ASPI–CIGI WORKSHOP ON PROMOTING CLOSER DEFENCE AND SECURITY COOPERATION IN THE ASIA–PACIFIC

PROCEEDINGS AND OUTCOMES STATEMENT

2–3 JUNE 2013, SINGAPORE

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

SUMMARY .......................................................................................................... 3

OPENING SESSION AND WELCOME REMARKS .............................................. 4

THE POLITICAL-SECURITY ENVIRONMENT IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC ................ 5

THE ASIA-PACIFIC’S EVOLVING REGIONAL SECURITY ARCHITECTURE ..... 7

CLOSER SECURITY COOPERATION ................................................................ 8

EXPANDING CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC .. 10

CLOSER DEFENCE COOPERATION ............................................................... 11

DIALOGUE AGENDA ........................................................................................ 13

PARTICIPANTS ................................................................................................ 17

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SUMMARY

The ASPI-CIGI Workshop for on Promoting Closer Defence and Security Cooperation in the Asia–Pacific is the

result of a joint project between ASPI and CIGI to investigate ways to engage and expand bilateral and

multilateral relationships in the region.

The Workshop was held in the Orchid Room of the Shangri-La Hotel, Singapore, shortly after the cessation of the

IISS 2013 Shangri-La Dialogue.

The Workshop consisted of four sessions covering salient security issues in the Asia-Pacific, including;

The evolving political-security environment in the Asia-Pacific

The Asia-Pacific’s evolving regional security architecture

Closer security cooperation, particularly intelligence and cyber security

Closer defence cooperation, primarily maritime activity.

The delegations from Australia and Canada included academic, think-tank, industry and former public service

representatives. Serving military officers and public servants were invited to attend as observers. Observers

and participants were also present from Singapore, the Philippines, Malaysia, and South Korea

A dinner was held at the Halia Restaurant in the Singapore Botanic Gardens on 2 June preceding the Workshop.

The Australian High Commissioner to Singapore, Phillip Green, spoke about the growth of the Asia-Pacific and

the scope to engage with it at a critical juncture. The Dialogue was conducted under the Chatham House Rule.

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OPENING SESSION

WELCOME REMARKS

The workshop opened with some interesting questions from the co-chairs and participants, which set the tone for the day.

There’s a general recognition that Canada wants to be engaged in the Asia-Pacific for the reasons that Australia is

already fully engaged in the region. But what added value can Canada bring, and would it be welcome?

How serious is the Canadian government about engaging in the Asia-Pacific? Does it recognize the level of

investment that would be required?

Can Australia and Canadian collaborate in the region in a way that would not appear purely self-interested to Asian

partners?

Given their many cultural similarities and shared interests, why aren’t Australia and Canada already working closely

together in the region? Is it mainly due to perceptions of geographical distance, or is there more to it?

What can Australia and Canada do to help ensure that China moves beyond the national humiliation narrative to

become a mature and responsible global power?

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THE ‘KANGAMOOSE’

As the co-chair made clear, these questions drive to the heart of the ASPI-CIGI project. They represent the ‘elephant in the

room’ or in this case, the ‘Kangamoose’. The group’s responses to these questions were as follows:

Canadian participants expressed that the desire to engage more fully in the region is genuine, mainly driven by

opportunities to diversify trade and investment, and take advantage of emerging markets. The question Canada is unclear

about, however, is how to engage.There’s a general awareness that economic prosperity depends on peace and security

and effective crisis management, which in turn depends on good governance, and the strength of regional institutions. It’s

for this reason that Canada is seeking membership of the East Asia Summit (EAS) and the ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting

Plus (ADMM+), and is exploring ways to cooperate with other middle powers to contribute to the security and stability of

the region.Beyond this, however, there is some uncertainty over exactly how Canada can contribute. One speaker argued

that Canada lacks hard power, but has a lot to offer in soft power initiatives, including peace support operations,

transnational crime, maritime security, food security, financial services, life sciences, education and infrastructure. The

question is over the optimal means for Canada to assist in an age of shrinking budgets, competing priorities, and rapid

strategic change.

