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Australian Nuclear Association Lecture
ASNO and Recent Developments in Nuclear Safeguardsand Nuclear SecurityDr Robert Floyd, Director General
Australian Safeguards and Non-Proliferation Office
1 pm Thurs 26 June 2014AINSE Theatre, New Illawarra Rd, Lucas Heights, NSW.
Abstract
Dr Floyd will provide an update on recent developments in the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) tomodify the way it implements nuclear safeguards. The way the IAEA implements safeguards to verify thecompliance of states with non-proliferation commitments is, by design, an evolving system. It is essentialthat IAEA safeguards approaches and methodologies are able to adapt as technologies change, as the riskprofile of the nuclear fuel cycle changes, and as its experience of what does and does not work changes. Thepresentation will also cover some of the complexity of IAEA safeguards implementation in some States withnon-standard arrangements.
Dr Floyd will also describe recent developments in nuclear security. There has been strong activity in nuclearsecurity globally, highlighted by three summits of world leaders held in Washington, Seoul and this year inthe Netherlands. Australia has shown unwavering support for strong outcomes at these summits. On thedomestic front, Australia undertook an IAEA nuclear security peer review of its nuclear securityarrangements in November 2013. The mission team concluded that nuclear security within Australia has longbeen of a high standard and has been significantly enhanced in recent years. Australia’s strong nuclearsecurity credentials has also been recognised in the Nuclear Threat Initiative’s Nuclear Security Index whichhas twice ranked Australia’s performance first among states having significant holdings of sensitive nuclearmaterial. The presentation will outline what Australia brought to the 2014 Netherlands Nuclear SecuritySummit, provide highlights of our peer review mission and set out why Australia is ranked first in the NuclearSecurity Index.
About Dr Robert Floyd
Dr Floyd was appointed to the position of Director General, Australian Safeguards and Non-proliferationOffice (ASNO) in December 2010. He is responsible for Australia’s implementation and compliance withregard to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, Chemical Weapons Convention and the Comprehensive TestBan Treaty as well as engaging in further development of safeguards and non-proliferation regimes. He hasbeen appointed by the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency to his Standing AdvisoryGroup on Safeguards Implementation, is the lead official (“Sherpa”) for Australia in the Nuclear SecuritySummit process, and Chair of the AsiaPacific Safeguards Network.
Prior to this appointment as Director General of ASNO, Dr Floyd served for more than seven years in theDepartment of the Prime Minister and Cabinet (PM&C) where he held a number of senior executivepositions providing advice to the Prime Minister on policy issues covering counter-terrorism, counter-proliferation, emergency management, homeland and border security. He has previously spent nearly 20years working in CSIRO as a research scientist in biological sciences and has held various senior researchmanagement positions.
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Australian Safeguards and
Non-Proliferation Office
ASNO and recent developments in nuclear safeguards and nuclear security
Australian Nuclear Association Meeting
26 June 2014
Dr Robert Floyd
Director General ASNO
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Outline
1. Australian Safeguards and Non-proliferation Office
2. Recent developments in nuclear safeguards
– Australia and IAEA safeguards
– State-level concept for safeguards implementation
– Further evolution of safeguards
3. Recent developments in nuclear security
– Nuclear Security Summit 2014
– International Physical Protection Advisory Service mission
– Nuclear Threat Initiative – Nuclear Security Index
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Australian Safeguards and
Non-Proliferation Office
To enhance Australia’s and global security through activities which contribute to effective regimes against the proliferation of nuclear and chemical weapons
Goal of ASNO
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Australian Safeguards and
Non-Proliferation Office
• NPT and associated IAEA safeguards agreements (CSA + AP)
• CPPNM (Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material)
• CTBT (Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty)
• CWC (Chemical Weapons Convention)
• SPNFZ (South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone)
• Network of 22 bilateral nuclear safeguards agreements
– ASNO responsible for “tracking” Australian uranium exports through
network of bilateral nuclear safeguards agreements
Regulatory and administrative responsibilities
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Australian Safeguards and
Non-Proliferation Office
• Safeguards Act gives effect to Australia’s obligations
– NPT
– Safeguards Agreement and Additional Protocol with the IAEA
– Agreements between Australia and various countries (and Euratom) - transfers of nuclear items and cooperation
– Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and its 2005 amendment
• Safeguards Act establishes a system for control over nuclear material, associated items and facilities
– ASNO as an independent regulator
– Director General ASNO responsible directly to the Minister for Foreign Affairs and Parliament
– Requirements for permits for possession and transport of nuclear material and associated items
Nuclear Non-Proliferation (Safeguards) Act 1987
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Australian Safeguards and
Non-Proliferation Office
• Application of safeguards in Australia
– Submit reports to IAEA on nuclear materials and facilities
– Administer permits and authorities
• Physical protection and security of nuclear material, technology and facilities
– Issue permits and monitor compliance
• Operation of bilateral safeguards agreements
– Tracking and reporting for Australian obligated uranium exports and foreign obligated materials in Australia
• Advice to Government
• Development and effective implementation of International Safeguards
– SAGSI, APSN, ASSP and outreach
So what does ASNO do?
