Asia’s Complex Strategic Environment Nuclear Multipolarity and Other Dangers

8/10/2019 Asias Complex Strategic Environment Nuclear Multipolarity and Other Dangers

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Asia's Complex Strategic Environment: Nuclear Multipolarityand Other Dangers

Christopher P. Twomey

Asia Policy, Number 11, January 2011, pp. 51-78 (Article)

Published by National Bureau of Asian ResearchDOI: 10.1353/asp.2011.0006

For additional information about this article

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chri stophe r p. twomey is Assistant Pro essor o National Security Affairs at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, Cali ornia, and aResearch Fellow o the National Asia Research Program. He can be reachedat .

note u Te author would like to thank three anonymous reviewers or theirexceptionally help ul comments and critiques. He would also like to recognizeChris Siegels able research assistance. Tis article expresses the views o theauthor only. An earlier version o this article was presented at the Asia Policy Assembly in Washington, D.C., on June 1718, 2010.

Asias Complex Strategic Environment:Nuclear Multipolarity and Other Dangers

Christopher P. womey

as ia p ol ic y , number 11 ( january 2011 ) , 5178

http://asiapolicy.nbr.org

keywords: asia; nuclear weapons; security; balance of power

Te National Bureau o Asian Research, Seattle, Washington


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Tis article evaluates the implications o nuclear multipolarity and strategic

complexity in Asia.main argument

Ongoing changes in traditional state-to-state nuclear dynamics are reshapinginternational security in Asia. oday, Asia is a multipolar nuclear environmentin which long-range nuclear weapons are joined by other systems with strategiceffect, and in which countries hold different views about the role and utility onuclear weapons. Tis article discusses the implications o these shifs rom the

Cold War to the present or several guises o stability, on the one hand, and orcompetition and conict, on the other. Tough each o these considerationsleads to dangerous outcomes in isolation, their combined effect is even moredeleterious. Te implications o this analysis are deeply pessimistic, both orpeace in general and or U.S. national security interests in particular.

policy implications

Asia is likely to see vigorous competition in the strategic arena, rangingrom increased offensive nuclear weapons to the development o advanced

conventional offensive munitions and missile de enses. Tese technologieswill likely continue to spread.

Competition between Asian states is likely to lead to increased reliance onnuclear threats, bluster, and statecraf. Tis will erode any nuclear tabooand will increase the chance o nuclear weapons detonation.

Arms control is unlikely to substantially mitigate any of these concerns inthe current environment.

Given the pessimistic factors outlined above, increased understandingacross states o how each sees the utility o nuclear weapons will beextremely benecial.

Missile defenses systems make, on balance, a positive contribution toregional security; nevertheless, their negative implications should beaddressed through judicious use o transparency about nontechnicalaspects o the systems.

Expansive national security goals such as regime change should beabandoned, given the potential or catastrophic nuclear escalation.


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he Cold War continues to constrain thinking about nuclear issues. Inthe rst 20 years o the Cold War, a dynamic nuclear environment posed

great risks of truly catastrophic war. Yet by the end of the 50 years of bipolarrivalry, many argued that nuclear weapons had stabilized Soviet-U.S. relations.

raditional deterrence theory, with its emphasis on calculating rationality,seemed to contribute to Americans understanding o world events. Certainlythe latter years o the rivalry saw the rise o arms control efforts within andbeyond the nuclear arena that acilitated the end o the Cold War. Troughoutthat period, the two primary nuclear powers developed sophisticated nationalsecurity apparatuses with an increasingly deep understanding o the efficaciesand dangers of nuclear weapons. Few of these factors speak to the nuclear

environment in Asia today.It is increasingly clear that the second nuclear age is upon us. 1 Much work

on this epochal shif ocuses both on the role o asymmetry in nuclear balancesand on the role o nonstate actors. 2 Indeed, some analysts characterize thissituation in pejorative terms: an advanced set o nuclear haves declaringless developed latecomers to be the primary source o danger in the nuclearorder smacks of hypocrisy and Orientalism. 3

Tis article argues that these elements o the second nuclear age, while

important, are complemented by three ongoing changes in traditionalstate-to-state nuclear dynamics that are even more important: the nuclearenvironment is multipolar, long-range nuclear weapons are joined by othersystems with strategic effect, and many countries hold different views aboutthe role and utility o nuclear weapons. Tese three changes are mani est mostclearly in Asia since the Cold War. While each change leads to dangerousoutcomes in isolation, their combined effects are even more deleterious.Consideration o these three actors challenges the more positive conclusionsthat currently dominate analysis o Asian nuclear affairs. 4 Te implications o

1 Colin S. Gray, Te Second Nuclear Age (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1999); and PaulBracken, e Second Nuclear Age, Foreign Affairs 79, no. 1 (January/February 2000): 14656.

2 For a good summary, see Jeffrey W. Knop , Te Fourth Wave in Deterrence Research,Contemporary Security Policy 31, no. 1 (April 2010): 133.

3 Hugh Gusterson, e Second Nuclear Age, in Anthropology and Science: Epistemologies inPractice, ed. Jeanette Edwards, Penny Harvey, and Peter Wade (Ox ord: Berg, 2007). Tat said, there

has always been a degree of hypocrisy in the nuclear order. In fact, such hypocrisy is foundationalto the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) regime. See, for example, William Walker, NuclearEnlightenment and Counter-Enlightenment, International Affairs 83, no. 3 (May 2007): 43153.

4 Te best study is the comprehensive volume edited by Muthiah Alagappa. See Muthiah Alagappa,ed., Te Long Shadow: Nuclear Weapons and Security in 21st Century Asia (Stan ord: Stan ordUniversity Press, 2008). For a orce ul de ense o optimistic conclusions regarding the region, seeMuthiah Alagappa, Reinforcing National Security and Regional Stability: e Implications ofNuclear Weapons and Strategies, in Alagappa, Te Long Shadow , 50844.


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this analysis are thus deeply pessimistic, both or peace in general and or U.S.national security interests in particular.

Tis article proceeds as ollows:u

pp. 5456 lay out the baseline for a comparison of the present environmentin Asia with the Cold Waru pp. 5667 characterize the nature of the three dimensions of complexity

in Asia empirically: nuclear multipolarity, multidimensionality, and thedifferent utilities o nuclear weapons in various countries

u pp. 6775 assess the analytic implications of these issues, rst in isolationand then the more problematic interactions across the three areas

u pp. 7578 draw conclusions and implications

In contrasting the contemporary dangers in Asia with those of the ColdWar, it is important not to understate the grave risks that were confronted inthat period. ough these risks were navigated successfully, past performancewould have been no guarantee o uture outcomes had the Cold War continued,nor i similar situations had characterized other periods and dyads.

