Page 1: Occupying German troops marchpast the Arc de Triomphe, Paris, 1940.Page 2-3: Italian troops on the EasternFront, 1942.

This page: US Marines at Iwo Jima plotthe position of a Japanese machine gunpost, February 1945.

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Natkiel, Richard.Atlas of World War II.

ContentsIntroduction 6

Blitzkrieg 10The War in Northern Waters 32The Desert War and the Mediterranean 42Soviet Ambitions Betrayed 64The Course of Global Conflict: 1939-45 78The Japanese Juggernaut 96The Italian Campaign 108Ebb Tide in the Pacific 120Retaking Burma: The Forgotten War 138Russia Finds Its Strength 148Fortress Europe Overthrown 166Index 190

(i

IntroductionIt has often been stated that World War IIwas part of a European Civil War thatbegan in 1914 at the start of World War I.This is partly true. In Europe, at least,the two world wars were the two hideoushalves of the Anglo-German controversythat was at the heart of both conflicts.The question posed was: would Britain beable, or willing, to maintain her vastEmpire in the face of German hegemonyon the continent of Europe? The answerto that question never came. Britain, inseeking to thwart German interests onthe Continent, eventually lost her wholeEmpire in the attempt -an empire thatbetween the wars encompassed a quarterof the earth's surface and an equal pro-portion of its population. Put into thatcontext, both world wars were dangerousfor Britain to fight, jeopardizing the veryexistence of the Empire and inevitablyweakening the mother country to thepoint that she could not maintain herworld position at the end of the conflicts.

From Germany's point of view, thewars were not only dangerous in thatthey finally ruined virtually every townand city, devastated the countryside anddismembered the nation; they wereirrelevant. In 1890 Germany was in aposition from which, within a generation,she would economically dominate thewhole of Europe. Inevitably, with thateconomic hegemony, political hegemonywould soon follow, if not even precede. By1910 the process was well in train; had noone done anything to stop her, Germanywould have achieved the Kaiser's dreamswithout war by the mid 1920s. The col-lapse of Imperial Germany in 1918, fol-lowed by temporary occupation, inflationand national humiliation, set Germanyback only a few years. Despite the disas-ters of World War I and its aftermath,Germany was quickly recovering her oldposition - roughly that of 1910 - by thetime Hitler took power in 1933. By 1938German power in Europe was greaterthan ever before, and Britain had to facethe old question once again. Could shecondone German political dominance ofthe Continent?

In 1938 some Conservatives, likeChamberlain and Halifax, recognized thethreat and were tacitly willing to main-tain the Imperial status quo and condoneHitler. Other Tories, like Churchill andthe Labour and Liberal Parties, wantedto challenge Germany again. Had Hitlerbeen a bit more discreet and less hurried,perhaps a bit less flamboyant and

Below: Dunkirk, scene of an ignominiousretreat by Allied forces that signaled theFall of France.

virulently anti-Semitic, Chamberlain'spolicy might have succeeded. Germanywould have extended her power inEurope and the Empire would have beenmaintained. But that was to ask the im-possible, to wish that Hitler were some-one other than Hitler. The result -humiliation of Britain's policy whenCzechoslovakia was overrun in March1939 - forced even Chamberlain's hand,and the stage was set for round two of theEuropean Civil War.

World War II in Europe was very like aGreek tragedy, wherein the elements ofdisaster are present before the play be-gins, and the tragedy is writ all the largerbecause of the disaster's inevitability.The story of the war, told through themaps of Richard Natkiel in this volume,are signposts for the historian of humanfolly. In the end, Germany and Italy weredestroyed, along with much of Europe.With the devastation came the inevitablecollapse of both the impoverished BritishEmpire and centuries of Europeanhegemony in the world. A broader lookfrom the perspective of the 1980s wouldindicate a further irony. Despite Ger-many's loss of part of its Polish and Rus-sian territory and its division into twocountries, not to mention the separationof Austria from the Reich and the semi-permanent occupation of Berlin, the Ger-man economic advance was only delayed,not permanently stopped. The FederalRepublic is clearly the strongest economyin Western Europe today and the fourthstrongest in the world. The GermanDemocratic Republic rates twelfth onthis basis. Together their economies areroughly as strong as that of the SovietUnion, and their political reunification isnow less of a dream, more of a realitytoward which Germans on both sides ofthe Iron Curtain are striving. One day,probably within the next two decades, aform of unification may take place, andwhen it does, German power on the Con-tinent will be greater than ever before.No wonder the Soviets and many West-ern Europeans view this prospect withfear and cynicism. What had the worldwars been for? For what ideals had theblood of tens of millions been spilt?

The irony of World War II becomeseven clearer when one views briefly itssecond half, the struggle between Japanand the United States for control of thePacific. The question facing AmericanPresidents from Theodore Roosevelt toFranklin Roosevelt had been: could the

8

Left: The successful Russian defense ofStalingrad was a major setback toGerman war plans.Below: Japanese tanks pass a wreckedBritish ambulance inBurma, 1942.

United States maintain its security andtrade routes in the Pacific in the face of anincreasingly powerful Japanese Navyand economy? For decades the questionwas begged, until the Japanese took mat-ters into their own hands at Pearl Har-bor, the Philippines, Vietnam andMalaya in 1941. The ensuing tragedy, asinevitable in the Pacific as was its coun-terpart in Europe, became obviousalmost from the outset. Millions died invain; Japan itself was devastated by fireand atomic bombs, and eventually con-ceded defeat.

From a forty-year perspective, whatwas the point of the Pacific War? Japanhas the third largest economy in theworld and by far the largest in Asia. Inrecent years the United States hasactually encouraged Japan to flex itspolitical muscles, increase its armedforces and help the United States policethe Western Pacific. It would seem thatthis conflict was as tragically futile as theEuropean Civil War.

The greatest disaster in the history ofmankind to date was World War II. Thisatlas is a valuable reference work forthose who feel it bears remembering.Clearly, this is the case, but the lessons ofthe war have been less clearly spelled out- to those who fought in it, who rememberit, or who suffered from it, as well as tosubsequent generations who were shapedby it and fascinated by its horrific drama.The exceptional maps of Richard Natkielof The Economist, which punctuate thisvolume, can give only the outlines of thetragedy; they do not seek to give, nor canthey give, the lessons to be learned.

It would seem that if anything useful isto be derived from studying World War II,it is this: avoid such conflicts at all costs.No nation can profit from them. This iscertainly truer today than if these wordshad been written in 1945. The advancesof science have made a future world con-flict even less appetizing to those who arestill mad enough to contemplate such athing.

Perhaps the balance of the 20th centuryand the early years of the 21st will bevery like the past 40 years: small con-flicts, limited wars, brinkmanship, armsraces and world tension - yes; generalwar, no. If our future takes this course,the period following World War II may beseen by historians of the 21st century as atime similar to the century following theNapoleonic Wars - one of growing worldprosperity, which has indeed been appa-rent for some nations since 1945, manycrises, but no all-out war. If that is ourfuture, as it has been our recent past, thestudy of World War II will have beenmore than useful. It will have preparedthe world psychologically to avoid worldconflict at all cost. In that event, for thesake of a relatively stable, increasinglyprosperous 'cold peace,' the 1939-45 con-flict will not have been in vain. If war isthe price for a bloodstained peace, thosewho will benefit are ourselves and futuregenerations.

S L Mayer

12

The SwastikaAscendant

The German humiliation at Versail-les was skillfully exploited byAdolf Hitler and his Nazis, who

rode to power in 1933 on a tide of nationalresentment that they had channeled totheir purpose. The territorial losses, eco-nomic hardships and affronts to Germanpride embodied in the Treaty of Versail-les virtually guaranteed the conflict thatescalated into World War II. As MarshalFoch had prophesied when the treaty wasforced upon a prostrate Germany: 'This isnot Peace. It is an Armistice for twentyyears.'

Hitler's stormy career seemed to reachits zenith when he seized control of theGerman Government in March of 1933.In fact, it was only beginning. Hitler im-

plemented a military build-up in defianceof the Versailles Treaty, which had li-mited German armed forces to an army of100,000 and a small navy without armoror air force support. Groundwork was laidfor a much larger army to be built up byconscription upon a highly trained pro-fessional base organized by GeneralHans von Seeckt. The prohibited tanksand planes were developed secretly,many in the Soviet Union, and futurepilots were trained. Meanwhile, theNazis continued to scapegoat the Jewsand other minorities for the nation'sproblems; they established the first con-centration camp at Dachau in the sameyear they came to power.

Germany withdrew from the League of

13

Previous page: German blitzkrieg(lightning war) tactics were expertlyexecuted by their highly trained troops.Below left: Germany's expansion byAugust 1939.Bottom left: Detail showing the recentlyannexed Rhineland and Sudetenland.Below: The Nuremberg Rally in 1934,with Adolf Hitler (center).

Nations, and by 1935 Hitler couldannounce repudiation of the Treaty ofVersailles. He told the world that theGerman Air Force had been re-created,and that the army would be strengthenedto 300,000 through compulsory militaryservice. The Western democracies,France and Britain, failed to make anymeaningful protest, a weakness that en-couraged Hitler's ambition to restoreGermany to her 'rightful place' asEurope's most powerful nation.

Nazi Germany's first overt movebeyond her borders was into the Rhine-land, which was reoccupied in 1936. Thiscoup was achieved more through bravadothan by superior force. Hitler's generalshad counseled against it on account of therelative size of France's army, but thereoccupation was uncontested. The next

step was to bring all Germans living out-side the Reich into the 'Greater Ger-many.' Austria was annexed in March1938, with only token protests from Bri-tain and France. Even more ominous wasHitler's demand that Czechoslovakiaturn over its western border - the Su-detenland — on ground that its three mil-lion German-speaking inhabitants wereoppressed. The Nazis orchestrated a de-mand for annexation among the SudetenGermans, and the Czechoslovakian Gov-ernment prepared to muster its strongarmed forces for resistance. Then BritishPrime Minister Neville Chamberlainflew to Munich to confer with Hitler.

Chamberlain rationalized that theproblem was one affecting CentralEurope alone, and expressed reluctanceto risk war on behalf of 'a far-off country

of which we know little.' France had tostand by its alliance with Britain, and theCzechoslovakian democracy was isolatedin a rising sea of German expansionism.The Sudetenland, with its vital frontierdefenses, was handed over. Far fromsecuring 'peace in our time,' as NevilleChamber l a in had promised af terMunich, this concession opened the doorto Nazi occupation of all Czechoslovakiain March 1939'.

Only at this point did the Westerndemocracies grasp the true scope of Hit-ler's ambitions. Belatedly, they began torearm after years of war-weary stasis. Bynow Hitler's forces were more than equalto theirs, and the Führer was lookingeastward, where Poland's Danzig Corri-dor stood between him and East Prussia,the birthplace of German militarism.

14

The Partition ofPoland

France and Britain tried to forestallthe Nazi assault on Poland byissuing a joint guarantee to the

threatened nation. This was supposed toprovide leverage whereby the democra-cies could persuade the Poles to makeconcessions similar to those made by theCzechs. But Hitler's aggressiveness grewmore apparent throughout the springand summer of 1939. In April he revokedboth the German-Polish Non-AggressionPact and the Anglo-German NavalAgreement of 1935. Then he sent emis-saries to the Soviet Union, whereJoachim von Ribbentrop concluded bothan economic agreement and a Non-Aggression Pact with Josef Stalin. By 1September 1939, the Germans wereready to invade Poland on two fronts intheir first demonstration of blitzkrieg -lightning war - a strategy that combinedsurprise, speed and terror. It took Ger-man forces just 18 days to conquer Po-land, which had no chance to complete itsmobilization. The Poles had a bare dozencavalry brigades and a few light tanks tosend against nine armored divisions. Atotal of five German armies took part inthe assault, and German superiority inartillery and infantry was at least threeto one. The Polish Air Force was almostentirely destroyed on the ground by theLuftwaffe offensive supporting ArmyGroups North and South.

Above right: The Nazi thrust into Poland,early September.Right: Russia counterattacks, mid to lateSeptember.Below: The partition of Poland as agreedby Germany and R ussia.

Below: German troops enter Warsaw. Thecity finally surrendered on 27 Septemberafter 56 hours of resistance against airand artillery attack.

L 5

Thinly spread Polish troops staggeredback from their border, and Germanforces were approaching Warsaw a weeklater. The Poles made a last-ditch effortalong the Bzura River to halt the Germanadvance against their capital, but theycould not withstand the forces pittedagainst them. The Polish Governmentfled to Rumania, and on 27 SeptemberWarsaw finally capitulated.

Meanwhile, Britain and France haddeclared war on Germany 48 hours after

the invasion of Poland. Australia, NewZealand and South Africa soon joinedthem. Since the Western Allies had failedin their diplomatic efforts to enlist Sovietsupport, they faced a united totalitarianfront of Hitler's Germany and Stalin'sRussia (which could be counted upon totake full advantage of Poland's impo-tence). Stalin had made it clear that hewanted a free hand in Eastern Europewhen he cast his lot with Germany. Be-fore the month of September was out, it

became obvious that Russia and Ger-many had reached a secret agreement onthe partition of Poland during the sum-mer months. On 17 September Soviettroops crossed the eastern frontier to takeVilnyas; a German-Soviet Treaty ofFriendship was announced two dayslater. On 28 September, after Warsaw'ssurrender, Russia annexed 77,000 squaremiles of eastern Poland. The other 73,000square miles, bordering on Germany,were declared a Reich protectorate.

1 fi

Blitzkrieg - North

Hitler counted on Allied reluctanceto assume an active role in thewar, and he was not disappointed.

The six-month hiatus known as thePhony War lasted from September 1939until April 1940, when Germany invadedNorway and Denmark. In the interim,Britain and France made plans thatcould only fail, because they were basedon a negative concept: avoidance of thecostly direct attacks that had character-ized World War I. New Anglo-Frenchstrategy focused on naval blockade andencirclement - indirect methods thatwere no match for the new blitzkrieg tac-tics of Nazi Germany.

Early in 1940 Hitler turned his atten-tion to Scandinavia, where he had avested interest in Swedish iron ore im-ports that reached Germany via theNorwegian port of Narvik. Norway had asmall Nazi Party, headed by VidkunQuisling, that could be counted upon forfifth-column support. February broughtevidence that the Allies would resist aGerman incursion into Norway when theAltmark, carrying British prisoners, wasboarded in Norwegian waters by a Brit-ish party. Both sides began to make plansfor a Northern confrontation.

On 9 April the Germans launched theirinvasion of Norway and Denmark, basedon a bold strategy that called for navallandings at six points in Norway, sup-ported by waves of paratroops. The navalescort for the Narvik landing sufferedheavy losses, and the defenders of Oslosank the cruiser Blücher and damagedthe pocket battleship Liitzow. Even so,the Germans seized vital airfields, whichallowed them to reinforce their assaultunits and deploy their warplanes againstthe Royal Navy ships along the coast.

17

Denmark had already been overrun andposed no threat to German designs.

Norwegian defense forces were weak,and the Germans captured numerousarms depots at the outset, leaving hastilymobi l ized reservists without anyweapons. Allied planning proved whollyinadequate to German professionalismand air superiority. Kristiansand, Sta-vanger, Bergen, Trondheim and Narvikwere all lost to the Germans, along withthe country's capital, Oslo. Few Alliedtroops were trained for landing, andthose who did get ashore were poorly sup-plied.

In May, British, French and Polishforces attempted to recapture two impor-tant cities, but their brief success at Nar-vik was offset by the bungled effort atTrondheim to the south. Troops in thatarea had to be evacuated within twoweeks, and soon after Narvik was aban-doned to the Germans when events inFrance drew off Allied troops.

Norway and Denmark would remainunder German occupation throughoutthe war, and it seemed that Hitler's Scan-dinavian triumph was complete. Howev-er, German naval losses there wouldhamper plans for the invasion of Britain,and the occupation would tie up numer-ous German troops for the duration. TheAllies were not much consoled by thesereflections at the time. The Northernblitzkrieg had been a heavy blow to theirmorale, and the Germans had gainedvaluable Atlantic bases for subsequentoperations.

Opposite top left: The Reich expands to thenorth and east.Opposite: German forces forge throughDenmark and make six simultaneouslandings in Norway.A hove: A Norwegian port burns as theGermans follow through their surpriseattack.

18

Military Balance inthe West

On the Western Front, both Alliedand German armies scarcely stir-red for six months after the

declaration of war. The Allies had an ill-founded faith in their Maginot Line - stillincomplete - which stretched only to theBelgian border. The threat of a Germanattack through Belgium, comparable tothe Schlieffen Plan of 1914, was to be metthrough the Dyle Plan. This strategycalled for blocking any advance betweenthe Ardennes and Calais by a swift de-ployment of troops into Belgium from thevicinity of Sedan.

German General Erich von Mansteinanticipated this plan, whose weak linkwas the hilly Ardennes region - widelybelieved to be impassable to an advanc-ing army. Manstein prepared for anattack on the Low Countries to draw theAllies forward, followed by a swift sur-prise breakthrough in the Ardennes thatwould aim for Calais. This would cut offany Allied troops that had moved intoBelgium to implement the Dyle Plan.

The Allies, discounting the possibilityof a large-scale German advance throughthe Ardennes, garrisoned the MaginotLine and deployed their remaining forcesalong the Franco-Belgian border. Theretroops stood ready to advance to the RiverDyle should the Belgians need assist-

ance. Experienced French and Britishunits were designated for this advance,which left the sector opposite the Arden-nes as the most vulnerable part of theAllied line.

On paper, the opposing forces werealmost equally matched. The Allies had atotal of 149 divisions as against 136 Ger-man divisions, with some 3000 armoredvehicles to the Germans' 2700. But theGermans had several advantages, not theleast of which was superiority in the air -some 6000 fighters and bombers to theAllies' 3300. Less tangible, but no lessimportant, was their innovative andflexible approach to modern warfare. TheAllies still clung to outmoded ideas ofpositional warfare, and wasted theirarmor in scattered deployments amongtheir infantry divisions. The Germansmassed their armor in powerful Panzergroups that could cut a swath through themost determined resistance. Wherenecessary, dive-bombing Stukas couldsupport German tanks that had outstrip-ped their artillery support in the field. Itwas a lethal combination.

In organization, too, the Allies laggedfar behind the German war machine.Their training, communications andleadership were not comparable to thoseof Hitler's army, which was characterized

by dynamic co-ordination of every detail.General Maurice Gamelin, Allied Com-mander in Chief, now in his late sixties,was in far from vigorous health. Con-siderable friction developed between theBritish and French commands. TheAllies also counted too much upon co-operation from the Belgians and theDutch, who were slow to commit them-selves for fear of provoking a Germanattack. German leadership, by contrast,was unified and aggressive - providedHitler did not take a direct hand inmilitary affairs.

l!)

Below left: Thrust and counterthrust atthe Belgian border.Bottom left: German soldiers fire atattacking aircraft from the remains of ademolished bridge, Holland, 1940.Below: The forces of the Reich mass at theSieg fried Line.

20

Blitzkrieg - West

The German assault on the West waslaunched on 10 May 1940, whenaerial bombardments and para-

troop landings rained down on the LowCountries at daylight. Dutch airfieldsand bridges were captured, and Germantroops poured into Holland and Belgium.Both countries called for help fromFrance and Britain, as the Dutch retre-ated from their borders, flooding theirlands and demolishing strategic objec-tives in an attempt to halt the invasion.Their demoralization was completed by asavage air attack on Rotterdam (14 May),after which Dutch forces surrendered.Queen Wilhelmina and her government

were evacuated to England.The French Seventh Army had tried to

intervene in Holland, but it was repulsed.In Belgium, the German capture of EbenEmael, a key fortress, and the accom-plishment of Manstein's plan to traversethe Ardennes with his Panzer divisions,gave access to the Meuse. Three bridge-heads were secured by 14 May, and theAllied line had been breached from Sedanto Dinant. The Panzer divisions thenmade for the sea, forcing back the BritishExpeditionary Force and two Frencharmies in Belgium. Allied forces weresplit, and their attempt to link up nearArras (21 May) was a failure. German

21

Opposite below: German forces pour intothe Low Countries.Left: Motorized Dutch soldiers arepictured traversing a dyke.Below: The Panzer thrust to the Meuse.

tanks had already reached the sea atNoyelles and were turning north towardthe Channel ports.

Only the unwarranted caution of Ger-man commanders prevented wholesaledestruction of Allied forces in Belgium.On 23 May orders to halt came down fromHitler and Field Marshal Gerd von Rund-stedt. The German advance did not re-sume until 26 May, and the beleagueredAllies were able to fall back aroundDunkirk.

22

Dunkirk and the Fallof France

Adetermined defense at Calais, andGerman failure to capitalize onthe chance of seizing the Channel

ports, enabled the Royal Navy to beginevacuating British troops from Dunkirk.Between 27 May, when Allied resistanceat Calais ended, and 4 June, 338,226 menof the British Expeditionary Force leftDunkirk along with 120,000 French sol-diers. The Germans tried to prevent therescue operation with attacks by theLuftwaffe, but the Royal Air Force dis-tinguished itself in safeguarding the ex-odus. With the loss of only 29 planes, RAFpilots accounted for 179 German aircraftin the four-day period beginning 27 May.Royal Navy losses totaled six destroyerssunk and 19 badly damaged, plus manysmaller craft. The toll in lives and matér-iel would have been much higher hadchance not favored the Allies in the formof Germany's inexplicable pause atNoyelles.

To the south, General MaximeWeygand tried to rally remaining Frenchforces for defense of the Somme Line. TheGermans began to attack south on 5June, and the line gave way despitecourageous fighting by many French un-its. By 10 June the Germans had crossed

the Seine, and Mussolini took advantageof the situation by declaring war onFrance. Italian troops moved in and en-countered stiff resistance, but overallFrench morale and confidence were at alow ebb. The government removed toBordeaux and rejected Prime MinisterWinston Churchill's offer of a union be-tween Britain and France. By 16 JunePremier Reynaud was resigning in favorof Marshal Henri Pétain, who announcedthe next day that France was seeking anarmistice.

The conquered nation was divided intooccupied and unoccupied zones. ThePétain Government would rule the un-occupied zone from Vichy and collaborateclosely with the Germans, to the revul-sion of most Frenchmen. The 'FreeFrench,' led by Charles de Gaulle, ayoung army officer and politician, repudi-ated the Vichy régime and departed forEngland, where de Gaulle announcedthat France would ultimately throw offthe German oppressors.

Above: Germany expands westwards tothe Channel coast.Below: The Allied front line contracts asFrance andBelgium are overrun.

2;_i

Far left: The Allies prepare to evacuate asthe Germans advance.Left: France divided under Nazi andVichy rule.Below: The occupying forces move intoParis in June.

24

Left: German vacillation and the spiriteddefense of Calais gave the A llies time toevacuate from Dunkirk.Below: A British soldier is hit by strafingLuftwaffe aircraft on theDunkirk beach.Bottom: The British Expeditionary Forceand their French allies await departure.Right: The aftermath of evacuation.Below right: The German sweepsouthwards through France that resultedin the 22 June armistice. Note Italianincursions from the southeast.

25

26

The Attack onBritain

Right: The stage is set for the Battle ofBritain, 1940.Below: London's dockland burns after oneof the first major bombing raids on thecapital, 7September 1940.

The Battle of Britain was fought inthe air to prevent a seaborneinvasion of the British Isles. The

German invasion plan, code-named Op-eration Sealion, took shape when Britainfailed to sue for peace, as Hitler had ex-pected, after the fall of France. On 16July 1940, German Armed Forces wereadvised that the Luftwaffe must defeatthe RAF, so that Royal Navy ships wouldbe unprotected if they tried to prevent across-Channel invasion. It was an ambi-tious project for the relatively small Ger-man Navy, but success would hinge uponair power, not sea power.

There were only some 25 divisions onBritish home ground, widely scatteredand ill supplied with equipment andtransport. The RAF alone could gain thetime necessary for the army to re-equipafter Dunkirk, and hold off the Germansuntil stormy fall weather made it im-possible to launch Operation Sealion.The air arm was well led by Air ChiefMarshal Hugh Dowding, who made themost of his relatively small but skillfulforce. The RAF had the advantage of agood radar system, which the Germansunwisely neglected to destroy, and pro-fited also from the German High Com-

mand's decision to concentrate on thecities rather than airfields.