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Australian Safeguards and
Non-Proliferation Office
• IAEA safeguards to apply or fallback safeguards should NPT or IAEA safeguards cease
• AONM is used only for peaceful purposes and in no way enhances or contributes to any military purpose
• Prior consent for retransfers, reprocessing, and enrichment to 20% or more
• AONM is properly accounted for as it moves through the nuclear fuel cycle (procedures set out in administrative arrangements)
• Adequate levels of physical protection applied to AONM
Australia’s uranium export policy
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Outline
1. Australian Safeguards and Non-proliferation Office
2. Recent developments in nuclear safeguards
– Australia and IAEA safeguards
– State-level concept for safeguards implementation
– Further evolution of safeguards
3. Recent developments in nuclear security
– Nuclear Security Summit 2014
– International Physical Protection Advisory Service mission
– Nuclear Threat Initiative – Nuclear Security Index
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Australian Safeguards and
Non-Proliferation Office
What are IAEA Safeguards?
• Not about ‘safe’ or ‘guards’
• Safeguards are measures applied by the IAEA to verify that non-proliferation commitments made by States under safeguards agreements with the IAEA are fulfilled
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Australian Safeguards and
Non-Proliferation Office
Comprehensive Safeguards & Additional Protocol
Comprehensive Safeguards (1972)
• Gives the IAEA the tools to determine
the correctness of state declarations
• Primarily limited to nuclear facilities and
declared nuclear material
Additional Protocol (1997)
• IAEA tools to determine correctness &
completeness of state declarations
• Broader IAEA access to info and
locations related to nuclear activities10
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Australian Safeguards and
Non-Proliferation Office
• Undeclared: Detection of undeclared activities in the State
• Misuse: Detection of undeclared production or processing of nuclear material at declared facilities
• Diversion: Detection of diversion of declared nuclear material
Safeguards objectives
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Australian Safeguards and
Non-Proliferation Office
• IAEA collects & processes safeguards-relevant info from wide range of sources:
− Reports: information from the State;
− Boots on the ground: inspections of nuclear material inventory, facility designs, nuclear-related activities
− HQ analysis: analysis of declared info, open source info (e.g. sat. imagery) & third party info
• IAEA reviews all info and evaluates consistency with the State’s declarations
− any anomalies, questions or inconsistencies are identified and addressed in a timely manner through follow-up action.
