient des défauts. La Ville a fait inspecter l‟acier reçu sur le chantier, et les défauts ont été corrigés par l‟entrepreneur.


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4. La Ville a imposé à l‟entrepreneur des dommages-intérêts de 117 000 $ pour les retards en déduisant cette somme de trois paiements qu‟elle lui a versés.

5. Le cabinet d‟architecture et les entreprises de génie structurel, mécanique et électrique retenues par la Ville ont réalisé des inspections et des essais qui ont permis de fournir une évaluation générale de la construction. En outre, la Ville a retenu les services une société spécialisée pour l‟inspection de l‟acier de construction et des soudures et a réalisé une analyse du béton et du compactage, conformément aux pratiques courantes.

6. Un examen du dossier a révélé que toutes les anomalies constatées dans le bâtiment ont été corrigées avant le versement du dernier paiement.

7. Les principaux problèmes constatés en lien avec ce projet sont les suivants :

la relation avec le fabricant d‟acier de construction a été conflictuelle dès le départ, et ce dernier n‟a pas respecté les exigences du contrat;

l‟acier de construction a été livré sans avoir fait l‟objet de l‟inspection requise en atelier, et certaines pièces présentaient des défauts (qui ont été corrigés sur le chantier).

Quelques projets examinés

Les constatations ci-après concernent dix projets qui ont été sélectionnés comme échantillon pour la présentation du contexte du processus global aux fins de l‟examen des projets susmentionnés. Ces projets ont été examinés conformément à l‟objectif de vérification no 4 et aux critères connexes.

Prolongement de la partie sud-ouest du Transitway (nord), phase 1

1. Ce projet comprend les travaux de prolongement de la partie sud-ouest du Transitway, de la promenade Berrigan jusqu‟au chemin Oriska, le passage inférieur de la promenade Highbury Park et la station Longfield. La valeur contractuelle du projet, d‟après l‟appel d‟offres, était de 12 457 000 $. La valeur des demandes de modification a atteint 1 196 238 $, pour une valeur totale finale du contrat octroyé de13 653 238 $.

2. Plusieurs demandes de modification présentées dans le cadre de ce projet découlaient d‟une erreur dans les élévations des radiers des égouts pluviaux indiquée sur un dessin d‟après exécution versé au dossier de la Ville. Les coûts supplémentaires ayant fait suite à ces modifications ont atteint 440 831 $.

3. La question à l‟examen, dans ce projet, porte sur la précision des dessins d‟après exécution et le fait que le consultant en conception aurait dû vérifier les radiers des égouts pluviaux étant donné l‟importance cruciale de cette traverse. Il semble que la Ville n‟a pas vérifié si elle pouvait recouvrer les coûts de ces travaux supplémentaires auprès des différents consultants.


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4. Pendant la construction du passage supérieur Highbury, on a constaté que la roche présente à la hauteur des fondations prévues n‟était pas adéquate. Cette constatation a exigé des travaux de prospection et d‟analyse supplémentaires du substrat rocheux ainsi qu‟une révision de la conception de la semelle. Les coûts des demandes de modification ont totalisé 86 132 $. Ces dépenses auraient pu être évitées si l‟étude géotechnique avait été bien menée.

5. La Ville publie des documents d‟appel d‟offres standard pour les contrats à prix unitaires, qui incluent une coupe transversale type de la tranchée pour les conduits et systèmes d‟égout (dessin standard n° S6). Cependant, la largeur indiquée sur les dessins de conception correspondait à celle d‟une tranchée type pour deux égouts, contrairement aux données fournies sur le dessin standard. En conséquence, une demande de modification a été présentée pour les nouveaux travaux d‟excavation requis. Les coûts des travaux d‟excavation supplémentaires ont totalisé 18 069 $.

6. Au total, des demandes de modification totalisant 696 881 $ résultaient d‟erreurs au moment de la conception. De ce montant, on estime que 559 174 $ peuvent être classés comme des paiements que la Ville a versés et qui auraient pu être évités au moment de la conception. Rien n‟indique si la Ville a envisagé de recouvrer les coûts supplémentaires engagés auprès des consultants (consultant principal et sous-consultant en géotechnique).

Remplacement de la conduite d’eau principale de l’avenue Woodroffe (contrat de 2009)

1. Ce projet comprenait le remplacement d‟une conduite d‟eau principale en vue de la construction du Transitway sur le côté ouest de l‟avenue Woodroffe, au sud du chemin Baseline. La valeur contractuelle du projet était de6 327 937 $.

2. Ce projet a progressé sans problème majeur. Treize demandes de modification totalisant 246 716 $ étaient imputables aux conditions du site ou à des exigences des Services de gestion de l‟eau potable. La plus importante de ces demandes concernait la construction d‟une nouvelle chambre de vanne et l‟installation de la vanne, à la demande des Services de gestion de l‟eau potable (166 509 $). Un crédit de 50 000 $ a été appliqué en raison de l‟abandon précoce de l‟ancienne conduite d‟eau principale.

Chemin Sandridge (entre le chemin Hillsdale et l’avenue Merriman)

1. Ce projet portait sur la reconstruction du chemin Sandridge, y compris le remplacement de la conduite d‟eau principale et des égouts entre le chemin Hillsdale et l‟avenue Merriman. La valeur contractuelle du projet était de 6 878 000 $.


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2. Ce projet a progressé sans problème majeur. Les demandes de modification présentées au cours du projet, d‟un total de248 026 $, sont imputables aux conditions du site ou à de nouvelles exigences du service des opérations. Hydro Ottawa a remboursé les coûts des demandes de modification qu‟elle a présentées.

Agrandissement du Théâtre Centrepointe

1. Ce projet portait sur l‟agrandissement du Théâtre Centrepointe sur une superficie de 2 630 mètres carrés. L‟agrandissement comprenait un studio de répétition, de nouvelles loges, une aire de repos, une salle pour les bénévoles, un atelier, un quai de chargement intérieur et des salles d‟entreposage ainsi qu‟une rampe de chargement et un aménagement paysager. La valeur totale du contrat était de 9 343 824 $.

2. En tout, 129 demandes de modification ont été présentées, pour une valeur totale de 424 159 $, y compris un crédit de 80 995 $ en tant que solde des allocations (250 000 $) prévues au contrat. Certaines modifications étaient nécessaires pour la coordination des travaux de conception. Les modifications les plus importantes concernaient les changements qu‟il a fallu apporter au toit afin de permettre le raccord de celui-ci au toit actuel, les changements qu‟il a fallu apporter à une sous-station hydroélectrique ainsi que des articles spéciaux dont on a eu besoin vers la toute fin des travaux.

3. Les demandes de modification présentées ont représenté environ 4,5 % de la valeur totale du projet. En conséquence, on a conclu que la valeur des demandes de modification présentées pour ce projet était acceptable.

4. La valeur des demandes de modification découlant d‟omissions sur les documents d‟appel d‟offres a atteint 62 949 $. Même si cette valeur est réputée se situer dans la marge de 3 % qui est acceptée dans l‟industrie, le fait qu‟il s‟agissait d‟omissions et non pas de modifications demandées à des fins de coordination doit être pris en considération.

5. Il convient de noter que le gestionnaire de projet du présent contrat a précisé, dans les demandes de modification, les raisons de chacune et a classifié ces demandes en prenant soin d‟indiquer la nature des erreurs et des omissions faites au moment de la conception. Cette précision est très importante du fait qu‟elle pourrait faciliter le recouvrement des coûts.

6. Les travaux de construction ont progressé sans problème majeur et ont été achevés dans les limites du budget établi et de l‟échéancier fixé.


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Égout collecteur de Nepean-Ouest –- remise en état par chemisage

1. La remise en état de l‟égout collecteur de Nepean-Ouest a été entreprise dans le cadre Fonds de stimulation de l‟infrastructure (FSI) du gouvernement fédéral (Programme du fonds de stimulation économique). Initialement, ce projet devait être terminé en mars 2011. Cependant, étant donné le report de la date limite du programme par le gouvernement fédéral, le projet a été achevé en juin 2011.

2. Le contrat initial a été évalué à 3 470 297 $. Le projet a été élargi et prolongé lorsque le gouvernement fédéral a reporté la date limite du programme. Le contrat final a été évalué à 3 804 902 $.

3. Une surcharge d‟égout majeure causée par l‟utilisation du contrôleur en temps réel pour l‟égout unitaire a entraîné des coûts additionnels de 221 346 $. L‟inquiétude au sujet de cet incident est liée au fait que les plans de l‟ouvrage de dérivation préparés par l‟entrepreneur avaient été examinés par le gestionnaire de projet et Opérations.

Les documents relatifs au contrat auraient dû inclure un avertissement concernant l‟utilisation d‟un contrôleur en temps réel et son incidence possible sur l‟égout collecteur de Nepean-Ouest.

Durant l‟examen des plans de l‟ouvrage de dérivation soumis par l‟entrepreneur, Opérations aurait dû mentionner à l‟entrepreneur que le tunnel pouvait être inondé durant un épisode pluvieux.

Bien qu‟aucune modification aux plans de l‟ouvrage de dérivation n‟eût pu éviter le refoulement d‟égout dans le tronçon visé de l‟égout collecteur de Nepean-Ouest, si l‟entrepreneur avait été informé de la possibilité d‟une inondation, il aurait pu, en modifiant ses procédures, éviter les dommages au revêtement intérieur et à l‟installation de dérivation qui ont été causés par l‟inondation.

4. Dans l‟un des plans de l‟ouvrage de dérivation, l‟entrepreneur supposait que la conduite pouvait traverser des terrains appartenant à la CCN. Cependant, la Ville ne possédait aucune servitude sur ces terrains et a dû obtenir un droit de passage temporaire de la CCN. Comme il a dû attendre l‟autorisation de la CCN, l‟entrepreneur a présenté une réclamation pour frais de retard; il a, en outre, et utilisé un autre tracé pour le passage de la conduite de dérivation. La situation aurait pu être évitée si les documents relatifs au contrat avaient été préparés conformément aux exigences suivantes.

L‟entrepreneur ne doit faire passer une conduite de dérivation qu‟à l‟intérieur des limites des emprises et des servitudes existantes.

L‟entrepreneur peut choisir la méthode de pose d‟une conduite de dérivation, mais la Ville en choisit le tracé.

L‟entrepreneur doit faire approuver par la Ville l‟utilisation d‟un autre tracé. Si ce tracé n‟est pas approuvé, il doit faire passer la conduite de dérivation par le tracé indiqué.


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Station de pompage de l’eau de la promenade Campeau

1. La station de pompage de l‟eau de la promenade Campeau fait partie de la conduite principale 3W. La valeur initiale du contrat a été évaluée à 4 478 000 $ (moins-disant). Il est intéressant de constater que l‟écart entre le moins-disant les deuxième et troisième moins-disants était inférieur à 255 000 $, ce qui montre que la Ville a obtenu un prix raisonnable pour les travaux.

2. Des coûts additionnels d‟environ 165 700 $ ont résulté de modifications visant à assurer la conformité aux exigences du Code du bâtiment ou à régler d‟autres problèmes de conception. La valeur finale du contrat a été évaluée à 4 807 853 $.

3. La réalisation du projet s‟est déroulée sans problème majeur, et ce, jusqu‟à ce que le projet devienne opérationnel.

4. Les Services de gestion de l‟eau potable de la Ville ont constaté que le système SCADA (système d‟acquisition et de contrôle des données) installé par le sous-traitant ne répondait pas aux normes de la Ville.

5. Le sous-traitant a construit et installé le panneau de commande local sans fournir les dessins d‟atelier ou obtenir l‟avis de Services de gestion de l‟eau potable. Le procès-verbal de la première réunion visant à recenser les lacunes montre que le test d‟acceptation usine pour le panneau de commande local n‟avait pas été effectué et que ce panneau n‟était pas homologué CSA. Les dessins d‟atelier ont été soumis pour les composants du panneau mais pas pour le panneau complet.

6. Le processus de résolution du différend concernant le panneau de commande local s‟est échelonné d‟avril 2010 à février 2011 (dix mois).

7. Étant donné que l‟entrepreneur a pu installer un panneau de commande local inadéquat et que le consultant a recommandé le paiement des travaux, on peut conclure que le processus d‟inspection a été déficient. Il est raisonnable de penser que le consultant aurait dû se rendre compte que le panneau de commande local était installé sans que les étapes stipulées au contrat soient respectées. Le consultant est donc en partie responsable du retard dans l‟achèvement de la station de pompage.

8. En conséquence, le projet a été retardé de manière importante et a été achevé presque une année et demie plus tard que prévu.

Promenade Strandherd (de Crestway à Prince of Wales) incluant l’élargissement de la promenade Prince of Wales

1. Les travaux de prolongement de la promenade Strandherd, de la promenade Crestway à la promenade Prince of Wales, ont commencé en août 2009 et se sont terminés en septembre 2011. Le contrat initial a été évalué à 14 892 000 $. Des demandes de modification d‟une valeur de2 064 769 $ ont été approuvées et payées, ce qui a porté la valeur du projet à 15 997 123 $.


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2. Selon un examen des demandes de modification, des coûts se chiffrant à 700 175 $ ont résulté de modifications requises parce qu‟on avait oublié d‟inclure certains composants au moment de la conception du projet. Les demandes de modification pour des ouvrages d‟Hydro Ottawa se sont chiffrées à 244 654 $, dont 234 084 $ ont été remboursés à la Ville par le service public.

3. La Ville a défrayé une demande de modification d‟une valeur de 16 500 $ pour l‟installation de sismographes servant à assurer la surveillance des vibrations durant les activités de construction. Ce montant n‟aurait pas dû être payé par la Ville.

4. Le projet a été achevé à l‟intérieur du délai imparti et sans dépassement du budget global. Cependant, un nombre considérable de modifications ont dû être apportées en raison d‟omissions au moment de la conception.

Conduite principale reliant 3W – Phase 1, partie 1 (de la promenade de l’Outaouais à Moodie)

1. Le branchement de la conduite principale de la zone 3W est un composant majeur du réseau de distribution d‟eau potable de la Ville d‟Ottawa. La pose du tronçon visé a commencé le 20 mai 2010; le contrat initial a été évalué à 11 867 325 $.

2. Des demandes de modification d‟une valeur de 762 817 $ ont été approuvées et payées, portant la valeur finale du contrat à 11 739 514 $. La raison pour laquelle la valeur finale du contrat est pratiquement identique à sa valeur initiale est que les dépenses provisoires avaient été estimées à 785 000 $ et que seul un montant de 13 815 $ a été utilisé.

3. La principale inquiétude liée à ce projet est qu‟une proportion importante (297 161 $) des modifications requises durant la construction résultait de problèmes de conception. La plupart de ces problèmes concernaient des conflits non résolus avec les services publics et privés. La demande de modification la plus importante, d‟une valeur de 216 000 $, portait sur les travaux nécessaires au branchement de la conduite principale au reste du réseau; cela n‟a pas été causé par une erreur au moment de la conception, mais parce que la Ville a exigé la mise en place d‟un plan d‟urgence à la station de pompage de Carlington Heights, plan qui a nécessité l‟apport de modifications aux canalisations et au système de pompage en vue d‟assurer un approvisionnement en eau ininterrompu en cas de défaillance de la conduite d‟amenée durant le piquage sur conduite en charge. On peut cependant dire qu‟il s‟agit d‟un problème de conception parce que le consultant aurait dû prévoir la mise en place d‟un plan d‟urgence pour le branchement de la nouvelle conduite au réseau.

4. Une phase ultérieure du projet a été mise en œuvre dans le cadre d‟un contrat subséquent relevant du même consultant. Or, durant cette phase, le consultant n‟a pas tenu compte de la présence d‟un important volume d‟eau souterraine;


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cette omission a entraîné des coûts de plus 1,6 million de dollars. Le Ville a entrepris une poursuite contre le consultant en conception et le consultant en géotechnique.

Égout collecteur de Cave Creek, phase 1 (de l’avenue Harmer à la rue Faraday)

1. Ce projet prévoyait la construction du nouvel égout collecteur de Cave Creek, phase 1, de l‟avenue Harmer à la rue Faraday. Le contrat a été octroyé le 18 août 2010. Les documents d‟appel d‟offres exigeaient l‟achèvement substantiel des travaux avant le 21 décembre 2010 et leur achèvement complet avant le 15 mai 2011.

2. Le certificat d‟autorisation délivré par le ministère de l‟Environnement n‟a pas été reçu avant le 14 septembre. Les travaux ont aussi été retardés par les travaux de Bell, qui devait avoir quitté le site en septembre 2010, mais qui ne l‟a pas fait avant novembre 2010.

3. Le contrat initial a été évalué à 3 505 330 $. Les demandes de modification du projet se sont chiffrées à 367 888 $.

4. Environ 332 000 $ des coûts additionnels ont résulté du retard avec lequel ont commencé les travaux de construction.

5. La Ville a payé 61 930 $ pour un égout pluvial avec ponceau à dalot, mais un article du contrat prévoyait la fourniture et l‟installation d‟un ponceau de même taille. La Ville a expliqué que le tronçon visé ne pouvait pas être payé en fonction des prix unitaires parce que le tronçon d‟égout pluvial remplacé était en béton coulé sur place et que son remplacement exigeait la démolition d‟un ouvrage en béton existant, la mise en place de deux dalots en béton préfabriqués, l‟installation de goujons destinés à lier le nouvel ouvrage au ponceau en béton existant et la construction d‟un nouveau tronçon en béton coulé sur place.

Reconstruction du carrefour giratoire de la promenade Prince of Wales à la hauteur de la Ferme expérimentale centrale

1. Ce projet prévoyait la reconstruction d‟un carrefour giratoire afin de reconfigurer l‟intersection en fonction d‟un rond-point.

2. L‟ordre de commencement des travaux a été donné par la Ville le 18 mai 2011. Le contrat exigeait l‟achèvement substantiel des travaux avant le 15 juillet 2011 et leur achèvement complet avant le 16 septembre 2011. Au commencement des travaux, la valeur du contrat se chiffrait à 1 191 778 $.

3. Le coût des demandes de modification a atteint 57 560 $. Sur ce montant, 36 135 $ ont été versés pour le remplacement des conduites d‟amenée du bassin collecteur aux égouts pluviaux appartenant à Travaux publics et Services gouvernementaux Canada (TPSGC). La méthode de raccordement avait été approuvée par Travaux publics et la Ville, sauf que l‟entente intervenue entre les


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deux parties n‟a pas été remise au concepteur. En conséquence, la méthode de raccordement illustrée sur les dessins et utilisée sur le terrain ne répondait pas aux exigences de TPSGC. La Ville a ordonné à l‟entrepreneur de retirer les conduites d‟amenée qui avaient été posées conformément aux plans de conception et de les réinstaller en suivant les instructions de TPSGC.