The Australian side expressed more certainty about the kind of engagement that is needed and which would be regarded as

appropriate by Asian partners. A bipartisan consensus exists over the need to pursue initiatives that reflect the reality that

Australia’s security and prosperity are directly tied to the Asia-Pacific, and especially to the US-China relationship and to

security dynamics in Southeast Asia. Thankfully, the US and China also have mutual interests in stability in the region. But at

the same time, a major process of militarymodernization is underway (especially in China, India, Vietnam and South Korea),

increasing force projection capabilities, and activating latent regional disputes. In response to these challenges, Australia

views forging deeper bilateral and regional engagement as the providing the best opportunities for Australia to play a

constructive role, helping rising countries to recognize interdependencies and to evolve into responsible regional powers.

Over the next 2-5 years, Australia’s focus is on practical ‘nuts and bolts’ cooperation, such as maritime capacity-building and

increasing service-to-service interoperability. Building trust and understanding through 1.5 dialogues is also important, as is

bolstering institutions by creating interpersonal links and transferring knowledge. In terms of the Australia-Canada

relationship, the important point is that this can’t and shouldn’t be a process of Australia and Canada imposing themselves

on the region. It’s crucial that both countries are sensitive to regional partners and their needs as they become more

externally focused.

THE POLITICAL-SECURITY ENVIRONMENT IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC

The first session began with a summary of one of the background papers that was prepared for the workshop, titled

‘Sources of Tension in the Asia-Pacific: Strategic Competition, Divided Regionalism and Non-Traditional Security Challenges’.

The paper’s main points were that the Asia-Pacific is confronted by a number of strategic challenges, which create

incentives for closer middle power cooperation in the region:

The rise of China and its active defence posture and military modernization;

Uncertainties over the capacity and the will of the US to retain regional primacy;

Overlapping maritime boundary claims and the expansion of naval capabilities;

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The inability of regional security architecture to build trust between states; and

Unresolved sovereignty disputes on the Korean Peninsula and across the Taiwan Strait.

Additional security challenges, including North Korean nuclear provocations, space and cyber issues,competition over

natural resources, environmental challenges, and trans-boundary river politics were added to the list.

The next presenter provided an Indian perspective on the evolving Asia-Pacific security environment. He argued that major

sources of tension remain between India and China, but there is a growing sense of mutual containment. India has emerged

from its ‘scared and prickly hedgehog’ status of the 1990s to become a more confident regional presence, building deeper

bilateral links and expanding trade relations. In terms of how Australia and Canada can help stabilize the region, which is at

risk of arms racing and serious maritime conflict, the speaker suggested that both countries could forge closer bilateral links

with other regional states, help strengthen regional institutions, and promote closer security cooperation. More specifically,

they could:

Use their influence to encourage China to join the Indian Ocean Forum;

Bring India into closer involvement in the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) meetings;

Help develop maritime confidence-building measures; and

Encourage China, India and other states to discuss nuclear risk reduction strategies.

The final presenter provided a Southeast Asian perspective, arguing that competitive regional security dynamics, which had

been on the back burner since the end of the Cold War, were re-emerging in the Asia-Pacific, causing the potential for

instability. He argued that many countries in Southeast Asia are gravitating towards the US in response to China’s rise,

although China has pursued a successful soft power agenda in the region, increasing bilateral linkages in ways that make it

in the interests of ASEAN members to continue their hedging strategies. His perception was that Canada is searching for an

appropriate role to play in Southeast Asia and the wider region, but that its efforts are unlikely to succeed unless the

government is willing to invest in concrete bilateral defence cooperation, which is currently uncertain. According to this

presenter, ASEAN favours practical cooperation rather than dialogue and ambitious speeches, which is why its members

appreciate Australia’s capacity-building efforts in the region. In general, however, Southeast Asian countries are prioritizing

intra-ASEAN defence and security cooperation. Recent steps include a trilateral initiative by Philippines, Indonesia and

Malaysia to discuss protocols for peaceful interaction in the South China Sea.

In the short discussion that followed three interesting themes emerged: the likelihood of war; the willingness and capacity

for Australia and Canada to cooperate in the region to encourage stability; and the types of concrete cooperation that

might be possible.