Trough at least the Cuban Missile Crisis, there was great ux in attitudestoward nuclear weapons. One study o a cross-national set o senior leadershighlights this: All the statesmen treated in this book displayed ambivalencewith regard to nuclear weapons and nuclear war. At one time or another, eachspoke or wrote of nuclear weapons as weapons that might actually be used, andyet, at some other time, spoke of nuclear war as impossible or unthinkable. 5 Beyond the question o basic utility, the range o roles conceived or weapons, i

they were used, varied widely in those early years o experience with the bomb.In part because of this, and in part because of the intense rivalry between

the Soviet Union and the United States, crises in Berlin, Korea, and Cuba allraised the prospect o large-scale nuclear conict. 6 Te rapid growth o thesuperpowers arsenals through the 1960s increased the scale o devastation

5 Ernest May, Introduction, in Cold War Statesmen Con ront the Bomb: Nuclear Diplomacy since

1945, ed. John Lewis Gaddis et al. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 5.6 On early Cold War crises, see Melvyn P. Leffler, A Preponderance o Power: National Security, the

ruman Administration, and the Cold War (Stan ord: Stan ord University Press, 1992); Matt Jones, Afer Hiroshima: Te United States, Race and Nuclear Weapons in Asia, 19451965 (Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, 2010); and John Lewis Gaddis, We Now Know: Rethinking Cold WarHistory (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997). For the midCold War crises, see RichardNed Lebow and Janice Gross Stein, We All Lost the Cold War (Princeton: Princeton UniversityPress, 1993).


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that any con ict would wreck as well as engendered its own set of dangers.Simple mistakes might easily have caused catastrophic consequences. Indeed,a cottage industry o research on accidents and mishaps involving weaponsand their support systems showed the pervasive nature o such dangers. 7

Tus, this article does not contrast Asias present with a Panglossian stableand secure Cold War. Te point o this analysis is to note that, as bad as theCold War was, the undamental dangers it posed are only the baseline romwhich todays Asia adds several layers o exacerbating actors.

Nuclear Optimists and the Long Peace?

While the Cold War legacy emphasizes the risks of crisis instability,eventually nuclear weapons also brought a degree o clarity to the strategicrivalry in Europe. Because o the dangers o a crisis escalating to the nuclearlevel, both sides at times exercised more restraint than they might haveotherwise. 8 One multinational study emphasizes this positive contributionto the Cold War:

e questionis whether evidence regarding ten key statesmeno the rst decade or two o that era seems to match themore conventional reasoning captured in the phrase nuclearrevolutionthat dread o nuclear war, not o war per se,trans ormed the calculus that had governed interstate orinternational relations ever since states and nations came intobeing.[T]hese Cold War statesmen appeared to think thatnuclear weapons were revolutionary in character. ey invokedthe aw ul power o these weapons as a reason either or caution ontheir own part or or expecting caution on the part o others. 9

Similarly, Chinas development o a nuclear arsenal in the 1960s wasnot perceived as entirely negative; rather, most American analysts sawthe acquisition o nuclear status as inducing a great caution in the Chineseleadership. 10

7 Scott Douglas Sagan, Te Limits o Sa ety: Organizations, Accidents, and Nuclear Weapons (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993). For a recent combing o declassied literature by tworetired airmen who specialized in handling nuclear warheads, see Michael H. Maggelet and JamesC. Oskins, Broken Arrow: Te Declassied History o U.S. Nuclear Weapons Accidents, vols. I and II(Raleigh: Lulu.com, 2008).

8 For the most famous advocacy of this argument, see John Lewis Gaddis, Te Long Peace: Inquiriesinto the History o the Cold War (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987).

9 May, Introduction, 34. 10 Jones, Afer Hiroshima , 462. Tis positive attribute was coupled with other negative aspects,

o course: Tere was however a widespread belie that Chinese stature would be raised quitedramatically by its entrance into the occidental nuclear club. Tis might then both increase itsattractiveness to revolutionary groups and generate political problems, as Chinas neighbors cameto eel intimidated and even coerced by the new strategic environment.


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Te central purpose o this article is not to resolve the debate betweennuclear optimists and nuclear pessimists. 11 Instead, this article shows thatthe optimist case is less positive in the contemporary Asian context than it wasin the Cold War, while the pessimist case ignores some important elementsapplicable to Asia today. Te optimist-pessimist debate, which is exempliedby the debate between Kenneth Waltz and Scott Sagan, is one in which the twolines o reasoning do not directly contradict each other; rather, the negativeso proli eration must be weighed against the positives. Tis article pointsout that both positions understate the dangers now con ronting Asia. Newchanges in the strategic realm undermine the applicability o the so-calledoptimistic lessons drawn rom nuclear affairs in the Cold War.

Tree distinct changes characterize Asia today: the nuclear environmentis multipolar, strategic competition is multidimensional, and countries holddiverging views about the utility o nuclear weapons. Tis section outlinesthese causes o nuclear complexity through a descriptive discussion o ongoingempirical change. Te effects o these changes, both individual and joint, willbe discussed later in the article.

Nuclear Multipolarity in Asia

During the Cold War, the two superpowers dominated the nucleararena. French and British arsenals, whatever their rhetoric might haveimplied, primarily served to enhance the credibility o U.S. extended nucleardeterrence by lowering the nuclear threshold in any conventional Sovietinvasion. 12 Chinas arsenal played a different role but was ofen viewed as alesser-included case (and there ore was encompassed within any strategyto deter the Soviet Union) by the United States prior to normalization in the1970s and tacit alignment in the 1980s. 13 Only in the 1980s did China begin

11 at said, key sources on the South Asian rivalry explicitly engage this debate. See Scott DouglasSagan and Kenneth N. Waltz. Te Spread o Nuclear Weapons: A Debate Renewed , 2nd ed. (New

York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2003); Robert Jervis, Te Meaning o the Nuclear Revolution:Statecraf and the Prospect o Armageddon (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989); and Alagappa,Te Long Shadow .

12 Good sources still primarily emphasizing the Cold War legacies of these forces can be found inJohn C. Hopkins and Weixing Hu, Strategic Views rom the Second ier: Te Nuclear WeaponsPolicies o France, Britain, and China (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 1995).

13 On the evolution o this relationship, see James Mann, About Face: A History o Americas CuriousRelationship with China, rom Nixon to Clinton (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1998).


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to have anything approaching a deliverable orce against distant strategictargets, and even then Chinas nuclear ratio with the Soviet Union wasextremely lopsided.

Asia today is clearly not characterized by nuclear bipolarity betweena privileged two states and the vastly asymmetric holdings o others. AsMuthiah Alagappa notes, there is no comparable overarching globalsecurity dynamic in the present period. 14 Table 1 highlights the atteningand broadening o the distribution o nuclear capabilities over the past dozenyears. A series o strategic arms control agreements has structured reductionsin arsenals or Russia and the United States. An economic impetus or the

ormer overlaid a shif in threat perceptions or both that greatly reduced the

potential contributions o nuclear weapons to security or the two Cold Waradversaries. Tese trends will continue as the New S AR reaty, the recentlyratied successor to the Cold War agreements, is phased in over ve years.Tere is also an expressed desire by the United States to draw down nuclear

orces beyond those levels, although domestic politics will complicate theprocess o achieving that goal.15 Elsewhere in the region, the nascent programin North Korea increasingly looks like a permanent xture of the Asiansecurity environment. Te largest changes, o course, have come in South

Asia. Following the 1998 nuclear tests by both India and Pakistan, each of thetwo states has moved to develop a more advanced civilian energy programthat will also provide added potential or arsenal expansion. Finally, China isengaged in a substantial modernization program of its historically backwardand modest arsenal. Te recent growth in warhead numbers in China issigni cant. In sum, these changes do not lead to parity among the key playersbut have attenuated the skewed distribution of past decades. 16

Te numbers listed in able 1, particularly or countries other thanthe United States, are highly suspect, and all depend critically on differentde nitions of what makes a warhead operational. Nevertheless, threeconclusions are clear even rom these rough estimates.

