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AttorneyandJudgeExperienceinTortsLitigation:AnEmpiricalStudy†
Yun‐chienChang*
Kong‐PinChen**
Chang‐ChingLin***
†AdraftofthispaperhasbeenpresentedattheTheodoreEisenbergEmpiricalLegalStudiesConferenceheldatTelAvivUniversityFacultyofLawonJune2–3,2015;HamburgLecturesonLawandEconomicsonMay27,2015;BACTseminaratRotterdamInstituteofLawandEconomicsonJune5,2015;StaffSeminaratSingaporeManagementUniversityFacultyofLawonJuly29,2015;the2015EastAsianLawandSocietyAnnualMeetingheldatWasedaUniversity,TokyoonAugust3–6,2015;UniversityofPennsylvaniaLawSchoolAdHocFacultyWorkshoponOct.27,2015;LawandEconomicsColloquiumatNorthwesternLawSchoolonOct.29,2015;2015ConferenceonEmpiricalLegalStudiesheldatWashingtonUniversityatSaintLouisonOct.31,2015;RCHSSEmpiricalLegalStudiesWorkshoponNov.6,2015;QuantitativeEmpiricalLegalStudiesConferenceheldatInternationalSchoolofFinanceLaw,EastChinaUniversityofPoliticalScienceandLawinShanghai,ChinaonNov.30,2015;FacultyWorkshopatUniversityofIowaCollegeofLawonJan.25,2016;LawandEconomicsColloquiumatNYUSchoolofLawonFeb.9,2016;Work‐in‐ProgressWorkshopattheUniversityofChicagoLawSchoolonFeb.25,2016.WethankDavidAbrams,GailAgrawal,JanetAinsworth,ShilpiBhattacharya,BernieBlack,ArthurBonnfield,GaryChan,DawnChutkow,JacquesdeLisle,ThomasEger,MichaelFaure,TaliaFisher,ChrisReindersFolmer,EzraFriedman,HualingFu,ThomasGallanis,JeanGalbraith,JonahGelbach,JergGutmann,PaulHeaton,MichaelHeise,Han‐weiHo,DavidHoffman,WilliamHubbard,DavidHyman,NicholasJohnson,MichaelKnoll,Hon.JamesLeach,PeyWoanLee,KKLim,KateLitvak,JingLiu,KeeYangLow,PeterMascini,SandraGMayson,AlanMiller,KonstantinosPilpilides,VictorD.Quintanilla,JasonRantanen,JohnReitz,IssiRosen‐Zvi,MaxSchanzenbach,MargoSchlanger,JeanetteShao,MatthewSpitzer,AgnesStrauß,HangWuTang,LeaVanderVelde,StefanVoigt,FranziskaWeber,KerenWeinshall‐Margel,YixinXu,EyalZamir,andWeiZhangforhelpfulcomments.Withduerespects,wethanktheseveraljudgesandattorneyswhoattendthetworoundtablediscussionsonjudgeandattorneyexperienceforkindlysharingtheirinsightswithus.WealsothankAliceKuo,Jian‐HuaLai,Chieh‐YuLiu,HilaryTsai,Yu‐JuneTseng,andTien‐hsinWangforresearchassistance.Da‐weiDavidJuang(theformerCEOofpingluweb.com)provideduswiththejudgeandattorneyexperiencedata,whichareinvaluableforthisresearch.*AssociateResearchProfessor&DirectorofCenterforEmpiricalLegalStudies,InstitutumIurisprudentiae,AcademiaSinica,[email protected]. **DistinguishedResearchFellowandDirector,ResearchCenterforHumanitiesandSocialSciences,AcademiaSinica;ExecutiveDirector,CenterofInstitutionandBehaviorStudies,AcademiaSinica;Professor,DepartmentofEconomics,[email protected]***AssociateProfessor,DepartmentofEconomics,[email protected]
Chang, Chen & Lin
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Abstract
Theeffectofattorneyandjudgeexperienceinlitigationhasnotbeenfully
explored,asdetailedmeasuresofjuristexperiencearenotavailable.Usinga
uniquedatasetfromTaiwan,wemeasureattorney(judge)experiencebythe
totalnumberofcivilcasestheyhaverepresented(rendered)from2000to2014.
Combiningthesedatawithanotheruniquedatasetwecompiledfrompainand
sufferingdamageslawsuitsregardingpersonalinjuryinastructuralequation
model,wefindthatbothdistrictcourtjudgesandplaintiffattorneysfollowthe
recentchangesindamagesassessmentpracticeinhighcourts.Courtawards
weresubjecttotheanchoringeffectcastbyplaintiffs’claims.Inaddition,the
moreexperiencedtheplaintiffattorneyswere,themoretheplaintiffs’claims
deviatedfromthehistoricaltrendofcourt‐adjudicatedpainandsuffering
damages.Thus,throughtheindirecteffectofhigherclaims,experiencedplaintiff
attorneysearnedtheirclientshigheramountsofpainandsufferingdamages.
Whetherdefendantshireattorneysandwhetherdefendantattorneysandjudges
areexperienceddonotaffectwhethercourt‐adjudicatedpainandsuffering
damagesdeviatedfromthehistorictrend.
Keywords
Painandsufferingdamages,compensationpercentage,filingfee,deviationfrom
historictrend,structuralequationmodel(SEM)
Chang, Chen & Lin
iii
TableofContents
I. Introduction ............................................................................................................ 1
II. Pain and Suffering Damages Law and Legal Practice in Taiwan .......................... 3
III. Research Questions and Prior Literature ............................................................... 7
A. Judges ............................................................................................................. 7
B. Attorneys ........................................................................................................ 8
1. Assignment of Cases to Attorneys ......................................................... 9
2. Plaintiff Attorneys ................................................................................ 14
3. Defendant Attorneys ............................................................................ 17
IV. Models ................................................................................................................. 18
A. OLS Models to Predict District Court and High Court Awards ................... 20
B. Structural Equation Model on Deviation of Court Award from Trend ........ 21
V. Data ...................................................................................................................... 26
VI. Findings and Implications .................................................................................... 34
A. Judges Pay Close Attention to High Court Decisions .................................. 34
B. Attorney Influence on Plaintiff Claim ......................................................... 37
C. Plaintiff Attorney Influence on Adjudication ............................................... 38
D. Judge Experience Does Not Affect Deviation Pattern Error! Bookmark not
defined.
E. Defendant Attorney Has No Role ................................................................ 39
VII. Conclusion ........................................................................................................... 40
Appendix A: Predicting Court-Adjudicated Pain and Suffering Damages .................. 42
Appendix B: Attorney Hiring Decisions ...................................................................... 44
Chang, Chen & Lin
1
I. INTRODUCTION
Whenyougetinvolvedinalegaldisputeandthecaseisgoingtocourt,
wouldyouratherhireanexperiencedattorneythananinexperiencedone,
assumingyoucanaffordtopaythefeechargedbytheformer?Ifyes,why?Senior
lawyerschargemore,butwhatistheaddedvalueoftheirexperience?Inthelong
debateontheissueof“haveversushave‐not”inlitigation,thepremiseisthatthe
haves(i.e.therich)arebetterabletomobilizelitigation‐usefulresources,
includinghiringmoreexpensiveattorneys(Kuo‐ChangHuang,Lin,andChen
2014;Boyd2015b:296;Chen,Huang,andLin2015).1 Fromintuitionsof
ordinarypeopletothelegalliterature,theoftenimplicitassumptionisthat
experiencedattorneysarebetter.Nonetheless,veryfewempiricalworkshave
beenabletodemonstratethedifferencesbetweenexperiencedand
inexperiencedattorneys.
Astudyonattorneyexperiencewouldbeincompleteiftheroleofjudges(in
ajurisdictionwithoutjuries)isignored.Theeffectofattorneyexperiencecould
varyaccordingtothesittingjudges’experience.Theeffectofjudgeexperience
alsohasindependentinterests.Judgesfollowprecedentsthatsettlequestionsof
law,butwhethertheyfollowprecedentsthatdealwithquestionsoffacts,suchas
howtoassessdamages,hasnotbeenrigorouslyexamined.Towhatextentjudges’
experienceaffectstheirdecisionstofollowhighercourtsregardingassessmentof
damageshasalsonotbeenstudied,either.Poweredbyauniquedatasetthat
containsdetailedmeasuresofmultiplefacetsoftheexperienceofallattorneys
andjudgesinTaiwanasof2014,thisarticlesetsouttofillthegapinthe
empiricalliterature.
Thelegalissueusedtoexaminetheimportofjuristexperienceisthe
assessmentofpainandsufferingdamagesforpersonalinjuriesincurredincar
accidents.Theeffectofjuristexperiencecanbebetterisolatedwhenthejudicial
decisionsareneitherformulaicnorrule‐based.Painandsufferingdamagesare
1 Thisarticledoesnotdirectlyfitinthe“haveversushavenot”literatureitself.Mostnatural‐personplaintiffsanddefendantsincaraccidentcasesare“have‐not”—ourdataonparties’incomecansupportthisclaim.Asaresultofthelackofvariance,partycapabilityandcourts’ideologicalpreferencewouldbeaminorconcern,ifatall,inthisstudy,sothattheeffectofjuristexperiencecanbeidentifiedbetter.
Chang, Chen & Lin
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highlydiscretionaryinTaiwan,2 andthusjudgesmaybeaffectedbyextra‐factual
factors,includingattorney“manipulation.”Albeitdiscretionary,theamountof
painandsufferingdamagesis,toacertainextent,predictable.Twoprior
empiricalstudies(Changetal.2014;Changetal.2015)havedemonstratedthat
painandsufferingdamagescanbecapturedbysimpleregressionmodels3—this
isimportant,asattorneyexperiencewouldnotmatteriftheamountof
non‐pecuniarydamagesisarbitrarilydecided.
Assessmentsofpainandsufferingdamagesprovideastreamlinedsettingto
examinejudicialbehaviors.Avastempiricalliteratureisdevotedtoshowthat
judgesareideological(forarecentreview,seeEpstein,Landes,andPosner2013:
77–85).Ontheotherhand,asPosner(2008)pointsout,easycasescanbe
determinedbystatutorytexts.Assessingtheamountofpainandsuffering
damagesisneitheralegalistnoranideologicalexercise.Followingthepragmatic
labor‐modelofjudges(Posner2008;Epstein,Landes,andPosner2013),this
articleempiricallyexamineswhetherthecareerjudgesinTaiwandemonstrated
reversalaversionand“audition(desireforpromotion),”withouttheconfounding
influenceofideologyandlegalisticpressure,andwhetherthejudges’experience
onthebenchaffectstheirbehaviors.
Thisstreamlinedsettingisalsosuitablefortestingtheeffectofattorney
experience,asattorneys’ideologycanbeignored.Granted,lawyerskillsarenot
singular.Threadingthestatutorytextsandjudicialcasestogethertomakean
innovativeandconvincingargumentisahallmarkofgoodlawyers.Nevertheless,
thisskillislargelyuselessintheassessmentofpainandsufferingdamages.Thus,
ourfindingregardingtheeffectofattorneyexperienceisnotreadily
generalizabletootherlegalcontextswherestatutoryinterpretationiscritical.Yet,
intermsofidentifyingtheeffectofattorneyexperience,perhapsitisbetterthat
thelegalissuewestudyenablesustoignoreotheraspectsofattorneyskillsand
focusontheaddedvalueofexperiencewhenattorneysmakesnumericclaims
basedonfacts.
2 Nostatuteorsupremecourtprecedenthasprovidedclearguidanceonhowtoassessthistypeofnon‐pecuniarydamages.3 TheR‐squaresofthemultipleregressionmodelsusedtopredictthesetwotypesofpainandsufferingdamagesrenderedbycourtsinTaiwanbetween2008and2012arebetween0.50and0.85.
Chang, Chen & Lin
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Usingstructuralequationmodelsthatcancontrolforendogeneityproblem,
wefindthatdistrictcourtjudgesdetectthechangingtrendinhighcourtsand
dutifullyfollowthelatestwayhighcourtsassesspainandsufferingdamages.
ConsistentwithChang,Chen,andLin(2016),weagainfindthatjudgeswere
influencedbytheamountofplaintiffs’claims.Judicialexperiencedoesnotaffect
whetherjudgesdeviatefromthehistoricaltrendornot.Judgesaresuspiciousof
seniorattorneys.Seniorplaintiffattorneystendtoover‐claim,andthroughthe
anchoringeffect,winmorepainandsufferingdamagesfortheirclients.Whether
thedefendanthiredanattorneyandhowexperienceddefendantattorneysaredo
notmatter.
Thestructureofthisarticleisasfollows:PartIIprovidesanoverviewof
Taiwanlaw.PartIIIexplainstheresearchquestionsandsummarizestheprior
literature.PartIVlaysoutourOLSandSEMmodels.PartVdescribesthe
pertinentdata.PartVIdiscussestheimplicationofourfindings.PartVII
concludes.
