MaliceandStupidity:OutgroupMotiveAttributionandAffectivePolarization

July2019

SeanFreederUniversityofCalifornia,Berkeley

ABSTRACT:Affectivepolarizationweakensvoters’willingnesstocrosspartylines,supportbipartisancompromise,andtrustoutgroupmessages.Existingscholarshiponcausesofrisingpartisanhostilityhasfocusedonmassideologicalpolarization,eliteincivility,andpartisandemographicsorting.Thispaperadvancesnegativemotiveattribution—citizens’tendencytoassumeill-intentguidesoutpartyinterests—asanotherkeydynamicunderlyingaffectivepolarization.Inonesurvey,subjectsdemonstratethatabouthalftheattributionsmadeaboutpoliticaloutgroupsarenegative.Then,intwoexperiments,subjectsareexposedtoaseriesofothercitizens’statementsofmotiveforsupportingagivenpartyorpolicy,whichvaryintermsofthoughtfulnessandpro-sociality.Subjectsexposedtomoreadmirableoutgroupmotivesdemonstratedecreasedoutpartyhostility,andincreasedwillingnesstointeractwithandvotefortheoutparty.Themagnitudeoftheseeffectssurpasseseventhatofperceivedattitudinalsimilarity,suggestingaffectivejudgmentsdependnotjustonperceptionsofwhattheoutgroupwants,butalsowhytheywantit.Thesefindingssuggestanewapproachtowardsattenuatingaffectivepolarization,butalsohighlightthedifficultyofchangingcitizens’partisanattributions.Acknowledgments:IwouldliketothankGabrielLenz,LauraStoker,JackCitrin,RachelBernhard,MerrillShanks,RobVanHouweling,AndrewMcCall,MichaelDougal,JakeGrumbachandJoshKallafortheircommentsandsuggestions.EarlierversionsofthispaperwerepresentedattheResearchWorkshopinAmericanPoliticsatUniversityofCaliforniain2018,andatthe2017meetingsoftheMidwestPoliticalScienceAssociation,WesternPoliticalScienceAssociation,andInternationalSocietyofPoliticalPsychology.Ithankallparticipantsintheseforumsfortheirfeedback.Anyerrorsaremyown.

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"Neverattributetomalicethatwhichisadequatelyexplainedbystupidity"-Hanlon'sRazor

"Peopleareevil.Wealsoliveinastupidsociety."-Anonymoussurveyrespondent

Overthepastseveraldecades,politicalpolarizationintheUnitedStateshasbecomea

focalpointofacademicandsocietalconcern.Whilescholarsagreethatideologicaland/or

partisanpolarizationoccuramongelites(PooleandRosenthal1984;Hetherington2001;

McCartyPooleandRosenthal2016),theydisagreeovertheextenttowhichmasseshave

polarized;someclaimthattheyhave(AbramowitzandSaunders2008;NivolaandBrady2008;

BafumiandShapiro2009;Abramowitz2010),whileothersfindlackingevidence(Fiorinaand

Abrams2008;BaldassarriandGelman2008),arguingthatpeoplehavenotbecomeextremeor

constrainedintheirviews,butratherbettersortedideologicallyintothecorrectparties.Whether

ornotcitizensaregrowingapartideologically,theyarecertainlypolarizingintermsofaffect.

Partisansincreasinglythinkofeachothernegatively,shunclosetiestooneanother,andoccupy

separatesocialandpoliticalrealities(Iyengar,SoodandLelkes2012;IyengarandWestwood

2015;Mason2015;Lelkes2016).

ThedynamicsofthisincreasedoutgrouphostilityinAmericanpoliticsarenotyetwell

understood.Politicalscientistshavesuggestedanumberofplausiblecauses,thoughallface

empiricalortheoreticalchallenges.First,increasinglyextremepolicypreferenceswithinthe

DemocraticandRepublicanpartiesmaydriveeachsidetogreaterdislikeoftheother(Rogowski

andSutherland2016;WebsterandAbramowitz2017).Whileplausible,thisviewremainsat

oddswiththeaforementionedscholarshiparguingthatthepublichasnotpolarizedinitsviews,

especiallygiventhatalargeshareofthepubliclacksattitudinalstabilityandbasicknowledgeof

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partypositionsonevenhigh-salienceissues(Freeder,LenzandTurney2018).Someresearchers

haveevenfoundthatmediacoverageofpolarizationattenuatespolicyextremitywhile

neverthelessincreasingpartisanoutgrouphostility(LevenduskyandMalhotra2016),suggesting

atleastthatthelatterisnotasimple,exclusivefunctionoftheformer.

Second,affectivepolarizationmayresultfromexposuretoahostile,partisanmedia—

whencitizenswitnesselitepoliticalcommunication,theyadopttheapparentnormsofincivility

thatoperatebetweenbickeringpundits(BerryandSobieraj2011;Levendusky2013;Mutz2015).

Again,whileplausible,somestudieshavefoundthatpartisanmediaexposuredoesnotincrease

polarization(Prior2013),andmaysometimesactuallyexposepartisanstothemorereasonable

viewsoftheotherside(Mutz2007).Furthermore,onlyasmallfractionofthepublicregularly

payscloseattentiontopartisanmedia,andthosewhodolikelyhavealreadyformedstrong

opinionsofthoseintheotherpartybeforeviewing.

Third,affectivepolarizationmayarisefrombeliefsthattheoutgroupdiffersintermsof

salientnon-politicalbehaviorsandcharacteristics,suchasrace,sexualorientation,and

occupation.AsaresultofsomecombinationofgrowingsocialalienationbetweenDemocrats

andRepublicans(AbramowitzandWebster2009;Mason2016),atendencyformanypeopleto

perceivepoliticalconflictprimarilyasgroup-based(Converse1964;GrossmanandHopkins

2016),andcognitivebiases,partisansincreasinglyassume(oftencorrectly,sometimesnot)that

theothersidelooks,acts,andlivesverydifferentlyfromthemandtheirco-partisans(Ahlerand

Sood2018).Thatsaid,opportunitiesforpartisaninteractionstillexist;usingsocialmedia

networkssuchasFacebookandTwitterincreasestheoddsofobservingandinteractingwith

membersofpoliticaloutgroups(WojcieszakandMutz,2009).Despiteconcernsaboutnetwork

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homophilyandtheformationofechochambers,scholarsdisagreeovertheextenttowhich

politicalpruningofone'ssocialnetworkactuallyoccurs.

Thispaperadvancesanunder-examined,complementaryaccountforaffective

polarization—negativemotiveattribution.Scholarshiptendstofocusoninter-partisan

perceptionsofwhotheotherparty’smembersare,andwhattheywant;lessexploredisthe

impactofperceptionsofwhytheywantwhattheywant.Theimportantofthelattercanbe

illustratedinashortvignetteinvolvingtwocitizens:thefirststronglydisagreeswithyouona

matterofpolicybutmakescleartheirpositionarisesfromthesamefundamental,value-laden

concernsthatyoursdoes—harmreduction,justice,fairness,andsoon.Anydisagreementarises

thereforeentirelyfromdifferencesoverhowtoachievethosegoals.Thesecondpersonhappens

toholdthesamepolicypositionasyou,butadmitsthattheydosobecausetheymaterially

benefitfromthatoutcomedespiteacknowledgingitsdetrimentalimpactonothers,orbecausethe

policyharmsademographicgrouptowardswhichtheyareprejudiced.Towardswhichindividual

wouldyoufeelmorewarmly?Thoughdebatable,thisvignetteclarifiesthataffectisnotpurelya

functionofcongruenceonpolicypreferences,butalsothequalityofone’sintentions.Whenwe

encounterdisagreement,wemaybelievethatoutgroupmembersneverthelesspossessgood

intentions,butthatwesimplydisagreeoverhowtobestrealizethem.Alternatively,wemay

believetheyaremotivatedbytherepugnantandindefensible—stupidity,madness,ignorance,

greed,bigotry,cruelty,hungerforpower,andsoon.Citizensoftheformerinclinationmayseea

complicatedbutfunctioningdemocracyamongstdiversecountrymenwithacommongoal,while

thosewhobelievethelattermayperceivemanyoftheircompatriotsasalienandunrecognizable.

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IfAmericansincreasinglybelievethelatter,ourdemocracyconstitutesatenseandincreasingly

untenablearrangementbetweentribesthatsharelittletobindthem,morallyandsocially.

Dopeopletendtomakenegativeattributionsaboutpoliticaloutgroups?Ifso,dothese

attributionshaveacausalimpactonoutgroupaffectindependentfromotherstudiedcausal

variables?Howmuchandwhatkindsofevidenceofpositiveoutgroupmotivesisnecessaryto

haveanoticeableimpactonoutgroupaffect?Thethreestudiesshowninthispaperprovide

evidencethatspeakstothesequestions.Inthefirst,usingopen-endedresponses,respondents

revealtheirattributionsaboutthepeoplewithwhomtheydisagreepolitically,demonstratingthat

abouthalfofpoliticaloutgroupattributionsarenegative.Inthesecond,subjectsareexposedtoa

seriesofmotivestatementsofvaryingqualitybythosewithwhomtheydisagree;asthequality

ofmotivesshownimproves,sodoesoutgroupaffect,toadegreesurpassingeventheeffectof

perceivedattitudinalsimilaritybetweenthegroups.Inthethird,subjectsseeaseriesofmotive

statementsasbefore,buttheconsistencyofpositivemotivestatementsisvariedsystematically.

Theresultsdemonstratethatimprovingoutgroupattributionscanimproveoutgroupaffect,but

thatmotivatedreasoningmakessuchupdatingunlikelyinallbutthemostextremeofconditions.

Takentogether,thesestudiesdemonstratetheimportanceofunderstandingtheroleofattribution

inexacerbatingoutgrouphostilities,andhighlightanothermeansbywhichscholars,journalists

andpublicpolicyadvocatesmayseektoreduceaffectivepolarization.

TheoryandDesign

Theexistingliteratureinpsychologyandpoliticalsciencesuggeststhatpeoplearelikely

tomakenegativeassessmentsofoutgrouptraits,andnegativeattributionsaboutoutgroup

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behavior.Thisisgenerallytrueaboutassessmentsofallothers,aspeopletendtoassumethey

themselvesmakerationaldecisions,whileotherssuffercognitivebiases,asdescribedinworkon

naiverealism(Wardetal.1997;Pronin,LinandRoss2002;Pronin,GilovichandRoss2004).

Thefundamentalattributionerrorcausespeopletooverlyrelyoninternalfactorslikepersonality

orself-interest(Ross1977;MillerandRatner1998)asexplanationsforothers’behavior(Heider

1944;Aronson2003).Theultimateattributionerrordescribesthispracticeatthegrouplevel

(Pettigrew1979),especiallywhensocialstatusisatstake(TajfelandTurner2004;Brewerand

Brown1998).Becausepeoplehaveavestedinterestinmaintainingthesuperiorityofthe

ingroup,theyalsoengageinmotivatedreasoningtorejectanyevidenceofstatusthreats(Lord,

RossandLepper1979;Kunda1990;Westenetal.2006).Scholarshavefoundevidenceof

negativemotiveattributioningroupconflictgenerally(Reederetal.2002;Kenworthyand

Miller2002;Reederetal.2004;WaytzYoungandGinges2014)andforspecificpoliticalissues

suchaswar(Reederetal.2005),affirmativeaction(Sherman,NelsonandRoss2003),abortion

(Robinsonetal.1995),andracialinequality(Knight1998).

Inamodelforunderstandinghowaffectivepolarizationisgenerated,motiveattribution

shouldbeconceivedofasafeedbackmechanism,likelyservingasbothitscauseandeffect.That

is,peoplemightfirstnegativelyassesssomeone,thenformnegativeattributionsaboutthemasa

result(e.g.wethinkpoorlyofsomeoneandthenassumetheywanttoharmothers).