First, the number o nuclear powers has doubled (i a bit o ambiguity istolerated about what exactly that means).

14 Muthiah Alagappa, Nuclear Weapons and National Security: Far-Reaching In uence and

Deterrence Dominance, in Alagappa, Te Long Shadow , 495. 15 For discussions o both the uture direction and the political challenges beyond New S AR , seeGeorge Perkovich, e Obama Nuclear Agenda One Year a er Prague, Carnegie Endowment forInternational Peace, Policy Outlook, March 31, 2010; and Joachim Krause and Benjamin Schreer,Salvaging Global Zero, RUSI Journal 155, no. 3 (June/July 2010): 4246.

16 For an optimistic view about the uture proli eration across the region, ocusing on the domesticdeterminants o security identities, see Etel Solingen, Nuclear Logics: Contrasting Paths in East Asiaand the Middle East (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007).


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Source: Te data or the present number o warheads is drawn rom Bulletin o Scientists, NuclearNotebooks, 2009 and 2010. Data for the 1997 arsenal is from the Natural Resources Defense Council(NRDC), Nuclear Notebook, 1998. Note: e table refers to estimates of operational warheads and thus excludes stockpiles. Bombers in theU.S., Chinese, and Russian forces refer to heavy, long-range bombers; ghters in the Pakistani and Indianforces refer to shorter-range tactical strike aircra . Asterisk indicates that the Chinese gure of 400 for 1998from the NRDC Nuclear Notebook includes signi cant tactical warheads and bomber-delivered warheads.More recent estimates have concluded that these estimates are inaccurate; thus, an estimate o 170 might bemore appropriate for comparison. at said, the author knows of no source that directly suggests China hasreduced its overall arsenal size.

ABLE 1

Nuclear Weapons in Asia

Country Warheads(1997) Warheads(2010) Delivery systems

Russia 10,240 4,600 Missile, bomber, and submarine

United States 8,425 2,468 Missile, bomber, and submarine

China 170 (400?)* ~193 Missile, bomber (?), andsubmarine (in development)

Pakistan None? 7090 Missile and ghter

India None? 6080 Missile and ghter

North Korea None Several? Missile (?)

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Second, the disparity between the arsenals o the superpowers and thoseo the rest o the region has narrowed: the ratio between Russian and Chinese

nuclear arsenal sizes has dropped from 50:1 to 20:1; the disparity betweenthe U.S. and Chinese arsenals has dropped rom 40:1 to 10:1; and Chinaholds a 4:1 advantage over the South Asian countries. Although these ratiosremain lopsided, given that nuclear weapons do not create power through alinear assessment o orce ratios, this narrowing o ratios is signicant. Somepolitical effects are gained rom minimal deterrence postures or example,the existence o more small-but-secure nuclear arsenals will increase thenumber o countries that can rely on them or existential threats. However,

for most of the relevant countriesNorth Korea, Pakistan, and Indiathesecurity of their nuclear forces from attack by several potential adversariesis questionable. Furthermore, this attening o orce ratios increases thepotential or biased analysis to emerge. When a ratio is characterized bymassive disparity, the two sides are likely to share an understanding of its broad


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parameters, even i national bias affects analysis at the margins. Less lopsidedbalances are harder or each side to evaluate without bias. When China hada dozen or two warheads that could reach the United States and aced tens othousands o U.S. weapons, the only credible use or Beijings weapons wouldhave been as an ultimate retaliatory response. As the gaps narrow, however,China is likely to nd new options for engaging in nuclear swagger. 17

Tird, the trend lines suggest a urther attening o arms distribution;it is unlikely for domestic budgetary reasons that either the United States orRussia will avoid further cuts in nuclear weapons. Yet all the other powers in

able 1 are increasing their arsenals. Continued rapid growth in the arsenalsof all the nuclear-armed countries is possible; North Korea is likely the only

country signicantly constrained by quantity o ssile material.18

rendshave effects over time, o course, but even today, they convey political andperceptual power beyond the existing stockpiles. Concerns in the UnitedStates about the potential or China to race to parity emphasize this reality,and related questions rom U.S. allies in the region have spawned extensiveand unprecedented efforts to bolster extended deterrence with South Koreaand Japan.

Additionally, it is important to highlight that Asian states are modernizing

weapon delivery systems across the board. Some modernizations will likelystabilize power dyads, but most will not (as discussed in the next section).China has begun to develop a secure second-strike force. e PeoplesLiberation Army (PLA) already has elded long-range solid ueled missilesthat can be launched in minutes rather than hours. Tese DF-31A systemsare also deployed on mobile launchers, urther enhancing their immunityfrom a potential rst strike to disarm them by Russia, the United States, or,potentially, India. 19 Te PLA Navy is also in the process o deploying newballistic missilelaunching submarines (Chinas boomers are the ype-94Jin-class boats).20 At some point, these will be equipped with a modern missile,the JL-2, which has long been in development. 21

17 Tere is clearly an element o this in the PLA Second Artillery Force, Science o Second ArtilleryCampaigns (Beijing: PLA Press, 2004).

18 Je rey Lewis argues that a technical ceiling based on ssile material stockpiles does exist for China,although this level is much higher than current estimates of Chinas arsenal. See Je rey G. Lewis,Te Minimum Means o Reprisal: Chinas Search or Security in the Nuclear Age (Cambridge: MITPress, 2006).

19 Office o the Secretary o De ense, Military and Security Developments Involving the PeoplesRepublic o China: Annual Report to Congress (Washington, D.C., August 16, 2010).

20 O ce of Naval Intelligence, Chinas Navy 2007 (Washington, D.C., 2007). 21 See the shif in language in the 2010 Pentagon report emphasizing challenges in the development o

the JL-2 system. Office o the Secretary o De ense, Military and Security Developments.