All-out Luftwaffe attacks did not beginuntil 13 August, which gave Britain timeto make good some of the losses incurredat Dunkirk and to train additional pilots.On 7 September London became the mainGerman target, relieving pressure onBritish airfields which had suffered inearlier bombings. RAF pilots who wereshot down unwounded could, and oftendid, return to combat on the same day,while German pilots were captured. Theshort-range Messerschmitt Bf 109 couldstay over England only briefly if it were

21

28

Bottom: Two Luftwaffe Dornier Do 17bombers over the R iver Thames,September 1940.Right: Aftermath of heavy nightbombing in the Midlands city of Coventrytwo months later.

to return to its base in France, whichhelped cancel out the German superiorityin numbers of planes and pilots.

The Battle of Britain raged in the skiesfor almost two months, while a Germanfleet of barges and steamers awaited thesignal to depart the Channel ports for theBritish coast. By mid September, the in-vasion date had already been put offthree times, and Hitler had to concedethat the Luftwaffe had failed in its mis-sion. Sporadic German bombing wouldcontinue until well into 1941, but Opera-tion Sealion was 'postponed' indefinitely.

The Invasion ofYugoslavia

On 6 April 1941, the Germansmoved to extend their influence inthe Balkans by an attack on

Yugoslavia, whose Regent, Prince Paul,had been coerced into signing the Tripar-tite Pact on 25 March. As a result, he wasdeposed by a Serbian coalition thatplaced King Peter on the throne in a gov-ernment that would last only a matter ofdays. Hitler ordered 33 divisions intoYugoslavia, and heavy air raids struckBelgrade in a new display of blitzkrieg.At the same time, the Yugoslav Air Forcewas knocked out before it could come tothe nation's defense.

The German plan called for an incur-sion from Bulgaria by the Twelfth Army,which would aim south toward Skopjeand Monastir to prevent Greek assist-ance to the Yugoslavs. Thence theywould move into Greece itself, for the in-vasion that had been planned since theprevious year. Two days later, GeneralPaul von Kleist would lead his First Pan-zer Group toward Nis and Belgrade,

where it would be joined by the SecondArmy and other units that includedItalians, Hungarians and Germans.

The plan worked smoothly, and therewas little resistance to any of the attacksmounted between 6 and 17 April, whenan armistice was agreed after King Peterleft the country. Internal dissensionamong the various Yugoslavian stateswas a help to the Germans, who lost fewerthan 200 men in the entire campaign.Another factor in their favor was the de-fenders' use of an ineffectual cordon de-ployment that was no match for thestrength and numbers thrown againstthem. German air superiority completedthe case against Yugoslavian autonomy.

Below: Yugoslavia falls in the face ofpressure from Germany, Hungary andItaly, April 1941.

2! i

30

The Battle forGreece

Below: Italian attacks and Greekcounteroffensives, winter 1940-41.Right: TheBritish evacuate the Greekmainland as Axis forces thrustsouthwards.

The overthrow of Yugoslavia's Re-gency Government on 27 March1941 changed Hitler's scenario for

southeastern Europe. Prior to that, hehad planned to assist his Italian allies intheir ill-starred Greek campaign by per-suading Bulgaria and Yugoslavia toallow his troops free passage into Greece.Now he would have to invade both Yugo-slavia and Greece, where the Britishwere landing over 50,000 men in anattempt to enforce their 1939 guaranteeof Greek independence.

Mussolini's forces had crossed theGreek frontier into Albania on 28 Octo-ber 1940, but their fortunes had beengoing downhill since November. TheGreeks mobilized rapidly and pushed theItalians back until half of Albania wasrecovered, with British assistance, byMarch of 1941. The prospect of his ally'sdefeat, coupled with British proximity tothe oil fields of Rumania, motivated Hit-ler to send three full army corps, with astrong armor component, into Greece.The attack was launched on 6 April,simultaneously with the invasion ofYugoslavia.

Allied forces in Greece included sevenGreek divisions - none of them strong -less than two divisions from Australiaand New Zealand, and a British armoredbrigade, as well as the forces deployed inAlbania. British leaders wanted to basetheir defense on the Aliakmon Line,where topography favored them, withsufficient forces to close the MonastirGap. But the Greek Commander in Chiefheld out for a futile attempt to protectGreek Macedonia, which drew off much-needed troops to the less-defensibleMetaxas Line. The Germans seized theirchance to destroy this line in directattacks and push other troops throughthe Monastir Gap to outflank the Allieddefense lines.

By 10 April the German offensive wasin high gear and rolling over the Aliak-mon Line, which had to be evacuated. Aweek later, General Archibald Wavelldeclined to send any more British rein-forcements from Egypt - a sure sign thatthe fight for Greece was being aban-doned. Some 43,000 men were evacuatedto Crete before the Germans closed thelast Peloponnesian port at Kalamata;11,000 others were left behind.

Right: German mountain infantry marchthrough the township of Lamia in April1941.

; s :

34

Battle of the Atlantic1939-42

The memory of German submarinesuccess in World War I led the Brit-ish to introduce a convoy system as

soon as hostilities began. The immediatethreat was less than British leaders im-agined, because submarine constructionhad not been given high priority in theGerman rearmament program, and Hit-ler was reluctant to antagonize neutralnations by unrestricted submarine war-fare. This was fortunate for the British inthe early months of the war, because theylacked sufficient escort vessels. Manyships sailed independently, and otherswere convoyed only partway on theirvoyages.

In June 1940 the U-boat threat becamemore pressing. The fall of France entailedthe loss of support from the French Fleeteven as British naval responsibility in-creased with Italian participation in thewar. Germany's position was streng-thened by the acquisition of bases inwestern France and Norway for theirlong-range reconnaissance support planes

Previous pages: A surfaced German U-boat immediately prior to its sinking byUS Navy bombers southwest of AscensionIsland, November 1943.Opposite and below right: Earlydevelopments in the Battle of the Atlantic.Below. USS Spencer closes on a U-boatoff the east coast of America.

and U-boats. And German submarines,if relatively few in number, had severaltechnical advantages. Their intelli-gence was superior to that of the Britishdue to effective code-breaking by theGerman signals service. British Asdicequipment could detect only submergedsubmarines; those on the surface wereeasily overlooked at night or until theyapproached within striking distance of aconvoy. Radar was not sophisticated, andBritish patrol aircraft were in very shortsupply.

As a result, the Battle of the Atlanticwas not one of ships alone. It involvedtechnology, tactics, intelligence, air pow-er and industrial competition. The Ger-mans made full use of their advantages inthe second half of 1940 (known to Ger-man submariners as 'the happy time').U-boat 'wolf-packs' made concertedattacks on convoys to swamp theirescorts, and numerous commanders wonrenown for the speed and success of theirmissions.

35

:!<;

By March 1941 this picture was chang-ing. Many U-boats had been destroyed,and replacement construction was notkeeping pace. The British provided stron-ger escorts and made use of rapidly de-veloping radar capabilities to frustrateGerman plans. Three of the best GermanU-boat commanders were killed thatMarch, and Churchill formed the effec-tive Battle of the Atlantic Committee toco-ordinate British efforts in everysphere of the struggle. The remainder of1941 proved that a balance had beenstruck: German U-boats tripled in num-ber between March and November, butshipping losses in November were thelowest of the war to that date. US assist-ance in both convoy duty and supplieshelped improve the British position, asdid intelligence breakthroughs.

When the United States formally en-

37

Opposite and below right: T he Battle ofthe Atlantic continues, with Allied aircover now apparent.Below: US troops disembark in Iceland.Air cover from Reykjavik drasticallyreduced U-boat strikes in the area from1941 onwards.

tered the war at the end of 1941, thesituation changed again. The US Navywas preoccupied with the Japanesethreat in the Pacific, and the East Coastwas left vulnerable to German sub-marine operations. For the first half of1942, the US ships sailed without escorts,showed lights at night and communi-cated without codes - afflicted by thesame peacetime mentality that hadproved so disastrous at Pearl Harbor.Sparse anti-submarine patrols along theEast Coast were easily evaded by the ex-perienced Germans. It was months beforean effective convoy system was estab-lished and extended as far south as theCaribbean. But by late summer of 1942the US coastline was no longer a happyhunting ground, and the U-boats turnedtheir attention back to the main NorthAtlantic routes.

:',8

Stalking theBismarck

The formidable German battleshipBismarck was ready for action inthe spring of 1941. Armed with 15-

inch guns and protected by massivearmor plate, she was an ocean raider toreckon with, accompanied on her firstforay by the heavy cruiser Prinz Eugen,which had finished her trials at the sametime. On 18 May the two warships leftGdynia for Bergen, where RAF recon-naissance planes spotted them two dayslater. Their presence in Norwegian wa-ters could only mean a foray into theAtlantic, and Royal Navy vessels in andaround Britain were warned of the com-ing confrontation. Meanwhile, the Ger-man ships put to sea in foggy weather,bound for the Denmark Strait under com-mand of Vice-Admiral Günther Lütjens.Not until late on 23 May were they spot-ted in the Strait by the cruisers Suffolkand Norfolk.

British Vice-Admiral Lancelot Hol-land, commanding the Hood and the newbattleship Prince of Wales, altered course

to intercept the raiders. Prince of Walesstill had workmen aboard and was by nomeans fully prepared to fight. Hood was aveteran, but she took a German shell inone of her aft magazines just as she closedwith Bismarck and blew up. Only threecrew members of 1500 survived. Bis-marck then scored several direct hits onPrince of Wales, ending the engagement.Leaking fuel from a ruptured tank, Bis-marck left the scene, shadowed by Princeof Wales and two cruisers. Prinz Eugenbroke away and returned to Brest, andthe Royal Navy lost contact with thedamaged German battleship. On 26 Mayshe was spotted by an RAF Catalinanorth of Gibraltar.

Force H, heading northeast from Gib-raltar, included the carrier Ark Royal,which launched her Swordfish againstthe disabled Bismarck. A torpedo strikejammed Bismarck's rudder and left heran easy prey to the battleships Rodneyand King George V, which arrived thatnight (26-27 May) to pour heavy-caliber

shells into the German warship. A torpe-do from the cruiser Dorsetshire completedthe Bismarck's destruction. She sankwith all but 110 men of her crew, whichnumbered 2300.

Below: Charting the Bismarck's course todestruction, May 1941.Right: The loss of Allied convoy PQ-17 inJuly 1942 proved a grievous blow tomorale. Almost two-thirds of the shipsinvolved failed to reach their destination,Archangel, and thousands of tons ofurgently needed matériel were lost.

The Arctic Convoys

39

Hazardous duty fell to the men whoconvoyed supplies to Russia afterthe German invasion of June

1941. The forces of nature on the arcticrun posed a threat equal to that of theGermans. Savage storms and shifting icepacks were a constant menace. In thesummer months, the pack ice retreatednorth, and convoys could give a widerberth to enemy airfields on the Norwe-gian and Finnish coasts, but the longsummer daylight made them vulnerableto U-boats. When the ice edge movedsouth again, the U-boat threat lessenedwith the hours of daylight, but it wasmore difficult to stand clear of theairfields.

Many Allied seamen lost their lives onthe arctic run, including most of themembers of PQ-17, which sailed for Rus-sia on 27 June 1942. Thirty-six merchant

ships were heavily escorted by Allied des-troyers, battleships, submarines, a car-rier and various smaller craft. Near BearIsland in the Barents Sea, the convoy lostits shadowing aircraft in heavy fog. Atthe same time, word came that Germansurface ships Tirpitz, Scheer and Hipperhad left their southern bases.

Early on 4 July, German planes torpe-doed a merchantman and sank two shipsof the convoy. The German ships arrivedat Altenfjord, Norway, and operationscontrol in London expected an imminentsailing to intercept the convoy, whose dis-tant cover had been withdrawn per pre-vious plans. Sir Dudley Pound, First SeaLord, saw a chance for the convoy's shipsto evade the German raiders by scatter-ing; orders to this effect were issued on 4July. The long-range escort, except forthe submarines, left the convoy to rendez-

vous with the close cover, leaving PQ-17scattered and defenseless. GermanU-boats and aircraft began to pick off thehapless ships, and the surface-ship mis-sion that set sail from Altenfjord on 5July was canceled as unnecessary latethat day.

Between 5 and 8 July, almost two-thirds of the convoy was sunk in icywaters hundreds of miles from its des-tination of Archangel. The armed trawlerAyrshire succeeded in leading three mer-chantmen up into the ice, where theycamouflaged themselves with whitepaint and rode out the crisis. These threewere among the eleven merchant shipsthat finally reached Russia with desper-ately needed supplies. The other 25 wentdown with their crews and thousands oftons of matériel destined for the Sovietwar effort.

40

The Sea RoadsSecured, 1943-45

By mid 1942 the Battle of the Atlan-tic had shifted away from the USEast Coast to more distant areas,

where German U-boats continued tomake successful raids on Allied shipping.Many oil tankers and other vessels werelost south of the Caribbean, off the Brazi-lian coast and around the Cape of GoodHope. Before the year was out, the Allieshad augmented the convoy system byspecially trained Support Groups - escortvessels that would help endangered con-voys or seek out U-boats in areas wherethey had been detected. These groupsusually included a small aircraft carrierand an escort carrier; along with surfaceforces. They were free of normal escortduties and could therefore hunt theU-boats to destruction.

A cryptographic breakthrough at theend of 1942 increased Allied intelligenceon German deployments, and changes inthe code system (June 1943) made it moredifficult for the Germans to anticipateAllied movements. Even so, late 1942and early 1943 brought great difficulties.Allied commitments were increased bythe invasion of North Africa, which drewoff North Atlantic escort forces, with

4 1

Opposite: Continuation and (below right)conclusion of the Battle of the Atlantic.Below: A U-boat victim burns in mid-Atlantic. By the summer of 1943 the worstAllied shipping losses were over.

corresponding shipping losses. In March1943, the climax of the Battle of theAtlantic, 120 Allied ships were sunk.Then the support groups returned fromNorth African waters, and the US indust-rial effort paid dividends in acceleratedproduction of escort carriers and otherneeded equipment. Improvements inradar and long-range scout planes, yearsin the making, came to the fore, andAllied crews began to capitalize on theirhard-won experience. In April 1943, ship-ping losses declined, and the followingmonth 41 U-boats were destroyed. On 22May the German submarines wereordered to withdraw from the NorthAtlantic.

After the summer of 1943, the U-boatswere never again the threat that theyhad been. The 'wolf-pack' tactic wasabandoned in 1944, and the remainingsubmarines prowled singly in an area in-creasingly focused around the BritishIsles. At the war's end, fewer than 200were still operational. Allied victory inthe Atlantic was largely a function ofsuperior co-ordination of effort, whichultimately offset the initial Germanadvantage in submarine technology.

44

Rommel's FirstOffensive

The first German troops began land-ing in North Africa on February1941, under command of General

Erwin Rommel, who would earn the nick-name 'Desert Fox.' His leadership abili-ties were acknowledged by comrades andenemies alike. Rommel soon saw thatBritish forces in Africa were weak, andthat no reinforcements would be forth-coming. On 24 March German forces tookEl Agheila easily, and the 5 Light Divi-sion went on to attack the British 2Armored Division at Mersa Brega. Therethey encountered stiff resistance, but theBritish failed to counterattack and losttheir advantage.

Instead of choosing among threealternative courses of attack, Rommelmoved boldly on all three fronts: north toBenghazi, northeast to Msus and Mechiliand east to Tengeder, to threaten Britishsupply lines. Field Marshal ArchibaldWavell, in overall command of Britishforces, lacked the men to counter thismultiple attack, launched on 5 April. Hissingle armored division fell back and wasreduced to a remnant by mechanical fail-ure. The defense at Mechili, 3 Indian Bri-gade, was soon overwhelmed, with whatremained of the 2 Armored Division. The8 Australian Division retreated fromBenghazi to Derna, thence toward Tob-ruk, which was being reinforced with the7 Australian Division.

On 14 April the German 5 Light Divi-

sion penetrated the Tobruk perimeter ashort distance, but was driven back. Ita-lian troops were now coming up to replacethe German units making ready to crossthe Egyptian frontier. The British garri-son at Tobruk was isolated in the midst ofAxis forces, and on 25 April the Germans

Previous pages: The German retreat fromEl Alamein,November 1942.Right: The Germans press eastwardsthrough Libya into Egypt.Below: Rommel enters Egypt.Bottom left: Rommel and his officersinspect a captured British tank.Bottom: The Allies isolatedat Tobruk.Below right: Rommel directs operations.

broke through the Halfaya Pass intoEgypt. Rommel was dissatisfied with thefailure to capture Tobruk, and anotherfull-scale attack struck the British thereon 30 April. Axis troops pushed a salientinto the western sector, but it was con-tained after four days of fighting.

45

46

The German Driveon Gazala

Rommel's German units, the Deut-sches Afrika Korps (DAK), andtheir allies suffered a setback in

the Crusader Battles with the BritishEighth Army late in 1941. Tobruk wasrelieved, and Rommel had to pull back toEl Agheila, having suffered 38,000 Axiscasualties as against 18,000 for the Brit-ish. His men were exhausted, supplieswere running out and 300 German tankshad been destroyed in the Libyan desert.

British forces pursued Rommel to ElAgheila, believing that his shattered un-its would be unable to react. However,successful air raids on Malta had restoredthe German supply line across theMediterranean, and Rommel's forceswere quickly rebuilt to fighting strength.On 21 January 1942 they made an unex-pected advance that pushed Eighth Army

47

back toward Agedabia. In a matter ofdays the British faced encirclement atBenghazi and were forced to retreat tothe defensive position at Gazala. The linethere consisted of minefields runningsouth to Bir Hacheim and a series of for-tified keeps that were manned by XIIICorps brigades.

DAK forces under Cruewell swungaround Bir Hacheim on 26 May to out-flank the Gazala Line, but they wereattacked from both sides on Sidra Ridgeand stopped short with loss of a third oftheir armor. Their water and fuel wererunning out, and Rommel tried to push as u p p l y l i ne t h rough the Br i t i shminefields without success. He thenmoved all his remaining armor into 'theCauldron' to await the impending Britishcounterattack.

Cruewell's isolated forces were finallysupplied on 4 June, and Eighth Armyfailed to counterattack until 5/6 June,when it was beaten off with heavy losses.The defense at Bir Hacheim crumbledand DAK broke out of the Cauldron toforce the British back from the GazalaLine even beyond Tobruk. Axis forceshad surrounded the British garrisonthere by 18 June.

Opposite above: Rommel advanceseastwards, pushing the Eighth Armyback toward Gazala and Tobruk.

Opposite: The Allied stand on 26 May,with fortified keeps (shaded) scatteredalong the minefield (bold line).

Above left: Breakout from theCauldron.Below: An AfrikaKorps Panzer IIIadvances.

48

TheFallofTobruk

E ighth Army was severely demoral-ized by the German triumph atGazala, which contributed to the

distrust between infantry and tank unitsthat had surfaced during the CrusaderBattles. British leadership had failed tocapitalize on several advantages, includ-ing a numerical superiority in armor, theDAK containment in the Cauldron andthe well-prepared defense line at Gazala.

Rommel launched his drive on Tobrukfrom the southeastern sector on 20 June1942. Heavy dive-bomber attacks dis-played German air superiority to devas-tating effect, after which DAK pushedthrough the perimeter defenses. By mid-morning German troops had reached theminefields, and the airfields were over-run soon after. At 1900 hours 21 PanzerDivision moved into Tobruk.

There was sporadic fighting within theperimeter through the night, but the Ger-mans had overcome almost all resistanceby the morning of 21 June. General Klop-per, the South African in command of thegarrison, surrendered, and the road toEgypt was open.

Right: T he perimeter defenses arebreached, and the fall of Tobruk is lessthan 12 hours away.Below: British troops surrender to theirAxis adversaries. Rommel's victory,completed on21 June, cleared the way foran advance into Egypt.

The Naval War in theMediterranean

49

The Royal Navy faced a difficult taskin the Mediterranean, where thewell-equipped and modern Italian

Navy enjoyed a position from which itcould strike at will. British forces weresplit between Gibraltar (Force H) andAlexandria, with Malta at the center - akey position, but highly vulnerable. Onlylight and submarine naval forces werebased on Malta, and Mediterranean Fleetcommander Sir Andrew Cunninghamwas constantly seeking ways to enhancethe British position in the Mediterraneanthrough flexible use of his surface ships,including a limited number of carriers.

Cunningham's forces scored severalsuccesses against the Italian Navy inchance encounters during July 1940, andplans were laid to attack the Italian fleetin harbor at Taranto. On the night of 11November , 21 Swordfish torpedo-bombers were launched from the carrierIllustrious: all but two returned, havingsunk the new battleship Littorio and twomodernized battleships and inflictedheavy damage on other craft. It was amajor coup for the British, and soon fol-lowed by another successful strike atCape Matapan, Greece.

Italian naval forces moved towardGreece in late March 1941, to interdictconvoys carrying British troops to assistthe Greeks during the Axis invasion ofthe Balkans, then imminent. On 27

March, RAF scouts reported three Italiancruisers heading east, and Admiral Cun-ningham put to sea from Alexandria.Three battleships, an aircraft carrier anddestroyer escorts comprised his force,which was to rendezvous south of Cretewith Vice-Admiral IID Pridham-Wippellcommanding a force of four cruisers andfour destroyers.

The principal target among the Italianforce converging south of Crete was thebattleship Vittorio Veneto, the pride ofMussolini's fleet. Air strikes were laun-ched against her, but only one torpedofound its mark. Then the Italian cruiserPola was heavily damaged, and theheavy cruisers Zara and Flume were sent

back to help; all three were destroyed.The remainder of the Italian force fled

back to its bases, including the VittorioVeneto, which found safe harbor atTaranto to the d i sappo in tmen t ofAdmiral Cunningham and his men.

Above: The successful night attack on theItalian fleet in Taranto on 11 November1940 mounted by 21 Swordfish torpedo-bombers from HMS Illustrious.Below: A second blow was dealt to Italiannaval might at Cape Matapan on 28March 1941.Following pages: HMS Barham, abattleship of the Allied Mediterraneanfleet, at Gibraltar.

52

The Malta Convoys

The British island fortress of Maltawas in serious straits by mid 1942.Its location astride Axis supply

lines made it the target of incessant airattack, and its own supply lines were in-creasingly tenuous. Convoys to Maltahad to be suspended in July due to theirheavy losses. It was clear that Maltacould not hold out against both the Luft-waffe and the Italian Regia Aeronauticawithout food or fuel, and OperationPedestal was mounted as a desperateeffort to convoy supplies from England.

Twenty warships under command ofVice-Admiral E N Syfret left the Clyde on3 August with 14 merchantmen, 32 des-troyers and various smaller craft. Theaircraft carrier Furious accompanied thegroup with a cargo of fighter planes forMalta's RAF squadron. On 10 Septem-ber, when the convoy passed through theStrait of Gibraltar in fog, a dummy con-voy was dispatched from Port Said to-ward Malta as a diversion. Next day itreturned to port, having failed to distractAxis leaders from the main operation,which was shadowed by reconnaissanceaircraft from the morning of 11 Septem-ber. That afternoon Furious flew her

planes off to Malta and turned back, andthe Axis made its first overt move in theform of a U-boat attack on the carrierEagle, which was sunk.

The next day brought heavy Allied los-ses to Axis planes and submarines. Thefreighter Deucalion went down, the des-troyer Foresight was so badly damagedthat she had to be sunk and the Indomit-able's flight deck was bombed out of op-eration. At this point Syfret turned backaccording to plan, leaving Rear AdmiralH M Burrough to escort the convoy therest of the way with four cruisers and fourdestroyers. Two of the cruisers were dis-abled in the next few hours, Cairo so bad-ly that she had to be sunk. At dusk, two ofthe merchantmen were destroyed andone damaged. The American tanker Ohiowas hit but stayed with the convoy, as didthe damaged cruiser Kenya.

