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Gail Higgins (SBN 164989) Blake Lindemann (SBN 255747) LINDEMANN LAW GROUP PLC 433 N. Camden Drive, 4th Floor Beverly Hills, CA 90210 Telephone: (310) 279-5269 Facsimile: (310) 279-5270 E-mail: [email protected] Attorneys For Michel’le Toussant
UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
LOS ANGELES DIVISION
In re:
DEATH ROW RECORDS, INC.,
Debtor.
Case No. 2:06-bk-11205-VZ Chapter 11 Proceeding NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION FOR ALLOWANCE OF DOMESTIC SUPPORT OBLIGATION CLAIM AND TO COMPEL THE CHAPTER 11 TRUSTEE R. TODD NEILSON TO IMMEDIATELY PAY DOMESTIC SUPPORT OBLIGATION CLAIM; MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES; DECLARATION OF BRAD SANDLER AND MICHEL’LE TOUSSANT IN SUPPORT THEREOF Hearing Date: May 19, 2009 Time: 11:00 A.M. Place: Courtroom 1368 255 E. Temple Street Los Angeles, CA
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TO THE HONORABLE VINCENT P. ZURZOLO, CHIEF JUDGE OF THE UNITED
BANKRUPTCY COURT FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA; CHAPTER
11 TRUSTEE R. TODD NEILSON AND HIS COUNSEL, THE DEBTOR AND HIS
COUNSEL, AND OTHER INTERESTED PARTIES:
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that Michel’le Toussant (hereinafter “Toussant”) hereby submits
her Motion For Allowance of a Domestic Support Obligation Claim and To Compel the Chapter 11
Trustee To Immediately Pay Domestic Support (the “Motion”). In the Motion, Toussant will request
that the Court enter an order directing the Chapter 11 Trustee R. Todd Neilson (the “Trustee” of the
Consolidated Bankruptcy Estate) to use Estate Funds from the Consolidated Bankruptcy Estates of
the Marion Knight Junior Estate (“Knight Estate”), and the Death Row Records, Inc. Estate (“Death
Row Estate”) (collectively the “Estate Funds”) in his possession and control in this Chapter 11 case
to pay court-ordered child support and spousal support (collectively “DSO” or “Domestic Support
Obligations”) that has accrued but has gone unpaid since February 1, 2009 of approximately
$40,476.00, and to use Estate Funds as well as future funds that may come into the estate to pay
future court-ordered child support at the rate of $13,492.00 per month, as may be changed from time
to time in this Chapter 11 case and in any Chapter 7 case to which it may be converted.
This motion is based on the attached Memorandum of Points and Authorities set forth below,
the Declaration of Brad Sandler and Michel’le Toussant filed concurrently herewith, all pleadings,
papers and records on file with the Court in this proceeding, and on such other evidence, oral or
documentary as may be presented to the Court in connection with this Motion and the hearing
hereon.
PLEASE TAKE FURTHER NOTICE that a hearing on this Motion will be held on May
19, 2009 at 11:00 A.M. Pacific Time, before the Honorable Vincent P. Zurzolo in Courtroom 1368,
255 E. Temple St., Los Angeles, California.
PLEASE TAKE FURTHER NOTICE that Local Bankruptcy Rule 9013-1(a)(7) requires
that any formal response to this Motion must be filed and served at least 14 days prior to the hearing
on this Motion. Additionally, Local Bankruptcy Rule 9013-1(a)(11) provides that the failure to
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timely file and serve an opposition or response may be deemed by the Court to constitute consent to
the relief requested.
Dated: April 15, 2009 Respectfully submitted by,
LINDEMANN LAW GROUP PLC
By: /s/ Blake Lindemann
Blake Lindemann
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2
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES
I. JURISDICTION
The Bankruptcy Court may hear and determine the Claims of Toussant, as allowance
or disallowance of a creditor’s claim and immediate payment thereof is a core proceeding under
Title 28 U.S.C. Section 157(b)(2)(B).