The general sense was that major war in the Indo-Pacific was not likely in the foreseeable future; that the high degree of

interdependence had a constraining effect on strategic competition, creating incentives for closer cooperation and risk

mitigation. But there were some words of caution. One speaker from the region argued that even in the context of

economic and other forms of interdependence, war can’t be ruled out as a deliberate decision, but of greater concern is the

possibility of the unintentional escalation of a minor dispute into a major conflict. This is especially dangerous when

nuclear-armed states are involved. Future spillover from intra-state and peripheral conflicts is also a serious cause for

concern, particularly as international forces are withdrawn from Afghanistan. A Canadian participant commented that the

majority of Canadians believe a major conflict in the region is likely in the next 10 years and that this will have a significant

impact on Canadian security.

Participants were divided on the issue of the types of Australia-Canada cooperation that would be feasible and helpful in

the region. The point was made that the best forms of cooperation might well be separate from each other, drawing on the

different strengths of each country, but in ways that projected a common message. The ASEAN preference for informal

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dialogue rather than concrete cooperation was mentioned as a possible limitation on the types of initiatives that might be

possible, but a representative from the region denied that this was a problem, stressing that countries in the region are

committed to practical capacity-building. Suggestions for closer cooperation included:

Coordinating policy responses to China, in the interests of consistent messaging;

Developing maritime confidence-building measures (CBMs) that build on Australia and Canada’s strengths. For

example, Canada could establish a centre of excellence for CBM training in Southeast Asia, to help develop

practical skills for preventing incidents at sea;

Cooperation on counter-terrorism, people trafficking and other areas of non-traditional security, which could be

enhanced by engaging the diasporas in the region; and

Shifting the focus from nuclear and conventional deterrence to building trust through a series of CBMs.

THE ASIA-PACIFIC’S EVOLVING REGIONAL SECURITY ARCHITECTURE

The chair began with some opening comments and proposed some framing questions for the panel:

How can regional institutions contribute to effective security and peace across the Asia-Pacific?

Is it possible to achieve true whole-of-government approaches to the various issues we are discussing?

What ideas can come from the panel and discussions for how Canada and Australia can add value regionally?

The first presenter examined two key areas, firstly theregional security architecture. He pointed out that what does

currently exist is known to be deeply ambiguous, and joked that there were no real solid foundations upon which these

structures were built. Despite this he outlined that ASEAN nations are happy to work within the structures it provides and

are reluctant for change. However, there was room for reform and tweaking. The second area that he examined was

outlining the Canadian and Australian contribution to the creation of the ASEAN structure. The perspective was largely a

historical one, mentioning many key Australian and Canadian politicians and academics who had contributed procedurally

or intellectually to building the security architecture of the Asia-Pacific. The Australia in the Asian Century White Paper was

mentioned as being a positive step forward for Australian thinking on regional engagement and was felt to be changing

negativity that could have been built up during the previous decade. Canada’s profile in the Asia-Pacific was noted as

‘fading’ and that there was a real need for re-engagement from them.

The second perspective looked at the defence element of regional architectures and spoke of them in reference to both

bilateral relationships and discussions, along with broader regional engagement through ASEAN. He stressed the challenge

lay in how to make mechanisms established during the Cold War relevant to the present day. The other question he posed

was whether the re-emergence of traditional security issues in the region would mean the return of alliances to the original

remit upon which they were first formed. Reference was made to the US–Philippine alliance which has closely been focused

on non-traditional security issues recently. There was concern about the time pressures that are placed on defence

engagement, and that there are too many avenues for this to take place which could dilute the effectiveness of these

discussions. Put simply, it would be difficult for defence officials to actually attend the number of meetings now required.

ASEAN has been very guilty of this and he felt that the ‘alphabet soup’ of meetings had to be rationalised in order to make

them more focused. He felt that there was increased appetite for expanded practical engagement rather than more ‘talk

shops’, and additionally there was a real need to be able to sustain the important dialogues rather than continually

introduce new ones.

The next presenter added a South Korean perspective on regional engagement. He felt that in many cases, a country’s

Ministry of Defence could now be called the ‘Ministry of Dialogue’. It is important to understand the diversity of security

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interests across the region and that perceptions of the threats are very different depending upon which nation you are.