Early on the morning of 13 September,five more merchantmen and the cruiserManchester were lost to torpedoes, andrenewed air attacks sank Wairanamaand did additional damage to Ohio, withits irreplaceable fuel cargo. By the timelight forces from Malta met the convoy,all but five of the merchantmen had been

sunk, along with one aircraft carrier, twocruisers and a destroyer. But the fuel andother supplies that got through enabledMalta to hold on.

Above: The hazardous passage toMalta.Below: The damaged tanker HMS Ohiolimps toward port with destroyer escort.Right: General Eisenhower (left) onMalta with Viscount Gort, the island'sgovernor.

53

5,12 Augustond air attack

1215,12 AugustDeucalion damaged,sunk later

1600,12 AugustU-boat sunk

1840,12 AugustForesight sunk,carrier Indomitabledamaged. Maincovering force {'X')withdraws as planned

2000,12 AugustCairo, Clan Ferguson& Empire Hope sunk.Nigeria, BrisbaneStar, Kenya & Ohiodamaged

Night, 12/13 AugustSanta Eliza, Wairangi,Almeria, Lykes&Glenorchy sunk.Manchester damaged,sunk later. RochesterCastle damaged

0800,13 AugustWaimaramasunk, Ohiodamaged

1125,13 AugustRochester Castle& Ohio damaged.Dorset damaged,sunk later

1900,13 AugustMerchant shipstraggler sunk byGerman aircraft

54

El Alamein: TheFirst Battle

Below: The German tanks advance, withItalian support.Right: The first Battle of El Alamein.Below right: General Grant tanks of theA Uied22ndArmoredBrigade advancesouth of El Alamein.

After the fall of Tobruk, Rommelwas promoted to Field Marshal, astatus that strengthened his argu-

ment for advancing to Egypt at once. (Theoriginal Axis plan called for a halt whilenaval and air forces massed to invadeMalta.) Using the supplies newly cap-tured at Tobruk, Rommel crossed theEgyptian frontier and attacked the Brit-ish at Mersa Matruh (26-27 June), whereEighth Army was now under tacticalcommand of General Claude Auchinleck,Commander in Chief, Middle East. TheBritish could not contain the Germanadvance and retreated to the next de-fensible position - a line south from thesmall rail station of El Alamein.

Auchinleck had few reserve units withwhich to prepare his position from ElAlamein, near the coast, to the QattaraDepression, an area of wilderness thatwas considered almost impassable. Hisdepleted forces took their positions alongthis line to bar the way to the Nile. Mean-while, Rommel's forces had also beenmuch reduced in recent battles — to some2000 German infantry and 65 tanks -while fuel and other supplies were dwind-ling (these had consisted largely of bootycaptured at Tobruk and Mersa Matruh).

Eighth Army's artillery units were in-strumental in repelling the first Germanand Italian attacks on 2-4 July; their co-ordination was much better than it hadbeen under General N M Ritchie fromwhom Auchinleck had assumed com-mand. The British Commander in Chiefwas now in a position to essay somelimited counterattacks, whose targetswere Italian rather than German divi-sions. This choice was deliberate, as itcompelled Rommel to waste fuel in wide-spread efforts to assist his Italian cohorts.

The Sabratha unit fell to the 9 AustralianDivision on 10-11 July, and the Britishrecovered Tell el Eisa as a result.

Larger Allied efforts were mounted inthe Ruweisat Ridge area, where opposingforces grappled to an exhausted stand-still. Both sides were simply worn out,

and Auchinleck's refusal to continue theattacks known collectively as the FirstBattle of El Alamein was to cost him hiscommand.

Below: The Allied retreat along theMediterranean coast to El Alamein.

55

r>«

The Battle of AlamHaifa

In August 1942 Churchill arrived inthe Middle East to make changes.General Harold Alexander replaced

Auchinleck as Commander in Chief, andGeneral Bernard Montgomery tookcharge of Eighth Army. Less than threeweeks later, he would face Rommel's lastattempt to break through the position atEl Alamein.

Montgomery's defensive plan was

based loosely upon Auchinleck's: to holdthe Alam Haifa Ridge and counter a Ger-man threat in the South with 7 ArmoredDivision. Rommel used the tactic thisplan had anticipated when, on 30 August,his main attacks swung south of the Brit-ish positions with the object of turningnorth again beyond Alam Haifa to sur-round Eighth Army. The presence of 7Armored Division on the right flank

forced him to turn north earlier than hehad intended, with the result that DAKfailed to break through the Alam Haifaposition. Harassing air attacks and ashortage of fuel compounded Rommel'sdifficulties. His 15 Panzer Division triedto outflank 22 Armored Brigade on 1September, but this effort was stymied byan improved British antitank system.Axis forces pulled back to prepare a deep

57

Below: A Vickersgun noses over thebarricades.Right: The Axis attack on A lam Hal fafailed to achieve its objectives.Below right: Rommel's staff confer as theAllied defense turns into counterattack.

defensive position between the QattaraDepression and the sea.

Rommel had to hold the new line ofdefense or be overwhelmed — he lackedboth the vehicles and the fuel for a mobilebattle. By the same token he could notretreat. On 6 September, Axis forces wereback where they had started, committedto an immediate counterattack for everyfoot of disputed ground.

58

El Alamein: TheSecond Battle

In his new command, General Mont-gomery lived up to his reputation as acareful planner who emphasized both

training and morale. Eighth Army hadsuffered many changes of fortune andcommand in the North African Theater,and morale had eroded to a serious de-gree. Failures of co-operation and con-fidence had resulted in faulty operations,and Montgomery addressed himself to re-building Eighth Army into an optimumfighting unit. At the same time, he wasamassing a force superior to the Ger-mans' in every respect: troops, tanks,guns and aircraft.

The Germans were well dug in along aline between the sea and the Qattara De-pression, and Montgomery's plan was toattack north of the Miteirya Ridge. Theinfantry of XXX Corps was to push for-ward to the Oxalic Line and open corri-dors through the minefields for passage ofthe X Corps' Sherman tanks, which werefinally proving a match for the GermanMark IV. Axis forward defenses weremanned largely by Italian troops, andRommel was hospitalized in Germany; hedid not arrive until 25 October, when thebattle was underway. General Stummecommanded in his absence.

The British infantry made a good starttoward its objectives on 24 October, but itproved impossible to move the tanks for-ward as planned. The German 21st Pan-zer Division was kept out of the mainbattle for several days by diversionaryefforts from XIII Corps, and the Germandefense suffered as a result of GeneralStumme's death from a heart attack dur-ing the first day of fighting. The Axis fuelshortage had become critical with thesinking of two tankers in Tobruk Harbor.

When Rommel returned to North Afri-ca, he launched a series of unsuccessfulcounterattacks that ended on 3 Novem-ber, when the British armor began tobreak through into open ground. Hitlerat first forbade a withdrawal, but by 4November Axis losses had made it inevit-able. Rommel and his remaining forcesmade good their retreat.

A bove right: The attack plan for corridorsto be driven through Axis minefields toprovide safe passage for Allied tanks.Right: General Montgomery directsoperations at El Alamein. On his right isGeneral Sir Brian H or rocks.

59

Above: Italian infantrymen in the field atElAlamein.Right: The second battle saw the EighthArmy repel Axis attacks.

60

Operation Torch

On 8 November 1942, four days af-ter Rommel began to retreat fromEl Alamein, American and Brit-

ish forces made a series of landings inFrench North Africa. This operation,code-named Torch, was the first realAllied effort of the war. It was hoped thatthe numerous Vichy French forces inNorth Africa would not resist the land-ings, and the US had undertaken diplo-matic missions to local French leaderswith this object in view. (Anglo-Frenchrelations were still embittered by theevents of 1940.) Despite these efforts,sporadic French opposition delayed plan-ned Allied attacks on Casablanca andMehdia, and two destroyers were lost offAlgiers. However, the weakest point ofthe Allied plan was its failure to occupyTunisia in the first landings. Germantroops began to arrive there on 9 Novem-ber to cover Rommel's retreat and formeda defensive perimeter.

The Allied capture of Vichy leaderAdmiral Darlan at Algiers helped dimin-ish resistance from French forces; fewerthan 2000 casualties were incurred in thethree main landing areas. The largestdifficulty was pushing the considerableAllied force the 400 miles to Tunis beforethe Germans could pour in troops andaircraft from Sicily. This they did withgreat speed, on instructions from Hitlerand Commander in Chief Mediterranean

Field Marshal Kesselring. Allied forcesunder General Dwight D Eisenhower,American Commander in Chief of theTorch operation, were stopped short inTunisia by early December.

Below: US troops march on AlgiersMaison Blanche airfield.Bottom: The Operation Torch landings.Right: TheAlliedpush into Tunisia.Below right: The Germans reinforce.

6]

62

From Tripoli toTunis

E ighth Army's pursuit of Rommel'sforces was hampered by weatherand supply problems. It took Mont-

gomery almost three weeks to reach Age-dabia (23 November 1942), and he had tohalt there until he was resupplied. Soonafter, the short-lived German position atEl Agheila was outflanked and the racetoward Tunisia resumed.

The port of Tripoli offered the Britishhope of alleviating their supply prob-lems, but the Germans got there first anddid as much damage as they could to portinstallations before pushing on to Tuni-sia. The British reached Tripoli on 23January 1943, and it was not until mid-March that the port began to functioneffectively as a pipeline for British sup-plies. Meanwhile, Axis forces had con-solidated behind the Mareth Line afterinflicting 10,000 casualties on Alliedtroops from the Torch landings at theBattle of Kasserine. Rommel now facedMontgomery's Eighth Army in his lastbattle in Africa - a bitter fight that ragedfrom 6 to 27 March. Axis forces were out-flanked, and by mid-April had retreatedup the coast to form a tight perimeteron the hills around Bizerta and Tunis.

Rommel urged evacuation of Germanand Italian forces from Africa when hereturned to Germany, but his counselwas ignored. Thirteen understrength

Axis divisions sought to defend Tunisiaagainst 19 Allied divisions that had reco-vered from their earlier reverses to takeon an overwhelming superiority in airpower and armor. The Allies had 1200tanks to the Axis' 130, 1500 guns to theAxis' 500.

Hill 609 was hotly contested by Amer-ican forces seeking access to the so-calledMousetrap Valley leading to the coastalplain. British troops made some progressat Longstop Hill and Peter's Corner,which commanded the Medjerda Valley.Then General Alexander switched ex-perienced units from Eighth Army to VCorps, which made possible a decisive

victory. Allied troops broke through inearly May. Tunis fell on the 7th, and fivedays later Italy's Marshal Messe andGermany's General von Arnim surren-dered with some quarter of a milliontroops. These forces would be sorely mis-sed by Hitler when the Allies launchedtheir invasion of Italy.

Above: The Eighth Army's attempt toprogress up Tunisia's east coast wasdelayed at WadiAkarit.Right: The Allied conquest of Tunisia.Bizerta and Tunis fell on 7 May.Below: The Eighth Army's progress in thewakeofElAlamein.

fit

66

The Winter War:Finland, 1939-40

On 30 November 1939, the SovietUnion invaded Finland, after fail-ing to obtain territorial conces-

sions demanded in early October. Fivedifferent Soviet armies crossed theRusso-Finnish frontier on four majorfronts, but the conquest of this smallneighboring nation proved much moredifficult than had been foreseen. Deepsnow and heavy forest forced Russiantanks and transports to stay on the roads,where they were easy targets for themobile, well-trained Finnish ski troops.Russian convoys were shot up and sepa-rated, and formations were isolated anddefeated in detail. The Finns never hadmore than nine divisions in the field, withfew guns and almost no tanks. But theirconfidence was high, and they had theadvantage of fighting on familiar groundwith tactics suited to the terrain.

By 31 January 1940, the Russians hadmade deep penetrations in the north bydint of superior numbers, but the Man-nerheim Line, on the Karelian Isthmus,was holding on. The Seventh and Thir-teenth Soviet Armies assaulted this linefrom 1 through 13 February with forcesthat included six tank brigades and 21infantry divisions. A massive bombard-ment preceded these attacks, whichachieved a breakthrough in mid-February. The Finns were forced to sur-render, and to cede the Karelian Isthmus

and considerable territory in the north.They would seek to make good these los-ses the following year in an alliance withNazi Germany.

The Finnish fight was solitary and ulti-mately hopeless, because the British andFrench Governments feared to arouseSoviet hostility by involving themselves.Nevertheless, the Russo-Finnish Warhad far-reaching consequences in the in-ternational community. As a result of it,the French Government fell due to dis-sension about helping the Finns, and theLeague of Nations was thoroughly dis-credited. Hitler formed a false impressionof Soviet inefficiency that probably influ-enced his decision to turn on his Russianally. And the Red Army was awakened todeep-seated internal problems that be-came subject to reform in the months thatfollowed.

Previous pages: The Wehrmacht advancewith difficulty along a muddy Russianroad, 1941.Below: The Russians breach Finland'sMannerheim Line in February.Right: Soviet soldiers dismantle Finnishanti-tank obstacles.

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Above: Earlier Soviet penetration in thenorth and east from November 1939 hadmet effective Finnish resistance.

(W

Military Balance onthe Eastern Front

The German High Command spentalmost a year planning the inva-sion of Russia, code-named Opera-

tion Barbarossa. Three different planswere devised, of which the one givingpriority to the capture of Leningrad waschosen. German leaders estimated RedArmy strength along the frontier at some155 divisions (in fact, there were 170within operational distance.) The frontwas divided in half by the Pripet Mar-shes. In the north, von Leeb's ArmyGroup North was to aim itself againstLeningrad, where it faced an almostequal number of Russian divisions.However, these were deployed so far for-ward that they were vulnerable to beingpushed back against the coast. VonBock's Army Group Centre, with twoPanzer armies, was the strongest Ger-man force in the field; facing it was thecomparatively weak Red Army WestFront. Most Soviet troops were south ofthe Pripet Marshes, positioned to defendthe agricultural and industrial wealth ofthe Ukraine. Von Rundstedt's ArmyGroup South was to thrust southeastagainst these forces.

The German plan called for swiftpenetration deep into Russia in June, todestroy the Red Army long before winter.A massive German buildup began, butStalin and his advisors were so deter-mined not to give Hitler any excuse to

attack that they ignored all the warningsigns. In fact, the Red Army was still on apeacetime footing when the invasion be-gan on 22 June. Most units were widelyscattered for summer training; otherswere too close to the western frontier. Thereforms that followed upon the Russo-

Finnish War were far from complete, andthere was almost no Russian reserve todeal with deep incursions. The Germanshad good reason to be optimistic aboutthe invasion of Russia.

Below: Soviet cavalry men on the march,1941. Horse-mounted troops were moremobile than tanks in the severe Russianwinter conditions, and were thus moreeffective than appearances suggested.

Above left: The initial German thrusts toMoscow and Kiev.Far le ft: A northern attack was lateradded to the original two-pronged assaultplan.Left: Hitler finally identified Leningradas the prime target, and it was this plan ofattack that was selected.Right: The EasternFront from the Balticto the Black Sea, showing the relativestrengths and dispositions of the twoprotagonists.

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OperationBarbarossa: 1941

Below: The crew of a German Panzerattempt to free their tank from frozen mudby lighting a fire.Right: The frontline moves progressivelyeastwards as German pressure forcesRussia to yield.

German forces achieved almosttotal surprise in their 22 June in-vasion of Soviet territory, which

was preceded by a devastating air attackthat all but wiped out the Red Air Force.Fourth Panzer Group took a series ofnorthern objectives that brought it to theLuga by 14 July. Army Group Centresealed off Russian forces at Bialystok andGorodische, taking 300,000 prisonersand 2500 tanks in a week's operations.Army Group South faced the greatest re-sistance in the Ukraine, where the Rus-sian Fifth Army counterattacked on 10

July to prevent an assault on Kiev.This development incited Hitler to di-

vert Army Group Centre from its attackon Moscow via Smolensk into theUkraine offensive. Second Army andHeinz Guderian's Second Panzer Groupwere ordered south to destroy the SovietFifth Army and surround Kiev. Guderianwas radically opposed to abandoning theMoscow offensive, but he turned south on23 August as ordered. An unsuccessfulRussian counteroffensive failed to haltthe German advance north of Gomel, andthe Soviet South-West Front suffered

heavy losses every time it gave battle.Many divisions were trapped in pocketsand destroyed piecemeal, while at Kievalone, half a million Red soldiers werecaptured.

By mid November the Germans hadseized Rostov and the Perekop Isthmus,which commanded the Crimea. In thecenter, their victories at Smolensk andBryansk had enabled them to captureOrel, Tula and Vyazma. The BalticStates had been occupied, and the Fin-nish alliance had helped open the way toLeningrad.

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The Finnish FrontBelow left: With German assistance, theFinns established a front line to the east oftheir 1939 border.Below: Finnish infantry adopt defensivepositions on the Mannerheim Line asRussian pressure increased.

The 1941 alliance with Germanybrought significant improvementsin Finland's forces. Mobilization

and training systems were revamped, asthe Finns prepared to regain the territorylost to Russia the previous year by ex-pediting the German assault in the

north. Marshal Carl von Mannerheim,hero of the Russo-Finnish War, wouldlead first the army and then the state forthe balance of World War II.

Joint German-Finnish attacks beganon 19 June 1941, with early successesaround Lake Ladoga. The Russians were

outflanked there and began to withdrawby water, until the Finns had pursued toa point near their former frontier (1September). On the Karelian Isthmus,another attack reached Vuosalmi on 16August, but was stopped short of Lenin-grad by a second Russian retreat. At thispoint Mannerheim called a halt: havingregained the territory lost in the previousyear, he was reluctant to become moredeeply involved in the attack on Russia.

Offensives did not resume until severaldays later, when attacks north of LakeLadoga and against the Murmansk rail-way achieved their objectives. Then theRussian resistance grew increasinglystronger, and by early December theFinns were on the defensive. The frontline stabilized along an axis east of the1939 Russo-Finnish boundary.

The Attack onLeningrad

7,3

German Army Group North, com-manded by General Wilhelm vonLeeb, arrived near Leningrad on 1

September 1941. The Germans had de-cided not to storm the city, but to isolate itand starve out its defenders. Artillerybombardments began immediately, andwithin two weeks Leningrad had beencut off entirely from overland com-munication with the rest of Russia.

The city had only a month's supply offood - heavily rationed - and starvationset in by October. The following month,11,000 died of hunger. Meager suppliescontinued to come in by barge acrossLake Ladoga in the early fall, but on 9November the Germans took Tikhvin,the point of origin, and ice on the lakemade navigation impossible. Four weekslater, the Russians opened a new 'Life-

line' road from Zaborie to Lednevo, butwinter weather and difficult terrainslowed supply trucks to a crawl.

Thousands more had succumbed tostarvation in Leningrad by early Decem-ber, when the Red Army's counteroffen-sive began to make itself felt. Tikhvinwas recaptured, and the Germans werepushed back to the Volkhov River. TheRussians repaired the railroad andopened an ice road across the lake, whichwas now frozen solidly enough to bear the

weight of trucks. By Christmas Day, itwas possible to increase the bread rationin Leningrad. But relief came too late formany: on that same day, almost 4000died of starvation.

Above: Supply routes to the besiegedcityofLeningrad.Below: Finnish members of the Waffen-SS in action.

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Moscow - Strike andCounter strike

Below: The German Army Group Southpushes to capture the Ukraine, but isforced to withdraw to the MiusRiver.Bottom: Muscovites dig defense linesaround the capital, 1941.Right: The German assault on Moscow.

After capturing Kiev, the Germansredeployed their forces for theassault on Moscow. They had a su-

periority of two to one in men and tanks,three to one in the air. Fourteen Panzerdivisions were involved in the attacksthat converged on Russia's capital begin-ning 30 September.

By 7 October large pockets of Soviettroops had been cut off around Vyazmaand Bryansk. They were systematicallydestroyed in the next two weeks, afterwhich heavy rains put a serious check onGerman mobility. The Mozhaisk defenseline offered increasing resistance, and by30 October German forces had boggeddown miles from Moscow. Many men andtanks were lost in the frustrating ad-vance through a sea of mud.

When the weather changed, it did littleto help the German cause. The freeze thatset in hardened the roads, but Germansoldiers found it difficult to adapt to theextreme cold, which also created newproblems with their vehicles. By 27November, units of the Third Panzer

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Group finally reached the Volga Canal,19 miles from Moscow center, but theylacked the support for a frontal assault onthe city. Elements of the Second PanzerArmy had gotten as far as Kashira, butthey had to fall back for the same reason.

By 5 December the Germans realizedthat they could go no farther for the timebeing. Valuable time has been lost in thecapture of Smolensk, whose courageousdefenders had helped delay the Germanadvance on Moscow until the dreadedonset of winter. Now the capital could notbe completely encircled, and heavy bomb-ing did not offset the failure to close Mos-cow's window on the east. Fresh Soviettroops began to arrive from Siberia even

as the Germans faced temperatures thatplummeted to 40 degrees below zero.

On 8 December Hitler announced asuspension of operations outside Moscow,but the Soviet High Command was notlistening. Employing the reserves it hadgathered in previous weeks, the RedArmy launched a great counteroffensivethat recalled the winter of 1812, whenNapoleon's forces came to grief on thesame ground. Avoiding German strong-points, the Soviets advanced by infiltra-tion — passing over fields instead of roads,making skillful use of Cossack cavalry,ski troops and guerrilla forces. The Ger-mans were harried from flank and rear,forced from one position after another.

Tanks and planes became inoperable inthe extreme cold, and supply lines weretenuous or nonexistent.

With the recapture of Kalinin andTula, the Russians removed the immedi-ate threat to Moscow. Their offensivedrove on into late February, and Germantroops took refuge in strongly fortifieddefensive positions (called hedgehogs) inhope of holding out until fresh troopscould arrive. Hitler had ordered 'No re-treat,' and airborne supplies kept manyenclaves going through the winter. ButOperation Barbarossa had foundered inthe snowfields of Russia. The Sovietswere regaining ground from Leningradto the Crimea.

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The Red ArmyFights Back

During the fall of 1941, the Rus-sians were able to evacuate muchof their factory equipment and

many key workers to the east, where theybegan to rebui ld their industr ialmachine. Railroad equipment was alsoevacuated, giving the Soviets an edge inthe number of locomotives and freightcars per mile of track. The transportationbreakdown foreseen by Hitler did notmaterialize, and Russian troop reserveswere built up in Siberia to replace thegreat losses incurred on the EasternFront. At the same time, war matérielfrom the West began to reach Russia viaArchangel, Murmansk, Vladivostok andPersia.

Since Operation Barbarossa had beendesigned to achieve a quick victory dur-ing the summer months, German troopshad never been equipped for winter war-fare. Soviet troops by contrast, wereroutinely equipped with clothing andvehicles appropriate to the theater of op-erations. The Soviet Supreme Command

(Stavka) had rallied from the shock ofinvasion to make effective use of the hugearmy that had been so wastefully de-ployed in June of 1941.

The Russian counteroffensive that be-gan on 5-6 December saw immediate anddramatic gains on many fronts. The siegeof Moscow was broken by the Kalinin,West and South-West Fronts (armygroups). Supplies began to reach Lenin-grad in time to avert universal starvationin the besieged city. In the south, theKerch Isthmus was retaken and theCrimea re-entered with help from theRed Navy. The Russians had gone all theway back to Velikiye Luki and Mozhaiskbefore they had to rest and regroup in lateFebruary 1942.

Opposite: TheRedArmy launches itscounteroffensive.R ight: R ussian territory regained by theend of April 1942.Below: A political meeting of the R ussianTwentieth Army near Smolensk.

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The Treaty ofVersailles: Blueprintfor Hostilities

Germany had had no part in thenegotiations that resulted in theTreaty of Versailles; it was entire-

ly the work of the 32 nations that hadbeen leagued against her in World War I.The 80,000-word draft of the proposedpeace treaty was approved by the AlliedPeace Congress on 6 May 1919, and Ger-man representatives did not even see thedocument until the following day. Theyprotested bitterly against its terms, and

there were demonstrations all over Ger-many and a change of government beforeit was signed.