Alternatively,onemayfirstassumetheworstaboutsomeone'sintentions,thenevaluatethem

accordingly(e.g.someonewantstoharmothers—therefore,wethinkpoorlyofthem).Negative

motiveattributionthereforeisbothacauseandconsequenceofoutgrouphostility:motivated

reasoningaboutout-partisansencouragesout-partisanstereotyping,whichinturnleadsto

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increasedhostility,whichincentivizesfurtherstereotyping,andsoon.Theliteratureon

ethnocentrismmakesclearthatasingroup-outgroupdynamicsformandstrengthen,group

membersincreaseoutgroupstereotyping,bothasameansbywhichtoenlargethesocialdistance

betweenthetwogroups,aswellasanexcusefordismissinganyadmirableorsympathetic

qualitieswhichtheymaypossess.Oncepartisanpolarizationbegins,negativemotiveattribution

mayprovidepartisanswithaneasywayto"other"theoutgroup.Suchafeedbackloopleads

citizenstoperceivethemselvesasincreasinglysurroundedbymonsters.Negativemotive

attributionisnotnecessarilythe‘firstmover'ofaffectivepolarization,butratheramajorpartof

theiterativedynamicsthatpropelthegrowthinoutgrouphostility.Combinedwithother

explanationsforaffectivepolarization,negativemotiveattributionservesasaforcemultiplierfor

existingoutgrouphostilities.

Ifmotiveattributionisakeycomponentofaffectivepolarization,whatwouldexplainthe

increaseinnegativeattributionsovertime?Onepossibleexplanationisthechangingnatureof

masspoliticaldiscussion.Justdecadesago,politicaldiscussionsbetweendifferingpartisanswere

rarer,andmorelikelytotakeplaceamongstfriendsorfamily,ifatall,givensocietalperceptions

ofpoliticalconversationastabooordangerous.Indeliberationswithclosecompany,normsof

civilityandgood-faithassumptionoperate;suchindividualsostensiblyalreadylikeoneanother,

andexpectrepeatedinteractioninthefuture.However,inthepresentday,socialmediahas

significantlyincreasedthelikelihoodofobservingthepoliticalcommunicationsfromstrangers,

thoseforwhomthesamenormsofcivilitylikelydonothold.Underthecloakofanonymity,

peoplelacktheincentivetotreateachotherrespectfullyandtosuppressopenhostility.Worse

still,thosewhoactwithhostilityarealsomorelikelytospeaktheirmind,leadingtotheir

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overrepresentation.Therefore,comparedtopastenvironmentsforassociative,behavioraland

sociallearningaboutoutgroups,themodernpartisanismuchmorelikelytoencounterexamples

ofanti-socialandcruelbehavior.Whilethisaccountofrisingnegativeattributionisplausible,

giventhepriorlackofpoliticalscienceattentiontomotiveattribution,thisaccountcannoteasily

betested,asmajorsurveyshavefailedtoprobecitizens’politicalattributions.

Mostresearchonaffectivepolarizationfocusesexclusivelyonpartisanaffect,butin

theseexperiments,Ialsostudyattributionsandaffectiveevaluationsofissueoutgroups,orthose

whomwedisagreewithonspecificpoliticalissues.Affectbetweenthosewhodisagreeover

policyhasbeenlargelyignoredbypoliticalscientists.Thisisperhapsjustifiedgiventhatpartisan

identificationiscommon,stable,andstronglylinkedtokeypoliticalbehaviorslikevotingand

cuetaking(Green,PalmquistandSchickler2004).Ontheotherhand,issueattitudestendtobe

lesscommon,relativelymoreunstableovertime,andplayalimitedroleinvotechoicewhen

controllingforotherkeyvariables.Still,therearegoodreasonsforstudyingissue-basedaffect.

Partisanhostilitydoesnotoccurinavacuum,butinthecontextofwhateverpartisanconflictis

mostsalientatanygivenmoment.Issuedisagreementsarenexuspointsatwhichpolitical

differencesmostclearlymanifestthemselves.Injustthepastyear,anumberofpolicydisputes

havegeneratedintensepublicinterestandanger—healthcare,illegalimmigration,transgender

rights,guncontrol,responsestopolicebrutality,andsoon.Forpartisans,iftheyknowwherethe

partiesstandontheissues,thenattributionsaboutissuepreferencesshouldimpactoutparty

evaluations.Ontheotherhand,trueindependents,orthosewhodonotknowwheretheparties

stand,mayevincelittlepartisanhostility,butstillpossessanimosityforthoseontheothersideof

thatissue.Assuch,issue-basedaffectivepolarizationshouldnotbeignored.

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Ifnegativeattributionshelptoexplainaffectivepolarization,thenitmustfirstbe

demonstratedthatcitizenstodaydoinfactcommonlytendtomakenegativeattributionsabout

thebehaviorsandattitudesofpoliticaloutgroups.Thefirststudypresentedinthispaperrelies

uponacombinationofclosedandopen-endedquestionstogetabettersenseofthelandscapeof

attributionspeopletendtomakeabouttheotherside.Undergraduateresearcherslatercodethese

responsesforvalenceandcontent.

Thesecondtwostudiesusesurveyexperimentstorequirethenecessaryexogenous

variationtodeterminewhetheranyrelationshipbetweennegativemotiveattributionoutgroup

hostilityisactuallycausal.Aresearchdesignreliantuponobservationaldata—forinstance,

askingrespondentsabouttheiroutgroupattributionsandaffect,thenlookingattherelationship

betweenthetwo—wouldbeflawedforatleasttworeasons.First,anyapparentrelationship

betweenattributionandaffectmightactuallyresultfromanomittedvariable.Forinstance,it

maybethatpeoplewithmoreextremeviewsholdmorenegativemotivebeliefs,andthatsome

formofattitudinalorideologicalextremityisreallywhatdrivestherelationshipwithaffect.

Evenifoneweretocontrolforthesefactors,someunobservedcharacteristiccouldstillbiasthe

effectestimate.Second,evenifacausalrelationshipexistsbetweenaffectandmotiveattribution,

muchofwhatwouldbepickedupmightbeinthewrongcausaldirection;indeed,itisquite

likelythatincreasedoutgrouphostilityleadstomorenegativeattributions.Thesolutiontoboth

oftheseproblemsisexogenousmanipulationofattributionsviaexperimentaltreatment.

Intwoexperiments,subjectsareshownaseriesofstatementssaidtobewrittenbyother,

realcitizens,inwhichtheyexplaintheirpoliticalpreferences.Thesestatementsarenotreal,but

arebasedheavilyonthoseofferedbyrespondentsfrompilotstudies.Ifcitizenslearnaboutthe

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motivesoftheothersidebyobservingmassoutgroupcommunications,thenexposuretothese

profilesshouldpromptthemtoupdatetheirattributions,atleasttemporarily.Inturn,improving

outgroupattributionswilldecreaseoutgrouphostility.

HowCommonAreNegativeOutgroupAttributionsinPolitics?

Docitizensoftenmakenegativeattributionsaboutpoliticaloutgroups?Ifsuchbeliefsare

rare,thenmotiveattributionlikelydoesnotcontributesignificantlytoaffectivepolarization.The

followingstudyusesacombinationofclosedandopen-endedsurveyquestionstorevealwhat

motivescitizensattributetoothers’politicalattitudesandbehaviors.

Fortheopen-endedresponseitem,respondentswereaskedtothinkaboutwhatmotivates

someonetotakeaparticularposition,andthenwritedownanythingthatcomestomind.Two

undergraduateresearchassistantsandIthencodedtheopen-endedresponsesintothreegeneral

motivecategories:bad,good,orambiguous.Responsesthatwereeitheroff-topicor

unintelligible,constitutinglessthan10%ofthesample,wereremovedfromanalysis.We

countedresponsesascontainingbadmotiveifwhatsomeonesaidwasunambiguouslynegative.

Mostothermotivementionswerecountedasgood.Asmallsubsetofresponsesweretoo

ambiguoustoascertaintheirvalence.Aresponsecouldcontainmultiplemotives(potentially

bothgoodandbad),thoughsuchresponsesconstitutedasmallportion(3-9%ofrespondentswho

offeredamotive)ofthesample.Incasesinwhichallthreecodersdisagreedoveracoding,I

droptheresponsefromanalysis.Disagreementsinwhichtwoofthethreecoderswerein

agreementwerecodedinfavorofthemajority.

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Fortheclosedresponseitems,respondentswerepresentedwithalistofpotentialmotives

fortakingagivenpoliticalpositionandaskedtoassesswhatpercentageofpeoplewhoholdthat

positiondosoprimarilyforeachreason(allpercentagessumto100).Themotivespresented

wereacombinationofbad(e.g.ignorance,bigotry,selfishness)andgood(e.g.values,morals,

empiricalevidence).Ithensummedpercentagesacrossallbadmotivestogetthepercentageof

individualstowhomanybadmotivewasattributed.

Eachmethodhasitsadvantagesanddrawbacks.Theopen-responsequestionallows

respondentstoanswerastheywishwithoutoutsideprompting,andthemeasureitselfreflects

whatarespondentseesasthetypicaloutgroupmember.Open-endedresponsesallowforcoding

intofurthersubcategories,makingitmucheasiertocapturethevarietyofmotivesattributed.

However,peoplemighttendtofocusonparticularlybadexamplesofoutgroupmembers,while

stillbelievingmosttobepositivelymotivated.Iftrue,thismeasuremightnotrevealthat.The

closedresponsesdoallowustoassessthetotalpercentageofoutgroupmembersbelievedtobe

negativelymotivated.Unfortunately,themotiveoptionsprovidedonthelistwerelimitedtoa

smallset,sorespondentsmayhavefoundthemotivelistinexhaustive.Also,thetaskofsumming

percentagesmayconfusesomerespondents.

Giventhevarietyofpotentialsitesforgroupconflictinpolitics,Iassessedmotive

attributioninthreebroaddomains:policyissues,partisanidentity,andvoteintent.Inthecaseof

policyissues,tocapturevariationacrossthelargenumberofpoliticalconflicts,Iusedasetof

nineissues(taxes,healthcare,guncontrol,gaymarriage,immigration,affirmativeaction,global

warming,Israel/Palestine,andflagburning)thatvaryinpublicsalience,mediacoverage,and

issuetype.ThegroupsusedintheotherdomainsareDemocrats/RepublicansandClinton/Trump

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voters.Furthermore,todemonstratethatthenatureofmotiveattributiondependsonwho’sbeing

evaluated,Iconductseparateanalysesforingroup,outgroup,andunaffiliatedjudgments.

Negativemotiveattributionshouldoccurforoutgroupsfarmorethantheothers.

ThisstudywasfieldedacrossthreeseparatesurveysbetweenDecember2015andJune

2017,eachofwhichfocusedonadifferenttypeofpoliticaloutgroup(disagreementsover

policies,candidates,andpartiesrespectively).Inthefirstsurvey(December2015),1811

respondentsinasampleprovidedbySurveySamplingInternationalansweredaseriesof

questionsonthreerandomlyselectedpoliticalissuesfromthefullsetofnine.Foreachissue,

respondentssawabriefdescriptionoftheissueconflict,thenindicatedtheirissueattitudeona

sevenpointscale(plus"don'tknow").Theythensawtheopen-responsequestion.Foroneofthe

threeissues,respondentswereaskedtospeculateonthemotivesofotherswhoagreewiththem,

ortheirown.Fortheothertwoissues,theyattributedmotivestothosewhodisagreewiththem.

Individualswhotooknopositionwereaskedabouttheirviewsofthoseonbothsidesofthe

issue,separately.Therespondentsinthisstudydidnotseetheclosedresponsequestion.

ThesecondsurveywasfieldedinNovember2016,justbeforetheelection,using879

respondentsrecruitedfromMechanicalTurk.Inthissurvey,respondentsindicatedifthey

plannedtovoteintheupcomingelectionand,ifso,forwhichcandidatetheyplannedtovote.

Then,eachpersonsawbothopen-endedandclosedresponsequestionsaboutthemotivesof

TrumpandClintonvoters.ThethirdsurveytookplaceinFebruary2017with711Mechanical

Turkrespondents.Here,respondentsplacedthemselvesona7-pointpartisanscaleatthe

beginning,thencompletedboththeopenandclosedquestionsforboththeirpartisaningroupand

outgroup.Toavoidcoloringresponses,open-endedquestionsalwaysprecedeclosedquestions.

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Figure1:FrequencyofNegativeAttributionsAcrossSurveysParticipants

Note:Thenumberofobservationsforeachsurvey(Issues,Parties,Voting)aboveisn=1811,n=879,andn=711,respectively.95%confidenceintervalsarenotshown,butdifferencesarehighlysignificant(p<0.001).The"Closed,Issues"panelisblankassubjectsintheIssuesstudywerenotaskedclosed

Theabovefigureshowsthefrequencyofnegativeattributionstakenacrossallthree

surveys.TheY-axisdisplaysthepercentofresponsesinagivencategorythatciteatleastone

negativemotivefortheotherside.Resultsareseparatedbysurvey,andthereforewhether

respondentswereevaluatingpeoplewhodisagreedwiththemonpolicy,candidate,andparty

preferences.Respondentsineachsurveyarethengroupedbywhethertheywereevaluatingtheir

side,theotherside,orwereunattachedandevaluatingeitherside.

