Assessing the Value of Stealthy Aircraft and Cruise Missiles

Assessing the Value of Stealthy Aircraft and Cruise MissilesAuthor(s): Jasper WelchSource: International Security, Vol. 14, No. 2 (Fall, 1989), pp. 47-63Published by: The MIT PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2538854 .

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Assessing the Value of Jasper Welch Stealthy Aircrft and

Cruise Missiles

In 1980, the United States announced that it had achieved the technical ability to build aircraft with radically reduced observability to radar-so-called "stealthy" aircraft. Since that time, five air vehicle programs have been identified as having a stealthy nature: 1) the Advanced Cruise Missile (ACM), to be carried by strategic bombers; 2) the Advanced Technology Bomber (ATB); 3) the U.S. Air Force's Advanced Tactical Fighter; 4) the U.S. Navy's Advanced Tactical Aircraft; and 5) the recently announced F-117A fighter. All of these programs have been carried out in a highly classified manner, with the budget level and even the schedule of development hidden from public view.

With the current downturn in the defense budget as a whole, and with new non-stealthy combat aircraft programs limited to modifications and model changes, there is increased questioning of the wisdom of this major U.S. commitment to stealth. To be sure, much of the questioning comes from committed opponents of U.S. defense spending in general. But others who are genuinely concerned for national security are asking questions as well.

The purpose of this article is to lay out a framework of the issues that should be addressed in any responsible effort to assess the value of stealthy aircraft. To this framework will be added examples and historical analogues, in a manner intended to permit an interested, generally well-informed non- specialist to follow the line of argument. In order to keep the paper unclas- sified, some issues will not be pursued to conclusion, nor will the discussion center on data or numerical evaluation. Nonetheless, substantial information and logic are available to support a judgment that stealth technology holds a promise of major geostrategic importance.

Stealth is first examined as an additional capability obtained within particular design constraints. Next, ways are explored in which the additional capability (i.e., radically reduced radar detectability) removes some other

The views expressed are those of the author and not of any other person or organization.

Jasper Welch (USAF, Ret.) is a national security consultant and President of Jasper Welch Associates of Arlington, Va. He was Air Force Assistant Chief of Staff, Studies and Analysis, and Defense Policy Coordinator for the National Security Council in the late 1970s; and from 1981 to 1983 he was Air Force Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Research, Development, and Acquisition.

International Security, Fall 1989 (Vol. 14, No. 2) C) 1989 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

47



International Security 14:2 | 48

design constraints and many operational constraints, specifically, those as- sociated with other methods used to cope with enemy defenses. Finally, indirect benefits and costs are described where they are likely to be significant in the evaluation. Special attention is paid to 1) the value of the first increment of stealth aircraft in operation with non-stealth aircraft; 2) the impact of the U.S. stealth program on Soviet military doctrine; 3) the competitive strategy aspects of stealth on Soviet costs and programs; and 4) the value of stealth in enhancing deterrence of theater conflict as well as strategic nuclear conflict.

Soviet Countermeasures

Stealth is in the first instance a technical matter, an improvement to which one might well expect a countermeasure. The long U.S. experience with stealth in the submarine arena is characterized as a major net U.S. superiority, because the United States is better at stealth (quieting) than are the Soviets (or any other country for that matter), and better at counter-stealth (listening with sonar) than the Soviets. That one nation can be better at both, over a prolonged period, has profound consequences.

Some concern has been expressed in recent months regarding the possible improved quieting of Soviet submarines. This would make Soviet submarines more survivable, of course, but it would not directly affect the survivability of any U.S. submarines patrolling quietly in broad ocean areas.

In the case of stealthy aircraft, the straightforward countermeasure is improved radar. Indeed, if the degree of stealth is modest enough, then even upgrades of existing radars might well suffice to return matters to the status quo ante.

Thus it is useful to distinguish between: 1) modest levels of stealth that straightforward radar improvements are able to counter; and 2) robust levels of stealth that pose such a severe challenge of detectability that the existing radar inventory is utterly inadequate and must be replaced either with new radars or with sensors based on other physical principles.

IMPLICATIONS OF WHOLESALE RADAR REPLACEMENT

The Soviet armed forces have a very large number of radars, many times the number in Western forces. The Soviets have steadily modernized these radars over the years, and could afford to continue this modernization rate if new radars cost about the same as old radars.