By the treaty's terms, Germany cededAlsace-Lorraine to France, the towns ofEupeh and Malmédy to Belgium, the cityof Memel to Lithuania, and the provinceof Posen and a 'corridor' through WestPrussia to Poland. German Austria, Po-land and Czechoslovakia were declaredindependent. The port city of Danzig was

internationalized as a 'free city,' and thevaluable coal region of the Saar passedunder League of Nations administrationand the economic control of France.

In addition, Germany lost all of itsoverseas empire, most of its armed forcesand control of the Rhineland — which wasto be occupied at Germany's expense un-til the Treaty of Versailles was fully ex-ecuted. A clause that even some of thevictors disputed forced Germany to claim

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full responsibility for the war and topromise financial reparation Tor all dam-age done to the civilian population of theAllies and their property.' The initialpayment was set at five billion dollars;subsequent reparations were limitedonly by 'the utmost of [Germany's] abil-ity' to pay. Disarmed, dishonored andheavily mortgaged, the conquered nationembarked upon years of distress and re-sentment that would culminate in theconflict that was to eclipse even the GreatWar itself.

Previous page: USS Arizona explodes atPearl Harbor, 7 December 1941.Opposite: Admiral Chester WNimitzpoints the way to Tokyo. Seated (left toright) are General MacArthur, PresidentRoosevelt and Admiral Leahy.Left: European boundaries before andafter Versailles.Below: The Allied premiers convene inParis for the Peace Conference in 1919.

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German Expansion,1939-40

The German Army that went to warin 1939 was armed and organizedmuch like that of 1918, but there

had been important developments in theinterwar years. The Stuka dive bombernow served as a form of mobile artilleryat need. Submachine guns offered anadvantage in portability over the Vickersand Bren machine guns used by the Brit-ish. Allied forces had more tanks, but theGermans were much better at using themtactically. German generals knew how tofight the war of movement, while theFrench were still fixated on their Magi-not Line - a static and incomplete systemthat anticipated a second Verdun. TheGermans had no intention of fightinganother such action.

The new blitzkrieg style of Germanwarfare rolled over Poland, Norway,Denmark and France in a matter ofmonths. The British Army was shatteredby the French campaign, but the evacua-tion from Dunkirk and the crucial weeksbought by the Battle of Britain staved offinvasion of the British Isles. Mussolinitook advantage of Allied defeats to enterthe war on the German side, but Italian

83

armies in both Greece and North Africawere struggling before the end of 1940.By that time, German U-boats were tak-ing a heavy toll of Allied shipping on theconvoy routes.

Above left: Saluting the Swastika.Left: Axis expansion in the late 1930s.Above: German and Italian territorialgains in 1939 and 1940.Right: The dreaded Ju 87 Stuka divebomber, whose success in Europe becamelegendary.

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German Conquest atIts Height

Below: 1942 saw the high tidemark ofGerman expansion. Allied landings inNorth Africa combined with the Sovietcounteroffensive on theEasternFrontwere to turn the tide and sound the death-knell for Hitler's territorial aspirations.

Having been balked in his plan toinvade the British Isles, Hitlerdirected his attention to the east,

where he gained control of the Balkans inthe spring of 1941. He shored up thetenuous Italian position in North Africa,then ordered the implementation of Op-eration Barbarossa — the invasion of theSoviet Union. Operations beginning 22June 1941 inflicted great losses on the

Red Army, but the expected quick andeasy victory was not forthcoming. Ger-man confidence and supplies began toerode with the onset of an early winterthat found troops unequipped for freezingconditions. The Russian Bear shook offits tormentors in a counteroffensive thatprevented the capture of Moscow, thenStalingrad, in 1942. Russian civiliansproved able defenders of their embattled

homeland, and the Germans went ontothe defensive in Russia. An ill-adviseddeclaration of war on the United Statesafter Pearl Harbor guaranteed open andactive American involvement, with allthe industrial and military strength thatthis implied. Hitler's Germany had over-reached itself.

The PropagandaWar

Below: Two examples of war propagandafrom German (left) and Soviet artists;their respective messages are clear.Right: Anti-Semitic feelings foundexpression in such German posters as 'TheEternalJew'.

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Propaganda was used by all of thebelligerents in World War II toincite patriotism and inflame

popular feeling against 'the enemy,' bothoutside and within the country. Luridlyillustrated Soviet posters trumpeted 'Killthe German Beasts!' and 'Destroy theHitlerite Army - It can and must bedone!' Soviet leaders did not feel fullyconfident of their peoples' loyalty in everyphase of the war, in which they lost moresoldiers and civilians than any othersingle belligerent.

Germany produced comparable war artfrom 1943 on, after the office of NationalSocialist Leadership was created.Psychological warfare played a majorrole in the German war effort, with theproduction of films, posters, magazines

and other media that fostered unques-tioning loyalty and hatred of minorities,who were accused of subverting the wareffort. During World War I, propagandahad been so falsified by all parties in-volved that genuine atrocities like 'TheFinal Solution to the Jewish Problem'were widely disbelieved - until Allied li-beration of concentration camp survivorsin 1945 revealed the incredible truth.

The US propaganda effort was less ob-vious, but not necessarily less effective.Marine recruitment posters bore thelegend: 'We're looking for a few goodmen,' emphasizing the Marines' reputa-tion as an élite force. 'War Bonds' and'Victory Gardens' abounded to fosterwholehearted co-operation on the homefront. 'Remember Pearl Harbor' was

taken up as a powerful rallying cry in thewar against Japan. Thus dictatorshipsand democracies alike waged the prop-aganda war with deep intensity and un-shakeable conviction of the Tightness oftheir cause.

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Below: Japan's sphere of influence andactivity, December 1941.Below right: Soldiers return to Japanfrom Manchuria to a hero's welcome.

87

Japan Asserts ItsPower

J apanese resentment at the Pacificsettlement following World War Igathered strength through the

1920s. 'Patriotic Societies' agitated for anaggressive foreign policy, and theJapanese constitution gave the militarya disproportionate voice in nationalaffairs. The rise of Chinese Nationalismposed a threat to Japan's position as theleading Asian power, and the West waswidely distrusted as racist in its attitudes- not without cause.

All these factors were involved in theJapanese seizure of Manchuria (1931),which was made by the so-calledJapanese Manchurian Army acting inde-pendently of the government. Two yearslater, Japan withdrew from the League ofNations and accelerated her arms pro-duction. Serious fighting with Chinabroke out in 1937 and resulted in

Japanese occupation of most majorChinese ports and extensive areas oftheir territory.

To prevent the Chinese from being sup-plied through French Indochina, theJapanese put pressure on the area andended by occupying it in 1941. Thisbrought open opposition from the US inthe form of an export embargo. Japan'srecent pacts with the Axis Powers andthe USSR had imperiled Allied interestsin the Pacific, and stringent sanctionsagainst Japanese trade and oil importswere decisive. Faced with the loss of 75percent of her trade and 90 percent of heroil supplies, Japan sent her aircraft car-rier force into the Pacific on 26 November1941. On 2 December General Tojo, nowmilitant Prime Minister of Japan,ordered it to attack the US Pacific Fleetat Pearl Harbor, Hawaii.

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Below right: Japan's surprise attack atPearl Harbor, Hawaii, on 7 December1941 (below) raised the curtain on ninemonths of feverish expansion in thePacific-yet the scale of this empire-building was destined to sap her strength.

89

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When the Japanese aimed theirstunning strike at Pearl Har-bor, their strategists expected -

and achieved - a series of rapid victoriesin the Pacific. They had no real choice:without access to oil, their war machinewould grind to a halt even as US industrygeared up for new feats of productionunder wartime conditions. The oil-richEast Indies were an inevitable target, aswere the Allied colonies astride the searoutes.

Available forces were relatively mod-est - some 80 percent of the 51 Japanesedivisions were tied up in China andManchuria. On the plus side, the out-numbered Japanese troops had good airsupport, jungle-warfare training and animpressive fleet that included 10 carriersand 8 modern battleships. (The USPacific Fleet had nine battleships ofWorld War I vintage and four carriers

that - fortunately - were absent fromPearl Harbor when the initial attack waslaunched.) Japanese Imperial Headquar-ters believed it was possible to achievetheir objectives within six months if theymoved decisively, and for the first fourmonths they effectively had the PacificWar to themselves.

At a cost of only 23 warships (nonelarger than a destroyer), the Japaneseoverran the Philippines, Malaya, Burma,the Dutch East Indies and a number ofBritish islands between December 1941and May 1942. Then the Doolittle Raid onTokyo (18 April) awakened them to thedanger of bombing on the home islands,and inflamed the Japanese 'Victory Dis-ease' (as one of their leaders would callit). The Japanese resolved to extend theirdefense perimeter despite their dimi-nishing resources - and thereby ensuredthat they would lose the war.

90

Below: Japan's empire-building wasfinally curtailed as a two-pronged Alliedoffensive from the east and southwestforced a retreat.Below right: U S and British combinedchiefs of staff discuss A Hied strategy.

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The Allies StrikeBack at Japan

As US forces gained experience inthe challenging Pacific Theater,their leaders saw the necessity for

mounting two major lines of advanceagainst Japan. US Navy carrier forceswere strengthened for their essentialrole, amphibious assault capability wasincreased and a fleet train was created tosupply the fighting ships hundreds ofmiles from their bases. These units wereto advance toward Japan via the centralPacific islands.Test case for the 'island-hopping' strategy was Tarawa, where USforces fought one of the costliest battles intheir history in proportion to the num-bers engaged in November 1943. Threethousand US Marines were casualties,and only 17 of the 4000 Japanese defen-

ders were captured. An intensive study ofthis campaign helped the Americans toavoid their mistakes on Tarawa in subse-quent operations. They accepted the factthat the Japanese would have to beflushed out of their caves and bunkersone by one, using grenades, flamethrow-ers and anything else that came to hand.

The other half of the Allied offensivewas in the southwest Pacific, whereAmerican and Australian forces underGeneral Douglas MacArthur made slowbut certain progress with massive sup-port from land-based aircraft. Australianforces had a strong vested interest in de-feating the Japanese, who were sure toattack their homeland if they could iso-late it from American support.

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The Defeat of NaziGermany

Germany's long retreat began in1943; the Battle of Kursk in Julyof that year was the death knell

for hopes of victory in the east. Twomonths before, Italy had been knockedout of the war, and it was only a matter oftime before the Allies would try to breakinto Fortress Europe. The German threatto the Atlantic supply routes was effec-tively nullified, and before the year was

out, US and British bombers were attack-ing both industrial targets and popula-tion centers within the Reich.

By the middle of 1944, after successfulmassive Allied landings in Normandyand breakthroughs aimed at the Rhine,the combined might of US and Soviet in-dustry and armies had become over-whelming. British resources werestrained, but not to the breaking point. In

fact, Allied organization and equipmentwere at their peak. The Germans, by con-trast, were drained in every area: men,money, armaments and leadership. Bythe time Allied forces converged on theElbe to link up with the Russians (April-May 1945), most German units were pre-pared to show the white flag. Town aftertown surrendered eagerly to the Allies inpreference to the feared Russians.

9,'j

Below left: The contraction and (below)final defeat of Hitler's Germany.Right: Berlin lies in ruins, the target ofround-the-clock raids by British and USbomber aircraft.

94

Below: The reversal of Japanesesupremacy in the Pacific was confirmed bythe Allies' recapture of the Philippine s inearly 1945. De feat was then only a matterof months away.Below right: A postwar view of thebusiness district of Kobe, showing thedamage caused by incendiary attack.

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Dissolution of theJapanese Empire

The first real check to the Japanesecame with the Battle of the CoralSea, six months after Pearl Harbor.

There US carriers commanded by RearAdmiral Frank 'Black-Jack' Fletcherdashed Japanese hopes of capturing PortMoresby, the key to New Guinea. Thebattle made history as the first naval en-gagement in which opposing ships neversighted each other - all fighting was doneby carrier-based planes. Both sides madeserious errors in this new form of war-fare, but many of these were corrected byUS forces in the subsequent Battle ofMidway.

In this action, the island of Midwayserved as an 'unsinkable aircraft carrier'for Admiral Chester W Nimitz. BungledJapanese intelligence contributed to adisaster from which the Japanese Navywould not recover - the loss of every car-rier commanded by Admiral ChuichiNagumo. After Midway, the Japanesewould be incapable of supporting the far-

flung conquests so rapidly made in pre-ceding months.

To preclude a second Japanese attempton Port Moresby, the Americans deter-mined to seize Tulagi and Guadalcanal inthe Solomon Islands. It was a six-monthstruggle in which US forces gained addi-tional skills from day to day despiteheavy losses, and it set the tone for theduration of the Pacific War - a campaignthat moved steadily toward Japan byavoiding heavily garrisoned enemystrongholds and seizing weaker positionsto use as a springboard to the next Amer-ican objective.

General Matsuichi Ino summarizedafter the war: 'The Americans attackedand seized, with minimum losses, arelatively weak area, constructed air-fields, and then proceeded to cut supplylines . . . Our strongpoints were gradu-ally starved out.' It was a brilliant im-provisation on the theme of the indirectapproach.

The JapaneseJuggernaut

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Previous page: The battleship Yamatofitting out at Kure, Japan, in!941.Above: Japan's occupied territories.R ight and far right: The Pearl Harborattacks in detail.Above right: The magazine of the USdestroyer Shaw explodes during the raids.

Pearl Harbor

The Japanese strike force thatapproached Pearl Harbor on 6 De-cember consisted of six fleet car-

riers escorted by two battleships and twoheavy cruisers. Anchored in Pearl Har-bor were eight battleships of the USPacific Fleet, numerous destroyers andtenders, and submarines and minesweep-ers. The carriers Lexington and Saratogawere away on a supply mission to WakeIsland, which was fortunate for the fu-ture course of the war on the Allied side.

Radio moni to r ing of increasedJapanese radio traffic in the several dayspreceding the attack made it clear thatan operation was underway. All Pacificforces had been alerted, but those atPearl Harbor remained on a peacetimefooting despite the danger. Aircraft onthe several Oahu airfields were undis-persed, and ships were anchored in linewith many members of their crewsashore. Reconnaissance flights had notbeen increased above the average.

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The Japanese launched the first waveof their two-part air attack at 6:00 AM on7 December. A radar station reported in-coming planes at 7:00 AM, but this reportwas unaccountably ignored. An hour la-ter, torpedo bombers came in to attackthe harbor as fighters began to strafe theairfields. Virtually all the US aircraftwere destroyed on the ground. In the har-bor, five of the eight battleships were hitimmediately; minutes later, West Virgi-nia was in flames and sinking, Oklahomahad capsized and California was badlydamaged. Arizona had exploded andNevada had to beach herself as she madefor the harbor entrance under fire fromthe second wave of the Japanese attack.Dive bombers and high-level bombershad joined the first aircraft contingent tocreate additional devastation.

By the time the second wave struck, USforces had rallied from the initial shock tooffer a more effective defense. At 9:45 AM,Vice-Admiral Nagumo's aircraft re-turned to their carriers with loss of ninefighters, fifteen dive bombers and fivetorpedo bombers.

Had Admiral Nagumo launched anadditional attack against the harbor, hemight have destroyed the port facilitiesentirely and accounted for the absent air-craft carriers as well. Instead, he chose towithdraw the strike force, from which hedispatched several units to attack WakeIsland (8 December). US Marines garri-soned there sank two Japanese des-troyers and held the island againststeady air and sea bombardment for twoweeks, until they were overwhelmed by aJapanese landing.

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Malaya

L ieutenant General TomoyukiY a m a s h i t a commanded theJapanese Twenty-fifth Army in its

whirlwind invasion of Malaya. (December1941). In this campaign, which drove allthe way to Singapore and was describedby Winston Churchill as the worst disas-ter in British military history, Yamashitaearned the nickname 'Tiger of Malaya.'His force consisted of three divisions sup-ported by 600 aircraft, as against Lieute-nant General A E Percival's two divisionswith some 150 aircraft.

Northern landings met little oppositionexcept at Kota Bharu, where TakumiForce, a regimental group, had to fight itsway ashore. Meanwhile, air attacks wipedout all but some 50 British planes.

A double advance south was led by theJapanese 5 Division, which grappledwith 11 Indian Division around Jitra on11 December. The defenders were pushedback steadily, as the Japanese GuardsDivision moved down the coast and 5 and18 Divisions progressed inland. Within70 days, Yamashita's troops had overrunall of Malaya through a combination ofsuperior force, speed and surprise. Gener-al Percival was tricked by skillful jungle-warfare tactics into believing that theJapanese force was vastly superior insize, and on 15 February 1942 he and hismen surrendered.

Above left: Aftermath of P earl Harbor,with USS Downes at left, USS Cassin atright and USS Pennsylvania at rear.Left: The garrison flag flies as HichamField burns.Right: The Japanese conquest ofMalaya,completed in January 1942.Below right: Singapore falls in February.Below: General Yamashita (foreground)surveys newly-conquered territory.

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The Fall of HongKong

Simultaneous with the Japanese in-vasion of the Malay Peninsula on 8December 1941 came the invasion

of Hong Kong, whose defenders werehopelessly outnumbered. Within 24hours they had been pushed back to theGindrinkers Line, which was breachedby the capture of Shing Mun Redoubt.The mainland then had to be evacuated,an operation which was completed on 13December. Five days later the Japanesecrossed Kowloon Bay on a wide front andcaptured more than half of Hong KongIsland. Fierce resistance continued untilseveral days before Christmas, but aftermost of the reservoirs were captured, thegarrison was forced to surrender on 25December.

A bove: British soldiers face captivity afterthe fall of Hong Kong.Right: Hong Kong and the surroundingarea.

A bove: The Japanese take Hong Kong onChristmas Day 1941.Opposite top: The Japanese conquest ofBataan, completed in April 1942.Opposite: The last US forces to hold out onCorregidor Island, south of Bataan, werefinally neutralized on the morning of6 M ay.

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Victory in thePhilippines

In July 1941, when the PhilippineArmy joined forces with the UnitedStates, General Douglas MacArthur

was made commander of US Forces in theFar East (USAFFE). His ten divisionsincluded some 19,000 American troopsand 160,000 Filipinos — most of them illequipped and undertrained. There werealso 200 aircraft at his disposal. TheJapanese believed, with some justifica-tion, that their Fourteenth Army of twodivisions supported by 500 aircraft couldconquer the Philippine Islands.

Heavy air attacks struck US air baseson 8 December (the same day as PearlHarbor, but dated a day later by the In-ternational Date Line). Word of the PearlHarbor disaster had impelled USAFFEto fly its bombers off Clark Field in themorning, but by the time of the middayattack, they were back on the groundwith their fighter escorts. Forty-eighthours of bombing against the airfieldsaccounted for the vast majority of USwarplanes and cleared the way forJapanese landings north of Luzon to seizethe bases at Vigan, Laoag and Tuguegar-ao. In the south, Legaspi was seized as abase from which to interdict seaborne USreinforcements.

The main Japanese landings were atLingayen Bay on 22 December, whencethe invaders broke out of their beachheadto advance against Manila. On 23 Decem-ber MacArthur announced his plan towithdraw to Bataan; five days later, hedeclared Manila an open city. By earlyJanuary, the Japanese were gainingground on the Bataan Peninsula, buttheir troops were overtaken by diseasethere and gained little ground for thenext two months.

On 12 March 1942, MacArthur wasflown out and replaced by LieutenantGeneral Jonathan Wainwright, whofrustrated several Japanese attempts toestablish beachheads behind US lines.Not until 3 April, after reinforcement bya fresh division, were the Japanese ableto launch their final offensive. Within aweek's time, they had penetrated so deep-ly that US forces were compelled to sur-render (7 April). The last Americantroops held out on Corregidor Island in asiege that ran from January until 5 May,when their artillery was almost entirelyknocked out by unceasing bombard-ments. On that day, Japanese troopslanded at Cavalry Point and establishedtheir beachhead. It was all over for thetime being in the Philippines.

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Left: Japanese landings on Luzon,December 1941.Above: Small Japanese field gun In actionduring theBataan campaign, April 1942.Right: American prisoners of war underguard by Japanese troops after thesurrender of Bataan.

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The Dutch E ästIndies

The oil and other resources of theDutch East Indies made them aprime target for occupation by

Japan, which planned a three-part attackon the islands early in 1942. WesternForce, from Indochina and newly cap-tured Sarawak, would attack southernSumatra, Western Java, and North Bor-neo; Central Force would attack Borneofrom Davao; and Eastern Force wouldjump off from the same point against theCelebes, Amboina, Timor, Bali and east-ern Java.

Defense of the islands was undertakenby a combined force of Allies in the South-west Pacific: American, British, Dutchand Australian (ABDA). General Archi-bald Wavell and his forces had more cour-age than support, which consisted largelyof a six-cruiser naval flotilla under DutchRear Admiral Karel Doorman. Theattacks began on 11 January 1942, andproceeded relentlessly from one objectiveto another in the weeks that followed.Naval engagements off Balikpapan (24January) and in the Lombok Straits (19-20 February) provided only a slight checkto the Japanese advance. On 27 FebruaryAdmiral Doorman attacked the Eastern

Force convoy in the Java Sea, where bothDutch cruisers were sunk before theycould inflict any damage. In the after-math, HMS Exeter was also destroyed, aswere HMAS Perth and USS Houstonwhen they resisted the Western Force onthe following day - to some effect in termsof damage done. But on 1 March, theJapanese made their inevitable landingon Java, whose Allied defenders suc-cumbed a week later.

Above: Japan captures the East Indiespiecemeal, 1942.Right: A Japanese column in Burmacrosses a footbridge south ofMoulmein.Far right: The invasion of Burma wasaccomplished with little Allied resistance.

Burma Bows toJapan

The Japanese invasion of Burma be-gan on 15 January 1942 with theoccupation of Victoria Point by a

detachment of Fifteenth Army, whichmoved north to take Tavoy four days la-ter. British defenses in Burma werepathetically unprepared to resist theJapanese invaders; only two brigades,one Indian and one Burmese, were able tocounter the push toward Moulmein thatbegan on 20 January. The British werethen forced back from the town underconstant threat of being outflanked, andfrom this point on fought a series of de-laying actions all the way to Rangoon -the conduit for all British supplies andreinforcements. Air support from a singleRAF squadron and a squadron of MajorClaire Chennault's 'Flying Tigers' wasinsufficient to prevent the capture ofRangoon on 8 March. The British garri-son there was very nearly cut off before itcould pull out. Meanwhile, LieutenantGeneral William Slim had taken com-mand of British ground forces, whileGeneral Harold Alexander had assumedoverall command of the deterioratingBritish defense. The Chinese Fifth andSixth Armies arrived to reinforce theAllies, but they fought erratically despitethe best efforts of American commanderGeneral Joseph Stilwell. Throughout themonth of April, Allied forces were in con-tinuous retreat from the Japanese, whowere now bringing in reinforcements andair support from conquered Malaya. Bymid May they were in control of Burma.

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The Conquest ofSicily

When the Tunisian bridgeheadcollapsed on 12 May 1943, a de-moralized Italy found herself in

imminent danger of invasion. Seriousstrikes in industrial northern Italy hadalready warned both Mussolini and Hit-ler of the depth of national discontent. Ina meeting with Hitler on 7 April, Musso-lini tried - and failed - to persuade hisally to forget about Russia and concen-trate on Mediterranean defense. On 5May General von Rintelin reported to

Hitler that an Allied landing in Italywould probably have 'most unpleasantconsequences, in view of the prevailingatmosphere of fatalism.' Hitler remainedadamant about his doomed adventure onthe Eastern Front, which would finallycollapse in July at the Battle of Kursk.

Even as Russian and German tanksbattered each other in the Kursk Salient,the Allies launched their invasion of Ita-ly, which Churchill had described as 'thesoft underbelly of the Axis.' Aerial bom-bardment from North Africa struck Axisairfields and communications centers inSicily, Sardinia and southern Italy, be-ginning in early June. Land forces for theinvasion comprised General George SPatton's US Seventh Army and GeneralBernard Montgomery's British EighthArmy; they were transported to Sicily ina fleet of 3000 vessels. Axis defense ofSicily was entrusted to the Italian Sixth

Army under General Alfredo Guzzoni,with strong German support.