II. PAINANDSUFFERINGDAMAGESLAWANDLEGALPRACTICEINTAIWAN4
Pursuant to Articles 193 and 195 of the Taiwan Civil Code, victims of a
tortiousact canrequest the tortfeasor topaypecuniarydamagesandpainand
suffering damages.5 No formula exists for courts to determine the amount of
painandsufferingdamages.Thecivilcodeprovidesnoguidance.Afewleading
casesrenderedbytheSupremeCourtofTaiwaninthe1950sand1960sdeclared
thatthefollowingfactorsshouldbeconsidered:thesocio‐economicstatus,total
asset, annual income, age, educational background, etc. of both sides, the
plaintiff ’s level of pain and harm, the victim’s negligence, the defendant’s
repentance,andsoon.Otherthanthis,todate,noconventionalwisdomorrules
of thumbexists forquantifyingpainandsuffering. Inpractice,plaintiffs simply
4 PartofthissectionisadaptedfromChangetal.(2014).5 TaiwanCivilCodeart.193Ipromulgates:“Ifapersonhaswrongfullydamagedtothebodyorhealthofanother,andcausedtheinjuredpersontoloseordecreasehislaboringcapacity,ortoincreasetheneedinliving,thetortfeasorsshallbeboundtomakecompensationtotheinjuredpersonforanyinjuryarisingtherefrom.”TaiwanCivilCodeart.195Iprescribes:“Ifapersonhaswrongfullydamagedtothebody,health,reputation,liberty,credit,privacyorchastityofanother,ortoanother'spersonalityinasevereway,theinjuredpersonmayclaimareasonablecompensationinmoneyevenifsuchinjuryisnotapurelypecuniaryloss.”
Chang, Chen & Lin
4
claimanamountandcontendthatitisjust,withlittlesupportingevidence.Court
decisionstypicallystartwithatemplatediscussionthatcarbon‐copiesthelistof
factorsemphasizedbytheleadingcases,6 thensummarizethefactsofthecaseat
hand,andconcludebyawardinganamount.Asjudgeshaveneverelaboratedon
theirformulasandrarelyprovidedconcreteinformationregardingthefactors,it
isdoubtful towhatextent those factors listed in the templateargumentsaffect
thefinalamountofpainandsufferingdamages.7
Courts inTaiwanwill review the receipts of all pecuniary expenses and
only grant plaintiffswith reasonable expenses. Due to themandatory national
health care system that covers most medical treatments andmedication, only
medical expenses that are not covered by the health care plans (such as
co‐payment, certain special medicines and operations, and domestic nursery
cares)canberecoveredbythevictimfromthetortfeasor.
Plaintiffsdonothaveanincentivetoclaimunrealisticallyhighamountsof
painandsufferingdamages.First, filing feesareproportional to theamountof
claimed total damages—roughly, around 1%of the total claimed damages; see
(Kuo‐ChangHuang2008:208fn.17).8 Second,the losingpartyhastopay filing
feesandothercourt fees. Ina tort lawsuit,aplaintiffusuallyhastopaypartof
thecourtfees(includingthefilingfee)ifthecourtdoesnotgrantallherclaims.
Theplaintiffgenerallyhastopay[1–(courtaward/plaintiff ’sclaim)]×courtfee.
So claiming a high amount of pain and suffering damages increases both the
amountoffilingfeesandtheprobabilityofbearingahigherpercentageofcourt
fees.One important caveat:whenaplaintiffmakespainandsufferingdamages
claimsaspartofthecriminalproceedingsagainstadefendant,andthedefendant
wasfoundguilty,theplaintiffdoesnothavetopayfilingfeesforhercivillawsuit
in the courtof first instance. Suchplaintiffs still have to shareother court fees
6 Notallcourtsusethesametemplate.Thefactorsthatacourtexplicitlyclaimstotakeintoaccountslightlydiffer. 7 Inunreportedtables,weexploredthefactorsthatTaiwanesecourtspurporttohaveconsideredindeterminingpainandsufferingdamages.Thetables,however,suggestnoclearpattern.8 PursuanttoArticle77‐13ofCivilProcedureCodeofTaiwan,thefilingfeeisassessedinthefollowingway:“1,000NTDonthefirstNTD100,000ofthepriceorclaim'svalue,andanadditionalamountshallbetaxedforeachNTD10,000thereafterinaccordancewiththefollowingrates:NTD110ontheportionbetweenNTD100,001andNTD1,000,000inclusive;NTD99ontheportionbetweenNTD1,000,001andNTD10,000,000inclusive;NTD88ontheportionbetweenNTD10,000,001andNTD100,000,000inclusive;NTD77ontheportionbetweenNTD100,000,001andNTD1,000,000,000inclusive;andNTD66ontheportionoverNTD1,000,000,000.AfractionofNTD10,000shallberoundeduptoNTD10,000forpurposesoftaxingcourtcosts.”
Chang, Chen & Lin
5
(suchasperdiemgiventotestifyingwitnesses).
Taiwancangenerallybeconsideredacivil‐lawcountry.Almostalljudgesare
career judgeswhomay ormay not have (most have not) practiced lawbefore
servingonthebench.Atoplawgraduatecanbecomeajudgeat25yearsoldor
so(theaverageinrecentyearsis28yearsold).MostjuristsinTaiwanmajorin
lawasanundergraduate, andonlyaminorityof juristsare trained ina JD‐like
graduate program. Jurists who pass the bar exam and finish six months of
practical training are qualified to practice law. Jurists who pursue a career as
judges or prosecutors have to take the “court officer” examination. Thosewho
pass the examination receive training in theAcademy for the Judiciary for two
years. At the end of their training, based on their grades, preferences, and
openings,theywillbecomejudgesorprosecutors. Judgesaretenured,andthus
presumably less influenced by external political influences. For civil matters,
there are three levels of courts: district courts, high courts, and the supreme
court.Theformertwocandeterminebothquestionsoffactandquestionsoflaw,
whilethesupremecourtonlydealswithquestionsoflaw.Appealingtothecourt
of second instance (for non‐small claim cases, the high courts) is as of right,
whereas large‐stake cases represented by attorneys can be appealed to the
supremecourt,subjecttoitsdiscretion(EisenbergandHuang2012;Chen,Huang,
andLin2015).
Asforattorneyfeescollectedbyplaintiffs’anddefendants’lawyers,
contingentfeesandhourlyfeesinthistypeoftortlitigationareveryrare,though
notprohibited.9 Flatfeesaremainstream.Thus,attorneysdonotnecessarily
haveincentivestoselectcasesthataremorelikelytowin,astheycouldreceive
similaramountsoffees.Also,accordingtotheattorneysweinterviewed,small
9 ZamirandRitov(2010)provideaconvincingbehavioralaccountofwhyplaintiffsintortlitigationoptforthecontingentfeestructurewhiledefendantsdonot.AccordingtotheTaiwaneseattorneysweinterviewed,however,fixedfeeshavebeendominantinTaiwan.Thecontingentfeearrangementwasusedinthefewcaseswhereclientsrequestit,anditwasoftenusedwhentheprobabilityofwinningisnothigh.Thecontingentfeepercentagesare20%–30%.Also,theattorneyfeearrangementisseldompurelycontingent‐based;usuallyattorneyswillstillchargeasmallamountofflatfee;smallfirms,ratherthanbigfirms,aremorewillingtoconsenttoacontingentfeearrangement.Moreimportantly,andstrikinglyoppositetothepracticeintheU.S.market,ourinterviewedattorneysbelievethatitisunethicaltotakecontingentfeesincaraccidentcases,asattorneyswouldbetakingawaymoneytocompensateforthepainandinjuryoftheirclients.Iftortvictimscannotaffordtheusualattorneyfees,attorneysmaychargealowerfeeratherthanenteringintoacontingentfeearrangement.Legalaidisanotherwayforpoorplaintiffstoseeklegalrepresentationwithoutresortingtocontingentfeearrangements.
Chang, Chen & Lin
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lawfirmsandsolopractitioners,whohandletortcases,donothavestableand
wideclientele;thus,theyaregenerallyunwillingtoturndownclientswhoare
willingtopayaflatfee.10 Attorneysoftenadjustthefeesexanteaccordingtothe
complexityofthecases.Seniorattorneysgenerallychargeahigherfee.Case
selectionmaybeintheformofpoorpartiesinsearchofattorneyswhochargea
lowerflatfee.Charginglowfeesisnotagoodindicatoroftheeffectivenessofthe
attorneys.Someattorneysmaybecheapbecausetheyareincapable,whileother
attorneysmaychargealowerfeebecausetheirmarginalcase‐handlingcostis
lower.
Thefollowingfactsarealsoworthnoting.Insurancecompanieshavea
minorroleintortslitigation.Insurancecompaniesarerarely,ifever,apartyin
suchlitigation(noobservationinourdatasetfeaturesaninsurancecompanyas
aparty).11 Evenwhentortfeasorshaveboughtliabilityinsurancepolicies,in
additiontothemandatorymotorvehicleinsurance,tortvictimssuethe
tortfeasors,notthelatter’sinsurancecompany.Also,thereisnodistinction
betweentheplaintiffbarandthedefendantbar(Kuo‐ChangHuang2008:227).
Finally,AbramsandYoon(2007)haveraisedtheissueofthedifficultyto
evaluatethecontributionofanindividualattorney.Thisisnotaprobleminour
study.Whilethepriorliteraturemostlyexaminestheeffectoflawfirms,this
researchfocusesonthatofindividualattorneys.BiglawfirmsinTaiwanmostly
practiceincorporatelawandIPlawandusuallychargebythehour.Seldomdo
theytakecaraccidentcases,mostlybecauseplaintiffswhocannotaffordthefee
chargedbybiglawfirmswillnotseektheirrepresentationinthefirstplace.After
interviewingwithseveralexperiencedattorneys,weidentified12biglawfirms
inTaiwanandcodedtheattorneyswhoworkthereasofSeptember2014.Only5
observationsinourdatabasecontainattorneysaffiliatedwiththesebiglawfirms.
Outsidebiglawfirms,mostattorneyspracticesolo—sometimeshiringafew
associatesandsharingofficespaceandsecretarieswithotherattorneys.Inother
words,litigationoutcomescanbeattributedtoindividualeffortsbyattorneys,
10 Twoveryseniorattorneysweinterviewed(oneofthemrecentlybecameajusticeinTaiwan’sConstitutionalCourt)toldusthattheywouldrefusetorepresentmeritlesscases.Theyadmitthattheyenjoythisprivilegebecausetheyarenotshortofclients.11 Healthinsurancecompaniescansubrogatevictimstosuethetortfeasors,butitisveryrare.Insurancecompaniesmaybesuediftheyrefusetoindemnifyaninsuredperson.Thesearenotthetortslitigationwestudyhere,asjudgesinthosecasesdonothavetoassesspainandsufferingdamages.
Chang, Chen & Lin
7
notlawfirms.
III. RESEARCHQUESTIONSANDPRIORLITERATURE
A. Judges
Ourexaminationofjudicialbehaviorsfocusesonwhetherjudges’experience
affectsthewaytheyfollowprecedents.Aspointedoutabove,inassessingpain
andsufferingdamages,neithertextnorideologyisthejudges’guidingposts.The
roleofprecedentspresumablyloomslarge.Itisnotbreakingnewsthatlower
courtjudgeslargelysticktolegaldoctrinesexpoundedbyhighercourts.The
precedentsunderdiscussionhere,however,refertothepatternofhowhigher
courtsordistrictcourtsinpriorcaseshaveassesseddamagesaccordingtocase
facts.Morespecifically,lowercourtjudgesmayallrefertothesameprovisionin
thecivilcodeandallcitethesameTaiwanSupremeCourtcasesthatlaidoutthe
keyfactorstobeconsidered.Nonetheless,judgesmaygivedifferentweightsto
thesefactors.Followingprecedentsinourempiricalprojectmeansthatjudges
givesimilarweightstofactorssuchasinjurylevel,medicalexpenses,andthe
lengthofdeclaredincarceration.
Wehypothesizethatdistrictcourtjudgeswillfollowtheassessmentpattern
ofappellatecourts.Ingeneral,judgesareaversetotheirdecisions’being
reversed.Overrulingmaytarnishthejudges’reputationandaffecttheirchanceof
beingpromotedtohighercourts.12 InTaiwan,accordingtoourinterviewwith
judges,theaforementionedconcernsdoexistanddistrictcourtjudgesthusstrive
tofollowtheimmediatelysupervisingcourts.13 Wearenotthefirstto
empiricallytestwhetherlowercourtsfollowhighercourtprecedents.14
Nonetheless,tothebestofourknowledge,wearethefirsttoempiricallyexamine
whetherlowercourtsmimicthewayhighercourtsevaluatefactstoassess
12 OurhypothesisisconsistentwithChoi,Gulati,andPosner(2012:518)’sempiricalworkthatfindsthatjudgesinFederalDistrictCourtsintheU.S.“adjusttheiropinion‐writingpracticestominimizetheirworkloadwhilemaximizingtheirreputationandchanceforelevationtoahighercourt.”13 TaiwanHighCourtevenliterallygradedtheDistrictCourtdecisionsappealedtotheHighCourt.Ineachjudge’spersonalwebaccount,shecanseethegradesofallhercasesthatwereappealedaswellastheaveragegradeofherfellowjudgesinthesamedistrictcourt.ThisrulewasabolishedaslateasJuly2015. 14 Forinstance,Boyd(2015a)’srecentempiricalstudyidentifiesthecriticalfactorsinenhancingthehierarchicalinfluenceoffederalcourtsofappealsonfederaldistrictcourtsintheU.S.
Chang, Chen & Lin
8
damages.