II. BACKGROUND FACTS
Toussant married Marion Knight, Jr. (“Knight”) on or about April 5, 1997. Toussant agreed
to marry Knight while he was serving a prison sentence for assault and battery. On or about
November 29, 2002, Toussant bore a child of which Mr. Knight was the father. The child will be
referred to in this pleading as “Child X” to protect the Child’s anonymity. On January 22, 2009, the
Superior Court of Ventura Court ordered Knight to pay child support obligations and spousal support
obligations to Toussant in the amount of $20,000.00 per month beginning on February 1, 2009
(spousal support obligations and child support obligations are collectively referred to hereinafter as
“DSO” or “Domestic Support Obligations”). On February 4, 2009, that amount was later reduced to
$13,492.00. See Exhibit “1” attached to Declaration of Brad Sandler.
Knight filed for Chapter 11 Bankruptcy on April 4, 2006. Richard Diamond was later
appointed as the Chapter 11 Trustee. On or about January 27, 2009 an Order was entered
substantially consolidating the estates, whereby R. Todd Neilson became Trustee of the consolidated
Bankruptcy Estate. Based upon information and belief, Knight is not earning post-petition income
by which he can satisfy the child support obligation to Toussant. Moreover, any estate funds that
can satisfy this DSO Obligation is believed to be held by Chapter 11 Trustee R. Todd Neilson.
Toussant executed a mutual release and settlement (the “Release”) on or about September 5,
2007, which was submitted to this Court by Trustee Diamond and Trustee Neilson as an exhibit to a
F.R.B.P. 9019 Motion for An Order Approving a Compromise. See Exhibit “2” attached to
Declaration of Michel’le Toussant. An Order Approving this Compromise was entered on October
9, 2007. The Release involved the settlement of a Mediated dispute regarding liabilities that
occurred based on transactions surrounding Mr. Knight’s Malibu Property (the “Malibu Property”).
The (“Settling Parties”) were the Internal Revenue Service, Toussant, Alliance Portfolio, Chicago
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Title, Trustee Richard K. Diamond, and Trustee R. Todd Neilson.
Toussant executed the Release believing the release only involved her claims and the claims
against her in regards to the Malibu Property. The Trustee’s Counsel, Danning Gill Diamond &
Kollitz, has taken the position that the release applies to any domestic support claim Toussant may
bring. As set forth in this Motion, Toussant’s and Child X’s claims exist notwithstanding the
Release for several reasons. Notably, the release does not specifically refer to Toussant’s potential
DSO claims against the Estate. Toussant believed at the time she signed the release that she would
be able to make claims against the estate for spousal support, and child support on behalf of her
child. Toussant now desperately needs the support monies owed to her and Child X.
III. ARGUMENT
SINCE THE DUTIES OF CHILD SUPPORT AND SPOUSAL SUPPORT ARE OWED TO
TOUSSANT PRE-PETITION, AND THESE CLAIMS ARE DSO’S PURSUANT TO
SECTION 101, TOUSSANT IS ENTITLED TO IMMEDIATE PAYMENT ON HER CLAIMS
A. Toussant’s Claim Along with Other Domestic Support Obligations are of the Highest
Priority relative to all creditors of the Bankruptcy Estate.
11 U.S.C. Section 507(a)(1)(A) provides in pertinent part:
(a) The following expenses and claims have priority in the following order: (1) First (A) Allowed unsecured claims for domestic support
obligations that, as of the date of the filing of the petition in a case under this title, are owed to or recoverable by a spouse, former spouse, or child of the debtor, or such child’s parent, legal guardian, or responsible relative, without regard to whether the claim is filed by such a person ….
11 U.S.C. Section 507(1)(1)(A).
Property of the Estate is to be distributed as set forth in 11 U.S.C. § 726(a),
which provides in pertinent part:
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Property of the estate shall be distributed- First in payment of claims of the kind specified in, and in the order
specified, section 507 of this title, proof of which is timely filed under section 501 of this title or tardily filed on or before the earlier of - (A) The date that is 10 days after the mailing to creditors of the summary of the trustee’s final report; or (B) the date on which the trustee commences a final distribution under this section.