4. Le problème découlant de l‟installation de conduites d‟amenée non appropriées aurait pu être évité si une coordination avait été assurée entre les gestionnaires de projets des différents services (Services d‟infrastructure et Urbanisme et Gestion de la croissance).

Domaines d’économies possibles

Voici les domaines d‟économies possibles qui ont été relevés dans le cadre de la présente vérification.

Assistance policière aux intersections – Le paiement de l‟assistance policière aux intersections devrait être versé directement par la Ville au Service de Police. Attendu que le coût horaire moyen de l‟assistance policière est de 188 $ et que le prix unitaire des soumissions est de 275 $/l‟heure, la Ville pourrait économiser plus de 435 000 $ en majoration des frais des entrepreneurs pour l‟utilisation d‟un total de 5 000 heures d‟assistance policière.

Recouvrement des coûts associés aux demandes de modification résultant d’erreurs et d’omissions au moment de la conception – Selon l‟échantillon de projets examiné, les demandes de modification représentaient en moyenne 9 % de la valeur des contrats, et 22 % des demandes de modification ont été présentées pour la correction d‟erreurs et d‟omissions au moment de la conception. La valeur des projets échantillonnés (123 766 000 $) représentait environ 30 % de la valeur totale des contrats octroyés par la Ville en 2011 (412,4 millions de dollars). En se basant sur la valeur moyenne des demandes de modification, 37,1 millions de dollars seraient versés pour les demandes de modification présentées pour l‟ensemble des contrats. Si 22 % des demandes de modification résultent d‟erreurs ou d‟omissions au moment de la conception, le montant versé pour les demandes présentées en ce sens est de 8.2 millions de dollars. En ne recouvrant que le 15 % associé aux frais généraux et aux marges bénéficiaires des entrepreneurs pour ces demandes de modification, la Ville pourrait réaliser des économies de l‟ordre de 1.2 million de dollars.

Recommandations et réponses de la direction

Recommandation 1

Que la Ville, en plus de faire appel à l’Association de la construction d’Ottawa (ACO) pour l’affichage de ses appels d’offres, veille à ce que ceux-ci apparaissent tous sur « Link2Build » (assurant ainsi leur diffusion plus large) et conserve les documents s’y rapportant.


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Réponse de la direction

La direction est d‟accord avec cette recommandation et celle-ci a été mise en œuvre.

La Direction de l‟approvisionnement garde maintenant tous les documents sur le dossier d‟approvisionnement confirmant que les exigences ont également été affichées sur « Link2Build ».

Recommandation 2

Que la Ville officialise ses relations avec l’ACO et « Link2Build » et veille notamment à ce que les droits d’examen et de vérification du processus de la Ville soient consignés.


La direction est d‟accord avec cette recommandation.

La Direction de l‟approvisionnement officialisera les relations de la Ville avec l‟Association de la construction d‟Ottawa (ACO) et « Link2Build » en veillant également à ce que la Ville ait le droit d‟examiner et de vérifier les processus consignés d‟ici la fin du quatrième trimestre de 2013.

Recommandation 3

Que la Ville élabore une politique selon laquelle les gestionnaires de projets seraient tenus de consigner dûment les erreurs et les omissions au moment de la conception décelées dans le cadre du processus de surveillance de la construction. Les gestionnaires de projets devraient être notamment tenus de classer les demandes de modification par catégories (erreurs et omissions au moment de la conception, problèmes de conception, conditions du site, etc.) de manière à faciliter le recouvrement des coûts auprès des consultants.



La direction élaborera une politique et/ou des procédures sur la consignation des erreurs et des omissions au moment de la conception décelées dans le cadre du processus de surveillance de la construction d‟ici la fin du deuxième trimestre de 2014.

Il convient de noter que certaines catégories (p. ex. conditions du site) ne donnent pas lieu à un recouvrement des coûts auprès des consultants. (Voir la réponse de la direction à la recommandation 4 concernant le recouvrement des coûts.)


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Recommandation 4

Que la Ville élabore une politique et les procédures sur le recouvrement des coûts liés aux demandes de modification et des coûts d’ingénierie initiaux liés à des éléments de construction précis auprès des consultants lorsque les coûts additionnels résultent d’erreurs ou d’omissions commises au moment de la conception.



La direction élaborera une politique sur le recouvrement des coûts liés aux demandes de modification et des coûts d‟ingénierie initiaux liés à des éléments de construction précis auprès des consultants lorsque les coûts additionnels résultent d‟erreurs ou d‟omissions commises au moment de la conception. Cette mesure sera mise en place avant la fin du deuxième trimestre de 2014.

Recommandation 5

Que la Ville élabore un système permettant la consignation du rendement des entrepreneurs ayant obtenu des contrats municipaux et qu’elle élargisse le processus d’évaluation des soumissions relatives à la construction afin d’inclure formellement un critère de rendement antérieur des soumissionnaires au processus d’évaluation des soumissions et d’octroi des contrats, l’objectif étant de faire en sorte que les contrats soient accordés en tenant compte du rendement antérieur, de l’expérience et du personnel en plus du prix le plus compétitif.



Actuellement, le processus d‟appels d‟offres de la Ville d‟Ottawa comprend une disposition selon laquelle une entreprise doit avoir une expérience concluante dans la réalisation de projets d‟envergure et de complexité semblables. Les entreprises qui sont incapables de faire la preuve d‟une telle expérience sont jugées irrecevables et ne se voient pas accorder le contrat.

Un projet a été lancé au sein de la Direction de l‟approvisionnement. Il vise à permettre la mise au point d‟un système électronique qui enregistrera le rendement antérieur d‟un entrepreneur et y donnera suite. Ce système sera mis en place avant la fin du quatrième trimestre de 2014. Les Services d‟infrastructure travailleront avec la Direction de l‟approvisionnement à déterminer comment le rendement antérieur affectera l‟octroi des contrats à l‟avenir.


Page lxvi Rapport annuel 2012 du Bureau du vérificateur général

Recommandation 6

Que la Ville s’assure que, dans le cas des ponceaux pour lesquels on envisage une réduction de la capacité d’écoulement, le processus de réfection comprenne la réalisation des études de conception hydrologique et hydraulique requises.



Depuis février 2011, Gestion des biens immobiliers a modifié ses pratiques par l‟ajout d‟une évaluation hydraulique pour les options de réfection des ponceaux susceptibles d‟entraîner une réduction de la capacité d‟écoulement.

Recommandation 7

Que la Ville mette en œuvre un programme d’inspection de ses conduites d’eau principales critiques qu’elle sait exposées à un environnement corrosif ou qu’elle soupçonne de l’être; que la Ville prenne les mesures qui s’imposent en fonction des résultats des inspections.



En juin 2012, les Services environnementaux ont présenté au Comité de l‟environnement un rapport sur un programme d‟évaluation conditionnel pour les conduites principales d‟eau potable (ACS2012-COS-ESD-0014). Ce rapport expose une approche fondée sur les risques pour l‟inspection et la gestion des conduites d‟eau principales.

Recommandation 8

Que la Ville présente au Conseil, dans le cadre du Rapport annuel du système de gestion de la qualité de l’eau potable, un sommaire des inspections menées à l’égard de ses conduites d’eau principales critiques, y compris un plan d’action pour la réparation des conduites désignées comme étant en très piètre condition.



Un sommaire des inspections concernant les conduites d‟eau principales critiques, y compris un plan d‟action pour la réparation des conduites désignées en très piètre état, sera incorporé au Rapport annuel du système de gestion de la qualité de l‟eau potable de 2013, lequel sera soumis au Conseil au deuxième trimestre de 2014.


Rapport annuel 2012 du Bureau du vérificateur général Page lxvii

Recommandation 9

Que la Ville modifie le mode de paiement des services municipaux dispensés par d’autres services de la Ville afin que ceux-ci ne donnent pas aux entrepreneurs la possibilité de réaliser des profits indus.



La direction mènera un examen des exigences qui modifieront le mode de paiement des services municipaux dispensés par d‟autres services de la Ville afin de ne pas donner aux entrepreneurs la possibilité de réaliser des profits indus. À moins que des restrictions ne soient précisées, cette mesure sera en place avant la fin du deuxième trimestre de 2014.

Recommandation 10

Que la Ville s’assure que des contraintes opérationnelles, telles que l’exploitation d’un contrôleur en temps réel, soient clairement décrites dans les documents contractuels et que le risque lié à la surveillance des prévisions météorologiques soit transféré à l’entrepreneur.



La direction travaillera avec Services environnementaux pour faire en sorte que les contraintes opérationnelles soient entièrement décrites dans les documents contractuels et que le risque lié à la surveillance des prévisions météorologiques soit transféré à l‟entrepreneur. Cette mesure sera intégrée aux modalités contractuelles avant la fin du deuxième trimestre de 2014.

Recommandation 11

Que la Ville spécifie, dans les projets de renouvellement des égouts, l’emplacement des conduites de dérivation du réseau d’égout et exige de l’entrepreneur qu’il situe toute conduite de dérivation sur des emprises ou des servitudes établies. Les entrepreneurs qui proposent d’autres tracés sur d’autres emplacements le feront à leurs risques et à leurs frais, y compris les conséquences des retards.




Page lxviii Rapport annuel 2012 du Bureau du vérificateur général

Dans tous les futurs contrats de renouvellement des égouts, la Ville exigera que les conduites de dérivation soient situées sur des emprises et des servitudes établies. Si l‟entrepreneur propose d‟autres emplacements, le contrat devra spécifier que ce sera à ses risques et à ses frais, y compris les conséquences des retards. Cette mesure sera intégrée aux modalités contractuelles avant la fin du deuxième trimestre de 2014.

Recommandation 12

Que la Ville modifie le document de délimitation de sorte que les engagements pris par tous les services soient explicitement examinés dans ce document.



La direction modifiera le document de délimitation de sorte que les engagements pris par tous les services soient explicitement examinés dans ce document. Cette mesure sera en place avant la fin du deuxième trimestre de 2014.

Recommandation 13

Que la Ville informe les gestionnaires de projets que les dommages-intérêts sont utilisés pour amener les entrepreneurs à respecter leur calendrier, mais qu’ils ne sont efficaces que dans la mesure où les gestionnaires de projets les facturent aux entrepreneurs.



Durant le troisième trimestre de 2013, la direction a émis une directive pour faire en sorte que les gestionnaires de projets imposent des dommages-intérêts aux entrepreneurs en conformité avec les documents d‟appel d‟offres standard de la Ville.

Conclusion

Le processus de supervision des contrats de construction de la Ville est exhaustif et comparable à celui utilisé par d‟autres municipalités et par le ministère des Transports de l‟Ontario.

La vérification a permis de constater qu‟une proportion substantielle de la hausse des coûts associés aux demandes de modification résultait d‟erreurs et d‟omissions des consultants et que la Ville ne recouvre pas ces coûts auprès des consultants. Elle le fait pour les demandes de modification présentées par Hydro Ottawa et devrait aussi le faire pour les demandes de modification requises en raison des erreurs et des omissions des consultants.


Rapport annuel 2012 du Bureau du vérificateur général Page lxix

Remerciements

Nous tenons à remercier la direction pour la collaboration et l‟assistance accordées à l‟équipe de vérification.


Office of the Auditor General 2012 Annual Report Page 1

1 BACKGROUND

1.1 Introduction

The Audit of Construction Supervision was included in the 2012 Audit Plan of the Office of the Auditor General (OAG), approved by City Council on December 14, 2011.

1.2 Responsible Department

Construction Services in the context of this audit comprise the process of contract administration of construction contracts for City infrastructure. The construction services include the preparation of tender documents, tendering, evaluation of tenders, contract administration, inspection, payment certificates, change order, and cost control. The City does not have construction forces for capital projects.

Construction Services for City projects are carried out by the Infrastructure Services Department. The City‟s Infrastructure Services Department is responsible for the asset management and design and construction of the entire City owned infrastructure and for the design and construction of all roads, bridges, culverts, retaining walls, transit stations, water and sewers.

The organization chart for Infrastructure Services is presented below.

Asset

Management

Business &

Technical

Services

Design &

Construction -

Municipal East

Design &

Construction -

Municipal West

Design &

Construction -

Building & Parks

Infrastructure

Services

Department

Construction services are provided by the three design and construction branches, namely: Municipal East; Municipal West; and, Buildings & Parks.

2 SCOPE The audit scope consists of a review of the construction supervision process used during construction of capital works projects by the City. The projects examined were constructed in 2010 and 2011, except for two that were constructed in 2004 and 2006.


Page 2 Office of the Auditor General 2012 Annual Report

The audit examined the projects listed in Table 1 below, which were brought to the attention of the Auditor General by Councillors. The review focussed on the specific concerns raised by the Councillors, in addition to the overall review of the delivery of construction services.

Table 1: Projects Referred by Councillors

Project Concerns of the Councillors

1 Transitway Installation of manhole covers along the travelled lanes and on the path of the bus wheels.

2 Gloucester Hornets Nest Review of cost compared to the size of the project; review of the procurement process.

3 Townline Bridge Replacement, Structure 433080

Contractor with poor performance was awarded the contract, previous project not completed on time, increase in risk to City. Note that this project was completed in 2004.

4 Cavanagh Bridge (John Shaw Road), Structure 433040

Contract awarded to same contractor as Structure 433080, the issues are the same. Note that this project was completed in 2006.

5 Dunrobin Road Culvert, Structure 338180

Culvert was flooded, was rehabilitated, flooded again, and was replaced completely in 2011.

6 King Edward Avenue Reconstruction

Concerns with basement cracks in a number of properties.

7 Woodroffe Avenue Watermain Replacement

Following a watermain break in January 2011, construction did not start until April 2011. The concern is whether the work could have been done in the winter or early spring. Summer construction affected the residents, including water restrictions due to the temporary water service.

8 John Leroux (Stittsville) Arena Upgrades

The roof repairs were delayed until late 2009 because the materials did not fit the curvature of the roof; work was not completed until 2010.

9 Goulbourn Recreation Complex

Ice pad addition was started in 2011 and completed in 2012. There is a concern with quality assurance and control, and how they may affect the warranty.



In order to provide context of the overall process to the review of the above projects, ten projects completed in 2011 and 2012 were examined, representing a total construction value of $123,766,000, which constitute approximately 11% of the total budget value of the projects that were active in the City in 2011. The 10 projects were of small, medium and large size. The following projects were selected as a representative sample based on these criteria:

Table 2: Selected Projects Reviewed

Per Infrastructure Services Department

Projects Estimate at Completion Cost ($000s)

1 SW Transitway Extension (North) Stage 1 - Fallowfield to Berrigan

$17,568

2 Woodroffe Ave. Watermain Replacement (Baseline to Navaho) $4,827

3 Sandridge Rd (Hillsdale Rd to Merriman Ave) - Road, Watermain & Sewer

$8,000

4 Centrepointe Theatre Expansion $11,850

5 West Nepean Collector Sewer - CIPP Rehabilitation $3,800

6 Campeau Dr. Water Pumping Station $3,500

7 Strandherd Dr. (Crestway to Prince of Wales) incl. widening of Prince of Wales

$35,000

8 3W Feedermain Link - Phase 1, Part 1 (Ottawa River Pkwy to Moodie Drive)

$32,000

9 Cave Creek Collector, Phase 1 (Harmer to Faraday) $6,000

10 Prince of Wales Roundabout Reconstruction at Central Experimental Farm

$1,221

TOTAL Estimate at Completion Cost of Projects Examined $123,766

Change orders were reviewed in the projects listed in Table 1 and five of the projects raised by Councillors, where change orders were applicable. In total change orders of 15 projects were reviewed.

In all projects, we reviewed the costs in comparison with the authorities. Particular attention was given to the change orders.

The audit encompassed the following tasks:

Review legislative framework;

Review City policies, procedures, standards and practices;



Review industry procedures, standards and practices;

Review background data;

Obtain and review all files for the project, as provided by the City;

Conduct interviews with individuals involved in the various projects;

Conduct site visits, as required;

Prepare draft report for fact verification;

Conduct additional interviews for confirmation of issues, as required; and,

Submit draft report for management review.

2.1 Review Legislative Framework

The audit began by reviewing the legislative framework for the construction services. In Ontario, construction-related legislation and regulations include the following:

Occupational Health and Safety Act and Ontario Regulation 213/91 Construction Projects

Construction Lien Act

Ontario Building Code Act

Ontario Water Resources Act

Canadian Highway Bridge Design Code

2.2 Review City’s Policies, Procedures, Standards and Practices

Pertinent City's policies, procedures, standards, and practices were examined and reviewed, including:

Project Manager‟s Procedures Manual, 2006

Inspection Manual for City‟s Construction Contracts, May 2003

Standard Tender Documents for Unit Price Contracts, Volumes No. 1 and 2

The Canadian Construction Documents Committee (CCDC) General Conditions for Stipulated Price Contracts are used by the City for building contracts.

The Ontario Provincial Standard Specifications are included by reference in the Standard Tender Documents for Unit Price Contracts.

2.3 Review Industry Policies, Procedures, Standards and Practices

The City‟s policies, procedures, standards, and practices are based on those used by other municipalities and ministries in Ontario.



2.4 Review Project Files

All the files and reports for each project, as provided by the City, were reviewed. Collection and review of the background information were undertaken in light of the audit objectives and criteria.

2.5 Review Background Data

Background data available from the City was collected and reviewed. In general terms, this included tender documents, bid analysis data, construction administration files, construction inspection data and quality assurance data.

2.6 Review Project Files

Project files in hard copy and electronic format, where available, were provided by the City for review. The review of construction files encompassed the process from tendering to substantial performance.

2.7 Interviews

Interviews were held with City staff involved in the various projects.

3 OBJECTIVES On the basis of the information gathered during the preliminary assessment, and the corresponding analysis of that information, the scope of the audit was synthesized in the audit objectives. The criteria attached to each audit objective explain the scope of the review. These were presented in the Audit Plan, which was reviewed by the City.

Audit Objective No. 1 - Examine and evaluate the processes and methodologies pertaining to the Construction Supervision Procedures followed by the City.

Criteria: Review of tender documents

Examination of tendering process, including design/build projects


Review of contract documents

Construction administration files

Assignment of project manager, project supervisor and inspectors

Construction inspection tasks and procedures

Procedures for management of change orders and extra work orders

Claims process procedures



Audit Objective No. 2 - Determine whether the processes and methodologies are consistent and compliant with all relevant policies, procedures, legislation and regulations.

Criteria:



Tendering process



Cost control

Management of change and extra work orders


Management of claims by contractor

Audit Objective No. 3 - Examine nine specific projects and specific issues brought to the attention of the Auditor General by Members of Council, to determine if they are consistent with relevant policies, procedures, legislation, and regulations.

Criteria:

Review of specific projects and issues indicated by Councillors








Claims management

Cost control



Audit Objective No. 4 - Examine a sample of ten construction projects completed in 2011 to determine if they are consistent with relevant policies, procedures, legislation, and regulations.