Whetherjudges’experienceaffectsthepatternoffollowingprecedentshas
yettobestudiedextensively.Chang,Chen,andLin(2016)reportthat
experiencedjudgesinreal‐worldcaseswerenotsubjecttotheanchoringeffect,
whileinexperiencedjudgeswerestronglyinfluencedbyanchors.Nonetheless,by
counter‐claiming,defendantscanweaken,evenfullyerase,theanchoringeffect
createdbyplaintiffs’claims.Judges’experience,therefore,isusefulindebiasing.
Asjudgeshaveincentives(reversalaversionanddesireforpromotion)tofollow
highercourtprecedentsthroughouttheirtenure,weexpectthatexperiencedoes
notmatter.Still,arigorousempiricaltestingiswarranted.
B. Attorneys
Theeffectofattorneyexperiencehasnotbeenthoroughlystudied,perhaps
forlackofgooddataandtheproblemofselectioneffect.Severalexistentstudies
havefoundthatseniorattorneysperformbetterinlitigationthanunseasoned
colleagues.AbramsandYoon(2007)studyalmost12,000felonycasesinwhich
publicdefenderswererandomlyassignedtoclients,andfindthatexperienced
attorneys,measuredbytheirtenureinthepublicdefenderoffice,achieve
substantiallymorefavorableoutcomesfortheirclientsthanlessexperienced
attorneys.Harris,Peeples,andMetzloff(2005:235–36,241)measureexperience
ofmedicalmalpracticeattorneysbytheyearofpracticeandthenumberofcases
anattorneyhashandledwithinthe348sampledcases,andfindthatattorneys
whohadhandledmoremedicalmalpracticecases,hadmoretrialexperience,and
wenttobetterlawschoolsperformedbetterthanattorneyswithoutthese
attributes.Harris,Peeples,andMetzloff(2008:267,280),using“yearssince
admittedtopractice”and“numberofmed‐malcaseshandledduringthestudy
period”asameasurementofattorneyexperience,findthatplaintiffs’attorneys
whohavehandledatleastfourcasesweremorelikelytoobtainmoneyforthe
plaintiffs.Krishnan,Davidoff,andThomas(2014)andHymanetal.(2015)find
thattoplawfirmsarebetteratwinninglawsuits.Sloan(1993:196–201)finds
that“specialist”plaintiffattorneysinmedicalmalpracticefaredbetterthan
“non‐specialist”plaintiffattorneysinreceivingcourt‐awardedmonetaryrecovery.
Chang, Chen & Lin
9
Specialistattorneysweredefinedasattorneyswhohavehandledfourormore
casesregardingmedicalmalpractice(basedoncourtrecordsavailableincounty
courthousesinFlorida),attorneyswhodesignatedthemselvesasexperts,and
thosewhowerelistedbyothersasexperts(Sloan1993:170).Ledermanand
Hrung(2006)useyearsofexperiencetomeasureattorneyexpertiseandfind
thatintaxlitigationagainsttheIRS,plaintiffswithattorneyrepresentationfare
betterthanthoseprose,andplaintiffswithmoreexperienceattorneyshave
higherrecoveryratios.Feldman(2015)talliesthenumberofcasesanattorney
representsbeforetheU.S.SupremeCourtandfindsthatbriefsofmore
experiencedattorneysaremorewidelyadoptedbySCOTUSinitsopinions.
Otherstudiesdisputetheresultsoftheaforementionedstudies.Greinerand
Pattanayak(2011:2125),usingdatafromreal‐worldrandomizedexperimenton
legalrepresentation,findthatthey“couldcometonofirmconclusionregardinga
use‐of‐representationeffectonthewinrate.”Goodman‐Delahuntyetal.(2010)
survey481sampledlitigatingattorneysintheU.S.andfindthattheyare
overconfidentinpredictingtheoutcomeoftheirowncasesandcalibrationdoes
notincreasewithyearsoflegalexperience.Kuo‐ChangHuang(2008),basedon
crudeyetcomprehensiveofficialdataoncivilcourtcases,arguesthatpartiesin
Taiwansoughtlegalrepresentationonlywhentheybelievedtheyhadsome
chancestowin.Thatis,civillitigationresultsweredrivenmainlybymeritsofthe
cases,andthedifferencesinwinningpercentagesshouldbeattributedtothe
selectioneffectofpartiesseekingrepresentationbasedonperceivedwinning
chances,notattorneyrepresentationitself.
1. AssignmentofCasestoAttorneys
RandomassignmentsofpublicdefendersinAbramsandYoon(2007)and
thosebetweenpublicdefendersandappointedcounselsinAndersonandHeaton
(2012)andKuo‐ChangHuang,Chen,andLin(2010)avoidtheselection
effect—attorneysaimtorepresentstrongercases.Otherpriorempiricalworks
oncivillawsuits,however,sufferfromtheproblemofselectioneffect,asplaintiffs’
anddefendants’attorneysarerarely,ifever,randomlyassignedtoclientsincivil
cases.15 Studiesofplaintiffs’attorneysintheU.S.foundthattheyroutinelyturn
15 Seethelonglistofliteraturecitedandcritiquedas“unworthyofcredence”(forlackofrandom
Chang, Chen & Lin
10
awaymorethanhalfofthepotentialclientsseekingrepresentation,aslawyers
whotakecontingencyfeesriskalotinhandlingmeritlesscases(Sloan1993:77;
Kritzer2004:73;Harris,Peeples,andMetzloff2008:257).
AttorneysinTaiwanwerenotrandomlyassignedtotortscasesaswell.Thus,
attorneyrepresentationandseniorityofattorneysmaybeassociatedwithcase
characteristics.Casecharacteristicsobservabletousdonotconfoundourresults,
astheireffectscanbecontrolledforintheregressionmodels.Manyimportant
casecharacteristics,includingproxiesforseverityofinjuries,werealreadycoded
andusedinourmodel.Unobservablefactorsmaycauseproblems.Yetthenature
ofcaraccidentlawsuitsandfixedattorneyfeestructureinTaiwanwouldgreatly
reducethefrequencyofcaseselection.Belowweadvanceacaseselectionstory
forfixed‐feeattorneys(inparticularplaintiffattorneysinTaiwan)basedon
rationalchoicetheoryandqualitativeinterviews.
Thefirststageofselectiontakesplacewhenatortvictimsearchforan
attorney.Thesolopractitionersweinterviewedtoldusthattheyreceivednew
clientsmostlyviareferralbynon‐attorneyfriends.Thepreconditionforstronger
casessystematicallyflowingtoseniorattorneysisthatfriendsofsenior
attorneysreferredonaveragestrongercasesorthatoldclientsofsenior
attorneyswhocamebackwithsystematicallystrongercases.Bothscenarios
strikeusasimplausible.Victimswhosearchforlawyersby,say,comparing
lawyerpracticestatistics(seebelow)on‐linemaytrytofindbetterattorneys,but
whileitisplausiblethatvictimsbelievedthatseniorattorneysaregenerally
better,thesevictimswhosearchbythemselvesdonotnecessarilyhavestronger
cases.Hence,thereappearstobenogoodreasontobelievethatseniorattorneys
systematicallyencounterclientswithstrongercases.
Thesecondstageofselectioniswhenattorneysdeterminewhethertotake
cases,thefocusoftheU.S.literature.IntheU.S.context,astrongcar‐accidenttort
caseforaplaintiffattorneyisoneinwhichthetortfeasor’snegligencecanbe
easilyestablishedandthevictimisseriouslyinjured,asthiskindofcaseismore
likelytoleadtohighamountofdamages,athirdorsoofwhichgoestothe
attorney.Contingent‐feeplaintiffattorneysareinclinedtotakeonlystrongcases.
Bycontrast,plaintiffanddefendantattorneysinTaiwanmostoftenreceivedflat
assignmentofattorneys)byGreinerandPattanayak(2011:2175–2184).
Chang, Chen & Lin
11
retainerfeesfortheirserviceinordinarytortslitigation(Kuo‐ChangHuang2008:
216).ThisfeestructureshouldnotmotivateTaiwaneseattorneystoturndown
casesasaggressivelyastheirAmericancolleaguesdo(seePartII).Manylawyers
weintervieweddidinformusthattheytendtoturndownmeritlesscases,even
thoughtheycancollecttheirfeesanyway.Amoralistreasonforlawyerstodoso
isthattheselawyersbelievethatthecomplainantshavenolegalcaseandshould
notsueorthattheyshouldsimplyusetheattorneyfeestopaybacktheirdebt,
notdefendinglegitimateclaims.Apracticalconcernisthatclientswhopayfixed
feesandgetnothingfromthelitigationwillkeep“bugging”theattorneys
afterwards.
Onemightconjecturethatseniorattorneysmaycherry‐pickthebestcases
thatgotothem.Whilethismightbetrue(wedonotyethavedatatoexaminethis
conjecture),thisislargelyinapplicableincar‐accidenttortcases.Our
intervieweesthinkthatthistypeofcasesmightbetheeasiestcasesamongcivil
matters.Noclassaction,complexcontracts,ormulti‐nationalconglomeratesare
involved.Thelawsuitisusuallyone‐on‐one,andjudgmentsofcausationand
negligencecanbeaidedbythewide‐spreadcar‐camsandCCTVsaswellasother
moderntechnologies.Theitemsthatvictimscanclaimareclear,theonly
questionishowmuch.Thetortfeasorsknowthattheyhavetocompensateand
occasionallycontendthatvictimswerecomparativelynegligent.Thequestionis
againhowmuch.Therefore,attorneysdonotseemtohavestrongincentivesto
turndownrepresentingtheplaintiffsorthedefendantsinagenuinecaraccident
case.Theycouldadjustthefixedfeesaccordingtotheamountatstakes.Wesee
nostrongreasonthatseniorattorneyswouldselecttorepresentonlyclientswith
moreseriousinjuriesormoreclearlynegligent.
Thethirdstageofselectionissettlement.Thereareseveralexistent
empiricalstudiesonsettlementofcivilcasesinTaiwan.Kuo‐ChangHuang(2008:
217)findsthatattorneyrepresentationisassociatedwithsettlementratesand
contendsthatitisduetothe“representationselection”—“aparty’sinitial
decisiontolitigatethecase[leads]tohimorherretainingcounsel.”Kuo‐Chang
Huang(2009)findsthatsettlementratesafteracivilcaseenteredcourtsin
Taiwanisabout30%.Kuo‐ChangHuang(2016)findsthatsettlementratesbefore
acivildisputeenteredcourtsinTaiwanisonaverage60%,andthatthe
Chang, Chen & Lin
12
scatterplotofsettlementrate(Yaxis)againstamountofstakes(Xaxis)revealsan
inverted‐Ushaperelation.Fromourinterviews,welearnedthatseniorattorneys
arebetteratsettlement.Thereis,however,noempiricalresearchonwhether
settlementratesvarybystrengthofplaintiffclaims.
Forourpurposes,aslongasproseparties,attorneysrepresentedbyjunior
attorneys,andthoserepresentedbyseniorattorneysdonotsystematicallysettle
differenttypesofcases,settlementshouldnotbiasourempiricalfindings.Thatis,
wecontendthatinthefirsttwostages,nostrongselectiontakesplace.Ifdisputes
withdifferentrepresentationstatusesweresettledindifferentpatterns,a
statisticallysignificantresultregardingrepresentationstatusesmaybespurious.
Again,thereseemstobegoodreasontobelievethatsettlementratesamong
differentrepresentationstatuseswillcorrelatewithafactorthatisnotalready
controlledbyourregressionmodels.
Finally,weconducttwo‐samplet‐testsandFisher’sexacttests16 toexamine
whethercasecharacteristicsarebalancedacrossthefollowingfourcomparison
groups:
1) caseswithproseplaintiffsversusthosewithrepresentedplaintiffs;
2) caseswithprosedefendantsversusthosewithrepresenteddefendants;
3) casesinwhichplaintiffswererepresentedbyseniorattorneysversus
thoseinwhichplaintiffswererepresentedbyjuniorattorneys;and
4) casesinwhichdefendantswererepresentedbyseniorattorneysversus
thoseinwhichdefendantswererepresentedbyjuniorattorneys.
AsshowninTable1,casecharacteristicsontheplaintiffsidearebalanced.Only
twoassociationsarestatisticallysignificantatthe5%levelandtheydonot
correlatewithcasestrength.Casecharacteristicsonthedefendantsideareless
balanced,asseveralcasecharacteristicsarestatisticallysignificantatthe5%
levelandsomeofthemareproxiesforseverityofinjury(alsoproxiesforcase
strength).
Asawhole,althoughourdataarenotproducedbya(natural)experimentin
which attorneys are randomly assigned to cases, thanks to the attorney fee
structure,theselectioneffectappearstobeminor,especiallyregardingselections
16 Inthesetests,weused,inrows,thevariablesusedinthehedonicregressionmodels;thecolumnvariablesareeither“hiringattorneysversusnothiringattorneys”or“hiringattorneyswithabove‐medianexperienceversushiringattorneyswithbelow‐medianexperience.”
Chang, Chen & Lin
13
ontheplaintiffside.Totheextentthatattorneyrepresentationstatusesarenot
associatedwithunobservablevariables,ourregressionmodelsshouldbeableto
tease out the effect of attorney representation and the value of attorney
experience.17
17 Forrobustnesscheck,wealsotriedpropensityscorematchingmethodbasedonwhetherattorneyshaveabove‐orbelow‐medianexperience.Duetothebalancedcasecharacteristicsmentionedinthetext,theregressionresultsareverysimilartothosereportedinTable3.