11 U.S.C. Section 726(a).
In assessing the priority of Domestic Support Obligations relative to other creditor claims in
a Chapter 11 or Chapter 7 case, one other provision applies. 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(1)(C) provides in
pertinent part that a Trustee
shall be paid before payments of claims under subparagraphs (A) and (B), to the extent that the trustee administers assets that are otherwise available for the payment of such claims. (Emphasis added).
A plain language interpretation of this statute would dictate that Congress would not have
meant the Trustee to have a super-priority claim over the DSO obligation because the language “to
the extent that the trustee administers assets that are otherwise available for the payment of such
claims” was added as a modifier. This interpretation is buttressed by legislative history regarding
the amendments to 11 U.S.C. Section 507(a)(1)(A). The Statements of Bill Founder Orrin Hatch in
the 106th Congress are relevant. The bill also protects our children. Under my provisions [referring to 507(a)(1) and other DSO provisions discussed in the next section of this motion] the obligation to pay child support is moved to first priority status, as opposed to its current place at seventh in line, behind attorneys fees and other special interests. If you really want to know the truth my measures [that] make improvements over current law in this area are too numerous to mention here at this time, but they work to facilitate the collection of child support and alimony and effectively prevent deadbeats from getting their obligation discharge.
146th Congress Rec. Section 50 (Daily ed. January 26, 2006).
11 U.S.C. Section 507(a)(1)(C) was added only after it was pointed out in the dissenting view
of a House Report that absent adequate compensation, trustees would be more likely to abandon
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non-exempt assets back to the Debtor instead of administering them if the Trustee had to pay DSO
obligations first. The language of Section 507(a)(1)(C) was merely intended to give trustees an
incentive to administer non-exempt assets when the total of those assets was less than the DSO
obligations owed to the Estate.
Here, the Trustee was faced with no risk that after administering assets to pay certain DSO
obligations, there would be no money to pay for the Trustee’s costs of administration. To the
contrary, non-exempt Estate assets far exceeded the monies needed to administer assets to pay DSO
obligations in this case. Moreover, if the Trustee had not administered any assets there would have
been money to pay the DSO claims. Instead, the Trustee(s) believed it was in the best interests of all
creditors of the Bankruptcy Estate to reduce the stream of future payments to one lump sum.
In previous disputes with other mothers of Mr. Knight’s children, Trustee Diamond argued
that payment of administrative expenses has been held to be a higher priority than Domestic Support
Obligations. However, this finding has only been made post 2005 in Chapter 13 cases, where
pursuant to 1326(b), Courts have held that the specific directive of the Bankruptcy Code requiring
distribution first to 507(a)(2) claims is senior to the payment of a domestic support obligation. See
e.g. In re Williams, 385 B.R. 468 (S.D. Ga. 2008). There is not a concomitant provision in a Chapter
11 as to payments before or at the time of each payment to creditors under a Chapter 11 Plan.
Accordingly, DSO obligations are senior in priority to the claims of the Trustee and his professionals
in a Chapter 11 Bankruptcy where non-exempt assets exceeded DSO claims of the Estate.
B. Toussant’s Ongoing Claim For Child Support is a Section 507(a)(1)(A) Claim
As set forth above, 11 U.S.C. Section 507(a)(1)(A) provides that an allowed unsecured claim
that is owed to or recoverable by a spouse for domestic support should be allowed as of the date of
the filing of the petition. When confronted with questions of statutory construction, the analysis
should start with the language of the statute itself. Hughes Aircraft Co. v. Jacobson, 525 U.S. 432,
438 (1999). When the statute’s language is plain, the court should enforce it according to its terms,
unless such a reading would render it absurd. Lamie v. United States Trustee, 540 U.S. 526, 534
(2004) quoting Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Union Planters Bank, N.A., 530 U.S. 1, 6 (2000).