Criteria: Review of ten sample projects








Claims management

Cost control

4 FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS The results of the analysis and the findings of the audit are presented in this section. The discussion that follows is organized on the basis of the audit objectives presented in Section 3.

4.1 Audit Objective No. 1

Examine and evaluate the processes and methodologies pertaining to the Construction Supervision Procedures followed by the City.

The City has established a procurement process for construction services that requires preparation of bid documents for all projects to be solicited.

The procurement process is carried out by Supply Branch, based on the estimated cost of construction. For the projects reviewed in this audit, the solicitation methods were competitive Request for Tenders.

The City uses a procurement process for construction services that requires public solicitation of bids for the work. Bidding opportunities for construction projects are sent to the Ottawa Construction Association (OCA), who publishes them and administers the issue of solicitation documents for interested contractors. Solicitations are not published in other bidding opportunity advertising sites unless the project requires highly specialized contractors, in which case the City uses



MERX2 for advertising. MERX has no affiliation to construction associations and has been in operation for at least 15 years, and is widely known in Ontario.

Projects posted at the OCA are available for viewing on site or online by members of the OCA. Non-members can purchase the solicitation documents at a higher cost. During the audit, the solicitation document process for non-members was tested by registering and downloading the documents for one project. The process was clear and relatively straightforward.

The City has advised that tenders are published by OCA in Link2Build, a new electronic bid advertisement board. Link2Build is a website that publishes construction bid opportunities (primarily non-residential) published by local and regional construction associations; it has been in operation for about one year.

The concern with the method of tender advertising is that the City only posts bidding opportunities with OCA (and Link2Build as noted above).Consequently, tenders do not get as wide distribution outside of the City of Ottawa or the Ottawa area than they would if they were published on a bid opportunity listing system that has wider scope, such as MERX. Bidding opportunities would receive wider distribution if they are published in more general sites, such as MERX. It can be expected that advertising bidding opportunities in a wider area will result in the City getting bids for their tenders which would result is that the greater exposure of tenders will result in lower prices for City contracts.

Link2Build is a relatively new service that has been in operation for about a year and links to other construction associations in Ontario. Projects posted at OCA are posted by them on Link2Build. MERX is well established and well known in the industry, as it has been in operation for more than 15 years. Whether or not contractors from outside the Ottawa area are willing to bid on a particular job will depend on a number of factors; however, if contractors are not aware of a project because it was not advertised widely enough, they cannot decide whether or not to bid.

The Delegation of Authority reports to Council identify the billing addresses or head offices of the companies awarded contracts, as extracted from SAP. As a result, it may appear as if a contract was awarded to a company from outside of Ottawa, when in fact the work will be performed by the local office, or local representatives.

In its annual report to Council, Supply Branch analyzes the Delegation of Authority reports to identify contracts awarded to and/or performed by local companies. According to the annual report, when adjusted to remove goods and services not available locally (e.g., transit buses are not manufactured in Ottawa, nor is winter

2 MERX is an electronic tendering service with Canada-wide scope.



rock salt mined locally), approximately 94.5% of the City‟s annual purchasing dollar was spent in Ottawa and the surrounding area.

Table 3: Analysis of Local Purchasing by Quarter Per Supply Branch

Q1: 2011

Q2: 2011

Q3: 2011

Q4: 2011

BEFORE removing purchases not available locally: 69.6% 85.7% 78.9% 80.7%

AFTER removing purchasing not available locally: 91.4% 92.9% 97.6% 93.7%

Table 4: Geographical Vendor Breakdown for 2009 to 2011 Contracts Awarded Under Delegation of Authority

Per Supply Branch

2011 2010 2009

Region Dollar Value % of Total Dollar Value % of Total Dollar Value % of Total

Ottawa and area $898,901,307 94.5% $754,027,060 94.6% $732,055,748 95.4%

Ontario $22,897,121 2.4% $18,187,233 2.3% $24,918,710 3.2%

Quebec $10,522,412 1.1% $13,028,587 1.6% $5,796,562 0.8%

All Others $18,607,380 2.0% $12,077,843 1.5% $4,805,783 0.6%

Total $950,928,220 100.0% $797,320,723 100.0% $767,576,803 100.0%

Supply Branch did a 2011 “buy local” analysis isolating only construction contracts. Based on this analysis, 808 of the total 884 construction contracts awarded in 2011 (91.4%) were awarded to local firms. When considering dollar value, this figure rises to 96.6%.

Table 5: 2011 “Buy Local” of Construction Contracts

Per Supply Branch

Region # of

Construction Contracts

Dollar Value % of Dollar

Value

Ottawa & Area 808 $397,711,493 96.6%

Ontario 50 $11,995,007 2.9%

Quebec 21 $1,845,407 0.4%

Other 5 $226,940 0.1%

Total 884 $411,778,847 100.0%



Information provided by OCA indicates that approximately 9% of the total Infrastructure Services Department tenders (110 out of 1,271) had tender document takers that were from outside of the Ottawa and surrounding area (defined as 50 km from the City‟s boundary). The City provided data that showed that, of these, five tenders were awarded to contractors from outside the Ottawa and surrounding area, comprising less than 1% of the total value of construction contracts awarded by the City ($363,200,000).

Recommendation 1

To provide a wider circulation of tenders, that the City, in addition to posting tenders with the Ottawa Construction Association, ensure that all tenders are posted on “Link2Build” and retain documentation of this.

Management Response


Supply Branch now retains documentation on the procurement file confirming that the requirement was also posted on “Link2Build”.



The projects examined, with one exception, were constructed using a design-tender-construction format of procurement. The Dunrobin Road culvert replacement was constructed using a time-and-materials basis immediately after the second flood event, due to the need to re-open the road very quickly. None of the projects referred by the Councillors and those selected as representative projects were constructed using a design/build process.

The City carries out a bid analysis for all tenders, comparing the Cost Estimate prepared before tendering with the various bids. In general the bid analysis compares the prices for the various components (items) of the contract to enable the project managers to assess any trends in the various bids. Awards are made in accordance with the selection methodology identified in the solicitation document. This procedure is similar to that used generally by other Ontario municipalities.

The contractor is selected based on the methodology identified in the solicitation. In the case of the projects examined this was based on lowest responsive bid.

The City does not have a policy and procedures to enable explicit evaluation of the past performance of contractors on previous City contracts when determining the award of a new contract. The City advises that a prequalification process is used in large complex projects, and that it has the right to request a firm‟s experience in successfully completing projects of similar size and complexity. However, the City does not always use these methods, and past performance does not enter explicitly into the bid evaluation. As a result, contracts are awarded to the lowest bidder meeting the bonding and insurance requirements.

The City has developed a document for reporting supplier performance during the course of a contract; however, if the contractor completes the contract without default, they are eligible to bid in future City contracts; even if the contract process is fraught with difficulties, delays, and extra costs caused by poor contractor performance. The only penalty considered is if Supply Branch barrs the contractor from bidding on future City projects. A performance evaluation method that is taken into account in the evaluation of future bid opportunities is necessary to distinguish between contractors who perform well from those who do not.

Past performance should be documented and a rating system established to enable the City to take into account contractors past performance when they are competing for new work. The City currently has a Contractor Performance Appraisal Form to document performance; the form is included in Appendix X-2 of the Project Manager Manual. This form, with some modifications, would be a good basis for contractor performance evaluation, as discussed in the previous point. We note that the Contractor Performance Appraisal Form was only found in the Townline Bridge project file and not in any other reviewed project file.



The contract documents consist of a form of agreement and associated documents incorporated by reference, including the solicitation document, any and all addendums, and the bidder‟s submission. All projects examined had a set of contract documents.

Construction administration files were found to be generally complete. The City is moving to also storing the files in digital format, a practice that is appropriate. However, in some cases the digital files do not contain all the information that is contained in the paper files.

The City explained that the assignment of the project manager is done by the branch manager and program manager. The later generally supervises the work of 5 to 11 project managers. In many, but not all cases, the project manager is responsible for the entire span of the project (i.e., from preliminary design to completion of construction), but is some cases not. Generally the project manager has relevant experience to the project.

Inspectors are assigned from a pool of City inspectors. If the volume of work or complexity of the project warrant it, the City retains a consultant to provide the contract administration and inspection services.

Construction inspection tasks and procedures are described in the City‟s Inspection Manual for City Construction Projects, dated May 2003. The Inspection Manual provides instructions on communications with the contractor and the public; meetings; documentation requirements and forms; safety; and detailed inspection tasks.

The Inspection Manual contains instructions for the management of change orders and extra work orders. The Inspection Manual directs the inspector to discuss all changes with the project manager. The procedures for the management of change orders are not fully documented in the Inspection Manual.

The City uses a number of forms to document contemplated change orders, change orders, extra work daily record for time and materials work, force account records. However, they are not documented in the Inspection Manual.

Claims procedures are documented in the Inspection Manual, which instructs the inspector to begin maintaining daily work records for the potential claim situation. The inspector is instructed to prepare a report to the project manager on the claim issue.

The City provides an item for all anticipated areas of work. If there is no item, then there is a change order required. For example, in one contract the contractor had to remove interlocking driveway stones, and an item was set up by the contract administrator to pay for the reinstatement work. The only problem with this procedure is that it does not have a limit on the extent of material removed, so the restoration could require replacing a large area of existing work. In many contracts outside of Ottawa the procedure used to pay for restoration is by lump sum, which



generally helps ensure that the contractor does not remove more materials than needed.

In general terms, change orders in large building projects on new buildings can be expected to have a value ranging between 2% and 3% of the contract value on very well coordinated projects; however, average values can be as high as 5%. On projects that are additions to other buildings the value of change orders is expected to be higher. For heavy construction projects, such as roads, watermains, sewers, and bridges, acceptable values of change orders range from 5% to 10% of the contract value. The changes are expected to be the result of site conditions.

These values were determined based on the experience of a senior architect with more than 20 years of experience, and was used as a typical experience. Construction Delay Claims, B. Bramble & M. Callahan, Construction Law Library, 2005, p. 5-26 states that change orders can range from -5% to +10%. The American Institute of Architects (AIA), The Architect’s Handbook of Professional Practice, 1994 states that the changes could be as high as 7%. AIA Best Practice document, Managing the Contingency Allowance, David Hart, 2007, indicates a value of 5% is commonly used. Columbia University Facilities (http://facilities.columbia.edu) provides a range of 5% to 10%. In addition, the acceptable range of change orders can be supported by the usual range of contingency allowances that are provided in civil construction projects.

Review of the change orders for the various projects examined disclosed that several were the result of design errors and omissions. Work performed under a change order is generally more costly than if the same work is performed under the original tender bid. The reason for the higher cost is that the contractor will charge full price for labour, materials, and equipment required to carry out the work (since there is no competitive process), plus the contractor is entitled to mark up the cost by 15% in the case of work done by the contractor or 10% for work done by a sub-contractor for overhead and profit. In contrast, contractor's overhead and profit are distributed throughout the project items in a bid.

In some instances, the cost of the entire change order was the result of consultant's errors and omissions, but the City paid the entire cost, without requiring the consultant to cover the additional costs. As discussed later in this report, the City should have a policy and procedures to enable recovery of unwarranted costs when they are the result of design errors and omissions.

On two of the projects reviewed the respective project manager classified the change order into categories (e.g., design errors and omissions, coordination, owner request, site conditions, and others). This procedure is important to assist in recording the amounts that could be recovered from the consultants. Not all project managers follow this procedure, but should.



Recommendation 2

That the City formalize its relationship with the Ottawa Construction Association and “Link2Build”, including ensuring that the City’s rights to review and audit the processes are documented.

Management Response


Supply Branch will formalize the City‟s relationship with the Ottawa Construction Association (OCA) and “Link2Build” including ensuring that the City has the right to review and audit the documented processes, by the end of Q4 2013.

Recommendation 3

That the City develop a policy to require project managers to formally document design errors and omissions found during the construction supervision process. The documentation should include the requirement for project managers to classify change orders into categories, such as design errors and omissions, design issues, site conditions, etc., to facilitate the recovery of costs from the consultants.

Management Response


Management will develop a policy and/or procedures to document design errors and omissions found during the construction supervision process by Q4 2014.

It should be noted that some categories, (i.e., site conditions) will not result in cost recovery from consultants. (See Management Response to Recommendation 4 with regard to cost recovery).



Table 6 summarizes the costs of change orders for the various projects, and the portion of the cost that was due to design errors and omissions by consultants. Details on individual change orders for each project are provided in Appendix A. The amount of the change orders suggests that there may be issues with this matter. This will be explored further in our 2013 Audit of Infrastructure Services.

Table 6: Contract Amounts and Change Orders

Project Name Original Contract Amount

Change Order

Amount

Percentage of Change Orders in

Relation to Original Contract

Amount

Portion of the Change Order Paid by City Relating to

Design Errors

1 Gloucester Hornets Nest Fieldhouse

$298,253 $35,097 11.8% $30,816

2 Cavanagh Bridge $751,100 167,918 22.4%

3 Woodroffe Avenue Watermain ISD11-5046

$4,110,700 $1,065,830 25.9%

4 John Leroux Arena (Stittsville Arena)

$493,300 $64,562 13.1%

5 Goulbourn Twin Ice Pad

$6,635,000 $346,501 5.2% $50,562

6 Southwest Transitway Extension

$12,457,000 $1,196,238 9.6% $696,881

7 Woodroffe Watermain ISB09-6001

$6,327,937 $246,716 3.9%

8 Sandridge Road Reconstruction and Hillsdale Road

$6,878,000 $248,026 3.6%

9 Centrepointe Theatre Expansion

$9,343,824 $424,159 4.5% $63,292

10 West Nepean Collector Sewer Rehabilitation

$3,470,297 $595,180 17.2%

11 Campeau Drive Pumping Station

$4,478,000 $379,595 8.5% $198,075

12 Strandherd Drive Extension ISB09-5009

$14,892,000 $2,064,769 13.9% $660,470

13 3W Feedermain Phase 1, Part 1

$11,867,325 $762,817 6.4% $30,204

14 Cave Creek Collector Relocation

$3,505,330 $367,888 10.5% $70,980

15 Prince of Wales Roundabout

$1,191,778 $57,560 4.8%

TOTAL ALL PROJECTS

$86,699,844 $8,022,856

9.3% $1,801,280

Note that the percentage of the change orders due to design errors and omissions is 22% of the change order value.




Determine whether the processes and methodologies are consistent and compliant with all relevant policies, procedures, legislation and regulations.

The policies relevant to construction supervision comprise the procurement policies and procurement of construction services, the Project Manager Manual, and the Inspection Manual.

Purchasing By-law No. 50 of 2000 – A By-law of the City of Ottawa Respecting Purchasing of Goods, Services and Construction (Purchasing By-law) has the objective of obtaining the best value when purchasing goods, construction and services for the City, while treating suppliers equitably. The guiding principle is that purchases be made using a competitive process that is open, transparent and fair to all suppliers. This audit examined the application of the by-law to the process of acquiring construction services.

The Project Manager Manual (PMM) provides detailed guidance and instruction on requirements for tendering of the projects. Supply Branch coordinates with the Ottawa Construction Association to post bidding opportunities valued at more than $50,000, and the project manager provides input during the solicitation period.

The Project Manager Manual makes provisions for the steps to be taken when the construction administration and inspection are done by a consultant.

The PMM contains directions regarding questions during the procurement process.

As noted earlier, upon closing, the bids are reviewed for clerical errors and compared to estimates and budget. A rationale is provided for any gross inconsistencies in unit prices. The City advises that a prequalification process is used in large complex projects, and that it has the right to request a firm‟s experience in successfully completing projects of similar size and complexity. However, the City does not always use these methods, and past performance does not enter explicitly into the bid evaluation. This issue is discussed further in Section 4.1 and 4.3, as it is one of the issues raised by Councillors.


Examine nine specific projects and specific issues brought to the attention of the Auditor General by members of Council, to determine if they are consistent with relevant policies, procedures, legislation, and regulations.

The nine specific projects examined are summarized below, with a summary of the findings for each one of the criteria, as listed in Section 3. The sections below expand on each project.



4.3.1 Transitway

The “Transitway Design Manual, October 1993” has provisions for the placement of manholes on the Transitway. Specifically, Section B.3.5 - Catchbasin Spacing and Grates states that surface ironwork, including manholes, valve chambers, etc. shall not be placed on the travelled portion of the pavement. In Section B.7.1 – Utilities the Design Manual states that Utilities (i.e., utility companies) should be discouraged from locating their plant within the Transitway, and reiterates that no surface ironwork shall be permitted on the travelled portion of the Transitway.

The Sewer Design Guidelines, SDG001, November 2004 in Section 6.2.2 Locations and Spacing states that attempts should be made to avoid locating manholes in the path of vehicle tires, subject to the location requirements of the Guidelines for the Placement of Utilities in the Right-of-Way", which takes precedence.

Review of the provisions show that they are adequate. Spot examination of the Transitway disclosed that its design follows these provisions.

4.3.2 Gloucester Hornets Nest

For this project, the issue brought to the attention of the Auditor General was that the project cost was high for the type of facility provided; the audit also reviewed the procurement process.

Review of the files showed that the Gloucester Hornets Nest project consisted of the expansion of the existing fieldhouse, installation of a new sanitary sewer (44.8 m long), connection to the existing pumping station; and reconstruction of part of the existing pathway. The project was designed by an architect, tendered by the City, and was constructed by the contractor selected on the basis of the lowest bid.

The fieldhouse expansion comprised a 139.2 m2 expansion of the existing 250 m2± existing building. The construction estimated cost prepared by the consultant based on the design was $362,000.

The tender was carried out by Supply Branch based on tender documents prepared by the consulting team. Examination of the file showed that the tender was carried out using the Supply Branch procedures, and that it was posted in the Ottawa Construction Association, which serves as an electronic advertisement for all construction bidding opportunities issued by the City valued at more than $50,000.

Bids were received by the City from eleven contractors, ranging from $298,937 to $581,333. The lowest bidder was selected.

Review of the cost of the building shows that the cost per square metre of building was $2,310 ($215 per square foot). Based on average construction cost per unit area of similar buildings, the unit cost for the building is competitive.

The review of the files showed that the project was completed within the budget and on time. As part of the audit the change orders were reviewed in detail. In



reviewing the change orders it is concluded that change orders totalling $30,816 were mostly necessary due to design issues. The drawings show that the parking lot located east of the addition slopes to the site, so it would have been reasonable to expect that surface runoff would reach the construction site. Although the soils report indicated that the groundwater levels at the time of the investigation were lower than the bottom of the excavations, the seasonal fluctuation in groundwater levels should have been taken into account.

Although the work incorporated into the project was necessary, the costs of the additional work is higher when done by change order than when it is included from the beginning in the tender bid, because there is no competitive process at that time. Based on the change orders in the projects reviewed, the contractor‟s overhead and profit mark-up on any change is 10% for sub-contractors and 15% for the general contractor; these mark-ups are added to the cost of doing the work, which generally already includes profit margin.