On 10 July the Americans landed inSicily's Gulf of Gela, the British in theGulf of Syracuse. The landings were asurprise to the Italians, coming as theydid in poor weather that seemed to pre-clude air- or seaborne operations. Vigor-ous German counterattacks against theAmericans came from German divisionson 11-12 July, but Patton's force pressedon toward the north coast, clearing west-ern Sicily by 23 July. Montgomery suf-fered a check at Catania, but smallamphibious operations allowed him tocontinue his advance to Messina, whichhe reached on 17 August. Meanwhile, theItalians, who had offered minimal resist-ance from the first, evacuated the island.The Germans were left to fight a rear-guard campaign until the Allied victoryof mid August.

The PeninsularLandings

On 24 July 1943, Mussolini wasoverthrown. His replacement,Marshal Ugo Cavallero, began

secret armistice talks with the Allies.Hitler suspected that the Italians weretrying to take themselves out of the warand sent German reinforcements intonorthern Italy to safeguard communica-tions. Field Marshal Albert Kesselringadvised him that an Allied landing inItaly could be expected soon after the con-quest of Sicily - probably on the Gulf ofSalerno near Naples.

On 3 September, the day that thearmistice with Italy was signed, BritishEighth Army made a landing on the toe ofItaly, at Reggio di Calabria - largely as adiversion. The main landing did takeplace at Salerno, on 9 September, afterthe secret armistice with Italy was madepublic. General Mark Clark's US FifthArmy, with British X Corps, secured onlyfour small beachheads in the face of awell-prepared German defense. Farthersouth, Montgomery was advancingthrough Calabria, and there had been asecond British landing at Tarante.

From 9 through 14 September, theFifth Army was in serious trouble atSalerno. German shells from the sur-rounding hills, followed by a powerfulattack on the 12th, almost cut the Alliesin half. Reinforcements arrived two dayslater, barely in time to salvage the opera-tion, and by 18 September Clark's forceshad consolidated the beachhead. WhenMontgomery's advance units arrived on16 September, Kesselring began to with-draw north to the Gustav Line, which ranalong the Rivers Garigliano and Sangro.The Allies pursued from both east andwest until 8 October, when a rest halt wascalled on the Volturno/Termoli Line. Theterrain grew increasingly rougher andthe weather more severe as the Alliedadvance resumed in mid October.

Previous page: US troops liberate Rome,June 1944.Left: Sicily falls to the Allies, 1943.A bove right: The main Allied landing inItaly was undertaken at Salerno byClark's U S Fifth Army.Right: A diversionary attack at Reggio diCalabria by the British Eighth Ar mypreceded the main attack, while a thirdlanding was made at Taranto in the east.

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Allied Drive on theGustav Line

Below: Mussolini (left) and Hitler confer.The former s displacement by MarshalU go Cavallero on 24 July 1943 led toAnglo-Italian armistice talks.Right: The Germans were less prepared toyield than their former allies, finallyestablishing the Gustav Line as 1943ended.

Fifth Army made a difficult crossingof the Volturno, swollen by autumnrains, beginning on 12 October

1943. The roadless mountains north ofthe river posed even greater obstacles.On the east coast, Eighth Army forced apassage over the Trigno River, but theirprogress on both sides of the centralmountains was slowed by skillful Ger-man delaying tactics. Kesselring used

the time gained to complete the impress-ive Gustav Line, which ran along the lineof the Garigliano and Rapido Rivers, overthe central mountains and north of theSangro River to the Adriatic. GermanTenth Army held the line under GeneralHeinrich von Vietinghoff. The westernend was especially strong, as it was back-ed by the mountains on either side of theLiri and by Cassino.

On 20 November US Fifth Armyattacked this strong sector, at a very highcost in casualties. Painful progressbrought Fifth Army almost as far as theRapido, but there it was halted at year'send by arctic weather conditions. Mont-gomery had forced the Sangro on 15November and broken through the lineeast of Lanciano. The British took Ortonaon 27 December.

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The Fight for MonteCassino

The ancient abbey of Monte Cassinoastride the Gustav Line was theobject of heavy fighting in the early

months of 1944. The Allies made a frontalassault on the almost impregnable posi-tion on 17 January, but a whole series ofattacks failed to take it by storm. TheFrench Expeditionary Corps had joinedthe Allied forces in Italy, but they madeonly limited advances with very heavycasualties. The New Zealand Corps suf-fered similar repulses between 15 and 18February.

A long hiatus followed the first offen-sive, during which the Allies regroupedand reinforced for a new effort, launched11 May along a 20-mile front between thearea east of Cassino and the sea. TheBritish pushed over the Rapido but werethen contained by the Germans, TheAmericans broke through the GustavLine along the coast, only to be stopped atSanta Maria Infante. It was the FrenchExpeditionary Force that crossed theGarigliano and cut the German lines ofcommunication; interdiction of Germansupplies to the point of starvation wasalso a factor. On 17 May Kesselring con-ceded the loss of this key position by awithdrawal. The historic abbey had beenriddled with tunnels and redoubts to pro-tect its defenders from heavy bombard-ment; it was reduced to rubble by thetime the Allies claimed it on 18 May, atthe cost of many lives.

Right: Initial Allied attempts to break theGustav Line at Cassino in early 1944 metwith failure.

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Right: Little remained intact after theabbey at Monte Cassino was finallyoverrun by the Allies on 18 May.Below: The second Allied offensive on theGustav Line was somewhat moresuccessful than its predecessor, pus hingthe Germans to the Führer-Senger line.

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Anzio and the Roadto Rome

The Allied landings at Anzio on 22January 1944 were designed to re-lieve pressure on Cassino, but the

results were just the reverse: only theAllied success at Cassino allowed the USVI Corps to break out of its bungled posi-tion on the coast. Fifty thousand troopscame ashore under Major General JohnLucas, who made the fatal error of estab-lishing a beachhead rather than pressinginland so as to wait for his heavy artilleryand tanks. The Germans, under Macken-sen, seized this welcome opportunity topin down VI Corps at Anzio and massforces for a major counterattack on 16February. Not until the 19th was thishalted, to be followed by a state of siegethat would last until late May. Lucas wassoon replaced by Major General LuciusTruscott, but it was too late to retrievethe situation.

When the Allies finally broke the Gus-tav Line at Cassino, Clark's Fifth Armycould resume its advance northward. In-stead of swinging east in an effort to trapthe German Tenth Army, Clark opted forcapturing Rome - an important moralvictory, though hardly necessarystrategically. The Germans were able todelay his troops at Velletri and Valmon-tone long enough to ensure the escape ofvirtually all their forces in the area. TheAllies finally entered Rome on 4 June1944, just two days before the invasion ofFrance.

Right: The intention of the Anziooperation was to cut Germancommunications by landing behind theirfront line.Below: The Allies on the road toRome.

Above left: Mount Vesuvius'symboliceruption failed to deter B-25 bombers ofthe US 12th Air Force en route to Cassino.Left: A second pall of smoke hangs overthe city and monastery as the bombs burst.

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The End in Italy

A fter Rome fell, the Allies forcedthe Germans back to their last de-fense - the Gothic Line. The Ger-

mans were now being reinforced from theBalkans and Germany, while Alliedtroops, aircraft and landing craft hadbeen drawn off to France. British EighthArmy reached the Gothic Line on 30August 1944 and attacked with consider-able success, but the Germans held com-manding positions on the Gemmano andCoriano Ridges that slowed the advanceto Rimini until late September.

US Fifth Army had also brokenthrough, but the approach of winterfound Clark's exhausted forces short oftheir objective of Bologna. The Alliedadvance did not resume until April 1945,by which time Clark had become com-mander of 15 Army Group. Reinforce-ments and new equipment had reachedhim during the winter, and he planned atwo-pronged offensive against Ferrara(Eighth A r m y ) and Bologna (Fif thArmy).

The German Tenth Army, now underGeneral Herr, was surprised by the Brit-ish attack across Lake Comocchio, whichhad been covered by a major artillerybombardment beginning on 9 April. TheBritish moved into the Argenta Gap andFifth Army, now led by Major GeneralL u c i u s T r u s c o t t , b r o k e t h r o u g hLemelsen's German Fourteenth Armyinto the Po Valley ( 20 April ). General vonVietinghoff, who had replaced Kessel-ring as overall commander in Italy, wasforced back to the left bank of the Po,leaving behind all his heavy weapons andarmor. The Fascist Ligurian Army haddisappeared without a trace, and Axisforces in Italy were out of the fight whenBologna fell on 21 April. Vietinghoffsigned the surrender of German forces inItaly on 29 April 1945.

Opposite top left: The unsuccessful Anziolanding on 22 January 1944 which leftboth sides in a siege position.Above left: A n Axis ammunition trainreceives a direct hit, March 1944.Left: Wehrmacht soldiers are marchedinto captivity north of Anzio.Top right: Breaking the Gothic Line,the final German defense in Italy.Above right: The Allies advance intoNorthern Italy.Right: US 105mm howitzers fire acrossthe Arno,August 1944.

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Battle of the CoralSea

After the Doolittle bombing raid onTokyo (18 April 1942), Japanesestrategists sought ways to extend

their defense perimeter in Greater EastAsia. One of their options was to strikefrom Rabaul against Port Moresby, NewGuinea; extend their hold on the SolomonIslands; and isolate Australia from theUnited States. This task was assigned toa five-part force designated MO, undercommand of Admiral Shigeyoshi Inouye.It comprised a Port Moresby InvasionGroup of eleven transports and attendantdestroyers; a smaller Tulagi InvasionGroup charged with setting up a seaplanebase on Tulagi in the southern Solomons;

a Covering Group under Rear AdmiralGoto that included the carrier Shoho; asmaller support group; and Vice AdmiralTakagi's Carrier Striking Force, includ-ing Shokaku and Zuikaku. The opera-tion's complexity suggests that no seriousopposition was expected from the Allies,but Admiral Nimitz, Commander inChief of the Pacific Fleet, moved quicklyto counter it. A hastily improvised TaskForce of three components, including thecarriers Yorktown and Lexington, pre-pared to rendezvous in the Coral Sea on 4May. The Japanese attack came one dayearlier.

Tulagi was occupied without opposi-tion, after which the opponents lostseveral days seeking one another in vain.Then Vice-Admiral Frank Fletcher dis-patched British Rear-Admiral John Graceand his Task Force 44 to attack the PortMoresby Invasion Group (7 May). TheJapanese mistook this group for the mainAllied force and bombed it continuouslyuntil Grace made his escape by skillfulmaneuvering at the end of the day - not

without inflicting some damage in re-turn. Another Japanese error led to anattack on the tanker Neosho and the des-troyer Sims at the same time that themain Allied force, still undetected, con-verged on Goto's Covering Group andsank Shoho.

The Japanese had already ordered theinvasion transports to turn back, but nowthat Fletcher's position was known an airstrike was launched against his group onthe night of 7-8 May. Twenty-sevenJapanese planes took off, of which onlysix returned. Then Shokaku was attack-ed and disabled; a reciprocal Japanesestrike fatally damaged Lexington and putYorktown out of action. At no time in thebattle did opposing surface ships sightone another - a circumstance new to nav-al warfare, but soon to become familiar inthe Pacific Theater.

Tactically, the Battle of the Coral Seawas a draw: the Japanese lost moreplanes, the US more ships. Strategically- and morally — it was a major US victorythat came when one was needed most.

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Battle of Mid wayPrevious page: The final dive of a strickenJapanese bomber west of the MarianasIslands, June 1944-Opposite below: Coral Sea was the firstnaval battle fought without surfacevessels sighting each other.

Below: The complex Japanese plan ofattack at Midway involved no less thaneight task forces.Bottom: The battle took place north ofMidway and ended in decisive defeat forthe Japanese.

M idway was the turning point inthe Pacific War and a watershedin modern history. Having failed

to gain their objectives in the Coral Seaoperations of early May 1942, theJapanese were determined to captureMidway as a base within striking dis-tance of Hawaii. The destruction of thePacific Fleet before US industry couldbuild it up again was recognized as a mat-ter of supreme urgency, besides whichthe occupation of Midway would elimin-ate the bombing threat to the home is-lands. The operation was scheduled for 4June 1942.

Fleet Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto,architect of the Pearl Harbor attack,formed a complex plan involving eightseparate task forces, one of which was tomake a diversionary attack on the Aleu-tian Islands. Almost all of the Japanesesurface fleet would be involved - 162warships and auxiliaries, including fourfleet carriers and three light carrierscommanded by Admiral Nagumo.

Information - and the lack of it - play-ed a crucial role in the battle's outcome.Yamamoto believed that the carrierYorktown had been destroyed in the Cor-al Sea along with Lexington. In fact, thedamaged ship had been refitted for battleat Pearl Harbor in the incredibly shorttime of 48 hours. Nor did the Japaneserealize that the Americans had brokentheir fleet code: Nimitz was fully aware oftheir plans. Although he had only 76ships, three of them were fleet carriers -Yorktown, Enterprise and Hornet, with atotal of 250 planes - whose presence waswholly unsuspected by the Japanese. Asa result, Nagumo sent out few recon-naissance flights, which could havewarned him of their presence.

Before dawn on 4 June, the Japanesedispatched 108 bombers to Midway, re-serving 93 on deck armed for naval con-tingencies only with armor-piercingbombs and torpedoes. Many US planeswere destroyed on the ground in the firstattack, but those that survived took off tointercept the incoming bombers. Theywere largely destroyed by enemy Zeros,but they made a second strike imperativeand thereby gave their carriers thechance to attack Nagumo's fleet while itwas rearming with high-explosive andfragmentation bombs. When a Japanesereconnaissance plane finally reported de-tection of enemy carriers, Nagumo'splanes were unready to mount a defense.

The first few US carrier strikes inflictedlittle damage, but the decisive blowcaught all the newly armed Japaneseplanes on their flight decks waiting totake off. Five minutes later, three of thefour Japanese carriers were sinking.

Hiryu escaped immediate destructionand disabled Yorktown, but damage in-flicted on her by Enterprise was so severethat she had to be scuttled the followingday. It was the end of Japanese navalsupremacy in the Pacific.

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Guadalcanal and theSolomon Islands

Prior to 1942, few Americans hadever heard of those far-flung is-lands whose names would become

so familiar during the war years — nameslike Okinawa, Iwo Jima and Guadalcan-al. Japanese forces waged a six-monthbattle for this island in the southern Solo-mons with US Marines who landed thereon 7-8 August 1942. Their objective was aJapanese airbase still under constructionto offset the loss of carrier air cover atMidway.

Admiral Fletcher, who had disting-uished himself at Midway, was in overallcommand of operations in the southernSolomons. Rear Admiral R Kelly Turnerled an amphibious task force responsiblefor landing the 19,000-man 1st MarineDivision and its equipment. The Marinesreached the airbase — renamed Hender-son Field - soon after landing and foundit deserted, but they came under heavyattack from the Japanese Navy, whichdominated surrounding waters by nightand soon sent reinforcements ashore toretake the island. The Marines streng-thened the airfield's perimeter and usedit to gain control of the sea lanes by day.

Two costly but inconclusive carrierbattles were fought, one in August (Bat-tle of the Eastern Solomons), the other inOctober (Battle of Santa Cruz), as theJapanese landed additional troops andsupplies on Guadalcanal. On land, therewere three major attacks on the Marine

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garrison, all of which were thrown backat considerable cost to the Japanese. De-spite reinforcement, the Marines wereexhausted by December, but the XIVArmy Corps relieved them and theJapanese had to withdraw their own de-pleted forces.

Guadalcanal provided a jumping-offplace for successive conquests in the Solo-mons, culminating with Bougainville inOctober 1943. The campaign was char-acterized by surprise landings, followedby hasty construction or repair of air-strips for local defense and as bases forthe next attack. Even strongly garri-soned islands like Bougainville, whichhad 60,000 widely scattered defenders,were seized and isolated, while Japanesestrongpoints at Rabaul and Kaviengwere bypassed. The Solomons Campaignwound down in mid 1944, after successfulAllied landings on New Britain and theAdmiralty and St Matthias groups.

Left and inset: Occupying the Solomonswas a lengthy process that took the Alliesover a y ear to complete.Opposite below: A n attack by US aircraftat the beginning of the battle forGuadalcanal.Below: US Marines landing on the islandhead immediately for cover.

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Left: US landings on Guadalcanal andthe resistance encountered.Below left: Japanese supply ships andtheir escorts met US Task Force 67 nearTassafaronga on 30 November 1942 inone of the many naval actions offGuadalcanal. On this occasion, theJapanese emerged on top.Bottom left: Marine reinforcementsdisembark.Below: US Navy vessels weave to counterair attack off the Solomons.Right: US landings on New Guinea.Below right: General MacArthur (right)passes an encouraging word with aparatrooper at Port Moresby.

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New Guinea

The Japanese made a secondattempt against Port Moresby inJuly 1942 - an overland advance

from Buna - but it was stopped byAustralian formations in September.Allied forces built an airstrip at MilneBay, then proceeded over the Owen Stan-ley Range against totally adverse groundand weather conditions to capture Bunaand Sanananda at year's end. Australiancoast-watchers were instrumental inAllied success by providing early warn-ing of Japanese moves, but all com-batants were plagued by tropical disease,grueling terrain and a lack of accuratemaps of the area.

After Buna fell, Lae and the MarkhamValley were captured with the assistanceof Allied air forces (excellent co-ordination of all the services involvedwas a feature of this campaign). A seriesof operations around the Huon Peninsulawas followed by major landings at Hol-landia and Aitape in April 1944. Thesecut off some 200,000 Japanese troops andnumerous civilian workers centeredaround Wewak. The final New Guinealandings, at and near the northern tip ofthe island, secured airfields to be used insupport of operations in the Marianasand the Philippines. By July 1944, anentire Japanese Army had been neutral-ized in New Guinea, and the SolomonsCampaign had nullified the threat toAustralia and New Zealand.

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The Battle of thePhilippine Sea

After clearing the Marshall Islands,the US trans-Pacific drive con-verged on the Mariana group,

whose conquest would cut off theJapanese homeland from the Philippinesand Southeast Asia. When the USassault fell on the main Japanese de-fenses at Saipan, Tinian and Guam, theJapanese Navy was there to counter it(June-July 1944).

The Japanese First Mobile Fleet,under Vice-Admiral Jisaburo Ozawa,rendezvoused with Vice-Admira lMatome Ugaki's Southern Force on 16June. Three days later, Ozawa's scoutingplanes spotted Vice-Admiral Marc Mit-scher's US Task Force 58 underway togive battle; strike aircraft were launchedimmediately. Meanwhile, US sub-marines had located Ozawa's force andtorpedoed his flagship, the carrier Taiho.The veteran Shokaku was also sunk. Anabortive second strike by Ozawa was mis-directed, and US fighters intercepted iton its way to Guam. Japanese losses bynightfall of 19 June included 340 irre-placeable veteran pilots and two carriers.US crewmen dubbed the battle 'TheGreat Marianas Turkey Shoot.'

Ozawa compounded his errors by ling-ering in the vicinity, with the result thathe lost three more ships the followingday. The US had lost only 50 planes and

suffered slight damage to a single bat-tleship. Ozawa's reputation as an out-standing commander was impaired bythis disaster, but his resignation was re-fused by his superiors and he foughtagain at the Battle of Leyte Gulf withskill and tenacity. By that time, however,the Japanese defeat was inevitable.

Top left: The opposing fleets rendezvous.Center and above: The course of the battleon 19-20 June.Top: A Japanese diuebomber narrowlymisses USS Bunker Hill of Task Force 58.Right: Return of anF6F-3 Hellcat fighterto Lexington during 'The Great MarianasTurkey Shoot'.

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The Struggle forLeyte and Luzon

General Douglas MacArthur's over-riding desire to liberate the Phil-ippines played a major part in the

Allied High Command decision to makelandings on Leyte in October 1944.MacArthur's forces joined Nimitz's forthis operation, in a rare display of co-operation between these two competitiveleaders. Only 20,000 Japanese held theisland against 130,000 men of GeneralWalter Krueger's Sixth Army, who land-ed on 20 October. Japanese reinforce-ments could not keep pace with this kindof manpower. By Christmas 1944, majorengagements were almost over, withJapanese casualties estimated between

50 and 80,000. The Americans had lostonly 3600 men.

At sea, four major actions comprisedthe Battle of Leyte Gulf (21-25 October),in which Japan sought to prevent theAmericans from regaining a foothold inthe Philippines. Admiral Ozawa's de-pleted carrier force was to serve largelyas a decoy, luring Admiral Halsey'spowerful Third Fleet away from the mainaction. The real fighting was assigned tofour task forces of Japanese battleshipsand cruisers, which were still plentiful.On the US side, Halsey's force was aug-mented by Admiral Kincaid's SeventhFleet, backed by carrier formation TF.38.

Left: The land battles for Leyte sawsuperior US forces emerge triumphant.A boue: A Japanese fuel dump on Leyteblazes as a result of naval shelling.

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Above right: The sea actions comprisingthe Battle ofLeyte Gulf resulted in a USvictory despite the involvement of threeseparate Japanese forces.

Japanese Force A was turned back byUS submarines and carrier aircraft,which then turned north in pursuit ofOzawa's force. Vice-Admiral Nishi-mura's Force C was almost entirely des-troyed in a night battle, and Vice-Admiral Shima's Second Striking Forcewas turned back. Only Kurita's FirstStriking Force was still a factor, but itfailed to capitalize on its opportunity towreak havoc on the Seventh Fleet, andwithdrew after limited success on 25

October. Meanwhile, many of Ozawa'sships, including the valuable carrierZuikaku, last veteran of Pearl Harbor,had been sunk. Japanese desperationwas manifested in the first of the suicidalKamikaze missions, which struck an Au-stralian cruiser on 21 October.

L i e u t e n a n t Genera l Tomoyuk iYamashita, the 'Tiger of Malaya,' hadassumed command of Philippine defensejust as Ley te was being attacked. WhenUS forces moved to invade Luzon, the

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Above and inset: The capture of Luzon.Right: The US make landfall onLeyte.

principal island, in January 1945, histroops were ill prepared and poorlyarmed, and most of his air support hadbeen destroyed or withdrawn to Formosa.Doubting that he could hold the beaches,Yamashita made his stand in the inlandmountain areas with the object of tyingup numerous American forces for as longas possible. In the event, he did not sur-render until the war's end, when he stillhad 50,000 fighting men. By that time,most of Luzon and the other islands hadbeen recaptured in fighting that reachedits crescendo at Manila in February-March 1945.

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Iwo Jima

The rocky island of Iwo Jima,although far from Japan, was partof the Japanese homeland; it

offered the dual advantage to the Allies ofdemoralizing the enemy and providing afighter airbase in range of Tokyo - if itcould be captured. On the minus side, IwoJima was devoid of cover and stronglygarrisoned by 22,000 troops under MajorGeneral Tadamichi Kuribayashi, whohad made the eight-square-mile islandimpervious to aerial bombardment witha network of pillboxes, caves and tunnels.

The most prolonged and intense bom-bardment of the Pacific War preceded theUS Marine landings of 19 February 1945.The Japanese held their fire just minutestoo long, hoping to dupe the invaders intobelieving they would offer no resistance.By the time their weapons opened upagainst the beachhead, two Marine divi-sions and all their equipment had landed,with more to come throughout the day.

The Marines broke out and madestraight for Mt Suribachi, the sugar-loafmassif at the island's tip. There they suc-ceeded in raising the US flag after threedays of combat so costly that it eclipsedeven Tarawa, but the northeast of theisland remained unconquered. The mazeof underground defenses and lack of roomto maneuver made for hand-to-hand com-bat of savage ferocity. Nearly 7000 USMarines and sailors lost their lives in thefighting that raged until 26 March, andthe Japanese died almost to a man. Theirexemplar in courage was Kuribayashi,who contacted Tokyo days after their foodand water ran out with the message:'Fighting spirit is running high. We aregoing to fight bravely to the last moment.'

Right: Iwo Jima, a small island withimmense strategic significance.Below: US Marines advance withflamethrowers toward Mt Suribachi.