Severalfindingsstandout.First,acrossalldomains,respondentsalmostuniversally

perceivetheiringrouppositively,thoughlesssointhecaseoffellowpartisans,asnegative

attributionsrarelyriseabove10%.Second,aspredicted,peoplecommonlyattributenegative

motivestotheoutgroup.Generally,abouthalfofalloutgroupassessmentsrunnegative(open

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responses),andhalfoftheoutgroupisthoughtofasprimarilynegativelymotivated(closed

responses).Openassessmentsofvoteroutgroupsconstitutethesoleexception.Infact,inthis

case,theunaffiliatedopenresponsesweremorenegativethantheoutgroupassessments—

unsurprising,perhaps,as"unaffiliated"herereferstothosethirdpartyvoters.Theirlackof

affiliationlikelyresultsfromdislikeratherthandisinterest.

Whiletherespondentsinthesestudiestendedtobesomewhatunrepresentativeofthe

publicatlarge,thisdoesnotinvalidatethesefindings.Women,peopleundertheageof35,

Democratsandthecollege-educatedwereallquiteabitoverrepresentedinthesesubjectpools.

Thesegroups,however,werealsoeitherequallyorlesslikelytoholdnegativemotivebeliefs

relativetotheircounterparts—men,Republicans,andthelowereducatedwereallmorelikely

tohavenegativebeliefs.Therefore,totheextentthatthisstudyisunrepresentative,itislikely

underestimatingthedegreetowhichpeoplemakenegativeoutgroupattributionsinpolitics.

Experiment1a:HowMuchDoAttributionsImpactAffectiveEvaluations?

Thepreviousstudydemonstratesthatnegativeattributionsarecommon,butdonegative

attributionsaboutoutpartypreferencesandidentitiessignificantlyimpactpeople’soutparty

affect?Thisexperimentteststhispossibilitybyexposingrespondentstoaseriesofstatements

madebyotherpeople,eachcontainingadescriptionofapolicyattitudeorpartisanpreference,

andabriefexplanationforwhytheyholdthatview.Ifattributionisapartialdeterminantof

affect,respondentswhoareexposedtohigherqualitymotivesshouldindicatelesshostilitytothe

associatedgroupsinfollowupquestions.Ifthiseffectisnotjustexistentbutalsomeaningful,its

magnitudinalimpactshouldbecomparabletothatofattitudinalsimilarity,whichhaslongbeen

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demonstratedtoimpactpartisanaffect,andisconsideredoneofitskeydeterminants.Asinthe

earliervignette,ifattributionmatters,wemayprefersomeonewithwhomwedisagreeonpolicy

butwhosereasoningwerespectoversomeonewithwhomweagree,butwhosemotivesare

suspect.

InJune2017,594subjectswererecruitedfromMechanicalTurktotakeashortopinion

survey.Subjectsbeganbyindicatingtheirpartisanaffiliationandtheirattitudesonfourissues

(guncontrol,immigration,healthcare,environmentalprotection)onaseven-pointLikertscale.

Then,subjectswereshownthemabriefseriesofprofilesofotherindividualswho,theywere

told,hadpreviouslybeenaskedasimilarsetofattitudinalquestions.Eachprofilecontainsonlya

shortquotefromafictionalparticipantindicatingtheirpositiononanissue(theirplacementon

theseven-pointscale,plusabriefexplanationofwhattheyinterpretthatscaleplacementtomean

intermsofsubstantivepolicy),andtheirself-statedreasonforthatpreference.Subjectsthen

expressedtheirfeelingstowardsthisindividualusinga9-pointscale.Eachsubjectsawten

profiles:eightprofilesaboutissueattitudes(onefromeachsideofeachofthefourissues),and

twoprofilesindicatingpartisanpreference(i.e.strengthofpartisanidentityandstatedreasonfor

preferringthatparty).Theorderofthesetopicswasrandomized.Asmallsubsetofsubjects

(n=85)participatedinacontrolconditionwheretheyalsosawtenprofiles,butwithoutany

informationaboutmotive.

Thesurveyrandomizedthestrengthoftheattitudeandthequalityofthemotive

displayedineachprofile.Anattitudecouldtakeononeofthreelevelsofextremity(e.g.slightly,

somewhat,andstronglyopposeorsupport).Toensureagivenscalepointwasinterpreted

similarlyacrosssubjects,eachattitudeincludesabriefexplanationofwhatthepersoninthe

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profilebelievesthatscalepointtosubstantivelymeanforthatissue.Imeasureattitudinal

distancebetweenthesubjectandtheprofileastheabsolutevalueofthesubjectandprofilescale

positions(suchthatmeasureruns0-6,with0representingfullagreementbetweenrespondent

andtheexampleindividual,and6indicatingthattheyareonoppositeendsofthepolicyscale).

Asformotive,subjectsseeoneofsixexplanationsoneachprofile,halfpositive,half

negative.Eachstatement,whilenotoriginatingfromotheractualsubjects,drawsheavilyon

open-endedresponsesfromrealpeoplefieldedduringpreviousstudies(seeSISection3.4for

details).Statementsweredesignedtoreflectarangeofmotivetypesbothnegative(greed,

ignorance,bigotry,laziness,etc)andpositive(fairness,concernforothers,desireforliberty,etc).

Toconfirmthatrespondentsviewedmotivestatementsaspositively/negativelyasintended,I

fieldedaseparatestudyusing450MechanicalTurkrespondents,whowereaskedtoratethe

motivesforreasonabilityona9-pointscale,where1isperfectlyreasonableand9completely

unreasonable.Motivequalityinthisstudyisthereforemeasuredastheaverageoftheseratings.

Becauseingroupandoutgroupsjudgemotivequalitydifferently,thescoresoneachprofile

reflectaveragesfromone’singrouponly.

Table1belowshowsasampleofpositionsandmotivesthatmightbeshownineach

profile.Inthiscase,thesearethepositionsandmotivesusedfortheguncontrolprofiles.PanelA

showsthewordingthataccompanieseachposition,whilePanelBdoesthesameformotives.

PanelBalsoshowstheaveragemotivequalityratingforeachexample(loweraverages

correspondtobetterpreferredmotives).PanelCshowsexamplesoftheprofilesrespondents

actuallysee.Forthefullsetofpositionsandmotivesacrosstopics,seeSISections1.2and1.3.

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Table1:SamplePositionsandMotivationsPanelA:Positions

PanelB:Motivations

PanelC:ExampleProfiles

Note:Only“guncontrol”motivesandpositionsarelistedabove.Forafullsetofmotives/positionsacrossallissues,seeSISection1.InPanelB,“MotivationalQuality”referstotheaverageratingsofeachmotivebyaseparatesubjectpool.Thescoresrangefrom1-9,where9istheleastreasonable.

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Figure2:RelativeAffectiveImpactofMotiveBeliefsPanelA:EffectofMotiveQualitybyIssueDistance

Note:Confidenceintervalsare95%.Standarderrorsareclusteredbyindividualrespondent.Eachpointcorrespondstotheaverageratingacrossprofilesatthatlevelofdistance.N=5276.

PanelB:EffectofMotiveQualitybyObjectofJudgment

Note:Eachpointrepresentsanevaluationofaprofile,basedonthequalityofthemotiveassignedinthatprofile.Theratingonthey-axisrepresentsresidualaffectaftercontrollingforpositiondistance.Ingroupjudgmentsreflectevaluationsofthoseonthesameside,andOutgroupoftheother.Neutraljudgmentsreflectevaluationsbysubjectswhowereuncommitted.TheTotalpanelshowsthepooledresults.N=5276.

18

Affectdoesindeedappearstronglyinfluencedbymotivebeliefs.Figure2aaboveshows

themeanprofileratingofthoseinthecontrolgroupcomparedtothosewhosawthehighestand

lowestratedmotivationsforagivenitem,ateachpossiblelevelofissuepositiondistance.For

example,whensubjectssawsomeonewhosepositiondifferedfromtheirsbyadistanceof4ona

7-pointscale(e.g.subjectswhomoderatelyagreeratingsomeonewhomoderatelydisagrees),

theiroutgroupaffectrelativetoacontrolsubjectincreasesordecreasesonaveragebyabout15%

ofthescalelength,dependingonifthemotivetheyseeispositiveornegative.Thedifference

betweenthehighestandlowestratedmotives,onaverage,isaboutathirdtherangeoftheentire

scale,orthedifferencebetweenclearlikeandcleardislike.Itshouldbenotedthatsubjects

narrowlypreferindividualstheystronglydisagreedwithbuthadgoodmotivestothosewhothey

agreedwithbuthadbadmotives,furthersuggestingtheimportanceofattributionforaffect.The

plotalsoindicatestherearesomefloorandceilingeffects;highly-ratedmotivesdonotappearto

improveaffecttowardsthosewithwhomwestronglyagree,andpoorly-rateddonotfurther

loweritforthosewithwhomwestronglydisagree.Thisisconsistentwithpeopleassumingthose

withwhomtheyagreetobethoughtful,orthosewhodonottobeboorish.

Notonlydoesmotivequalitymatterforoutgroupjudgmentsatalllevelsofdisagreement,

butalsoforingroupandneutraljudgments.Figure2bplotsmotivequalityagainstresidualaffect

ratings(aftercontrollingforpositiondistance)bytypeofgroupjudgment.Thebottom-right

panelshowsalldatacombined.Thedashedlinerepresentsakernel-weightedlocalpolynomial

regression,andeachpointrepresentsasingleevaluation.Inallcases,affectdeclinesasmotive

qualityworsens,thoughsomewhatlessforthosewhotakepositionsatthemiddleofthescale.

19

Figure3:MotiveQualityImpactbyPositionDistance

Note:Confidenceintervalsare95%.Standarderrorsareclusteredattheleveloftheindividualrespondent.Ingroupjudgmentsreflectsubjectevaluationsofthoseonthesameside,andOutgroupoftheother.Neutraljudgmentsreflectevaluationsbysubjectswhoplacedthemselvesatthemidpointofascale.

Theaffectiveimpactofmotivationequalsorsurpassesthatofposition.Figure3shows

theresultsofastandardOLSregressionofaffectonbothissuepositiondistanceandmotive

qualitytreatments,separatelyforthosewhojudgesomeoneontheirside,theotherside,and

neutralpeoplejudgingeitherside.Thebottom-mostpanelshowstheresultsforallsubjectstaken

togetherinawithin-subjects,fixed-effectsregression.Higherabsolutemagnitudesindicate

strongereffects.Thecoefficientonmotivationisseveraltimesthatofposition,regardlessof

whetheroneisjudgingone’sownsideortheotherside.Ofcourse,giventhevarietyof

substantivechoices(i.e.typesofissues,chosenpositionsonthoseissues)thatcouldbemade

differentlyinconstructingbothofthesemeasures,resultsshouldbetakenwithagrainofsalt.

Still,thesescaleswerecreatedtocapturethewholerangeofpositions(e.g.thehealthcarescale

20

goesfromfullgovernmenttakeovertoeliminatingMedicare)andmotivations(e.g.thoughtful

claimsversusopenracism),sotheresultsshouldstillbeinstructive.

Oneadditionalfindingbearsmentioning—therelativeimportanceofpositionand

motivationdependsonone'sinterestintheissueathand(seeSISections1.5and1.6fordetails

andplots).Asinterestdecreases,sodoestheimportanceofpositiondistance,andforthosewith

lowinterest,positiondistancehasnoeffect.However,themagnitudeandsignificanceofmotive

qualityhold,regardlessofextremityorevenpoliticalinterest.Thisdemonstratesboththe

robustnessofmotiveattributionasadeterminantofaffect,andthatimprovingmotivebeliefs

wouldhelpeventhosewhomaynototherwisepayagreatdealofattentionorinteresttopolitics.

Experiment1b:DoAttributionsImpactAffectTowardsPartisanGroups?