To determine whether the statutory language is plain or ambiguous, the court should refer to
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“the language itself, the specific context in which that language is used, and the broader context of
the statute as a whole.” Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 341 (1997). When a statute does
not define a term, that term should be construed according to its ordinary, contemporary, common
meaning. San Jose Christian College v. Morgan Hill, 360 F.3d 1024, 1034 (9th Cir. 2004). The
court may resort to a dictionary to determine the plain meaning of the term undefined by a statute.
Id. The Court should only refer to the statute’s legislative history if an ambiguity exists or an absurd
construction results. Id.
First, an interpretation that Section 507(a)(1)(A) does not cover DSO’s that are due post-
petition would lead to absurd results. A Trustee or Debtor In Possession could claim that all income
is property of the Estate, and refuse to pay ongoing support obligations during the limbo period
between the filing of a case, and the date a plan is confirmed or the case is converted to a case under
Chapter 7. The Knight case which has now been consolidated into the Death Row Estate, has been
active for three years.
Also, before BAPCPA, all DSO’s were priority. Former 507(a)(7) provided in relevant part:
Allowed claims for debts to a spouse, former spouse or child of the debtor, for alimony to, maintenance for, or support of such spouse or child, in connection with a separation agreement, divorce decree or other order of a court of record …
Notably, under former Section 507(a)(7), there was no such language regarding “as of the
date of filing.” It would be an absurd interpretation of 507(a)(1)(A) to assume Congress would
elevate DSO’s to first priority only to eliminate DSO’s that came due post-petition as priority claims
altogether. This is particularly true when the broad purpose of certain BAPCPA amendments was to
promote the protection of women and children.
The plain meaning of Section 507(a)(1)(A) also supports Toussant’s claims that her DSO
claims should be allowed pursuant to Section 507(a)(1)(A). DSO obligations were “owed to” or
“recoverable” by Toussant even though an order providing for these payments was entered post-
petition. “Owed” nor “recoverable” are defined terms in the Bankruptcy Code. The ordinary,
common meaning of “owed” should impel the court to a conclusion that a post-petition DSO should
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qualify as a claim under Section 507(a)(1)(A). “Owed” in its ordinary sense means (1) to be under
obligation to pay or repay in return for something received; be indebted in the sum of; (2) to be
under obligation to render (as duty or service) b: to be indebted to; to be in debt for. WEBSTER’S
COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 60 (11th Ed. 2005). “Recoverable” in its ordinary sense means (1) to
get back; regain (2) a: to bring back to normal position or condition; (3) a: to make up for b: to gain
by legal process (4) to regain a normal position. Id.
Under California law, Toussant as spouse and legal guardian to Child X, is owed a duty of
support from the debtor Marion Knight from the time Child X is born until the time Child X turns
eighteen. Accordingly, Child X has a claim under 507(a)(1)(A). “The duty of support imposed by
Section 3900 continues as to an unmarried child who has attained the age of 18 years . . . .”
California Family Code Section 3901. “Duty of Support” means an obligation imposed or
imposable by law to provide support for a child, spouse, or former spouse, including an unsatisfied
obligation to provide support. California Family Code Section 4901(c). Even though the child
support claim and spousal support claim did not necessarily mature as of the petition date, Knight
owed Toussant and Child X a duty pre-petition that continues until Child X turns 18.
Toussant clearly has a “claim” under 11 U.S.C. Sections 502(a) and 101(5), and none of the
provisions in 11 U.S.C. Section 502(b) apply. Toussant’s claim can also reasonably be considered a
DSO. Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. Section 101(14A), “domestic support obligation”
Means a debt that accrues before, on, or after the date of the order for relief in a case under this title, including interest that accrues on that debt as provided under applicable nonbankruptcy law notwithstanding any other provisions of this title, that is- (A) owed to or recoverable by- (i) a spouse, former spouse, or child of the debtor or such child’s parent, legal guardian, or responsible relative; or (ii) a governmental unit; (B) in the nature of alimony, maintenance or support (including assistance provided by a governmental unit) of such spouse, former spouse, or child of the debtor or such child’s parent, without regard to whether such debt is expressly so designated; (C) established or subject to establishment before, on or after the date of the order for relief in a case under this title, by reason of applicable provisions of-
(i) a separation agreement, divorce decree, or property settlement agreement;
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(ii) an order of a court of record; (iii) a determination made in accordance with applicable nonbankruptcy law by a government unit….