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Okinawa

The inexorable Allied advance to-ward the Japanese home islandsreached Okinawa, the main island

of the Ryukyu group, in March of 1945.Okinawa's capture was necessary to pro-vide harbor and air-base facilities for theinvasion of Japan. The island was de-fended by the Japanese Thirty-secondArmy - some 130,000 men - underGeneral Mitsuru Ushijima.

Preliminary air operations were aimedat Japanese air bases on Formosa and theislands surrounding densely populatedOkinawa. US and British carrier forcessuffered losses to waves of Kamikazeattacks, but the Japanese paid a higherprice - 90 percent of their planes wereshot down before they could sacrificethemselves on the enemy's ships. From23 March, Okinawa itself was the targetof continuous air and artillery strafing.

Allied forces began to land on 1 April,when General Simon Bolivar Buckner'sTenth Army and associated forces gaineda beachhead at the southern end of theisland. The Japanese had establishedthemselves behind the formidable ShuriLine, which remained almost imperviousto attack until early May, when suicidalcounterattacks disclosed the locations ofmany Japanese defensive positions.From this point on, both of the US corpsinvolved gradually pushed forward, asUshijima's forces retreated into the hillmasses of the island's southern tip. Finalresistance was overwhelmed by a mas-sive two-pronged attack on 21 June.

Throughout the operation, code-namedIceberg, supporting naval forces wereunder constant attack by Kamikazepilots, who accounted for 36 US and Brit-ish ships and damaged hundreds ofothers. The Japanese lost a staggering4000 aircraft in these suicide missions,and even sacrificed the giant battleshipYamato, which was dispatched to Okina-wa with insufficient fuel for a return tripto do as much damage as possible beforeshe was destroyed. This happened on 7April, long before the battleship couldreach the target area.

On land, known Japanese dead totaledalmost 108,000, and for the first time asignificant number of prisoners wastaken - over 7000. General Buckner waskilled, with over 7000 of his men; almost32,000 were wounded. US Navy casual-ties were almost 10,000, of whom roughlyhalf were killed and half wounded. SinceOkinawa was considered a 'dress rehear-sal' for the invasion of Japan, these

figures were sobering to Americanstrategists; General MacArthur esti-mated that it would take five million mento capture the home islands, of whomperhaps one million would becomecasualties. Thus Okinawa strengthenedthe Allied case for ending the war byother means.

Above: The invasion of Okinawa was seenas the dress rehearsal for a similar actionagainst the Japanese home islands.Above right: Marines await survivors ofan explosive attack on a Japanese hideoutonOkinawa.Right: The Japanese battleship Yamatowas sacrificed in a vain attempt to stemthe invasion.

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Air Strikes on theHome Islands

The bomber offensive against Japancould not begin until 1944, for lackof a very-long-range (VLR) bomber

capable of carrying heavy loads for over3000 miles. Such a plane was finally ac-quired from Boeing by the US Army AirForce (the B-29 Superfortress), but it wasso newly developed that operationalproblems plagued its early operations.The B-29's bombing altitude of 30,000feet created difficulties with high windsand the effect of ice on instruments andengines. Losses were running high forseveral months after the first raid, fromeastern China, in June of 1944. Addi-tionally, Japanese anti-aircraft defensesproved much more effective than hadbeen anticipated.

Modified tactics resulted in operating

the planes at much lower altitudes withheavier bomb loads, which paid off in im-proved performance. New bases wereestablished in the Marianas Islands ofthe Central Pacific in November, afterwhich up to 20 Bombardment Groupsflew regularly over Japanese cities byday and night. They dropped a total of9365 tons of incendiaries, which gutted32 square miles of urban areas. Thenescort fighters began to arrive from new-ly captured Iwo Jima (early April) andAmerican losses reached a new low. Asmore B-29s became available, mortalblows were dealt to Japanese industry.On 6 and 9 August 1945, the war withJapan was ended - and a new era in hu-man history begun - by the atomic bomb-ing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

Left: The now-familiar atomic mushroomcloud rises over Nagasaki.Above: The Japanese homeland and(inset) the radius of US bomberoperations over it.Right: Doolittle's daring one-off raid inApril 1942 from the USS Hornet had beenas much a propaganda exercise as anattack. The firebomb raids of 1945 were ona different scale altogether.Far right: Tokyo in ruins.

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140

The Arakan Battles

British and US leaders disagreed onstrategy in the Burma Theater af-ter the British had been driven

into India in May of 1942. The Americansbelieved that Burmese operations shouldfocus on reopening land communicationswith the Chinese Nationalists, who weretrying to contain large Japanese forces ontheir home ground. The British had littlefaith in Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalistmovement and maintained their hope ofwinning back the imperial territories lostto Japan in the 1942 débâcle.

General Archibald Wavell, command-ing Allied forces in India, knew that alarge-scale invasion was out of the ques-tion for the time, but he sought to employhis men and build up morale via small-scale operations near the Indian border.The first of these centered on the Arakan,where the island post of Akyab providedJapan with a position from which to bombChittagong and Calcutta. On 21 Septem-ber Wavell's 14 Indian Division began toadvance cautiously into Burma by way ofCox's Bazar. General lida, the Japanesecommander, countered with a series of de-laying tactics that created a stalemate last-ing until March 1943 when his counter-attack on two fronts forced a retreat.

In December 1943, the British sentChristison's XV Corps on a second ex-pedition against Akyab. LieutenantGeneral Renya Mutaguchi barred theway through the Mayu Peninsula andsent his Sakurai Column through moun-tainous jungle that was believed impass-able to cut off 5 and 7 Indian Divisions.Lieutenant General William Slim, whohad led the 900-mile fighting retreatfrom Rangoon, airlifted supplies to hisisolated troops until they had foughttheir way through to one another in lateFebruary 1944. (Slim's use of air supplywould ultimately be the key to Britishsuccess in Burma.) In March XV Corpsfinally renewed its advance on Akyab,but was stopped short again by the needto send reinforcements back to India forthe defense of Imphal.

Previous pages: A 25-pounder gun isbrought ashore in Rangoon.Above right: The Allied route southwardsalong fair-weather tracks was hamperedby enemy action.Right: 5 and 7Indian Divisions reuniteafter being isolated by a Japanese thrust.Opposite: Japanese troops used elephantsas a means of transporting supplies acrossBurma's rugged terrain.

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142

The ChinditOperations

Morale had been a problem in Bur-ma even before the Allies tookwhat Stilwell described as 'a hell

of a beating.' During the disastrous cam-paign of 1942, fighting spirit reached anew low. The Japanese were perceived asunbeatable in jungle warfare, and theAllied forces' sick rate reflected the pre-vailing malaise: thousands succumbed todysentery, malaria, skin diseases andother complaints. The heterogeneousassortment of troops involved in Burma-Indian, British and Gurkha — comprisedan army beset by problems of disciplineand discrimination.

Brigadier Orde Wingate arrived in the

Far East early in 1943 with guerrilla-warfare experience gained in Palestineand Abyssinia. Backed by WinstonChurchill and General Wavell, he cre-ated a 'private army' to penetrate behindenemy lines and disrupt Japanese com-munications and supplies. In so doing, hewould also prove that the Japanese couldbe defeated in the jungle.

The Chindits (so called after Chinthe, amythical beast) crossed the River Chind-win into Burma in February 1943 andspent four months raiding Japaneseterritory. They cut the Mandalay-Myitkyina Railway in 75 places beforethe Japanese counterattacked in force

and drove them back into India. Thepress lionized Wingate, and the mystiqueof Japanese invincibility began to lose itspower. Wingate's superiors then autho-rized a far more ambitious operation -involving six brigades - to complementStilwell's advance on Myitkyina.

The main Chindit force was airliftedinto Burma in February 1944 to establishblocking points against supplies movingup against Stilwell. They encounteredimmediate difficulties that grew steadilyworse until midsummer, when they hadto be withdrawn. Wingate himself waskilled in a plane crash soon after theabortive operation began.

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Japanese Defeat atKohima and Imphal

Above left: The Chindit operations inBurmain 1943.Left: Wingate (center) briefs pilots oninvasionplans with the assistance of theUSAAF's Colonel Cochran (left).Above: Troop movements aroundKohima.

Three Japanese divisions wereordered to prepare for the invasionof India (Operation U-GO) in early

March 1944. It was clear that an Alliedoffensive was being prepared, and theonly practical place from which it couldbe launched was the plain at Manipur,where Imphal and Kohima were located.Lieutenant General Mutaguchi's Fif-teenth Army was to spoil the plannedoffensive and cut the single railway toAssam, north India.

General William Slim, commandingFourteenth Army, expected a Japaneseadvance, but its speed was such that heand his men were taken by surprise.

Scoones's XV Corps was cut off at Kohi-ma on 4 April, and the garrison at Imphala day later. Both forces prepared to holdout with the help of air supply until reliefarrived from XXXIII Corps, which wasassembling at Dimapur. The quality ofSlim's leadership would be reflected inthe tenacity of his hard-pressed troopsuntil that help arrived.

Relentless Japanese attacks rolledover the small garrison at Kohima be-tween 7 and 18 April, when British 2Division's 5 Brigade pushed through theroadblock at Zubza to reinforce the defen-ders. Then 5 and 4 Brigades undertook asweeping pincer movement designed to

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trap the Japanese; this was not achieveduntil 3 June. Meanwhile, IV Corps wasstruggling desperately around Imphal,where air supply proved far more difficultthan foreseen. Slim reinforced the garri-son to some 100,000 men during thesiege, which lasted for 88 days. British 2Division advanced from Kohima to meetIV Corps at Milestone 107, halfway be-tween the two cities, on 22 June.Japanese Fifteenth Army had foughtwith distinction against increasing odds,but its remnants now had to pull backtoward the Chindwin, with British forcesin hot pursuit. Mutaguchi had lost some65,000 men in the heaviest defeat suf-fered by the Japanese Army in WorldWar II.

Right: The unsuccessful Japanese siege ofImphal that ended in June.Below: Merrill's Marauders, the USjungle fighters renowned for theirexpertise in combating the Japanese inunfriendly terrain.

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To Mandalay andMeiktila

Lieutenant General Shihachi Kata-mura took command of JapaneseFifteenth Army after the dis-

astrous losses at Kohima and Imphal, forwhich his predecessor was unjustlyblamed. During the summer of 1944, herebuilt his force of 10 divisions and thenawaited the expected Allied push intocentral Burma. This operation, code-named Extended Capital, began on 19November and included Stilwell's North-ern Combat Area Command, BritishFourteenth Army and the XV Corps. On4 December bridgeheads were securedacross the Chindwin, and the British ad-vanced to meet elements of Stilwell's forcefor the drive across the Irrawaddy intoMandalay. Only General Slim, of all theAllied leaders in Burma, correctly sur-mised that Katamura would attempt todestroy the Fourteenth Army at the rivercrossing.

On 3 March 1945, Slim struck atJapanese communication lines to Ran-goon located at Meiktila, achieving totalsurprise. The capture of this vital railcenter opened the door to the larger cityof Mandalay. Kimura pulled so manytroops away from Mandalay to assaultMeiktila that he lost both cities to theAllies. Slim raced on to reach Rangoonbefore the monsoon, but when he arrivedthe Japanese had already evacuated.Sum's outstanding leadership in the Bur-ma Theater led to his appointment asCommander in Chief of Allied LandForces in Southeast Asia.

A bove right: Operation Extended Capitaltook the Allies across the Chindwin andon to Mandalay.Right: Flamethrower and rifle-equippedinfantry of the United States Armyprepare for action.

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Left: Control ofMeiktila was to prove ofcrucial importance in the battle forMandalay.Below: US troops pause on a Burmesejungle trail.Below right: General Claire Chennault,whose 'Flying Tigers' struck at Japaneseground troops in China andFormosa.Far right: China's struggle to repel theJapanese invaders.

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China - An ErraticAlly

J apan's war on China predated WorldWar II by several years, and by 1939the aggressive island empire had

seized control of China's richest areas.The 'sleeping giant' was especiallyvulnerable on account of the internalstrife between the Nationalists (orKuomintang) led by GeneralissimoChiang Kai-shek and Mao Tse-tung'sCommunists.

US General George C Marshall warnedthe Allies that Nationalist China must bepropped up; otherwise, the Japanese Gov-ernment could flee to China when thehome islands were invaded - as was thenplanned - 'and continue the war on agreat and rich land mass.' Throughoutthe war, the US shipped enormous quan-tities of supplies to China, first by theBurma Road, and after 1942 by air overthe Himalayas - a dangerous routeknown as 'the Hump.' Chiang's positionwas strengthened by the creation of theUS 14th Air Force, impressively com-manded by Brigadier General ClaireChennault, which inflicted heavy dam-age on Japanese troops both in China andFormosa. General Joseph 'Vinegar Joe'Stilwell was sent in to help retrain theChinese Army. However, many of thesupplies destined for use against theJapanese were diverted into Chiang'swar on the Communists; corruptionflourished in his Nationalist Party.

US air strikes by Chennault's 'FlyingTigers' provoked a Japanese offensiveagainst the airfields at Liuchow, Kwei-lin, Lingling and other sites in the springof 1944. Chinese resistance did not holdup, as was often the case, and the loss of

these bases hampered Allied operationsuntil December. Meanwhile, a truce waspatched up between the Communists andNationalists, allowing greater activityagainst the Japanese, who renewed theiroffensive in 1945.

In the war's final year, Japanese

General Okamura overextended the de-ployment of his China ExpeditionaryArmy, and the Chinese were able to cutoff the corridor to Indochina. They heldthis position for the duration, after whichthe Nationalists and the Communistspromptly resumed their civil war.

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The German Drive tothe Volga

Germany's critical oil shortage wasdecisive in Hitler's first 1942 cam-paign plan for the Eastern Front.

In April he instructed that the maineffort was to be in southern Russia, whereGerman forces must defeat the Red Armyon the River Don and advance to the co-veted Caucasian oil fields. For this cam-paign, Bock's Army Group South wasreorganized into Army Groups A and B,A to undertake the Caucasus offensiveand B to establish a protective front alongthe Don and go on to Stalingrad. Theneutralization of 'Stalin's City' soongained a compelling hold on Hitler'smind, despite his staffs objections to di-viding the German effort before the RedArmy had been shattered. Stalingradwas a major rail and river center, whosetank and armaments factories offeredadditional inducements to attack it.

The obsession with Stalingrad was adisastrous mistake on Hitler's part, com-pounded by his seizure of control from hisdissenting officers. Army Group A madea rapid advance from 28 June to 29 July,capturing Novorossiysk and threateningthe Russian Trans-Caucasus Front. Butthe diversion of 300,000 German troopsto the Stalingrad offensive preventedthem from achieving their original objec-tive — the Batumi-Baku Line. They wereleft to hold a 500-mile Caucasian frontagainst strong Russian opposition -leaderless, except for the erratic and con-tradictory orders of Hitler himself.

The Russians had made good their1941 manpower losses from the subjectpeoples of Asia, and they threw the T-34tank into the field at this point to com-plete the German fiasco in the Caucasus.The vital oil fields were lost to Germany.Army Group B raced toward Stalingradto attempt what had now become the onlypossible success of the campaign. The citycould not be encircled without crossingthe Volga, which General Weichs lackedthe resources to attempt, so a frontalassault was launched on 31 August.

Previous pages: Red Army sappers clearGerman barbed wire defenses.Above right: The original German battleplan, with oilfields the main objective.Above far right: Splitting the forces tostrengthen the attack on Stalingradproved a major error.Right: The German advancesoutheastwards with armor and artillery.Opposite: Commander Chuikov of theRussian 62nd Army at the Volga.

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152

Stalin's City HoldsOut

Below: The German forces attack.Below left: Stalingrad's position on thebanks of the Volga enhanced its defensivecapabilities.Bottom: Manstein's forces are repulsed.

The slow pace of the German sum-mer offensive of 1942 allowed Sta-lingrad's defenders to strengthen

their position considerably. The city washome to half a million Russians, whowere united in their determination to re-pel the German assault. Most of theSoviet soldiers were assigned to the de-fense perimeter, the city itself being en-trusted largely to armed civilians, whosehigh morale promised fierce resistance.

The Volga wound through many chan-nels around the city, posing seriousobstacles to any attempt at bridging it.The Germans made no effort to establisha bridgehead north of the city so as toblock river traffic and reinforcement.

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Right: A Ger man soldier shows the strainof fighting an unwinnable battle.Bottom: The red flag flies victorious overStalingrad in February 1943 as theGermans finally surrender.

This was only one of many mistakes, theworst of which was the decision to carrythe city by direct attack. The resultantbattle would become the Verdun of WorldWar II.

By the end of August, the Russian de-fenders had been squeezed into a smallperimeter, and twelve days later the Ger-mans were in the city, striving to fighttheir way to the western bank of the Vol-ga. Soviet civilians and soldiers strug-gled side by side in a constant barrage ofbombs and artillery fire, falling back afoot at a time. House-to-house fightingraged until 13 October, when the ex-hausted German infantry reached theriver in the south city. But the northernindustrial sector remained unconquered.Hitler ordered intensified bombardmentsthat served only to make the infantry'stask more difficult. Stalingrad's de-fenders continued to fight regardless.

By 18 November, when the winterfreeze was imminent, Hitler's armiesaround Stalingrad were undersupplied,overextended and vulnerable to the Rus-sian counterattack that was forming.Before the Germans were forced to sur-render (February 1943), they had lost100,000 of the 200,000 men involved.Five hundred Luftwaffe transport planeshad been destroyed in impotent efforts tosupply them, and six months' worth ofGerman war production had been thrownaway. Wehrmacht morale was shattered,not only by the great defeat itself, but bythe wanton intrusions into military plan-ning that had wrecked the campaignfrom Berlin.

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The Battle of Kursk

The success of the 1942 Russian win-ter offensive left a large salientaround Kursk that tempted the

German High Command into mounting amajor attack. The fact that US and Brit-ish aid was now flowing freely into Rus-sia lent urgency to this plan of attack, asGermany's resources were steadilydraining away.

The armored pincer movement againstthe Kursk Salient - codenamed Opera-tion Citadel - was scheduled for July of1943. Early intelligence of it enabled theRussians to prepare by moving in twoarmies and setting up eight concentriccircles of defense. When the Germanslaunched their attack on 5 July, it was inthe belief that they would achieve sur-prise. On the contrary, Russian defensesat Kursk were the most formidable theyhad ever assaulted. The Soviet T-34 tankwas superior to anything the GermanPanzer groups could field, and air com-mand was seized at the outset by multi-tudes of Russian planes. They were notequal to the Luftwaffe in technology, butthey were far superior in numbers.

In the north, German Ninth Army ad-vanced only six miles in the first fewdays, at a cost of 25,000 killed and 400tanks and aircraft. In the south, Man-stein's Fourth Panzer Army drovethrough the Russian Sixth Army - againat high cost - only to face fresh Soviet

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Opposite far left: The German offensiveagainst Kursk, launched on 5 July.Left: By 20 July German forces were infull retreat.Right: The heavily armoredKV-1 tanksgave the Germans many problems.Below: Soviet T-34s take part in thebiggest tank battle of the war nearProkhorovka in the south.

tank units from the Russian Steppe Frontreserve. The largest tank armies in his-tory clashed near Prokhorovka on 12July and fought for seven days. InitialGerman success was followed by increas-ing Soviet ascendancy, and by 20 July allGerman forces were in full retreat. Twomillion men had been involved, with6000 tanks and 4000 aircraft. Many ofthe surviving German tanks were dis-patched immediately to Italy to counterthe Allied offensive that had begun withlandings in Sicily. The Russians main-tained their momentum in successfuladvances south of Moscow.

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The Dniepr andSmolensk

By fall of 1943, the Soviets hadpushed their front line far to thewest against diminishing German

forces that managed to stay intact andresist, although they could not prevail. Inmid September the Russians threatenedSmolensk in the north and Kiev in thecenter. They crossed the Donets in thesouth and by 30 September had capturedSmolensk and established themselvesalong most of the Dniepr.

German Army Group A, virtuallyabandoned at its bridgehead in the Cau-casus since the previous summer, waspulled out to operate on the right of Man-stein's Army Group South, its parentformation. Manstein had recapturedKharkov in February — against numeric-al odds of seven to one — but his losses hadbeen staggering. When the Russians tookKiev (6 November) and penetrated hissector, he called for evacuation of theSeventeenth Army from the Crimea. Hit-ler's characteristic 'No retreat' order wasManstein's reward for months of super-human effort. Seventeenth Army was cutoff in the Crimean Peninsula, just as hehad foreseen, and by year's end the Rus-sians had effectively regained all theterritory lost in 1942 and more.

Left: The scope of Soviet reoccupation attheir western border.Above: The eventual German withdrawalwas made all the more inevitable by theremoval of armor and personnel to theItalian Front.Opposite: A German NCO leads hisinfantry section at the front line.

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The Relief ofLeningrad

Leningrad had been isolated fromthe rest of Russia since 1941 by theGerman-held corridor between

Tosno and Lake Ladoga. For 900 days itspeople were deprived of food, fuel andarms; by the end of the siege, they weredying of hunger and cold at the rate of20,000 a day. Throughout this ordeal,Leningrad's citizens continued to pro-duce goods in their factories, even atgreatly reduced levels, and to provide forcivil defense. A trickle of supplies beganto arrive in January 1943, thanks to aconcerted effort by the Leningrad andVolkhov Fronts to secure a supply linesouth of Lake Ladoga. It was littleenough, but it prevented total starvation.Not until a year later did real relief reachLeningrad.

In mid-January 1944, three RussianFronts- Leningrad, Volkhov and 2 Baltic- launched attacks against GermanArmy Group North, commanded first byKüchler and after 29 January by FieldMarshal Walther Model. By that time theRussians had cleared the Moscow-Leningrad Railway and recaptured Nov-gorod. Now threatened by encirclement,Model withdrew Army Group North eastof Lake Chudskoye and subsequentlystopped the Soviet advance into the Bal-tic States. Beleaguered Leningrad wasrestored to the Soviet Union.

Above: Supplies reached Leningrad inlimited quantities through the so-called'Corridor of Death'.Above right: The earlier division of theLeningrad and Volkhov Fronts.Right: Final relief of the siege wasachieved early in 1944.Opposite: Defenders dig in at Leningrad'sperimeter.

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160

Regaining theUkraine

During the drive to relieve Lenin-grad, Russian forces in the southwere equally active. The 1 and 2

Ukrainian Fronts launched attacks onall German forces in the Ukraine be-tween 24 December 1943 and 5 January1944. German First Panzer Army wastrapped, and both Manstein's ArmyGroup North Ukraine and Kleist's ArmyGroup A were hard pressed. Mansteintried to counterattack under blizzard con-ditions, but could do little to slow theRussian advance to the Rivers Bug andDniestr.

An improvised airlift kept First PanzerArmy supplied until it could fight its wayout behind Russian lines. German tena-city in south Russia at this time wasalmost unbelievable, but it was a losingfight. Kleist had to fall back to Odessa,leaving elements of Sixth and EighthArmies surrounded. On 10 April he wasforced out of Odessa, and the Russianfront was extended almost as far as BrestLitovsk.

The last rail link between the Germansin Poland and those in southern Russiahad been severed in March with the cap-

ture of Chernovtsy by First UkraineFront. The abandoned German Seven-teenth Army was driven from theCrimea, and Sevastopol fell to the Sovietson 12 May.

Hitler was enraged by the losses in theUkraine, whose rich mineral resourceswere desperately needed by the Reich.Instead of rewarding Manstein's heroicrole there, he relieved him of his com-mand and put the trouble-shooting Modelin his place. Kleist was ousted in favor ofthe ambitious Field Marshal FriedrichSchörner.

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Left: A column of Germans captured nearthe pocket of resistance at Korsun-Shevchenkosky.Above: Soviet advances on agrandscale.Right: German soldiers advance throughthe maize fields of the Ukraine.

