[G.R. Nos. 147933-34.December 12, 2001]PUBLIC ESTATES AUTHORITY,petitioner, vs. ELPIDIO S. UY, doing business under the name and style EDISON DEVELOPMENT & CONSTRUCTION, AND THE COURT OF APPEALS,respondents.D E C I S I O NYNARES-SANTIAGO,J.:This is a petition for review of the Joint Decision dated September 25, 2000[1]and the Joint Resolution dated April 25, 2001[2]of the Court of Appeals in the consolidated cases CA-G.R. SP Nos. 59308 and 59849.Petitioner Public Estates Authority is the government agency tasked by the Bases Conversion Development Authority to develop the first-class memorial park known as the Heritage Park, located in Fort Bonifacio, Taguig, Metro Manila.On November 20, 1996, petitioner executed with respondent Elpidio S. Uy, doing business under the name and style Edison Development & Construction, a Landscaping and Construction Agreement, whereby respondent undertook to perform all landscaping works on the 105-hectare Heritage Park.The Agreement stipulated that the completion date for the landscaping job was within 450 days, commencing within 14 days after receipt by respondent from petitioner of a written notice to proceed.Due to delays, the contracted period was extended to 693 days.Among the causes of the delay was petitioners inability to deliver to respondent 45 hectares of the property for landscaping, because of the existence of squatters and a public cemetery.Respondent instituted with the Construction Industry Arbitration Commission an action, docketed as CIAC Case No. 02-2000, seeking to collect from petitioner damages arising from its delay in the delivery of the entire property for landscaping.Specifically, respondent alleged that he incurred additional rental costs for the equipment which were kept on stand-by and labor costs for the idle manpower.Likewise, the delay incurred by petitioner caused the topsoil at the original supplier to be depleted, which compelled respondent to obtain the topsoil from a farther source, thereby incurring added costs.He also claims that he had to mobilize water trucks for the plants and trees which have already been delivered at the site.Furthermore, it became necessary to construct a nursery shade to protect and preserve the young plants and trees prior to actual transplanting at the landscaped area.On May 16, 2000, the CIAC rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the Claimant ContractorELPIDIO S. UYandAwardis hereby made on its monetary claim as follows:RespondentPUBLIC ESTATES AUTHORITYis directed to pay the Claimant the following amounts:P19,604,132.06--- for the cost of idle time of equipment.2,275,721.00--- for the cost of idled manpower.6,050,165.05--- for the construction of the nursery shade net area.605,016.50--- for attorneys fees.Interest on the amount ofP6,050,165.05as cost for the construction of the nursery shade net area shall be paid at the rate of 6% per annum from the date the Complaint was filed on 12 January 2000.Interest on the total amount ofP21,879,853.06for the cost of idled manpower and equipment shall be paid at the same rate of 6% per annum from the date this Decision is promulgated.After finality of this Decision, interest at the rate of12%per annum shall be paid on the total of these 3 awards amounting toP27,930,018.11until full payment of the awarded amount shall have been made,this interim period being deemed to be at that time already a forbearance of credit (Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, et al.,243 SCRA 78 [1994];Keng Hua Paper Products Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals,286 SCRA 257 [1998];Crismina Garments, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,G.R. No. 128721, March 9, 1999).SO ORDERED.[3]Both petitioner and respondent filed petitions for review with the Court of Appeals.In CA-G.R. SP No. 59308, petitioner contested the monetary awards given by the CIAC.On the other hand, respondent filed CA-G.R. SP No. 59849, arguing that the CIAC erred in awarding a reduced amount for equipment stand-by costs and for denying his claims for additional costs for topsoil hauling and operating costs of water trucks.The two petitions were consolidated.On September 25, 2000, the Court of Appeals rendered the now assailed Joint Decision, dismissing the petitions, to wit:WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petitions in CA-G.R. SP No. 59308, entitledPublic Estates Authority v. Elpidio S. Uy, doing business under the name and style of Edison Development & Construction,and CA-G.R. SP No. 59849,Elpidio S. Uy, doing business under the name and style of Edison Development & Construction v. Public Estates Authority,are both hereby DENIED DUE COURSE and accordingly, DISMISSED, for lack of merit.Consequently, the Award/Decision issued by the Construction Industry Arbitration Commission on May 16, 2000 in CIAC Case No. 02-200, entitledElpidio S. Uy, doing business under the name and style of Edison Development & Construction v. Public Estates Authority,is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.No pronouncement as to costs.SO ORDERED.[4]Both parties filed motions for reconsideration.Subsequently, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals an Urgent Motion for Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction, seeking to enjoin the CIAC from proceeding with CIAC Case No. 03-2001, which respondent has filed.Petitioner alleged that the said case involved claims by respondent arising from the same Landscaping and Construction Agreement, subject of the cases pending with the Court of Appeals.On April 25, 2001, the Court of Appeals issued the assailed Joint Resolution, thus:WHEREFORE, the present Motion/s for Reconsideration in CA-G.R. SP No. 59308 and CA-G.R. SP No. 59849 are hereby both DENIED, for lack of merit.Accordingly, let an injunction issue permanently enjoining the Construction Industry Arbitration Commission from proceeding with CIAC Case No. 03-2001, entitledELPIDIO S. UY, doing business under the name and style of EDISON DEVELOPMENT & CONSTRUCTION v. PUBLIC ESTATES AUTHORITY and/or HONORABLE CARLOS P. DOBLE.SO ORDERED.[5]Hence, this petition for review, raising the following arguments:ITHE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN DENYING DUE COURSE PETITIONERS(SIC)PETITION FILED PURSUANT TO RULE 43 OF THE 1997 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE APPEALING THE ADVERSE DECISION OF THE CIAC A QUOIITHE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN DENYING THE HEREIN PETITIONERS MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION ON THE JOINT DECISION PROMULGATED ON SEPTEMBER 25, 2000.IIITHE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT ALLOWING THE APPEAL ON THE MERITS TO BE THRESHED OUT PURSUANT TO EXISTING LAWS AND JURISPRUDENCE ALL IN INTEREST OF DUE PROCESS,.IVTHE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DENYING PETITIONERS CLAIM FOR UNRECOUPED BALANCE IN THE 15% ADVANCE PAYMENT; UNRECOUPED BALANCE ON PRE-PAID MATERIALS, AND OVERPAYMENT BASED ON ACTUAL PAYMENT MADE AS AGAINST PHYSICAL ACCOMPLISHMENTS.VTHE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE CIAC DECISION FINDING RESPONDENT ENTITLED TO ATTORNEYS FEES IN THE AMOUNT OF P605,096.50 WHICH IS 10% OF THE AMOUNT AWARDED FOR THE CLAIM OF NURSERY SHADE CONSTRUCTION WHILE DENYING PETITIONERS COUNTERCLAIM FOR ATTORNEYS FEES.VITHE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT PETITIONERS OBLIGATION, IF ANY, HAS BEEN EFFECTIVELY EXTINGUISHED.VIITHE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT ORDERING THE RESPONDENT TO REIMBURSE THE PETITIONER THE AMOUNT OF P345,583.20 THE LATTER PAID TO THE CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY ARBITRATION COMMISSION.[6]After respondent filed its comment[7]on August 20, 2001, this Court issued a resolution dated September 3, 2001[8]requiring petitioner to file its reply within ten days from notice.Despite service of the resolution on petitioner and its counsel on October 1, 2001, no reply has been filed with this Court to date.Therefore, we dispense with the filing of petitioners reply and decide this case based on the pleadings on record.The petition is without merit.Petitioner assails the dismissal of its petition by the Court of Appeals based on a technicality,i.e.,the verification and certification of non-forum shopping was signed by its Officer-in-Charge, who did not appear to have been authorized by petitioner to represent it in the case.Petitioner moreover argues that in an earlier resolution, the First Division of the Court of Appeals gave due course to its petition.Despite this, it was the Seventeenth Division of the Court of Appeals which rendered the Joint Decision dismissing its petition.The contention is untenable.Petitioner, being a government owned and controlled corporation, can act only through its duly authorized representatives.In the case ofPremium Marble Resources, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,[9]which the Court of Appeals cited, we made it clear that in the absence of an authority from the board of directors, no person, not even the officers of the corporation, can validly bind the corporation.[10]Thus, we held in that case:We agree with the finding of public respondent Court of Appeals, that in the absence of any board resolution from its board of directors the [sic] authority to act for and in behalf of the corporation, the present action must necessary fail.The power of the corporation to sue and be sued in any court is lodged with the board of directors that exercises its corporate powers.Thus, the issue of authority and the invalidity of plaintiff-appellants subscription which is still pending, is a matter that is also addressed, considering the premises, to the sound judgment of the Securities and Exchange Commission.[11]Therefore, the Court of Appeals did not err in finding that, in view of the absence of a board resolution authorizing petitioners Officer-in-Charge to represent it in the petition, the verification and certification of non-forum shopping executed by said officer failed to satisfy the requirement of the Rules.In this connection, Rule 43, Section 7, of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure categorically provides:Effect of failure to comply with requirements.--- The failure of the petition to comply with any of the foregoing requirements regarding the payment of the docket and other lawful fees, the deposit for costs, proof of service of the petition, and the contents of and the documents which should accompany the petition shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal thereof.Anent petitioners contention that its petition had already been given due course, it is well to note that under the Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals, each case is raffled to a Justice twice --- the first raffle for completion of records and the second raffle for study and report.