Chang, Chen & Lin
14
Table1HomogeneityofCaseCharacteristicsAcrossLegalRepresentation
Statuses
PanelA:Continuousvariables
Prose
plaintiffsor
not
Prosedefendants
ornot
Plaintiff
attorneysenior
orjunior
Defendantattorney
seniororjunior
Judgeexperience 0.584 0.745 0.745 0.887
Declaredincarcerationtime 0.617 0.912 0.149 0.931
Incurredmedicalexpenses 0.212 0.069+ 0.402 0.049*
Plaintiffage 0.626 0.003** 0.423 0.003**
Plaintiffincome 0.739 0.061+ 0.304 0.139
Defendantincome 0.551 0.394 0.739 0.365
Cellscontainp‐valuesfortwo‐samplet‐tests.Valuesinrowvariablesare
transformedtonaturallogbeforethet‐tests.
***p<0.001,**p<0.01,*p<0.05,+p<0.1.
PanelB:Categoricalvariable
Prose
plaintiffsor
not
Prose
defendantsor
not
Plaintiff
attorneysenior
orjunior
Defendant
attorneysenior
orjunior
Defendantsincludecorporations 0.003** 0.152 0.189 0.095+
Drivingundertheinfluenceofalcohol 0.594 1.000 0.843 1.000
Hitandrun 0.114 0.563 0.567 0.569
Plaintiffpaysfilingfees 0.020* 0.808 0.465 0.808
7injurylevels 0.576 0.020* 0.167 0.019*
2injurylevels 1.000 0.002** 0.360 0.002**
Cellscontainp‐valuesfortwo‐tailedFisher’sexacttests.
***p<0.001,**p<0.01,*p<0.05,+p<0.1.
2. PlaintiffAttorneys
PlaintiffattorneysinTaiwanmostlychargefixedfeesfortortdamagescases,
andtheirincentivesarethusdifferentfromthosein,forinstance,theU.S.and
Israelwhochargecontingentfees.Theincentivesofcontingent‐feeattorneysare
alignedwiththeinterestsoftheirclients.Aslongasitiscost‐justified,attorneys
Chang, Chen & Lin
15
workhardertowinlargeramountofdamages,astheytakehomeathirdorsoof
thedamages.Bycontrast,theprinciple‐agentproblemismoreacuteamong
fixed‐feeattorneys.Thefinancialincomeoftheseattorneysisindependentof
caseoutcomes.Attorneys,thus,totheextentthattheycannotexanteadjustthe
amountoffees,wouldprefereasytocomplexcases.Attorneysalsohave
incentivestosettleearly,evenatalowfigure.Otherthingsbeingequal,fixed‐fee
attorneysmaynotworkashardascontingent‐feeattorneysoncases.
Attorneyscareaboutmaintainingreputationsandgettingmoreclientsin
thefuture.Injurisdictionswhereplaintiffshavetospelloutaddamnumclauses
andblockbustercasesarerare,theclaim‐grantratiocanroughlymeasurethe
extenttowhichplaintiffsanddefendantseach“win.”CourtsinTaiwan
summarizetheclaim‐grantratiointhecourtfeepercentage(seePartII).
Assumingthatattorneyscontrolhowmuchtoclaim,thecourtfeepercentagecan
serveasaproxyforattorneyskills.PingLuWeb,18 aleadinglegalserviceprovider
inTaiwan,hasusedcourtfeepercentagesasthecentralstatisticsincomparing
attorneyskills.Inthelongrun,ahighaveragecourtfeepercentageindicatesthat
anattorneylosesalotofpleadingordefenses.Usingaveragecourtfee
percentagestoevaluatehowgoodsattorneysareatpersuadingjudgesand
predictingcaseoutcomesexanteandmakingclaimsaccordinglyisparticularly
aptincar‐accidenttortcases,asthesecasesaremostlyabouttheamountof
compensation.
Fixed‐feeattorneyswhocareabouttheircourtfeepercentagesquawinning
recordswouldtendtomakeconservativeclaims,sothatcourtswouldgrantmost
oftheirclaims,keepingtheircourt‐fee‐percentagestatisticslowandtheclients’
feeslow.Conservativeclaims,however,donotnecessarilymaximizeclient
interests.Courtscannotawardmorethantheamountsplaintiffsclaim,andfiling
feesareabout1percentoftheclaimedamount.Whenclaiming100dollarsmore
wouldleadtoanincreaseinexpectedawardsofmorethan1dollarorso,
attorneyswhocaresolelyabouttheinterestoftheirclientsshouldandwilldoso.
Iftheexpectedincreaseinawardsis,say,5dollars,however,theattorney’sfee
percentageisquitelikelytoincrease,unlesslessthan5%oftheotherpartofthe
claimisexpectedtobegranted.Attorneysthusmaynothaveincentivestoadvise
18 PingLuWebliterallymeansthewebsiteforevaluatingattorneysinMandarinChinese.
Chang, Chen & Lin
16
theirclientstoclaimmore.
Providedthatjudgeswereunbiased,claimingmorethantheattorneys’best
estimatesofcourtawardsbasedonwhathighercourtshaverecentlyallowedis
unlikelytoswayjudges.Asaresult,over‐claimingisirrationalfortheattorneys
andtheirclients.Nonetheless,ifjudgesweresubjecttotheanchoringeffect,
over‐claimingmakeseconomicsensefortheclients,butattorneyswhoare
sensitivetotheirwinningrecordsmaybeinclinedtobeconservative.
Ourhypothesisisthatexperiencedattorneys,ascomparedtoinexperienced
attorneys,tendtoover‐claim.Theeconomicreasoningbehindthishypothesisis
thatseniorandjuniorattorneyshavedifferentbusinessmodels.Experienced
attorneysaremorelikelytohaveafirmerclientbaseandretainnewclients
throughwordsofmouth(referralsnotjustbypersonalfriendsbutalsoby
formerclients).Withalongertrackrecordandreputation,theirbusinessistoa
lesserextentinfluencedbyanincreaseinaveragecourtfeepercentage.Senior
attorneysthusaremorewillingtomakebolderclaimsthanjuniorcolleagues.As
experiencedattorneysgenerallychargeahigherfee,theywouldneedtoshow
theirclientsthattheyareworthit,andbeatingtheaverage(claimingmoreand
gettingmore)issuchasignal.Sometimes,accordingtoattorneysweinterview,
winninganimprobableclaimwouldleadtoabonus(“redenvelope”)givenbythe
clienttotheattorney.AsFigure1shows,thefilingfeepercentagesandthe
numberofcivilcasesplaintiffattorneyshaverepresenteddoappeartohavea
positiverelationship.
Chang, Chen & Lin
17
Figure1Plaintiffattorneyexperienceandcourtfeepercentage
N=280.Districtcourtcasesinourdatasetinwhichatleastoneattorneywas
retainedbytheplaintiffareincluded.
Therearealsopsychologicalreasonsfordifferentclaimingpatterns.
Whetherattorneysareawareoftheanchoringeffectornot,seniorattorneysare
morelikelytoover‐claim,astheyaremoreconfidentintheirownpersuasion
skills(Goodman‐Delahuntyetal.2010).Oneexperiencedattorneywe
interviewedadvancedaninterestingtheory:forplaintiffattorneys,eachcasehas
areasonablerangeforpainandsufferingdamages.Experiencedattorneystend
toclaimanamountthatisattheupperechelon,becausetheirhigherincomeand
otheraspectsoftheirlifeexperiencemakethehigherfiguremore“natural.”
3. DefendantAttorneys
Defendantattorneysareexpectedtoprioritizedismissingcasesagainsttheir
clients.Ascasesinourdatasetarelimitedtothoseinwhichdefendantswere
foundliable.Wearenotabletotestwhetherhiring(experienced)attorneys
increasethechanceofcasedismissal.
Defendantattorneysarealsoexpectedtoreducetheamountofdamages.
0.2
.4.6
.81
Per
cent
age
of fi
ling
fee
pla
intif
f has
to p
ay
1 1.5 2 2.5 3Number of civil cases plaintiff attorneys represented in 2000-2014 (log10)
Lowess line 1 observation
Chang, Chen & Lin
18
Pecuniarydamagesaretypicallyformulaic.Defenseattorneyscangreatlyreduce
theamountofcompensationusuallybyprovingthatplaintiffsarecomparatively
negligent.Aspainandsufferingdamagesarediscretionary,weconjecturethat
defenseattorneyswouldchallengethisclaim.Inpractice,somedefendants
counteredaspecificamountofdamages,somesimplyobjectedthattheclaimed
damagesaretoohigh,andsomefailedtomakeanyobjection.Wehypothesize
thatthecounter‐claimingpatternisaffectedbyseveralfactorsincludinghow
muchplaintiffs’claimedamountdeviatesfromthehistorictrend,whether
defendantsorplaintiffshireattorneysandhowexperiencedtheyare,whether
defendantsincludecorporations,anddefendants’income.
ItisalsoworthnotingthatintheTaiwancaseswestudy,nodefendantisan
insurancecompany,andcorporatedefendantsareonlyvicariouslyliable.19 In
otherwords,defendantsaretherealtortfeasorswhodroveamobilevehicle
whileinjuringtheplaintiffs/victims.
IV. MODELS
Asophisticatedstructuralequationmodelisspecifiedtoclosely
approximateareal‐worlddecision‐makingprocess.Formallyandinformally,we
interviewedmanyattorneysandjudgesofallexperiencelevelsinTaiwanin
privateandinfocusgroups.Thecoreinsightisthatbeforetheplaintiffs’
attorneysformulatetherequestedamountofpainandsufferingdamages,and
beforedistrictcourtjudgesmaketheirdecisions,bothhavesearchedinthe
officialcourtcasedatabase(http://jirs.judicial.gov.tw/Index.htm)forsimilar
casespreviouslydecidedindistrictcourtsandhighcourts,tobeconsistentwith
precedents.Therefore,thebasicset‐upofourregressionmodelistotestwhether
districtcourtjudgesattimeTwoulddeviatefromtheassessmentpatternatthe
districtcourtlevelattimeT‐1iftheassessmentpatternatthehighcourtlevelat
timeT‐1isdifferentfromthatatthedistrictcourtlevelattimeT‐1.20 Casefacts
19 Insharpcontrast,defendantsinpersonalinjurycaseselsewhereareoftenlargefirmsorinsurancecompanies(ZamirandRitov2010:276).20 Inthisarticle,wefocusontheinteractionofdistrictcourtsandhighcourts(whichreviewthecasedenovo),leavingouttheTaiwanSupremeCourt.Whileafew“selectedprecedents”renderedbytheTaiwanSupremeCourtinthe1950sand1960swerestillfrequentlycitedindistrict‐courtandhigh‐courtdecisions.Thoseprecedentsprovidehardlyanyguidanceforlowercourtjudges.Nojudgesweinterviewedsuggestthattheyoranycolleaguederivedtheamountofpainand
Chang, Chen & Lin
19
(includingvictims’severityofinjury),judges’andattorneys’experience,etc.are
addedtotheregressionmodels.
Morespecifically,underourmodel,districtcourtjudgeswouldask,giventhe
factsofthecasesathand,howmuchpainandsufferingdamagesthehighcourts
andthedistrictcourtswouldaward.Topredictwhatjudgeswouldestimateas
thetwohypotheticaldamagesawards,weusehedonicregressionmodelsto
predicttheamountofpainandsufferingdamagesforeachdistrictcourtcasein
ourmainresearchperiod(Sep.5,2013–Sep.2,2014),basedonthehigh‐court
ordistrict‐courtcasesdecidedwithinthepast3months21 ofeachcase.Thatis,
thehedonicregressionmodelwasrun102(=51*2)times,twoforeachweek.22
Therefore,eachdistrictcourtcaseintheresearchperiodispairedwithtwo
estimatesofpainandsufferingdamages:oneiswhatthehighcourtwouldhave
rendered,andtheotheriswhatthedistrictcourtwouldhaveawarded.These
estimatesarehereinafterreferredtoasthetrend(ofpainandsufferingawards).
Moreconcretely,toestimatethepainandsufferingdamagesforadistrictcourt
caserenderedinthefirstweekofApril,weusedthecasesdecidedinthefirst
threemonthsoftheyearrenderedinthehighcourtinahedonicregression
model.Thecoefficientofthemodelandthefactsofthesaidcasecanprovide
estimatedpainandsufferingdamages—thebestestimateofwhatthehighcourt
wouldhavedonehadthiscasecamebeforeitinJanuary,February,orMarch.We
thenrepeatedthesameprocedureondistrictcourtcases,togetholdofthebest
estimateofwhatthedistrictcourtwouldhaverenderedhadthiscasecame
beforeitafewweeksearlier.