Stealthy Aircraft | 49

But if new radars adequate to perform a counter-stealth role against robust stealth were to cost many times as much as existing radars, then affordability as well as technical feasibility would be at issue. The issue of technical feasibility is particularly acute for airborne radars, where solutions based on brute force increases in transmitter power and antenna aperture size are basically not available.

The continued classification protection of the exact levels of U.S. stealth adds an important tension to the Soviet countermeasure planning. Should the Soviets underestimate U.S. stealth, they could go to enormous expense to replace all their radars and still have an inadequate radar detection capability.

NON-RADAR RESPONSES

Should the Soviets be unable or unwilling simply to replace every radar with an adequately counter-stealth radar, then they will be faced with the follow- ing two challenges: 1) they could seek to use their new radars in different ways to work around their lesser capability; and 2) they could seek to develop new sensors based on technical principles other than radar. Infrared, visible light, and acoustics are the most common suggestions.

Such new approaches to air defense have their own technical challenges, opportunities, and limitations, which are too complex to outline here. But from the Soviet point of view, the most worrisome matter is that the whole body of Soviet military doctrine on air defense has been based on numerous, capable, long-range radars.

To the Soviets the development of military doctrine is a scientific-technical process, where the objective facts to be examined include historical events as well as engineering data. The lack of a historical data base for stealth poses a very severe concern to the Soviets, of a type not present in most Western military circles. The Soviet military wants the assurance of a doctrine tested against historical data, a doctrine that is objective historically as well as technically, a doctrine that permits and sustains objective, quantitative military planning. For example, they want proven norms for required weight of effort (military force size and type) for various circumstances, and proven norms for the time required to accomplish various functions.

THE THREE-FOLD IMPACT OF STEALTH

There are, thus, three major effects of the U.S. stealth aircraft program on Soviet counter-air operations:



International Security 14:2 150

(1) There is an economic impact as the Soviets attempt to maintain the effectiveness of their radar base by upgrade and replacement;

(2) There is a technical impact as the Soviets find radar improvements inadequate or infeasible and they turn to other sensor techniques; and

(3) There is a military-doctrinal impact with widespread concern that the new methods, untried and untested over time in real combat, might not be effective or predictable as to what is needed to produce a given effectiveness.

U.S. Penalties and Gains From Stealth

The requirements of stealth on an aircraft's design can be conceptually considered as an additional constraint on the design. That is, no matter how clever the designer, we would expect that the designer could design a better flying aircraft without the stealth requirement than with it. In fact, one of the common questions raised with regard to the wisdom of stealthy aircraft is whether this design penalty is too high.

The design penalty can manifest itself in terms of unit cost, overall aircraft weight, range-payload, acceleration, climb, maneuver, handling characteristics or perhaps in other ways. Not all characteristics need be impacted. In the design of any aircraft there are always trades to be made between these characteristics. For example, a principal issue in the design of the F-15 (then called the F-X) was the proper trade-off of range for maneuverability. Larger wing area increases turn rate, but also increases drag at cruise conditions. Such design trades can only be chosen wisely after consideration of two factors: 1) How much of the one is traded for how much of the other? 2) How much does each characteristic count in the mission for which the aircraft is intended?

When comparing two aircraft of succeeding generations, as opposed to alternative aircraft within the same generation, it is common to find the successor generation aircraft better in all characteristics. This wholesale improvement occurs because, between generations, a number of technical advances will have been made, and this allows the designer to operate within a broader range of technical opportunities. For example, it is common that engines available for successor generations will have lower weight and lower fuel consumption per unit thrust. Both technical advances would contribute to a longer range for the same airframe with a new engine. Alternatively,




the designer could create a new-airframe/new-engine combination that traded off some increased range for more maneuverability (through an increased wing area, for example). This design choice would produce successor generation aircraft with both more range and more maneuverability than the older generation aircraft. Other technology advances with similar impacts include increased strength-to-weight in structural materials, increased capability-to-weight in electrical generation and distribution systems, better com- putational and experimental techniques in aerodynamics, and advanced man- ufacturing techniques that reduce cost.

Thus a new generation of aircraft can be expected to have better characteristics all the way around. The aerodynamic performance characteristics of stealth aircraft will also benefit from these "non-stealth advanced technologies." The benefits would tend to compensate for any aerodynamic design penalties and might more than compensate for them, compared to older aircraft.