[12]Hence, there was nothing unusual in the fact that its petition was first raffled to the First Division of the Court of Appeals but was later decided by the Seventeenth Division thereof.Petitioners imputations of irregularity have no basis whatsoever, and can only viewed as a desperate attempt to muddle the issue by nit-picking on non-essential matters.Likewise, the giving of due course to a petition is not a guarantee that the same will be granted on its merits.Significantly, the dismissal by the Court of Appeals of the petition was based not only on its fatal procedural defect, but also on its lack of substantive merit; specifically, its failure to show that the CIAC committed gross abuse of discretion, fraud or error of law, such as to warrant the reversal of its factual findings.We have carefully gone over the decision of the CIAC in CIAC Case No. 02-2000, and we have found that it contains an exhaustive discussion of all claims and counterclaims of respondent and petitioner, respectively.More importantly, its findings are well supported by evidence which are properly referred to in the record.In all, we have found no ground to disturb the decision of the CIAC, especially since it possesses the required expertise in the field of construction arbitration.It is well settled that findings of fact of administrative agencies and quasi-judicial bodies, which have acquired expertise because their jurisdiction is confined to specific matters, are generally accorded not only respect, but finality when affirmed by the Court of Appeals.[13]Thus, we affirm the factual findings and conclusions of the CIAC as regards the arbitral awards to respondent.The records clearly show that these are amply supported by substantial evidence.Coming now to petitioners counterclaims, we find that the CIAC painstakingly sifted through the records to discuss these, despite its initial observation that petitioner absolutely omitted to make any arguments to substantiate the same.[14]As far as the unrecouped balance on prepaid materials are concerned, the CIAC found:The Arbitral Tribunal finds the evidence adduced by the Respondents (petitioner herein) sorely lacking to establish this counterclaim.The affidavit of Mr. Jaime Millan touched on this matter by merely stating this additional claim a)Unrecouped balance on prepaid materials amounting to P45,372,589.85.No further elaboration was made of this bare statement.The affidavit of Mr. Roigelio A. Cantoria merely states that as Senior Accountant, it was he who prepared the computation for the recoupment of prepaid materials and advance payment marked as Annex Bof RespondentsCompliance/Submissiondated 16 March 2000.Examination of that single page document shows that for the 2ndBilling, the amount of P32,695,138.86 was 75%Prepaid for some unspecified Materials on Hand. The rest of the other items were payments fortrees and shrubs, RCP, Baluster & Cons. Paver, and GFRC (Baluster)in various amounts taken from other billings.The billings themselves have not been introduced in evidence.No testimonial evidence was also offered to explain how these computations were made, if only to explain the meaning of those terms above-quoted and why the recoupment of amounts of the various billings were generally much lower than the payment for materials.As stated at the outset of the discussion of these additional claims,it is not the burden of this Tribunal to dig into the haystack to look for the proverbial needle to support these counterclaims.[15]On the other hand, we find that the CIAC correctly deferred determination of the counterclaim for unrecouped balance on the advance payment.It explained that the amount of this claim is determined by deducting from respondents progress billing a proportionate amount equal to the percentage of work accomplished.However, this could not be done since petitioner terminated the construction contract.At the time the CIAC rendered its decision, the issue of the validity of the termination was still pending determination by the Regional Trial Court of Paraaque.Thus, in view of the non-fulfillment of that precondition to the grant of petitioners counterclaim, the CIAC deferred resolution of the same.[16]In the case at bar, petitioner still failed to show that its termination of the construction contract was upheld by the court as valid.Anent petitioners claim for attorneys fees, suffice it to state that it was represented by the Government Corporate Counsel in the proceedings before the CIAC.Attorney's fees are in the nature of actual damages, which must be duly proved.[17]Petitioner failed to show with convincing evidence that it incurred attorneys fees.Petitioner further argues that its liability to respondent has been extinguished by novation when it assigned and turned over all its contracted works at the Heritage Park to the Heritage Park Management Corporation.[18]This, however, can not bind respondent, who was not a party to the assignment.Moreover, it has not been shown that respondent gave his consent to the turn-over.Article 1293 of the Civil Code expressly provides:Novation which consists in substituting a new debtor in the place of the original one, may be made even without the knowledge or against the will of the latter,but not without the consent of the creditor.Payment by the new debtor gives him the rights mentioned in articles 1236 and 1237.(emphasis ours)Lastly, petitioner argues that respondent should reimburse to it all fees paid to the CIAC by reason of the case.To be sure, this contention is based on the premise that the suit filed by respondent was unwarranted and without legal and factual basis.But as shown in the CIAC decision, this was not so.In fact, respondent was adjudged entitled to the arbitral awards made by the CIAC.These awards have been sustained by the Court of Appeals, and now by this Court.It appears that there is a pending motion to consolidate the instant petition with G.R. No. 147925-26, filed by respondent.Considering, however, that the instant petition has no merit, the motion for consolidation is rendered also without merit, as there will be no more petition to consolidate with the said case.Hence, the motion to consolidate filed in this case must be denied.However, in order not to prejudice the deliberations of the Courts Second Division in G.R. No. 147925-26, it should be stated that the findings made in this case, especially as regards the correctness of the findings of the CIAC, are limited to the arbitral awards granted to respondent Elpidio S. Uy and to the denial of the counterclaims of petitioner Public Estates Authority.Our decision in this case does not affect the other claims of respondent Uy which were not granted by the CIAC in its questioned decision, the merits of which were not submitted to us for determination in the instant petition.WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition for review is DENIED.The Motion to Consolidate this petition with G.R. No. 147925-26 is also DENIED.SO ORDERED.G.R. No. 147989 February 20, 2006ROLANDO CLAVECILLA,Petitioner,vs.TERESITO QUITAIN and RICO QUITAIN, et al.,Respondents.D E C I S I O NAUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,J.:Before this Court is a petition for review oncertiorariassailing the Resolution1of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated October 5, 2000 which dismissed Rolando Clavecillas petition on the ground that the verification and certification of non-forum shopping was signed by counsel without the proper authority from petitioner, as well as the Resolution dated March 28, 20012which denied petitioners motion for reconsideration.The facts are as follows:Teresito and Rico Quitain (Quitains) filed on March 7, 1997, a complaint against Rolando Clavecilla (Clavecilla) before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 6, Davao City (MTCC) for the enforcement of the amicable settlement entered into by them on August 19, 1996 before theLupon Tagapamayapa, BarangayTalomo, Davao. Pertinent portions of said settlement reads:1. That the respondent (Clavecilla) agreed to purchase the property on October 15, 1996.2. Failure to pay the property on the said date the respondent will voluntarily vacate the place with the assistance of five thousand (P5,000.00) pesos only.3. The complainant (Rico Quitain) agreed to the demand of the respondent.3The Quitains alleged that Clavecilla failed to pay the amount agreed upon and six months had already passed since the agreement was entered into and yet Clavecilla has still not left the premises.4Clavecilla answered that the August 19, 1996 agreement was no longer enforceable since it was novated by an agreement dated October 29, 1996.5Said agreement reads:x x x1. That both parties agreed to meet again on Nov. 5, 1996 at the Barangay for another round of talk (sic).2. That on Nov. 5, 1996 the respondent will pay the 50% total amount of the selling price of the said lot, 111 sq.m. more or less located at Lot 1989-A being a portion of Lot 1989 (T.C.T. # T-6615) at Talomo proper.3. Price per sq.m.P1,000.00 only.4. Failure to accomplished (sic) this Nov. 5, 1996 requirement, the respondent will voluntarily vacate the said lot with aP5,000.00 assistance for their effort.5. All agreement is final upon signing.6x x xClavecilla claims that on November 5, 1996, he appeared at thebarangayand was supposed to pay Quitains the 50% price of the lot in question but they were not present.7Rico Quitain asserts however that he was present that day as shown by a certification made by the office of theluponof saidbarangay.8On March 8, 2000, the MTCC rendered its Decision in favor of the Quitains finding that there was no novation, as the October 29, 1996 was not incompatible with the August 19, 1996 agreement but was only a reiteration of the earlier agreement.9Clavecilla filed a notice of appeal.10On June 20, 2000, the Regional Trial Court of Davao City, Branch 33 (RTC) dismissed the appeal for Clavecillas failure to file the memorandum on appeal within the period prescribed by the Rules.11Clavecilla filed a Motion for Reconsideration and For Leave of Court to Admit Appeal Memorandum claiming that his counsel was not able to file the memorandum on appeal on time since said counsel was diagnosed with pneumonia and had to rest for more than ten days.12Clavecilla then filed an Appeal Memorandum claiming that the MTCC erred in rendering judgment against him since he did not sign the agreement but it was his wife Erlinda who signed the same without authority from him.13On July 5, 2000, the RTC denied Clavecillas motion stating that the reason advanced by Clavecillas counsel for his failure to file the appeal memorandum on time is not a compelling reason, and even if such memorandum was given due course, the arguments raised by Clavecilla therein are not sufficient to justify a reversal of the Decision of the lower court.14Petitioner filed another motion for reconsideration dated July 21, 2000 which was denied by the RTC on the same day.15On September 13, 2000, petitioner filed a petition for review under Rule 42 of the Rules of Court with the CA which rendered the herein assailed Resolution on October 5, 2000 thus:The Verification and Certification of non-forum shopping, which accompanied the petition at bench, was executed and signed by petitioners counsel Atty. Oswaldo A. Macadangdang, without the proper authority from petitioner, in violation of Sec. 5, Rule 7 and Sec. 2, Rule 42 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. The duty to certify under oath is strictly