Whiletheaboveresultssuggestthatattributionsplayasignificantroleinpolitical

evaluations,thesewereevaluationsofindividuals,notgroups,andthusdonotdirectlydealwith

outgroupaffect.Thisexperimentusesthesamedatasetasthefirst,butwithindependentand

dependentvariablesthatmeasuregroup-levelmotivebeliefsandaffect,respectively.

Inthepreviousexperiment,thekeyindependentvariablewastherandomlyassigned

motivequalityforeachindividualprofile.Theinformationlearnedinthesetenprofilesshould,

takentogether,contributetogroup-levelmotivebeliefs—DemocratsandRepublicanshave

stakedoutclearpositionsoneachissueusedintheseprofiles,sopoliticallyattentiveindividuals

shouldbeabletoattributemotivesforagivenissuepositiontotheassociatedparty.Aseach

profile’smotivequalitywasrandomlyassigned,bychancealone,someindividualssawmore

high-qualitymotivesassociatedwiththepartisanoutgroupthandidothers.Thisvariationis

21

leveragedheretocreatea"motivequalityindex"representingtheaverageofratingsfromeachof

themotivesseenbyanindividual.Ifindividualsapplywhattheyhavecollectivelylearnedfrom

theseindividualstothepartieswithwhichtheirpreferencesareassociated,astheindexscore

improves,soshouldoutpartyaffect.

Afterseeingtheprofiles,andansweringaseriesofdistractionquestions(apolitical

generalknowledgebattery),respondentsindicatedpartisanaffectinseveralways.First,they

providedpartisanfeelingratingsonanine-pointscale.Second,theyspeculatedonhowthey

wouldreacttotheirchildmarryingamemberoftheoppositeparty,aquestionnowfrequently

usedtomeasureoutgrouphostility.Third,toperhapsbettercapturethesentimentsofthosewho

donothave(orplantohave)children,andtofurthergaugewillingnesstosociallyinteractwith

theotherside,subjectswerealsoaskedaquestionaboutdatingpreferences.Thequestionsasks

themtosupposetheyseeaprofileonadatingserviceforsomeonewhoinitiallyintereststhem,

butaffiliateswiththeoutparty.Subjectsthenindicatehowtheywouldreacttothisinformation

ona5-pointscale,where1equalsincreasedinterest,and5atotalunwillingnesstocontactthem

(a“dealbreaker”).Ialsouseadummythatequals1forthedealbreaker,and0otherwise.

Table2:AverageOutgroupMotiveQuality

Note:***p<0.01,**p<0.05.Allvariablesrecoded0-1.Rows1-3reflectstandardOLSregression;Row4useslogisticregression.Outgroupcolumnsuseonlyoutgroupratings,whiletheIngroup-Outgroupcolumnsuseingroupratingsminusoutgroupratings.

22

Figure4:AffectIndexbyOutgroupMotiveQuality

Note:Confidenceintervalis95%.Eachpointrepresentsasinglesubject’sevaluationoftheoutparty.They-axisshowsanindexthatcombinesthethreeaforementionedmeasuresofaffect(partisanfeeling,marriageindicator,andwillingnesstodate).

Table2abovereportstheresultsofaseriesofsimplebivariateOLSregressionsofthese

dependentvariablesonthemotivequalityindex.Eachrowcorrespondstoadifferentdependent

variablechosenfromthefouraforementionedaffectmeasures.The“outgroup”columnusesonly

ratingsofoutgroups,whilethe“ingroup-outgroup”columntakesthedifferencebetweeningroup

andoutgroupratings.Eachrowshowsthattheeffectofmotivequalityissignificantregardlessof

specification.Forinstance,inrow1,movingfromthelowesttohighestassignedmotivequality

improvesaffectbyalittlemorethanafifthofthescale.Forthedealbreakerresults(row4),

movingfromthebottomtothetopofthemotivequalityindexcorrespondstoabouta33%

decreaseinthelikelihoodofselectingthedealbreakeroption.Overall,subjectsappeartohave

learnedfromtheprofilesandupdatedtheirbeliefsaboutoutgroupmotives.Figure4above

summarizestheresultsbyshowingtherelationshipbetweenthemotivequalityindexandan

indexofthethreeaffectivemeasures(asimpleaverageacrossallthree).Thosewhosawabetter

23

motivesetindicatedgreaterwarmthtowardstheoutparty,andincreasedwillingnesstointeract

withitsmembers.Thestrengthofthiseffectisremarkablegiventhatrespondentswereleftto

drawconclusionsaboutpartiesfromasetofprofilesthatfocusedprimarilyonissuepositions.

Experiment2:WhatDoesItTakeForPeopleToUpdateTheirAttributions?

AlthoughExperiment1btestswhetheroutgroupmotiveattributioncausallyimpacts

outgroupaffect,itdoessousingonlyahandfulofexamplesacrossseveralissues.Onemotive

perissueseemslikeaninadequatedraw,especiallygiventhatissuemotiveswon’tcontributeto

partisanfeelingunlessrespondentsknowwherethepartystandsonthatissue,whichisoftennot

thecase.Choosingasingletopic(issuepreferenceorpartyaffiliation)andprovidingrespondents

withmotiveexamplesfromalargenumberofindividualsmaybetterapproximatereal-life

situations–outpartybehaviorsandattitudesaremostlikelytobeencounteredinthediscussion

ofasingletopicorevent,suchasonsocialmedia.

Anotherexperimentalsoprovidestheopportunitytobetterunderstandhowpeople

interpretdirectevidenceofoutgroupmotives.Forinstance,whatweknowabout

ingroup-outgroupdynamicssuggestsmotivebeliefswillbedifficulttocorrect.Peoplearelikely

toacceptpositiveinformationaboutingroups,ornegativeinformationaboutoutgroups,asthese

revelationseasilyaccordwithpreexistingbeliefs.However,whengivenevidenceoutof

alignmentwithone’spriors(i.e.evidenceofgoodmotivesforoutgroups,andviceversa),

rejectionofthisnewinformationbecomesmuchlikelier.Anindividualmayoverlookbad

ingroupbehaviorasthatof"afewbadapples",butseizeuponanyillintentfromtheoutgroupas

24

typical.Iftrue,tosuccessfullychangeoutgroupattributions,wemayneedtostackthedeckin

favoroftheoutgroup—thatis,showsubjectsuniformpositivityintheexamplestheysee.

Thissecondexperimentisthereforedesignedtoimproveexperimentalrealismandto

bettertestthefactorsthatinfluencewhetherpeopleapplywhattheylearnaboutgroupmembers

tothegroupasawhole.Whiletheindependentanddependentvariablesremainthesameasin

thefirstexperiment,thetreatmentprotocolischanged.Subjectsareexposedtoaseriesofmotive

profiles,asbefore,butnowtheseprofilesalladdressasingletopic,andthepercentageof

profilescontaininggoodorbadmotiveinformationissystematicallyvariedacrossparticipants.

ThissecondexperimentwasconductedinJune2017,using3,266participantson

MechanicalTurk.Toreducepotentialdemandeffects,recruitmentmaterialsstatedthatsubjects

wouldparticipateinaratingtaskthatwouldlaterbeusedtocreateatrainingsetformachine

learning—notuntilthedebriefingattheendwererespondentstoldtheyweretakingpartinan

academicsurvey.Asbefore,subjectssawmultipleprofilescontainingbothaposition(only"for"

or"against,"–tomaintainexperimentalpower,strengthofpositioninnotvariedinthis

experiment)andamotiveforthatposition.Foreachprofile,subjectswereaskedtocategorize

themotivestatementusingapresetlistofmotives(sixoptions—threenegative,threepositive

—plus"other").Statementswereagainbasedonrealcommunicationsbyrespondentsin

previousstudies,anddesignedtogiveanimpressionofwhatshareofoutgroupmembershave

negative(e.g.bigotry,selfishness,stupidity,cruelty)orpositive(e.g.seekingjustice,seeking

freedom,careforothers)motives.Torestrictthestudy'sfocustopartisaningroup/outgroup

dynamics,onlythosewhoindicatedapreferencefortheDemocraticorRepublicanparty(i.e.

thosewhodidnotidentifythemselvesastrueindependents)participated.

25

Thekeyexperimentalvariationisthepercentageofmotivestatementsthatarenegatively

valenced.Somesubjectswererandomlyassignedtoseemostlynegativestatements,somemostly

positiveones,andanothergroupsawexclusivelypositivestatements.Asvalenceimproves,we

shouldexpectoutgroupaffecttoimprove.However,ifmotivatedreasoningorsomeother

cognitivebiasisatwork,subjectsshouldupdatetheirpriors,ifatall,onlywhenunabletodraw

onanyexamplesofoutgroupmisconduct.

Asmentionedabove,whileeachprofileinExperiment2pertainedtoadifferenttopic,

hererespondentsseeaseriesofprofilesonthesametopic,alsorandomlyassigned.Thegoalwas

toprovidesubjectsalargerpoolofevidencefromwhichtomakeattributionsaboutasingle

outgroup.Asbefore,Iusebothissueandpartisanoutgroups.Subjectssawoneoftwoversionsof

theabovetask—about"issues"(affirmativeactionorhealthcare),or"partyidentification"

(DemocratorRepublican)—ortookpartinacontrolcondition,inwhichrespondentscompleted

aneutralratingtaskonanunrelatedtopic.Allrespondentsinthe"issues"conditionsaweight

statementsfromdisagreersontheirassignedissue.Iassignedrespondentstooneofthreevalence

conditions—bad(sixbadmotives),good(twobadmotives),orperfect(nobadmotives).Half

ofthosechosentosee“party”profileswereshowneightoutgroupprofiles,asabove,butwith

motivesabouttheirpartisanidentificationratherthanissueposition.

Theotherhalfof“party”subjectswereassignedtoprofilesfrombothinpartyand

outpartymembers(twelveinall,sixfromeachparty).Itmaybethataffectivepolarizationcanbe

diminishednotjustbyrevealingthatmanyoutgroupmembersarepositivelymotivated,butthat

manyingroupmembersarenegativelyso.Totestthepotentialeffectsofingroup-outgroup

comparison,subjectsinthisconditionwereassignedtovalencesusinga2x2factorial(ingroup

26

"good"or"bad,"outgroup"good"or"bad").Ofthesixstatementsusedforeachparty,fourare

negativeinthe"bad"valencecondition,andtwointhe"good"valencecondition.Therefore,

subjectswererandomlyassignedtoseeoneoffoursetsofprofiles(bothpartiesgood;both

partiesbad;inpartygood,outpartybad;andviceversa).SISection2.2containsalistofall

possiblemotives.Figure5belowshowstwoexamplesoftheprofilesrespondentsmightsee.

Figure5:SampleProfilesUsedinExperiment3

27

Uponcompletingtheirassignedratingtask,subjectsansweredaknowledgebattery,then

placedthemselveson9-pointscalesforpartisanaffectandissuegroupaffect.Finally,totest

whethermanipulatingattributionsmighthavebehavioralconsequences,Iaskaquestionto

gaugewillingnesstovoteacrosspartylines.Subjectssawavignetteinwhichacandidatefrom

theirpartywasunderinvestigationbeforeanelection,andaskedwhethertheywouldvotefor

thatperson,someoneelse(theoutpartychallengeroranindependent)ornotvoteatall.

Inordertoconfirmthatthetreatmentsdidsuccessfullymanipulatetheintendedbelief

(attributionsforoutgroupattitudes/behaviors),immediatelyfollowingtheexercise,Ishowed

respondentsalistofpossibleattributions,goodandbad,aboutoutgroupmembers,andasked

themtowriteinthepercentagetheythoughtwereprimarilymotivatedbyeachattribution(forced

summingto100%).Ithensummedthepercentagesacrossbadmotivestogetameasureof

overalloutgroupattributions.Themanipulationsweresuccessful;asvalenceimproved,the

percentageofoutgroupmembersgivennegativeattributionsdecreased(seeSISection2.3).

Figure6belowshowstheexperimentalresults.Ineachpanel,theY-axisshowsthe

differencebetweeningroupandoutgroupaffect(scaledfrom-1to1,where-1correspondsto

lowoutgroupaffect)ineachcondition.Theoneexceptionisthefourthpanel,wheretheY-axis

showsthepercentageofpeoplewhopreferredtheirownparty's(possiblycorrupt)candidateif

theywereforcedtovotefortheirownortheotherparty'scandidate.Thetoptwopanelsshow

effectsforthosewhosawissueoutgroupmotives,thenexttwopanelsforthosewhosawparty

outgroupmotives,andthefinalpanelforsubjectswhosawpartymotivesforboththeingroup

andoutgroup.Thedashedlinesineachpanelcorrespondto95%confidenceintervalsoncontrol

groupaffectratings(notshowninthetoppanel,asthecontrolgroupwasnotaskedaboutissues).