EVALUATING THE COST OF STEALTHY AIRCRAFT

An obvious factor to evaluate is the unit cost of an item-a truck, a ship, a tank, an aircraft, a missile. If one is comparing two vehicles, and they are more or less equivalent in performance, or even in utility to the job at hand, then relative unit cost is commonly the decisive evaluation criterion. But as the vehicles are more and more dissimilar, then the straightforward compar- ison of unit cost is less and less meaningful; one must somehow take into account the differences between the vehicles. In comparing stealthy and non- stealthy aircraft the direct difference, observability, manifests itself in many ways, and these must all be taken into account.

An example might be helpful: Consider a ground attack mission to halt movement of a Soviet Motorized Infantry Brigade that is located some 300 kilometers behind the front. Use of stealthy aircraft would introduce at least four areas of difference:

(1) The stealthy aircraft will likely suffer less attrition. Indeed, the losses to the non-stealthy aircraft may be so high (for such a deep penetration) that the overall needs of the theater may simply rule out this mission compared to other alternative uses of the non-stealthy aircraft;

(2) The non-stealthy aircraft will require more support (i.e., incur more costs) for mitigating Soviet defenses, such as on-board electronic countermeasures, defense suppression sorties, escort fighters, support jam-




ming, and intelligence to locate, classify, and identify the defensive units;

(3) The non-stealthy aircraft will require more support (i.e., incur more costs) to achieve target acquisition, since its flight path is more constrained by air defenses to fly lower and faster than the stealthy aircraft. This would result in less capability for the same on-board sensors; and

(4) The stealthy aircraft may well arrive in the target area to find an unalerted Soviet column, whereas the non-stealthy aircraft is much more likely to have instigated a timely warning to the unit under attack. This lack of warning, with stealth, would provide three distinct advantages: (a) the unit would be in plain view on the road, aiding detection and identification, and easing the requirement on intelligence assets to predict the unit's exact location; (b) the unit's organic short- range defenses would not be alerted and would probably be ineffective; and (c) the unit's physical and psychological vulnerability would be increased, thus increasing the effectiveness of any ordnance delivered.

Thus we see in this example that in the areas of penetration, target acquisition, and target vulnerability, large indirect effectiveness increases accrue to the stealthy aircraft; and large indirect cost increases accrue to the non- stealthy aircraft.

Scenarios for Application of Stealth

The remainder of this article explores a range of scenarios, both nuclear and nonnuclear, for applications of cruise missiles, stealthy bombers, and stealthy fighters: * Strategic nuclear operations: bombers and missiles; * Strategic nonnuclear operations: bombers and missiles; * Theater nonnuclear operations: fighters and fighter-bombers; * Theater nuclear operations: missiles and fighter-bombers.

STRATEGIC NUCLEAR OPERATIONS WITH STEALTHY VEHICLES

One obvious advantage accruing to stealth aircraft is the ability to penetrate hostile airspace with minimum regard for possible attrition. For cruise missiles that have the very straightforward mission of delivering ordnance to a target, this penetration advantage is central.




But for a strategic bomber, penetrativity per se is not the only advantage. Stealth could result in an increase in the bomber's effective range. For example: 1) circuitous routing to avoid defense concentrations en route to assigned targets could be eliminated; 2) fuel-inefficient speed and altitude profiles used to degrade defenses could be eliminated; and 3) on-board electronic countermeasures that displace fuel could be eliminated. These stealth-provided benefits could be used, alternatively, to provide a larger payload to the same effective range, or to carry the same payload to a longer effective range.

Moreover, for a strategic bomber, penetrativity is not the only requirement. The stealth bomber must have good base-escape survivability under surprise attack, it must carry a reasonably large payload to target, and it must have a reasonable and predictable cost.

Thus, for strategic bombers used to attack fixed targets with nuclear weapons, the value of stealth lies in three areas:

(1) High penetrativity and high assurance of penetration lends credence to our nuclear deterrent;

(2) The cost-imposing, technology-stressing, and doctrine-eroding nature of stealth supports a competitive strategy against the Soviet Union;

(3) The direct increases in range-payload due to new technologies in aerodynamics, propulsion, and materials, and the indirect increases through stealth's ability to relieve flight-path constraints, support cost- effectiveness.

This list of benefits is quite compelling, especially when the fundamental first-strike stability of bombers is considered.