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From Warsaw to theOder

E arly summer of 1944 found widelyscattered German forces trying tohold a 1400-mile Eastern Front

with very few reserves. On 23 June theSoviets struck along the central sectorwith three fronts under overall commandof Marshal Georgi Zhukov, now deputysupreme commander in the USSR. Witha density of almost 400 guns per mile,these troops assaulted General Busch'sArmy Group Centre just as partisanactivity in its rear disrupted communica-tions entirely. There was no contest inthe air, as many Luftwaffe units hadalready been taken west. Busch lost halfa million men, killed or captured, fromhis 33 divisions and was replaced by Mod-el immediately. By the end of August,Zhukov's offensive was at the gates ofWarsaw — in the the north, at Riga. Modelbarely succeeded in preventing the Rus-sians from entering Warsaw; their ownpause to resupply outside the city wasprovidential for him. Farther south,Soviet troops had crossed the Vistula fora combined advance of 450 miles in twomonths. Operations had to be suspendeduntil supply lines could catch up.

By January 1945 the Russians werepoised to invade Germany for the firsttime since 1914. Rokossovsky's 2 Be-lorussian Front of nine armies assaultedthe German Second Army north of War-saw, while the Russian Forty-seventhArmy encircled the city, which fell on 17January. Army Group Centre was drivenback into a few pockets along the Bay ofDanzig, from which the German Navyextricated some half a million men inMarch and April. On 9 May the last Ger-man beachheads surrendered.

As Rokossovsky attacked north of theVistula, the 1 Belorussian and 1 Ukrai-nian Fronts advanced at top speed on awide front from Warsaw to Jasto. Theyhad reached the Oder by 31 January,bypassing pockets of German resistance.Russian armies of over 1,500,000 menconfronted German forces of 596,000,with still greater inequalities in arma-ments and aircraft. By 24 FebruaryPomerania and Silesia had fallen, givingSoviet forces a solid front along the Oderless than 40 miles from Berlin. Only onesizeable German force would be left inEurope after the fall of Berlin: Schörner'sArmy Group Centre, which had movedinto Czechoslovakia. The Russian 'libera-tion' of that country would be a micro-cosm of what transpired in EasternEurope after the German defeat.

Below: The frontiers of Germanoccupation are pushed back.Bottom: Marshal Ivan Konev,Commander of 1 UkrainianFront, 1944.Right: R ussian forces halt at the Oderprior to the final push to Berlin.Below right: Troops of4 UkrainianFrontplod over the Polish Carpathians in thewinter of 1944-45.

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164

The Drive intoCzechoslovakia

Desperate Nazi plans focused on theformation of a 'national redoubt'on the German/Czechoslovak bor-

der after the fall of Berlin. These planswere based on Schörner's armies of almosta million men, which held the Reich's lastimportant industrial area. In reality,however, their situation was hopeless,surrounded as they were by the Russianson three sides and with Patton's US ThirdArmy approaching from the west.

By 6 March 1945 the Russians hadalready overrun much of Slovakia, andtwo months later they held over half thecountry. Czech partisans in Prague andother cities disrupted German com-munications and harassed German forcesin every way they could. On 8 May aconcerted Russian offensive attackedfrom north, south and east, and Praguewas liberated the following day. USArmy closed the circle on 12 May along aline from Karlovy Vary to Linz. Schörnersurrendered with all his forces, five daysafter the formal surrender of Germany.

Left: The western boundaries of Sovietwartime expansion.Below: The Allies drive intoCzechoslovakia from all directions.Opposite: Soviet anti-tank gunners.

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The BomberOffensive onGermany

Allied air raids on Germany beganas early as 1940, but it was notuntil late 1943 that the bombing

offensive became systematic and wide-spread. At that time American 8th AirForce units joined the RAF Bomber Com-mand in force, and several months later

an increasing range of escort fightersallowed deep penetration raids over thewhole of Germany. RAF Bomber Com-mand concentrated on night bombing ofGerman cities, while the US 8th AirForce, with fewer planes, targeted spe-cific military installations by day.

Previous pages .'Russian troops inRedSquare with captured Nazi banners.Left: B-24 bombers of the USAAFcontinue their daylight raids on the Reich.Above: The ever-expanding operationalrange of US escort fighters ensured thatyet more bombers would hit the target.

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Prior to this, several historic raids hadbeen made, including the first '1000-bomber' raid on Cologne (31 May 1942),which destroyed half the target area.Three months later, US 8th Air Forcedispatched 12 Flying Fortresses againstthe marshalling yards near Rouen. Dam-age was slight, but no American planeswere lost, and this raid set the pattern forUS concentration on precision bombingin daylight hours.

The night of 18-19 November 1943brought the first of sixteen major raids onBerlin, where serious damage was in-flicted with loss of only nine RAF air-craft. With the arrival of escort fightersin spring of 1944, the 8th Air Force

attacked the Erkner ball-bearing factoryin Berlin, disrupting production con-siderably at a cost of 37 planes. Threeweeks later, the RAF struck Nurembergwith almost 800 aircraft, causing somerelatively minor damage but losing 95bombers in the process; 71 others weredamaged. The British abandoned arearaids on distant objectives after this re-sounding failure.

The most controversial raid of the warin Europe was that on Dresden (13-14February 1945). Estimates of civilianskilled in this raid ranged from 35,000 to135,000. Over 1500 acres of the beautifuland historic city - of no military valuewhatever — were destroyed. The first de-

vastating fire bombing was carried out by805 Bomber Command aircraft, with theloss of only eight planes. The followingday, 8th Air Force bombers overflew thecity again.

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Strategy: OperationOverlord

At the 1943 Trident Conference inWashington, Allied leaders madetheir plans for the invasion of

Europe - Operation Overlord - duringthe coming year. France was selected asthe target of a cross-Channel assault,with beachheads to be established in Nor-mandy between Cherbourg and LeHavre. This area was within easy reachof fighter bases in southern England andrepresented the shortest possible routefor a massive amphibious operation, ex-cluding the Pas de Calais. Since theAllied invasion was expected in the latterarea, the Normandy beaches would beless heavily defended.

The main assault force consisted of theUS First and the British Second Armies,with air support from the US 82 and 101Airborne Divisions and the British 8 Air-borne Division. These forces would landright and left of the target beaches tocover the landings. Two artificial ports(called Mulberry Harbors) would betowed across the Channel to permit thelanding of tons of supplies before a portcould be secured.

Elaborate plans were laid to deceivethe Germans into believing that Pas de

Calais was the intended target. A dummyheadquarters and railroad sidings werebuilt; dozens of sorties were flown overthe area; while tons of bombs were drop-ped west of Le Havre.

German forces guarding the coast ofFrance consisted of Army Group B, com-manded by Rommel, and Seventh Armyunder Dollmann. Hitler had a bad habit ofbypassing von Rundstedt, Commander inChief West, when he issued orders to hisArmy Group leaders, so the Germans hadno effective chain of command in thewest. Their position was further jeopar-dized by topography; destruction of theriver crossings on the Loire and the Seinewould isolate their forces in Normandy.

Below: Nearly three million men made upthe A Hied army and supporting forcesready for invasion.Right: The first landings take place on theNormandy beaches.Far right: The disposition of opposingGerman forces.

171

D-Day

A ll the careful Allied planning thatwent into the invasion of Francewas subject to one imponderable -

the weather. June of 1944 opened withunseasonable cold and high winds, whichposed serious problems for the strateg-ists. Optimum conditions of moon andtide occurred only a few days each month,and the first week of June comprised sucha period.

General Dwight D Eisenhower, Sup-reme Commander of the operation, de-cided that the landings must go ahead onschedule. Then a fortunate break in theweather allowed the huge force to launchthe largest combined operation in milit-ary history on D-Day - 6 June 1944.Three million men, 4600 transports andwarships, and almost 10,000 aircraftwere involved. General Montgomery

172

Left: Loading Allied wounded aboardaC-47Dakota. Note the aircraft's black-and-white invasion stripes, adopted foreasy identification.Below: The invasion beaches.Right: LCVP landing craft en route to theFrench coast.

173

174

commanded ground forces, AdmiralRamsay co-ordinated naval operationsand Air Marshal Leigh-Mallory wascharged with air support. Preparatory airattacks were particularly important inview of the shortage of paratroop-transport aircraft and the comparativestrength of opposing ground forces — somehalf a mill ion men of the GermanSeventh Army.

Hitler himself contributed to Alliedsuccess by misusing the advice of two ofhis ablest generals to produce a com-promise scheme that seriously hamperedthe German defense. Field Marshal vonRundstedt, Commander in Chief West,wanted to form a strong central reserveuntil the true Allied plan was known andthen use it to repel the invasion, keepingbeach defenses to a minimum. Rommel,commanding German armies in northernFrance and the Low Countries, cautionedthat Allied air power would preventRundstedt's reserve from coming into ac-tion and recommended that the Alliesshould be defeated on the beaches beforethey could reach full strength. Hitler'scompromise - strongly influenced byinflated reports of Allied manpower- neither strengthened the beachessufficiently nor allowed for the flexible

use of Rundstedt's reserve.Five beaches were targeted for the

Allied landings, code-named Utah, Oma-ha, Gold, Juno and Sword. At 2:00 AM on 6June, US and British airborne forces de-scended on their objectives and consoli-dated a position within the hour. Tacticalsurprise was complete, thanks to themonths of painstaking work by the decep-tion team. An hour later, aerial bombard-ment of the beaches began, soon followedby fire from the 600 warships that hadassembled off the coast. At 6:30 AM thefirst waves went ashore, US First Armyon Utah and Omaha Beaches and BritishSecond Army on Gold, Juno and Sword.Real problems were encountered only onOmaha, where landing forces were de-prived of full amphibious tank support byrough seas. They were pinned down on thebeach for hours, but managed to fight theirway out to the coast road by nightfall.Within 24 hours, the Allies had achievedalmost all their objectives for D-Day.

Above .'Disposition of Alliedbombardment vessels on D-Day.Top right: LST landing ships disgorgemen and matériel.Right: A convoy of US Coast Guardlanding craft (LCI) head for Normandy.

175

176

The Anvil Landingsin Southern France

US and British leaders disagreedon the necessity of landing forcesin southern France to support Op-

eration Overlord on the Normandy coast.The Americans argued that such land-ings could open the much-needed port ofMarseilles and draw off German troopsfrom the north, but this could be doneonly by transferring troops from Italy.British leaders saw vast untapped poten-tial in the Italian campaign and arguedfor pouring men and munitions into Italyto facilitate an advance over the Alps to-ward Vienna and the Danube. Stalin hadhis own vested interest in an Anglo-American effort as far west of Russia aspossible, and he enlisted US PresidentFranklin D Roosevelt's support. It wasthe American plan that prevailed.

Operation Anvil was postponed fromJune 1944 — simultaneous with D-Day —to 15 August, due to a shortage of landingcraft. On that date US Seventh Armymade landings between Toulon and Can-nes. Ninety-four thousand men and11,000 vehicles came ashore with fewerthan 200 casualties: all of southernFrance was defended by only eight Ger-man divisions. The French II Corps,under General de Lattre de Tassigny,then advanced toward Toulon andMarseilles, while US elements closed inon the German Nineteenth Army, taking15,000 prisoners. De Lattre capturedboth his objectives, and US LieutenantGeneral Alexander Patch fought his wayup the Rhône Valley to make contactwith Patton's Third Army on 12 Septem-ber. The newly formed French FirstArmy then combined with US Seventh toform the US 6 Army Group under Lieute-nant General Jacob Devers to drive intoGermany on the right of the Allied line.

177

The Allied Breakoutfrom Normandy

It took over half the summer for Alliedforces to extend their initial beach-heads well into Normandy, where

Rommel had been reinforced from thesouth of France. Montgomery adhered tohis original campaign plan and made

slow but steady progress (although notenough to satisfy his critics, who werenumerous). By 27 July (D + 50), theCotentin Peninsula was in Allied hands.Patton's US Third Army broke throughthe Avranches gap into Brittany and cen-tral France, and US, British and Cana-dian Forces attacked south and east inearly August.

Hitler responded with orders for im-mediate counterattacks, which failed tocontain the Allied advance. Both vonRundstedt and Rommel had been re-placed in early July, and their successor,von Kluge, was pulled out on 25 Augustafter four Allied armies pursued him to

the Seine crossings. Patton's armorreached the Seine at Fontainbleu on thesame day that US and Canadian forcesclosed the gap at Falaise, cutting off theescape of German Seventh and Fifth Pan-zer Armies. By this time, 10,000 Germansoldiers had died and 50,000 more hadbeen taken prisoner.

The US XV Corps established a bridge-head downstream of Paris as soon as itreached the Seine, and five days later, on25 August, the French capital was liber-ated. Kluge had succeeded in salvagingmuch of Army Group B, but his commandwas turned over to General Model by wayof thanks.

Opposite bottom: Anvil, Overlord and theBritishplan over which they prevailed.Left: US troops drive the Germans fromsouthern France.Below: Patton's Third Army poursthrough the Avranches Gap and sweepssouth toward the Loire.Inset: Pursuit and defeat of German forcesat the A tlantic coast.

Above: US armor crosses the SiegfriedLine en route for Germany.Left: The escape route for the Fifth andSeventh German armies ended at Falaise.Above right: Reclaiming France and theLow Countries, summer 1944.Right: German soldiers pictured on thelong march to captivity.

178

179

Advance to Antwerp

The remarkable achievement ofAllied operations in Normandyshould have been followed up,

according to Montgomery and otherstrategists, by a narrow-front thrust intoGermany to end the war in 1944.Eisenhower, who assumed direct controlof ground forces in September as a func-tion of supreme command, favored a slowadvance in line by all Allied forces. Thecritical issue in August 1944 was that ofsupply: the logistics of providing food,fuel and other necessities to four Alliedarmies now 300 miles from the Norman-dy coast had become unworkable. A portwas needed desperately.

Montgomery, Bradley and other nar-row-front proponents argued for sup-plying part of the Allied force abundantlyand sending it through Belgium to encir-cle the Ruhr and advance on Berlin at topspeed. Eisenhower held out for a more

cautious advance that did not underesti-mate the power of German armies still inthe field despite their losses - 700,000men since D-Day. There was far less riskin this approach, both strategically andpolitically. The disadvantage was indragging out the war until 1945, whichmeant that the Russians would have timeto establish their armies far west of theirborders.

The Canadian First Army seized sever-al small French Channel ports, and on 4September the Allies captured the largeport of Antwerp with its facilities almostintact. But failure to consolidate theirgrip on this valuable harbor immediatelyresulted in loss of control of the ScheldtEstuary, its seaward approach, to theGermans.

180

Arnhem and theDrive to the Rhine

Once Belgium was liberated, theAllies sought to secure a con-tinuous northernward advance by

capturing a series of four bridges at keycanal and river crossings. This would cre-ate a corridor through the Netherlandsfor a swing around the northern end ofGermany's West Wall defenses (whichwere by no means as strong as the Alliessupposed). Montgomery planned to dropthree airborne divisions near the bridgesat Veghel, Grave, Nijmegen and Arnhemin an operation that was hastily assem-b led u n d e r the c o d e n a m e o f'Market Garden.'

The 17 September landings at Vegheland Grave by US 101 and 82 AirborneDivisions were successful, and BritishXXX Corps linked up with these forcesthe following day. They captured thebridge at Nijmegen on 20 September, butwere unable to make further progress. AtArnhem, British 1 Airborne Division wasin desperate straits as a result of landingtoo far from the bridge in a strongly de-fended area. Only one battalion reachedthe objective, where it was immediatelycut off, and the rest of the division wassurrounded. Only 2200 survivors made itback to British lines; 7000 others re-mained behind to be killed, wounded orcaptured.

The port of Antwerp was still useless tothe Allies on account of German forces inthe Scheldt Estuary, which was notcleared until early November. ThenBradley's 12 Army Group was enlargedby the arrival of the US Ninth Army, and6 Army Group pushed through theVosges Mountains to the German border.By 15 December 1944, the Allies werepoised to cross the Rhine.

Below: The Allies advance.Bottom: The two tactical alternatives-astrong thrust (left) and the more cautiousadvance actually adopted (right).Right: Operation Market Garden,mounted against four key river bridges.Far right: British airborne forces ran intotrouble at Arnhem.Below right: US troops bridge theRhine.

181

182

Germany's LastThrow: The Battle ofthe Bulge

As they prepared to cross the Rhineinto Germany, the Allies dis-counted any possibility that the

Germans would launch a last-ditch offen-sive. In fact, Hitler had scraped togetherhis last reserves and ordered them tobreak through the Allied front in theArdennes, split US and British forces,and drive on to Antwerp to cut off Alliedsupplies. Twenty-four German divisions,10 of them armored, were involved in thisbold offensive, which came dangerouslyclose to succeeding.

Since they lacked air cover, the Ger-mans were fortunate that low cloud and aheavy snowfall concealed their move-

ments through the Ardennes. On 16 De-cember eight Panzer Divisions appearedseemingly from nowhere to fall upon theUS VIII Corps in the first encounter of asix-week struggle. The British would callit the Battle of the Ardennes, the Amer-icans the Battle of the Bulge.

German tactical surprise was com-plete, and additional confusion spreadthrough the US lines when English-speaking German soldiers in Allied uni-forms (carefully coached in Americanslang) made their presence known.Eisenhower was forced to commit his re-serves to the bulge in his line, includingairborne divisions that were still resting

from Operation Market Garden. The US101 Airborne Division arrived in Bas-togne only to be trapped on 20 December,as German forces prepared to head for theMeuse.

Then the Allies rallied to mount a con-certed attack on the German salient byHodges' US First Army and Patton'sThird Army. Montgomery took charge ofall Allied units north of the bulge, andBradley assumed command in the south.By Christmas Eve, the Ardennes Offen-sive was grinding to a halt for lack of fuel.The Germans were unable to overrunAllied fuel dumps, and stiffening opposi-tion completed their undoing. The last

183

major Luftwaffe effort of the war, againstairfields in France, Belgium and Hol-land, had no effect on the punishingaerial attacks that supported Alliedground forces in the Ardennes.

Hitler's gamble had failed long before 7February 1945, when the salient wasfinally eliminated. With it went the lastGerman forces that might have stoppedthe Russian onslaught now preparing tofall upon the German homeland.

Above: Hitler's plan to split the Britishand US forces by making for Antwerp.Left: ThePanzers break out into theArdennes.Above right: A n Allied supply line rollsthrough Bastogne in January 1945 afterits relief.Right: Bastogne under siege inDecember1944; the US 101st Airborne Divisiondefends the perimeter.

184

Crossing the RhineBelow: A US Army half-track guardsagainst air attack at Remagen, a key Rhinecrossing-point captured on 7 March.Bottom: German prisoners taken in thedrive to the Rhine east oftheRoer river,February 1945.Right: Crossing the Rhine.

The Rhine River was the greatestwater obstacle in Western Europe,and no Allied leader expected to

cross it with impunity. Not until earlyMarch 1945 were sufficient forces inplace to attempt the capture of a vitalbridge. This was achieved on 7 March in abrilliant stroke by men of Hodges' USFirst Army, who seized the Ludendorffrailroad bridge at Remagen intact, thenestablished a bridgehead with bewilder-ing speed. Valuable as this was, addition-al crossings had to be secured both up-and downstream of Remagen before itcould be exploited.

On 22 March, US Third Army made asecond crossing at Nierstein, soon fol-lowed by others at points from Nijmegento Mannheim. Wiesbaden was capturedon 27 March; the day before, US SeventhArmy had crossed near Worms to link upwith Patton's Third Army on the eastbank. From 31 March onward, theFrench First Army began to force cross-ings south of Mannheim, and within aweek's time the Germans had lost alltheir positions on the Rhine's east bank.

186

The Drive intoGermany

Below: German anti-aircraft artilleryclaims a direct hit on a US B-26 attackingroad and rail targets in support of Alliedground troops.Right: The Allied drive into Germanyhalted at the Elbe.

The Allied advance through Ger-many from the Rhine to the Elbemet bitter opposition at several

points where determined German lead-ers still commanded veteran troops. Butfor the most part, resistance was minim-al; German units lacked food, fuel,ammunition and leadership by this time,and many welcomed the opportunity tosurrender to the Americans rather thanface the Russians.

Eisenhower had focused most of hisattacks in the south, due partly to reportsthat the Germans would retreat to an'Alpine Redoubt' whose unspecified loca-tion was largely in Hitler's mind. Firstand Third Armies had crossed the Rhinesouth of Aachen with unexpected ease,and German communications had brokendown almost entirely. There is no doubtthat the Allies could have reached bothBerlin and Prague in April 1945, but US

commitments to the Soviet Union man-dated a halt on the Elbe. As the Alliedarmies advanced through Germany tolink up with the Russians, they disco-vered Belsen, Buchenwald and othercamps whose infamies had been rumoredbut not fully known until that time. An-ger against the Nazi régime hardenedwith every appalling discovery, as filmsand pictures from the camps began toreach the world.

188

The Fall of BerlinBelow: The victors and the defeated.Soviet troops enter Berlin, May 1945.Below left: The partition of Berlin.Bottom: Occupied Germany as itappeared at the war's end.Right: As Berlin falls, the warinEuropecomes to an end.

By mid April 1945, Soviet forcesalong the Oder were ready to ad-vance on Berlin. Konev's 1 Ukrai-

nian Front and Zhukov's 1 BelorussianFront (some 2,500,000 men) faced amillion German defenders in strong posi-tions on the Oder's west bank. The des-perate Germans were keenly aware of theconsequences should the Russians breakthrough, and they were prepared to fightas never before.

The opening Russian bombardmentemployed a record-breaking concentra-tion of one gun per 13 feet of front. It wasa fitting prelude to one of the most fero-cious bouts of the war. Only two smallbridgeheads were achieved in the first

two days (16-18 Apri l ) , but deeperpenetrations were made in the following48 hours. By 20 April, German resistanceon the Oder was shattered, and five dayslater the two Russian forces had encircledthe city to meet on its west side. It was onthe same day, 25 April, that US andSoviet forces made contact on the Elbe atTorgau.

Berlin contained 2,000,000 civiliansand a garrison of some 30,000. Itsrudimentary defenses were wholly un-equal to the forces massed against it, butthe city resisted to the last. From 26 Aprilto 2 May, fighting raged in the streets, asthe two Russian armies moved in fromnorth and south to meet across the Char-

lottenberg Chaussee. Before they madecontact, the Reichstag fell (30 April), andHitler died by his own hand, namingAdmiral Karl Dönitz as his successor.

On 4 May 1945, General Montgomeryaccepted Germany's unconditional sur-render, and three days later the war inEurope was formally at an end. The vic-tors divided both Germany and Berlin(which was deep in the Soviet sector) intofour zones each, to be controlled by thefour major Allies. The stage was set forSoviet hegemony in Eastern Europe, theCold War, emerging nationalism amongformer subject peoples around the world,and the precarious new balance of powerthat persists to this day.