The Order entered by the Superior Court of the State of California For the County of Ventura
attached to the declaration of Brad Sandler as Exhibit “2” is an Order for payment of support. For
all the foregoing reasons, Toussant and Child X have a claim against the Estate based on domestic
support obligation ordered against Marion Knight.
C. Toussant’s alleged execution of a release as to certain Claims against the Estate does not
Apply to her claims for Spousal Support and Certainly Do Not Apply to Her Claims For Child
Support on Behalf of Her Child
Toussant executed a Release on September 5, 2007 by which she waived certain claims. In
discussions with the Trustee’s Counsel, it was suggested that Toussant executed a Release as to all
her claims against the Estate. Toussant has never been under the impression that she had waived
child support or spousal support as part of the Release. To the extent necessary to advance
Toussant’s DSO claims, Toussant reserves all rights to file a Motion to vacate or reconsider the
release Executed on September 5, 2007. However, this Motion is unnecessary because a waiver of a
DSO claim is void against public policy, the child did not sign the Release (nor did a representative
for child), and the purpose of California Civil Code Section 1542 would dictate that the Release here
should not extend to the Child and Spousal Support.
1. The Section 1542 Waiver is Void Against Public Policy and Should Be Set Aside Solely
To The Extent it Covers DSO Claims.
The validity of a waiver under California Civil Code depends upon the type of matter under
consideration. One California Court of Appeal has broadly held that a waiver of child support is
void against public policy. Parents have no right, in California, to waive or limit by agreement a child's right to support.... Public policy intervenes to protect the child's continued right to support. A judgment so terminating parental rights and the attendant obligation to support the child is void as a breach of public policy and as an act in excess of the court's jurisdiction.
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Kristine M. v. David P., 2006 Cal. App. LEXIS 34 (January 13, 2006).
As for the $10,129.00 that is spousal support, Movant first argues that the release does not
apply to her claims for Spousal Support. Even if these claims are considered to be part of the
agreement, Movant argues that waiver of spousal support is also void against public policy.
California courts have held that waiver of support obligations must be scrutinized. When the
equities don’t favor a waiver of spousal support, “it would be unconscionable to enforce the spousal
support provisions against the wife….” Wright v. Wright (1957) 148 Cal.App.2d 257; See also
Moog v. Moog (1928) 203 Cal 406.
The equities strongly favor a finding that the Release does not apply to Toussant’s spousal
support claim. Mr. Knight had promised Toussant she would be compensated for past due support
and well into the future. To date, Mr. Knight has not made payments. Further, Mr. Knight’s
activities as husband has caused Toussant to be embroiled in significant legal disputes. The claims
brought against her, and those that parties continue to allege, were based on Knight’s activities.
2. The Child Did Not Sign the Release, nor Did a Guardian Ad Litum or Conservator, or
Toussant on behalf of Child.
Child X did not sign the release. Child support is a duty owed to the Child. Toussant did not
sign the Release on behalf of the Child. Since, the child did not sign the release and no claims of the
child’s were signed by anybody on the child’s behalf, the claims for child support may be brought on
this ground alone, notwithstanding the Release.
3. The Purpose of California Civil Code Section 1542 and Case Law Interpreting Section
1542 Would Dictate That the Release here should not Extend to the Child and Spousal Support
Claims.