28

Figure6:AffectRatingsinResponsetoEvidenceofOutgroupMotiveQuality

Note:Errorbarsare95%confidenceintervals.Dashedlinesreflecttheupperandlowerof95%confidenceintervalsontheestimateofaffectinthecontrolgroup.AllDVsabovearemeasuredasthedifferencebetweeningroupandoutgroupaffect,scaledfrom-1to1,where-1correspondstomaximumoutgrouphostility.Plotsshowmarginalaverages.AlldifferencesineffectmagnitudebetweenthePerfectandControlgroupaffectratingsabovearesignificantatthe95%confidencelevelinthemultivariateregressionanalysis.

29

Theseanalysesuseonlythesubsetofsubjectswhoappeartohavecompliedwiththe

instructionsoftheexercise—somesubjectsmerelyclickedthroughtheexercisewithoutreading

thevignettes,thusnotreceivingthetreatment.Todealwiththeinattentiveorotherwise

noncompliant,Icountthetotalnumberofmotivescorrectlyidentified(goodorbad)bythe

subjects,anddropthoseroughlyinthebottomquintileofthismeasure(generallycorresponding

tothosewhodidworsethanchancewouldpredict).Becauseextremityandpolitical

sophisticationcorrelatewithcompliance,alltreatmenteffectsshownabovearisefroma

multivariateregressionincludingpartyextremityandgeneralknowledge.Still,theaboveresults

holdwhenusingatwostageleastsquaresregressioninwhichtreatmentisinstrumentedon

compliance(seeSections2.4-2.6fordetailedanalyses).

EachpanelinFigure6showsthatthedifferencebetweeningroupandoutgroupaffect

decreasesasoutgroupmotivevalenceincreases.Inthetoppanel,forinstance,whenpeoplesaw

mostlynegativemotivesfromthosewhodisagreedwiththemonaffirmativeactionorhealthcare,

theiraffecttowardsthatoutgroupwassignificantlylowerthanthosewhosawmostlyorentirely

positivemotives.However,inmostcases,thetreatmenteffectisonlysignificantintheperfect

condition.Inotherwords,peoplewhosawmostlygoodmotivesdidnotevaluatetheoutgroup

significantlydifferentlyfromthosewhosawmostlybadones—onlythosewhosawnothingbut

goodmotivesshowedclearimprovement.Inotherwords,affectimprovedonlywhensubjects

completelylackedrecentevidenceofnegativeoutgroupconduct.Thissuggestsoneoftwo

possibilitiesabouthowpeopleinterpretgroupmotivesfromexample.First,ingroupmembers

maythinkbadmotivesaremorecommonthangoodonesintheoutgroup,sowhentheyseeone,

theyfigureitisbetterrepresentativeofthetypicaloutgroupmember.Second,negativemotives

30

maybeparticularlysalient,soevenifsomeonedoesn'tassumedeficiencyonthepartyofmost

outgroupmembers,theymightoverlyfocusonthefewwhoare.Eitherway,theseresults

demonstratethehighdifficultyofchangingperceptionsoftheoutgroup.

Learningnegativemotivesaboutone’sownpartydoesnotappeartoimprovethe

outparty-inpartyaffectdifferentialunlessitisalsopairedwithpositiveevidenceabouttheother

party.Thebottompanelshowsresultsfromtheingroup-outgrouppartisancomparisoncondition.

Whentheingroupappearstohavebettermotivesthantheoutgroup,thecontrolconditionis

replicated.Showingbothgroupsascontainingseveralnegativelymotivatedindividualshasno

impactonaffect.Here,assubjectsmightdismisspositiveoutgroupexamplesasunrepresentative

ofthegroupasawhole,theymaysimplydothesamewithnegativeingroupexamples.Asinthe

othermanipulations,however,providinggoodinformationaboutoutpartymotivesimproves

outpartyaffect,thoughagainonlysignificantlysowhentheevidentiarydeckisstackedinthe

outgroup’sfavorasmuchaspossible.

Asdemonstratedinthefourthpanel,manipulatingmotivebeliefsmayimpactnotjust

attitudesbutalsobehavior,oratleastbehavioralintent.Whileabout85%ofthoseinthecontrol

groupsaidthey'dvotefortheirownparty's(likelycorrupt)candidate,only74%ofthosewho

sawnothingbutpositiveoutgroupmotivesindicatethesame.Thissmallbutsignificantdecrease

suggeststhatsomepeoplearewillingtocrosspartylineswhenfacedwithaninadequateinparty

candidate,butonlyiftheybelievethatpeopleintheoutpartypossessgoodintentions.Sucha

findingseemsrelevanttothe2016presidentialelection,whichfeaturedthetwoleastpopular

majorpartycandidatesinhistory,eachwithanarguablyquestionablelegalpast.Nevertheless,

peoplestilllargelyvotedalongpartylines.Inalesspolarizedpartisanenvironment,votersmay

31

havefeltfreertorejecttheirparty'scandidatebasedonundesirablequalities.Ofcourse,asthese

resultsreflectbehavioralintentinahypothetical,andnotreal-lifebehaviorsthemselves,they

shouldbetakenwithagrainofsalt.

Experiment2demonstrates,asdidexperiment1,thatmotiveattributionisakeycausal

contributortooutgrouphostility,andthatgivingcitizensreasontobelievetheoutgrouphasgood

intentionscanreduceoutgrouphostility.Theseresultssuggestitmaybepossibletofight

affectivepolarizationbydirectlyprovidingevidenceofpositiveoutgroupmotives;however,this

mayonlyworkwhentheevidenceofwell-intentionedoutgroupmembersappearsoverwhelming.

Evenasinglebadapplemayspoilthewholebunch.

DiscussionandConclusion

Whileaffectivepolarizationiswell-documented,itisstillnotwellunderstood.What

explainsthepersistentriseinanimositybetweenpartisangroups?Thispaperaddstotheexisting

setofexplanationsanadditionalanswer,thatcitizensoftenattributenefariousmotivesto

outgroupmembers,ratherthanassumethattheirpreferencesresultfromlegitimatevaluesand

concerns.Roughlyhalfofthepublicappeartoholdnegativebeliefsaboutoutgroupmotives,and

thosewhodoevaluateoutgroupmembersmorenegatively.Theimpactofmotiveattributionon

outgroupaffectappearstobeequaltoorlargerthanthatofattitudinalsimilarity,akeyfinding

foraliteraturethat,tothispoint,hasfocusedonaffectivepolarization'srelationshipwithwhat

peoplewantratherthanwhytheywantit.Theimpactofmotivebeliefsonaffectisstrong

regardlessofwhoisbeingjudged(ingroupmembers,outgroupmembers,andjudgmentsof

eithersidebytheuncommitted)orone’slevelofinterestintheissue,somethinguntrueof

32

attitudinalsimilarity.Mostimportantly,peopleappearwillingtochangetheiroutgroupmotive

beliefs,butperhapsonlyunderthebestconditions;whentheydo,theiroutgrouphostility

lessens,theirwillingnesstointeractwithoutgroupmembersincreases,andtheyappear

somewhatmorewillingtovoteacrosspartylinestoblockproblematicingroupcandidates.

Theseexperimentsarenotwithoutlimitation—surveyswerenotconductedusinga

random,nationallyrepresentativesample,thoughinallcases,underrepresentedrespondent

groupswereequallyormorelikelytoengageinnegativemotiveattributionandshowsignificant

effects;therelianceuponsurveyresearchraisessomeconcernaboutexternalvalidity;thestudies

donottrackmultiplewaves,andthereforecannotspeaktolong-termeffectdecay;dependent

variablesarenon-behavioralandself-reported.Manipulatingbeliefsand/oraffectonamore

permanentbasis,inamorerealisticenvironment,maybemuchmoredifficult.

Theresultsofthisstudyshouldinformfuturestepslawmakersorprivateorganizations

mighttaketocombataffectivepolarization.Peopleacquireinformationabouteachother’s

motivesfromtheirmediaenvironment;ifthiscontentiseitherlargelynegativeorinfrequently

provided,citizenswilllearn,oratleastassume,thatpoliticaldisagreementsstemfromnefarious

outgroupmotives.Journalists,therefore,shoulddoabetterjobofexplainingwhypeoplesupport

thepoliciestheydo,andavoidsuggestionsthatsaidsupportisunderlaidprimarilybyillintent.

Socialmediaorganizationscanalsoworktorestructuretheirplatformstominimizethe

likelihoodofshallow,hostileoutgroupinteractions.Thismayincludeinterventionssuchasthe

minimizationoftheroleofcommentssectionsonnewsarticles,preventinganonymous

commenting,andincentivizingthoughtfuldeliberation.

33

AffectivepolarizationisasignificantproblemintheUnitedStates.Hostilitytowardsthe

othersidemakespoliticalcompromisemoredifficult,encouragestheformationofinformational

echochambers,makesvotingfortheout-partydifficultevenwhensensible,incentivizeselected

officialstoapproachpoliticaldecision-makinginanincreasinglypartisanfashion,andincreases

thelikelihoodofpartisanviolence.Thehighamountofcongressionalgridlock,increasing

partisandisagreementonevenbasicfactsofreality,thechoicebymostpartisanstostickwith

theirparty'scandidateinthe2016electiondespitehighunfavorables,agrowingtendency

towardspartisanhardball,therecentpublicshootingsofReps.GabbyGiffordsandSteveScalise,

andtheviolenceatprotestsinCharlottesville,VAandBerkeley,CAarejustafewrecent

manifestationsoftheseproblems.Ifaffectivepolarizationcontinuesoverthecomingyears,we

willundoubtedlywitnessthefurthererosionofpoliticalnormsofcivilityandgoodfaith

deliberation;afunctioningdemocracywouldseemtorequire,attheveryleast,itscitizenstonot

assumetheirneighborstobemonsters.

34

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SupplementalInformationfor“MaliceandStupidity”TABLEOFCONTENTS

1Experiment1Materials1.1AttitudinalSelf-Ratings(4issues)1.2PositionsShowninProfiles1.3MotivationsUsedinProfiles1.4ExerciseInstructionsforRespondents1.5EffectofMotivationQualitybyPosition1.6EffectofMotivationQualitybyIssueSalience1.7MotivationQualityIndexDistribution

2Experiment2Materials2.1ExerciseInstructionsforRespondents2.2MotivationsUsedinProfiles2.3ManipulationCheck2.4TreatmentCompliance2.5OutgroupAffectbyCompliance2.6InstrumentalVariableAnalysis2.7RatingExercise

3AdditionalMaterials3.1StudyInformation3.2DependentVariables3.2GeneralKnowledgeBattery3.3MeasureofPartisanIdentification

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1Experiment1Materials

1.1AttitudinalSelf-Ratings(4issues)

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1.2PositionsShowninProfilesIssueType PositionType PositionWording

GunControl StrongOppose "Ifullysupportthe2ndamendment.Idon'twantanynewrulesongunownership,andwouldliketorollbackmanyexistingregulations."

GunControl Oppose "Iwanttorollbackseveralexistingregulations,butthereisaneedforsomeverybasiclawsongunownership."

GunControl WeakOppose "Isupportmostcurrentgunlaws,butdon'twantanyadditionalregulations."

GunControl StrongFavor "I'mcompletelyinfavorofmakingprivategunownershipdifficult,eventhebanningofprivategunownershipaltogether."

GunControl Favor "Isupportmuchstricterregulationsthancurrentlyexist,butIdobelieveinthebasicrighttoownfirearms."

GunControl WeakFavor "Isupportafewadditionalregulations,butIdobelieveinthebasicrighttoownfirearms."

Healthcare StrongOppose "Privatecompaniesshouldbecompletelyresponsibleforinsurance.Thefreemarketshouldsetpricesandaccess."

Healthcare Oppose "Healthcareshouldprimarilybehandledbyprivatecompanies,butthegov'tshouldsetsomebasicrules,andmaintainMedicare."

Healthcare WeakOppose "Healthcareshouldmostlybehandledbyprivatecompanies,butthegov'tshouldkeepthemincheck,andofcoursecontinueMedicareandMedicaid."