Safeguards measures
Note: IAEA’s safeguards measures not just about detecting non-compliance;
also about deterring non-compliance by risk of detection 12
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Australian Safeguards and
Non-Proliferation Office
• CSA: Evaluation and verification activities that provide credible assurance that declared nuclear material is accounted for and remains in peaceful nuclear activities (conclusion on non-diversion) - focus on correctness of declarations
• CSA + Additional Protocol: Measures to provide the international community with credible assurance that not only is all declared nuclear material accounted for, but there is also no undeclared nuclear material or activities in a State – focus on completeness of declarations
− known as the “broader conclusion”
IAEA’s safeguards compliance conclusions
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Australian Safeguards and
Non-Proliferation Office
• The IAEA has drawn the “broader conclusion” on Australia’s safeguards compliance since 2001, i.e. conclusion that
− not only is all declared nuclear material accounted for, but there is no undeclared nuclear material or activities
• Australia first “broader conclusion” country in the world
• This was due to, inter alia
− Australia’s early ratification of Additional Protocol
− Strong record of cooperation and transparency with IAEA
− Effectiveness of Australia’s system of accountancy and control of nuclear material
− Relatively small size of Australia’s nuclear industry
IAEA Safeguards Conclusions - Australia
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Australian Safeguards and
Non-Proliferation Office
• Safeguards only on identified facilities as a condition of supply
− 1950s – early 1970s
• Safeguards on all nuclear material and facilities applied on a facility-by-facility basis
− early 1970s – today
• State-level safeguards approach – from ~2001 for some countries
− Integrated safeguards – optimum combination of all safeguards measures (CSA+AP) to achieve maximum effectiveness and efficiency of meeting safeguards obligations (once “broader conclusion” has been drawn)
• Further evolution is required to apply State-level approaches to all States
Evolution of Safeguards Implementation
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Continued Evolution
• Enhance IAEA safeguards system providing credible assurances
• Enhance effectiveness and improve efficiency of implementation
• Move further away from prescriptive, criteria-driven implementation focused at facility-level towards safeguards implementation focused at the State-level
• More focused safeguards activities – flexible and customized
• Better use of all safeguards-relevant information
• More dynamic, robust and iterative State evaluation process
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State-Level Concept: Definition
Safeguards implementation that is based more upon
safeguards considerations for the State as a whole
rather than solely on the quantity and type of declared
nuclear material and facilities in a State
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State-Level Concept
• A holistic approach to safeguards implementation
− Applicable to all States with SG agreements
− Based on a comprehensive and continuous State evaluation and a customized State-level approach
− Executed through an annual implementation plan
• Considering the State as a whole provides the opportunity to take State-specific factors into consideration during all stages of safeguards implementation
• Implementation of the State-level concept is responsive to changes in the analysis, ensuring that safeguards conclusions remain soundly based and up-to-date
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Australian Safeguards and
Non-Proliferation Office
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Australian Safeguards and
Non-Proliferation Office
The case for further evolution of safeguards
Time
Safeguards Budget Facilities & nuclear material
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Outline
• Australian Safeguards and Non-proliferation Office
• Recent developments in nuclear safeguards
– Australia and IAEA safeguards
– State-level concept for safeguards implementation
– Further evolution of safeguards
• Recent developments in nuclear security
– Nuclear Security Summit 2014
– International Physical Protection Advisory Service mission
– Nuclear Threat Initiative – Nuclear Security Index
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Safety
Security
Safeguards
Treaties, Laws,
Regulation, Design,
Inspection, Review
Assurance
The Trilogy
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Significant Nuclear Events
• Hiroshima and Nagasaki
• Windscale, Three Mile Island, Chernobyl, Tokai-mura, Fukushima
• Loose Nukes, Improvised Nuclear Device, Nuclear Terrorism…?
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Nuclear Security Summits
• Nuclear Security Summit followed President Obama’s “Prague speech” (5 April 2009)
– Identified acquisition of a nuclear weapon by terrorists as “the most immediate and extreme threat to global security”.
– called for “a new international effort to secure all vulnerable nuclear material around the world within four years”.
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Washington Summit
• 1st Summit 12-13 April 2010
• 47 countries + IAEA + United Nations + European Union
• Produced Communiqué and Workplan
Seoul Summit
• 2nd Summit 26-27 March 2012
• Added Denmark, Lithuania, Azerbaijan,
Romania, Gabon, Hungary, Interpol
• Now 53 + 5 States
• New Communiqué
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The Hague Summit
Opening Ceremony Scenario Based Exercise
Communique #3
Leader’s only discussionFuture of the Summit
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How Does Australia Perform?