California Civil Code Section 1542 reads as follows: “A general release does not extend to
claims which the creditor does not know or suspect to exist in his favor at the time of executing the
release, which if known by him must have materially affected his settlement with the Debtor.” The
purpose of Section 1542 is to prevent the inadvertent barring of a later discovered claim by a mere
boiler-plate recital in the release. Thus, it has been held that the mere recital in a release that a party
waives unknown claims is not sufficient. Casey v. Proctor, 59 Cal. 2d 97, 110 (1963). DSO claims
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would not be inadvertently barred if Section 1542 does not apply because nowhere in the recitals
was this information listed.
Toussant only intended to waive her rights against the Estate and the Estates’ claims as to her
regarding the Malibu property transaction. Where a party’s intent is to release only claims relating
to one transaction, the Court should consider that the release involved is not a general release. In re
Estate of McLellan, 35 Cal. App. 2d 18, 2194 P.2d 408, 409 (1939). The following provision is
found on page 11 of the Release:
Pursuant to this statute, as well as any other statutes or common-law principles, whether of federal or state origin, of similar effect, the trustees, on the one hand, and Toussant, on the other hand (each, a “Party”) each expressly waive any rights with respect to any claim which on Party may have against the other Party.
The Trustees were both aware that Toussant had a child, yet nowhere in the release was it set
forth that she would be waiving any right to child support or spousal support. Declaration of
Michel’le Toussant. A general release should contain language in the broadest possible terms.
Neubauer v. Goldfarb, 108 Cal. App. 4th 47, 133 Cal. Rprt. 2d 218 (2003). Since the release was not
labeled a general release, nor did it mention the facts surrounding Toussant’s other potential claims
against the Estate, the release should not preclude her from recovering spousal or child support.
D. The Trustee Should be Compelled to Immediately pay Support Obligations To Toussant
Bankruptcy Courts have discretion to determine whether to compel immediate payment of
certain expenses. In re HQ Global Holdings, Inc., 282 B.R. 169, 173-74 (Bankr. D. Del 2002). The
“Court has wide discretion in allowing the payment of administrative expenses, such as attorney’s
fees, on an interim basis.” In re Standard Furniture Company, 3 B.R. 527, 532 (Bankr. S.D. Cal.
1980) citing Lutheran Hospitals and Homes Society of Amer. V. Duecy, 422 F.2d 200, 205 (9th Cir.
1970); Matter of Pac. Far East Line, Inc., 458 F.Supp. 771 (N. Cal. 1978). Likewise, discretion is
applicable to claims for expense like rent even though the Bankruptcy Act did explicitly allow the
court to establish a priority claim for rent among administrative claimants. See E.g. Matter of
Texlon Corporation, 3 B.C.D. 1013 (S.N.Y. 1977). Since DSO obligations are senior in priority to
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administrative claimants, the Bankruptcy Court should have equally wide discretion in directing the
Trustee to make payments. Accordingly, the Court should direct Trustee R. Todd Nielson to
immediately pay Toussant the DSO obligations owed to her.
IV. CONCLUSION
For all the foregoing reasons, Toussant respectfully requests an Order:
1. Allowing a DSO claim for support and spousal support payment to her
totaling $13,492.00 per month beginning on February 1, 2009 and continuing forward.
2. Compelling the Trustee to make such payments as they come due, and to pay
the amounts that came due on February 1, 2009, March 1, 2009, and April 1, 2009;
3. Any other relief the Court deems to be just and appropriate.
Dated: April 15, 2009 Respectfully submitted by,
LINDEMANN LAW GROUP PLC
By: /s/ Blake Lindemann
Blake Lindemann
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DECLARATION OF MICHEL’LE TOUSSANT
1. I, Michel’le Toussant, am over the age of eighteen years, and if called upon to testify
I could and would do so competently. I have personal knowledge of the facts set forth herein, and
based on that personal knowledge, I assert that all such facts are true and correct to the best of my
knowledge. To the extent I base my testimony upon information and belief or upon admissible
evidence other than my personal knowledge, I will specifically so state.
2. I married Marion Knight, Jr. (“Knight” or “Debtor”) on or about April 5, 1997. I
agreed to marry Knight while he was serving a prison sentence for assault and battery. On or about
November 29, 2002, I bore a child of which Mr. Knight was the father.