Afterfurthercomputations,werunstructuralequationmodels(SEM)totest
whethertherulingonpainandsufferingdamagesbydistrictcourtjudgesand
sufferingdamagesfromtheselectedprecedents.Thus,theissuewestudyhereisdifferentfromthatinpriorliteraturethatfocusesontheinteractionbetweenthehighestcourtofajurisdictionanditslowercourts. 21 Weassume(basedoninterviews)thatjudgeswouldsearchthemostrecentcasesasreferences.Choosingthreemonthsasthescopeisasomewhatarbitrary,exantedecision,though.(Wecoded4monthsofcasespriortothemainresearchperiod,becausetheplaintiffswereassumedtoclaim1monthbeforeadjudication,andwethusneededthreemoremonthspriortothefirstplaintiffclaimtoestimatewhatthisplaintiffwouldhaveconsideredtobethetrend.)Wehavetriedtouse2.5and3.5monthsasthecut‐off,andtheresultsregardingtheattorneyandjudgeexperiencevariablesareessentiallythesame. 22 Thereareintotal51weeksinourmainresearchperiod(definedinPartV).51modelsusedistrictcourtcasesasobservations,whereastheother51modelsusehighcourtcases.
Chang, Chen & Lin
20
thoseclaimedbyplaintiffswereaffectedbythetrend,andwhetherthedeviation
fromthetrendcanbeattributedtojuristexperienceandcasefacts.We
expatriatetheempiricalstrategyinthefollowing:
A. OLSModelstoPredictDistrictCourtandHighCourtAwards
OurOLShedonicregressionmodelstakethefollowingform23:
PSD=β0+β1INJURY+β2MED+β3JAIL+β4CRIME+β5DCORP+β6CHAR+ε
wherePSD is thenatural logof the judge’spainandsufferingdamagesaward;
INJURYisadummyvariableindicatingwhetherthevictimsufferedfromminor
injury or serious injury (defined according to Article 10 of Taiwan’s Criminal
Code);24 MED are a variable presenting the natural log of court‐adjudicated
medical‐relatedexpensesalready incurredandexpectedto incurandadummy
variablethatequals0ifmedicalexpensesare0;JAIListhenaturallogofmonths
criminalcourtshavesentencedthedefendantstobe incarcerated;CRIMEarea
dummy variable that equals 1 if the defendant drove under the influence of
alcoholandadummyvariablethatequals1ifthedefendanthittheplaintiffand
ranawaywithoutassistingtheinjuredplaintiff(bothareanindependenttypeof
crime under Taiwan’s Criminal Code);DCORP is a dummy variable indicating
whetheranyofthedefendantsisacorporation(whichisvicariouslyliableforits
employees);CHARincludeplaintiffs’ages,plaintiffs’income,defendants’income,
and three dummy variables that equal 1 when age or income information is
missing.Thecoefficientstobeestimatedareβn;εisanerrorterm.
Morespecifically,utilizingthecomprehensive,officialcourtcasewebsite,
23 Oneofushascollaboratedinjointresearchprojectsonpainandsufferingdamagesforpersonalinjury(Changetal.2014),wrongfuldeath(Changetal.2015),anddefamation(Chang,Ho,andHsu2016).Thoseworksexplorethedeterminantsofcourt‐adjudicatedpainandsufferingdamagesinTaiwan.Changetal.(2014)inparticularfindsthatthelevelofinjuryandmedicalexpensesalonecanexplainmorethanhalfofthevariationfromtheaverageamount.Thus,inthisarticle,wealsousethelevelofinjuryandmedicalexpensesasthemajordeterminantsinthehedonicregressionmodels(SectionA).24 Aseriousinjuryisoneofthefollowingconditions:1.Destructionoforseriousdamagetothesightofoneorbotheyes;2.Destructionoforseriousdamagetothehearingofoneorbothears;3.Destructionoforseriousdamagetothefunctionsofspeech,taste,orsmell;4.Destructionoforseriousdamagetothefunctionofoneormorelimbs;5.Destructionoforseriousdamagetothepowerofreproduction;and6.Otherseriousinjurytobodyortohealththatiseitherimpossibleordifficulttocure.
Chang, Chen & Lin
21
weareabletofindwhetherthecivildefendantshavebeenconvictedbeforethe
civil court rendered its decisions (most of them were). We chronicled the
declaredsentences(JAIL),amongothers,fromthecriminalcourtdecisions.Our
conjectureisthatthelengthofthedeclaredsentencemightaffecttheamountof
painandsufferingdamagesascivilcourt judgescouldhavetaken itasanother
measureoftheseverityofthetortfeasors’acts.Thedeclaredsentences,however,
are not a good measure of how long the tortfeasors have suffered in prison.
Tortfeasorswhosedeclaredsentencesaresixmonthsorshortercanavoidbeing
jailed by paying criminal fines instead, and 91% of our cases fall into this
category.Manyoftherestofthecasescouldstillbeappealed.
DCORP tries to capture the effect of the deep pockets of corporate
defendants. Prior literature has shown that the deep pocket effect has its
presenceinTaiwanesecourt(Changetal.2014;Chang,Ho,andHsu2016).
WhenalldistrictcourtcaseswereputintothisOLSmodel,theR‐squareis
0.63.WhenallhighcourtcaseswereputintothisOLSmodel,theR‐squareis0.60.
SeeAppendixAforregressionresults.
B. StructuralEquationModelonDeviationofCourtAwardfromTrend
Judgesindistrictcourtssurveyedrecentsimilarcases(thehistorictrend)
andthenevaluatedthecasesathandbasedonthehistorictrendintheprevious
period.Theirmaindecisionsare thereforehowmuch theadjudicatedpainand
suffering damages (R) for the current case should deviate from the trend. The
deviation (R–bl) from the trend in district court (bl) is called “intra‐court
deviation.” The intra‐court deviation, as hypothesized, might be based on the
“inter‐court deviation” (bh–bl)—that is, the historic trend in high courtsminus
that in district courts. For example, assume that the district court at time T‐1
awarded1milliondollarstoavictiminacertaintypeofcaseandthehighcourt
attimeT‐1awarded1.5milliondollars,weconjecturethatdistrictcourtattime
T would deviate from 1 million dollars and move toward 1.5 million dollars.
Simultaneously,thedeviationoftheplaintiffs’claim(P)fromblmightserveasan
anchortothejudges’decisions.Notethatinthispaper,R,blandbharemeasured
asthenaturallogarithmoftheoriginalvaluestopromotenormality.Forthesake
Chang, Chen & Lin
22
ofbrevity,thewords“naturallog”or“ln”willbeomitted.
Toascertainthevaluesoftheaforementionedvariables,wefirstconstruct
hedonic estimates of thehistoric trend set in thepreviousperiodbyusing the
cases adjudicated 1 to 12 weeks before the verdict of the case at hand, as
describedinSectionIV.A.Wethenpluginthecharacteristicsofthecurrentcase
toassessthebestestimateofpainandsufferingdamagesinthatcase.Finally,we
calculate the intra‐court deviation (R–bl), inter‐court deviation (bh–bl), and
plaintiff‐claimdeviation(theplaintiffs’claimsminusthehistorictrendindistrict
courts;P–bl).
A structural model is warranted to handle the endogeneity problem
inherent in the nature of our inquiry.25 First, the plaintiffs’ claims (or, for that
matter,plaintiff‐claimdeviation)wereaffectedbycasefactsbutinfluencedcourt
adjudication aswell. The problem is accounted for in the structuralmodel by
using the plaintiff‐claim deviation as one independent variable in the first
equation and the dependent variable in the second equation. Second, some
characteristics considered by judges and plaintiffs are not observed by
researchers. Our structuralmodel takes into account the correlations between
theerrortermsofthetwoequations, thuscontrollingtheendogeneityproblem
(Wooldridge2010:681).26 Specifically,werunthefollowingstructuralequation
model:
)1(,)()()( 1215,*,432
*,1,,, iiiilil
ajiliilihili eWXbbEEbPbbbR
.)( 2437*,
*,6
*, iiiilih
aili eZXbbEbP (2)
In equations (1), R–bl is the intra‐court deviation; bh–bl is the inter‐court
25 Asourlaterresultwouldshow,therho(Table3)thatcaptureswhetherthecorrelationbetweenthetwoerrortermsinthetwoequationsinthestructuralequationmodelisnotstatisticallysignificant.Inotherwords,thestructuralmodelinformsusthatnoendogeneityproblemwasdetected.Theexantedecisiontouseastructureequationmodelisstilljustified,asoneshouldworrythatomittedvariablesmayexist.26 Whileitistraditionallydifficulttoanalyticallyderivetheconditionaldensityandnumericallymaximizethelikelihoodinamulti‐equationsystem,Roodman(2011:681–685)providesausefulSTATAprocedureCMP(ConditionalMixedProcessestimatorwithrandomeffectsandcoefficients),whichcanbeappliedtoinstrumentalsystemproblemstoestimatethesystemunderthejointnormalityassumption.Inthestructuralequationmodelweusedandreportlater,Shapiro‐WilkWtestsfornormalitysuggestthatwecannotrejectthenullhypothesisthattheresidualsofequation1andequation2arenormal.
Applyingthemaximumlikelihoodapproachinlinearmodelstocontroltheendogenousproblem,seeGreene(2003:402);DavidsonandMacKinnon(2004:537–538);DavidsonandMacKinnon(1993:644–651);CameronandTrivedi(2005:191).
Chang, Chen & Lin
23
deviation; P–b*l is plaintiff‐claim deviation;27 Ea are a dummy variable that
indicates whether plaintiffs retain attorneys, the natural logarithm of plaintiff
attorneys’ civil experience, and adummyvariable that equals 1 if the attorney
startedpracticingbeforeyear2000,thushisorherexperiencesunder‐estimated
byourdata;Ejrepresentsthenaturallogarithmofjudges’civilexperienceanda
dummyvariablethatequals1ifthejudgestartedhisorhercareeronthebench
before year 2000; b*l–bl is the historic change in district courts between
estimatedpain and suffering awards 1 to 12weeks before the verdict (bl) and
estimatedpainandsufferingawards5to16weeksbeforetheverdict(b*l).28
The common explanatory variables in equations (1) and (2), X, mainly
capturetheinformationorfactorsthatcouldexplainthedecisionsofthejudges
and plaintiffs. They consist of 6 dummy variables on levels of injury.29 X also
includes 18 dummy variables that control for which district courts made the
27 Tobemoreexact,P–b*listhedifferencebetweenplaintiffs’claimsandestimatedpainandsufferingawards5to16weeksbeforetheverdict.Wedeductfromtheformerthelatter,ratherthanestimatedpainandsufferingawards1to12weeksbeforetheverdict,becauseplaintiffs’claimswereonaveragemadeaboutonemonthbeforejudges’ruling.Thenewtrendthathappens1to4weeksbeforetheverdictwouldbeunbeknownsttotheplaintiffswhentheymadetheclaims.Seealsofootnote28formoreexplanation. 28 Thisvariableitselfisnotofinterest.Weaddedthistoadjustthispotentialtime‐inconsistencyofthehistorictrend.Morespecifically,P–b*lisusedasanindependentvariableinequation(1)andasthedependentvariableinequation(2)toaccountfortheendogeneityproblem.Nonetheless,theanchoringeffectcreatedbytheplaintiffs’claimsmaynotderivefromthedifferencebetweentheclaimandtheoldtrend(5–16weeksbeforeverdict),butbetweentheclaimandthenewtrend(1–12weeksbeforeverdict).Tobeabletoascertainthemagnitudeoftheanchoringeffect,b*l–blisaddedasadjustment.Morespecifically,equation(1)canbere‐writtenasfollows:
,))(()()(
)()()(
12125,*,432,1,,
1215,*,432
*,1,,,
iiiililaj
iliilih
iiiililaj
iliilihili
eWXbbEEbPbb
eWXbbEEbPbbbR
wherethevariableinthesecondterm(p–b)measurestheanchoringeffectcreatedbythedeviationofplaintiffs’claimsfromthenewtrend.Astheaboveequationshows,(p–b)and(p–b*)bothhaveγ2asitscoefficient.Thatis,theregressioncoefficientγ2canberegardedasthemeasurementoftheanchoringeffect.ConductingaregressionofR–blonP–bl,b*l–blandothervariablewillresultinthesamecoefficients(exceptthatofb*l–bl)asconductingaregressionbasedonequation(1).29 Hereweclassifiedthevictims’injuriesinto9levelsbasedonNAIC(NationalAssociationofInsuranceCommissioners)scale,asitisamoredetailedclassificationofinjuries.TheNAICscalehasbeenusedinpriorempiricalstudies.See,e.g.,Vidmar,Gross,andRose(1998:283);Sloan(1993:23).The9levelsare:1.Emotionalonly(fright,nophysicaldamage);2.Temporaryinsignificant(lacerations,contusions,minorscars,rash;norecoverydelay);3.Temporaryminor(infections,fracture,fallinhospital;recoverydelayed);4.Temporarymajor(burns,surgicalmaterialleft,drugsideeffect,braindamage;recoverydelayed);5.Permanentminor(lossoffingers,lossordamagetoorgans;includesnondisablinginjuries);6.Permanentsignificant(deafness,lossoflimb,lossofeye,lossofonekidneyorlung);7.Permanentmajor(paraplegia,blindness,lossoftwolimbs,braindamage);8.Permanentgrave(quadriplegia,severebraindamage,lifelongcareorfatalprognosis);9.Death.Novictiminourcasessufferedmerelylevel‐oneinjury.Weexcludedeathcasesastheyarecategoricallyanddoctrinallydifferent.
Chang, Chen & Lin
24
decisions. Inaddition,Xcontainsplaintiffs’age innatural log;plaintiffs’annual
income in natural log; 30 two dummy variables that equal one when an
observation contains missing values in age and income; whether defendants
droveundertheinfluenceofalcohol;whetherdefendantshitandran;thelength
of defendants’ declared criminal sentences; andwhether defendants include a
corporationvicariouslyliableforthenaturalpersonwhocausedtheaccident.