The change orders addressed the need to add more step footings to the new foundation to prevent undermining of the existing foundation; the cost of winter protection to concrete due to groundwater issues; and the cost of a drainage system to address surface and groundwater issues.

The specific errors and omissions comprised:

An error in the design of the footings adjacent to the existing building footings: Although the design drawings show that the design engineer was aware that the existing footings where higher than the footings for the new building, and thus had the required information to know that a step would be necessary, the design engineer did not address that the new footings could not be excavated lower than the existing ones without undermining them. A field instruction and additional cost was required to correct this issue.

A design error in addressing the drainage to the site: The design engineer did not address that, as it is shown on the drawings, the drainage from the parking lot is directed by the existing grades toward the fieldhouse extension, and as a result, significant water problems occurred during construction.

The mistaken conclusion from the geotechnical report that the groundwater elevation would be lower than the footing foundation elevations: Although the geotechnical investigation found that the water table at the time of the field investigations was below the foundation levels, it is well known that the water table elevations fluctuate seasonally. The design did not include any provisions for drainage of groundwater away from the footings, and had to be added during construction.



As will be seen in other projects reviewed, the cost of design errors and omissions can be substantial. Based on the cost of overhead and profit mark-up (15%), as indicated in the change orders, in this particular case the additional cost calculated as 15% of the value of the change orders is approximately $4,000.

Recommendation 4

That the City develop a policy and procedures to be followed to recover the costs of construction changes and original engineering costs related to the specific component from the consultants when the additional costs are caused by design errors or omissions.

Management Response


Management will develop a policy and/or procedures to recover the costs of construction changes and original engineering costs related to a specific contract component when the additional costs are caused by design errors or omissions. This work will be completed by Q2 2014.

4.3.3 Townline Bridge Replacement, Structure 433080

Contract ISB02-7052 was executed on July 10, 2003, substantially performed on July 9, 2004, and completed on July 30, 2004. The contract work was delayed so the City applied liquidated damages to the contractor in accordance with the contract, and deducted them from the payments.

After the contractor was notified that liquidated damages were being assessed as a result of delays in completion of the work, the contractor made a claim for additional payment and for an extension of the working days, based on the premise that he had been delayed as a result of problems with the installation of the precast concrete girders. After review with the consulting firm responsible for the project contract administration, the City rejected the claim.

In 2007, the contractor took legal action against the City on the basis of the claim. This project is presently under litigation by the contractor against the City.

The contractor had worked for the City before this project but there was no clear method to permit evaluation of their performance at the time of bids were received and the decision made on the contract award.

The issue in this contract is whether the contractor had performed prior work for the City and their performance was not taken into account in awarding them this contract. The audit found that the contractor had completed a smaller culvert replacement, in which they had made a major mistake in setting the elevations of the culvert footings. However, the resulting problems were corrected by the contractor at their cost and at no cost to the City.



In the bid for the subject bridge contract, the contractor met all the bid requirements, including provision of a bid deposit and agreement to bond, and subsequently met all insurance and bonding requirements.

Upon completion of this contract in July 2004, it could be concluded that the contractor completed the work satisfactorily, but had schedule problems.

4.3.4 Cavanagh Bridge (John Shaw Road), Structure 433040

Contract ISB04-7018 was awarded in April 2005, after the completion of the Townline Bridge Replacement, discussed in Section 4.3.3. The contractor work started on July 4, 2005, was substantially completed on January 6, 2006, and completed on June 27, 2006.

At the start of the contract, the City discussed with the contractor the problems associated with various deficiencies, non-performance and supervisory issues on previous contracts carried out by them. The contractor agreed with the City that their performance would be monitored during the execution of this contract.

The contractor‟s performance would be documented in a Contractor Rating Form which had been developed by the former Regional Municipality of Ottawa-Carleton. The Form scores the performance of the contractor on several areas, including project supervision, equipment and operators, workmanship/service, material storage and handling, safety procedures, cooperation, public relations, extras, cleanup, and commencement and completion. The maximum score is 100; the minimum acceptable score is 75. Upon completion, both the City‟s project manager and the contractor are required to sign the form.

The City advised the contractor that during or subsequent to the monitoring period, it would decide regarding the ability of the contractor to bid on future City tenders.

At the completion of the contract, the City provided the contractor with the Contractor Rating Form, showing that the contractor had rated 68/100. Most of the points lost were due to a general lack of adequate supervision by the contractor, which required more supervision by the City and its consultant. The form on file is not signed.

In the Cavanagh Bridge contract, the contractor claimed $321,602 as extra for several issues relating to construction of the abutments, $283,744 of the extra payment requested related to the construction of the north abutment. The claim was reviewed and evaluated by the consulting firm and the City and a recommendation to pay $245,000 was made by the consulting firm. The claim was settled for that amount.

Although the City attempted to apply a formal contractor evaluation form for future use, it appears that this was not widely used by the City after amalgamation. Furthermore, until recently, the City did not have a formal procedure for contractor evaluation.



At present, Supply Branch working with departments has developed a procedure for recording supplier non-performance, by progressive escalation of contract issues. The document provides general instructions for enforcing the provisions of the contracts, including notice of default and termination of the contract. However, the document is general and intended to be applied to all City procurement, and is not sufficiently specific to construction.

The procedures do not include a method for recording the performance of contractors for general use. There is no specific method for applying the results of past performance of a contractor in previous City contracts to the selection process of future City contracts. In fact, the method appears to be “all or nothing” in that Supply Branch could barr a supplier from providing services to the City, but otherwise a poorly performing contractor could continue to bid on City‟s projects at the disadvantage of well performing contractors.

The City advises that a prequalification process is used in large complex projects, and that the City has the right to request a firm‟s experience in successfully completing projects of similar size and complexity. However, the City does not always use these methods, and past performance does not enter explicitly into the bid evaluation. As a result, contracts are awarded to the lowest bidder meeting the bonding and insurance requirements.

The City has developed a document for reporting supplier performance during the course of a contract; however, if the contractor completes the contract without default, the contractor is eligible to bid in future City contracts; even if the contract process is fraught with difficulties, delays, and extra costs caused by poor contractor performance. The only penalty considered is if Supply Branch barrs the contractor from bidding on future City projects. A performance evaluation method that is taken into account in the evaluation of future bid opportunities is necessary to distinguish between contractors who perform well from those who do not.

Past performance of contractors should be documented and a rating system established to enable the City to take the contractor‟s past performance when the contractor is competing for new work. The City currently has a Contractor Performance Appraisal Form to document performance; the form is included in Appendix X-2 of the Project Manager Manual. This form, with some modifications, would be a good basis for contractor performance evaluation, as discussed in the previous point. We note that the Contractor Performance Appraisal Form was found in the project files of only one project (Townline Bridge) and was not found in the files of any other project reviewed.



Recommendation 5

That the City develop a system to record contractor performance in City contracts, and that the City expand the construction bid evaluation process to include formally the past performance of the bidder in the evaluation and award of contracts, so that contracts are awarded on the basis of past performance, experience, and staffing in addition to lowest cost.

Management Response


Currently, City of Ottawa construction bid solicitations include a provision whereby a firm must have experience successfully completing projects of similar size and complexity. Firms that are unable to demonstrate this experience are deemed non-responsive and are not awarded the contract.

A project has been initiated within Supply Branch to develop an electronic system to record and act on a Contractor‟s past performance. This system will be implemented by Q4 2014. ISD will be working with Supply Branch on how contractors‟ past performance will be affecting future award of contracts.

4.3.5 Dunrobin Road Culvert, Structure 338180

The Dunrobin Road culvert is located approximately 1.2 km north of Kinburn Side Road. The original culvert was a 1.8 m diameter corrugated steel pipe (CSP) culvert, which had corroded substantially. In 2007, the City arranged to rehabilitate it by installing another culvert through the barrel of the CSP culvert to extend its useful life. The process of installing the culvert through an existing one is called sliplining.

On August 15, 2010, the road was overtopped at the culvert and part of the road embankment was washed out by the flood. Investigation of the storm by the City revealed that the rain recorded by several observers located near the site amounted to 166 mm to 215 mm in about 10 hours. For Ontario, this amount of rain in a 10 hour period is a very unusual rainfall. The City‟s investigations indicate that the rainfall amount exceeded the rainfall amount associated with the 100 year return period. Investigation by the City showed that it is possible that part of the capacity of the culvert was reduced due to accumulation of debris within the culvert. The road was repaired in 2010.

On April 11, 2011, the road was overtopped during another storm, which caused damage to the northbound lane and shoulder, although not to the same extent as in the August 2010 flood. Following the flood, the road was repaired under emergency work procedures and reopened on April 16, 2011.

Following the flood, a hydraulic analysis of the culvert showed that the lining done in 2010 had reduced the hydraulic capacity of the culvert. The consultant recommended that the culvert be replaced with a larger one.



On June 24, 2011, the road was overtopped a third time in less than one year. On this occasion the City decided to keep the road closed and to replace the culvert. The contractor who had been called in by the City to repair the road was retained using a time and materials basis to complete the culvert replacement. This time the new culvert was selected on the basis of the consultant hydraulic recommendations and the pipe that was available from the manufacturer for rapid delivery.

The issues with this project are that the initial renewal process, which concluded in the sliplining rehabilitation in 2007, did not follow the formal procedures for evaluation of renewal alternatives of bridges and bridge-culverts. The hydrology and hydraulic calculations were not sufficiently thorough to permit the City to recognize that the hydraulic capacity had been reduced, or the implications of this reduction.

Recommendation 6

That the City ensure that for culverts where a reduction in conveyance capacity is being considered, the renewal process includes undertaking the required hydrology and hydraulic design.

Management Response


Since February 2011, the Asset Management Branch has modified its practice to include a hydraulic assessment for culvert renewal options that would result in a reduction in the hydraulic conveyance capacity.

4.3.6 King Edward Avenue Reconstruction

The project comprised reconstruction of King Edward Avenue and connecting streets between York Street, Sussex Drive and the Macdonald-Cartier Bridge. The work comprised relining the existing collector sanitary and storm sewers; reconstruction of underground utilities; removal of existing road bed, excavation, granular and hot mix asphalt; rehabilitation of the Red Path structures; demolition of one structure and three new landscape wall structures with a stone facing.

The project was subject to an environmental assessment based on the Municipal Class Environmental Assessment. Detailed design, tendering, award of contract and construction proceeded based on the City‟s standard process. As part of the process, the City required the contractor to conduct a pre-construction survey of buildings and structures that could potentially be affected by construction activities and vibration.



The contractor retained a specialized firm to complete the pre-construction survey. The limits of the pre-construction survey are determined by the contractor, and not the City. This contracting procedure protects the City as the responsibility for damages is the contractor‟s. The procedure is a standard procedure used by practically all project owners, since the project owner (the City in this case) does not have control over the contractor‟s methods and operations.

The specialized firm carried out a pre-construction survey of 100 buildings; of these, 44 were inspected both inside and outside. The remaining 56 were surveyed only on the outside because the owner refused entry to the survey company representatives.

The property owners of nine buildings claimed that their buildings had been damaged as a result of construction. Of the nine buildings, four are located outside of the pre-construction survey limits.

The property owners discussed the matter with the City‟s project manager, who referred the matter to the contractor. The contractor referred the matter to his insurance company. As part of the process of review of the various properties, the property owners requested copies of the photos and videos that were taken by the pre-construction survey company for the contractor, and were required to sign releases and process other paperwork before being provided with the photos and videos. Consequently, there was delay in providing the subject information. In reviewing the files, we found that this process is not unusual and is a requirement that the contractor and inspection companies must undertake for privacy protection.

The issue on this project arose from the fact that the City contract documents transfer the responsibility for damages that occur during construction to the contractor. A number of the property owners brought the matter to the attention of the Mayor, who had the City Solicitor review the contract documents. The City Solicitor advised the property owners that the matter should be pursued with the contractor.

The property owners have taken issue with the fact that the City transfers to the contractor the entire responsibility and risk for any damages caused by construction. The reason the City and practically all other project owners in North America pass this responsibility is that, as previously noted, the City does not have control or responsibility for the methods and procedures used by the contractor.

We reviewed contract documents issued by the Town of Oakville, Town of Port Hope, City of Mississauga, Ministry of Transportation, County of Lanark, and others. In all cases, they use the Ontario General Conditions of Contract, part of the Ontario Provincial Standard Specifications, which transfer the responsibility for any damages caused by the contractor to the contractor. Public Works Canada in its contracts uses similar language.



In construction projects, it is common to require a one year warranty period during which the contractor is responsible for repairing any defects or deficiencies in the project construction. The warranty period starts when the project is completed and the City has accepted the work. We note that the one year warranty period is common in construction contracts. During this period, the contractor is required any defects as part of the contract, at no additional cost to the City. After the warranty period expires, the City becomes responsible for the upkeep of the project, as part of the normal maintenance process.

In conclusion, the City‟s contract provisions meet the current standard for handling of damage claims. As well, the manner in which the project manager addressed construction damage claims was correct.

4.3.7 Woodroffe Avenue Watermain Replacement

In 2007, a watermain failure on Woodroffe Avenue south of Hunt Club Road occurred. The City carried out a non-destructive pipeline condition assessment of the watermain from Hunt Club Road southerly to Fallowfield Road in November 2008. The condition assessment found that 18 of 558 pipes inspected (3.2%) had broken prestressing wires. A failure risk analysis of the data collected in the condition assessment was completed to calculate the risk of failure of the prestressed concrete cylinder pipes and the repair priorities for the maximum pressures. The failure risk analysis results, reported in February 2009, indicated that of the 18 pipes with broken prestressing wires, 3 were in Repair Priority 1 (immediate action required) and 1 pipe in Repair Priority 2 (replace within 3 years). The other 14 pipes were in priority 3 and 4 (moderate and low risk for the next 5 years.

The 1.2 m diameter watermain on Woodroffe Avenue broke on January 14, 2011 between Medhurst Drive and Hunt Club Road. This section of the watermain was constructed in 1975 and 1976 using concrete prestressed pipe.

The section of watermain that failed in January 2011 is located north of Hunt Club Road. It was constructed using the same type of pipe which had a similar failure in the fall of 2007, but about 1 to 2 years earlier.

The failure risk analysis classifies the pipe segments into four Priorities, depending on the risk of failure within one year, three to five years, and longer term, as listed below.

Priority 1: The maximum pressure in the line exceeds the pressure that produces the ultimate strength with (Priority 1a) and without (Priority 1b) the contribution of soil resistance. The failure can occur at any time. Repair should be performed as soon as practical and in less than 1 year.



Priority 2: The maximum pressure exceeds the minimum pressure that produces damage limit states. The failure occurs with time as the number of broken wires increases or when the steel cylinder corrodes. Repair should be performed within a short time period of about three to five years.

Priority 3: The maximum pressure in the line exceeds the pressure that produces serviceability limit states, but not the damage limit states. The failure of the pipe, if it occurs at all, is after much longer time period than in Priority 2. The pipeline should be monitored.

Priority 4: The maximum pressure in the line is less than the pressure that produces serviceability limit states. The failure of the pipe, if it occurs at all, is after much longer time period than in Priority 3. The pipeline should be monitored.

The report recommended that the four pipes in Repair Priorities 1 and 2 be excavated and inspected externally to confirm the level of distress, and to replace the pipes accordingly. We did not find a record that the additional inspection recommended was carried out.

Based on the results of the failure risk analysis report, dated February 2009, the Priority 1 pipes should have been replaced within one year.

The City stated that the section of pipe north of Hunt Club Road had never been inspected prior to the failure in January 2011. Given the findings of the 2008 condition assessment and the 2009 failure risk assessment, and the fact that the watermain north of Hunt Club Road was constructed two years earlier, using the same materials, and placed in similar soil conditions, we reviewed whether it may have been prudent for the City to have done, in 2009, a condition assessment of the watermain north of Hunt Club Road at least to the limits of the original construction contract.

After discussion with the City, it became clear that the section of pipe where the Priority 1 pipes were located has different characteristics from the remainder of the watermain. The section south of Hunt Club Road is at a considerably shallower depth than the section north of Hunt Club Road, making it subject to a higher risk of corrosion. The majority of the pipe sections with more advanced deterioration were located in the shallower sections, suggesting that the basis for the inspection limits were reasonable. In addition, inspections of large watermains pose important operational constraints. On this basis, it was agreed that the limits chosen by the City for inspection in 2008 were reasonable.

The design for the replacement of the four pipes south of Hunt Club Road in Priority 1 and 2 started in December 2009, with original schedule of construction start for October 2010, which is 8 months later than the Priority 1 failure risk



indicated. The original design schedule was to have the design completed and the tender package ready before June 2010.

At a scheduling meeting on January 12, 2010, the City decided that the project would be postponed, but that the design should be ready for construction in case an emergency required the work to proceed. This decision was made based on other risks to the water system. Drinking Water Services carried out a transient analysis (maximum water pressure analysis) in 2009 to assess the likelihood and magnitude of transients that could affect the pipes. This decision was communicated to the project manager by a senior watermain rehabilitation engineer on May 19, 2010, who indicated that the delay was due to other potentially conflicting demands on the system, that the watermain and transient pressures would be monitored by Operations, and that the design should proceed to completion in case an emergency repair became necessary. The City has indicated that the decision to delay the repairs was made based on other risks to the water system that would not have been apparent to the consultant conducting the inspection at the time.

The City indicated that an assessment was performed to determine the likelihood and magnitude of transients through routine operations.

Following the major watermain break on January 14, 2011, the City reactivated the project design, with the initial intention of including the failed section repairs in the contract. However, the drawings were only at 60% completion and there were no contract documents ready, which indicates that the design was stopped once the City notified the project manager that the contract had been postponed. The fact that the drawings were not ready did not impact the 2011 construction schedule, although it could have been a concern had one of the Priority 1 pipe segments failed before the scheduled construction.

At the time of the January 2011 watermain break, construction of the Zone 2W (West) – Section 2C feedermain was in progress, so the City Design and Construction explored the possibility of extending the contract to include the watermain north of Hunt Club Road. However, Asset Management and Drinking Water Services suggested that a condition assessment of the Woodroffe Avenue watermain be done first to identify areas of concern. This time the assessment extended north of Hunt Club Road, the section of watermain that had similar characteristics as the watermain south of Hunt Club Road, in addition to the section done in 2008 (Hunt Club Road to Fallowfield Road).

The 2008 assessment included approximately 3 km of pipe. The 2011 assessment included 5 km of pipe, which showed three additional pipes in need of repair including the section that failed in 2011.

On February 7, 2011, the project manager warned for the first time that the pipe supply could take up to three months as pipe suppliers were very busy. He started



getting prices from the suppliers who could deliver the replacement pipes within the schedule required to expedite construction for the spring.