The next section, dealing with nuclear attack on certain specialized sets of strategic targets, is somewhat more detailed because the subject matter is less well known, not because these target sets are any more or less important. The examples also set the stage for the discussion that follows of the use of strategic bombers in nonnuclear operations.

The diminished concern for active defenses provided by stealth opens up additional flexibility in the areas of target valuation, target location, target identification, and weapon delivery. These benefits accrue to a stealth bomber or fighter-bomber because its flight profile in the target area is relatively less constrained by concern for defenses.

In particular, the stealth bomber need not fly at breakneck speed, at tree- top level, or along routes chosen to avoid active defense radars. Rather, the




stealth bomber generally can fly at speeds, altitudes, and routes chosen to provide its on-board sensors with a good, long view of the target area.

The emphasized words "relatively" and "generally" are meant to imply that stealth is not perfect and that sensors can degrade stealth performance. Thus in order to evaluate this benefit, two further inquiries must be made: 1) Do adequate sensors exist that will enable the bomber to perform the target valuation, target location, target identification, and weapon delivery functions even at the flight profiles provided by stealth? 2) Are there important target classes for which these targeting and weapon delivery functions are useful? These are difficult questions to answer in the abstract. Convincing answers demand quantitative analysis and, particularly for sensors, field testing under realistic conditions. Moreover, the questions are coupled to each other and to another question: 3) Are there more attractive ways, other than stealth bombers, to perform the desired targeting and weapons delivery functions?

Three examples will help to analyze these points: one favorable to the benefits provided by stealth, another where the effectiveness depends on certain details, and a third where even the advantages of the stealth bomber can be stressed by certain target designs.

FIRST EXAMPLE: BACK-UP ATTACKS FOR ASSURANCE. First, the stealth-favorable example involves back-up attacks for assurance. A common technique for assuring high confidence of target destruction is to cross-target, that is, to use more than one type of weapon system to attack the same target. If this is done, then systematic failures in one weapon system can be back- stopped by the other weapon system. Such cross-targeting can be used between missiles and bombers of different types or between a missile and a bomber.

The example is primarily the case of a bomber backing up a missile or another bomber. The back-up bomber will arrive at the target area typically a few hours after the first attack, to provide assurance of target destruction. If the bomber's sensors can discern that the first attack failed to occur, then the back-up bomber can deliver one of its own weapons to attack the target. The back-up bomber could even reattack with a second one of its weapons if a malfunction should occur in its first weapon.

In this example, the ability to discern that a weapon actually has detonated on the target transforms the assurance of target destruction from a statistical matter (one minus the joint probability of having all assigned weapons fail), to a matter of the observability of the target and confidence that the observing




platform can reach its observation point. As discussed above, these are exactly the qualities possessed by a stealth bomber. Put another way, if the back-up bomber does not have a robust sensor capability, and if it does not have a high assurance of getting to the target area, then the value of cross- targeting with bombers is reduced considerably.

In a variation on this first example, the bomber calls for a back-up missile attack if the bomber discerns that the first attack failed. This concept of operation requires trans-attack intercontinental communication, and probably a manned command center to sort out the calls from various bombers. To provide these types of survivable C3 (command, control, and communi- cations) functions is difficult, expensive, and uncertain, but not impossible. The main alternative to bomber back-up is to use space-borne assets to ascertain the success of the first attack and then call for a back-up missile attack. This alternative also requires similar trans-attack C3 functions, as well as survivability of the space assets.

Other variations on this first example would include discernment not only as to whether the first weapon arrived and detonated, but also whether the intended target was destroyed. This discernment requires substantially more robust sensor capabilities than mere confirmation of detonation. Here again, the stealth bomber would have a distinct advantage, and the space-borne sensor alternative would be at a distinct disadvantage.

SECOND EXAMPLE: OCCUPANCY EVALUATION. The second example uses the bomber for the primary attack (as opposed to the back-up role in the first example), but concerns itself with targets whose value is uncertain, even though their location and identification are known. The common examples are airfields (with and without aircraft), seaports (with or without ships), and army bases (with or without their garrisons). To be sure, main operating bases are probably worth attacking in any event and would not be prime candidates for this concept of operation. Precisely because main operating bases are worth attacking, one would expect the forces to be dispersed from their main operating bases, particularly for a case of retaliatory attack. That is, the retaliatory threat must really threaten to attack the forces themselves, not where they used to be.