Healthcare StrongFavor "Thegovernmentshouldbethesoleproviderofinsuranceandtreatment,andguaranteeitforeveryoneinthecountry."

Healthcare Favor "Thegov'tshouldguaranteeeveryone'saccesstoinsuranceinaregulatedmarket,andapubliclyfundedoptionshouldbeavailabletoall."

Healthcare WeakFavor "Thegov'tshouldguaranteethateveryone,includingpeoplewithpre-existingconditions,hasaccesstoinsuranceinaregulatedmarket."

Immigration StrongOppose "Ithinkallillegalimmigrantsshouldbedeportedhoweverandwheneverpossible,andweneedtobuildaborderwall."

Immigration Oppose "Iwantaborderwallandthedeportationofmostillegalimmigrantsthatarealreadyhere,thoughmaybewithexceptionsforcertainminors."

Immigration WeakOppose "Iwanttoimprovebordersecurity.Ifavorthedeportationofillegalimmigrantsalreadyhere,withexceptionsforminorsandtheelderly."

Immigration StrongFavor "IstandinsolidaritywithundocumentedimmigrantscurrentlyintheUS,andagainstanyeffortstodeportorharassthem."

Immigration Favor "Iapproveofdeportingillegalimmigrantswhohavecommittedcriminalacts,butotherwiseweshouldleaveillegalimmigrantsalreadylivingherealone."

Immigration WeakFavor "Iwanttodeportillegalimmigrantswhohavecommittedcriminalacts,buttherestshouldhaveachancetobecitizens,providedtheypaypenalties."

Environment StrongOppose "I'magainstnewregulations,andwouldliketoseealotoftheonesonthebooksweakenedoreliminatedentirely."

Environment Oppose "Idon'twantanynewregulations,andI'dliketogetridofmanyoftheexistingones.Still,Iseetheneedforsomebasicrules."

Environment WeakOppose "Ingeneral,I'malittlewaryoftherulesthatexistandthosewemightmakeinthefuture."

Environment StrongFavor "Ourcurrentenvironmentalprotectionstandardsarecompletelyinadequate.Iwantamajorexpansionofexistingregulations."

Environment Favor "I'dliketoseethegovernmentkeepmostexistingrules,andaddnewoneswhereneeded."

Environment WeakFavor "Igenerallysupporteffortsbythegovernmenttoprotecttheenvironment."

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1.3MotivationsUsedinProfilesIssueType

PositionType

MotivationQuality MotivationWording

GunControl Oppose 4.25 "Iliveinaruralareawithoutmuchpolicepresence.Regulationsagainstgunownershipwouldrendermeunabletodefendmyselfandfamilyagainstpossibleintruders."

GunControl Oppose 4.45 "Ibelieveintheoriginalmeaningofthe2ndamendment-I'mevenopentosomestrictfirearmregulations,buttheconstitutionfirstneedstobeamended."

GunControl Oppose 5.05 "Iwanttosaveinnocentlives-morepeoplewouldbeharmed,asunarmedcitizens,thanwouldbesavedbythepassageofanti-gunlaws."

GunControl Oppose 5.6 "Ilikegunsandownmanydifferentkinds-gunviolencealonedoesn'tjustifymakinglawsthatwoulddeprivemeofmyguns."

GunControl Oppose 6.58 "Iliveinamixedraceneighborhood-gottabeabletodefendmyselfifmyhomegetsvandalizedortargetedbyminorities."

GunControl Oppose 6.83 "Eventually,thegovernmentisgonnatrytoenslavethepeopleoftheUnitedStates,andcitizenswillneedtostockpilegunsandammunitioninordertoresistthem."

GunControl Favor 4.39 "Iwanttosaveinnocentlives-stricterlawswouldreduceaccidentaldeaths,andpreventcriminalsandunstablepeoplefromusinggunstocommitviolentcrimes."

GunControl Favor 5.33 "Ilivenearaschoolwhereseveralkidswerekilledbyagunman.Strongergunlawswillreducetheoddsofthesekindsofthingshappeningagain."

GunControl Favor 5.55 "Guns,especiallythosewithhigh-capacitymagazines,makeittooeasyformassmurderstooccur.Othercountrieswithstricterlawshavefewermassmurders."

GunControl Favor 6.09 "Iliveinamixedraceneighborhood-thelastthingweneedismoreofthosepeoplearmed."

GunControl Favor 7 "Idon'tlikegunsandIdon'tlikegunowners-there'srarelyajustifiablereasonforowning,using,orcollectingguns."

GunControl Favor 7.69 "Gunownersarerednecks-Icouldn'tcarelesswhethergunlawsimpacttheirlivesnegativelyornot."

Healthcare Oppose 3.78 "Healthcaredecisionsshouldbemadebyindividuals-peopleshouldbefreetoforgoinsuranceiftheyfeelit'sintheirowninterest,andtochooseamongoptionsinthefreemarket."

Healthcare Oppose 4.33 "I'mgenerallyopposedtoexpandingthegovernment.Theyneverendupworkingforthepeople,butratherrichinterestgroupslikepharmaceuticalcompanies."

Healthcare Oppose 4.33 "Idon'twantmytaxesgoingup-payingforotherpeoplewhoaren'twillingtopayforthemselvesjustmeanslessmoneyforme."

Healthcare Oppose 4.8 "Thegovernmentwouldrunthehealthcaresysteminefficiently-thelackofcompetitionwouldgivethegovtnoincentivetohandlethingscost-effectively.Thefreemarketisthebestoption."

Healthcare Oppose 6.02 "Iamfirmlyopposedtohandouts.Peopleshouldworkforwhattheywant,andnotrelyupongettingfreestufffromthegovernment."

Healthcare Oppose 6.07 "I'vealreadygotgoodinsurance.Don'tseeaneedtofixthesystem,it'sworkingfineforme."

Healthcare Favor 3.76 "Ijustdon'twanttopeopletobehurt,suffer,ordie-inthe21stcentury,nooneshouldhavetoworryaboutthemselvesortheirfamilysufferingfromtreatableillnessesandconditions."

Healthcare Favor 4.15 "I'monwelfareandcan'taffordinsurance.Ineedthegovernmenttostepinandpayforme."

Healthcare Favor 5.04 "Governmentcontrolofhealthcaresimplyworkselsewhere-theUSisoneoffewdevelopednationswithoutgovernment-runhealthcare,buthasthehighestcostsandpooresthealth."

Healthcare Favor 5.19 "Thegovernmentisbestabletorunthesystemefficiently.Thefreemarketisgoodbutfailsinmarketswherepeopleneedthegoodstosurvive.Thegov'tisneededtonegotiateontheirbehalf."

Healthcare Favor 5.5 "Simple,Ineedfreebenefits-I'mnotworkingrightnow,can'tpayintothesystem,butIstillwantgoodhealthcare."

Healthcare Favor 6.48 "Governmentcontrolmeanswecanstartfixingpeople'slifestyles-peopleneedtoeathealthilyandsustainably,exerciseregularly,andthegov'tcanenforcethat."

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IssueTypePositionType Motivation

Quality MotivationWording

Immigration Oppose 3.23 "Thecurrentsystemisunfairtolegalimmigrants;manyimmigrantsplayedbytherulesandearnedtheirrighttobehere.It'sunfairforillegalstoskipaheadoftheminline."

Immigration Oppose 4.63 "IwanttoprotectAmericanjobs-whereIlive,thelossoffactoryjobshasledtohighunemployment,andmanybusinesseshireillegalimmigrantstodowhatworkremains."

Immigration Oppose 5.67 "Iwanttosaveinnocentlives-manyillegalimmigrantshaverapedormurderedAmericansinthepast.AstricterimmigrationpolicywouldprotectUScitizens."

Immigration Oppose 6.21 "IwanttoprotectthecultureoftheUS-illegalimmigrantsdon'tassimilateandbringunwantedbeliefsandtraditionsintotheAmericanmainstream."

Immigration Oppose 7.3 "AmericansaremoreimportanttomethanMexicans-I'dbefineallowing1000mexicanstoremaininpovertyifitmeantprotecting1Americanfamily."

Immigration Oppose 7.69 "Idon'tlikemexicans-alotoftheminmyareaarelazy,won'twork,andareinvolvedwithcrimeanddrugs."

Immigration Favor 4.15 "Iwanttosaveinnocentlives.Manyillegalimmigrantsfleetheircountrytoescapeviolenceandoppression.Deportingthemwouldbecruelandimmoral."

Immigration Favor 4.24 "Weareanationofimmigrants,andgiventhathistory,weshouldbeparticularlywelcomingtothosethatcometothiscountryforanopportunityforabetterlife."

Immigration Favor 4.79 "Iknowafamilyofundocumentedimmigrants-theyaregoodpeoplewhoarerespectedinthecommunity,andI'dneverwanttodoanythingtoharmtheirfamily,orotherslikethem."

Immigration Favor 5.27 "Ibelieveinaborderlessworld!Weshouldn'tbefocusedonbordersatall,weneedtolearntoliveasasinglehumanrace."

Immigration Favor 5.45 "Illegalimmigrationdoesn'taffectme.Combattingitisawasteoftime,whocares.Let'sspendmoneyelsewhere."

Immigration Favor 6.84 "Hey,it'sgoodfortheDemocrats-illegalimmigrantswillfindawaytovote,andit'llkeepRepublicansoutofoffice."

Environment Oppose 4.03 "Inmyarea,we'velostalotofjobsduetoenvironmentaloverregulation-smallbusinessescan'tmeetexpensiverequirements,whilebigcorporationscaneasilypayforthem.It'snotfair."

Environment Oppose 4.81 "Idon'twanttoreallyhurtoureconomyjusttoonlyslightlyimprovetheenvironment.I'veseensmallbusinessownershavetocloseshopjusttoprotectcertainreptilespecies!"

Environment Oppose 5.53 "Privateentitiescantakebettercareoftheenvironmentthanthegov't-publiclandshouldbemanagedbyprivatecitizens,who'llhaveself-interestinpreventingpollution/damage."

Environment Oppose 5.92 "Well,honestly,Iownstockinacouplebigcoalcompanies.EnvironmentalregulationswouldlikelycutintotheprofitIcanexpectfrommystockportfolio."

Environment Oppose 7.38 "Honestly,Ijustdon'tcaremuchabouttheenvironment-Iliveinabigcity,andIdon'tgooutdoorsmuch.Aren'ttherebiggerpriorities?"

Environment Oppose 7.81 "I'mjustsickofwhinyhippiesandliberalswhodon'tunderstandhowtherealworldworks."

Environment Favor 3.31 "Mycommunityhasbeencompletelydevastatedbyfrakking-itmadethewaterundrinkableandtherewerebirthdefects.Weneedregulationstopreventthisfromhappeningtoothers."

Environment Favor 4 "Withoutregulations,overtime,privatecompanieswilldestroytheenvironment.Corporationsonlyfocusonshort-termprofits.They'llalwayschoosethatoversafetyandhealth."

Environment Favor 4.58 "Bottomline,Iwanttoleaveourchildrenbetteroff-it'sunfairforourgenerationtolivehoweverwewantwithnothoughttotheglobalcriseswearecreatingforthenextgeneration."

Environment Favor 5.58 "It'sREALLYsimple.We'llbedeadsoonifwedon'tactnow-I'veseenresearchontheinternetthatsayshumanswillbewipedoutinlessthanfiveyearsbyglobalwarming!"

Environment Favor 5.85 "I'veinvestedprettyheavilyinrenewableenergycompanies-environmentalregulationsshouldputtheoldcompetitorsoutofbusiness,andresultinsomeprettyniceprofits."

Environment Favor 6.88 "It'sonemorewaytohurtbigbusinesses-evilcorporationsneedtobepunishedandrunoutofbusinessusingregulations,evenifitweakensthewholeeconomyforawhile."

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IssueType

PositionType

MotivationQuality PositionWording

Party Democrat 3 "Ibelieveintakingcareofthepoor,sick,andvulnerableinsociety."

Party Democrat 3.43 "Iwanttofightdiscriminationagainstonthebasisofrace,religion,class,gender,orsexualorientation."

Party Democrat 4.24 "Isupporttherightsofworkers.Iwanttoleveltheplayingfieldbetweentherichandthepoor."

Party Democrat 5.74 "It'sgreatwhenthegovernmentprovidesmewithfreethings,themorethebetter."

Party Democrat 6.09 "IsupportCommunism.IwanttheUStobeaCommunistnation.Closeasitgets."