3. I executed a mutual release and settlement (the “Release”) on or about September 5,
2007, which was apparently submitted to this Court by Trustee Diamond and Trustee Neilson as an
exhibit to a F.R.B.P. 9019 Motion for An Order Approving a Compromise. See Exhibit “2”
attached hereto. This release was executed on my own behalf and not on behalf of my child. The
Release involved the settlement of a Mediated dispute regarding liabilities that occurred based on
transactions surrounding Mr. Knight’s Malibu Property (the “Malibu Property”).
4. I executed the Release believing the Release only related to my claim for the Malibu
property and any claim against me regarding the same. I did not receive the Malibu property as part
of the settlement.
5. It was my belief that I would still be able to make claims against the bankruptcy
estate for child support and domestic support, notwithstanding the Release. No language I read in
the release indicates I specifically waived my rights to claim spousal support or child support on
behalf of my child.
7. I informed both R. Todd Neilson and Richard Diamond that I had a child with
Knight.
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PROOF OF SERVICE OF DOCUMENT
I am over the age of 18 and not a party to this bankruptcy case or adversary proceeding. My business address is: Lindemann Law Group, 433 N. Camden Drive, Beverly Hills, CA 90210.
The foregoing document described as NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION FOR ALLOWANCE OF DOMESTIC SUPPORT OBLIGATION CLAIM AND TO COMPEL THE CHAPTER 11 TRUSTEE R. TODD NEILSON TO IMMEDIATELY PAY DOMESTIC SUPPORT OBLIGATION CLAIM; MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES; DECLARATION OF BRAD SANDLER AND MICHEL’LE TOUSSANT IN SUPPORT THEREOF will be served or was served (a) on the judge in chambers in the form and manner required by LBR 5005-2(d); and (b) in the manner indicated below:
I. TO BE SERVED BY THE COURT VIA NOTICE OF ELECTRONIC FILING (“NEF”) : Pursuant to controlling General Order(s) and Local Bankruptcy Rule(s) (“LBR”), the foregoing document will be served by the court via NEF and hyperlink to the document. On April 15, 2009 I checked the CM/ECF docket for this bankruptcy case or adversary proceeding and determined that the following person(s) are on the Electronic Mail Notice List to receive NEF transmission at the email address(es) indicated below:
Service information continued on attached page. II. SERVED BY U.S. MAIL OR OVERNIGHT MAIL (indicate method for each person or entity served): On April 15, 2009, I served the following person(s) and/or entity(ies) at the last known address(es) in this bankruptcy case or adversary proceeding by placing a true and correct copy thereof in a sealed envelope in the United States Mail, first class, postage prepaid, and/or with an overnight mail service addressed as follows. Listing the judge here constitutes a declaration that mailing to the judge will be completed no later than 24 hours after the document is filed. Service information continued on attached page. III. SERVED BY PERSONAL DELIVERY, FACSIMILE TRANSMISSION OR EMAIL (indicate method for each person or entity served): Pursuant to F.R.Civ.P. 5 and/or controlling LBR, on April 15, 2009, I served the following person(s) and/or entity(ies) by personal delivery, or (for those who consented in writing to such service method), by facsimile transmission and/or email as follows. Listing the judge here constitutes a declaration that personal delivery on the judge will be completed no later than 24 hours after the document is filed.
Service information continued on attached page.