addressed to petitioner, Rolando Clavecilla. To allow delegation of said duty to anyone would render Revised Circular No. 28-91 inutile.16x x xx x x xAccordingly, the Court Resolves toDENY DUE COURSEand toDISMISSthe petition.SO ORDERED.17Petitioners motion for reconsideration was also denied on March 28, 2001 as follows:Petitioner moves for the reconsideration of our Resolution dated 05 October 2000 dismissing the petition for the reason that the certificate of non-forum shopping was signed by petitioners counsel and not by the petitioner.1avvphil.netAdmitting that the duty to sign under oath the certificate is addressed to the petitioner, petitioner attached to his motion a Special Power of Attorney dated 09 August 2000 authorizing his counsel to sign the certificate. The court believes that this authorization was made after the petition had been filed, in a vain attempt to cure the fatal defect, for if Atty. Maca[d]angdang had such authority, he would have indicated that in the Verification and Certification he signed on 25 August 2000 attached to the petition.In any event, it is a settled rule that the certificate against forum shopping must be executed by the petitioner and not by counsel. xxx To merit the Courts Consideration, petitioner must show reasonable cause for failure to personally sign the certification. x x x This petitioner failed to show. (citations omitted)WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED for lack of merit.SO ORDERED.18Hence, the present petition alleging that:THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DEPARTING FROM THE ACCEPTED JURISPRUDENCE OF ALLOWING LIBERAL INTERPRETATION OF THE RULES OF COURT PROVIDED PETITIONER SUBSTANTIALLY COMPLIED WITH CIRCULAR NO. 28-91 AS SHOWN IN THE SPECIAL POWER OF ATTORNEY WHICH HE ATTACHED TO HIS MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION.19Petitioner avers that: his lawyer had the authority to sign the certification against forum shopping; the CA was hasty in concluding that the authorization of petitioners lawyer was made after the petition had been filed; the CA should have granted petitioner the benefit of the doubt that he gave such authorization to his lawyer at the time that his lawyer signed the verification and certification against forum shopping; petitioners failure to have a properly executed certification against forum shopping attached to his petition for review is not fatal; the rules of procedure are used only to help secure and not override substantial justice, and the CA departed from the established liberal interpretation of the rules despite petitioners substantial compliance with the rule on non-forum shopping.20Rico Quitain in his Comment countered that: the petition is not sufficient in form and substance and is utterly deficient in factual and procedural bases; petitioner named "Teresito Quitain, Rico Quitain, et al." as respondents without specifying who "et al." referred to; Teresito Quitain is already deceased and the MTCC as early as June 5, 1998 already ordered Teresitos substitution; the spouse and children of Teresito, to wit, Lolita, Rene, Ruel, Radi and Romy, all surnamed Quitain, have the right to be informed of the filing of the petition and the fact that they were not so specifically named as respondents but were referred to as "et al." makes the petition a sham pleading; petitioner failed to attach certified true copies of the MTCC Decision dated March 8, 2000 and the RTC Order dated July 5, 2000 which should have been included as annexes in the present petition as they are material to the case, and the petition does not allege a good and valid defense which, if appreciated, could probably cause the reversal of the July 5, 2000 and March 8, 2000 issuances.21The parties filed their respective Memoranda reiterating their respective contentions.22After evaluating the records of the case and the issues raised by the parties, the Court finds that the CA did not err in denying the petition and motion for reconsideration filed by Clavecilla before it. The Court however finds different grounds for denying Clavecillas petition.First, it must be determined whether there existed a special power of attorney in favor of petitioners counsel when the petition before the CA was filed.The CA in its Resolution dated March 28, 2001, stated that it believes that the special power of attorney in favor of the lawyer attached to petitioners motion for reconsideration was only made after the petition had been filed reasoning that if the counsel had such authority from the beginning, he would have attached the same when the petition was first filed.The Court disagrees.The rule is that any suspicion on the authenticity and due execution of the special power of attorney which is a notarized document, thus a public document, cannot stand against the presumption of regularity in their favor absent evidence that is clear, convincing and more than merely preponderant.23In this case, the petition before the CA was filed on September 13, 2000.24The special power of attorney meanwhile was dated August 9, 2000.25Absent any proof that the special power of attorney was not actually in existence before the petition was filed, this Court has no recourse but to believe that it was indeed in existence at such time.The next matter to be determined is whether the CA was correct in dismissing Clavecillas petition and motion for reconsideration, notwithstanding the authority given by Clavecilla in favor of his lawyer to sign the verification and certification in his behalf.The Court answers in the affirmative.Obedience to the requirements of procedural rules is needed if we are to expect fair results therefrom, and utter disregard of the rules cannot justly be rationalized by harking on the policy of liberal construction.26Time and again, this Court has strictly enforced the requirement of verification and certification of non-forum shopping under the Rules of Court.27This case is no exception.Verification is required to secure an assurance that the allegations of the petition have been made in good faith, or are true and correct and not merely speculative.28In this case, petitioners counsel signed the verification alleging that he had read the petition and the contents thereof are true and correct of his own "knowledge and belief."29On this ground alone, the petition should already be dismissed for as provided for in Section 4 Rule 7 of the Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 00-2-10-SC dated May 1, 2000:Sec. 4.Verification. ---xxxA pleading is verified by an affidavit that the affiant has read the pleading and that the allegations therein are true and correct of his personal knowledge or based on authentic records.1avvphil.netA pleading required to be verified which contains a verification based on "information and belief," or upon "knowledge, information and belief," or lacks a proper verification, shall be treated as an unsigned pleading.While the Court has exercised leniency in cases where the lapse in observing the rules was committed when the rules have just recently taken effect,30the attendant circumstances in this case however do not warrant such leniency.1avvphil.netThe certification against forum shopping in this case was signed by petitioners counsel despite the clear requirement of the law that petitioners themselves must sign the certification. The certification must be made by petitioner himself and not by counsel, since it is petitioner who is in the best position to know whether he has previously commenced any similar action involving the same issues in any other tribunal or agency.31And the lack of a certification against forum shopping, unlike that of verification, is generally not cured by its submission after the filing of the petition.32As explained by this Court inGutierrez v. Sec. of Dept. of Labor and Employment:33x x x [T]he certification (against forum shopping) must be signed by the plaintiff or any of the principal parties and not by the attorney. For such certification is a peculiar personal representation on the part of the principal party, an assurance given to the court or other tribunal that there are no other pending cases involving basically the same parties, issues and causes of action.x x x Obviously it is the petitioner, and not always the counsel whose professional services have been retained for a particular case, who is in the best position to know whether he or it actually filed or caused the filing of a petition in that case. Hence, a certification against forum shopping by counsel is a defective certification.34InMariveles Shipyard Corp. v. Court of Appeals,35this Court further elucidated that:x x xIn the case of natural persons, the Rule requires the parties themselves to sign the certificate of non-forum shopping.x x x [I]n the case of the corporations, the physical act of signing may be performed, on behalf of the corporate entity, only by specifically authorized individuals for the simple reason that corporations, as artificial persons, cannot personally do the task themselves.36(emphasis supplied)In the case ofSantos v. Court of Appeals,37the Court further clarified, that even with a special power of attorney executed by the petitioners in favor of their counsel to sign the certification on their behalf, still the rule stands. Thus:We are aware of our ruling inBA Savings Bank v. Siathat a certification against forum shopping may be signed by an authorized lawyer who has personal knowledge of the facts required to be disclosed in such document. However,BA Savings Bankmust be distinguished from the case at bar because in the former, the complainant was a corporation, and hence, a juridical person. Therefore, that case made an exception to the general rule that the certification must be made by the petitioner himself since a corporation can only act through natural persons. In fact, physical actions, e.g., signing and delivery of documents, may be performed on behalf of the corporate entity only by specifically authorized individuals.In the instant case, petitioners are all natural persons and there is no showing of any reasonable cause to justify their failure to personally sign the certification. It is noteworthy that PEPSI in its Comment stated that it was petitioners themselves who executed the verification and certification requirements in all their previous pleadings. Counsel for petitioners argues that as a matter of policy, aSpecial Power of Attorneyis executed to promptly and effectively meet any contingency relative to the handling of a case. This argument only weakens their position sinceit is clear that at the outset no justifiable reason yet existed for counsel to substitute petitioners in signing the certification. In fact, in the case of natural persons, this policy serves no legal purpose. Convenience cannot be made the basis for a circumvention of the Rules.38(emphasis supplied)While there are cases when the Court has relaxed the rule requiring that in case of a natural person, he shall personally sign the non-forum shopping certification, in such cases the Court found compelling and justifiable reasons to relax observance of the rules.InDonato v. Court of Appeals39andWee v. Galvez40the Court noted