W represents variables that are only used in the first equation, including
whetherdefendantshiredattorneys,thecivilexperienceofdefendantattorneys,
adummyvariablethatequals1ifthedefenseattorneystartedpracticingbefore
year 2000, natural log of court‐adjudicated medical expenses, and a dummy
variablethatequals0whencourt‐adjudicatedmedicalexpensesare0.
The specification in equation (1) examines the driving force of judicial
decision‐making, whereas that in equation (2) teases out what drove the
plaintiffs’ decisions. As the plaintiffs’ claims were on averagemade about one
month before judges’ ruling,31 we again construct hedonic estimates of the
historictrendsinhighcourtsanddistrictcourtsbyusingcasesrendered5to16
weeks before court verdict (that is, 1–12 weeks before plaintiffs made their
claimstocourts).Then,wepluginthecharacteristicsofthecasesinquestionto
estimatetheadjudicateddamages.Thus,thedependentvariableinequation(2)
is thedeviationof theplaintiffs’ claimsaway from thehistoric trend indistrict
courts 5 to 16 weeks before court verdict. The difference of the estimated
damagesatdistrictandhighcourts5to16weeksbeforecourtverdict(bh*–bl*)is
oneofthemajorindependentvariablesinequation(2).32
30 TheannualincomeinformationwasacquiredbycourtsviatheMinistryofFinanceandreportedinthecourtdecisions. 31 Accordingtoofficialsummarystatistics,theaveragehandlingtimeforadistrictcourtcivilcaseis30days.Asanapproximation,weused4weeksasthedifferencesintimebetweenplaintiffs’claimingandjudges’adjudicating.Eachcase,ofcourse,isdifferent.Somecasessurelytookmorethan30daystoreachtheconclusionofatrial,butwehavenoinformationastohowlong.Inaddition,plaintiffscanchangetheiramountofclaimsbeforemakingtheclosingstatements.Whilesomecourtdecisionsdocontaininformationastowhetherplaintiffsincreasedordecreasedtheirclaimedamount,thosedecisionsdidnotspelloutwhethertheclaimofpecuniarydamagesorthatofnon‐pecuniarydamageswaschanged. Inshort,theremustbedifferencesintimebetweenplaintiffs’claimingandjudges’adjudicating;thatis,certainnewcasescouldbetakenintoconsiderationbyjudgesbutnotbyattorneys.Butwearenotentirelysurehowlongthetimegapis.Ourmodelassumesthatplaintiffstookintoaccountdistrictcourtandhighcourtcasesrenderedinthepreviousthreemonthswhentheyformulatedtheirrequestedamountofpainandsufferingdamages4weeksbeforecourtadjudication.Seealsofootnotes27and28.32 Inunreportedmodels,adummyvariablecapturingwhetherdefendantsexplicitlycounter
Chang, Chen & Lin
25
Due to the nature of our data and for identification purposes, specific
explanatory variables, in addition to X, are added for equation (2). These
potentialdeterminantsofreactions(Z) includethethreefollowingindependent
variables:whetherplaintiffshavetopayfilingfee,plaintiffs’incurredamountof
medical expenses in nature log, and a dummyvariable that equals 0when the
incurredmedicalexpensesare0.Whetherplaintiffshavetopayfilingfeesshould
notaffecttheawardofpainandsufferingdamages,asithasnothingtodowith
thelossesofplaintiffs,whileplaintiffswhodidnothavetopaytheproratafiling
fees have incentives to claim above the trend. Plaintiffs’ incurred medical
expensesarelargerthanorequaltocourts’adjudication,becausecourtsevaluate
medical expenses and usually award only part of them. We conjecture that
plaintiffs and judges each use their own incurred and adjudicated medical
expenses, respectively, as proxies for the level of pain; thus, they are put to
equation(2)andequation(1),respectively.Inaddition,thevariable(bh*–bl*)also
servesthepurposeofidentification,asitisonlyincludedinequation(2).(bh*–bl*)
should not affect judges, because judges should not care about the changing
trendasofonemonthbeforetheadjudication;rather, judgesshouldcareabout
the changing trend as of adjudication. Hence, (bh–bl) is put in equation (1)
instead.
Finally, we assume that the error terms eki (k = 1, 2) are jointly normally
distributedwithameanofzero.33
Ourmaininterestisinthevaluesoftheestimatedcoefficientsγ1toγ7,except
γ5. Ifγ1 is statisticallysignificantandpositive, thedistrictcourt tends to follow
thelatesttrendinhighcourts.Ifγ2 isstatisticallysignificantandpositive, there
exists an anchoring effect created by plaintiffs’ claims. The statistical
significances of γ3and γ4 demonstrate whether the increases in attorney and
judgeexperience lead todistrict courts’deviating from theirhistoric trends.γ6
informs whether attorney experience affects plaintiff claims. γ7 teases out
whether plaintiffs take into account changes in trend when formulating their
plaintiffs’claimedpainandsufferingdamagesisincludedinthefirstequation.Theresultisnotrobust.Sometimesitisstatisticallysignificant(withtheexpectednegativesign),whilesometimesitisnotstatisticallysignificant.Thisdummyvariableisultimatelyomittedduetopotentialendogeneityproblem.33 Wesetthevarianceofe2ito1toidentifytheparameters.Moreover,weallowforresidualcorrelationbetweenequations1and2.
Chang, Chen & Lin
26
claims.
Finally, several technical and substantive checks have been done. Robust
standard errors are used. Judge random effects are controlled in the first
equation.Thestructuralequationmodel is clusteredbycases.Severaldifferent
sets of variables have been added to unreported models to explore the
relationship among case outcomes, judge experience, and attorney experience:
thesupremecourtrepresentationexperienceofplaintiffanddefendantattorneys;
age differences between attorneys; the number of times the plaintiff attorneys
hasappearedbeforethejudges;thenumberoftimestheplaintiffattorneysand
thedefendantattorneyshaverepresentedoppositepartiesinlitigation;andthe
gender combination of the judges and the plaintiffs. None of these unreported
variablesarestatisticallysignificant.
V. DATA
A legal service provider, Ping‐LuWeb (www.pingluweb.com), provides us
with a rich data set on the experience of all Taiwanese attorneys and all
TaiwanesejudgesasofJune30,2014.Ping‐LuWebdownloadedmillionsofcases,
freely available on the official court case database
(http://jirs.judicial.gov.tw/Index.htm), and tallied the number of times any
lawyer (judge) appears as anattorney (judge) of a case. Theonlydrawbackof
this data set is that, as most cases before year 2000 are not available in the
officialcourtcasedatabase,theexperienceofjudgesandattorneyswhostarted
theircareersbefore2000willbeunder‐estimated.34
AssummarizedinPartIII,nopriorwork,tothebestofourknowledge,hasa
comprehensive,continuousandaccuratemeasureofjuristexperience.Mostdata
measure the number of practicing years or the number of cases an attorney
representedwithinthesample.Ourdatasetallowsustogaugejudges’experience
in terms of number of years on the bench and the total number of signed
opinionsregardingcivil,criminal,andadministrativematters.Italsoenablesus
34 Intheregressionmodels,wehavetriedaddingdummyvariablesthatindicatewhetherplaintiffs’ordefendants’attorneysstartedtopracticebeforeyear2000,inordertocapturethepotentialeffectofunder‐estimatingtheexperienceoftheseseniorattorneys.Thedummyvariablesarenotstatisticallysignificant.
Chang, Chen & Lin
27
tomeasureattorneys’experienceby thenumberofyearssinceanattorneygot
herlicense;thenumberofyearssinceanattorneyfirstrepresentedaclientina
lawsuit; and the number of court cases in which an attorney is listed as a
representativeofeithertheplaintifforthedefendant.Thepercentagesofcasesin
whichanattorneyrepresentsanindividual,acorporation,orthegovernmentis
alsoknown.SeeFigure2,Figure3,andFigure4forthedistributionofattorneys’
andjudges’experience,asmeasuredbythenumberofcivilcaseshandled.
To capture the civil‐litigation experience of plaintiffs’ attorneys,
defendants’ attorneys, and judges,weuse the number of civil cases (attorneys
represent and judges adjudicate) as the measure of their legal experience.35
Whentherearemultipleattorneyshiredbyeitherparty(sometimesonelitigant
hired multiple attorneys, and sometimes there were multiple plaintiffs or
defendantsinonecaseandtheyhireddifferentattorneys),theexperienceofthe
most seniorattorney isused.Usually,one judgesitson thebench foradistrict
courttrial.Nevertheless,whenajuniorjudgewithlessthan2yearsofexperience
onthebenchisrandomlyassignedacase,twomoreseniorcolleagueswouldjoin
him or her to form a panel. (There are 40 such cases in our data set.) In this
scenario,weusetheexperienceofthemostsenior judge(usuallythepresiding
judge)tomeasurethejudgeexperienceofthosecases.
35 Numberofyearsofpracticehasbeenusedinourregressionmodels,withorwithoutthevariableonthenumberofhandledcases.Wefound,however,thattheformerisnotstatisticallysignificantinanymodel.Thisisaninterestingcontrasttothepriorstudiesthatusedthisasthemeasuringrodofattorneyexperienceandfoundstatisticallysignificantresults.
Chang, Chen & Lin
28
Figure2DistributionofPlaintiffAttorneyExperience
N=324.In63observations,plaintiffsdidnothireattorneys.
05
1015
Per
cent
age
1 10 100 1,000Number of civil cases plaintiff attorneys have represented (log10)
Chang, Chen & Lin
29
Figure3DistributionofDefendantAttorneyExperience
N=201.In186observations,defendantsdidnothireattorneys.
05
1015
Per
cent
age
1 10 100 1,000Number of civil cases defendant attorneys have represented (log10)
Chang, Chen & Lin
30
Figure4DistributionofJudgeExperience
N=387.
Tomatchwiththisuniquedataset,thisprojecthascodedpainandsuffering
damages cases between September 5, 2013 and September 2, 2014 (during
which no judge was transferred to another court).36 To better control other
facets of the cases and to isolate the effects of the experience of judges and
attorneys, only cases involving pain and suffering damages for personal injury
incurred in caraccidentsare included. Inaddition,only cases inwhichat least
one party has hired at least one attorney‐at‐law are included in the database.
Court decisions rendered in a previous period (T‐1) were used to predict the
currentperiod(T); thus,painandsufferingdamagescasesbetweenMay1and
September 4, 2013 were also coded. Both district court and high court cases
duringthis16‐monthresearchperiodwerecoded.Thesameselectioncriterion
applies.Theattorneys’andjudges’experienceasofJune30,2014willbeusedas
theirexperiencethroughoutthemainresearchperiodwithoutadjustment.
Intotal,wecoded484civildistrictcourtcases(producing546observations)
36 Everyyear,judgetransfersinTaiwantakeplaceinonepre‐specifieddateinthefirstweekofSeptember.
05
1015
Per
cent
age
10 100 1,000 10,000Number of civil cases judges have rendered (log10)
Chang, Chen & Lin
31
andallthecriminalcasesagainstthedefendantsofthosecivilcases.Amongthem,
387 observations were 1) rendered in the main research period; 2) without
missing information in key variables; 3)not extremeoutliers (weonly exclude
foursuchcases).Theseobservationswereusedinthestructuralequationmodel
toteaseouttheeffectof juristexperience.164appellantcourtcaseshavebeen
coded in the sameway aswell.Major variables used in regressionmodels are
summarizedbelowinTable2,andthedistributionofcourt‐adjudicatedpainand
sufferingdamagesandplaintiff‐claimedpainandsufferingdamagesareshownin
Figure5andFigure6.
Thisarticlefocusesondistrictcourtcasesratherthanappellatecourtcases
forthefollowingreasons:first,almostallcurrentstudiesfocusontheappellate
orsupremecourts.Thenumberofcasesinappellatecourtsislimited;asaresult,
researchers have to include caseswith different factpatterns to gain sufficient
degreesof freedom.Theadvantageof this approach is to includeplaintiffs and
defendantswithandwithoutlegalresources(thehavesandthehavenots).The
downsideof this approach is that the effect of attorneys’ experience cannotbe
isolatedifthecontrolsforthenatureofthecasesareimperfect.
Second,amajorityofcases (about60%of the tortscases inTaiwan)were
notappealed.Researchesonappellatecasesmaysufferfromtheselectionbias.37
Third, to control and compare the effect of judges’ experience, examining
district court judges is preferable, as appellate judgesmay be similarly senior,
whiledistrictcourtjudgesaremorediverseintermsofexperience.Inaddition,
underTaiwan’shierarchicaljudicialsystem,districtcourtsaremorelikelystaffed
with inexperienced judges (in the absolute sense), who may suffer from the
anchoringbias(Chang,Chen,andLin2016)andothertypesofbiases.Similarly,
attorneysrepresentingappellatecases,particularlysupremecourtcases,would
not be novices. Had this project chosen to study appellate decisions, the
variancesofjudges’andattorneys’experiencewouldnotbelarge.
37 Adjudicatedcasesarebiasedinthesensethatmostdisputesaresettled.Nonetheless,weareinterestedinstudyingjudicialbehaviorsandtheinfluenceofattorneysonjudges.Thus,lackinginformationonsettleddisputeswillnotbiasourresults.