I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the United States of America and of California that the foregoing is true and correct. Dated: April 15, 2009 /s/ Karen Bower Karen Bower
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ADDITIONAL SERVICE LIST INFORMATION
I. TO BE SERVED BY THE COURT VIA NOTICE OF ELECTRONIC FILING (“NEF”) Adam N Barasch [email protected] Bradley E Brook [email protected] Marc S Cohen [email protected] Marcus Colabianchi [email protected] Jeffrey Lee Costell [email protected], [email protected];[email protected];rhull@costelllaw. com;[email protected] Jeffrey Lee Costell , [email protected];[email protected];[email protected];[email protected] Donald H Cram [email protected] Ashleigh A Danker [email protected] Henry S David [email protected] Brian L Davidoff [email protected], [email protected];[email protected] Jeffry A Davis [email protected] Richard K Diamond [email protected], [email protected] J Rudy Freeman [email protected], [email protected] Debra I Grassgreen [email protected] Everett L Green [email protected] Peter J Gurfein [email protected] Jeffrey J Hagen [email protected] James Andrew Hinds [email protected] Eric P Israel [email protected] Steven J Kahn [email protected] Ira Benjamin Katz [email protected] Jeremy W Katz [email protected] Andy Kong [email protected] Duane Kumagai [email protected], [email protected] Dare Law [email protected] Ronald L Leibow [email protected] Elan S Levey [email protected], [email protected] Alvin Mar [email protected] Kathleen P March [email protected] Daniel J McCarthy [email protected] Patrick K McClellan [email protected] Kathryn A Meyer [email protected] Randall P Mroczynski [email protected] Robert B Orgel [email protected], [email protected] Christina M Padien [email protected] Gary A Plotkin [email protected], [email protected] Uzzi O Raanan [email protected] Russell H Rapoport [email protected], [email protected]
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Anthony J Rothman [email protected] Victor A Sahn [email protected] Matthew J. Shier [email protected] Jeffrey S Shinbrot [email protected] Pamela E Singer [email protected], [email protected] Gary A Starre [email protected] John N Tedford [email protected] Wayne R Terry [email protected] United States Trustee (LA) [email protected] Jason Wallach [email protected] David Weinstein [email protected] Sharon Z Weiss [email protected] Steven Werth [email protected] Martin S Zohn [email protected]
II. SERVED BY U.S. MAIL OR OVERNIGHT MAIL VIA FIRST CLASS MAIL JUDGE’S COPY Honorable Vincent P. Zurzolo United States Bankruptcy Court Central District of California Edward R. Roybal Federal Building and Courthouse 255 E. Temple Street Suite 1360 Los Angeles, CA 90012 DEBTOR Marion Knight, Jr. P.O. Box 77622 Corona, CA 92877 COUNSEL TO DEBTOR Robert S. Altagen, Esq. Law Offices of Robert S. Altagen, Inc. 1111 Corporate Center Dr.,Suite 201 Monterey Park, CA 91754 COUNSEL TO MARION KNIGHT, JR. Daniel J. McCarthy, Esq. Hill, Farrer & Burrill LLP
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One California Plaza 300 South Grand Ave., 37th Floor Los Angeles, CA 90071-3147 FORMER CHAPTER 11 TRUSTEE Richard Diamond, Esq. Danning Gill Diamond & Kollitz LLP 2029 Century Park East, Third Floor Los Angeles, CA 90067 ATTORNEY FOR TRUSTEE Eric Israel, Esq. Danning Gill Diamond & Kollitz LLP 2029 Century Park East, Third Floor Los Angeles, CA 90067 CHAPTER 11 TRUSTEE R. Todd Neilson LECG 2049 Century Park East, Suite 2300 Los Angeles, CA 90067-3125 FORMER ATTORNEY FOR CHAPTER 11 TRUSTEE Marc Cohen, Esq. Kaye Scholer, LLP 1999 Avenue of the Stars, Ste. 1700 Los Angeles, CA 90067 COMMITTEE COUNSEL Debra I. Grassgreen, Esq. PACHULSKI STANG ZIEHL & JONES LLP 10100 Santa Monica Blvd., 11th Floor Los Angeles, California 90067-4100 INTERESTED PARTY L. Cruz, Chief Attorney Sheila Lebowitz, Esq. Child Support Services Dept., Interstate Division 5701 S. Eastern Ave., Suite 201 Commerce, CA 90040
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. SERVED BY PERSONAL DELIVERY, FACSIMILE TRANSMISSION OR EMAIL
VIA E-MAIL Judge Vincent P. Zurzolo Courtesty Copy Pilot Program [email protected]