that the petitioners were already in the United States, thus the signing of the certification by their authorized representatives was deemed sufficient compliance with the rules. InOrbeta v. Sendiong41the Court found that the annulment of judgment filed by the parties was meritorious thus the certification signed by the daughter of petitioner who had a general power of attorney in her favor was deemed sufficient. InSy Chin v. Court of Appeals42the Court also upheld substantial justice and ruled that the failure of the parties to sign the certification may be overlooked as the parties case was meritorious.No such justifiable or compelling reasons exist in the case at bar.In this case, petitioner did not present any cause for his failure to personally sign the certification against forum shopping at the time that the petition was filed at the CA. He merely acknowledged in his motion for reconsideration of the October 5, 2000 Resolution of the CA that he "has the duty to certify under oath."43He then asked for a reconsideration of the said Resolution and attached a Special Power of Attorney executed by him in favor of his lawyer.44There is also no showing that there is substantial merit in petitioners claims. In his petition before the CA and in his Appeal Memorandum filed with the RTC, petitioner argues that he is not a party to the amicable settlement as it was his wife who signed the same without authority from him.45Petitioner in his Answer however admitted having entered into an agreement with the Quitains, before theluponof theirbarangayon August 19, 1996.46Petitioner also claims that the August 19, 1996 agreement was novated by the one dated October 29, 1996. The claim has no merit.Novation cannot be presumed but must be clearly shown either by the express assent of the parties or by the complete incompatibility between the old and the new agreements.47In this case, the October 29, 1996 agreement merely held that the parties shall meet again on November 5, 1996 at which time petitioner shall pay 50% of the purchase price or he will vacate the property. His obligation to pay the purchase price or to vacate the property in case of his failure to do so, still exists and was not extinguished by the October 29, 1996 agreement.Records also show that Rico Quitain was ready to comply with his part of the agreement as he was present at thebarangayon November 5, 1996 to receive the payment from Clavecilla.48Quitain also consigned the amount ofP5,000.00 to the court, which is the amount he agreed to give Clavecilla to assist him and his family when they leave the property.49As correctly pointed out by the RTC, even if petitioners appeal was allowed to proceed, still the arguments raised are not sufficient to overturn the ruling of the MTCC.It is also worth mentioning that the petitioner erred in including the name of Teresito in the caption of the petition and using only the phrase "et al." to refer to the heirs who substituted him after his death. As pointed out by respondent Rico Quitain, Teresito is already deceased and was already substituted by his heirs, namely: Lolita, widow of Teresito, Rene, Ruel, Radi, and Romy, sons of Teresito, in the Order of the MTCC dated June 5, 1998.50Consequently, the above-named heirs are deemed co-respondents in the present petition.WHEREFORE, the petition isDENIEDfor lack of merit. Costs against petitioner.SO ORDERED.G.R. No. 146459 June 8, 2006HEIRS OF DICMAN, namely: ERNESTO DICMAN, PAUL DICMAN, FLORENCE DICMAN FELICIANO TORRES, EMILY TORRES, TOMASITO TORRES and HEIRS OF CRISTINA ALAWAS and BABING COSIL,*Petitioners,vs.JOSE CARIO and COURT OF APPEALS,Respondents.D E C I S I O NAUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,J.:This refers to the petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court questioning the Decision1dated June 30, 2000 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 33731, which affirmed in toto the Decision dated November 28, 1990 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 7 (Baguio City), La Trinidad, Benguet; and the CA Resolution dated December 15, 2000 which denied the petitioners motion for reconsideration.The petition originated from an action for recovery of possession of the eastern half of a parcel of land situated in Residence Section "J", Camp Seven, Baguio City, consisting of 101,006 square meters, more or less, and identified as Lot 46, Ts-39, Plan SWO-37115.2The antecedent facts are clear:The subject land, at the turn of the 20th century, had been part of the land claim of Mateo Cario. Within this site, a sawmill and other buildings had been constructed by H.C. Heald in connection with his lumber business. On March 14, 1916, H.C. Heald sold the buildings to Sioco Cario, son of Mateo Cario and grandfather of private respondent Jose Cario. Sioco Cario then took possession of the buildings and the land on which the buildings were situated.Ting-el Dicman,3predecessor-in-interest of the petitioners, namely, Ernesto Dicman, Paul Dicman, Florence Dicman, Babing Cosil, Feliciano Torres, Cristina Alawas, Emily Torres and Tomasito Torres, and resident of Atab, a sitio within the City of Baguio but located at some distance from the land in controversy, had been employed by Sioco Cario as his cattle herder. On the advice of his lawyers, and because there were already many parcels of land recorded in his name,4Sioco Cario caused the survey of the land in controversy in the name of Ting-el Dicman.On October 22, 1928, Ting-el Dicman executed a public instrument entitled "Deed of Conveyance of Part Rights and Interests in Agricultural Land" with Sioco Cario. The deed reads:DEED OF CONVEYANCE OF PART RIGHTS ANDINTERESTS IN AGRICULTURAL LAND.KNOW ALL PERSONS BY THESE PRESENTS:That I, Ting-el Diac-man, of legal age, widower, and resident of the sitio known as "Atab", near Camp Seven, City of Baguio, Philippine Islands, DO HEREBY STATE, viz: That I am the applicant for a free-patent of a parcel of land (public), having a surface of over ten (10) hectares, surveyed by the District Land Office of Baguio for me, and located in the place known as Camp Seven, Baguio;That to-date I have not as yet received the plan for said survey;That Mr. Sioco Cario has advanced all expenses for said survey for me and in my name, and also all other expenses for the improvement of said land, to date;That for and in consideration of said advance expenses, to me made and delivered by said Mr. Sioco Cario, I hereby pledge and promise to convey, deliver and transfer unto said Sioco Cario, of legal age, married to Guilata Acop, and resident of Baguio, P.I., his heirs and assigns, one half (1/2) of my title, rights, and interest to and in the aforesaid parcel of land; same to be delivered, conveyed and transferred in a final form, according to law, to him, his heirs and assigns, by me, my heirs, and assigns, as soon as title for the same is issued to me by proper authorities.That this conveyance, transfer, or assignment, notwithstanding its temporary nature, shall have legal force and effect; once it is approved by the approving authorities all the final papers and documents, this instrument shall be considered superseded.After I have received my title to said parcel of land I bind myself, my heirs and assigns, to execute the final papers and forward same for approval of the competent authorities at Mr. Sioco Carios expense.WITNESS MY HAND in the City of Baguio, P.I., this, the 22nd day of October, 1928, A.D.his right thumbmark5TING-EL DIAC-MANAfter the execution of the foregoing deed, Sioco Cario, who had been in possession of the land in controversy since 1916, continued to stay thereon.On January 10, 1938, Sioco Cario executed, as seller, a public instrument entitled "Deed of Absolute Sale" covering the subject land and its improvements with his son, Guzman Cario, as buyer. The contract states in part:x x x for and in consideration of the sum of ONE PESO (P 1.00) Philippine Currency and other valuable considerations which I had received from my son, Guzman A. Cario x x x have ceded, transferred and conveyed as by these presents do hereby cede, convey and transfer unto the [sic] said Guzman A. Cario, his heirs, executors, administrators and assigns, all my rights, title, interests in and participation to that parcel of land (public) covered by an application for free patent with a surface area of Ten (10) hectares, surveyed by the District Land Office of Baguio in the name of Pingel Dicman, and who ceded, conveyed and transferred one half of his title, rights and interests to me under an instrument executed by the said owner in the city of Baguio, Philippines, on the 22nd day of October, 1928 A.D. and duly ratified before Notary Public x x x together with all improvements therein, consisting of oranges, mangoes, and other fruit trees and a building of strong materials (half finished) x x x, which building was purchased by me from H.C. Heald on March 14, 1916, free from all liens and encumbrances, with full rights and authority to the said Guzman A. Cario to perfect his claim with any government agency the proper issuance of such patent or title as may be permitted to him under existing laws.x x x x6In a letter dated January 15, 1938, Sioco Cario asked his son, Guzman Cario, who had been doing business in Damortis, Sto. Tomas, La Union, to take possession of the subject land and building.7Guzman Cario moved to Baguio as requested and occupied the property. Evidence was adduced in the RTC to the effect that Guzman Cario took possession of the property publicly, peacefully, and in the concept of owner: the directory of Baguio Telephones published in October 1940 lists the residence of Guzman A. Cario at Camp 7, Baguio City, along with his telephone number; pictures were taken of him and his family, including the private respondent who was then an infant, depicting the property in the background; U.S. Army authorities obtained permission from Guzman Cario to use a part of the land in question after the war; he introduced various improvements on the property over the years and exercised acts of ownership over them; he permitted the use of portions of the land to Governor Eulogio Rodriguez, Jr. and the Boy Scouts of Rizal Province; he leased out portions of the land to Bayani Pictures, Inc.; and his neighbors confirmed the possession and occupation over the property of Guzman Cario and, after him, his son, herein private respondent Jose Cario. These findings of fact were either confirmed or uncontroverted by the CA.8On July 27, 1954, Guzman Cario had the entire Lot 46 resurveyed so as to indicate the half portion that belonged to him and the other half that belonged to the petitioners. The resurvey evenly divided the lot into Lot 76-A and 76-B, and purportedly indicated that Lot 76-A, consisting of 50,953 square meters, belonged to the petitioners, while Lot 76-B, also consisting of 50,953 square meters, formerly pertained to Sioco Cario and, later, to Guzman Cario. Additionally, the resurvey indicated the house where private respondent Jose Cario resided and, before him, where his predecessors-in-interest, Sioco and Guzman Cario, also resided.On May 23, 1955, Guzman Cario filed a Free Patent Application over the land