• Adhere to International Nuclear Security Treaties and Norms
– Amended CPPNM, ICSANT, UNSCR1540
• Minimisation of HEU Norms
– Use of LEU fuel and targets for 99Mo production
• Strong use of best practice guidelines
– e.g. INFCIRC/225
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• Peer Review - hosted International Physical Protection Advisory Service mission (will discuss later)
• Active in Nuclear Security Partnerships
– GICNT - chair of Nuclear Forensics Working Group
• Full support for the IAEAPartnerships
– including donations to Nuclear Security Fund (NSF)
– Incident and Trafficking Database
• International Cooperation and Outreach
How Does Australia Perform?
How Does Australia Perform?
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International Assurances?
• Activities undertaken, information shared, or measures implemented that provide confidence to others of the effectiveness of nuclear security within a given state
• Builds credibility and confidences
– Internal - Government and public
– External - State-to-state, multilateral
• Raise the level of practice
• Help assess effectiveness
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Safeguards SecuritySafety
RulesTreaties
Conventions
Standards
Transparency & Accountability
Assurance
How much assurance is provided?
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Transparency and Openness are not absolutes
Scaled Transparency and Openness
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Assurances mechanisms are diverse
ASSURANCE
PROVIDERS
ASSURANCE
ARRANGEMENTS
• Governments
– Ministries/Agencies
– Regulator
• Industry/Nuclear Operators
• Unilateral
• Bilateral
• Multilateral
ASSURANCE
RECIPIENTS
• Other Governments
– Neighbors
– Allies
– Adversaries
• International Organizations
• The Public32
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Security assurance
now
RulesTreaties
Conventions
Standards
Transparency & Accountability
AssuranceSecurity
assurance in the future?
Assurances… now and the future
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Country CPPNM +2005
Amend
ICSANT GCINT COC* IAEA AP CTBT Nuclear
Activities
Brunei No No No No No No Ratified None
Cambodia Ratified No Signed Yes No No Ratified None
Laos Ratified No No No No BOG Ratified None
Myanmar No No No No No Signed Signed None
Indonesia Ratified Ratified No No Yes In Force Ratified RRs
Malaysia No No Signed Yes Yes Signed Ratified RR
Philippines Ratified No Signed Yes Yes In Force Ratified RR, PWR (Inop)
Singapore No No Signed Yes No In Force Ratified None
Thailand No No Signed Yes Yes Signed Ratified RR
Vietnam Ratified Ratified No Yes Yes In Force Ratified RR
China Ratified Ratified Ratified Yes Yes In Force Signed Full fuel cycle
Japan Ratified No Accept Yes Yes In Force Ratified Full fuel cycle
Korea Ratified No Signed Yes Yes In Force Ratified PWR, RR, Fuel Fab
Australia Ratified Ratified Ratified Yes Yes In Force Ratified U mines, RR
New Zealand Ratified No Signed Yes Yes In Force Ratified None
ICSANT = Nuclear Terrorism Convention, AP = IAEA Additional Protocol, COC = Code of Conduct on the Safety and
Security of Radioactive Sources, GCINT = Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism,
* Formal support via Notif GC(47)/RES/7.B
Much to be done…
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Australian Safeguards and
Non-Proliferation Office
Nuclear Threat Initiative: Nuclear Security Index
• Assesses the contribution of states toward improved global nuclear materials security conditions
– 25 states with > 1 kg or more of weapons-usable nuclear materials
– 151 states < 1 kg of weapons-usable nuclear materials
• Developed by the Nuclear Threat Initiative with the Economist Intelligence Unit (publisher of the Economist)
• Reviewed by international expert panel of experts including one panelist from Australia.
• First done in 2012 and revised 2014 just before the Seoul and The Hague Nuclear Security Summits
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Australian Safeguards and
Non-Proliferation Office
NTI Nuclear Security Index
Criteria High Scores for…
Quantities and Sites Lower Inventory of sensitive nuclear material
Lower number of nuclear sites
Decreasing Inventory
Security and Control Measures
Strong on-site and transport procedures
Strong accountancy and control or materials
Personal security measures and vetting
Response capabilities
Global Norms Adherence to international security treaties
Making voluntary commitments and contribution to security
partnerships
Transparency measures
Domestic Commitments and Capacity
UNSCR 1540 Implementation
Domestic Legislation
Independent regulatory agency
Risk Environment & Societal Factors
High political stability
Low pervasiveness of corruption
Low interest in illicit trafficking 36
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Australian Safeguards and
Non-Proliferation Office
High Scores for… Australia
Lower Inventory of sensitive nuclear material
Lower number of nuclear sites
Decreasing Inventory
~4 kg of HEU and separated plutonium at
one site.