The bomber would visit a number of dispersal bases, discern which of them are occupied, and attack those that are occupied. The sensor demands are dependent upon the degree of concealment present. The effectiveness depends upon the ability of the bomber to cover enough dispersal bases to be likely to find enough occupied ones. (Ordinarily, such attacks are planned




to use only a portion of the bomber's load in order to smooth out the statistics.) The extra range benefit of stealth is an advantage, as is the ability to visit military bases systematically with reduced concern for the defenses likely to be present.

THIRD EXAMPLE: RELOCATABLE TARGETS. A third example involves the search over a limited space for a military force known to exist-an army on the move, a fleet at sea, or trains on a rail network. These military forces are important targets; merely attacking their home bases, where they used to be in peacetime, is not sufficient. Moreover, these forces have missions which require substantial movement, which inevitably implies visibility and vulnerability.

The current concern for the ability to attack mobile missiles is, in principle, a variation of this example. But mobile missiles are in fact a very demanding variation. The launchers are relatively small; they can be hidden in a quies- cent state; and they need move only occasionally. An extreme case of this was the MX basing design called multiple protective shelters (MPS). In this case, the MPS shelters were exposed and known, and could have been attacked individually. But there were to be many more shelters than missiles, to make wholesale barrage so inefficient as to discourage attack, unless the shelters with missiles could be discerned from the empty shelters. But the "empty+' shelters were to be fitted out with decoy missiles, power consumption devices, and the like, to such an extent that airborne sensors or even ground parties would be unable to discern which shelters held missiles.

Thus, the third example spans a wide range of feasibility and value de- pending upon the target nature and the degree of effort put into concealment. What stealth offers is the ability to be more effective over a wide range of cases, both directly, by undercutting air defenses, and indirectly, by allowing sensors a better flight profile for viewing.

STRATEGIC BOMBERS IN CONVENTIONAL OPERATIONS

Historically, the United States has found the use of air and naval forces to be preferable to ground forces in the case of intervention into a proxy conflict or crisis situation, for several reasons. For example, they can be applied more rapidly and with less dependence upon the cooperation of other countries, and they can be withdrawn or moved in point of application more easily. For many cases, aircraft carriers provide a ready-made, effective and practical solution. In other cases, where the oceans are too distant or too hostile, long-




range aircraft offer a good solution. In most cases, both would be useful. In the Vietnam War, for example, the United States employed about one-third of all its B-52s and aircraft carriers for several years.

In future crisis situations the choice of bases for air-power intervention will be severely constrained by political factors and a declining base structure. Moreover, crises are inherently unpredictable, and it is usually desirable to postpone intervention as long as possible. Accordingly, there is a great premium on long-range rather than short-range aircraft in order to provide appropriate, secure, and capable bases. Aerial refueling can be and is used to extend en route range, but even so, short-range fighter aircraft have practical upper limits that fail to cover many important geographic situations, particularly in Southwest Asia.

Thus secure basing is an important technical aspect of effective intervention. Penetration of air defense, effectiveness of target identification and lethal weapon delivery, and cost efficiency in delivering ordnance to the target are also needed to provide an effective intervention force.

In considering penetration of air defenses in the intervention context, two related issues emerge. Because the Soviets have always provided their client states with substantial amounts of air defense equipment, the air defenses opposing U.S. intervention are likely to be formidable, thus requiring stealth and other complementary penetration aids to guarantee high-confidence penetration. The U.S. action to undercut these Soviet-provided defenses with U.S. stealthy aircraft is at once a symbol of U.S. commitment and a dem- onstration of U.S. military-technical superiority. Similarly, the use of stealthy aircraft to directly attack and destroy air defenses would play a key interven- tionist role, by making U.S. effectiveness manifest, by focusing early actions against symbols of Soviet involvement, and by opening up the area to future penetration by non-stealthy aircraft.

In considering target identification and weapon delivery effectiveness, two types of targets must be distinguished: First, those that are fixed installations, whether political, economic or military; and second, those that are military force elements per se: ships, aircraft, army vehicles, and personnel. The distinction emphasizes the predictability of location and of signature of the fixed installations, as opposed to the relative unpredictability for the force elements of their location and signature (as well as the background against which their signature must be discerned). The point of the distinction is that autonomous target acquisition and weapon guidance by cruise missiles is



International Security 14:2 j 58

much more feasible when the target location, signature, and signature context are known well in advance with confidence. Thus cruise missiles, perhaps equipped with terminal sensors, appear appropriate for fixed targets.