in question. The application was given due course, but Guzman later withdrew it when he decided to file his opposition to the petition later filed by the heirs of Ting-el Dicman. This petition, entitled "Petition of the Heirs of Dicman to Reopen Civil Reservation Case No. 1, G.L.R.O. 211," was filed by Felipe Dicman, Bobing Dicman and Cating Dicman, in their capacity as compulsory heirs of Ting-el Dicman on April 24, 1959 with the Court of First Instance of Baguio. The petition sought to establish ownership over Lot 76-A and Lot 76-B which, taken together, covered an area of 10.1006 hectares. Guzman Cario opposed the petition insofar as he insisted ownership over Lot 76-B, the land in controversy. The Estate of Sioco Cario likewise filed an opposition.On March 6, 1963, the trial court rendered a partial judgment and confirmed that the title over Lot 76-A belonged to the heirs of Ting-el Dicman, there having been no adverse claim. But as to Lot 76-B, the trial court found it necessary to hold further hearing in order to decide on the adverse claims of the parties.Meanwhile, on January 8, 1960, while the foregoing petition was pending in the trial court, President Carlos P. Garcia issued Proclamation No. 628 "excluding from the operation of the Baguio Townsite Reservation certain parcels of public land known as Igorot Claims situated in the City of Baguio and declaring the same open to disposition under the provisions of Chapter VII of the Public Land Act." The Proclamation further provided that the "Igorot Claims" enumerated therein shall be "subject to the condition that except in favor of the government or any of its branches, units, or institutions, lands acquired by virtue of this proclamation shall not be encumbered or alienated within a period of fifteen years from and after the date of issuance of patent." One such claim pertained to the "Heirs of Dicman," to wit:Name Lot No. Survey Plan Residence Section Area (Sq.m.)Heirs of 46 Swo-37115 "J" 101,006DicmanBefore the trial court could dispose of the case, the Supreme Court promulgated Republic v. Marcos9which held that Courts of First Instance of Baguio have no jurisdiction to reopen judicial proceedings on the basis of Republic Act No. 931. As a consequence, on July 28, 1978, the trial court dismissed the petition to reopen Civil Reservation Case No. 1, G.L.R.O. 211 insofar as Lot 76-B was concerned, and the certificate of title issued pursuant to the partial decision involving Lot 76-A was invalidated. The trial court stated that the remedy for those who were issued titles was to file a petition for revalidation under Presidential Decree No. 1271, as amended by Presidential Decrees No. 1311 and 2034.After the dismissal of the case, Guzman Cario was left undisturbed in his possession of the subject property until his death on August 19, 1982. His remains are buried on the land in question, next to the large house purchased in 1916 by his father, Sioco Cario (the grandfather of private respondent), from H.C. Heald. Guzmans widow and son, private respondent Jose Sioco C. Cario, continued possession of the subject property.10On April 20, 1983, petitioners, suing as compulsory heirs of Ting-el Dicman, revived the foregoing case by filing a complaint for recovery of possession with damages involving the subject property with the RTC, docketed as Civil Case No. 59-R. As earlier stated, petitioners, then complainants, originally sought to recover possession of the eastern half of the parcel of land situated in Residence Section "J", Camp Seven, Baguio City, consisting of 101,006 square meters, more or less, and identified as Lot 46, Ts-39, Plan SWO-37115.Petitioners, then plaintiffs, averred in their complaint:10. That however, this Honorable Court was not able to decide the [ ] petition for reopening as far as the remaining eastern half portion of the above-described property is concerned due to the fact that the said petition was dismissed for alleged lack of jurisdiction; x x x11. That because of the above-mentioned dismissal, the conflict between herein plaintiffs and defendant over the half eastern portion of the above-described property which was one of the issues supposed to be decided in the said judicial reopening case remains undecided;12. That after the dismissal of the abovementioned petition and before the dispute between herein plaintiffs and defendant over the eastern half portion of the above-described property, defendant unlawfully and illegally continue to occupy portion [sic] of the above-described property to the clear damage and prejudice of herein plaintiffs;13. That the defendant has no valid claim of ownership and possession over any of the portions of the above-described property;14. That plaintiffs and their predecessors-in-interest have been religiously paying the realty taxes covering the above-described property x x x11Private respondent Jose Cario filed his answer and prayed for dismissal. He alleged that his predecessors-in-interest had acquired the land by onerous title through the "Deed of Absolute Sale" dated January 10, 1938 executed by his grandfather, Sioco Cario, as seller, and his father, Guzman Cario, as buyer; that the property was earlier acquired by Sioco Cario by virtue of the "Deed of Conveyance of Part Rights and Interests in Agricultural Land" dated October 22, 1928 executed between Sioco Cario and Ting-el Dicman; and that he has been in possession of the subject property for 55 years peacefully, in good faith, and in concept of owner and therefore perfected title over the same through acquisitive prescription.On June 13, 1983, the administratrix of the Estate of Sioco Cario filed a motion to intervene with the RTC. On July 1, 1983, the RTC granted said motion. On July 11, 1983, the Estate of Sioco Cario filed its Complaint-in-Intervention, praying for quieting of title among the adverse claimants.The RTC, through an ocular inspection on February 15, 1984, found that the larger building still stands on the land in controversy and, together with the surrounding area, constituted the residence and was in the possession of private respondent and his family.On November 28, 1990, the RTC rendered its decision in favor of private respondent, the dispositive portion of which states:IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:1. Plaintiffs complaint is hereby DISMISSED;2. Plaintiffs-Intervenors complaint-in-intervention is hereby dismissed;3. Defendant is hereby declared the lawful possessor and as the party who has the better right over the land subject matter [sic] of this action and as such he may apply for the confirmation of his title thereto in accordance with law (R.A. No. 894012)[.] Defendants counterclaim is dismissed;4. Costs is [sic] adjudged against the plaintiff and plaintiff-intervenor.SO ORDERED.To support its ruling, the RTC found that the tax declarations and their revisions submitted as evidence by the petitioners made no reference to the land in question;13that no tax declaration over the land declared in the name of the Estate of Sioco Cario had been submitted as evidence, and that the intervenor-estate presented tax declarations over the building only; that it was Guzman Cario alone who declared for taxation purposes both the land and the improvements thereon in his name;14that there is no evidence to theeffect that petitioners ever filed any action to challenge the validity of the "Deed of Conveyance of Part Rights and Interests in Agricultural Land" dated October 22, 1928; that even assuming that this instrument may be invalid for whatever reason, the fact remains that Sioco Cario and his successors-in-interest had been in possession of the subject property publicly, adversely, continuously and in concept of owner for at least 55 years before the filing of the action;15that Siocos successor, Guzman Cario, had been in open and continuous possession of the property in good faith and in the concept of owner from 1938 until his death in 1982 and, hence, the Estate of Sioco Cario has lost all rights to recover possession from Guzman Cario or his heirs and assigns; and that although the Estate of Sioco Cario attempted to assail the genuineness and due execution of the "Deed of Absolute Sale" dated January 10, 1938 executed by Sioco Cario in favor of his son, Guzman Cario, the challenge failed since no evidence had been adduced to support the allegation of forgery.16On January 23, 1991, petitioners seasonably filed their notice of appeal. The RTC, however, denied the motion for reconsideration and motion to admit appeal filed by the Estate of Sioco Cario on July 3, 1991 for being filed out of time.Petitioners raised the following issues before the Court of Appeals:1. THE HONORABLE TRIAL COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING THE DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE OF THE PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS AND THE STRAIGHTFORWARD DECLARATIONS OF THEIR WITNESS.2. THE HONORABLE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONSIDERING THE DEED OF CONVEYANCE [OF] PART RIGHTS AND INTERESTS IN AGRICULTURAL LAND EXECUTED BY DICMAN IN FAVOR OF SIOCO CARIO DESPITE ITS NULLITY.3. THE HONORABLE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DECLARING DEFENDANT-APPELLEE TO HAVE A BETTER RIGHT TO THE PROPERTY IN DISPUTE.4. THE HONORABLE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT AND NOT GRANTING THE RELIEFS PRAYED FOR THEREIN.On June 30, 2000, the CA dismissed the petition and affirmed in toto the ruling of the RTC. On December 15, 2000, the CA issued a Resolution denying petitioners motion for reconsideration.The CA based its ruling on the following reasons: that the petitioners raised for the first time on appeal the issue on whether the "Deed of Conveyance of Part Rights and Interests in Agricultural Land" is void ab initio under Sections 145 and 146 of the Administrative Code of Mindanao and Sulu17(which was made applicable later to the Mountain Province and Nueva Viscaya by Act 2798, as amended by Act 2913, and then to all other cultural minorities found within the national territory by virtue of Section 120 of the Public Land Act18) and, hence, cannot be considered by the reviewing court;19that, even if this issue were considered, the records fail to show that Ting-el Dicman, though an Igorot, is a non-Christian and, hence, the foregoing laws are not applicable;20that there was sufficient proof of consideration for the said deed;21and that even if the deed were a mere contract to sell and not an absolute sale, under Borromeo v. Franco22the obligation on the part of the purchaser to perfect the title papers within a certain time is not a condition subsequent nor essential to the obligation to sell, but rather the same is an incidental undertaking the failure to comply therewith not being a bar to the sale agreed upon.23On February 12, 2001, petitioners, through newly retained counsel, filed their petition for review oncertiorariunder Rule 45.Petitioners raise the following grounds for the petition:A.THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT THE PROVISIONS OF ACT NO. 2798 ARE NOT APPLICABLE TO THE "DEED OF CONVEYANCE" EXECUTED BY PING-EL DICMAN ON THE GROUNDS THAT THERE IS