Party Democrat 6.74 "Republicansarethepartyofoldwhitemen.Idon'ttrustthem,don'tlikethem."

Party Republican 4.31 "Ibelieveinindividualresponsibility,freedomofchoice,andfreedomofspeech."

Party Republican 4.52 "Privateindividualsmakethebestdecisionsabouttheeconomyandjobcreation,notthegovernment."

Party Republican 4.54 "Idon'tbelievethatthegovernmentiscapableofrunningmostprogramswithoutcorruptionandwaste."

Party Republican 5.46 "Idon'twantlazypeopletryingtotakefreestuffoutofmypockets."

Party Republican 6.25 "Honestly,Ijustwantthingstogobacktohowtheywere50yearsago."

Party Republican 6.59 "Democratsarethepartyofminorities.Whitepeoplearelosingcontrolofthiscountry!"

Motivationqualityisscoredfrom1-9,where1representsaratingof“highlyreasonable”and9“highlyunreasonable”.Allmotivationqualityscoresabovearetakenfromtheaverageofoutgroupjudgmentsonly.

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1.4ExerciseInstructionsforRespondentsALLRESPONDENTS:“Forthefollowingexercise,youwillseeaseriesofprofiles.Thecommentsintheseprofilescomefromrealpeoplewhopreviouslyparticipatedinasimilar,earlierstudy.Whilehundredsofpeopleparticipated,weareshowingyoutheresponsesofonlyasmallsampleofpeople.”THEN,IFCONTROLGROUP: “Justasyoudid,theseindividualswerefirstaskedtoindicatetheirpositiononanumberofissues.Oneachofthefollowingpages,you'llseeadifferentindividualandtheirpositiononacertainissue.Giventhisinformation,pleaseindicatehowyoufeeltowardsthem,positiveornegative,usingthescaleprovided.”THEN,IFEXPERIMENTALGROUP:“Justasyoudid,theseindividualswerefirstaskedtoindicatetheirpositiononanumberofissues.Then,foreachone,theywereaskedtotalkaboutwhytheytakethatposition.Oneachofthefollowingpages,you'llseeadifferentindividual,andboththeirpositionandmotivationonacertainissue.Giventhisinformation,pleaseindicatehowyoufeeltowardsthem,positiveornegative,usingthescaleprovided.”

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1.5EffectofMotivationQualitybyPosition

Note:Theabovefigureshowsthemeanaffectratingsforeachtypeofmotivation,witheachpanelrepresentingadifferentlevelofpositiondistancefromtheindividualintheprofile.Eachobservationreflectsasinglerating(eachrespondentrankedmultipleprofiles).Onlyoutgroupjudgmentsareused,sotheminimumpositiondistanceis2(e.g.3and5ona7-pointscale).Thex-axisshowsthemotivationseachprofilemightcontain,arrangedinorderfromthehighesttolowestratedmotivationforeachissue.They-axisrepresentsthemeanaffectratingforagivenindividualprofile.Thedashedlinesaretheedgesofthe95%confidenceintervalofthemeanaffectofthecontrolgroup.Eachpanelshowsthatthepresenceofthehighestratedmotivationhasasignificantpositiveeffectrelativetothecontrolgroupand,inmostcases,thelowestratedmotivationshaveasignificantnegativeeffect.Evenforthoseevaluatingsomeoneontheoppositeendofthescale(AttDiff=6),theaffectiveimpactofseeingthebestmotiveissuchthattheiroutgroupaffectequalsthatofthecontrolgroupintheminimaldifferencepanel(AttDiff=2),amovementacrossaboutathirdoftheentirescale.

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1.6EffectofMotivationQualitybyIssueSalience

Note:Theabovefigureshowstheeffectsizesofmotivationqualityandpositiondistanceonprofilerating,bytherespondent’slevelofinterestinagivenissue.Eachobservationreflectsasinglerating(eachrespondentrankedmultipleprofiles).Thedashedlinerepresentsanulleffect.Foreachissue,respondentswereaskedtoindicatetheirlevelofinterestintheissueona5-pointscale,andeachpanelaboverepresentsallratingsbythosewiththegiveninterestlevel.Thesepanelsshowthatmotivationqualityalwayshasasignificanteffect(exceptfortheVeryLowpanel,whichhasveryfewobservations).Positiondistance,however,onlymatterstothosewithahighamountofinterestinanissue.

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1.7MotivationQualityIndexDistribution

Note:ThetoppanelshowsahistogramdensityplotoftheMotivationQualityIndexasdescribedinthemainpaper.Thisindexrepresentstheaveragemotivationqualityeachrespondentseesacrossallfiveoutgroupprofiles.Theindexvalueconsistsoffiverandomlyassignedvalues,andthereforevariesacrosssubjectsbychancealone.Motivationqualityrangesfrom0-1,where0isamotivationratedbyaseparatepilotgroupas“highlyunreasonable”,and1as“highlyreasonable”.Thebottomshowsthesamedistributionasabox-and-whiskersplot.

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2Experiment2Materials

2.1ExerciseInstructionsforRespondentsISSUECONDITION:“Forthefollowingtask,wearegoingtopresentyouwithseveralshortquotesfromanumberofcitizens.Theseregularpeopletoldustheirattitude(fororagainst)on<AFFIRMATIVEACTION/GOVERNMENTINVOLVEMENTINHEALTHCARE>,thenprovidedabriefexplanationforwhytheytakethepositionthattheydo.

Foreachstatement,wewantyoutodothefollowing:

1)indicatewhatyouthinktheirmotiveisfromapresetlistofmotives(checkallthatapply)2)evaluatetheemotionalcontentoftheirresponse(checkallthatapply)3)evaluatehowreasonable/justifiableyouthinktheiranswertothequestionis

Wewillbeusingyourresponsestodevelopanalgorithmtocodeamuchlargerofasetofthesestatementsautomatically.Thoughtfulresponsesarecrucialtoourresearch,sopleasedonotanswerrandomlywithoutreadingtheprompts!Therewillbeanattentionchecktoensurethis.”PARTY/PARTIESCONDITIONS:“Forthefollowingtask,wearegoingtopresentyouwithseveralshortquotesfromanumberofcitizens.Theseregularpeopletolduswhichpoliticalpartytheyidentifywith,thenprovidedabriefexplanationforwhytheytakethepositionthattheydo.Foreachstatement,wewantyoutodothefollowing:1)indicatewhatyouthinktheirmotiveisfromapresetlistofmotives(checkallthatapply)2)evaluatetheemotionalcontentoftheirresponse(checkallthatapply)3)evaluatehowreasonable/justifiableyouthinktheiranswertothequestionisWewillbeusingyourresponsestodevelopanalgorithmtocodeamuchlargerofasetofthesestatementsautomatically.Thoughtfulresponsesarecrucialtoourresearch,sopleasedonotanswerrandomlywithoutreadingtheprompts!Therewillbeanattentionchecktoensurethis.”

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2.2MotivationsUsedinProfiles

IssueTypePositionType

ValenceType PositionWording

AffirmativeAction Oppose Good "Ibelieveeveryoneinthiscountrydeservesanequalchanceofgettinghired,nomattertheircolororbackground."

AffirmativeAction Oppose Good "Iwanttomakesurepeoplearehiredbasedonhavingthehighestmeritofallthecandidates."

AffirmativeAction Oppose Good “Ithinkraceshouldonlyplayaroleinjobhiringifallthetopcandidatesareequallyqualifiedinallotherways.”

AffirmativeAction Oppose Good “Ithinkitsunfairtominoritiestotreatthemliketheyneedthehelp-thesoftbigotryoflowexpectations.”

AffirmativeAction Oppose Good“Ipersonallylostanopportunitytoadvanceinmycareerrecentlybecausethepositionhadhitaquotaforwhitecandidates.Affirmativeactioncreatesfairnessforonegroupbycreatingunfairnessforanother.”

AffirmativeAction Oppose Good “Raceorethnicbackgroundarealwaysunfaircriteriaforevaluatingfolksforajob.”

AffirmativeAction Oppose Good “Itjustseemsunfairtopotentiallydisadvantagethemostqualifiedapplicantforapositionjustbecausetheymightnotbeaminority.”

AffirmativeAction Oppose Good “Ithinkitmightjusthurtminoritiesinthelongrun.Affirmativeactionwilljustgiveracistwhitesawaytoconvincethemselvesthatminoritiesdidn’tdeservethepositiontheyweregiven.”

AffirmativeAction Oppose Bad “Its2017,racismisntaproblemanymore,minoritieswillbefine.”

AffirmativeAction Oppose Bad “Idontneedtomakeitanyharderformetogetajobthanitalreadyis.”

AffirmativeAction Oppose Bad “Imwhite.”

AffirmativeAction Oppose Bad “Itsjustforlazypeoplewhowanteverythingtobehandedtothem.”

AffirmativeAction Oppose Bad “Everyoneneedstoquitmakingsuchabigdealaboutrace.”

AffirmativeAction Oppose Bad “theyresnoreasonfordoingthatinUSAtoday”

AffirmativeAction Favor Good “Althoughminoritieshaveequalrightsnow,theirfamilieswereoppressedformanygenerations.Theeffectsofthis,aswellasthediscriminationwhichstilloccurs,warrantsaffirmativeaction.”

AffirmativeAction Favor Good “It’sgoodtohelppeoplewhoaredisadvantaged.Equalityinournationiskey,andthatmotivatesmetowanttohelp.”

AffirmativeAction Favor Good “Itiscleartomethatminoritiesdonotreceivethesamesocioeconomicconsiderationsthatcaucasiansdointhiscountry.”

AffirmativeAction Favor Good “Iwanttobalanceaplayingfieldthathasbeenunequalforcenturies.”

AffirmativeAction Favor Good “Ibelieveinfairnessandjustice.”

AffirmativeAction Favor Good “Ihaveseenfirsthandhowminorityjobapplicantsaretreatedpoorlyandwanttohelpfightdiscrimination.”

AffirmativeAction Favor Good “I’veseenresearchthatpeopleofcolorandwomendomorepoorlyonthejobmarketthanequallyqualifiedwhiteormaleapplicants.”

AffirmativeAction Favor Good “Iwanttohelpminoritiesgetalegupinaninherentlyunequalsociety.”

AffirmativeAction Favor Bad “Itstimeforwhitepeopletogetatasteoftheirownmedicine.”

AffirmativeAction Favor Bad “dontknowmuchaboutitbutifithelpsmegethiredthangreat.”

AffirmativeAction Favor Bad “Imawhiteallythatthinkswhitepeopleneedtochecktheirprivilege!”

AffirmativeAction Favor Bad “mysisterneedsajob”

AffirmativeAction Favor Bad “thatswhatDemocratspositiononthatissueis.

AffirmativeAction Favor Bad “Whitesshouldfeelguiltyaboutwhatwhiteshavedonetoblacks,theydeservestuffinreturn.”

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IssueTypePositionType

ValenceType PositionWording

Healthcare Oppose Good “Thefreemarketisthebestwaytoensurethataproductisproducedwiththehighestpossiblequalityandsoldatthelowestpossibleprice.”

Healthcare Oppose Good “I’mconcernedthatthegovernmentwouldprovidepoorhealthcoverage.Weknowhowbadlythey’vescrewedupotherthingsinthepast.”

Healthcare Oppose Good “It’snotintheconstitution.Thegovernmentdoesnothaveanybusinessgettinginvolvedintheprivatemedicaldecisionsofitscitizens.”

Healthcare Oppose Good “Thegovernmentisnotgoodatmanagingbigprograms.Justlookatwhatthey’vedonewithsocialsecurity-it’sbankrupt.”

Healthcare Oppose Good “Ithinkit’saniceideaintheory,andpeopleshouldhavegoodhealthcareoptions,butIdon’tthinkgovernment-runhealthcarewouldworkinacountrythiscontrolledbythepharmaceuticalindustry.”

Healthcare Oppose Good “Incountrieswherethegovernmentrunsthehealthcaresystem,thereareterriblewaitingtimesforsurgeriesandotherimportantmedicalprocedures.Idon’twantthathere.”

Healthcare Oppose Good “Peoplearegoingtolosetheircurrentinsuranceplansifwemakebigchangestothesystem,andthatsnotfairtothosewhoarealreadyhappywithwhattheyhave.”

Healthcare Oppose Good “Governmentisalreadytoointrusiveinourdailylives,dowereallyneedtogivethemourmedicalrecordstoo?”