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India and Pakistan are both improving their delivery systems, in theformer case against multiple targets. For some time India has possessed various short-range systems in the Privthi missile amily that are capable ohitting Pakistani targets. More recently, New Delhi has successfully tested thelonger-range Agni-III, capable of hitting Beijing and Shanghai, three times overthe past three years, ollowing an earlier ailure in 2006. Tis missile system isa mobile, solid-fueled system, one that had long been under development. InAugust 2010, the Indian minister of defense A.K. Antony stated that the Agni-III with a range of 3000 km is ready for induction into the Indian military. 22 Pakistans Shaheen-II, capable of reaching all of India as well as much of theMiddle East, completed its rst successful test launch in 2004. Its shorter-

range predecessor, the Shaheen-I, is undergoing guidance improvements toincrease its accuracy and was most recently tested in 2010. 23

North Korea, beginning rom the lowest base, has also improved itscapabilities. In 1998, 2006, and again in 2009, Pyongyang tested its longest-range system, the aepodong amily ( D-1 in the rst test, D-2 in thesubsequent tests), which is assessed to be capable of reaching Alaska. Whilenone o the tests suggested that the system is operational at the moment,North Korean scientists acquired important knowledge about multiple-stage,

long-range systems. Furthermore, the 2009 test seemed more promisingthan the previous attempts. Beyond the long-range programs, there are alsodevelopments primarily relevant to regional actors: in July 2006 and again atseveral points in the summer o 2009, Pyongyang launched multiple missiles

rom short-range systems that could be used to threaten South Korea, Japan,or hypothetically China. 24

Tus, across the region proli eration o weapons and delivery systemshas accelerated in the postCold War era. Without even considering potential

uture players in the strategic competitionJapan, South Korea, Vietnam,Taiwan, and Indonesia, to name a few serious candidates 25the basic situationis vastly changed rom two decades ago.

22 Agni-III Ready for Induction: Antony, imes o India, August 9, 2010. 23 Pakistan Successfully Test-Fires Two Ballistic Missiles, Associated Press, May 8, 2010; and

Pakistan Tests Long-Range Missile, BBC News, March 9, 2004. 24 See Daniel A. Pinkston, Te North Korean Ballistic Missile Program (Carlisle: Strategic Studies

Institute, 2008). 25 For discussion of several of these cases, see Llewelyn Hughes, Why Japan Will Not Go Nuclear

(Yet): International and Domestic Constraints on the Nuclearization of Japan, InternationalSecurity 31, no. 4 (Spring 2007): 6796; and Michael S. Malley and anya Ogilvie-White, NuclearCapabilities in Southeast Asia: Building a Preventive Proli eration Firewall, Nonproli erationReview 16, no. 1 (2009): 2545. On space capabilities and potential delivery system capabilitiesdeveloped therein, see James Clay Moltz, Asias Space Race: National Motivations, RegionalDynamics, and Global Implications (New York: Columbia University Press, forthcoming 2011).


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he Multidimensionality o Strategic Competition in Asia

De ning strategic weapons is tricky. Atomic and nuclear weapons wereoriginally recognized as having a strategic effect; that is, they could directly

serve strategic rather than tactical or operational aims. Over time, a distinctionemerged between strategic nuclear weaponsto be used against an opponentshomelandand tactical weapons that might be used on the battle eld. Yetdeterrence theorists, policymakers, and arms control proponents remaineddisproportionately ocused on strategic nuclear weapons. 26 Even afer theadvent o precision-guided munitions in the Vietnam War and the conceptualdevelopment of AirLand Battle in the 1980sa framework emphasizing deepstrikes by conventional forces on the rear areas of the battle eldconventionalweapons did not play a strategic role. 27

oday, such a narrow ocus is unwarranted. Not only do long-rangenuclear weapons have strategic effect, but advanced conventional weaponsmight as well. Furthermore, in the strategic geography o Asia, distinguishingbetween non-strategic and strategic nuclear weapons is problematic (aconcern similar to that raised by German critics during the Cold War).Missile de enses opposing nuclear weapons clearly have the ability to mitigatethe latters strategic effect. Biological and chemical weapons have alsocomplicated strategic analysis, leading to the awkward term weapons of massdestruction. Te more recent and more cumbersome term weapons o masse ect conveys an even broader range of capabilities. Space and cyber attackscan directly target objects valued by an opponent without rst achieving abattleeld victory. 28 Tus, in addition to the modernization and proli erationo offensive systems in Asia, a range o other systems must be considered inassessing todays strategic environment.

Most signicant and prevalent among these are the effective de ensivesystems deployed throughout the region. It is important to di erentiatebetween large area de enses that intercept the missile in the exo-atmosphericmid-course phase rom point de enses that intercept closer to the intended

26 For a good overview o this evolution during the Cold War, see Lawrence Freedman, Te Evolutiono Nuclear Strategy , 3rd ed. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003).

27 William W. Momyer, Airpower in Tree Wars: World War II, Korea and Vietnam (Washington, D.C.:U.S. Government Printing O ce, 1985).

28 On space security, see James Clay Moltz, Te Politics o Space Security: Strategic Restraint and thePursuit o National Interests (Stan ord: Stan ord University Press, 2008).


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target.29 Both categories o systems have enjoyed rapid development anddeployment throughout the region.

Te United States and Japan deploy the most success ul area de enseprogram, the Aegis SM-3 missile, which is capable o intercepting targetsmid-course. o date, the current variant has succeeded in thirteen out ofeen U.S. tests and is effective at ranges up to a thousand miles. Althoughthe two countries are engaged in joint research to substantially increase theinterceptors capabilities, 30 the existing system already enables Japan to protectits home islands against a North Korean threat with only one or two Kongo-class ships on station. Japans current eet o six ships allows or adequatecoverage and continual time on station if Tokyo chooses. 31 China also recently

tested an indigenous mid-course interceptor that would boast a large theater-or nation-sized de ensive ootprint, potentially paralleling the United Statesown national missile de ense system.32

Shorter-range systems are widely deployed throughout the region. TeUnited States, Japan, and aiwan deploy advanced point de ense systems inthe Patriot PAC-3 system. (South Korea has imported earlier Patriot modelsfrom Germany.) ese provide a narrower footprint of defensive coverage buthave dramatically increased in capability over the past twenty years. India has

begun technical consultations with the United States regarding purchasingPatriot or other systems and continues to develop indigenous systems aswell.33 Russia elds an advanced Patriot-like system, the S-300 family ofmobile missile de ense batteries, which also has been purchased by China.

In the near future, viable boost phase interceptors are likely to be elded(SM-3, block IIB), and airborne lasers will continue to be tested. ese willprovide additional de ensive capabilities, particularly acilitating additionalshoot-look-shoot tactics that will dramatically increase the e ectiveness of

29 A third category, also capable o de ending large areas, contains those systems that intercept amissile while it is still in its ascent phase. Tese remain nascent technologies at present, althoughpromising in the longer term.

30 Ronald ORourke, Sea-Based Ballistic Missile DefenseBackground and Issues for Congress,Congressional Research Service, CRS Report for Congress, RL33745, July 20, 2009.

31 See data contained in Dean Wilkening, European Ballistic Missile Defense Options (paper

presented at the Tenth RUSI Missile Defence Conference of the Royal United Services Institute,London, May 2729, 2009). 32 Russell Hsiao, Aims and Motives o Chinas Recent Missile De ense est, Jamestown Foundation,

China Brie , January 21, 2010. 33 Te short-range system has been tested success ully and the exo-atmospheric system is undergoing

development with potential initial operational capability in 2012. See PAD/AAD (India), Self-propelled Surface-to-Air Missiles, Janes Information Group, Janes Land Based Air Defense, July26, 2010 u http://www.janes.com/articles/Janes-Land-Based-Air-Defence/PAD-AAD-India.html.