NO PROOF THAT HE WAS A NON-CHRISTIAN AND THAT BAGUIO CITY IS NOT COVERED BY THE SAID ACT.B.THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN THE APPLICATION OF THE RULING IN BORROMEO V. FRANCO (5 PHIL 49 [1905]) THAT AN AGREEMENT ON THE PART OF THE PARTY TO A CONTRACT TO PERFECT THE TITLE PAPERS TO A CERTAIN PROPERTY WITHIN A CERTAIN TIME IS NOT A CONDITION SUBSEQUENT OR ESSENTIAL OF THE OBLIGATION TO SELL [sic].C.THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT THE PROPERTY SUBJECT OF LITIGATION AND OVER WHICH RESPONDENTS IMPROVEMENTS ARE BUILT BELONGS TO RESPONDENT NOTWITHSTANDING UNCONTROVERTED EVIDENCE THAT PETITIONERS PREDECESSOR-IN-INTEREST PING-EL DICMAN HAD APPLIED FOR FREE PATENT OVER THE SUBJECT AREA AND HAD BEEN ISSUED PLAN SWO-37115 IN HIS NAME BY THE BUREAU OF LANDS IN 1954 AND HAD BEEN IN ACTUAL, OPEN, PEACEFUL, ADVERSE AND CONTINUOUS POSSESSION OF THE PROPERTY SINCE THE EARLY 1900s UNTIL HIS DEATH WHEN HIS GRANCHILDREN AND SUCCESSORS-IN-INTEREST, THE PETITIONERS, TOOK OVER AND CONTINUED THE POSSESSION OF THEIR GRANDFATHER, PING-EL DICMAN.On March 2, 2001, petitioners filed their Manifestation and Motion to Substitute Babing Cosil and Cristina Alawas With Their Respective Heirs stating, among others, that Julio F. Dicman, son of petitioner Ernesto Dicman, had been appointed by the petitioners to sign the petition for and in their behalf, but due to distance and time constraints between Makati City and Baguio, he was not able to submit the same in time for the deadline for the petition on February 12, 2001. Petitioners attached the Special Power of Attorney seeking to formalize the appointment of Julio F. Dicman as their attorney-in-fact and to ratify his execution of the verification and certification of non-forum shopping for and on behalf of the petitioners.On March 15, 2001, private respondent filed with this Court a Motion for Leave of Court to File Motion to Dismiss and/or Deny Due Course, arguing that the petition failed to comply with the requirements for verification and certification of non-forum shopping. The affiant of the petition, according to private respondent, is not a principal party in the case; rather, he is merely the son of Ernesto Dicman, one of the petitioners. The verification and certification reads:VERIFICATION AND CERTIFICATIONI, JULIO F. DICMAN, of legal age, Filipino, with residence address at Camp 7, Montecillo Road, Baguio City, after being first duly sworn in accordance with law, do hereby depose and state:1. I am one of the petitioners in the above-entitled case;x x x (emphasis supplied)To private respondent, since Ernesto Dicman, one of the petitioners, appears to be alive, he excludes his son as the successor-in-interest of Ting-el Dicman. The verification, therefore, is false in view of the statement under oath that Julio F. Dicman is a petitioner when in fact he is not, and should be cause for the dismissal of the case and indirect contempt of court, without prejudice to administrative and criminal action.On May 2, 2001, in their Manifestation and Motion for Leave to File the Attached Reply and Reply, petitioners argued that while it may be true that the verification and certification to the petition were signed by Julio F. Dicman, the son of one of the petitioners, they subsequently confirmed his authority to sign on behalf of all the petitioners through the Special Power of Attorney submitted to the Court in a Manifestation and Motion to Substitute Babing Cosil and Cristina Alawas With Their Respective Heirs filed on March 2, 2001. Petitioners invoked substantial compliance and prayed that the Court overlook the procedural lapse in the interest of substantial justice. The parties thereafter submitted their respective memoranda.The petition must be dismissed on the following grounds:1. Section 5, Rule 7 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires the pleader to submit a certificate of non-forum shopping to be executed by the plaintiff or principal party, is mandatory, and non-compliance therewith is a sufficient ground for the dismissal of the petition.24The forum shopping certification must be signed by the party himself as he has personal knowledge of the facts therein stated.25Obviously, it is the plaintiff or principal party who is in the best position to know whether he actually filed or caused the filing of a petition in the case.26Where there are two or more plaintiffs or petitioners, all of them must sign the verification and non-forum certification, and the signature of only one of them is insufficient,27unless the one who signs the verification and certification has been authorized to execute the same by, and on behalf of, the co-plaintiff or co-petitioner.28But it must be stressed that the requirement the principal party himself should sign the certification applies only to a natural person and not to a juridical person which can only act through its officer or duly authorized agent.29However, the Court has also held that the rules on forum shopping were designed to promote and facilitate the orderly administration of justice and thus should not be interpreted with such absolute literalness as to subvert its own ultimate and legitimate objective. The rule of substantial compliance may be availed of with respect to the contents of the certification. This is because the requirement of strict compliance with the provisions regarding the certification of non-forum shopping merely underscores its mandatory nature in that the certification cannot be altogether dispensed with or its requirements completely disregarded.30Thus, under justifiable circumstances, the Court has relaxed the rule requiring the submission of such certification considering that although it is obligatory, it is not jurisdictional.31lawphil.netBut a perusal of the relevant decisions handed down by this Court consistently shows that substantial compliance may be invoked and the procedural lapse overlooked provided that, where the petitioner is a natural person as in the case at bar, the authorized signatory must also be a principal party or co-petitioner.32Petitioners, as natural persons, cannot therefore appoint a non-party to sign for them, especially since only the petitioners occupy the best position to know whether they actually filed or caused the filing of a petition in this case and who personally know the facts stated in the petition. On this point alone the petition should be dismissed.2. It is a settled rule that in the exercise of the Supreme Courts power of review, the Court is not a trier of facts and does not normally undertake the re-examination of the evidence presented by the contending parties during the trial of the case considering that the findings of facts of the CA are conclusive and binding on the Court. While jurisprudence has recognized several exceptions in which factual issues may be resolved by this Court, namely: (1) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures; (2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) when there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of facts are conflicting; (6) when in making its findings the CA went beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and the appellee; (7) when the findings are contrary to the trial court; (8) when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioners main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent; (10) when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record; and (11) when the CA manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties, which, if properly considered, could justify a different conclusion,33none of these exceptions has been shown to apply in the present case and, hence, this Court may not review the findings of fact made by the lower courts.3. Petitioners argue on appeal that the "Deed of Conveyance of Part Rights and Interests in Agricultural Land" dated October 22, 1928 executed between Sioco Cario and Ting-el Dicman is voidab initiofor lack of approval of competent authorities as required under Section 145 in relation to Section 146 of the Administrative Code of Mindanao and Sulu, the application of which was later extended to the Mountain Province and Nueva Viscaya and, thereafter, throughout the entire national territory;34that the sale was without valid consideration; and that the said deed is not an absolute sale but merely a contract to sell subject to the suspensive condition that the papers evidencing the title must first be perfected. These arguments were lumped under the following issue in their appeal to the CA:2. THE HONORABLE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONSIDERING THE DEED OF CONVEYANCE [OF] PART RIGHTS AND INTERESTS IN AGRICULTURAL LAND EXECUTED BY DICMAN IN FAVOR OF SIOCO CARIO DESPITE ITS NULLITY.The foregoing issue and the incidents thereunder were never raised by the petitioners during the proceedings before the RTC. Suffice it to say that issues raised for the first time on appeal and not raised timely in the proceedings in the lower court are barred by estoppel.35Matters, theories or arguments not brought out in the original proceedings cannot be considered on review or appeal where they are raised for the first time. To consider the alleged facts and arguments raised belatedly would amount to trampling on the basic principles of fair play, justice and due process.364. Even if this Court should declare the sale null and void or the agreement merely a contract to sell subject to a suspensive condition that has yet to occur, private respondent nonetheless acquired ownership over the land in question through acquisitive prescription.37The records show that as early as 1938, the land in controversy had been in the possession of Guzman Cario, predecessor-in-interest of private respondent, continuously, publicly, peacefully, in concept of owner, and in good faith with just title, to the exclusion of the petitioners and their predecessors-in-interest, well beyond the period required under law to acquire title by acquisitive prescription which, in this case, is 10 years.38The findings of fact of the lower courts, and which this Court has no reason to disturb, inescapably point to this conclusion: immediately after the "Deed of Absolute Sale," a public instrument dated January 10, 1938, had been executed by Sioco Cario in favor of his son, Guzman Cario (the father of private respondent), the latter immediately occupied the property; the 1940 directory of Baguio Telephones lists his residence at Camp 7, Baguio City along with his telephone number; his permitting the use of portions of the property to various third parties; his introduction of improvements over the land in controversy; the testimonial accounts of his neighbors; and that it was Guzman Cario alone who declared for tax purposes both the land and the improvements thereon in his name, while the tax declarations of the other claimants made no reference to the subject property.39Although arguably Sioco Cario may not have been the owner of the subject property when he executed the "Deed of Absolute Sale" in 1938 in favor of his son, the requirement of just title is nonetheless satisfied, which means that the mode of transferring ownership should ordinarily