There was danger in the fact that so many bilateral tensions exist regionally, and that there is no clear consensus on the

regional security issues such as the South China Sea, and that being able to accommodate all of these different security

interests in one place was going to be extremely problematic. The second element of his talk looked at confidence and

transparency issues across the region. The fact that nations have different levels of development was highlighted as

important because many countries are struggling with nation building and are especially focused on their own national

interest rather than a regional understanding of the issues. This makes it difficult to build confidence in neighbours.

However, increased transparency would boost security cooperation in the Asia-Pacific. The point was again raised that

there are too many dialogues and meetings to discuss regional security issues and that this can create less participation

especially from smaller states.

He proposed some ways of increasing cooperation between nations in the region:

Strengthen the ARF – The working groups should have a streamlined focus and some groups should be culled, but

this could lead to a more organised and effective cooperative process.

Think closely about divisions of labour – Topics of discussion often overlap between the ARF and the ADMM+,

therefore, slim down the topics and lower the duplication of effort.

Overall there is a need for increased patience in this region for success to be achieved.

During the question and answer session there was discussion of the ‘messiness’ of the regional security architecture. There

was agreement on the fact that the landscape was cluttered, but opinions differed on whether this was an advantage or

disadvantage. Some viewed the cluttering as advantageous as this diffused the pressure placed upon a single meeting

which would have to decide all the issues, and that by dividing up the issues it became easier to create more practical

solutions. However, the other side of the argument was that the lack of focus means that the work is not entirely

understood or utilised to fit into the bigger picture of what ASEAN is trying to achieve. A lack of a grand design in the region

was mentioned and the danger that the oversupply of institutions lends itself to the over-influence of one great power. The

process of whittling down the number of avenues for discussion would be problematic as mistakes could be made and good

work lost as dialogues were closed down. How would one chose the areas to intervene anyway?

Discussion also examined the role of Australia and Canada. It was mentioned that when looking at the history of Australia’s

involvement in these processes it had hinged upon a ‘gatekeeper’, which was Indonesia. However, Australia cannot play

that same role for Canada, so there is the question of who could act as Canada’s gatekeeper should it try to gain entry into

ASEAN and the EAS.

CLOSER SECURITY COOPERATION

The first presenter discussed the challenges associated with cooperation on cyber issues and focused on opportunities for

Track 2 dialogues to facilitate exchange. Government recognizes that cyber is a problem, but officials don’t understand

cyber issues. For instance, there is issue conflation between cyber security and internet governance. There is also an

enormous disparity of knowledge, particularly between technical experts and policy community. There is a role for Track 2

dialogues to:

Clarify concepts for policymakers.

Coordinate tabletops or gaming on cyber simulations. This should include the private sector.

Engage the legal community to draft rules of engagement and provide guidance on appropriate legislation.

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The second presenter surveyed a range of non-traditional security issues in the Asia-Pacific region and looked for synergies

between Canada and Australia. One such area is food security, which itself is difficult to separate from other non-traditional

challenges like energy security, urbanization and environmental problems like fish stock preservation and the distribution of

water. Given Canadian and Australian comparative advantages as developed countries and as exporters of energy and food

Canada and Australia can:

Promote research and development on food security.

Pursue joint ventures with regional companies.

Promote fish stock conservation and strengthen the Fisheries and Agriculture Organization.

The final presenter characterized transnational crime as a cancer on the global economy, which is very hard to remove

because it is multifaceted making it difficult to identify threat actors and develop responses. Modern criminals are closer to

businesses than gangs: they partner well. According to the United Nations transnational crime in the Asia-Pacific is worth

$90 billion. Counterfeit goods are 2% of world trade and have penetrated the global supply chain. The regional heroin

market is $16.3 billion and the methamphetamine market is $15 billion. To this one can also add the politically contentious

issue of people smuggling. Areas of potential cooperation include:

Collaboration between Canadian and Australian authorities and with Interpol, particularly towards the

development of common data sets.

Information exchange.

Capacity building is the low hanging fruit. Contribute to the region’s legal, police, intelligence and educational

systems. The Australian Federal Policy and the Royal Canadian Mounted Policeoften train other police forces.