On February 24, 2011, Asset Management provided Design and Construction - West with a Scoping Document based on the findings of the condition assessment. When comparing the 2008 and 2011 conditions assessments, it was found that the number of pipe sections with wire breaks was similar on a per km basis, but a greater number of pipes had more severe deterioration. They did find a substantial increase in deterioration in the prestressed concrete pipe watermain from 2008. On the same date, the City received the pricing for the replacement pipes.

On March 1, 2011 the project manager informed the pipe supplier that the City would proceed with buying the pipe and appurtenances required. On March 10, 2011 the project manager sent an Estimated Spending Plan Authority (E-SPA) to Purchasing for the pipe. The project manager indicates in the email that Supply Branch had been kept apprised all along, but review of the files found no documentation to confirm that this was the case.

On March 16, Purchasing asked the project manager for the reason for sole sourcing the pipe and for selecting the company. The discussion about sole sourcing the pipe extended to March 30th, at which time the decision was to proceed with a standard tender.

The correspondence shows that at the time of the break in January 2011, the City repaired the broken watermain and it scheduled the required replacement of the remaining pipes to tender the project for work in the fall of 2011. However, the condition assessment of the watermain from David Drive to Fallowfield Road disclosed that sections of the watermain had deteriorated substantially since 2008 and that there was similar deterioration in the segment north of Hunt Club Road. Based on the results, the City decided to not return to service the section of watermain from Knoxdale Road to Vaan Drive until the required watermain replacement was completed, in order to not risk another watermain break if it was returned to service without the repairs. On this basis, the City decided to carry out the watermain replacement and repair work as soon as possible.

While the pipe was out of service, supply to the Barrhaven and Riverside South service areas was being provided through a single 406 mm watermain along Merivale Road, supplemented by in-line pumping. The temporary supply met the demand at the time, but hydraulic modelling indicated that it would meet only 75% of the Maximum Day Demand.

At the end of February 2011, the results of the condition assessment and the hydraulic modelling showed that construction could not be postponed until the fall, and it was scheduled for tendering as soon as possible.



A number of alternative means of operation and/or repair were examined, including repairs by leaving the pipe in place, such as sliplining or reinforcing the pipe. The analysis concluded that the preferred solution was open cut construction along Woodroffe. Any of the alternatives would only advance that completion by at most two weeks and the resulting watermain condition would not be as satisfactory.

As a result, it was necessary to impose a complete outdoor water ban in Barrhaven, Riverside South and Manotick until completion of the project, in order to avoid running the system dry and possible Boil Water Advisories and inability to meet fire fighting requirements.

Recommendation 7

That the City undertake a program for inspecting its critical water transmission mains where they are known or suspected to be exposed to corrosive environment, and that it takes action based on the results of the inspection findings.

Management Response


In June 2012, Environmental Services presented to Environment Committee a report on a condition assessment program for drinking water transmission mains (ACS2012-COS-ESD-0014). This report outlines a risk-based approach to the inspection and management of water transmission mains.

Recommendation 8

That the City submit to Council as part of the Drinking Water Quality Management System annual report a summary of inspections on critical water transmission mains, including an action plan for correction of pipes identified to be in very poor condition.

Management Response


A summary of inspections on critical water transmission mains, including an action plan for correction of pipes identified to be in poor condition, will be reflected in the 2013 Drinking Water Quality Management System (DWQMS) Annual Report to be presented to Council in Q2 2014.



Review of the change orders for this project found that they were fully documented and were reviewed by the contract administrator and project manager. In general terms, the change orders are necessary to expedite the project.

The “police assistance at intersections” item is a concern: Due to the level of traffic congestion on Woodroffe Avenue, it was necessary to have point duty police on a daily basis. The original tender did not anticipate this amount of point duty for the project. The additional cost was $247,637, paid by variation in the tender quantities at the tender price. The total price paid was $313,638. Review of the invoices to the contractor for 1,140.5 hours of police service show that the cost was $214,346, based on $188 per hour. The contractor was paid $99,292 or 46% mark-up on police cost.

The specification F-1012 allows one hour of contractor‟s organization/site supervision for each hour of police assistance at $40 per hour. In addition, it allows mark-up of 10% for contractor‟s overhead and 10% contractor‟s profit. It is hard to understand how there needs to be 1 hour of contractor‟s organization and supervision for each hour of police assistance. In our opinion, the unit price is very generous. Even reducing the time allowed for contractor‟s organization/supervision to 1 hour per 8-hour shift would reduce the unit price to $233 and the City would have paid $266,258, leaving a profit to the contractor of 24%. If the mark-up for contractor‟s profit is eliminated, the unit price becomes $212 and the City would have paid $242,053, leaving a profit to the contractor of 13%. This is an operation that has no risk to the contractor, so it should not be subject to profit.

The project manager should have negotiated the cost of this item, as it clearly was a very significant variation in the quantities, and the general conditions of the contract contained provisions for such eventuality. In addition, the manner in which the item is paid provides the contractor with a profit on a service provided by a City service to another. In fact, the profit margin is 46% even if the number of hours in the contract is not exceeded.

Rather than include an item with unit prices, the City should provide an allowance for the cost of the services, with only an administration markup for the contractor. A better option would be to have Ottawa Police Service invoice the City directly for the services.

Recommendation 9

That the City modify the payment method for services from other City services so that they do not provide an unwarranted profit to the contractor.

Management Response




Management will conduct a review of the requirements that will modify the payment method for City services from other City services so that they do not provide an unwarranted profit to the contractor. Unless specific restrictions are identified, this will be implemented by Q2 2014.

4.3.8 John Leroux (Stittsville) Arena Upgrades

In October 2007 the City received a Structural Adequacy Review for the Arena, which found its structural framing to be in poor condition, with some areas creating structural concerns due to the deterioration and distress found during the inspection. The report recommended a detailed condition survey of the roof framing.

The design for the Arena Upgrades comprised replacing the existing roof with a new one. The total fees paid for the design were $6,827.

The design drawings showed that the roof had variable slope, ranging from 10º near the apex to 17.4º near the fascia. The specifications required a specific product and model of sheet metal roofing and cladding. During the tender period, the City upon recommendation of the consultant allowed for an equivalent roof product based on a submission by another supplier. The City also included reinforcement of the purlins.

It is noted that the alternative sheet metal roofing and cladding was presented to the consultant as a product that would fit the configuration of the roof shown on the drawings.

After the contract was awarded (Purchase Order dated March 27, 2009), the contractor informed the City and the consultant that the roofing manufacturer selected by the contractor (from the approved suppliers provided in the tender documents) had advised that the specified roof replacement could not be installed on the arena roof because of the curvature of the roof. This information was confirmed by the supplier who had requested to be added to the specifications as an approved equal, that is, a product that met the requirements of the project and that is comparable in quality to the roofing originally specified.

The roofing manufacturer selected by the contractor suggested that an alternate product manufactured by them would be suitable for the site. The City accepted the alternative, which resulted in additional costs due to differences in colour and additional liner. The City provided the contractor with a list of alternative configurations and requested that they order the revised material; however, the alternate product recommended by the roofing supplier also could not be installed on the roof. At this stage, the contractor suggested that a membrane roofing system would be cheaper than the metal roofing specified.



The contractor submitted on May 15, 2009 a quotation for the contemplated change order that provided the breakdown of credits and additional costs for the change; the additional cost was $149,000. The additional costs were reviewed and accepted by the City, but no formal authorization to proceed with the change was issued to the contractor.

On May 26, 2009, the contractor advised the City that the purlin covers and interior hat channels had been ordered on May 20, 2009, but the manufacturer estimated delivery for June 4th or 5th. The City noted that the purlins must be fully installed over the slab area before the summer camps start on June 22, 2009, since no interior work over the slab would be able to proceed after that date. The contractor responded that they could not commit to that date, and reminded the City that the changes had not been authorized.

On June 1, 2009, the contractor submitted an alternative roof system for consideration by the City. The contractor stated that authorization to proceed would be required by June 3, 2009 to permit completion of the purlin covers before June 22, 2009.

At that time, the consultant arranged to have the supplier that was originally specified carry out measurements of the roof to determine whether their roofing system could be installed on the building. The contractor was concerned about the supplier using the contractor‟s scaffolding and other material to do the measurements, and requested clarification regarding the purlin covers, as they affected their operations. In response, the City clarified that limits of liability during the measurements and informed the contractor that the specification was for the original roofing system, and that the delays were caused by the contractor‟s choice of the alternative supplier.

On June 19, 2009, the City informed the contractor that the specified roofing system would not work on the building. Between this date and August 7, 2009, the engineer prepared revised drawings and the contractor provided a revised quotation.

Subsequently, the City authorized the contractor to repair the existing roof wood truss connections (change order No. 1) and the change of roofing system to the revised assembly (change order No. 2). However, the project did not proceed because the arena time commitments did not allow work in the late summer. In November 2009 the purchase order was cancelled.

On November 25, 2009, the City Legal Services advised the City that it could issue a termination letter based on the contract, paying the contractor for reasonable costs due to the delay. The message indicates that there were grounds for a claim against the consultant due to the faulty specifications they provided to the City.

The contractor submitted a claim for $301,663, which was considered, high by the City.



On February 5, 2010, the City offered to reinstate the purchase order to the contractor subject to several conditions regarding schedule and cost. On February 28, 2010, the City formally offered to reinstate the purchase order.

The project was completed in September 2010, using the revised roof design. The total additional cost was $39,314 due to the change of the roof and the delays.

Analysis of the project timeline shows the following issues:

The design consultant did not carry out sufficient due diligence to confirm that the roofing system provided in the tender documents would actually work.

The design consultant refused to accept that the roofing system proposed would not work until the contractor and the roofing supplier showed that it was not a feasible system for this project.

The City considered a claim against the consultant for the additional costs due to the change in roofing system and the delays, but decided against it.

The City received services from the consultant on another project to compensate for the consultant costs on this project. However, the extent of services provided is not fully documented.

4.3.9 Goulbourn Recreation Complex

The concerns raised regarding the construction of the Twin Ice Pad relate to the fact that the project was completed in May 2012, after the initial scheduled completion should have occurred in November 2011. In addition, some concern was expressed regarding the quality assurance and control during construction and the warranty on the project. Review of the contract indicates that the warranty is in place.

The construction of the Twin Ice Pad at the Goulbourn Recreation Complex commenced in January 2011. The Chief Building Official issued a Partial Occupancy Permit on March 29, 2012; the Final Occupancy permit has not been issued.

The original schedule for the project in 2010 was for the contract to be completed in January 2012. The schedule provided by the contractor during the initial stages of the project required completion by the end of November 2011. In September 2011 it was obvious to the contractor that the project would not be completed in accordance with the original schedule, and a revised schedule was issued with planned completion date of January 30, 2012.

The main reasons for the delay were the result of delays with the manufacturing, delivery and erection of the structural steel for the project. The manufacturer initially would not start the shop drawings until he received the signed and sealed structural drawing issued for construction. The original schedule was for 25 working days, but the work required 75 days. In addition, the structural steel was delivered to the site before the shop inspection required by the contract documents,



and with defects in some of the pieces. The City had the structural steel inspected on site and the defects were corrected by the contractor.

The City imposed on the contractor liquidated damages of $117,000 for the delays, by deducting the sums in three payments.

Inspection and testing was carried out by the architectural firm and the structural, mechanical, and electrical engineering firms retained by the City, which provided general review of construction. In addition, the City retained an inspection company to inspect the structural steel and welding, and carried out testing of concrete and compaction in accordance to standard practice.

Review of the file showed that all deficiencies found in the building were corrected before final payment.

The issues found on this project were mainly:

The structural steel manufacturer created an adversarial relationship from the very beginning and did not follow the requirements of the contract.

The structural steel was delivered without the required shop inspection and with defects in some pieces (these were corrected on site).

Recommendation 4 applies to this project


Examine a sample of ten construction projects completed in 2011 to determine if they are consistent with relevant policies, procedures, legislation, and regulations.

The 10 sample projects examined are summarized in Table 2, with a summary of the findings for each one of the criteria, as listed in Section 3. The sections below expand on each project.

4.4.1 Southwest Transitway Extension (North) Stage 1 - Fallowfield to Berrigan

This project comprised the construction of the Southwest Transitway Extension from Berrigan Drive to Oriska Way, Highbury Park Drive Underpass Structure, and the Longfield Station. The contract value for the project based on the tender was $12,457,000. The value of change orders was $1,196,238, for a total final contract value of $13,653,238.

Several change orders in this project were the result of an error in the storm sewer elevations shown on a record as-built drawing on file at the City. The original design proposed that the sanitary sewer from the Longfields Station would be constructed under an existing 2100 mm diameter storm sewer, to connect to the proposed sanitary sewer on Longfields Drive. When the contractor exposed the



existing storm sewer it was found to be lower than shown on the record drawings. The resulting additional cost was $440,831.

These changes were the result of an error in the storm sewer elevations shown on a record as-built drawing on file at the City. The original design proposed that the sanitary sewer from the Longfields Station would be constructed under an existing 2100 mm diameter storm sewer, to connect to the proposed sanitary sewer on Longfields Drive. When the contractor exposed the existing storm sewer it was found to be lower than shown on the record drawings.

The issue in this project is the accuracy of the record drawings and whether the design consultant should have checked the inverts of the storm sewer given that the crossing was critical. It appears that the City has not investigated whether it could recover any costs of this extra work from the respective consultants.

During construction of the Highbury Overpass it was found that the rock at the design foundation elevation was not adequate. This finding necessitated additional rock explorations and testing, and re-design of the footing. The total cost of the change orders was $86,132, which could have been saved if the geotechnical investigation had been completed thoroughly.

The City publishes Standard Tender Documents for Unit Price Contracts, which include a typical section for the trench for sewer and services (Standard Drawing No. S6). However, the design drawings showed a typical trench width for two sewers instead of using the standard drawing. As a result, a change order was issued for the additional rock excavation required. The total cost of the additional rock excavation was $18,069.

In total, change orders for $696,881 were the result of design errors. Of this, it is estimated that $559,174 can be classified as payments that the City made which could have been avoided during design. There is no indication that the City considered recovering the additional costs from the consultants (prime consultant and geotechnical sub-consultant).


4.4.2 Woodroffe Ave. Watermain Replacement (Baseline to Navaho)

This project comprised the replacement of a watermain to accommodate the construction of the Transitway on the west side of Woodroffe Ave. south of Baseline Road. The contract value of the project was $6,327,937.

This project progressed without major problems. Thirteen change orders were the result of site conditions or requirements of Drinking Water Services; the total value of change orders was $246,716. The largest change order comprised construction of a new valve chamber and installation of the valve as requested by Drinking Water Services ($166,509). A credit of $50,000 was applied for early abandonment of the old watermain.



We found no issues with this contract.

4.4.3 Sandridge Rd (Hillsdale Rd to Merriman Ave) - Road, Watermain & Sewer

This project comprised the reconstruction of Sandridge Road, including replacement of the watermain and sewers between Hillsdale Road and Merriman Avenue. The contract value of the project was $6,878,000.

This project progressed without major problems. During the project there was a total of $248,026 in change orders that were the result of site conditions or additional requirements of the Operations department. The largest change order ($60,499) involved the sealing of all inside joints in the 3.0 metre diameter sewer to prevent deposition of solids and debris in the pipe joints. One change order related to installation of fibre optic and power cables in ducts ($41,542). The remainder change orders were the result of site conditions and requirements of Hydro Ottawa. The Hydro Ottawa change orders were reimbursed by the utility.

We found no issues with this contract.

4.4.4 Centrepointe Theatre Expansion

This project comprised construction of the expansion to Centrepointe Theatre. The building addition comprised 2,630 m2 (square metres), including a rehearsal studio, dressing rooms, lounge area, volunteer room, workshop, interior loading dock and storage rooms, plus a loading ramp, and landscaping. The total contract value was $9,343,824.

A total of 129 change orders were issued for a total value of $424,159, including a credit of $80,995 to close out the cash allowances ($250,000) in the contract. Some changes were required due to design coordination. The largest modifications were due to changes to the roof to match the existing building‟s roof, hydro substation modifications, and specialty items that were required after substantial completion.

The value of change orders in this project constituted about 4.5% of the total project value. On that basis, it is concluded that the value of change orders for this project was within the accepted range.

The value of change orders resulting from omissions on the tender documents was $63,949. Although the value is considered to be within the industry-accepted margin of 3%, the fact that they were omissions and not coordination changes should be taken into account.

The project was constructed without major problems and was completed within budget and on time.




4.4.5 West Nepean Collector Sewer - CIPP Rehabilitation

The rehabilitation of the West Nepean collector sewer was undertaken under the Federal Stimulus Funding Program for Infrastructure Projects (Stimulus Program). It was originally scheduled to be completed before the deadline of March 2011, but with the extension of the deadline by the federal government, the project was completed in June 2011.

The original contract value was $3,470,297. The project was expanded and the completion date extended when the Federal government extended the Stimulus Program deadline. The final contract value was $3,804,902, including the value of the additional sewer lining and change orders due to field conditions that resulted from the extension in the project schedule to May 2011.

Of the additional cost in change orders, $132,535 was due to the work require for set up and restoration in areas affected due to the expanded project scope and the fact that construction extended into the spring.

A major sewer surcharge caused by the operation of the Real Time Control System for the combined sewers resulted in additional $221,346 costs. The concern with this event is that the sewage by-pass plans prepared by the contractor were reviewed by the project manager and Operations. The contract documents should have included a caution regarding operation of the Real Time Control System and its potential effect on the West Nepean. During the review of the by-pass plan submitted by the contractor, Operations should have noted to the contractor that the tunnel could be flooded during a rainfall event.

Although no changes to the by-pass plans may have avoided the back-up of sewage into the subject section of West Nepean Collector, if the contractor had been advised of the possibility of flooding they would have had the opportunity to change procedures to avoid damages to the lining and the by-pass setup that were caused by the flooding.

In one of the by-pass plans the contractor assumed that the by-pass could use lands owned by NCC. However, the City did not have an easement on those lands and had to obtain a temporary easement from NCC. The time required to obtain the NCC permission resulted in a delay claim by the contractor, plus the contractor used an alternate by-pass route. This situation could have been avoided if the contract documents had the following requirements:

The contractor shall use for by-pass only existing right-of-ways and existing easements.

The by-pass methods are determined by the contractor, but the by-pass routes are specified by the City.



Use of an alternative by-pass route by the contractor is subject to approval by the City. If the alternative is not approved by the City, the contractor shall use the specified routes.

Recommendation 10

That the City ensure that operational constraints such as the operation of the Real Time Control System are fully described in the contract documents and that the risk for monitoring weather forecasts is transferred to the contractor.

Management Response


Management will work with staff in the Environmental Services department to ensure that operational constraints are fully described in contract documents and that the risk for monitoring weather forecasts is transferred to the contractor. This will be built into contract standard specifications by Q2 2014.