Conversely, for targets with substantial unpredictability, or that have be- come important too recently to have been processed for the autonomous missiles, the more feasible choice is a large aircraft. Such an aircraft would carry multiple sensors and a crew to interpret their output. If the sensor output were unclear, the crew could take another look if desired, perhaps from a different angle or with a different sensor setting. Such aircraft would carry a number of weapons (guided bombs or short-range missiles) with simpler sensors for weapon guidance, and would rely for target detection and identification on the complex suite of sensors on board the large aircraft. Stealth aircraft would provide a great benefit, both to reduce attrition and to provide the opportunity to choose flight paths that permit a good and careful viewing of the target area.

In considering the cost-effectiveness in delivering ordnance to the target, stealth is not a natural ally (as with penetration and weapon delivery), but rather is a cost-imposer, a problem to be surmounted. Some would argue that stealth's ability to lower attrition saves the cost of lost aircraft, but the political demands for low attrition dominate the intervention scenarios. In either case it is also required that stealth aircraft be reasonably cost-efficient trucks. That is, even if the attrition were zero, we would still want to be able to buy a force of sufficient size and load-carrying capacity to make a difference. Turn-around time between sorties, and general reliability and main- tainability, are also important in assessing cost-efficiency. As a matter of principle, there always will be some penalty for stealth in terms of unit cost, but it makes a difference whether it is quite small or quite large. Moreover, as noted above, there are cost savings with stealth. The real issue is the net balance. Finally, as discussed earlier, cost-effectiveness impacts of stealth through indirect manifestations (e.g., flexible flight paths that increase range- payload and target visibility, and increased vulnerability of surprised targets) can be quite significant.

THEATER AIR OPERATIONS WITH STEALTH

Strategic bombers are also useful in higher-intensity, well-developed theater campaigns. Sometimes the considerations are identical to those outlined above for intervention scenarios. Other times they are close to those for fighter-bombers as outlined below.




For fighters and fighter-bombers employed with conventional weapons in a theater rich with both targets and air defenses, additional benefits accrue from stealth, particularly the elimination of escort and support sorties. The sole purpose of these sorties is to allow the primary mission aircraft to perform effectively in the presence of the stiff air defense typical of theater operations. Such sorties can be quite burdensome. For example, during one period in the Vietnam conflict some 80 percent of the sorties in the North were escort and support sorties, and a 30 percent support burden was common over prolonged periods.

Such high support and escort fractions are readily justified because theater defenses can be much denser than those en route to targets in the Soviet Union; theater aircraft must repeat their operations day after day and cannot afford a high per-sortie attrition; and in limited conflicts there is often a political premium on very low attrition.

These last two points lead to another benefit of stealth: providing assurance-assurance of penetration and assurance of mission accomplishment. That is, if the stealth aircraft are not engaged by air defense, there is little chance they will be killed, and little chance they will be diverted from their primary missions to act in self-defense.

Mission accomplishment is also served by the surprise factor afforded by stealth. In theater operations the targets to be attacked are primarily military units and vehicles that are engaged in their own missions. Surface units engaged in missions and not alerted will have a higher visibility, a higher physical vulnerability, and a lower active defense capability than if they were expecting an attack from the air and had taken appropriate action to protect themselves.

In air-to-air combat, surprise is an exceedingly strong factor. Even a small delay in detection can allow one aircraft to obtain a more favorable initial position that will provide dominance in the ensuing engagement.

In evaluating stealth aircraft operations in a theater context, two additional factors that arise from the shorter distances involved must be considered. They are more important in the context of new or improved radars that might have some capability to deal with stealth.

First, as is well known, very close encounters between radars and stealth aircraft are likely to result in at least fleeting detection due to the range dependence of radar detectability. (Note, however, that the commonly quoted "inverse fourth power of range" method overstates the increase in detectability under most circumstances, particularly in the theater context.)




Such detections, limited to close encounters, would require much different processing for effective integration into an effective air defense system. Thus, in addition to improved or new radars, an air defense faced with stealth must develop new command and control techniques and equipment for processing and integrating the radar results.