The discussion picked up on the last point with a collective effort to list Canadian competencies in capacity building in the

hopes it could leverage this capacity in the Asia-Pacific. The areas identified included: police, corrections and judicial

training in Afghanistan, Haiti and Mexico as well as the construction of maritime security operations centres. One speaker

noted that the Canadian government favourscentres of excellence that bring in multiple actors. For instance, through funds

allocated to military training, Canada works with Chile to train Guatemalan pilots at a Jamaican flight school. One

participant proposed that Canada and Australia compare notes in the field of capacity building since combating local

corruption is often the first challenge.

Another area of possible collaboration identified was human smuggling as both Canada and Australia are receivers in a

region of suppliers. Do the two countries, for instance, adopt similar policies towards transit countries? There may be space

to share best practices, from operations to handling of refugees. Furthermore, the two countries could share the diplomatic

burden of expressing their concerns about the issue to regional countries. This would be welcomed by Australia.

The discussion turned to practical steps, in light of sensitivities, for national security agencies to cooperate on cyber

defense. It was noted that there is a need to bring the private sector into discussions, but that this exacerbates concerns

from government about secrecy. Some suggested that Track 2 dialogues that leave government out are the way forward. It

was also noted that gaming exercises were an opportunity for the think-tank community to develop best practices on cyber

cooperation, which could be rolled out among allies. A participant from the region noted that support for the mapping of

critical infrastructure would likely be appreciated by countries in the Asia-Pacific. Given US overtures to China for a cyber

dialogue, there may be traction for Canada and Australia to act now.

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EXPANDING CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC

The session opened with some discussion before the presentations. The Chair addressed some of the ‘Kangamoose’ raised

in the first session. Australia can’t help Canada get into ADMM+; it’s an ASEAN meeting. Canada should explore Observer

status, front up with military capabilities and presence relevant to ASEAN interests. This cooperation should take the form

of full spectrum engagement including efforts to improve the capacity and professionalism of militaries in Southeast Asia.

This could range from teaching English to the Laotian military to conducting joint operations with Singapore. Admission to

ADMM+ is a beginning, not an end in itself. The symbolism associated with contributing to regional security is important.

The Australian government gets value from Canada in the region because it is another voice of the same values.

The first presenter put Canada’s capacity to engage in broader context; the opportunities to engage far outweigh its ability

to participate. Therefore, there is a need to focus on efforts that yield the greatest value. The Canadian government's 2013

budget made it clear that the defence department will be working with fewer resources. Therefore, proceeding with new

proposals will have to come at the expense of current activities. Against this backdrop the presenter made three points:

There are opportunity costs to engagement. There is a need to explain why it matters more than what Canada is

doing now.

It is imperative that any suggestions around “confidence building efforts” show how they will achieve specific

objectives.

Canadians may be concerned about how new Canadian efforts will be received in the region given growing

regional tensions. Will these efforts be perceived as threatening or helpful?

The second presenter noted that Canada and Australia have typically looked at the United States rather than each other,

which explains why there is unfulfilled potential in the relationship. Everyone agrees that Asia needs security engagement.

When it comes to regional disputes, the best that can be hoped for is perpetual dispute management. Resolution should be

avoided in order to avoid creating losers that may carry a vendetta. With the aim of contributing to the peaceful evolution

of the international system, it is important to consider the degree to which Canada and Australia can improve the overall

context of great power relations. What is the model of Canadian engagement in the Asia-Pacific? Is it to work with

Australia? Work with others? This needs to be addressed so that Canada bears the appropriate opportunity cost. With this

in mind the speaker outlined several proposals:

Australia has seen great value in sending people to military college in the region, despite often sub-optimal

education outcomes. This could be priceless engagement if graduates are connected to the defence attaché

stream.

Build connections via a junior officer exchange program.

Find 3rd

parties to facilitate otherwise impossible interactions. One example is a military exercise between Australia

and China, the United States and Indonesia.

Don’t leave China out.

Indonesia and Canada both use Leopard Tanks. This is grounds for a personnel exchange.

There are lots of opportunities for the sharing of best practices in SAR and HADR.

Everyone is interested in counter–IED tactics, biometrics, and the interoperability needed for climate change

events. These are areas of Canadian competency.

Ultimately, dollars can be managed and engagement can yield significant advantages.