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defenses. Japan and the United States are likely to be the earliest adaptors ofsuch technologies, but these too are likely to spread.

Conventional offensive capabilities are also entering the strategiccompetition in ways that make it more di cult to di erentiate betweenconventional and nuclear conict than was the case during the Cold War.

e advent of precision-guided munitions (PGM) in the 1970s laid theoundation or mature short-range systems in the 1990s. oday, the range o

such munitions is increasing; stand-o air strike, penetrating aircra (stealthyor conventional), or long-range missiles can deliver them. Te UnitedStates, China, and aiwan all now have missiles with conventional, long-range precision attack capabilities. 34 Te United States is actively pursuing a

conventional prompt global strike capability to give the military the abilityto attack targets anywhere on Earth within little over an hour. 35 o do so, theUnited States may expand its ballistic missile orce to include a conventionalrole for either the land-based Minuteman III or the submarine-launched

rident. China has deployed a signicant conventional arsenal near theaiwan Strait that provides political coercive options that transcend traditional

conventional campaigns. 36 Beyond that, the PLA possesses intermediate-range systems that can target Japan and U.S. bases in Guam. In the near term

it might also have the ability to target U.S. carriers, which would escalate anyconict dramatically.

Both missile de enses and accurate, power ul conventional weaponscomplicate matters because each can serve roles that previously only nuclearweapons could handle. Both capabilities could be used to destroy an opponentsoffensive nuclear arsenal, whereas previously this was only achievable by a rststrike with nuclear weapons. PGMs can also be used to destroy command,control, communications, and intelligence (C3I) systems in rear areas. is,too, was generally a mission or nuclear weapons in the Cold War. (Althoughconventional weapons were used in wars in Korea, Vietnam, and the MiddleEast to modest effect, against a great power, capable air de enses would haverendered such attacks very costly.) Unquestionably, such systems are a lessescalatory option than using nuclear weapons to achieve the same goal. At thesame time, that benet comes with a cost: the clarity o the nuclear threshold

34 e United States has the most options, with the Tomahawk being the most prominent. Chinaelds both the DH-10 cruise missile and the DF-21 (among other shorter-range systems). aiwansHsiung Feng IIE has recently entered service. All possess precision targeting.

35 Bruce M. Sugden, Speed Kills: Analyzing the Deployment o Conventional Ballistic Missiles,International Security 34, no. 1 (2009): 11346.

36 Christopher P. womey, Limits o Coercion: Compellence, Deterrence, and Cross-Strait PoliticalMilitary Affairs ( orthcoming, 2011).


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is obscured. Tresholds serve an important purpose in war, limiting escalationin some cases.37 Without a clear and mutually understood threshold, thequestion o when a war has gone nuclear will be more complex: certainly,afer a nuclear warhead has exploded through atomic ssion, but would aconventional attack on a nuclear missile count? 38 If a North Korean missileis intercepted over the Pacic, does the United States assume that the missilewas armed with a nuclear warhead?

Beyond these concerns, in many cases conventional systems rely oncommand and control systems that also per orm a role in nuclear operations.U.S. satellites that replaced the De ense Support Program (DSP) early warningconstellation rom the Cold War now provide preliminary telemetry to missile

de ense systems. Chinese long-range over-the-horizon radars used to ndU.S. carriers for attack by conventional ballistic missiles might also provideearly warning capabilities. Chinas Second Artillery Force is responsible orboth conventional and nuclear-armed missiles. Te separation o commandand control links between the two sides of the force is unclear.

Te point here is not to naively call or restraint in any such crisis butrather to highlight that new interactions between conventional and nuclearforces are now likely to pervade the battle eld in any high intensity war in

Asia. Te nature o these interactions will be discussed urther in the sectionon implications.

Divergence on the Utility o Nuclear Weapons

A nal source o complexity in Asian strategic affairs is the wide range o views held regarding the role that nuclear weapons can and should serve innational security policy. Te issue is not whether nuclear weapons are use ul 39

but rather how the countries that have chosen to develop such expensiveweapons perceive their utility. What role do nations in the region see theirnuclear arsenals serving in the context of national security? ere is quite abit o divergence on this issue.

37 On the importance o thresholds, see the discussion o ocal points in Tomas C. Schelling, TeStrategy o Conict (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960), 57.

38 During the Cold War, some scholars grappled with a similar issue. See Barry R. Posen, InadvertentEscalation: Conventional War and Nuclear Risks (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992). 39 For one side in this debate, see Nina annenwald, Te Nuclear aboo: Te United States and

the Normative Basis o Nuclear Non-Use, International Organization 53, no. 3 (Summer 1999):43368; and .V. Paul, Te radition o Non-Use o Nuclear Weapons (Stan ord: Stan ord UniversityPress, 2009). For an earlier and related view, see John Mueller, e Essential Irrelevance ofNuclear Weapons, International Security 13, no. 2 (Fall 1988): 5579. For an argument that nuclearweapons cast a long shadow over regional security affairs, see Alagappa, Te Long Shadow .


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It should be noted that views about nuclear weapons have varied overtime and space. For instance, during the Cold War there was a range o viewson precisely this question between the United States and Soviet Union. DavidYost observes:

It is inaccurate to attribute the development of strategic doctrinesto ensure mutual vulnerability and restraint to both the UnitedStates and the Soviet Union, especially if this is taken to imply asimilarity in doctrine. It is certainly true that devising doctrineso strategic stability through mutual vulnerability was a majorpreoccupation of American strategic thinkers in the 1960s and1970s. However, Soviet political and military leaders did not acceptsuch doctrines as guidance or their own orce development andstrategic planning. 40

Furthermore, during the Cold War, U.S. planning differed or the use oweapons in Europe and Asia:

Te [Eisenhower] administration had tried to present the specicactions suggested by the blunt term massive retaliation in a slightlydi erent form from that o ered in Europe, where since 1954NATOs shield forces had acted as a kind of tripwire which, in theevent o a large-scale Soviet offensive, would trigger the retaliatorynuclear response that was designed to deter aggression in the rstplace. Over the chance o a revival o a Communist aggression in

Korea, a direct move into Indochina, or any attempt to seize theoffshore islands and aiwan, the administration had been ready toassert it was prepared to use nuclear weapons, but that this wouldbe in a selected and controlled manner and directed at militarytargets which were believed to be supporting the Communistforces engaged in the attack. 41

Finally, the United States own position on the role o nuclear weapons hasshifed over time. 42 Nevertheless, as the Cold War carried on, this variation wasreduced. While many orms o deterrenceexisted during the Cold War,Muthiah Alagappa writes, these however remained on the periphery becausethe Soviet-American con rontation dominated international security. 43 Forthe United States, views rened or the European context began to permeate

40 David S. Yost, Analysing International Nuclear Order, International Affairs 83, no. 3(May 2007): 54974.

41 Jones, Afer Hiroshima , 454.

42 For a charting o these shifs during the Cold War, see Lawrence Freedman, Te First woGenerations of Nuclear Strategists, in Makers o Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age, ed. Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986). On more recent changes, seeJeffrey W. Knop , Te Fourth Wave in Deterrence Research, Contemporary Security Policy 31,no. 1 (April 2010): 133.