Healthcare Oppose Bad “Therearetomanypeoplejustlookingforahandoutthesedays.”

Healthcare Oppose Bad “Ivealreadygotgoodprivateinsurance,dontseeareasontodothingsdifferently.”

Healthcare Oppose Bad “Idon’twanttopayhighertaxesjusttosupportlazypeople.”

Healthcare Oppose Bad “Thegovtwouldtrytosavemoneythroughdeathpanelsandpopulationcontrol.”

Healthcare Oppose Bad “Ifyouwanthealthcaregetajob.”

Healthcare Oppose Bad “Don’tneedtohelpabunchofimmigrantsfillupourwaitingrooms.”

Healthcare Favor Good “Everyhumanbeingshouldhaveaccesstoadequatehealthcare.”

Healthcare Favor Good “Othercountriesthatusegovernment-runhealthcaresystemshavehigherqualitycareforlowerspending.”

Healthcare Favor Good “Theprivatesystemisnotworkingandcan’tbefixed.Wecouldnegotiatebetterpricesforhealthcareifthegovernmentweretheonlybuyer.”

Healthcare Favor Good “Lowincomefamiliesareoneillnessoraccidentawayfrombankruptcy.Weneedtoprotectthemostvulnerablepeopleinoursociety.”

Healthcare Favor Good “Mybrotherwouldn’tbealivenowifitweren’tfortheACA,everyoneneedstohaveinsuranceaccess.”

Healthcare Favor Good “Insurancecompaniesmakelifeordeathdecisionsbasedonprofits,healthcareshouldonlybeaboutmakingpeoplehealthy.”

Healthcare Favor Good “Thegovernmentisfarfromperfect,butItrustthemmorethanprivatecorporationswhenitcomestomyfamily’shealth.”

Healthcare Favor Good “IseepeopleinneedandIwanttohelpthem.”

Healthcare Favor Bad “idontseewhyishouldhavetopayformyownhealthcare”

Healthcare Favor Bad “ThatswhatthedemocratssayisrightandIusuallygoalongwiththem”

Healthcare Favor Bad “justbecauseidonotworkdoesnotmeanishouldnthavehealthinsurance.”

Healthcare Favor Bad “themoregovernment,thebetter.”

Healthcare Favor Bad “Igotalotofissues.Ineedhealthcare.”

Healthcare Favor Bad “thegovernmentshodjusttakecareoffit.”

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IssueType

PositionType

ValenceType PositionWording

Party Democrat Good “Icareaboutthelessfortunateandwanttohelpthemout.”

Party Democrat Good “Isupportequaltreatmentofpeopleregardlessofrace,gender,sexualorientationorreligion.

Party Democrat Good “Isupportcivilrights,acleanenvironment,betterconditionsforworkers,andqualityhealthcareandeducationforall.”

Party Democrat Good “Idon’tlikehowtherichgetricherandthepoorgetspoorer,andIthinktheDemocratsaremostlikelytodosomethingaboutthat.”

Party Democrat Good “I’mliberalonmoreissuesthanIamconservative.TheDemocratshavetheirproblemsbutthey’reclosesttowhatIbelievein.”

Party Democrat Good “Iamveryprogressiveonsocialissues.”

Party Democrat Good “I’mascientist.Itshouldn’tbepolitical,butnowadays,Democratsseemliketheleastlikelypoliticalpartytorejectanestablishedscientificfinding.”

Party Democrat Good “Ithinkasacommunityitisourdutytotakecareofoneanother,nomanisanisland.”

Party Democrat Bad “dontknowreally,parentsbroughtmeuptobeaDemocrat.”

Party Democrat Bad “Theywanttogiveusfreebenefits.”

Party Democrat Bad “theirbetterthanevilRepublicans.”

Party Democrat Bad “Weneedabiggovernmenttokeepeverythingundercontrol.

Party Democrat Bad “Whitepeopleareawfulanddemocratshaveourback.”

Party Democrat Bad “Imonwelfareanddisability”

Party Republican Good “Ibelieveinhardwork,individualresponsibilityandfreedomtolivemylifewithoutinterference.

Party Republican Good “Imfiscallyconservative,Iwanttokeepthedebtdown,andsupporttaxcodesimplification.

Party Republican Good “Icareaboutjobcreation.Wearelosingfartoomanyjobswiththepoliciesofthepast,andmanydecenthardworkingpeoplearesufferingbecauseofit.”

Party Republican Good “Ithinkgovernmentshouldbehandledaslocallyaspossible,andthedemocratswanttoexpandthefederalgovernment.”

Party Republican Good “Thegovernmenthasdemonstrateditcantbetrustedwithourmoneyandourprivateinformation.Theyarefarfromperfect,butIexpectprivateindustrytodoabetterjoboverall.”

Party Republican Good “Iservedinthemilitaryfor22years,andknowhowimportantastrongnationaldefenseis,andhoweasilywecanfindourselvesindangerwithoutproperfundingandleadership.”

Party Republican Good “Ithinktheydoabetterjobforsmallbusinessowners,toomanyregulationsaredrivingpeopleoutofbusiness.”

Party Republican Good “Iwantabalancedbudget.Neitherpartyhasbeengoodforthat,butRepublicansseemtocareaboutitmore.”

Party Republican Bad “Icantstandthefilthydegeneracyofhomosandblacksandhispanics.”

Party Republican Bad “Iwanttokeepmymoney,ifyouarentlivingthelifeyouwant,youneedtoworkharder.”

Party Republican Bad “dontknowreally,parentsbroughtmeupasarepublican”

Party Republican Bad “itstimetogetridofalltheforeignersandtakeourcountryback”

Party Republican Bad “imsickofliberals,noonemessswithmyguns,myflag,ormyfamely”

Party Republican Bad “idontwantmyhardearnedmoneygoingtoabunchoflosersanddrugaddicts”

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2.3ManipulationCheck

Note:Theleftandrightpanelsshowtheeffectofrandomassignmentofmotivationcontentonrespondentestimatesofoutgroupmotives.Aftertheratingexerciseandadistractionexercise,respondentsweregivenaversionoftheclosedresponsemotiveexercisethatcorrespondedtotheparticularissue/partyprofilestheywereshown(seesections3.1and4.1forexamples).Asthepercentageofpositivemotivesshownintheseprofilesincreased,thepercentageofoutgroupmembersestimatedtobenegativelymotivatedsharplydecreases,by30pointsinthecaseofissueoutgroups,and10pointsinthecaseofpartisanoutgroups.Thedifferenceineffectsizebetweenthesetwogroupsmightreflectpartisanviewsthataremuchmoreentrenchedthanthoseforissueoutgroups.Overall,thisplotdemonstratesthattheexperimentalmanipulationsareimpactingthedesiredconcept-motivejudgments.

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2.4TreatmentCompliance

Note:Theaboveplotsshowthedistributionofperformanceontheratingexercise.Respondentswereaskedtoevaluateanumberofprofiles(8forissueandpartyoutgroups,12forpartisaningroup/outgroup),andindicatewhichmotive(s)(fromalist)theysawintheprofile(thelistisshowninSISection1.2).Themotives(showninSISection1.4)presentedtendedtobeeasilycategorizableasgoodorbad.Foreachprofiletheyareshown,Icounttheirjudgmentaseither“correct”(iftheyselectedatleastonemotiveofthecorrectvalence,or“other”)or“incorrect”(otherwise).Ithencreateavariableequaltothenumberofcorrectidentificationsmadebyeachsubject,whichisdisplayedaboveonthex-axis.Thebarsrepresentthepercentageofrespondentsineachbin,whilethelinerepresentsthecumulativepercentageofpeoplewhoscoredthatamountorlower.IntheanalysespresentedinFigure7ofthepaper,Idropallobservationsfromroughlythebottomquintileofthismeasure(lessthan4correctintheleftpanel,andlessthan8correctintherightpanel).Giventheeaseoftheexercise,itishighlylikelythatrespondentsinthisbottomquintileweresimplynotpayingattention,andthereforenotreceivingthetreatment.

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2.5OutgroupAffectbyCompliance

Note:Thefourpanelsaboveshowtherelationshipbetweenoutgroupaffectandcompliancewithtreatment.Allobservationsincludedabovereflectrespondentswhowereinthestrongesttreatmentcategory(i.e.“100%good”motivesintheIssueorPartyconditions,or“Ingroupbad,Outgroupgood”intheMultiplePartiescondition),soastobestdemonstratetherelationshipbetweentreatmentcomplianceandtreatmenteffectiveness.Eachpanelrepresentsoneofthethreedifferentconditions;theIssueconditionshowsuptwiceasIanalyzetwodifferentoutgroups(issueandpartisan)forrespondentsinthiscondition.AllDVsareconstructedasthedifferencebetweeningroupandoutgroupaffect,andscaledfrom-1to1,where-1representsstrongdislikeoftheoutgroupandstrongsupportfortheingroup.Inthebottom-rightpanel,0-3aredroppedduetolowN(n=11acrossallvalues0-3)

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2.6InstrumentalVariableAnalysis

Note:Theabovetableshowstheresultsfrommultipleregressionsofoutgroupaffectontreatment.Eachrowrepresentsadifferentcombinationofcondition(issue/party/parties)andoutgroupusedastheDV(issue/party).AllDVsaremeasuredasingroupminusoutgroupaffect.Eachgroupofcolumnsshowsadifferentmodel,withthebetacoefficientandobservationslistedbelow.Inallmodelsabove,treatmentisavariableequalto1whensubjectswereexposedtothemostpositiveoutgroupcondition(“100%good”motivesintheissueandpartyconditions,“Ingroupbad-Outgroupgood”inthemultiplepartiescondition).Itisequalto0forthoseinthecontrolconditionorfor,inthecaseoftheissuecondition,whichhadnocorrespondingcontrolgroupaffectratings,thosereceivingthe“75%bad”treatment.Thefirstmodelshowsasimplebivariateregressionofaffectontreatmentforallsubjects.Theresultsarenullintheissuecondition,andsignificantintheparty/partiesconditions.Inmodel2,Idroproughlythebottomquintileofcompliers(seesection6.2).Withthismodification,treatmentisalwayssignificantandmuchlargerinmagnitude.Thecutoffpointfortreatmentcompliance,however,isarbitrary.Todemonstratethatthetreatmenteffectincreasesinmagnitudealongsidecompliance,Iperforma2SLSregressionbyinstrumentingtreatmentoncompliance,shownhereasthethirdmodel.Unfortunately,thiscannotbedoneinrow1,asthecontrolgroupwasneveraskedaboutissuegroups.Fortheothercases,treatmentremainssignificant,exceptinrow2.Thereasonforthefailureofthetestinrow2isthatoneofthemid-levelcompliancegroups(#correct=4),perhapsbychance,showsastrongertreatmenteffectthanthemorecompliant(asshowninSIsection6.3).Tohelpdemonstratethatthetreatmenteffectisstillsignificantwithoutthispotentialartifact,thefinalmodelshowstheresultsofanalysisinwhichthosegetlessthan5of8correctaredropped.Theeffectsaresmallerthaninmodel2,butstillsignificant.

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2.7RatingExerciseProfilesofthoseinsupportofaffirmativeaction

Profilesofthoseinoppositiontoaffirmativeaction

Profilesofthoseinfavorofgovernmentinvolvementinhealthcare

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Profilesofthoseinoppositiontogovernmentinvolvementinhealthcare

ProfilesofDemocrats

ProfilesofRepublicans

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3AdditionalMaterials

3.1StudyInformation

Note:ThesurveypopulationsusedacrossthesestudiesdifferfromthatofarandomsampleofAmericanadultsinanumberofsignificantways-thesurveygroupstendtobeyoungerandbettereducated,andhavegreaternumbersofwomenandDemocrats.

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3.2DependentVariablesMarriageIndicator:

WillingnesstoCrossPartyLines(exampleforDemocratidentifyingrespondents)

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IndividualProfileRating(Experiment1a)

PartyFeeling

WillingnesstoDate(orderrandomized)

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3.2GeneralKnowledgeBatteryIndexcreatedfromnumbercorrectof5questions,randomizedorder

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3.3MeasureofPartisanIdentification

Followingresponsescorrespondto1and2,respectively,on7pointpartyIDscale

Followingresponsescorrespondto6and7,respectively,on7pointpartyIDscale

Followingresponsescorrespondto3,5and4,respectively,on7pointpartyIDscale