have been valid and true, had the grantor been the owner.40By the time the successors-in-interest of Ting-el Dicman sought to establish ownership over the land in controversy by filing their "Petition of the Heirs of Dicman to Reopen Civil Reservation Case No. 1, G.L.R.O. 211" on April 24, 1959 with the trial court, and which Guzman timely opposed, more than 20 years had already elapsed. Thus, the 10-year period for acquisitive prescription is deemed satisfied well before Guzmans possession can be said to be civilly interrupted by the filing of the foregoing petition to reopen.41After the dismissal of that case on July 28, 1978, Guzman Cario was left undisturbed in his possession of the subject property until his death on August 19, 1982. His remains are buried on the land in question. Thereafter, Guzmans widow and son, herein private respondent, continued possession of the subject property in the same manner. When petitioners, heirs of Ting-el Dicman, tried to revive the case on April 20, 1983, they had, far before that time, lost all rights to recover possession or ownership.5. Prescinding from the issue on prescription, the petitioners and their predecessors-in-interest are nonetheless guilty of laches.Laches has been defined as such neglect or omission to assert a right, taken in conjunction with the lapse of time and other circumstances causing prejudice to an adverse party, as will operate as a bar in equity.42It is a delay in the assertion of a right which works disadvantage to another43because of the inequity founded on some change in the condition or relations of the property or parties.44It is based on public policy which, for the peace of society,45ordains that relief will be denied to a stale demand which otherwise could be a valid claim.46It is different from and applies independently of prescription. While prescription is concerned with the fact of delay, laches is concerned with the effect of delay. Prescription is a matter of time; laches is principally a question of inequity of permitting a claim to be enforced, this inequity being founded on some change in the condition of the property or the relation of the parties. Prescription is statutory; laches is not. Laches applies in equity, whereas prescription applies at law. Prescription is based on a fixed time, laches is not.47Lachesmeans the failure or neglect for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting the presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned or declined to assert it.48It has been held that even a registered owner of property under the Torrens Title system may be barred from recovering possession of property by virtue of laches.49Given the foregoing findings of fact, all the four (4) elements of laches, as prescribed by the decisions of this Court, are present in the case, to wit:1.a. Conduct on the part of the defendant, or of one under whom he claims, giving rise to the situation of which complaint is made and for which the complaint seeks a remedy;2.b. Delay in asserting the complainants rights, the complainant having had knowledge or notice, of the defendants conduct and having been afforded an opportunity to institute a suit;3.c. Lack of knowledge or notice on the part of the defendant that the complainant would assert the right on which he bases his suit; andd. Injury or prejudice to the defendant in the event relief is accorded to the complainant, or the suit is not held to be barred.50As correctly held by the RTC, there is no evidence to the effect that Ting-el Dicman or his successors-in-interest ever filed any action to question the validity of the "Deed of Conveyance of Part Rights and Interests in Agricultural Land" after its execution on October 22, 192851despite having every opportunity to do so. Nor was any action to recover possession of the property from Guzman Cario instituted anytime prior to April 24, 1959, a time when the period for acquisitive prescription, reckoned from Guzmans occupation of the property in 1938, had already transpired in his favor. No evidence likewise appears on the record that Sioco Cario or his Estate ever filed any action to contest the validity of the "Deed of Absolute Sale" dated January 10, 1938.52Though counsel for the Estate of Sioco Cario tried to assail the deed as a forgery in the trial court, the attempt failed and no appeal was lodged therefrom. It will be difficult for this Court to assume that the petitioners and their predecessors were all the while ignorant of the adverse possession of private respondent and his predecessors given the publicity of their conduct and the nature of their acts. Private respondent and his predecessors-in-interest were made to feel secure in the belief that no action would be filed against them by such passivity. There is no justifiable reason for petitioners delay in asserting their rightsthe facts in their entirety show that they have slept on them. For over 30 years reckoned from the "Deed of Conveyance of Part Rights and Interests in Agricultural Land" dated October 22, 1928, or 20 years reckoned from the "Deed of Absolute Sale" dated January 10, 1938, they neglected to take positive steps to assert their dominical claim over the property. With the exception of forgery, all other issues concerning the validity of the two instruments abovementioned, as well as the averment that the former was in the nature of a contract to sell, were issues raised only for the first time on appeal and cannot therefore be taken up at this late a stage. The features of this case are not new. The Court has on several occasions held in particular that despite the judicial pronouncement that the sale of real property by illiterate ethnic minorities is null and void for lack of approval of competent authorities, the right to recover possession has nonetheless been barred through the operation of the equitable doctrine of laches.536. Petitioners argue that Proclamation No. 628 issued by then President Carlos P. Garcia on January 8, 1960 had the effect of "segregating" and "reserving" certain Igorot claims identified therein, including one purportedly belonging to the "Heirs of Dicman," and prohibiting any encumbrance or alienation of these claims for a period of 15 years from acquisition of patent. But by the time the Proclamation had been issued, all rights over the property in question had already been vested in private respondent. The executive issuance can only go so far as to classify public land, but it cannot be construed as to prejudice vested rights. Moreover, property rights may not be altered or deprived by executive fiat alone without contravening the due process guarantees54of the Constitution and may amount to unlawful taking of private property to be redistributed for public use without just compensation.55The recognition, respect, and protection of the rights of indigenous peoples to preserve and develop their cultures, traditions, and institutions are vital concerns of the State and constitute important public policies which bear upon this case. To give life and meaning unto these policies the legislature saw it fit to enact Republic Act No. 8371, otherwise known as The Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997, as a culminating measure to affirm the views and opinions of indigenous peoples and ethnic minoritieson matters that affect their life and culture.56The provisions of that law unify an otherwise fragmented account of constitutional, jurisprudential and statutory doctrine which enjoins the organs of government to be vigilant for the protection of indigenous cultural communities as a marginalized sector,57to protect their ancestral domain and ancestral lands and ensure their economic, social, and cultural well-being,58and to guard their patrimony from those inclined to prey upon their ignorance or ductility.59As the final arbiter of disputes and the last bulwark of the Rule of Law this Court has always been mindful of the highest edicts of social justice especially where doubts arise in the interpretation and application of the law. But when in the pursuit of the loftiest ends ordained by the Constitution this Court finds that the law is clear and leaves no room for doubt, it shall decide according to the principles of right and justice as all people conceive them to be, and with due appreciation of the rights of all persons concerned.WHEREFORE, the instant petition isDENIEDand the assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals areAFFIRMED.No pronouncement as to costs.SO ORDERED.[G.R. No. 132007. August 5, 1998]SOLAR TEAM ENTERTAINMENT, INC.,petitioner,vs. HON. HELEN BAUTISTA RICAFORT,in her capacityas Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Paraaque, Metro Manila (Branch 260), TEAM IMAGE ENTERTAINMENT, INC., FELIX S. CO, JEFFREY C. CAL, and KING CUISIA,respondents.D E C I S I O NDAVIDE, JR.,J.:At issue is whether respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in denying petitioners motion to expunge private respondents answer with counterclaims on the ground that said pleading was not served personally; moreover, there was no written explanation as to why personal service was not accomplished, as required by Section 11 of Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.The antecedents are not disputed.On 10 July 1997, petitioner, as plaintiff, filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Paraaque, Metro Manila, a complaint for recovery of possession and damages with prayer for a writ of replevin[1]against herein private respondents.Thecase was docketed as Civil Case No. 97-0304 and was assigned to Branch 260 of said court, presided over by public respondent Judge Helen Bautista-Ricafort.Summonses and copies of the complaint were forthwith served on private respondents.On 25 July 1997, their counsel filed a notice of appearance with urgentex-partemotion for extension of time to plead,[2]which the court granted in its order of 4 August 1997.[3]On 8 August 1997, private respondents, as defendants, filed their Answer (with Counterclaims).