43 Alagappa, Nuclear Weapons and National Security, 495. See also Muthiah Alagappa, ExploringRoles, Strategies, and Implications: Historical and Conceptual Perspectives, in Alagappa,Te Long Shadow , 136.


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strategy toward Asia. 44 However, the range o views in Asia today on the roleo nuclear weapons is worse than the highpoints o variation along any o theabove dimensions during the Cold War.

Several di erent purposes or nuclear weapons can be posited. VipinNarang identi ies three distinct types o regional power nuclear postures:a catalytic posture, an assured retaliation posture, and an asymmetricescalation posture. 45 Building on this, at one end, nuclear weapons candeter the use o nuclear weapons against cities in a ight or nationalannihilation. Beyond that, in the context o a limited nuclear war, theymight deter escalation to more complete nuclear war. Additionally, some view nuclear weapons as being able to deter large-scale conventional attacks

on a state. On something o a separable dimension, nuclear weapons arecentral to most attempts to exert extended deterrence. Extended deterrenceattempts to prevent attacks on a security partner, whether such attacksmight be conventional or nuclear.

For instance, a recent Russian statement not only makes clear Moscowsdoctrine o using nuclear weapons to deter major conventional wars shorto global wars that involve Russia directly, but also hints at extended nucleardeterrence o conventional conict involving others. 46 Earlier statements rom

senior Russian officials were even more assertive.47 Given the countrys arsenalof some 5,400 operational tactical warheads (far dwar ng U.S. holdings ofabout 200), these statements would carry great weight even i they were notreected in official Russian policy.48

At the other end o the spectrum, North Korea sees some utility inpossessing a rudimentary arsenal that is not weaponized in the sense thatthe United States would use the term (operational and capable o beingordered into service in hours or days). Not only does Pyongyang expect itsarsenal to have some deterrent effect against conventional orces, but it alsoclearly tries to use its nuclear program or compellent power. Tis might betermed existential coercive power.

44 See Jones, Afer Hiroshima .45 Vipin Narang, Posturing for Peace? Pakistans Nuclear Postures and South Asian Stability,

International Security 34, no. 3 (Winter 2009/10): 3878. For other typologies, see Alagappa,Nuclear Weapons and National Security, 483.

46 Nikolai Sokov, e New, 2010 Russian Military Doctrine: e Nuclear Angle, James MartinCenter or Nonproli eration Studies (CNS), CNS Feature Stories, February 2010 u http://cns.miis.edu/stories/100205_russian_nuclear_doctrine.htm.

47 Luke Champlin and Volha Charnysh, Russia Plans Changes to Military Doctrine, Arms Controloday , December 2009.

48 Kori Schake, Tactical Nuclear Weapons: Time to Rea rm NATO Solidarity, Central EuropeDigest , August 2, 2010.


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Also related to the utility o nuclear weapons is the size and nature othe arsenal required or a states given purposes. Again, here some variationis possible, ranging rom a virtual arsenal ( or example, Japan today andperhaps South Korea and Vietnam tomorrow), to the barest existing arsenal(North Korea), to a weaponized force (possibly Pakistan), to a secure second-strike capability (China), to a force able to engage at multiple levels of warfare(the United States and Russia). It is important not to neglect views on theutility of the least robust of these nuclear powers. States such as India andPakistan before 1998, Israel for approximately the last three decades, NorthKorea over the past several years, and arguably Japan today have ound valuein possessing a vague yet not fully weaponized nuclear arsenal. In most cases,

political dynamics have highlighted the costs o moving toward weaponizationand deployed orces. However, these states, even those with serious securitythreats, were willing to tolerate such nuclear ambiguity.

Table 2 attempts to capture this range o views on the utility o weaponsand pair those views with countries in the region. Readers can certainly callinto question the coding o this table. Nevertheless, this author would arguethat the overall conclusion holds true that there are substantial differencesacross the region. Te point here is not to affirm any o these belie s but rather

to note the wide variation in Asia today. As is discussed below, this wide variation raises a number o problems.

Each element o complexity raises its own problems, which are summarizedin this section. In general, most of these e ects increase the challenges facing

national security elites throughout the region, increase the prospect ordangerous security competition, heighten potential or miscalculation, anddestabilize the region. Beyond that, the implications o these three individualelements will tend to interact, as discussed in a later section.

he First-Order E ects o Proli eration

Te simple quantitative increase in the number o nuclear arsenals has

several effects. Te most obvious effect is the increase in the number opotentially unstable dyads. Perhaps historically rare reasons restrained theintense rivalry o the Cold War, preventing it rom degenerating into anintense nuclear war. Tose actors, however, may not hold in other cases. Forinstance, there is strong evidence that some dyads in Asia do not share the


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Russia UnitedStates China Pakistan India NorthKorea Japan

Expected role

Deter nuclearthreat to cities X X X X X X

Deter nuclearescalation X X ?

Deter majorconventionaldefeat

X ? X X

Extendeddeterrence ofnuclear threat

X X

Extendeddeterrence ofconventionalthreat

X X

Compellentpower X X

Arsenal needs

Existential X X ? Virtual?

Robustsecond strike X

Advanced X X

Source: For use ul sources on the individual countries, see the country chapters in Alagappa, Te Long

Shadow; Narang, Posturing for Peace?; Kapur, India and Pakistans Unstable Peace; Lewis, Te Minimum Means o Reprisal ; and erence Roehrig, North Koreas Nuclear Weapons Program: Motivations, Strategy,and Doctrine, in Nuclear Strategy in the Second Nuclear Age, ed. Toshi Yoshihara and James Holmes(Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2011). It is from these sources that the above codings aregenerally drawn. Note: As the United States oresees no major conventional threat to its homeland, it does not currently ocuson the utility o nuclear weapons against such a threat outside the context o extended deterrence.

ABLE 2

Perceptions on the Utility o Nuclear Weapons in Asia

[ ]


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same characteristics as the U.S.-Soviet rivalry. Paul Kapur argues that thestability-instability paradox that may have held during the Cold War in Europedoes not hold in South Asia today. Instead, Pakistan views instability at thenuclear level as benecial to its bargaining leverage. 49 Te Cold War did notcenter on territory claimed as sovereign homeland, whereas the aiwan issueserves to complicate Sino-U.S. relations. Te Sino-Russian border is long, andthe two sides strategic arsenals are located more closely to each other than theU.S. and Soviet arsenals were in the Cold War. Additionally, no Soviet leaderwas ever as novice to international politics as Kim Jong-un in North Koreais, and the domestic legitimacy o the Soviet Union was never under as muchstress as that o the Communist Party in China or the North Korean regime

today. Tese and dozens o other issues highlight potentially salient points ocontrast with the Cold War.