Chang, Chen & Lin
32
Figure5Thedistributionofcourt‐adjudicatedpainandsufferingdamages
N=387.DamagesinNewTaiwanDollars.USDollars:NewTaiwanDollars=1:30.
Figure6Thedistributionofplaintiff‐claimedpainandsufferingdamages
N=387.DamagesinNewTaiwanDollars.USDollars:NewTaiwanDollars=1:30.
05
1015
Per
cent
age
10,000 100,000 1,000,000 10,000,000Court-adjudicated pain and suffering damages (log10)
05
1015
20P
erce
ntag
e
10,000 100,000 1,000,000 10,000,000Plaintiff's claimed pain and suffering damages (log10)
Chang, Chen & Lin
33
Table2SummaryStatisticsofVariables
ContinuousVariables Obs Mean Std.Dev. Min Max
intra‐courtdeviation 387 ‐0.006 0.8 ‐2.3 2.4
inter‐courtdeviation,1to12weeks
beforeverdict=A 387 0.4 0.9 ‐1.9 3.2
Inter‐courtdifference,5–16weeks
beforeverdict=B 387 0.5 0.8 ‐1.7 3.4
ThedifferencebetweenAandB 387 ‐0.003 0.3 ‐1.2 1.7
EstimatedPSdamagesinHighCourt,
5–16weeksbeforeverdict 387 12.5 0.9 9.4 15.1
EstimatedPSdamagesinDistrict
Court,5–16weeksbeforeverdict 387 12.9 1.2 9.3 16.5
Deviationofplaintiff ’sclaimfrom
districtcourtcases5–16weeks
beforeverdict
387 1.2 0.9 ‐1.9 4.2
Court‐adjudicatedPSdamages 387 444,786 519,466 10,000 3,000,000
PSdamagesclaimedbyplaintiffs 387 1,252,810 1,310,391 10,000 10,800,000
Judge’scivilexperience 387 760 500 55 2,857
Plaintiffattorney’scivilexperience 387 290 250 0 1,539
Defendantattorney’scivil
experience 387 170 245 0 1,813
Court‐adjudicatedmedical‐related
expenses 387 1,104,264 2,912,387 0 22,700,000
Medical‐relatedexpensesincurred
byplaintiffs 387 1,749,726 4,819,668 0 46,200,000
Defendant’snumberofmonthsjailed 387 3.1 2.7 0.0 24.0
plaintiff ’sage 387 27.1 25.0 0.0 88.0
plaintiff ’sincome 387 216,640 397,650 0 2,600,000
Deductionappliedtodamages 387 251,382 512,669 0 2,200,000
Plaintiff ’scomparativenegligence 387 0.2 0.2 0.0 0.8
Note:Allcontinuousvariablesexceptplaintiff ’scomparativenegligencearein
naturallog.
Chang, Chen & Lin
34
CategoricalVariables Obs =1 %
=1ifplaintiffhiresattorney(s) 387 324 83.7
=1ifdefendanthiresattorney(s) 387 201 51.9
=1ifplaintiffhastopayfilingfee 387 87 22.5
Levelofinjury(7levels) 387 100.0
2.Temporaryinsignificant 2 0.5
3.Temporaryminor 140 36.2
4.Temporarymajor 102 26.4
5.Permanentminor 74 19.1
6.Permanentsignificant 15 3.9
7.Permanentmajor 32 8.3
8.Permanentgrave 22 5.7
=1ifdefendantsincludeacorporationwhichis
vicariouslyliable
387 9223.8
=1ifdefendantdroveundertheinfluenceof
alcohol
387 2727.0
=1ifdefendanthitandran 387 12 3.1
=1ifplaintiff ’sageismissing 387 132 34.1
=1ifplaintiff ’sincomeismissing 387 119 30.8
=1ifjudgestartscareerbefore2000 387 196 50.7
=1ifplaintiffattorneystartscareerbefore2000 387 165 42.6
=1ifdefendantattorneystartscareerbefore
2000
387 96 24.8
=1ifcourt‐adjudicatedmedicalexpenseis0 387 4 1.0
=1ifplaintiff‐incurredmedicalexpenseis0 387 1 0.3
Note:DamagesinNewTaiwanDollars.USDollars:NewTaiwanDollars=1:30.
VI. FINDINGSANDIMPLICATIONS
A. JudgesPayCloseAttentiontoHighCourtDecisions
Thestructuralequationmodelshowsthatdistrictcourtjudgesfollowedthe
historictrendsetbyhighcourts.Thevariableoninter‐courtdeviationinthefirst
equationinTable3hasapositivesignandisstatisticallysignificant(p=0.002).
Thissuggeststhatwhen,inthethreemonthspriortothedistrictcourtdecisions,
highcourtshaveincreasedtheamountofpainandsufferingdamagesrelativeto
districtcourts,districtcourtjudgesinthecurrentperiodtendedtoincreasethe
Chang, Chen & Lin
35
awardedamount.Followingtheassessmentpatternssetbyhighcourtscould
reducetheprobabilityofreversalandinthelongrunincreasejudges’chancesof
beingpromotedtohighcourts.Thisisthefirstempiricalfindingthatlowercourt
judgesmimictheweightsgiventofactsbyhighercourtjudges.
Toensurethatthisfindingisnotspurious,weranandpassedaseriesof
placebotests.Wefoundthatchangingtrendinthepastaffectedjudicialdecisions,
butchangingtrendinthefutureshouldnotinanywayaffectjudicialdecisions.
Thefollowingvariablesarecreated:changingtrendinthenextthreemonths
(highcourtestimateattimeT+1minusdistrictcourtestimateattimeT+1),
changingtrendacrosstimeandcourt(highcourtestimateattimeT+1minus
districtcourtestimateattimeT‐1),andchangingtrendacrosstime(district
courtestimateattimeT+1minusdistrictcourtestimateattimeT‐1).These
variableswerethenusedtoreplaceorsupplementthechangingtrendvariablein
equation(1)inthestructuralequationmodel.Noneofthesevariablesare
statisticallysignificantatthe10%level.
Thejudges’ownexperiencedoesnotaffectintra‐courtdeviation.38
UnreportedSEMmodelsshowthatinteractiontermsofjudgeexperienceand
otherfactorsdonotyieldstatisticallysignificantresults.Thissuggeststhat
seniorjudgesindistrictcourtswerenotmoreorlessinclinedtodeviatefrom
historictrendsetbyhighcourtsthanjuniorjudges.Theinteractionterms’lackof
statisticalsignificancecouldbeinterpretedinthefollowingway:districtcourt
judgesofallexperiencehaveequallypreparedtofollowhighcourts.39 Bydoing
so,districtcourtjudgesexpecttofacelowerreversalratesandthusincreasing
theirchancesofbeingpromoted.
38 Inunreportedmodels,weusedthenumberofyearssinceajudgerendersherfirstcivil(orany)casetoreplaceorcomplementthenumber‐of‐civil‐casemeasureofexperience.Thesenewmeasuresarenotstatisticallysignificant. 39 Inunreportedmodels,wedividedthesamplesinto2equal‐sizegroupsaccordingtotheexperienceofjudges.Thesamestructuralmodelreportedinthetextwasrunonthe2groupsseparately.TheresultsareconsistentwithChang,Chen,andLin(2016)—experiencedjudgeswerenotsubjecttotheanchoringeffect,whereasinexperiencedjudgeswere.
Chang, Chen & Lin
36
Table3SEMresults
Dependentvariableintra‐courtdeviation
(ln)
Deviationofplaintiff’s
claimfromdistrictcourt
cases5–16weeksbefore
verdict(ln)
Coef. Std.Err Coef. Std.Err
Plaintiff‐claimdeviation(ln) 0.406 *** (0.090)
Inter‐courtdeviation,1–12weeksbeforeverdict(ln) 0.133 ** (0.043)
EstimatedPSdamagesindistrictcourts5–16weeks
beforeverdict(ln)minusestimatedPSdamagesin
districtcourts1–12weeksbeforeverdict(ln)
0.682 *** (0.113)
Judge’scivilexperience(ln) 0.084 (0.053)
=1ifjudgestartedbenchcareerbefore2000 ‐0.064 (0.082)
=1ifdefendanthiresattorney(s) 0.248 (0.297)
Defendantattorney’scivilexperience(ln) ‐0.040 (0.055)
=1ifdefenseattorneystartedpracticingbefore2000 0.114 (0.102)
Court‐adjudicatedmedical‐relatedexpenses(ln) 0.033 (0.023)
=1ifadjudicatedmedicalexpenseis0 0.95 * (0.410)
Defendant’smaxincome(ln) 0.005 (0.007)
=1ifdefendant’smaxismissing 0.056 (0.108)
Deductionappliedtodamages(ln) 0.016 ** (0.006)
Plaintiff’scomparativenegligence 0.099 (0.136)
Inter‐courtdeviation,5–16weeksbeforeverdict 0.142* (0.058)
Plaintiff‐incurredmedicalexpenses ‐0.076* (0.030)
=1ifincurredmedicalexpenseis0 1.462 (0.939)
=1ifplaintiffhastopayfilingfee ‐0.372** (0.136)
=1ifplaintiffhiresattorney(s) ‐0.053 (0.285) ‐0.652+ (0.371)
Plaintiffattorney’scivilexperience(ln) 0.001 (0.051) 0.128+ (0.068)
=1ifplaintiffattorneystartedpracticingbefore2000 ‐0.165 * (0.081) ‐0.086 (0.110)
6injury‐leveldummies(baseline:2.Temporary
insignificant)
3.Temporaryminor 0.876 + (0.473) ‐1.056+ (0.619)
4.Temporarymajor 1.213 * (0.473) ‐0.798 (0.621)
5.Permanentminor 1.214 * (0.478) ‐1.004 (0.624)
6.Permanentsignificant 1.136 * (0.507) ‐1.106+ (0.664)
Chang, Chen & Lin
37
7.Permanentmajor 1.173 * (0.497) ‐1.209+ (0.642)
8.Permanentgrave 0.999 + (0.513) ‐1.186+ (0.656)
Defendant’slengthofdeclaredincarceration(ln) ‐0.013 (0.058) ‐0.234* (0.098)
=1ifdefendantsincludeacorporationwhichis
vicariouslyliable0.027 (0.079) ‐0.036 (0.108)
=1ifdefendantdroveundertheinfluenceofalcohol ‐0.035 (0.127) 0.186 (0.173)
=1ifdefendanthitandran 0.190 (0.212) ‐0.043 (0.283)
plaintiff’sage(ln) ‐0.055 (0.083) ‐0.040 (0.111)
=1ifplaintiff’sageismissing ‐0.079 (0.310) ‐0.120 (0.415)
plaintiff’sincome(ln) 0.010 (0.007) ‐0.008 (0.010)
=1ifplaintiff’sincomeismissing 0.147 (0.100) ‐0.056 (0.128)
18courtdummies Yes Yes
Constant ‐2.725 *** (0.756) 3.963*** (0.852)
σ1 0.520 *** (0.028)
σ2 0.824*** (0.030)
ρ 0.063 (0.128)
Robuststandarderrorsinparentheses.Clusteredbycases.Judgerandomeffects
apply.PSdamages=painandsufferingdamages.
***p<0.001,**p<0.01,*p<0.05,+p<0.1.
Loglikelihood=‐791.25
B. AttorneyInfluenceonPlaintiffClaim
Whetherplaintiffshire(experienced)attorneyissignificantlyassociated
withhowplaintiffsclaim.Table3revealsthatplaintiffsrepresentedbyattorneys
withlittleexperienceclaimedlessthanthoseself‐representedorrepresentedby
non‐attorneys(p=0.079).Thisisintuitive,asproseplaintiffsmaybe
optimisticallybiased,whilejuniorattorneysknowbetterbutclaimconservatively.
Plaintiffs’claims,however,increasewiththeexperienceoftheirattorneys
(p=0.059).Thisisconsistentwiththeeconomicandpsychologicalaccountslaid
outinPartIII.B.2.
Asarguedabove,(senior)attorneyrepresentationisclosetorandom
assignments.TableB.1intheAppendixfurthershowsthatplaintiffincomesdo
notaffectwhetherplaintiffsseekattorneyrepresentation.Themajordriverof
Chang, Chen & Lin
38
plaintiffs’decisionstoretainattorneysiswhetherdefendantsincludea
corporation(p<0.01).Perhapsplaintiffshireattorneyswhentheyidentifyadeep
pocket.40
Allthefouridentifyingvariablesinequation(2)arestatistically
significant.41 Thedummyvariableonwhetherplaintiffspaidfilingfeesisworthy
ofmorediscussion.Thisvariablehastheexpectednegativesign,aseconomically
rationalplaintiffswhodonothavetopayproratafilingfeeswillover‐claimas
comparedtothosewhohavetopay.Assaidabove,thejudgesweinterviewed
sensethatourconjectureholdswater,andtheattorneysweinterviewed
admittedthattheytendtodoexactlyaswehypothesize.Thus,thisresultshould
notbesurprising.
Wealsofindthatinter‐courtdeviationispositivelyassociatedwiththe
deviationofplaintiffs’claimedamount(p=0.015),suggestingthatplaintiffsin
generalpaidcloseattentiontothechangingtrendinhighcourtsvis‐à‐visdistrict
courts,too.