Second, the advent of stealth opens up significant opportunities for electronic countermeasures by radically lowering the power level necessary to interfere with the victim radar. Of course, it does not make sense in most situations to put a jammer on a stealth aircraft itself (a so-called "on-board jammer"). But stealth and off-board jammers were made for each other, particularly if, as in the theater, the off-board jammers can be numerous and located not too far distant from the victim radar.

STEALTH AIRCRAFT OPERATIONS IN CONCERT WITH NON-STEALTH AIRCRAFT

In the current era it takes two decades or even longer to replace an entire force structure of theater aircraft. Consequently, there will be many years during which the force will consist of some stealth aircraft and some non- stealth aircraft. Indeed, in the earliest years stealth aircraft will be in the distinct minority. An evaluation of stealth must therefore examine force mix issues: 1) Are there special missions for the first increment of stealth aircraft that will make them valuable beyond their numbers? 2) Are there combined missions, using stealth and non-stealth aircraft concurrently, that enhance the value of the non-stealth aircraft? 3) Are there costs imposed upon the Soviets by the first increment of stealth aircraft that are disproportionate to their numbers?

Such evaluations involve broad considerations such as overall campaign objectives, initial conditions of strategic warning and mobilization, the numbers, dispositions, training, and readiness of opposing forces, as well as technical considerations involving stealth matters directly. Accordingly, results will vary with the specific values for these considerations, but the results are, for the most part, favorable. A few examples can illustrate.

A few stealthy cruise missiles with conventional warheads would be appropriate to provide a high-confidence attack on a small set of important, highly defended targets. Similarly, in a major attack the stealthy missiles could be assigned to the more heavily defended regions and routes, thus raising the effectiveness of the non-stealthy missiles, which would not need to contend with the worst circumstances. Finally, the Soviets would have to figure on upgrading their defenses at a majority of their valuable targets,



Stealthy Aircraft j 61

since the targets for the few stealthy missiles could be chosen after the defenses were deployed.

For strategic bombers with stealth, the same type of leverage on the defenses obtains. In addition, such aircraft, by safely bringing advanced ordnance, modern sensors, and skilled operators deep into hostile territory, pose a quick-acting military threat to unhinge a number of otherwise effective Soviet military operations.

In theater operations, especially survivable aircraft have always been valuable for reconnaissance, even if available only in small numbers. Historically, specialized aircraft in modest numbers have been decisive in air-to-air combat because they allow air supremacy to be won quickly, allowing the less-capable aircraft to conduct their air-to-ground missions unhindered.

In the future, because the Soviets rely so heavily on surface-to-air missile defenses (SAMs), we would foresee the effective use of stealth aircraft and cruise missiles to roll back SAM defenses for the non-stealth aircraft. Simi- larly, stealth aircraft could carry the air supremacy campaign deep into hostile territory, affording enemy aircraft no haven. This capability for offensive counter-air is very important to force a campaign toward early and favorable resolution, thus avoiding a long campaign stalemate in which political forces could force an unfavorable outcome.

STEALTH AIRCRAFT AND THEATER NUCLEAR OPERATIONS

The advent of the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty, which eliminates many ground-based, nuclear-armed missiles, opens up a special role for stealth aircraft. Stealth aircraft based in the theater would provide a high-confidence means of nuclear delivery. The current tight secrecy surrounding U.S. stealth programs could, however, pose possible political problems in Europe, where NATO members have traditionally shared nuclear capabilities in aircraft- delivered weapons.

SOVIET STEALTH AIRCRAFT IN THE THEATER

The general principles and values outlined above would apply to the Soviets, should they be able to develop stealth aircraft. The United States and its allies have a substantial investment in air defense, and believe that air defense protection is needed in the theater. Accordingly, there will be pressures to improve and modify U.S. and allied air defenses at a pace driven by intelligence estimates of Soviet activities in the stealth arena. Nonetheless, since the United States and its allies depend upon aircraft and cruise missiles much




more than the Soviet Union does, the value of stealth to the West will always outweigh its value to the East, even if the East's technology were to catch up at some point.

Cost and Other Unknowns

At the present state of development, many of the costs of incorporating stealth are not known in any substantial degree. Such estimates as the program offices have made are for the most part not in the public domain except in the most general terms. Only the B-2 bomber program is far enough along for production costs to be much more than estimates. No program is immune from bad luck or bad management. Moreover, the cost of operating stealth aircraft will be dependent on decisions not yet made about the degree of secrecy to be maintained.