Some scholars highlight the difficulties in attribution, not only in substateterrorism cases but also in multipolar rivalries. 50 Yet the attribution of state-led attacks, though technically challenging, seems less likely to be a concern inreality, given that most surprise attacks occur at times of heightened tension.Still, the di culty in identifying attackers might complicate issues in somecircumstances.

More problematic is the inherent instability o rivalries among three ormore players, a point not systematically evaluated in the existing literature onAsia.51 Game theorists characterize a truel as a duel to the death betweenthree actors. ese theorists have reached several conclusions about the likelyoutcomes o such contests. First and oremost, in contrast to stylized duels,truels are highly vulnerable to the specic assumptions about the sequenceof shooting, quality of weapons, size of arsenals, knowledge, and range ofstrategies chosen. 52 is makes generalizing hard for mathematicians but hasa very clear implication or policy analysts: the simplicity o a bilateral worldis gone. Slight changes in weapons or strategy can have large effects on theperceivedand actualbalance. 53

49 Samir Paul Kapur, India and Pakistans Unstable Peace: Why Nuclear South Asia Is Not Like ColdWar Europe, International Security 30, no. 2 (2005): 12752;

50 Stephen P. Rosen, A er Proliferation: What to Do If More States Go Nuclear, Foreign Affairs 85,no. 5 (September/October 2006): 9.

51 By design, for instance, Alagappas volume focuses on country speci c perspectives, and the bulkof the introductory and analytic work that frames those chapters focuses on dyads per se (albeitincluding some discussion o extended deterrence). Alagappa, Te Long Shadow .

52 D.M. Kilgour and Steven J. Brams, Te ruel, Mathematics Magazine 70, no. 5 (December 1997):31526.

53 One other nding is that partnerships in the context o the three-way game are not robust.


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One mani estation o this is heightened competition due to uncertaintyabout potential adversary coalitions. In a series of studies, Stephen Cimbalaused straight orward modeling to emphasize that states in Asia will bepressured to choose risky alert statuses and force postures out of such defensiveconcerns. 54 More relaxed postures, such as launch a er attack, could leavecountries with greatly reduced arsenals. Of course, riding out a rst strikeis always dangerous. But in a multipolar context, states must be concernedabout deterring, or retaliating against, multiple adversaries a er an attack.

e number of adversaries a state might face is also uncertain. In a crisis, theexistence o multiple potential enemies will heighten a states incentive to notabsorb a rst strike because doing so will reduce an arsenal that would need

to deter not only its primary, current adversary but also any other adversarieswho might be tempted to enter the conict soon thereafer. Both thesescenarios are worse than the bilateral rivalry in the Cold War and will tend tocatalyze more dangerous orce postures. Tus, even i the optimists are rightabout their characterization o the Cold War, these dynamics are new andnegative in the postCold War environment.

Modernization across the board paints something o a mixed picture. Tedevelopment of a secure second-strike capability for any nation would reduce

dangerous mobilization spirals. us, such a capability is likely to be stabilizingin some contexts involving the United States and China. However, a second-strike capability gives China substantial advantages in competition with India,which previously might have been characterized by a two-sided minimaldeterrent posture. Russia had hoped to balance conventional difficulties withnuclear preeminence in its relationship with China and others, but will beless able to do so the more secure and robust Chinas second-strike capabilityis. Furthermore, in other contexts the development of secure second-strikecapabilities makes coercive strategies much riskier: consider, for example, theUnited States and North Korea or China and India.

In many cases modernization of delivery systems is progressing ahead ofthe associated command and control systems. Tus, sur ace-to-sur ace ballisticmissiles (SSBM), when armed, might under certain conditions enhancethe security of Chinas second-strike force. However, several factors suggestthis will not be the case. First, China has not developed detailed procedures

54 See, for example, Stephen J. Cimbala, Nuclear Arms in Asia: eory and Policy Issues,Comparative Strategy 26, no. 2 (March 2007): 12740; Stephen J. Cimbala, Anticipatory Attacks:Nuclear Crisis Stability in Future Asia, Comparative Strategy 27, no. 2 (March 2008): 11332; andStephen J. Cimbala, North Korea and Nuclear Danger: Context and Policy Options, De ense &Security Analysis 25, no. 4 (December 2009): 393412.


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or the security ( rom unauthorized launch) and sa ety ( rom accidentallaunch) o its launch orces. On land the PLA has addressed these dangersthrough maintaining the separation of warhead and launch platform. Yet thatapproach will not be viable at sea, and so positive control o the warheads willneed to rely on other approaches. Te U.S. and Soviet experience was that thisstrategy is challenging. Second, based on hints rom the U.S. Office o NavalIntelligence, the Jin-class submarine is not likely to be particularly quiet. 55 Rather than presenting the United States with an invisible retaliatory orce,the submarine may instead be an easy target for early attack before it eludesany pursuing attack vessel or launches its missiles.

he First-Order E ects o Increased Complexity o Strategic ForcesTe increasing complexity o the nature o strategic orces leads to a

different set o concerns. First, it greatly complicates assessments o thestrategic balance in any dyad. With missile de enses, a calculation o whatconstitutes an e ective second strike for India against China must considerthat some of Indias likely depleted retaliatory forces may be intercepted. Evenif Chinas system is expected to be only minimally capable, India should also

recognize that its offensive orces will have already been worn down by aChinese rst strike. Precisely the same calculation has to be made by Chinawith regard to the United States. Russia may not be overly concerned aboutChinese missile defenses, but a larger-scale attack could achieve the sameeffect. Similarly, when assessing its ability to coerce South Korea and Japan,China now needs to consider these states missile de ense capabilities. 56 Indiasmissile de ense, i technically effective, would also raise the costs or China oany coercive strategies.

aiwan, as ofen is the case, is in its own class. Te island aces a muchlarger number of missiles (up to 1,150, according to the Pentagon), whichare more limited in utility against other neighbors (Japan and South Koreaare out of range; India and Russia have much more territory to disperse

55 See the chart in O ce of Naval Intelligence, Te Peoples Liberation Army Navy: A Modern Navywith Chinese Characteristics (Suitland, August 2009), 22 u http://www. as.org/irp/agency/oni/pla-

navy.pd . 56 While it is true that Japaneseas well as South Koreansystems could be easily saturated, two

complications arise for Beijing. First, its holdings of intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBM)are limited, consisting o 80 DF-21 variants and a declining number o older CSS-2 liquid ueledmissiles (declining from 1520 today). Furthermore, such weapons also serve deterrent rolesagainst India and U.S. regional bases. us, not all weapons can be used to saturate NortheastAsian missile de ense systems. For missile arsenal quantities, see Office o the Secretary o De ense, Military and Security Developments, 66.


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military targets across and their population centers are out o range). Tus,Taiwan would likely face the full scale of Chinas short-range M-9/11 missilecapabilities. Still, aiwans advanced missile de enses do orce Beijing to relyon a large offensive to achieve any given level o desired political effect. Smalldemonstrative attacks that are intercepted may well back re on China, forcingBeijing to incur the political cost o being perceived as a violent aggressorwithout any associated benet o signaling in blood to aiwans leaders thecosts o a particular course o action. Still, it is certainly the case that Beijingsconventional coercive options against aiwan are substantial.