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CLOSER DEFENCE COOPERATION

Session Four of the ASPI-CIGI Workshop unpacked the prospect of closer defence cooperation between Australia and

Canada in a bilateral and/or multilateral fashion. The first presenter spoke on elements of a paper entitled 'Closer Australia-

Canada defence cooperation?’, which covered the following:

a shared legacy;

regional engagement in the Asia-Pacific through defence attachés, ASEAN, US Pacific Command;

shared intelligence relationship through the Five Power Defence Arrangements;

further multilateral engagement in maritime exercises and collaboration with amphibious development;

capability enhancement through shared education and training, materiel acquisition and IT networking;

defence level Australian and Canadian engagement with the US and China in the Asia-Pacific.

Comments were made on the differing desires of Australia and Canada in the face of US engagement in Asia: Australia

desires it while Canada sees it as a competitor and wishes to move out from under the American shadow. The signs of a

strategic shift from Canada by way of energy exports and the importance of NATO was also outlined, as well as Australia's

'Indo-Pacific' shift.

The second speaker presented some general reflections on defence cooperation in the Asia-Pacific, specifically on

shortcomings and drawbacks. This was set against the backdrop of rising nationalism in Asia and less incentive within Asian

governments to divest control on regional cooperation to defence. The speaker elaborated on the following arguments;

meaningful defence cooperation only occurs in wartime;

defence cooperation during lean times is difficult as it is costly;

clear-cut adversary as a common objective is lacking in Asia when compared to NATO and the EU

meaningful defence cooperation requires trust: this is present in the EU but not across the board in Asia, thus no

bilateral defence relationships between neighbours in Asia;

only through high-powered defence arrangements can mulitlateral trust be built in Asia.

It was postulated by the speaker that defence cooperation in Asia is unlikely to grow, due to mistrust. Complimentary

military modernisation programs are the more serious feature of the security scene in Asia, particularly at the industrial

level where competition between various state defence industries makes cooperation between them under the auspices of

ASEAN impossible.

The major power activity in Asia is showing promise, and according to the speaker, the flux in encouraging as it promotes

hedging and acquiescence. The idea that the ADMM+ could be the Asian NATO was denuded as a 'little hard to square' with

Asian realities, and Asia is not obliged to fit into western templates.

The session then opened for questions, comments and discussion: a contributor to proceedings suggested first that while

narrative and perceptions on a national scale regarding regional states is important, major events that call for real defence

cooperation are the things that bind those relationships (Kapyong is reiterated as an example of the Australian-Canadian

bond through serving together in conflict). The NATO issue was also revisited: participants were assured that NATO is not a

sunset alliance for Canada. The contributor also highlighted the finite nature of funding and capacity for engagement;

Canadian engagement in Asia will detract from ability to engage with NATO. COBRA GOLD is an example of such an

exercise.

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The comment is made by another contributor that it is important that old forces are not dismantled or disengaged in the

establishment of new ones. A question was directed at the second speaker in relation to the Australian and Canadian

engagement with Asia regarding its progress and how to measure that progress given the different time scales in Asia vis

Australia-Canada.

Another contributor commented that ADF cooperation cannot discard the framework that has been established by ASEAN.

The question arose as to whether the ADMM+ will take on non-traditional security issues. This was furthered by discussion

raised by another participant in relation to Canada's high esteem as held by the rest of the world. The economic

frameworks in which Canada participates were also raised: the formation of GATT and WTO, APEC etc. The need to consider

economics when looking at security was posited. The need for patience as well as engagement was also posited, as was a

bilateral working group to establish and develop Canadian connections in the Asia-Pacific.

The consideration of Asia-Pacific engagement alongside existing European engagement (NATO) in the face of evolving

security challenges was raised by another participant: NATO may be an elegant system and important to Canada, but Asia is

inelegant and important also. The diverted focus over the last decade was mentioned. A question arose regarding shared

procurement of aerial capabilities and the shared nature of Australia and Canada's dependence on the US for air defence.

The point was made from one of the participants about how Canada's rebalance may be interpreted: it could be viewed as

another 'rebalance' and met with similar skepticism and fears of containment. How will Canada avoid being coopted by the

US into sea lane policing or the Air-Sea Battleconcept? A panelist also asked what Canada can offer Australia by way of

integrating them into Asia, and another participant spoke about capability expenditures and what the strategic outlook

post-Afghanistan looks like for Australia and Canada.