The other unknowns relate to the development and proof of tactics when the real aircraft are available in numbers. To be sure, much of the air doctrine of the past is applicable. In fact, stealthy aircraft correspond quite closely to the more ideal aircraft envisioned in the use of air power over the years. The principles and values set forth in the paper above form the core around which the tactics will need to be developed. But we cannot know for sure just how any particular aircraft or missile will manifest itself in practice.

Notwithstanding these uncertainties, there is nothing in the nature of stealth that requires that it be particularly costly or operationally difficult. For the B-2, for example, the unit fly-away cost, aircraft to aircraft, is esti- mated to be about 20 percent more than the B-lB. Should this be borne out, then the advantages of the B-2 stealth would utterly swamp the 20 percent differential, since the payloads are said to be comparable and the B-2's appearance indicates a very efficient aerodynamical design.

A synopsis of recent public statements on B-2 cost and characteristics is contained in Table 1.

Summary

This article has traced through a process for evaluating the value and wisdom of the U.S. commitment to stealth aircraft. Stealth technology holds a promise of major geostrategic importance; the framework presented in this article should assist evaluation of the degree to which the real U.S. programs are living up to that high promise of stealth technology.



Stealthy Aircraft j 63

Table 1. Strategic Bomber Cost Estimates.

FY 81$ FY 90$ TY $d Quantity

B-2 Costs FSDa 15.0B 21.7B 20.3B Production 27.5B 43.2B 47.8B

Fly-Awayb 23.1 B 36.0B 40.3B 132 Otherc 4.4B 7.2B 7.5B

Program 42.5B 64.9B 68.1 B 132

B- 1B Costs FSD ae 9.5B 13.8B N/A Production 17.5B 27.5B N/A

Fly-Away 14.7B 22.9B 100 Othercf 2.8B 4.6B

Program 27.0B 41.3B N/A 100

Per-Unit Costsg Fly-away

B-2 175M 273M B-1 B 147M 229M Ratio, B-2/B-1 B 1.19 1.19

Program B-2 322M 492M B-1 B 270M 413M Ratio, B-2/B-1 B 1.19 1.19

NOTES. a. "FSD" stands for Full Scale Development. These costs include all Research, Development, Test, and

Evaluation activities needed to bring a design to the initiation of series production. Costs of full scale development articles are included, as are special facilities and other test equipment with residual value.

b. "Fly-Away" includes all costs needed to produce the article ready to fly. It will include all special tooling but not general tooling and facilities with residual value (these later articles are not paid for by the government but are provided by the contractor).

c. "Other" includes costs for ground-support equipment, training equipment, special maintenance equipment, initial spares, and special operational facilities.

d. "TY$" ("then-year dollars") means the sum of dollars as valued in the years they were spent. The values given are based on October 10, 1988, schedules. Rescheduling to later deliveries will raise TY$ costs without any change in work content. In addition, overhead costs will rise to cover additional overhead work content. Two programs with the same base-year dollars would have different then- year dollars if the two programs occurred during different periods of time. Note that for B-2 FSD, the then-year dollars are intermediate between FY81 dollars and FY90 dollars because the bulk of the FSD dollars were to be spent between FY81 and FY90. Also note that the inflation indices are slightly different for FSD, Fly-Away, and Other to reflect varying economic sector content and inflation factors. For example, Secretary of Defense Cheney's 1990 proposed budget (June 1989) would stretch the program and increase the then-year program total about $2.0B from the values shown in the Table.

e. The B-1B FSD costs in FY81$ include $6.5 billion from the B-1A program (spent in the 1970s) and $3.0B from the B-1B program (spent in the 1980s) for a total of $9.5B (FY81$).

f. The nominal B-1B program is $20.5B in FY81 dollars, consisting of $14.7B Fly-Away, $2.8B Other, and $3.0B FSD. Some critics have charged that some training equipment and auxiliary equipment for the B-1B were budgeted outside the nominal B-1B program, and that certain future retrofit program costs on the B-1 B have yet to be announced. These costs, if included, would tend to reduce the cost increase of the B-2 over the B-1B below the 19 percent given in the Table.

g. Per-unit costs in then-year dollars have no relevance for the unit-cost comparisons. See note d.



Documents

Assessing the Value of Stealthy Aircraft and Cruise Missiles