Recommendation 11

That the City specify, in sewer renewal projects, the location for sewer by-passes and require the contractor to use by-pass locations on existing right-of-ways or appropriate existing easements. Sewer by-pass plans proposed by the contractor using other locations must be at the contractor’s risk and expense, including the consequences of delays.

Management Response


In all future sewer renewal contracts, the City will specify the location for sewer by-passes on existing right-of-ways and appropriate easements. Should the contractor propose other locations, the contract will specify that this will be at the contractor‟s risk and expense, including the consequences of delays. This will be built into contract standard specifications by Q2 2014.

4.4.6 Campeau Dr. Water Pumping Station

The Campeau Drive Water Pumping Station forms part of the Zone 3 West (3W Feedermain system. It was designed and tendered in 2008, but the prices were higher than the budget for the project. The contractor agreed to maintain the prices for 2009 and the City revised the budget accordingly. The original contract value was $4,478,000, which was the lowest bid. It is notable that the second and third lowest bids were within $255,000 of the lowest bid, which indicates that the City obtained a reasonable price for the work.

Approximately $165,700 of additional cost was the result of changes that were required to meet the Building Code requirements or other design issues. The final value of the contract was $4,807,853.



Construction of the project proceeded without a major issue until the project was ready to commission. In fact, on October 2, 2009 the contract administrator consultant issued a certificate of substantial performance which included payment to the contractor for partial demobilization, commissioning, asphalt pavement, curbs, grading, service entrance switchgear installation, soft starters and variable frequency drive installation, lighting and receptacles, electrical distribution, wiring of mechanical systems, control and instrumentation costs incurred by the contractor during the billing period.

The City‟s Drinking Water Services found that the SCADA (supervisory control and data acquisition) installed by the sub-contractor did not meet the City‟s standards. It is noted that the sub-contractor built and installed the SCADA panel without providing shop drawings or seeking input from Drinking Water Services for the design. Minutes of Deficiencies Meeting No. 1 show that the Factory Acceptance Testing for the Area Control Panel (ACP) was not completed and that the ACP was not CSA certified. Shop drawings were submitted for the components, but not the entire ACP. Resolution of the issues with the ACP took from April 2010 to February 2011 (ten months). After that, the project run into schedule difficulties, as the sub-contractor had to re-design the control system to meet the City‟s requirements, re-build it accordingly, re-install it and then test it.

The main issues with this contract related to the schedule of construction and the commissioning of the station due to mistakes and errors by the sub-contractor in the design and installation of the ACP, as noted above.

Given that the contractor was able to install the wrong ACP and that the consultant recommended payment for the work, it can be concluded that there was a gap in the inspection process. It is reasonable to expect that the consultant should have realized that the ACP was being installed without following the required steps, as stipulated in the contract documents. Consequently, the consultant is partly responsible for the delays in completion of the pumping station.


4.4.7 Strandherd Dr. (Crestway to Prince of Wales) incl. widening of Prince of Wales

The extension of Strandherd Drive from Crestway to Prince of Wales started in August 2009 and was completed in September 2011. The contract value was $14,892,000. Change orders with a value of $2,064,769 were approved and paid, for a final project value of $15,997,123.

Based on a review of the change orders, $700,175 were due to changes to items that were missed in the design of the project. Change orders for Hydro Ottawa work amounted to $574,184, of which $237,299 was reimbursed to the City by the Utility.



The City paid a $16,500 change order for installation of seismographs for vibration monitoring of construction activities. This should have been paid by the contractor and not by the City.

The project was completed on time, within the overall budget. However, there were a considerable number of changes due to omissions in the design.


4.4.8 3W Feedermain Link - Phase 1, Part 1 (Ottawa River Pkwy to Moodie Drive)

The 3W Feedermain Link is a major component of the water distribution system for the City of Ottawa. The section included in this project was started on May 20, 2010, with a contract price of $11,867,325. Change orders with a value of $762,277 were approved and paid, for a final contract value of $11,739,515. The reason why the final cost is similar to the initial contract value is that provisional items were estimated to cost $785,000 and only $13,815 of the provisional item budget was spent.

The major issue with this project is that a substantial proportion ($297,161) of the changes required during construction was due to design issues. Most of the problems that arose during construction related to unresolved conflicts with existing services and utilities. The largest change order, with a value of $216,000, related to the provisions that were necessary to connect the feedermain to the remainder of the system. The largest change order was not a design error, but was the result of a contingency plan requested by the City at the Carlington Heights Pumping Station, which required piping and pump modifications to ensure uninterrupted water supply in case of failure of the existing transmission main during the hot tap. The reason why it is considered a design issue is that the consultant should have made provision for a contingency plan.


4.4.9 Cave Creek Collector, Phase 1 (Harmer to Faraday)

This project comprised construction of the new Cave Creek Collector, Phase 1 on Harmer Avenue and Faraday Road. The contract was awarded on August 18, 2010. The tender documents required that the work be substantially performed by December 21, 2010, with completion by May 15, 2011.

The Certificate of Authorization from the Ministry of the Environment was not received until September 14th. The work was delayed further due to work by Bell which was scheduled to leave the site in September 2010 but did not until November 2010. The City should review this delay to determine if the cost of delays can be recovered from Bell.



The contract value at the project start was $3,505,330. Change orders for the project amount to $367,888.

The original construction plan by the contractor was to start the work on Harmer Avenue, and to proceed with three crews. In addition, the road construction sub-contractor planned to grind the asphalt and to reuse it in the contract. The City gave the contractor the choice of postponing the work to the next spring, but the contractor was concerned that there may not be sufficient working days in the contract to complete before the specified completion date. Given this constraints, the City directed the contractor to start work on Faraday Street to reduce the number of working days that he would need in 2011. The City considered that the June 30, 2011 completion date was important in order to avoid having the contractors for Phases 1 and 2 working too close to each other in the summer 2011.

Approximately $332,000 of the additional costs was the result of the delay in starting construction.

The City paid $61,930 for a box culvert sewer that had to be replaced due to the conditions found in the field. Upon review, it was determined that there was already an item in the contract for supply and installation of the same size culvert. The City has explained that the section of storm sewer replaced was a cast-in-place concrete section; replacement required demolition of a section of the existing concrete sewer, placement of 2 sections of precast concrete box, installation of dowels to tie in to the existing culvert, and construction of a cast-in-place concrete section.

It is noted that this project had three project managers: the first one retired, the second one worked on the project until a permanent position within the City opened and the third is managing the project currently. The project management for this project appears to have been transferred properly, as there does not appear to be any consequence from the changes in PM.

4.4.10 Prince of Wales Roundabout Reconstruction at Central Experimental Farm

This project comprised the reconstruction of an existing traffic circle to configure the intersection based on a roundabout.

The Commence Work Order was issued by the City on May 18, 2011. The contract required substantial completion by July 15, 2011 and completion of the work by September 16, 2011. The contract value when work started was $1,191,778. The contract was actually completed in October 2011.



The cost of change orders was $57,560, of which $36,135 was due to the need to change the connection of catchbasin leads to the existing storm sewer owned by Public Works Canada. The method of connection had been agreed between Public Works and the City, but the agreement was not provided to the designer. As a result, the method of connection shown on the drawings and used in the field did not meet the requirements of Public Works and Government Services Canada (PWGSC). The City instructed the contractor to remove the connections done per the design and to redo them based on the instructions from PWGSC.

The issue created by making the wrong connection should have been prevented through coordination between project managers from different departments (Infrastructure Services and Planning & Growth Management).

Recommendation 12

That the City modify the Scoping Document so that commitments made by all departments are explicitly discussed in the document.

Management Response


Management will amend the scoping document to ensure that commitments made by all departments are explicitly expressed. This work will be complete by Q2 2014.



The contractor in this project did not treat the project with the priority it required. The City‟s project manager wrote a memorandum to file summarizing his concerns, which included:

The contractor left his sub-contractors working for five weeks without supervision.

The contractor completed the roadwork 16 days late, but without completing the work in the islands, the centre median, the cobblestone installation, and landscaping.

Ten work days were lost because the contractor was absent from the site.

There is no documentation in the file or in the payment certificates to indicate that the City charged the contractor any liquidated damages. Given the information provided by the project manager and the lateness of completion of the project, the project manager should have charged liquidated damages to the contractor.

Recommendation 13

That the City instruct the project managers that the liquidated damages are provided to assist in keeping the contractors on schedule, but are not effective unless the project manager actually charges them to the contractor.

Management Response


In Q3 2013, management issued a directive to ensure that project managers impose liquidated damages on contractors pursuant to the City‟s Standard Tender Documents.

5 AREAS OF POTENTIAL SAVINGS The following areas of potential savings were identified in this audit:

Police assistance at intersections: The City should pay for police assistance at intersections directly to Ottawa Police Service. If the average hourly cost of police assistance is $188 and the unit price in tenders is $275 per hour, the City could save more than $435,000 in contractor mark-up fees based on a total annual utilization of 5,000 hours.

Change order cost recovery from consultants when the changes are the result of errors and omissions in the design: Based on the sample the average value of change orders was 9% of contract amounts, and the average value of change orders due to design errors and omissions was 22% of the total change orders. The value of the sample projects ($123,776,000) was about 30% of the total value of the projects awarded by the City in 2011 ($412.4 million). Using the average change order values, the change orders in these contracts could amount to $37.1 million. If 22% of these change orders are the result of design errors and omissions, this represents $8.2 million. Even recovering only the 15% contractors‟ overhead and profit



markup on the change orders, the savings to the City could be approximately $1.2 million.

6 CONCLUSION The City‟s Construction Supervision process is complete and comparable to the process and procedures used by other municipalities and the Ministry of Transportation in Ontario.

The audit found a substantial amount of cost caused by change orders resulting from consultants‟ errors and omissions, which the City is not recovering from the consultants. The City is currently recovering costs resulting from changes required by Hydro Ottawa, and should be able to recover costs for changes required by consultants‟ errors and omissions.

7 ACKNOWLEDGEMENT We wish to express our appreciation for the cooperation and assistance afforded the audit team by management.



APPENDIX A – CHANGE ORDER TABLES

Table of Contents

Table 7 Gloucester Hornets Nest Fieldhouse ............................................................................. 46 Table 8 Cavanagh Bridge .............................................................................................................. 46 Table 9 Woodroffe Avenue Watermain ISD11-5046 ................................................................. 48 Table 10 John Leroux Arena (Stittsville Arena) ......................................................................... 50 Table 11 Goulbourn Twin Ice Pad ............................................................................................... 51 Table 12 Southwest Transitway Extension ................................................................................. 54 Table 13 Woodroffe Watermain ISB09-6001 ............................................................................... 58 Table 14 Sandridge Road Reconstruction and Hillsdale Road ................................................ 59 Table 15 Centrepointe Theatre Expansion .................................................................................. 60 Table 16 West Nepean Collector Sewer Rehabilitation............................................................. 66 Table 17 Campeau Drive Pumping Station ................................................................................ 67 Table 18 Strandherd Drive Extension ISB09-5009 ..................................................................... 69 Table 19 3W Feedermain Phase 1, Part 1 .................................................................................... 71 Table 20 Cave Creek Collector Relocation .................................................................................. 72 Table 21 Prince of Wales Roundabout ......................................................................................... 73



Table 7 Gloucester Hornets Nest Fieldhouse

Change Order

Description Amount Discussion

1 Change EXIT signs to bilingual signs

$1,211.87 The EXIT signs are bilingual in Ottawa. This was a design oversight

Change lavatory from bottom mounted to countertop

The lavatory type was changed to suit countertop material

2 Change in backfill material; addition of 100 mm rigid insulation; additional vertical foundation wall insulation; new sub-drain.

$23,595 This work was required due to groundwater infiltration into the excavation. The design did not include a foundation drain. Drainage from the adjacent parking lot was not properly allowed for in the design

3 Addition of 4 extra step footings to avoid undermining existing building footing

$1,595.10 The situation corrected by this change order is evident in the design drawings, and should have been addressed by structural engineer before the tender. The design drawings show that the new foundation is lower than the existing; step footings should have been provided in the design

Additional wall switch motion sensor in storage room

$737.69

4 Provisions for additional footing and sub-grade frost protection

$3,677.28 Groundwater and surface runoff flooded the excavation. The source of the water was surface runoff, and its control should have been taken into account in the design

5 Additional door hardware, replace existing washroom floors, replace existing toilets, repair existing pea traps, replace faucet

$7,714.66 These changes were made at the request of the City to improve the existing building facilities

6 Relocate shower stall benches and grab bars

$468.00 These changes were made at the request of the City to improve the existing building facilities

7 Recovery of unspent cash allowance

-$3,902.84 Credit to the contract

Table 8 Cavanagh Bridge Change Order


1 Additional Detour Signing $1,199.96 Required

2 Remove tree $2,429.68 Required

3 Temporary Support MVCA $2085.35 MVCA request

4 Performance Graded Hot mix HL-3 $10,165.21



Table 8 Cavanagh Bridge Change Order


5 Asphalt Grinding $2,038.10

6 Abutment Change $150,000.00 Negotiated with contractor



Table 9 Woodroffe Avenue Watermain ISD11-5046

Change Order


1 Valve Pre-purchase $25,900.00 The water valves on this project would have taken too long to manufacture, so they were not included in the tender. The 610mm valve that was needed was purchased after construction started based on availability. A valve became available locally and was purchased from the re-seller. The cost is $25,900.00. Back up copy kept by consultant

2 Joint use pole installation - Sportsplex

$4,649.38

3 Tracer wire substitution $3,720.75

4 Bolt plating rush $360.00 Back up copy kept by consultant

5 Temp 300 mm watermain by-pass pumping system

$180,533.42 Site communication memo #3 on file. Back up copy kept by consultant. Installed to provide additional water supply to area

6 Additional spot repair at Grenfell $35,672.70 Back up copy kept by consultant

7 Spot repair for leak at Slack $151,764.64 For the spot repair at Slack Rd., a leak developed in the adjacent existing watermain. The cost to repair using time and material is $151,764.64

8 Re-testing 300 mm bypass $5,170.10 Not clear why the City needs to pay for re-test

9 Supply of Gorman-Rupp pump set $111,798.00

10 Connection of 300 mm by-pass to existing

$4,651.31 Connections were included in original request for prices

11 Gasket premium $798.82 Gaskets needed to be purchased from secondary supplier

12 Pipe delivery to Clyde Ave. $2,716.64 The contractor was asked to deliver the old 1200 mm watermain to the City depot

13 Standby charges for non-located traffic duct broken during construction

$5,545.85 Site condition

14 Temporary line painting $6,982.47 Site condition

15 Hunt Club traffic control measures $7,704.60 Required

16 Overtime wage costs $18,995.95 To meet schedule requirements

17 Additional concrete pressure pipe $6,598.28 Site condition

18 Not issued




Change Order


19 Additional police assistance $247,637.50 Due to the level of traffic congestion on Woodroffe, it was necessary to have point duty police on a daily basis. The original tender did not anticipate this amount of point duty for the project. The cost for this is $247,637.50 Back-up invoices only $180,395.68 Paid by variation in tender quantities at tender prices. 1140.50- 240 = 900.5 hours at $275.00 per hour. However, cost is only $158.17 per hour, so the contractor gets 74% mark-up on police cost

20 Additional grading and paving - Slack Rd. spot repair

$1,656.00 Reasonable

21 Additional grinding -Woodroffe $13,243.53 Reasonable

22 Additional grading and compaction – Woodroffe, including compaction and fine grading

$29,588.60 Required

23 Rental of standby pumps $13,735.20 For temporary 300 mm diameter watermain

24 Sidewalk along frontage of Sportsplex

$22,540.00 161 m of 1.8 m wide sidewalk. The sidewalk on the east side of Woodroffe adjacent to the Sportsplex was in very poor condition prior to this construction project. At various locations, it was necessary to repair various panels after watermain crossings were complete. It became very difficult to replace these panels, considering that numerous adjacent panels were in need of replacement as well. The cost for this was $22,540.00

25 Final paving 300 mm trench at Hunt Club

$8,769.61 Required for temporary water supply

26 Pump rental cost $2,385.60 Required for temporary water supply

27 Compression band and grout at Knoxdale/Woodroffe

$7,567.60 Required




Change Order


28 Copper wervice at 1757 Woodroffe Ave.

$3,008.38 Reasonable

29 Additional 600 mm watermain work $10,561.29 The original design only included a very short section of 610 mm watermain on Hunt Club. After the decision was made to install the booster pump and bypass piping, the required length of 610 mm watermain to replace increased significantly. The cost for this is $96,926.60

30 Additional 600 mm watermain work $10,886.43 The original design only included a very short section of 610 mm watermain on Hunt Club. After the decision was made to install the booster pump and bypass piping, the required length of 610 mm watermain to replace increased significantly. The cost for this is $96,926.60

31 Reinstate road cuts at school, Vaan Drive

$8,313.39 Temporary watermain

32 Road cut reinstatement front of school


33 Additional paving at school $4,689.31 Temporary watermain

34 Removal of temporary 300 mm watermain


35 Additional 600 mm watermain installation at Hunt Club

$75,478.88 The original design only included a very short section of 610 mm watermain on Hunt Club. After the decision was made to install the booster pump and bypass piping, the required length of 610 mm watermain to replace increased significantly. The cost for this is $96,926.60

Table 10 John Leroux Arena (Stittsville Arena)

Change Order


1 Wood truss connections $23,650.00 This was an addition to the contract based on structural recommendations



Table 10 John Leroux Arena (Stittsville Arena)

Change Order


2 Change roof system to SAR $24,700.00 The roofing system had to be changed because the originally specified system would not fit the shape of the arena roof.