C. PlaintiffAttorneyInfluenceonAdjudication
Experiencedplaintiffattorneysingeneralwinhigherpainandsuffering
damagesfortheirclients.Theplaintiffs’claimedamountscreatedtheanchoring
effect.42 Whenplaintiffs’claimsarehigherthanthepointestimatesbasedon
casesofthepreviousthreemonths,districtcourtjudgestendtoawardhigher
40 Duetotechnicalconstraints,wecannotuseplaintiffattorneyexperiences(orrepresentation)anddefendantattorneyexperiences(representation)asdependentvariablesinadditionalequationsinthestructuralequationmodel.
Whenweaddedoneortwomoreequationstothereportedtwo‐equationstructuralmodel,themodeldidnotconverge.Wehavetriedexcludingcaseswhereplaintiffswerenotrepresentedbyattorneystofocussolelyontheeffectofplaintiffattorneyexperience.Puttingthosecasesintothereportedmodelrevealsalargelysimilarresult.Outmainstoryholds,thoughthep‐valuesdoshiftabit,sometimescrossingthethresholdofstatisticalsignificance.Wehavealsoputthosecasesintoathree‐equationstructuralmodel—thereportedmodelplusoneequationtoaccountforthedefendants’decisiontoretainattorneys.AgainthemainstoryreportedinthetextandAppendixB.2remainsintact.41 Thefourvariables,whenaddedintothefirstequationtotestwhethertheyarevalidinstrumentalvariables,arejointlyinsignificantinthefirstequation.Andthreeofthefourvariablesarestatisticallyinsignificantatthe10%level.Bycontrast,thefourinstrumentalvariablesarejointlysignificantinthesecondequation(p<0.001). 42 ThefindingoftheanchoringeffectisconsistentwithourpriorresearchonpropertydisputesinTaiwan(Chang,Chen,andLin2016)andexperimentalresultsconductedbyothers(ChapmanandBornstein1996;Campbelletal.2014).
Chang, Chen & Lin
39
painandsufferingdamages(p<0.001).Asdiscussedabove,plaintiffs’claimswere
furtheraffectedbyattorneyrepresentationandattorneyexperience.Hence,
throughtheanchoringeffects,plaintiffswhohireseniorattorneyswereableto
garnerhigherpainandsufferingdamages.Forexample,anincreaseofplaintiff
attorneyexperienceby1%(3.47cases)wouldonaverageleadtoanincreaseof
0.128%($53)inclaim,whichfurtherresultsanincreaseof0.05%($21)inpain
andsufferingdamagesawards.43
Thisfinding,however,doesnotimplythatplaintiffswhoseekhigherpain
andsufferingdamageshavetoretainseniorattorneystoachievethisgoal.As
longasplaintiffscanidentifythehistoricaltrendsinhighcourtsanddistrict
courtsandarewillingtogamblebyover‐claiming,theymaybeawardedwith
higherpainandsufferingdamagesaswell.AsTable3suggests,plaintiffsnot
representedbyattorneystendtoclaimhigherthanthoserepresentedby
attorneys(p=0.079).Theseunassistedplaintiffsreceivedhigherpainand
sufferingdamagesthroughtheanchoringeffects.Moreover,seniorattorneys
tendedtobedistrustedbyjudgeswhentheyover‐claim.Thedummyvariable
thatequals1whenaplaintiffattorneypassedthebarandstartedpracticebefore
year2000(whoseexperienceunder‐estimated)hasanegativecoefficientandis
statisticallysignificant(p=0.042).Thisisevidencethatjudgesmightbe
suspiciousofseniorattorneys’claims.
D. DefendantAttorneyHasNoRole
AsTable3shows,whetheradefendanthiresattorneysanddefendant
attorneyexperience44 donotaffecttheextenttowhichdistrictcourtsdeviate
fromthehistorictrend.Perhapsdefendantattorneysworkondismissingthe
casealtogetherorarguingthatplaintiffsarecomparativelynegligent.Ourdatado
notallowustotestthesehypotheses.
Defendants’decisionstoretainattorneysaremainlyinfluencedbythe 43 Thesenumbersarecalculatedbasedonthesampleaveragesofplaintiffattorneyexperience(347)andplaintiff 'sclaimofpainandsufferingdamages($41,760).0.128%×0.405=0.05%.Theexchangerateusedis$1=NTD30.44 Inunreportedmodels,weusedthenumberofyearssinceajudgerendersherfirstcivil(orany)caseorthenumberofyearssinceadmittedtothebartoreplaceorcomplementthenumber‐of‐civil‐casemeasureofexperience.Thesenewmeasuresarenotstatisticallysignificant.
Chang, Chen & Lin
40
compensationrisktheywereexposedto,asTableB.2intheAppendixshows.
Morespecifically,naturallogoftheamountoftotalclaimsmadebyplaintiffsis
positivelyandstatisticallysignificantlyassociatedwiththebinarydecisionof
defendants’hiringattorneys(p<0.01).Thisresultissensible,asdefendantscare
moreabouthowmuchtheywouldhavetopaythanthecategoriesofthe
damages.Whendefendantsaremoreexposedtorisksofhighdamages,theyare
inclinedtoseeklegalrepresentation.Besides,again,defendantincomesdonot
havestatisticallysignificantrelationwithdefendantattorneyrepresentation.
VII. CONCLUSION
Theinnovationandcontributionofthisarticleisusingthemostaccurate
measureofattorneys’andjudges’experiencetodateinnewandwell‐specified
regressionmodelstodirectlyexaminetheeffectofjurists’experience,whichhas
notbeenfullyexplored.Thestructuralequationmodelrevealsthatin
adjudicatingpainandsufferingdamages,districtcourtjudgesdeviatedfromthe
historictrendinordertofollowtherecentchangesinassessmentpatternsin
highcourts.Seniorplaintiffattorneyswintheirclientsmorepainandsuffering
damagesbyclaiminghigheramountsofdamages,whichcreatetheanchoring
effect.Judgeexperienceanddefendantattorneyexperiencedonotaffectwhether
districtcourtjudgesdeviatefromthehistorictrend.Ourfindingsofjudicialand
attorneys’behaviorsshouldbegeneralizabletootherjurisdictionswithsimilar
institutionalsettings.
Plaintiffs’addamnumcreatesananchoringeffect,andseniorplaintiff
attorneyshaveexploitedthisjudicialbiasintippingthecasetowardtheirclients’
favor—wealsofindevidencethatjudgesmightbeawareofthehigherclaims
madebyseniorattorneys.Policymakersinjurisdictionswhereaddamnumisa
pre‐requisiteshouldseriouslyconsiderreformproposalsthatcouldreducethe
unduebiascreatingbyplaintiffs’claims.
Wehavedemonstratedtheaddedvalueofplaintiffattorneys’experience.Yet,
thismaynotbethewholereasonforthehigherfeechargedbyseasoned
attorneys.Thisstudyexaminestheimpactofclaimformulationbyplaintiff
attorneys,whiletheycanchangelitigationoutcomesinotherwaysaswell.45
Therearestillalotofempiricalstudiesonattorneyexperiencetobedone!
45 Fordiscussionsonhowattorneyscanchangelitigationoutcomesviaotherways,seegenerally,forexample,Galanter(1974),Kritzer(1998),Aldisert(1992),andHaire,Lindquist,andHartley(1999).
Chang, Chen & Lin
42
APPENDIXA:PREDICTINGCOURT‐ADJUDICATEDPAINANDSUFFERINGDAMAGES
TableA.1HedonicRegressionModelsonAdjudicatedPainandSuffering
DamagesinDistrictCourts
DependentvariableCourt‐Adjudicatedpain
andsufferingdamages
Coef. Std.Err
Lnofcourt‐adjudicatedmedicalexpenses 0.284 *** (0.023)
=1ifcourt‐adjudicatedmedicalexpense=0 1.945 *** (0.390)
injury‐leveldummy(baseline:minorinjury) 0.651 *** (0.090)
Defendant’snumberofmonthsjailed(ln) 0.192 *** (0.050)
plaintiff’sage(ln) ‐0.140 + (0.082)
=1ifplaintiff’sageismissing ‐0.768 * (0.315)
plaintiff’sincome(ln) 0.001 (0.007)
=1ifplaintiff’sincomeismissing 0.047 (0.091)
defendant’sincome(ln) 0.010 (0.008)
=1ifdefendant’sincomeismissing 0.104 (0.105)
=1ifdefendantdroveundertheinfluenceofalcohol 0.158 (0.104)
=1ifdefendanthitandran ‐0.432 + (0.240)
=1ifdefendantsincludeacorporationwhichis
vicariouslyliable0.131 + (0.071)
Constant 9.179 *** (0.414)
N=520
R2=0.628
Robuststandarderrorsinparentheses.Clusteredbycases.
***p<0.001,**p<0.01,*p<0.05,+p<0.1
Chang, Chen & Lin
43
TableA.2HedonicRegressionModelsonAdjudicatedPainandSuffering
DamagesinHighCourts
DependentvariableCourt‐Adjudicatedpain
andsufferingdamages
Coef. Std.Err
Lnofcourt‐adjudicatedmedicalexpenses 0.341 *** (0.040)
=1ifcourt‐adjudicatedmedicalexpense=0 3.107 *** (0.843)
=1ifseriousinjury(baseline:minorinjury) 0.429 ** (0.151)
Defendant’snumberofmonthsjailed(ln) 0.064 (0.125)
plaintiff’sage(ln) ‐0.167 (0.162)
=1ifplaintiff’sageismissing ‐1.022 + (0.583)
plaintiff’sincome(ln) 0.002 (0.013)
=1ifplaintiff’sincomeismissing ‐0.055 (0.175)
defendant’sincome(ln) 0.014 (0.014)
=1ifdefendant’sincomeismissing ‐0.085 (0.200)
=1ifdefendantdroveundertheinfluenceofalcohol 0.253 (0.285)
=1ifdefendanthitandran ‐1.117 *** (0.248)
=1ifdefendantsincludeacorporationwhichis
vicariouslyliable‐0.013 (0.149)
Constant 9.132 *** (0.655)
N=164
R2=0.596
Robuststandarderrorsinparentheses.Clusteredbycases.
***p<0.001,**p<0.01,*p<0.05,+p<0.1
Chang, Chen & Lin
44
APPENDIXB:ATTORNEYHIRINGDECISIONS
TableB.1ProbitRegressionModelsonPlaintiffs’HiringAttorney(s)
Dependentvariable=1ifplaintiffhires
attorney(s)
Coef. Std.Err
plaintiff’sincome(ln) 0.021 (0.017)
=1ifplaintiff’sincomeismissing 0.311 (0.230)
plaintiff’sage(ln) ‐0.337 (0.226)
=1ifplaintiff’sageismissing ‐1.282 (0.844)
7injury‐leveldummies(baseline:2.Temporary
insignificant)
3.Temporaryminor ‐0.897 + (0.541)
4.Temporarymajor ‐1.053 + (0.548)
5.Permanentminor ‐0.847 (0.562)
6.Permanentsignificant ‐1.419 * (0.661)
7.Permanentmajor ‐0.980 (0.600)
=1ifdefendantsincludeacorporationwhichis
vicariouslyliable0.672 ** (0.230)
=1ifdefendantdroveundertheinfluenceofalcohol 0.160 (0.358)
=1ifdefendanthitandran ‐0.431 (0.429)
=1ifplaintiffisamale 0.097 (0.177)
18courtdummies Yes
Constant 2.972 ** (1.048)
N=379
PseudoR2=0.092
Robuststandarderrorsinparentheses.Clusteredbycases.PSdamages=pain
andsufferingdamages.
***p<0.001,**p<0.01,*p<0.05,+p<0.1.
Logpseudolikelihood=‐155.2775
Chang, Chen & Lin
45
TableB.2ProbitRegressionModelsonDefendants’HiringAttorney(s)
Dependentvariable=1ifdefendanthires
attorney(s)
Coef. Std.Err
Plaintiffattorney’scivilexperience(ln) ‐0.022 (0.097)
Plaintiff ’stotalclaim 0.286 ** (0.108)
Defendants’maximumincome(ln) ‐0.015 (0.019)
=1ifalldefendants’incomearemissing ‐0.334 (0.253)
7injury‐leveldummies(baseline:2.Temporary
insignificant)
3.Temporaryminor ‐0.164 (0.840)
4.Temporarymajor ‐0.165 (0.836)
5.Permanentminor 0.046 (0.843)
6.Permanentsignificant ‐0.054 (0.915)
7.Permanentmajor 0.117 (0.882)
8.Permanentgrave ‐0.114 (0.903)
=1ifdefendantsincludeacorporationwhichis
vicariouslyliable0.309 (0.191)
=1ifdefendantdroveundertheinfluenceofalcohol 0.198 (0.277)
=1ifdefendanthitandran ‐0.619 (0.501)
18courtdummies Yes
Constant ‐3.966 * (1.784)
N=318
PseudoR2=0.124
Robuststandarderrorsinparentheses.Clusteredbycases.PSdamages=pain
andsufferingdamages.Casesinwhichplaintiffsdonothireattorneysare
excludedinthisProbitregressionbecauseinoursample,defendantsalwayshire
attorneysinthosecases;thus,thereisnovariance.
***p<0.001,**p<0.01,*p<0.05,+p<0.1.
Logpseudolikelihood=‐190.1241
Chang, Chen & Lin
46
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