The response from the two main speakers addressed a selection of the questions:

bilateral engagement with Asia has improved in some regards but not others; there has been deterioration on

Canada's side but Australia's engagement is not all that meaningful either.

there are competitive military programs running in Asia, and this is potentially destabilising.

communication between Canada-Australia-Asia has improved, and ADMM+ will play a useful role here, but non-

traditional security should not be addressed by this forum.

the likeminded approach of Canada and Australia to security will serve them both well.

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DIALOGUE AGENDA

3 June 2013 SHANGRI-LA SINGAPORE

9.00am - 9.15am WELCOME AND INTRODUCTORY REMARKS

Peter Jennings, Executive Director, Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI),

Australia

Len Edwards, Chair, Centre for International Governance Innovation (CIGI), Canada

9.15am - 9.30am PERSPECTIVES FROM SENIOR AUSTRALIAN AND CANADIAN OFFICIALS

9.30am - 10.45am SESSION 1: The evolving political-security environment in the Asia-Pacific

Sources of strategic tension in the Asia-Pacific region, including issues related to

China’s rise, US regional engagement, maritime disputes, military expansion and

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modernisation, and unresolved sovereignty issues on the Korean peninsula and

across the Taiwan Strait

Chair: Russell Trood, ASPI, Australia

Speakers: Professor Robert Ayson, CSS, New Zealand; Professor Rajesh Basrur,

RSIS, Singapore; Dr James Manicom, CIGI, Canada

10.45am – 11.15am COFFEE BREAK

11.15am - 12.30pm SESSION 2: The Asia-Pacific’s evolving regional security architecture

Strengths and weaknesses of the Asia-Pacific’s regional security architecture,

including an overview of Australian and Canadian participation in regional

frameworks and Asian perspectives on the potential for deeper regional

institutionalisation

Chair: Tanya Ogilvie-White, ASPI, Australia

Speakers: Professor Tan See Seng, RSIS, Singapore; Dr RaymundQuilop,

Philippines Ministry of Defence; Dr Lee Jaehyon, Asan Institute for Policy Studies,

Seoul

12.30pm - 1.30pm BUFFET LUNCH

Venue: The Line Restaurant, lower level, tower wing, Shangri-La

1.30pm - 2.45pm SESSION 3: Closer security cooperation

Options for strengthening governance and security cooperation in the Asia-Pacific,

via innovative bilateral and multilateral initiatives, particularly in areas of cyber,

energy, resource and food security

Chair: Fen Hampson, CIGI, Canada

Speakers: Ms. Elina Noor, ISIS, Malaysia; Ms Sarah Norgrove, ASPI, Australia, Dr.

Tobias Feakin, ASPI, Australia

2.45pm – 3.00pm COMMENTS from Australian and Canadian military officials on expanding

confidence building measures in the Asia-Pacific

3.00pm – 3.30pm TEA BREAK

3.30pm – 4.45pm SESSION 4: Closer defence cooperation

Forward-looking strategies to enhance bilateral and multilateral defence cooperation

in the Asia-Pacific, including in areas of military-to-military engagement, capability

development and industry cooperation

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Chair: Peter Jennings, ASPI, Australia

Speakers: Dr John Blaxland, ANU, Australia; Dr Tim Huxley, IISS, Singapore

4.45pm – 5.00pm CONCLUDING SESSION: Priorities for closer cooperation

Peter Jennings, ASPI, Australia

Len Edwards, CIGI, Canada

5.00pm – onwards Meeting closes,participants make their own departure and dinner

arrangements

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PARTICIPANTS

Professor Rajesh Basrur, Professor of International Relations, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Singapore

Dr John Blaxland, Senior Fellow, Australian National University, Australia

Mr Mike Byers, Executive Officer, United States Political and Strategic Division, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade,

Australia

Major-General Angus Campbell, Deputy Chief of Army, Department of Defence, Australia

Dr Andrew Carr, Associate Lecturer, Australian National University, Australia

Mr Ben Coleman, Assistant Secretary, Capability Development Group, Department of Defence, Australia