3 Fencing and scaffolding rental July – August 2009

$14,614.15 This was due to the fact that the originally specified roofing would not work

4 Pickup and delivery of purlins $1,597.83 Required due to structural requirements

Table 11 Goulbourn Twin Ice Pad

Change Order


1 CR 1 - CCN·1 Additional tile work in main lobby of GRC

$43,297.50 Owner request

2 CR 2-CCN·2 Temporary relocation of fire exit door

$14,931.70 Exit in existing building require during construction

3 CR 3 - CCN·3 Snow removal off the site

$10,589.40 Project done in winter, originally scheduled for spring

4 CR 4· CCN-4 Provide electrical revisions per SKE·CCNE

$1,509.02

5 CR 6· CCN·5 Replace CT·2 in public WR with rubber floor

$4,615.71 To allow public to walk on skates in washroom

6 CR 7 -CCN·6 Changing 150mm storm service to 200mm

$713.23 Site condition

7 CR 9 - CCN·8 Delete floor drain & pipe in refrig header trench

-$468.00

8 CR 8· CCN·7 Del of conc. curb , sidewalk demolition & reinstate


9 CR 11 - CCN·9 Changes to louvers dimensions


10 CR 10· CCN-l0 New cooling tower support

$12,285.72 Refrigeration equipment upgraded to remove need for full time operator; new cooling tower required

11 CR 12 -Remove hoarding around existing cooling lower


12 CR 18r 4· CCN-32 OH door & Recpt. for drink fountain

$4,863.54 Design issue

13 CR 13 - Drainage of sludge from existing melt pit


14 CR 15 SI·25 Revise slab reinforcing details in refrig. plant


15 CR-17 Disassembly of CIMCO refrig. equip.


16 CR·23· Testing of rock anchors $9,179.70 Additional work




Change Order


17 CR·19· CCN-13 Rerouting of exist. sprinkler test drain


18 CR-25 CCN 17 Heating & HVAC revisions in refrig. room


19 CR·24r 1 - Surveying of anchor bolts

$2,473.00 Owner requirement

20 CR-26 CCN·18 Elect. connect. for domestic WH pump

$1,537.99

21 CR-27 _ SI·29 new speaker location & conduit


22 CR·21 CCN·15 fire alarm connect for low pressure swit


23 CR·28 - Provision of curb extension $1,058.00 Site condition

24 CR-38 -CCN 26, CCN M 006 Relocate exist. unit heater


25 CR-42 Roofing cost Savings (option #3)

-$10,110.00

26 CR 33r 1- CCN 25 Insulation for header trench


27 CR·29 CCN-20 Seismic for cooling lower struct. Frame


28 CR-31 CCN·22 Header trench & slab revision


29 CR-32 -CCN-23 2 new indirect DWH in refrig. rm

$39,780.30 Energy management. Added two heater tanks from recovered heat of domestic water

30 CR-30 -CCO-21 In fill part of wall at roof (grid A ,I8)


31 Not issued

32 CR-44r 1 -CCN-28 Elect. For relocation of unit heater


33 CR-49 -ECN-9 Add fire alarm release for shutter door


34 CR-53 -CCN·36 Elect. for new sprinkler valve


35 CR-40 SI·36 ECN-7 Revised light fixture layout CR


36 CR-47· CCN·31 Power to exterior building signage

$17,229.81 Each logo and letter had own circuit, missed by design

37 CR-52 -CA Rectification for exterior signage

$2,465.10 Design issue. Modification of cash allowance

38 CR 59 CCN # 38 Removal of existing flooring


39 CR # 57, CCN # 39 New millwork & painting in staff room


40 Not issued

41 CR 61 CCN#41 $757.25




Change Order


42 Not issued

43 Supply only barrier-free rails $1,771.00

44 CR # 58 CCN # 37, two additional fire dampers

$638.00

45 CR # 62 new coach benches $990.00 Owner request

46 CR # 63 R 1, deletion of infill panel at east end of rink

$249.70

47 CR # 64, insulation of steel deck under dehumidifiers

$793.40 Design issue

48 CR # 65, CCN " 33. water testing & chemical feed

$855.37

49 CR " 67, lower exit signs $1,563.54 Exit Signs had to be lowered to comply with Building Code, authority having jurisdiction. Design issue

50 CR # 41 rev 2 S 1# 30 Lateral support to block walls


51 CR # SO, CCn # 35, new masonry at 2 RWL enclosures


52 CR # 56 rev 1 cn # 34 steel column enclosure & ceramic

$1,326.40

53 CR 73 rev 1 dedicated outlet in staff room for telecom hub

$727.91 Owner request

54 CR 74 r 1 en # 45 emerg exit removal exit sign & disconnect


55 CR # 76 removal of coat hooks in change rooms


56 CR # 77 dedicated outlet for FA monitoring system


57 CR # 78 modify detail lJA604 bypass structural elements

$897.00 Design issue

58 CR 54 rev I provide paint 10 plywood al grid 11


59 CR # CR # 71 spring hinges for doors in change rooms


60 CR # 75 removal of rigid insulation at grid line A & aa


61 CR # 80 rooftop firewall revisions $11,664.79 Design issue

62 CR #- 81 additional elect outlet in lobby for TV


63 CR # 82 reconfigure electrical conduit for goal light


64 CR # 75 rev 1 Tectum panels in front of signage wiring


1000 Additional excavation West parking lot part 1

$48,300.00 Organic material removal



Table 12 Southwest Transitway Extension

Change Order


1 Top rail fencing $5,334.78 Design issue. OC Transpo request

2 Longfield station servicing sanitary connection

$253,824.34 Designed service as gravity sewer, under existing sewer. As-built (record) drawings of existing sewer provided by City showed connection possible. Actual sewer elevation was different. By-pass required

3 Pumping station MH and forcemain $55,435.00 See No. 2

4 Strip topsoil at Highbury Park $13,362.04 Additional stripping required

5 Highbury drain valve handwheel in V/C

$423.99 No City staff available, contractor operated valve

6 Robert Exc. Stub Locate, adjust to 300 mm


7 Watermain shutdown and remobilize Highbury Park


8 Access Road Highbury $2,326.31 Site condition

9 Lintel East Station $5,070.00 Design omission

10 Rock investigation footings Highbury

$12,356.98 Limited rock coring done during design. This relates to contractor‟s cost during investigation done during construction. Inspector commented that this work should be invoiced to consultant. No evidence on boreholes drilled that the rock quality in localized areas would be so poor

11 Revision plumbing drain $2,092.16

12 Bell duct $11,040.00

13 Epoxy coated reinforcement $2,200.00 Missed in design

14 Duct in structure $2,020.00 Request by utility

15 35 MPa concrete for retaining walls Highbury

$3,095.04 Correction of design by consultant

16 Transitway rock for sewer $39,636.41 Standard width too narrow for sewer diameter. Design issue. Unless the sewer diameter was changed, there should be no need for this extra, as the City‟s standard has minimum width requirements. Site conditions due to poor rock quality required line drilling to control trench

17 Northwest wall insulation part 1 $19,200.00 Requested by geotechnical engineer




Change Order


18 Per CCN No. 1 $129,642.00 Related to by-pass pumping per CO 2

19 Paddles and bollards CCN No. 6 $33,280.00 OC Transpo requested for accessibility

20 Provide and install trap seal primer $16,270.00 Design issue. Plumbing code requirement addition for Building Services

21 SCU field device credit -$5,513.00

22 Architectural louvers $8,468.00 Design issue. TSSA requirement to address site issues regarding elevator shaft conflicts

23 Elevator column supports $8,800.00 Required by approval agency TSSA. Design issue. Unforeseen circumstances regarding type of elevator selected not compatible with design of supports assumed

24 SW modifications $1,800.00 Design issue. Site conditions regarding conflict with existing sewer

25 Retaining wall extension insulation $26,700.00 Design issue. Site conditions due to frost susceptible soil

26 Forming mass concrete west abutment

$12,696.68 Related to CO 10– resulting from over excavation of rock due to poor quality rock

27 Forming mass concrete east abutment

$15,179.21 Related to CO 10– resulting from over excavation of rock due to poor quality rock

28 Rodent grates $396.00 Design issue. Requested by City maintenance

29 Pedestrian pathway fence, regrade ditch, adjust MH


30 Modification structural steel roof decking


31 Pathway walls and footing modifications

$24,499.99 Modifications requested by Hydro Ottawa

32 Modify roof deck $2,823.00

33 Reduction in roof edge insulation -$9,439.00

34 Not issued

35 Highbury RSS wall support $27,190.00 Design issue. Site condition requiring more dowels and concrete

36 Security at Longfield station $27,005.75 Security issues at station – OC Transpo requested

37 Roof deck Longfield station $4,725.00

38 New stone block wall west abutment Highbury structure

$13,967.73 To prevent erosion and rock stability issues




Change Order


39 Additional electrical work lobby and interior underpass

$1,242.00

40 Block wall elevator shaft $4,000.00 Design issue. TSSA safety request.

41 New steel door frame janitor sink room

$661.00 OC Transpo request

42 Install guiderail channel anchors parapet wall

$3,120.00 City request for future guiderail installation preparation

43 Place aluminum plate thick curved roof station int.

$8,330.00 OC Transpo request

44 Install additional nursery stock $1,612.80

45 Provide adequate sewer trench width, due to discrepancy contract drawings H003 H004

$18,068.72 Design issue. City standard specifies minimum width on each side of the pipe 300 mm

46 Relocation condenser unit west station

$1,010.00

47 Adjust location of reglets $1,157.00

48 Northwest wall additional insulation

$19,321.00 Design issue. Requested by geotechnical due to poor site condition.

49 Additional steel Longfield station $1,599.87 Design issue. Clarification during shop drawing review.

50 Baseboard heaters elevator cabinet $1,486.00

51 Supply & install damaged glass panel (vandalism)

$3,457.00

52 Supply & install 6 pair Bell cable for OC Transpo elevator communications

$2,640.00 OC Transpo request

53 Additional milling on Berrigan $1,800.00

54 Install galvanized railing along pathway

$3,992.50

55 New junction box for pumping station in Longfield Stn

$1,930.00 Design issue, related to CO No. 3

56 Extend hand rail in east and west stations

$1,840.00 Design issue– Building Services inspection code requirement request

57 Install galvanized bollards filling station, Longfield stn.

$2,615.00 Design issue TSSA request for approval requirement

58 Install beacon lights elevators east and west station

$4,845.00

59 Install addit. panels for underpass skylight

$6,671.00

60 Install additional access doors elevator closet

$1,177.00

61 Redesign railing east and west stations

$5,575.00

62 Installation of culvert ends $609.78




Change Order


63 Supply and install welded pipe oil tank as per CCN#28

$9,365.00

64 Supply & install aluminum channel protector for AC conduit

$3,004.00

65 Supply & Install modified fascia and soffit

$1,393.00

66 Cost of key locknut at operating doors Longfield Stn.

$3,021.00

67 Provide extra Bell conduit service from Longfield to panel box

$2,481.00

68 Extra guide rails fixed, rotating - Longfield Stn

$7,560.00

69 Additional roof modifications at SW Transitway East Stn.

$7,976.00

70 Fuel pit modifications, Longfield Stn.

$2,576.00

71 Provide elevator glass film per TSSA

$6,395.00 Design issue. TSSA requirement

72 Stainless steel handrail revisions, SW Transitway for Building permit occupancy

$23,551.00 Building Services requirement (design issue)

73 Additional rental pedestrian fencing for ped. traffic during construction

$1,534.52

74 Ditching and new catchbasin beside Longfield stn. pathway

$17,987.10

75 Provide additional 1" water service between utility rooms

$4,190.00 Original design required 1.5” copper, but did not perform properly

76 Additional TSSA inspection $1,230.00

77 Additional handrail revisions $7,943.00 Building Services requirement (design issue)

78 Additional AECON supervision March 2011

$7,015.00

79 Excavation for installation of sub-drain & pathway relocation

$41,954.90

80 Additional landscaping $3,163.00

81 Anti-graffiti coating $45,942.50

82 Temporary Hydro service $30,872.90 Permanent power supply not available for use for reasons beyond contractor‟s control

83 Lower existing street light pole on pathway by Longfield Station

$1,987.20

84 Wood privacy fence Highbury $10,139.40 Requested by councillor

85 Ditching, misc. work at Highbury overpass

$23,437.50 Includes work required due to footing re-design




Change Order


86 Additional doors and safety film elevator

$10,668.00 Doors not shown on door schedule – design issue. TSSA requirement

87 Additional galv. curb steel for east tower

$1,559.00 Request by OC Transpo

88 Revision to credit for control units $4,763.00

89 Re-install handrail with plexiglass north side station west tower

$8,575.00

90 Re-instatement pathway at station $5,713.42

91 Caulking of joints at Longfield station and Transitway lanes

$2,760.00

92 Waterproofing kits for light fixtures $5,599.00

93 Roof scupper drains not shown on mechanical dwgs

$3,500.00 Design issue coordination of sub-trade issue – shown on architectural but not on mechanical drawings

94 Install two relays at Longfield Station

$6,500.00

95 Supply and install 4" welded pipe for oil tank

$9,365.00

Table 13 Woodroffe Watermain ISB09-6001

Change Order


1 Replace single gasketed joints with double gasketed joints using standard NSF61 certified gasket

$39,220.77 Required due to change in NSF61 standard from tender to construction

2 Provide 3810 x 3810 valve chamber, new pressure pipe elements, install 1220 mm valve supplied by City including corrosion protection, etc.

$166,509.00 Request by Water Services

3 Deletion of major item C011 (AFO cable)

$9,775.00

4 Performance bond amendment $7,780.80 To account for increased contract value

5 Realign temporary pathway at Navaho

$1,343.90

6 Credit for early abandonment of watermain

-$50,000.00 Watermain to be abandoned in next contract

7 Geotextile fabric – 1300 m2 at $3.00 per m2

$3,900.00

8 Line painting Baseline Rd, Constellation to Woodroffe

$1,945.62

9 Removal of JU foundation at Woodroffe and Navaho

$1,593.00

10 Repair 3x100 ducts at Woodroffe/Navaho

$6,142.50



Table 13 Woodroffe Watermain ISB09-6001

Change Order


11 Relocation of smart channel $35,580.38

12 Greylith concrete cold weather hoarding

$10,613.54 Due to schedule change

13 Three-rail handrail at Baseline pathway loop $56 m at $223.86

$12,311.75

Table 14 Sandridge Road Reconstruction and Hillsdale Road

Change Order


1 Authorization for changes in methodology proposed by the contractor

$0.00

2 Additional streetlight cable on Hillsdale Rd. and HDD under Hillsdale Bridge

$5,749.35

3 Additional sewer cleaning, tree relocations, removal of concrete debris, credit for drop pipe removal

$4,353.10

4 Additional MH to adjust alignment of 900 mm dia. storm sewer on Hillsdale

$6,122.41

5 Authorization for changes in methodology proposed by the contractor

$0.00

6 Additional work 300 mm pipe instead of 250 mm

$2,252.13

7 Install fibre optic and power cables in ducts

$41,542.45

8 Seal inside joints of 3.0 m dia. pipe $60,499.15 Request by Operations

9 Hydrovac excavation of weeping tiles at 220 Sandridge

$1,697.42

10 Concrete encasement – fibre optic, power ducts

$620.12

11 Remove and dispose abandoned MH


12 Reconfigure opening of STM MH to accommodate actual field elev. of existing sewer


13 Remove tree stumps left by Forestry Dept.


14 Remove tree stumps left by Forestry Dept.




Table 14 Sandridge Road Reconstruction and Hillsdale Road

Change Order


15 Modifications to CP-100 & CP-101 per Environmental Services Branch direction

$6,300.00 Design issue. Modifications to the control panels requested by Operations after contract award for level control in the storage pipe

16 Hydro Ottawa connection fee $3,067.94

17 Increase depth of CP-100 pane; extra cable; NEMA4 box for fibre optic panel

$1,684.80

18 Additional MH COM204C and 12.2m 1050 dia. pipe

$27,350.84

19 Reimburse owner 250 Sandridge Rd. Invisible fence damage

$258.00 Site condition (sprinklers on right-of-way)

20 Two year extended warranty and maintenance on tree planting

$5,325.00

21 Sprinkler repair 290 Sandridge Rd. 636.52 Site condition (sprinklers on right-of-way)

22 Install 500 mm dia. culvert at CP-101 $5,407.34

23 Relocate UPS in CP-100 from SCADA panel to power panel

$3,435.43

24 Install concrete bus pad at Birch/Sandridge intersection

$3,784.00

25 Additional electrical work SI 38 $4,438.38

26 Electrical work SI 36 and RFI dated 2010 12 06

$1,717.80

27 Install vent pipe on forcemain outlet COM 203

$5,652.11

28 Street light relocation $23,150.20

29 Sprinkler repairs 204, 240 Sandridge Road

$2,997.61 Site condition (sprinklers on right-of-way)

30 Asphalt gutter and sod removal $4,454.78

31 Additional shrubs planting CP-100 and CP-101

$1,367.20

32 Temporary asphalt ramping $5,325.00

33 Sprinkler repairs at 26, 204, 290, 300 Sandridge

$2,378.96 Site condition (sprinklers on right-of-way)

34 Reconstruction of Hillsdale Rd. claim

$6,500.00

Table 15 Centrepointe Theatre Expansion

Change Order


1 Structural modifications $1,611.00 Request by authority

2 Site revisions to Hydro substation $14,604.00 Required by authority

3 Modifications to North entrance $1,426.00 Owner request




Change Order


4 Electrical modifications west vestibule

$0.00

5 Emergency exit light, temporary exit $6,559.00 Site condition, coordination

6 Structural revisions and clarifications $0.00




10 Revisions to overhead doors (shop drawing coord.)

$1,760.00

11 Structural revisions and clarifications $403.00 Owner request

12 Landscaping revisions (owner request)

-$867.00

13 Added two beams omitted in design $805.00 Omission on tender documents (coordination during shop drawing review)

14 Revisions to 2 light fixtures for coordination

$417.00

15 Additional misc. metal cast in, fixed guard rail

$6,250.00

16 Weeping tile pipe $1,717.90

17 Panel T1A and T1B Control room – delete handrail, add wall, install panels in new wall

$3,500.00 Site condition, but seems design issue

18 Tunnel isolation (fastening styrofoam to concrete, install poly)

$2,185.00 Site condition, for acoustic separation

19 Install smoke detectors at elevator doors, relocated smoke detectors

$5,607.00 Omission on tender documents

20 Revisions to coordinate openings $2,538.00

21 Increase concrete class to 35 MPa and add superplasticizer

$6,728.00 Site condition, but was due to the number of conduits

22 Overhead fire shutters revisions, powder coat door T027.1.1, upgrade door T134.4


23 Revise underground plumbing $3,873.00 Site condition

24 Fire alarm connection to fire shutter doors T26.2 T26.3 T134.4

$8,471.00 Site condition, coordination?