189

190

Index

Index of mapsAlam Haifa 57Anzio landings 117,118Arakan battles 140Arctic convoys 39Ardennes, German breakthrough in

182Arnhem181Atlantic, Battle of

to May 1940 34June 1940 to March 1941 35April to December 1941 36January to July 1942 37Bismarck episode 38August 1942 to May 1943 40June 1943 to May 1945 41

Avranches breakthrough 177

Bataan Peninsula 103Belgium

German and Allied plans 18disposition of forces in 1939 19overrun 22,23Allied advance to Antwerp, 1944

179Berlin, partition of 188

encirclement of 189Bismarck episode 38Bougainville 125Britain, Battle of 27Burma, invasion of 107

Arakan battles, 1942-43 140Operation Ha-Go, 1944 140Allied Northern and Southern

Groups, 1943 142drive to Mandalay, 1944-45 145MeiktilaandMandalay, 1945 146

Calais 24China, Japanese occupation of 147Convoy PQ-17 39Coral Sea, Battle of 122Corregidor 103Crimea 16 1Czechoslovakia, Allied drive into 164

Dunkirk 23,24Dutch East Indies 106

East Prussia 162Eastern Front

planned thrusts to Moscow, Kievand Leningrad 68

relative strengths and dispositions,June 194169

Operation Barbarossa 71attack on Leningrad 73the Ukraine 74,161advance on Moscow 75,76Soviet counter-offensive, December

1941 76Soviet advance to April 1942 77drive to the Volga 150defense of Stalingrad 152Kursk offensive 154front lines, 1943156front lines to Spring 1944 161front lines, January to May 1945

163Warsaw to the Oder 163encirclement of Berlin 189

El Alamein, First Battle of 55Second Battle of 58,59

Europe, in 193912pre-1914 and 1919 boundaries 81

Falaise pocket 178Finland

Mannerheim Line 66Soviet penetration of, 1939-4066,67front line in 194172

Francedefensive positions in 1939 19overrun 22,25divided 23defense of Calais 24Italian incursions 25Allied landings in Normandy 170,

172-3German dispositions in 1944 171Allied landings in South, 176breakthrough at Avranches 177Falaise pocket 178advance to Antwerp 179

Gazala46Germany

expansion by August 1939 12,82in 1939-4016,83in 1940 22by 1942 84

thrust into Poland 14advance in Denmark and Norway

16Siegfried Line, 193919advance into Low Countries 20thrust to the Meuse 21advance through Belgium and

France 22,23invasion of Yugoslavia 29through Libya into Egypt 44,45contraction and defeat of 92,93bomber offensive against 169Allied drive into 187Allied Occupation Zones 188Soviet advance to Berlin 189

GreeceItalian attacks and counter-

offensives 30,31British evacuation of 31

Guadalcanal 125,126

Hong Kong 102

Imphal 144Italy

expansion of 82,83Allied landings in 110,111Gustav Line 113,114,115Allied advance in 117,119Anzio landings 117,118Gothic Line 119

Iwo Jima 133

Japan1941 sphere of influence 86-71941-42 expansion in Pacific 88-9limit of expansion, August 1942 90reversals in Pacific, 1944-45 94occupied terri tories, December

194198-9bombing of!36-7

Kohima 143Kursk 154

Leningrad, defense of 73,158relief of 158

Leyte, land battles for 130Leyte Gulf, Battle of 131Luzon, Japanese landings on 104

recapture of132

Malaya, Japanese conquest of 101Malta 53Mandalay 146Mannerheim Line 66Matapan, Battle of 49Mediterranean, naval war in 49,52-3Meiktila 146Mersa Matruh 54Midway, Battle of 123Moscow, advance on 75,76

NewGuineal24,125US landings on 127

North AfricaGerman advance into Egypt,

March/April 194144,45,54Tobruk44,46,47,48German advance to Gazala and

Tobruk 46First Battle of El Alamein 55Alam Haifa 57Second Battle of El Alamein 58,59Operation Torch 60Allied advance into Tunisia 61,62,

63Eighth Army advance, El Alamein

to Mareth Line 62-3

Okinawa 134Operation Anvil 176Operation Barbarossa 71Operation Market Garden 181Operation Overlord 170,176

landing beaches 172-3Allied naval dispositions 174

Operation Torch 60

PacificJapanese sphere of influence 1941

86Japanese expansion in 88,90,98Japanese containment in 94

Pearl Harbor 99Philippine Islands 128

conquest of 103,104liberation of 130,131,132

Philippine Sea, Battle of 128Poland

German thrust into 14Russian advance into 14partition of 14Soviet reoccupation 163

Rhine, Allied advance to 180crossing of 185

Rhineland, 1936 reoccupation 12,82

Sicily 110Singapore 101Solomon Islands 124-5Soviet Union

disposition of forces, 1941 69defense of Leningrad 73,158December 1941 counter-offensive

76gains to April 1942 77gains to November 1943 156gains to Spring 1944 161wartime expansion 164

Stalingrad 150,152Sudetenland 12

Taranto, attack on 49Tassafaronga, Battle of 126Tobruk 44,46,47,48Tunisia, Allied advance into 61

Ukraine, German capture of 74Soviet reoccupation 161

Yugoslavia, German invasion of 29

General IndexPage numbers in italicsrefer to illustrations

ABDA Command 106Alam Haifa, Battle of 56-7Albania 30Alexander, General Sir Harold 56,62,

107Algiers 60,60Allied army formations

6 Army Group 176,18012 Army Group 18015ArmyGroup 119see also British Army, French

Army, United States Army

Altmark, SS 16Anglo-German Naval Agreement 14Anglo-German rivalry 6Antwerp 179,180Anzio 117Arakan140Ardennes 18,20,182-3Arizona, USS, battleship 78-9,100ArkRoyal, HMS, carrier 38Arnhem 180,181Arnim, General Jürgen von 62Atlantic, Battle of 32-7,34-8,40-1,41,

92atomic bomb, 136,736Auchinleck, General Sir Claude 54,

56Australia 15,91,122,127Australian armed forces 30,91,127

7 Australian Division 448 Australian Division 44

Austria?, 13,80

Bar/torn, HMS, battleship 50-1Bastognel82,183Bataan 103,105Belgium 18, 20,21,80,179Berlin?,93,169,179,186,188,188BirHacheim47Bismarck, German battleship 38'blitzkrieg' 14,16,17, 20,29,82Blücher, German cruiser 16Bock, General Fedor von 68,150Bougainville 125Bradley, General Omar N 179,180Britain, Battle of26, 26-8,82British Army

in France/Belgium, 194018,20,22,24,82

in United Kingdom, 1940 26in Greece 30in North Africa 44,46-8,48,54,55,

56,56,58,60,62in Far East 101-2,102,107,140-6,

141in Sicily/Italy 110-2,114,119in Northwest Europe 174,177,179-

80First Canadian Army 179Second Army 170,174Eighth Army 46-8,54, 56,58,62,

110,111,112,119Fourteenth Army 143,145IV Corps 144V Corps 62XCorps58, 111XIII Corps 47, 58XV Corps 140,143,145XXX Corps 58,180XXXIII Corps 143New Zealand Corps 1141 st Airborne Division 180,7872nd Division 143,1442nd Armored Division 445th Indian Division 1407th Armored Division 567th Indian Division 1408th Airborne Division 1708th Australian Division 449th Australian Division 54llth Indian Division 10114th Indian Division 1403rd Indian Brigade 444th Brigade 1435th Brigade 14322nd Armored Brigade 55,56

British Empire 6,7Bryansk 70Buckner, General Simon Bolivar 134Bulgaria, Bulgarians 29,30Bulge, Battle of the 182BunferffiH,USS,carrier72SBurmaS, 89,706,107,140-6Burrough, Rear Admiral HM 52Busch, General Ernest 162

Cairo, HMS, cruiser 52Calais 18,22Canadian armed forces 177

First Canadian Army 179

191

Cape Matapan, Battle of 49Casablanca 60Cassin,USS100Caucasian oilfields 150Cavallero, Marshal Ugo 111Chamberlain, Neville 6-7,13Chennault, General Claire 107,147,

147Chiang Kai-shek 140,147China 87,140,147Chindit operations 142Chinese armed forces 107,147Christison, General Sir Philip 140Chuikov, Marshal Vasili 151Churchill, Winston 6,22,36,56,101,

110,142Clark, General Mark 111,117,119concentration camps 12convoys 34,35,36,37,39,40-1,83

to Malta 52to Russia 39

Coral Sea, Battle of 95,122,123Corregidor Island 103Coventry, bombing of28Grace, Rear AdmiralJohn 122Crete 30Crimea 70,76, 77,156,160Cruewell, General Ludwig47Cunningham, Admiral Sir Andrew

49Czechoslovakia 7,13,80,162,164

Danzig 80de Gaulle, General Charles 22Denmark 16,17Devers, Lieutenant General jacob

176Dollman, General 170Dönitz, Admiral Karl 188Doolittle raid on Tokyo 89,122,137Doorman, Rear Admiral Karel 106Dorsetshire, HMS, cruiser 38Dowding, Air Chief Marshal Sir Hugh

26Donnes, USS, 700Dunkirk 7,21,22, 24,24,26,82Dutch East Indies 89,106

Eagle, HMS, carrier 52East Prussia 13Eastern Solomons, Battle of 124Eisenhower, General Dwight D.5.3,

60,171, 179,182,186ElAlamein56,60

First Battle of 54Germans retreat from 42 -3Second Battle of 58,,5»

Enterprise, USS, carrier 123Exeter, HMS, cruiser 106

Falaise pocket 177Finland 66,72

armed forces of 66, 73German alliance with 66, 70, 72

Fiume, Italian cruiser 49Fletcher, Vice-Admiral Frank 95,

122,124Foch, Marshal Ferdinand 12Foresight, HMS. destroyer 52France 13,14,15,16,18,34,80,176

1944-45 campaign in 170-7,179and Finland 66fall of 20-2,26,34Free French 22Vichy France 22, 60

French Army 18,22troops of 24First Army 176,184Seventh Army 20II Corps 176French Expeditionary Corps 114

French fleet 34French Indochina 87French North Africa, invasion of 40,

60,60-1Furious, HMS, carrier 52

Gamelin, General Maurice 18Gazala47,48

German air force 13,14,22,26-8,28,48,52,153,162,182

German army 12,82in Poland 14,75,82in Scandinavia 16-7,82in France/Belgium, 1940 18, 20-1,

82in Yugoslavia 29in Greece 30,30inNorthAfrica42-3,44,46-8,47,

54,56-7,57,58,60,62on Eastern Front 64-5,68,70, 72-4,

76,152-6, 753,158,160,160-1,162,164

in Sicily/Italy 110-1,114,117,118,119

in North-West Europe, 1944-45170,174,176,177,178,179,180,182-3,184,184,186

troops of, in Paris 1,23Army Group North 68, 73,158Army Group Centre 68, 70,162Army Group South 68, 70,150,156Army Group A 150,156,160Army Group B 150Army Group North Ukraine 160Army Group B (France) 170,177First Pz Army 160Second Army 29,70,162Second Pz Army 76Fourth Pz Army 154Fifth Pz Army 177Sixth Army 160Seventh Army 170,174Eighth Army 160Ninth Army 154Tenth Army 112,117,119Twelfth Army 29Fourteenth Army 119Seventeenth Army 156,160,177Nineteenth Army 176First Panzer Group 29Second Panzer Group 70Third Panzer Group 74, 76Fourth Panzer Group 70Afrika Korps 46-7,47,48, 565th Light Division 4415th Panzer Division 5621st Panzer Division 48,58Waffen-SS 73

German navy 16,17,26,162Germany 85,150

Allied advance into 179,184-6,188and invasion of Russia 68,84and Versailles Treaty 80-1bombing offensive against 92,93,

168,168-9Democratic Republic of 7expansion in, 1939-42 82-4pre-war ascendancy of 6-7,13

Gurkha troops 142Gort, Field Marshal Viscount53Gothic Line 119Goto, Rear Admiral 122Great Britain

and Czechoslovakia 7,13and Finland 66and Poland 14,15and the Empire 6,7Battle of Britain 26early strategy in war 16,18prewar German rivalry with 6prewar reaction to Hitler 6,7,13

Greece 29,30,49,83Guadalcanal 95,124-5,124-5Guam 128Guderian, General Heinz 70Gustav Line 111, 112,114-5,117Guzzoni, General Alfredo 110

HalfayaPass44Halifax, Lord 6Halsey, Admiral William 130Herr, General Traugott 119Hipper, German cruiser 39Hiroshima 136Hiryu, Japanese carrier 123Hitler, Adolf 6,13,112

'Alpine Redoubt'ofl86

ambitions and aggression of 7,13,14

and Allied invasion 170,174,177and Ardennes offensive 182,183and Eastern Front 70,76,110and North Africa 48,60,84and Stalingrad 150,153and submarine warfare 34and Versailles Treaty 12,13Balkan takeover 29,30, 84cancellation of Sealion 28concern over Italy 110, 111death of 188decision to attack Russia 66,68, 84,

150military interference by 18,21, 58,

150,170,174mistakes Allies' desire for peace 16,

26'No retreat' orders 58,156replaces Kleist, Manstein 160replaces Kluger 177success in Scandinavia 16-7underestimates Russians 66, 77

Hodges, General Courtney 182,184Holland 18,20

armed forces of 21Holland, Vice-Admiral Lancelot 38Hong Kong 102,702Hood, HMS, battlecruiser 38Hornet, USS, carrier 123Horrocks, General Sir Brian 58Houston, USS, cruiser 106

lida, General 140Illustrious, HMS, carrier 49Imphal 140,143-4,145Indian troops 140,142Indomitable, HMS, carrier 52Ino, Genral Matsuichi 95Inouye, Admiral Shigeyoshi 122island-hopping strategy 91Italian air force 52Italian navy 49Italian troops 22,29,30,83,110

in Italy 119in North Africa 44,54,58,59,83on Eastern Front2-3

Italy 7,30,34,92,110,155campaign in 110-9,176

IwoJimal33,733,136

Japan 94and China 147bombing of 95,136,737prewar attitude of 7,9, 87war strategy 89,106,122,123

Japanese army 9,89,91,706,130,132,133,747

Fourteenth Army 103Fifteenth Army 107,143,144,145Twentyfifth Army 101Thirtysecond Army 134China Expeditionary Army 147m Burma 140,142,144-5

Japanese navy 89First Mobile Fleet 128

Java Sea, Battle of 106

Kamikaze attacks 131,134Karelian Isthmus 66, 72Kasserine, Battle of 62Katamura, Lieutenant General

Shihachi 145Kenya, HMS, cruiser 52Kesselring, Field Marshal Albert 60,

111,112,114,119Kharkov 156Kiev 70,74,156Kincaid, Admiral Thomas 130King George V, HMS, battleship 38Kleist, General Paul von 29,160Klopper, General 48Kluge, General Günther von 177Kobe, Japan 95Kohima 143-4,145Konev, Marshal Ivan 762,188Krueger, General Walter 130Küchler, General 158

Kuribayashi, Major GeneralTadamichi 133

Kurita, Admiral Takeo 131Kursk 92,110,154-5,755

Lake Ladoga 72,73,158Lattre de Tassigny, General Jean de

176League of Nations 12-3,66,87Leahy, Admiral W D80Leeb, General Wilhelm von 68,73Leigh-Mallory, Air Marshal Trafford

174Lemelsen, General Joachim 119Leningrad 68,70,72,73,76,77,158,

759,160Lexington, USS, carrier 99,122,123,

729Leytel30,730,131,732Leyte Gulf, Battle of 128,130-1Lithuania 80Littorio, Italian battleship 49London, air raids on 26,28Lucas, Major General John 117Lütjens, Vice-Admiral Günther 38Lützow, pocket battleship 16Luzon 103-4,131-2

MacArthur, General Douglas SO, 91,103,727,130,134

Mackensen, General 117MaginotLinel8,82Malaya 9,89,101,707,102Malta 46,49,52,52-3,54Manchester, HMS, cruiser 52Manchuria 87Mandalay 145Mannerheim, Marshal Carl von 72Mannerheim Line 66, 72Manstein, General Erich von 18,20,

156,160MaoTse-tungl47MarethLine62Marianas Islands 720-7,127,128,136Marseilles 176Marshall, General George C 147Mediterranean 49,52Meiktila 146Memel 80Merrill's Marauders 144Mersa Matruh 54Messe, Marshal Giovanni 62Midway 124

Battleof 95,123,124Mitscher, Vice-Admiral Marc 128Model, Field Marshal Walther 158,

160,162,177MonteCassinoll4,775,776,117Monterey, USS, light carrier 97Montgomery, General Sir Bernard 56,

58,55,62,110, 111, 171,177,179,180,182,188

Moscow 70,74, 74,76,77,84Mussolini, Benito, 22,30,82,110,

111,772Mutaguchi, General Renya 140,143,

144

Nagasaki 136Nagumo, Admiral Chuichi 95,100,

123Nevada, USS, battleship 100New Guinea 95,122,127New Zealand 15

armed forces of 30,114Nimitz, Admiral Chester W SO, 95,

122,123,130Nishimura, Vice-Admiral Shoji 131Norfolk, HMS, cruiser 38Normandy, landings in 92,170-1.

770-5,174,176,177,179North Africa 44-8,54-9,62-3,83

see also French North AfricaNorway 16,17,77,34Nuremberg Rally, 193473

Ohio, US tanker 52,52Okamura, General Yasuji 147Okinawa 134,735

192

Oklahoma, USS100Operation An vil 176Operation Barbarossa 68, 70,76,77,

84Operation Market Garden 180Operation Overlord 170-4,176Operation Pedestal 52Operation Sealion 26,28Operation Torch 60,60-7,62Orel 70Ozawa, Vice-AdmiralJisaburo 128,

130-1

Pacificcampaigns in 122-37prewar Japanese rivalry in 9

Paris, 1,23,81,177Patch, Lieutenant General Alexander

176Patton, General George S 110,164,

176,177,182,184Paul, Prince, of Yugoslavia 29Pearl Harbor 9, 78-9,84,87,89,89,

99-100,99-100,103,123Pennsylvania, USS 100Percival, Lieutenant General A E101Perth, HMAS, cruiser 106Pétain, Marshal Henri 22Peter, King, of Yugoslavia 29Philippine army 103Philippine Islands 9,89,103-4,127,

128,130-2Philippine Sea, Battle of 128Pola, Italian cruiser 49Poland 14-5,80,82,160,162Polish Corridor 13,80Port Moresby 95,122,127,127Pound, Admiral Sir Dudley 39Pridham-Wippell, Vice-Admiral H D

49P rince ofW ales, HMS, battleship 38Prinz Eugen, cruiser 38propaganda 85,85

Quisling, Vidkun 16

Rabaul 122,125Ramsay, Admiral Sir Bertram 174Rangoon 107,138-9,140,145Reynaud, Paul 22Rhine river 180,181,182,184,184,

186Rhineland, 13,80Ribbentrop, Joachim von, 14Rintelin, General von 110Ritchie, General N M 54Rodney, HMS, battleship 38Rokossovsky, Marshal Konstantin

162Rome708-9,117,119Rommel, General Erwin 44,44-5,46-

7,54, 56-7,60,62,170,174,177Roosevelt, President F D 80,176Rostov 70Royal Air Force 22,26,38,49,52,101,

107,168,169Royal Navy 16,22,26,38,49,134

Force H, 38,49Mediterranean Fleet 49,50-1

Rumania 30Rundstedt, Field Marshal Gerd von

21,68,170,174,177Russo-Finnish War 66,68,72

Saipan128Salerno 111Santa Cruz, Battle of 124Saratoga, USS, carrier 99Scandinavia 16Scheer, pocket battleship 39Schörner, Field Marshal Friedrich

160,162,164Scoones, General G A P143Seeckt, General Hans von 12Shaw, USS, destroyer 99Shima, Vice-Admiral K131Shoho, Japanese carrier 122Shokaku, Japanese carrier 122,128Sicily 110; 111,155

Singapore 101Slim, General Sir William 107,140,

143,144,145Smolensk 70,76, 77,156Solomon Islands 95,122,124-5,726,

127South Africa 30Soviet air force 70,154Soviet army 66,69,73,76, 77,148-9,

166-7,188,188in Finland, 66,66counter-offensive, winter 1941-42

76,77,84,154at Stalingrad 150,152-3Kursk battles 154-5advances in 1943 156relief of Leningrad 158Ukraine recovered 1601944 offensive 162liberation of Czechoslovakia 164advance to Berlin 188Second Baltic Front 158First Belorussian Front 162,168Second Belorussian Front 162First Ukrainian Front 160,162,

762,188Second Ukrainian Front 160Fourth Ukrainian Front 763Kalanin Front 77Leningrad Front 158South-West Front 70,77Steppe Front 155Trans-Caucasus Front 150Volkhov Front 158West Front 68,77Fifth Army 70Sixth Army 154Seventh Army 66Thirteenth Army 66Twentieth Army 77Forty-seventh Army 162Sixty-second Army 757

Soviet navy 77Soviet Union 7, 77,84,85,92,179,186

and Finland 66and Poland 15non-aggression pact with Germany

14supplies to 39,77,154Spencer, USS 34Stalin, Josef 14,15,68,176

Stalingrad 84,150,152-3,753Stilwell, General Joseph 107,142,

145,147Stuka di ve bomber 18,82,83Stumme, General G 58submarine warfare 34-7,39,40-1,83,

92Sudetenland 13Suffolk, HMS, cruiser 38Syfret, Vice-Admiral E N 52

Taiho, Japanese carrier 128Takagi, Vice-Admiral 122Tarante49, 111Tarawa91,133Tennessee, USS, battleship 100Tinian 128Tirpitz, battleship 39Tobruk 44,46,47,48,48,54,58Tojo, General Hideki 87Tokyo 89,133,737Tripoli, Libya 62Truscott, Major General Lucius 11

119Tulagi, Solomon Islands 95,122Tunis, Tunisia 60,62,110Turner, Rear Admiral R Kelly 124

U-boats 32-3,34-7,39,40-1,47,83Ugaki, Vice-Admiral Ma tome 128Ukraine 68,70,160,767United States 41,84,85,92

and Battle of Atlantic 36-7and China 147and Vichy France 60Japanese rivalry with 7,9,87strategy in Pacific 91,95

United States Army

in North Africa 60,60,62in Philippines 103,705in Sicily/Italy 110-2,114,117,119,

779in Far East, 745,746in North-West Europe 174,176,

177,778,179,180,787,182-4troops of 3 7,7 08 -9,145,1466 Army Group 176,180First Army 170,174,182,184,186Third Army 164,176,177,182,184,

186Fifth Army 111, 112,117,119Sixth Army 130Seventh Army 110,176,184Ninth Army 180Tenth Army 134VI Corps 117VIII Corps 182XIV Corps 125XV Corps 17782nd Airborne Division 170,180101st Airborne Division 170,180,

182,783Merrill's Marauders 744

United States Army Air Force 136,768

Eighth Air Force 168,169Twelfth Air Force 7 76Fourteenth Air Force 147

United States Marines 91,124-5,725,726,133,733

1st Marine Division 124United States Navy 34,37,91,134

Third Fleet 130Seventh Fleet 130,131Pacific Fleet 87,89,99,122,123Task Force 38 130Task Force 58128,728

Ushijima, General Mitsuru 134Utah, USS, battleship 100

Versailles Treaty 12,13,80,87Vesuvius, Mount 77 7Vietinghoff, General Heinrich von

112,119Vittorio Veneto, Italian battleship 49

Wainright, Lieutenant GeneralJonathan 103

Wake Island 99,100Warsaw 15,75,162Wavell, General Sir Archibald 30,44,

106,140,142Weichs, General M F von 150West Virginia, USS, battleship 100Weygand, General Maxime 22Wingate, Brigadier General Orde

142,742

Yamamoto, Admiral Isoroku 123Yamashita, Lieutenant General

Tomoyuki 101,707,131-2Yamato, Japanese battleship 96-7,

134,735Yorktown.VSS, carrier 122,123Yugoslavia 29,30

Zara, Italian cruiser 49Zhukov, Marshal Georgi 162,188Zuikaku, Japanese carrier 122,131

AcknowledgementsThe publishers would like to thankAdrian Hodgkins who designed thisbook and Ron Watson who compiledthe index. The following agencies andindividuals kindly supplied thephotographs.Bison Picture Library 2-3,8,9,10-

11,17,20-21,23,24 both, 40-41,42-43,47, 50-51,64-65, 72-73,73,82,83,85 (all), 87,101,102,106-107,108-109,112,116 bottom, 137right, 141,153 top, 157,149,161,181 top

Bison/IWM48Bundesarchiv l, 13,15,25,59,61,

81,178-179Crown©52,138-139Imperial War Museum 4-5,6-7,26,

28 both, 32-33,44,45,55,56-57,57,58-59,60,126 left, 134-135 bottom,148-149,155 top, 170-171,172

Novosti Press Agency 66,68,74,77,151,153 bottom, 155 bottom, 160.162,163,165,166-167,188

Peter Newark's HistoricalPictures 70-71

US Air Force 93,95,100 bottom, 115,116 top, 118,136,142,168,186

US Army 53, 80,89,118,119,127,130-131,145,146,147,178,181bottom, 183 both, 184 both

US Coast Guard 34-35,132,175-176,176

US Marine Corps 125,133US National Archives 18,30,91,

100 top,144US Naval Historical Center 96-97US Navy 36-37,78-79,99,120-121,

124,126 right, 128,129,134-135top, 137 left, 173,175

Dr Diosdado M Yap, BataanMagazine 104-105,105