Major-General Michael Day, Director-General, Department of National Defence, Canada

Mr Graeme Dobell, Journalist Fellow, Australian Strategic Policy Institute, Australia

Professor Wendy Dobson, Director, Rotman Institute for International Business, University of Toronto, Canada

Ambassador Len Edwards, Canadian Co-Chair and Distinguished Fellow, Centre for International Governance Innovation,

Canada

Dr Tobias Feakin, Senior Analyst, Australian Strategic Policy Institute, Australia

Mr Roger Girouard, Rear Admiral (Retired), Canadian Defence Industries Association, Canada

High Commissioner Heather Grant, High Commissioner of Canada to Singapore

Mr Philip Green, High Commissioner of Australia to Singapore

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Professor Fen Osler Hampson, Distinguished Fellow and Director, Global Security Program, Centre for International

Governance Innovation, Canada

Dr Tim Huxley, Executive Director, International Institute for Strategic Studies (Asia), Singapore

Professor Brian Job, Associate Director, Institute of Asian Research, University of British Columbia, Canada

Dr Jaehyon Lee, Director, Center for ASEAN and Oseania Studies, Asan Institute, South Korea

Mr Peter Jennings, Executive Director, Australian Strategic Policy Institute, Australia

Group Captain Phil Lavelle, Office of the Australian Defence Adviser, Australian High Commission, Singapore

Brigadier John Mackenzie, Director-General South East Asia, International Policy Division, Department of Defence, Australia

Dr James Manicom, Research Fellow, Centre for International Governance Innovation, Canada

Mr Reid Morden, Former Director, Canadian Security Intelligence Service, Canada

Ms Sarah Norgrove, Research Assistant, Australian Strategic Policy Institute, Australia

MsElina Noor, Assistant Director, Foreign Policy and Security Studies, Institute of Strategic and International Studies,

Malaysia

Ms Amanda O’Brien, First Secretary, Australian High Commission, Singapore

Dr Tanya Ogilvie-White, Senior Analyst, Australian Strategic Policy Institute, Australia

Mr Simon Pomel, Deputy Director, Office of the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Canada

Dr RaymundQuilop, Assistant Secretary, Department of National Defense, Philippines

Ms Lisa Rice Madan, Political Counsellor, Canadian High Commission, Singapore

Mr Morris Rosenberg, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Canada

Mr Michael Shoebridge, First Assistant Secretary Strategic Policy, Department of Defence, Australia

Professor Tan See Seng, Deputy Director, Institute for Defence and Strategic Studies; Head, Centre for Multilateralism

Studies, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Singapore

Ms Angela Tierney, Executive Officer, Defence Strategy and Regional Security Section, Department of Foreign Affairs and

Trade, Australia

Professor Russell Trood, Professor of International Relations, Griffith University, Australia

Professor David Welch, Chair in Global Security, Centre for International Governance Innovation, University of Waterloo,

Canada

Dr Jung-yup Woo, Director, Center for Security Policy, Asan Institute, South Korea

Professor Samina Yasmeen, Director, Centre for Muslim States and Societies, University of Western Australia, Australia

Ambassador Sung JoonYim, Former President, Korea Foundation, South Korea

19

About ASPI

The Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) is an independent, non-partisan policy institute. It has been set up by the Australian Government to provide fresh ideas on Australia’s defence and strategic policy choices. ASPI is charged with the task of informing the public on strategic and defence issues, generating new ideas for government, and fostering strategic expertise in Australia. It aims to help Australians understand the critical strategic choices which our country will face over the coming years, and will help government make better-informed decisions. ASPI www.aspi.org.au www.aspistrategist.org.au

About CIGI

The Centre for International Governance Innovation (CIGI) is an independent, non-partisan think tank on

international governance. Led by experienced practitioners and distinguished academics, CIGI supports research,

forms networks, advances policy debate and generates ideas for multilateral governance improvements.

Conducting an active agenda of research, events and publications, CIGI's interdisciplinary work includes

collaboration with policy, business and academic communities around the world.

CIGI

www.cigionline.org

© The Australian Strategic Policy Institute Limited and The Centre for International Governance Innovation 2013