[4]A copy thereof was furnished counsel for petitioner by registered mail; however, the pleading did not contain any written explanation as to why service was not made personally upon petitioner-plaintiff, as required by Section 11 of Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.On 11 August 1997, petitioner filed a motion to expunge the Answer (with Counterclaims) and to declare herein private respondents in default,[5]alleging therein that the latter did not observe the mandate of the aforementioned Section 11, and that there was:[A]bsolutely no valid reason why defendant[s] should not have personally served plaintiffs ... counsel with [a] copy of their answer [as] (t)he office of defendants (sic) counsel, Atty. Froilan Cabaltera, is just a stone [sic] throw away from the office of [petitioners] counsel, with an estimate (sic) distance of about 200 meters more or less.Petitioner further alleged that the post office was about ten (10) times farther from the office of Atty. Cabaltera.On 15 August 1997, private respondents filed their opposition[6]to the above mentioned motion, alleging that petitioners rigid and inflexible reliance on the provisions of Section 11, Rule 13 ... is an adventitious resort to technicality and is contrary to Section 6 of Rule 3 ... which admonishes that said Rules shall be liberally construed in order to promote their objective in securing a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of [e]very action and proceeding;and that Section 11, Rule 13 notwithstanding, private respondents religiously complied with [Section 5 of Rule 13] by personally present[ing] to the clerk of court their said Answer ... furnishing a copy thereof to the counsel for [petitioner] by way of registered mail.On 8 September 1997, public respondent Judge Bautista-Ricafort issued an order[7]stating that under Section 11 of Rule 13 it is within the discretion of the [trial court] whether to consider the pleading as filed or not, and denying, for lack of merit, petitioners motion to expunge the Answer (with Counterclaims) and to declare private respondents in default.Petitioner immediately moved for reconsideration[8]of the order, butpublic respondent Judge Bautista-Ricafort denied this motion in her order[9]of 17 November 1997.The order justified the denial in this wise:Section 6 [of] Rule 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure ordains that the Rules shall be liberally construed in order to promote their objective of securing a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding.Liberal construction of the rules and the pleading is the controlling principle to effect substantial justice.As pointed out by the Supreme Court in Alonso vs. Villamor, 16 Phil. 315, "the error in this case is purely technical. To take advantage of it for other purposes than to cure it, does not appeal a fair sense of justice. Its presentation as fatal to plaintiff a [sic] case smacks of skill rather than right. A litigation is not a game of technicalities in which one, more deeply schooled and skilled in the subtle art of movement and position, entraps and destroys the other. It is rather, a contest in which each contending party fully and fairly lays before the Court the facts in issue and then, brushing aside as wholly trivial and indecisive all imperfections or form of technicalities of procedure, asks that justice be done upon the merits.Lawsuits, unlike duels, are not to be won by a rapier's thrust."While it is desirable that the above Rules be faithfully and even meticulously observed, courts should not strict about procedural lapses that do not really impair the proper administration of justice. Furthermore, it is well settled that litigations should, as much as possible be decided on their merits and not on technicalities.Petitioner thus filed the instant special civil action ofcertiorari, contending that public respondent Judge Bautista-Ricafort committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when she admitted private respondents' "Answer (with Counterclaims)" notwithstanding private respondents' clear, admitted and inexcusable violation of Section 11, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, in that: (a) the "Answer (with Counterclaims)" was not served personally upon petitioners counsel despite the undisputed fact that the offices of private respondents counsel and that of petitioners counsel are only about 200 meters away from each other; and (b) the Answer did not contain any explanation as to why the answer was not served personally.In their Comment, filed in compliance with the resolution of 2 February 1998, and to which petitioner filed a Reply, private respondents aver that public respondent Judge Bautista-Ricafort correctly admitted private respondents Answer (with Counterclaims) in light of Section 6, Rule 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure; that Section 11 of Rule 13 begins with the phrase whenever practicable, thereby suggesting that service by mail may still be effected depending on the relative priority of the pleading sought to be filed; and when service is not done personally, it is more prudent and judicious for the courts to require a written explanation rather than to expunge the pleading outright or consider the same as not being filed.In view of the importance of the issue raised, which is, undoubtedly, one of the first impression, the Court resolved to give due course to the petitionand consider it submitted for decision on the basis of the pleadings filed by the parties.Section 5, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure prescribes two modes of service of pleadings, motions, notices, orders, judgments and other papers, namely: (1) personal service; and (2) service by mail.The first is governed by Section 6, while the second, by Section 7 of said Rule.If service cannot be done either personally or by mail, substituted service may be resorted to under Section 8 thereof.Pursuant, however, to Section 11 of Rule 13, service and filing of pleadings and other papers must, whenever practicable, be done personally; and if made through other modes, the party concerned must provide a written explanation as to why the service or filing was not done personally.The section reads:SEC. 11.Priorities in modes of service and filing.--Whenever practicable, the service and filing of pleadings and other papers shall be done personally.Except with respect to papers emanating from the court, a resort to other modes must be accompanied by a written explanation why the service or filing was not done personally.A violation of this Rule may be cause to consider the paper as not filed.(n)Note that Section 11 refers to bothserviceof pleadings and other papers on the adverse party or his counsel as provided for in Sections 6, 7 and 8; and to thefilingof pleadings and other papers in court.Personalserviceandfilingare preferred for obvious reasons.Plainly, such should expedite action or resolution on a pleading, motion or other paper; and conversely, minimize, if not eliminate, delays likely to be incurred if service or filing is done by mail, considering the inefficiency of the postal service.Likewise, personal service will do away with the practice of some lawyers who, wanting to appear clever, resort to the following less than ethical practices: (1) serving or filing pleadings by mail to catch opposing counsel off-guard, thus leaving the latter with little or no time to prepare, for instance, responsive pleadings or an opposition;or (2) upon receiving notice from the post office that the registered parcel containing the pleading of or other paper from the adverse party may be claimed, unduly procrastinating before claiming the parcel, or, worse, not claiming it at all, thereby causing undue delay in the disposition of such pleading or other papers.If only to underscore the mandatory nature of this innovation to our set of adjective rules requiring personal service whenever practicable, Section 11 of Rule 13 then gives the court the discretion to consider a pleading or paper as not filed if the other modes ofservice or filing were resorted to and no written explanation was made as to why personal service was not done in the first place.The exercise of discretion must, necessarily, consider the practicability of personal service, for Section 11 itself begins with the clause whenever practicable.We thus take this opportunity to clarify that under Section 11, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, personalserviceandfilingis the general rule, and resort to other modes of service and filing, the exception.Henceforth, whenever personal service or filing is practicable, in light of the circumstances of time, place and person, personal service or filing is mandatory.Only when personal service or filing is not practicable may resort to other modes be had, which must then be accompanied by a written explanation as to why personal service or filing was not practicable to begin with.In adjudging the plausibility of an explanation, a court shall likewise consider the importance of the subject matter of the case or the issues involved therein, and theprima faciemerit of the pleading sought to be expunged for violation of Section 11.This Court cannot rule otherwise, lest we allow circumvention of the innovation introduced by the 1997 Rules in order to obviate delay in the administration of justice.Here, the proximity between the offices of opposing counsel was established;moreover, that the office of private respondents counsel was ten times farther from the post office than the distance separating the offices of opposing counsel.Of course, proximity would seem to make personal service most practicable, but exceptions may nonetheless apply.For instance, where the adverse party or opposing counsel to be served with a pleading seldom reports to office and no employee is regularly present to receive pleadings, or where service is done on the last day of the reglementary period and the office of the adverse party or opposing counsel to be served is closed, for whatever reason.Returning, however, to the merits of this case, in view of the proximity between the offices of opposing counsel and the absence of any attendant explanation as to why personal service of the answer was not effected, indubitably, private respondents counsel violated Section 11 of Rule 13 and the motion to expunge wasprima faciemeritorious.However, the grant or denial of said motion nevertheless remained within the sound exercise of the trial courts discretion.Thus, as guided by Section 6, Rule 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which ordains that the Rules shall be liberally construed in order to promote their objective of securing a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action or proceeding, as well as by the dictum laid down inAlonso v. Villamor, 16 Phil. 315 [1910], the trial court opted to exercise its discretion in favor of admitting the Answer (with Counterclaims), instead of expungingit from the record.To our mind, if motions to expunge or strike out pleadings for violation of Section 11 of Rule 13 were to be indiscriminately resolved under Section 6 of Rule 1 orAlonzo v. Villamorand other analogous cases, then Section 11 would become meaningless and its sound purpose negated.Nevertheless, we sustain the challenged ruling of the trial court, but for reasons other than those provided for in the challenged order.The 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure took effect only on 1 July 1997, while the questioned Answer (with Counterclaims) was filed only on 8 August 1997, or on the 39thday following the effectivity of the 1997 Rules.Hence, private respondents counsel may not have been fully aware of the requirements and ramifications of Section 11, Rule 13.In fact, as pointed out by petitioners counsel, in another case where private respondents counsel was likewise opposing counsel, the latter similarly failed to comply with Section 11.It has been several months since the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure took effect.In the interim, this Court has generally accommodated parties and counsel who failed to comply with the requirement of a written explanation whenever personal service or filing was not practicable, guided, in the exercise of our discretion, by the primary objective of Section 11, the importance of the subject matter of th