Significant reparation of HEU
Strong on-site and transport procedures
Strong accountancy and control or materials
Personal security measures and vetting
Response capabilities
Australia follows IAEA Guidelines
Safeguards and Security covered by
Use of security clearances for access to
sensitive areas.
Adherence to international security treaties
Making voluntary commitments and
contribution to security partnerships
Transparency measures
Ratified both amended CPPNM & ICSANT
GICNT, PSI membership, NSF contributions
Published regulations
UNSCR 1540 Implementation
Domestic Legislation
Independent regulatory agency
Completion of UNSCR1540 reporting
ASNO Independent national authority for
security and safeguards
High political stability
Low pervasiveness of corruption
Low interest in illicit trafficking
Score well for political stability and low
corruption but lower score due to convictions
linked to interest in ANSTO.
NTI Nuclear Security Index
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Australian Safeguards and
Non-Proliferation Office
NTI Nuclear Security Index
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Australian Safeguards and
Non-Proliferation Office
How could Australia improve its score?
• Some security rules to be prescribed in regulations– use of Design Basis Threat
– drug and psych tests
– security vetting review frequency to be less than 2 years
– requirement to report suspicious behaviour
• Risk environment scores– societal factors
– quality of the bureaucracy
– fewer groups interested in acquiring nuclear material.
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Australian Safeguards and
Non-Proliferation Office
Lessons from the security Index
• Methodology not perfect but the resultant debate on what comprises good nuclear security is a success in its self.
• Transparent laws and regulations score better
• Comparisons will be made
• NTI Index does not tell the full story - needs to be complemented with on-site peer review
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Australian Safeguards and
Non-Proliferation Office
• Unlike IAEA safeguards, nuclear security treaties have no verification mechanism
• “Nuclear security is the responsibility of states”
• Increasing recognition of the value of peer review
• IPPAS mission service has provided by IAEA at request of States since 1996
• 3 weapon states have hosted IPPAS missions in last 2 years
• Review is based on Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and IAEA Guidance documents
• Final reports are Highly Confidential
• Some states have released portions of their reports
International Physical Protection Advisory Service
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Australian Safeguards and
Non-Proliferation Office
• Collection Phase (4-5 days)
– Presentations by regulators and other competent authorities
– Interviews and discussions
– Facility visits
• Reporting writing (4-5 days)
– Presentations by regulators and other competent authorities
• Review and delivery (2-3 days)
– Teams seeks additional information
– Host country has 1-2 days to review and provide feedback
– Final draft handed to host country on final day
– 2-3 months for IAEA to conduct final edit and review
IPPAS Mission Process
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Australian Safeguards and
Non-Proliferation Office
• Australian commitment to host an IPPAS mission was announced at 2012 Seoul Nuclear Security Summit
• Mission conducted 4-15 November 2013
Australian IPPAS
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Australian Safeguards and
Non-Proliferation Office
• Team members from
– IAEA, Canada, ROK, Indonesia, Czech Republic, UK & Hungary (team leader)
• Key Australian Participants
– ASNO, ANSTO, ARPANSA
– Attorney Generals Department, AFP, ASIO, ASD
• Security Modules
– National Security Regime
– Facility Review
– Transport
– Radioactive Sources
– Information and Cyber security
Australian IPPAS
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Australian Safeguards and
Non-Proliferation Office
• Main focus was OPAL reactor
• Looked at sufficiency of Australian legislation
• Operation of regulators (ASNO & ARPANSA)
• Management and Security Culture
Australian IPPAS
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Australian Safeguards and
Non-Proliferation Office