25 Revise incoming electrical service ductbank

$0.00

26 Studio theatre cable trench revisions $1,612.00 Client request

27 Control revisions $878.00 Client request

28 Audio mute system control $2,790.00 Audio system coordination

29 Tennant flow meters (flow and mass flow meters)

$23,540.00

30 Waterproofing existing electrical tunnel

$4,300.00

31 Temporary exit from existing building





Change Order


32 Cancelled

33 Revisions to power for theatre seating system

$1,269.00

34 Piping offsets around ductwork $3,081.00 Site condition

35 Cancelled

36 Revisions to hardware schedule $2,390.00 Coordination, client request, clarification

37 Reinstatement of existing site services $9,466.00 Site condition. Includes work required to accommodate the new location of storm sewer.\

38 Upgrade sump pit frame and cover $4,043.00 Coordination with shop drawings. Detail provided in the design drawings modified at owner‟s request due to concern that it would not support loads

39 Exterior masonry veneer colour change

$29,930.00 Revised to match the colour of the existing building

40 Lighting revisions $4,860.00 Client request

41 Furring on concrete wall $2,445.72 Negotiated by consultant to hide mechanical and electrical services

42 Cancelled

43 Additional framing for masonry veneer anchors


44 Delete railing -$1,068.00 Specified twice

45 Utility and HVAC revisions: Delete radiant panels, install baseboard heaters

$1,541.00 Coordination

46 Flooring within T111 and T113.1 $1,136.00 Omission on tender documents

47 Cancelled

48 Theatre HVAC revisions (acoustically lined ductwork, diffusers, silencers)

$25,979.00 Omission on tender documents (co-ordination between actual truss dimensions and mechanical duct sizes)

49 Revisions to return air transfer $1,244.00 Omission on tender documents

50 Grease interceptor $1,432.00

51 Coordination with Public Art installation

$10,087.00 Client request

52 Cancelled

53 Plywood backing for wall mounted shelves


54 Electrical revisions (GFI breaker and add‟l fixtures)


55 Cancelled

56 Revision to pipe rail $0.00 Owner request

57 Re-roofing of existing roof area $28,090.00 Existing conditions

58 Electrical revision $1,993.00 Owner request




Change Order


59 Revised ice machine location $1,295.00 Omission on tender documents

60 Textured paint surface studio arcade walls


61 Revisions to ST-1 Limestone, ST-4 Granite

-$300.00 Architect‟s direction

62 Revision to door T028.1 from 914mm to 1070mm


63 Revisions to walls in T049 and T050, and ceiling in T116.1. Add ceramic tile backer board, water resistant gypsum board; change ceiling to lay


64 Cancelled

65 Millwork in copy room T116.1 $897.00 Owner request

66 Plywood backing for wall mounted shelves


67 Elevator pit ladder $1,155.00

68 Smart board meeting room T115 $2,333.00 Owner request

69 Light fixture Type 2, T028, T121, T123 $1,042.00 Site condition, stems required to lower fixtures below mechanical services

70 Duct smoke detector – RTU2 $0.00 Owner request

71 Confirmation of wall construction and glazed screen GS024.1 at production coordinator office T024


72 Fire damper to duct in T132 $1,186.00 Omission on tender documents

73 Additional floor material $1,430.00 Variance between tender and construction drawings

74 Additional steel lintel over door T027.1

$4,385.00 Site condition for new opening cut into existing theatre wall

75 Deletion of millwork Item M64 -$385.00 Owner request

76 Gypsum board ceiling modifications $2,851.00 Error in tender documents

77 Mold abatement at existing stage flooring; replacement of existing damage flooring


78 A/V receptacles and breakers at stage level


79 Diffuser layout room T116 $4,370.00 Site condition

80 Fire damper EF-1 at wall penetration $1,554.00 Site condition

81 Revise signage breakers $240.00 Owner request

82 Return air slots in washroom T049 $343.00 Coordination (missed in design)

83 Installation of appliances $633.00 Owner request

84 Cancelled Taken from cash allowance

85 Additional radiator covers and window sills

$13,579.00 Contractor claim

86 Additional stain samples $165.00 Coordination with artist work




Change Order


87 Range hood colour change (white to black)

$449.00 Site condition (two hours plus difference in material price of $193.00)

88 Revised bulkhead in office area T116 $1,836.00 Owner request

89 Kitchen sink change (6” deep to 10” deep)

$822.00 Health inspector request

90 Cancelled

91 Raise three data jacks and receptacles in copy room T116-1 to 1200 mm above floor level


92 T113 fire dampers $1,926.00 Omission on tender documents, but was due to building code issues in existing building

93 Light fixture revisions $816.00 Site conditions

94 Cancelled

95 Door sweeps for kitchen $302.00 Ministry of Health requirements

96 Landscaping revisions -$927.00

97 Kitchen sink change from 6” deep to 8” deep

$670.00

98 Supervision work re J. Rigging after hours work

$1,656.00 Ministry of Health requirements

99 Sensing power house relay panel $1,377.00

100 Mobile hot food station – power outlet revisions

$537.00

101 Revisions to loading dock sprinkler $1,082.00

102 Cancelled

103 Temporary heating exterior masonry work (based on claim settlement agreement City-Contractor)

$19,541.50

104 Door closer T129.1 $496.00

105 Revised cable pass-through fire stop assembly

$2,127.00

106 Wood source supply materials security area bench and lobby tables

$3,385.00

107 Electrical coordination – exit lights and retractable seating

$3,685.00

108 Lockset revision door T117.1 for coordination with security contractor

$2,153.00

109 Loading bay additional wall bollard $977.00

110 Owner supply of damaged tackboards (credit)

$-800.00

111 Garage doors T26.2, T26.3 and misc. plugs in existing theatre

$8,532.00

112 Studio SPK1-1 electrical connections $543.00 Coordination with studio sound contractor

113 Control room 120V outlets $1,400.00 Coordination with studio sound contractor




Change Order


114 Additional fire alarm devices $7,676.00 Building official request for occupancy permit

115 Electrical power in room T047 $2,956.00 Omission on tender documents

116 Coat check mill work – provide full length gable supports.


117 Additional wood supply $558.00 Owner request

118 Cancelled

119 HVAC in room T024 $5,688.00 Omission on tender documents

120 Electrical modifications to studio $3,940.00 Omission on tender documents

121 Feminine hygiene receptacles in washrooms T034-1, T034-2, T043-2 and T044-2

$430.00 Omission on tender documents

122 Cancelled

123 Delete insulation from loading dock ceiling

-$2,500.00 Owner request

124 Cancelled

125 Paint colour revisions $1,341.00 Owner request

126 Platform for gallery fixed double seating


127 Wood railing and supports corridor D stair

$1,571.00 Building official request

128 Cancelled

129 Cancelled

130 Provision of 24x24 carpet tiles to suit control room T143

$2,794.00 Owner/ user request

131 Cancelled

132 Masonry repairs to existing building $2,930.00 Site condition

133 Revise hardware operation to door T042.2


134 Revision to washroom speaker connections. Revision to tension grid light fixture


135 Close out cash allowances (security, cabling/IT, exterior signs, locks)

-$80,995.00

136 Cancelled

137 Revision to stair material detail 8/A5.01

$1,340.00 Building official request

138 Demolition and new construction for new wall opening

$18,598.00 Owner request. Structural requirements, site condition

139 Reinstate concrete block wall at temporary exit


140 Platform for back row of gallery fixed seating

$3,049.00 Owner request. Site condition. Design did not allow clear view from back row seats

141 Rubber base stair D $0.00

142 Additional cable pass-through (fire stop)

$607.00 Authority requested tested assembly




Change Order


143 Modifications to studio pipe rails and headers


144 Landscaping revisions $3,850.00 Owner request

145 Cancelled

146 Cancelled

147 Cancelled

148 Extend wall finish to underside of slab after ceiling removed in loading bay


149 Replacement of hardwood & new paint on existing wood stage


47A Plumbing T125 -$1,535.00 Credit for cancelled CO 47 (reissued as CO59)

68A Smart board meeting room T115 -$1,628.00 Credit for missing blocking

108A Additional panic set added to doors T0352 T127.1

$1,199.00

Table 16 West Nepean Collector Sewer Rehabilitation

Change Order


1 Remove and seal water intrusion per claim#3


2 Clean up for watermain break #1 $3,515.17 Site condition

3 Clean up for watermain break #2 $8,564.52 Site condition

4 Excavation of driveways for by-pass hoses


5 Installation of a pre-liner SL36 to SL39

$21,117.33 Contract extension

6 NCC delay/alternative by-pass per claim 1

$85,114.92

7 Fuel price adjustment for April 2011 $8,849.38 Contract extension

8 By-pass of sewer at Trolly station $10,458.10

9 Grout sealing active groundwater infiltration

$3,443.88

10 Installation of pre-liner SL 35 $6,153.36 Contract extension

11 Installation of pre-liner SL40 to SL43 $24,789.17 Contract extension

12 Sweeper for NCC Pathway $506.00

13 Granular pad for staging area Lincoln Heights


14 Pumping groundwater infiltration in MH

$0.00

15 Work beyond March: Resin, By-Pass - April


16 Add. Combo cleaning - site conditions

$0.00



Table 16 West Nepean Collector Sewer Rehabilitation

Change Order


17 To remove all granular A and geotextile material used at Lincoln Heights staging area


18 Provide additional sewer CCTV and cleaning following surcharge event of April 11, 2011

$17,904.00 Paid under Item B-0001 (1492 m x $12.00/m)

19 Additional payment for increase in sewer by-pass capacity and for cost increase of resin for work after March 31, 2011

$57,749.41 Paid by variation in tender quantities for applicable work

20 Reinstate landscaping along NCC Pathway Poulin Ave. to Ottawa River Pkwy

$24,880.00 Revised tender prices or negotiated unit prices

21 To provide payment for delays and additional work incurred due to the sewer surcharge event that occurred on April 10-11, 2011

$221,345.81 Operations missed potential problem during review of bypass plan

Table 17 Campeau Drive Pumping Station

Change Order


1 Additional masonry reinf., footing projection and foam (CCD 1)


2 Curtain wall framing mods $2,934.00

3 Cost premium for floor drains (SI No. 4)

$444.00

4 Delete the supply of municipal water meter (CCD 6)

-$668.00

5 Concrete pilasters, surface mount rap-ties (CCD 3)

$34,000.10 Partly design issue

6 Membrane waterproofing on foundation walls


7 Spool pieces to connect 900 and 400 mm watermains


8 Cost premium for roof colour and 24 gauge metal

$5,567.94

9 Contract extension

10 Winter heating provision to carry out CCD 3 work


11 Costs for the selected vision panel glazing colour

$2,125.00

12 Piping restraints and slab thickening


13 Modifications to the generator lugging panel

$843.75

14 Supply additional masonry dowels $906.00



Table 17 Campeau Drive Pumping Station

Change Order


15 New louver and modify ductwork at EF-01

$562.50

16 Additional ball valve flushing connections

$3,549.11

17 Provide 4-20 mA outputs for flow meters

$1,687.50

18 Modified installation of ceiling fans $2,784.10

19 Modify main breaker installation, per Hydro Ottawa

$988.86 Not design error but rather additional works that Hydro Ottawa were to undertake, done by contractor instead. No additional cost to City

20 Modify discharge process piping at pumps 2 and 3

$1,000.00

21 Modifications to Hydro service installation

$72,649.42 Not design error but rather additional works that Hydro Ottawa were to undertake, done by contractor instead. No additional cost to City

22 Provide final wiring terminations on City's behalf

$16,205.29

23 Paint overhead door $1,100.00

24 Provide isolation flanges on 400mm bypass piping

$3,856.25

25 Additional trench grating $6,250.00

26 Modifications to grating support at discharge header pit

$2,777.30

27 Additional flashing at louver opening

$705.00

28 Install additional 24 VDC power supply and power bar

$1,630.97

29 Modifications to ACP-100 $22,165.15 Construction inspection issue

30 Inspection for high lift pump $31,455.36 Required due to pump seizure



Table 18 Strandherd Drive Extension ISB09-5009

Change Order


1 Drop pipe and delay costs $9,960.95 Design issue

2 Encountered rock during sewer installation


3 Rock at CB25, 26 & 27 $10,498.11 Design issue

4 Extra work on Transitway ramp $114,743.00 Required by OC Transpo

5 150mm water main on Transitway station

$74,910.00 Required by OC Transpo

6 Rock excavation $95,521.81 Required by OC Transpo

7 Culverts & retaining walls along west ditch on POW

$115,739.91 Hydro Ottawa

8 Modifications to Transitway ramp after issued for construction dwg were issued

$29,003.76 Adjacent development modifications

9 450mm concrete pipe 100-D $1,947.00 Adjacent development modifications

10 Install drop pipe on MH409 $8,754.89 Adjacent development modifications

11 1200mm concrete pipe 100-D (storm) $18,096.00 Design issue

12 A 3 X 100mm concrete encased ducts for Hydro Ottawa


12 C 6 X 100mm concrete encased Hydro duct bank


12 D 9 X 100mm concrete encased Hydro duct bank


12 E 12 X 100mm concrete encased Hydro duct


12 F 16 X 100mm concrete encased Hydro ducts


12 G Two way precast Hydro MH $28,000.00 Hydro Ottawa

12 H Pole ;aterals (curb forms) $3,630.00 Hydro Ottawa

13 A Culvert extension of SN118790 $16,000.00 Requested by AM

13 B SN118795 culvert replacement $23,307.00 Requested by AM

14 A Conc. encased Bell ducts - Transitway service

$9,075.00 Bell Canada

14 B Conc. encased Hydro ducts - Transitway service


14 C MH4013, Transformer pad & Bollards - Transitway Service


15 Expanded polystyrene insulation 75 mm HI-40

$43,601.52

16 A Concrete pole bases as DWG LID0003 in Transitway ramp


16 B Pole bases in Transitway as per DWG attached to Change Order

$29,600.00




Change Order


17 A 1.8 m high block retaining wall $80,620.00 Design issue. This is an issue that should have been addressed during detail design

17 B 1.4 m high block retaining wall $136,640.00 Design issue. This is an issue that should have been addressed during detail design

17 C Supply and install erosion control mat (North American Green P300)

$21,958.80 Field conditions

18 Concrete pavement $148,521.60 OC Transpo request

19 Redi-rock retaining wall 1030 mm block series. 210m2 surface area

$156,000.00 Design issue, related to CO 17A and B

20 2 X 1200 mm dia. CSP 2.8 m wall thickness

$50,269.45 Site conditions

21 Supply and install 8.2 m base mounted aluminum pole with decorative coach style luminaire

$10,890.00

22 Supply & install pre-cast curb for winter shut down

$94,216.49

23 Supply & install grate for 1200 mm dia. culvert ends

$7,768.00

24 Design errors for MH209 & MH204 $21,279.55 Design issue. the change order states that the manhole could not be installed as designed

25 Temporary roadway protection box culvert from DIMH219

$5,168.67 Site conditions due to POW realignment

26 Supply and install conduit from hand holes to bus platform

$9,743.12

27 A 1.2 m high black chain link fence $22,577.00 Site safety issue

27 B 1.5 m high black chain link fence $12,049.80 Site safety issue

27 C Three rail handrail as per City of Ottawa DWG F-1

$3,717.00 Site safety issue

28 Supply & install energy attenuator $21,940.00

29 Delay costs due to a late redesign of road alignment

$1,826.32 Redesign of Prince of Wales required by property owner

30 Uncover water service and aid in blanking it

$6,749.68

31 Repair 3-cable guide rail damaged by car accident

$2,635.06

32 Additional features traffic signals requested

$6,817.86

33 Adjust MH, HH, VC alternate item price to F-0021





Change Order


34 Supply and install aluminum hand railing on top of barrier wall

$53,913.60

35 Strengthen 900 X 1200 box culvert due to extra depth change

$16,323.46 Redesign of Prince of Wales

36 Supply and install cast-in-place head walls on culvert ends


37 Vibration monitoring $16,500.00 Should not be paid by City

38 Miscellaneous traffic requirements $11,522.18 Rideau River Bridge not open yet necessitated temporary traffic control

39 Open Strandherd up Early $37,181.45 Traffic control measures to permit early opening

40 Replace cable between transformer and disconnect in Transitway

$4,478.10 Design issue. Incorrect cable specified

41 A Supply and install MH frame and covers $2,528.00

41 B Supply and install hand hole frame and covers

$5,664.00

42 Steel grate for STM MH 209 $3,740.00 Design issue related to CO No. 24

Table 19 3W Feedermain Phase 1, Part 1

Change Order


1 Bell duct $4,957.76 Utility conflict

2 Holy Acres Road widening $6,793.51

3 Thrust block reinforcing $3,000.00 Change in City scope and requirements

4 Rework of feedermain with san. conflict

$10,707.47 Sanitary Sewer conflict

5 TVS concrete reinforcing $11,768.28

6 St. 4 + 075 investigation of forcemain

$5,978.46

7 St. 3 + 968 existing service conflict $1,714.70 Service locate conflict

8 Work at station 2 + 840 $1,152.43

9 St. 3 + 925 unknown service disruption

$25,600.38 Service locate conflict

10 St. 1 + 270 unknown water service break

$4,976.82 Service locate conflict

11 Relocate 6 wm at 3 + 968 " $30,204.20 Design issue

12 Bell duct conflict $1,168.91

13 Hydrant lead fix 1 + 825 $22,650.15 Watermain break

14 Bridge footing support $1,943.19

15 Repair kit $67,500.00

17 Curb work 3 + 450 and 4 + 125 $4,521.80

18 Additional closure Richmond $60,262.79 Schedule requirements



Table 19 3W Feedermain Phase 1, Part 1

Change Order


19R Carlington Heights reservoir hot tap

$216,000.00 Required to ensure that the system would be operational after closing the valves

21 Repairs to existing 16 at 2 + 725 " $7,339.80

22 Downtime at Boyee $2,196.89

23 Downtime at station 2 + 880 $16,245.06

25 Repairs to 406 wm Kempster $14,383.73 Watermain break

26 Sidewalk & curb replacement $169,451.00

27 Pavement restoration (middle lane) $13,583.94 Watermain break

28 Expose TVS station $12,737.06

29 Delay of hot tap $5,727.10

30 Pavement restoration (north lane and sidewalk)

$20,024.34

31 Hydrovac TVS chamber $7,915.84

32 Cleaning of TVS chamber $4,796.00

33 Patch road section at ORP $1,845.02

34 NCC tree plantings $5,670.00

Table 20 Cave Creek Collector Relocation

Change Order


1 Delay costs $50,000.00

2 Changes to issued for construction drawings from tender

$54,107.04

3 Site preparation for elections day $6,301.47

4 Additional CCTV and cleaning $6,107.00

5 Temporary hard surface for winter shut-down

$90,585.00

6 Storm box culvert replacement $61,930.00

7 Installation of PVC bypass Sewer at SA18

$22,909.25

8 Installation of additional pedestrian fencing on Harmer

$2,095.50

9 Downtime due to 400 mm valve problem: Byron & Harmer

$3,693.26

10 New storm manhole drop structure at Faraday and Clarendon

$24,925.00

11 Downtime due to watermain valve problem at Byron & Harmer

$10,313.61

12 Cutting of new west inlet hole at manhole SA7

$2,954.24

13 JCD Plugs at SA7 (2x750mm) $1,150.00

14 New 1500 mm manhole SA8 to replace 1800 mm MH

$9,050.00

15 2 more CIPP liners $8,400.00



Table 20 Cave Creek Collector Relocation

Change Order


16 Fisher Park School Wheelchair Ramp Handrailing

$6,534.00

17 Additional MH section on IPCres $4,223.64

18 Flagstone reinstatement at 147 Faraday

$2,609.04

Table 21 Prince of Wales Roundabout

Change Order


1 Reconnect catch basins to storm sewer

$36,135.50 Caused by miscommunication of PWGSC requirements within City

2 Police assistance at intersection $11,547.04

3 Break out and remove foundation $1,329.60

4 Excavate 450 mm storm sewer to connect oversize pipe

$6,478.29

5 Misc. materials for connection $2,069.97