Tere are, o course, potential responses to missile de ense. At least partof Chinas response in these cases is likely to be a quantitative build-up that

would increase the potential devastation should violence break out. For Chinaand others, qualitative improvements, both penetration aids and maneuveringwarheads, are also possible. 57 Tese may restore the balance in actual act, butthey are likely to create a gap in perceptions. For instance, both the defendingnation and China would likely be overcon dent in their own capabilities sincethe precise capabilities o these systems would remain highly classied on allsides.58 Tis dynamic also exists between the United States and China (andperhaps North Korea). It is furthermore worth noting that nuclear optimists

regarding the Cold War generally opposed missile de ense as destabilizingsuch balances during the twentieth century. e same logic would make thecontemporary era in Asia worse as well.

In other areas, non-strategic nuclear weapons developed by Russia toensure that its depleted conventional orces can withstand an advanced oecould also serve strategic purposes against some Chinese targets. Te samecase could be made for Pakistans non-strategic nuclear forces. In both cases,missile defense systems in China and India, respectively, would furthercomplicate Russian and Pakistani calculations by requiring a larger nuclearoffensive to achieve the same degradation o opposing conventional orces.

PGMs complicate the math of net assessments in some dyads evenurther. Tis is playing out in current U.S.-Russia arms control negotiations,

and, indeed, may even stymie future progress in that relationship. PGMshave also complicated Sino-U.S. relations. Despite Chinas nascent move

57 For an optimistic view on the efficacy o such weapons, see the recent report rom two long-timemissile defense critics: George N. Lewis and eodore A. Postol, A Flawed and Dangerous U.S.Missile De ense Plan, Arms Control oday , May 2010.

58 On a related orm o overcondence, misperception, and associated deterrence ailure, seeChristopher P. womey, Te Military Lens: Doctrinal Differences and Deterrence Failure in Sino- American Relations (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2010).


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he First-Order E ect o Divergent Belie s o Utility

When two states understand the utility o nuclear weapons similarly,oblique threats are ofen sufficient. Tis helps to ensure nuclear weapons

stay out o the center o any relationship.63

However, when there are wildlydifferent perspectives on the role o nuclear weapons, states will also disagreeabout what utility such weapons con er in a crisis-bargaining situation. Oneway or states to express this will be to engage in more explicit nuclear bluster.Again, such activities were common in the early Cold War but waned later. Areturn to such behavior is likely in Asia. Indeed, there is already evidence ofexactly that in North Korean and Pakistani behavior.

Tis trend threatens to erode norms that denigrate the utility o nuclearweapons. Explicit in the literature on nuclear taboos are policy prescriptions

or the United States to avoid nuclear threats and, in general, to reduce relianceon nuclear deterrence. As Nina annenwald notes, changing the discoursecould also change the taboo. 64 Increased public nuclear bluster in times ofcrises pushes in exactly the opposite direction. Whatever one thinks of thedurability o the nuclear taboo today, this will reduce its efficacy tomorrow.

he Interactive E ects o Multiple ChangesBeyond the direct effects o different individual elements o the

three changes, those changes interact, greatly complicating the strategicenvironment.

Te logic or restricting offensive and de ensive systems in tandemor dyads that see stability stemming rom mutual vulnerability is clear: i

mutual vulnerability is an accepted goal o both sides, de ensive weaponscertainly can affect that objective. 65 However, that logic no longer appliesto many dyads. Arms control or even condence-building measures in Asianeed to deal not only with the challenges o multiple players but also with theinherent interconnectedness o offensive and de ensive systems. Advancedoffensive conventional weapons may soon join this mix, as the United Statesglobal precision-strike systems could become capable of e ectively attackingnuclear orces.

63 Muthiah Alagappa, Introduction: Investigating Nuclear Weapons in a New Era, in Alagappa, TeLong Shadow, 23.

64 Nina annenwald, Te Nuclear aboo: Te United States and the Non-Use o Nuclear Weapons since1945 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 386. See also the discussion of strains on thetaboo in Paul, Te radition o Non-Use o Nuclear Weapons, chap. 9.

65 Yost, however, notes that the Soviet Union had other rationales in mind as well. See Yost,Analysing International Nuclear Order, 554.


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Arms races are also affected by both the numeric and qualitative changesdescribed here. Arms races can spiral. For example, India could build upits arsenal in response to Pakistans modernization. China, in turn, mightrespond to India, 66 raising concerns or either Russia or the United States (orboth). Alternatively, a U.S. missile de ense system aimed at reducing threats

rom North Korea is provocative to China and has shaped the countrysmodernization plans.

Adding consideration o the nal source o complexity, that o varyingperceptions on the role o nuclear weapons, only worsens the picture.Stability in the nuclear balance during the Cold War had a ew meanings,but to the United States such stability was the recognition that neither side

had the means or intent to create the capability for a disarming rst strike.Tis balance is impossible to achieve when different countries conceive odifferent roles or their nuclear arsenals. Because some nations such as Russiaand Pakistan have more substantial expectations about the role of nuclearweapons, as discussed in the previous section, they will rely on more advancedand larger arsenals. Tis will pose threats to the more modestly geared orces.While the usual example offered here is the threat posed to China by U.S.forces, China threatens India in an analogous fashion.

Finding a stable balance o nuclear capabilities is hard with two actors.It is harder still with multiple players because of uncertainty about coalitionsand the need to deter multiple actors. When there are different conceptions othe appropriate role o nuclear weapons, and there ore different implications

or sizing and posture, these problems are greatly exacerbated.

A productive debate began in 1995 between Kenneth Waltz and ScottSagan weighing the dangers o nuclear proli eration.67 What this articleargues is that even i we limit our analysis to essentially realist actors such asbalancing power, rst-strike advantages, and interstate coercion, among otherfactors, the outlook for avoiding nuclear con ict is deeply pessimistic. Whencoupled with the dangers surrounding misperception and command andcontrol difficulties emphasized by Sagan, that pessimism is only deepened.

66 e barest inkling of Chinese concern over Indian strategic forces is now apparent at various TrackII meetings in which the author has participated.

67 Sagan and Waltz, Te Spread o Nuclear Weapons .


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Expect things to get worse is not a policy prescription per se, but this view does have several implications. First, whatever the role o the nucleartaboo in recent times, it is likely to decline as the dynamics outlined aboveencourage greater nuclear posturing and a more intense nuclear environment.As noted by Paul J. Bracken, nuclear weapons can be used without beingdetonated; the story o early Cold War diplomacy is riddled with examples onuclear threats being used to serve coercive purposes. 68 As states that have amore expansive view o the utility o nuclear weapons interact with those witha narrower view, such nuclear use will become more common, underminingone o the oundations o the nuclear taboo.

Second, in such a security environment the United States should recognize

that far-reaching and expansive goals are likely to be costly. Regime change,rollback of an adversarys gains, and even active promotion of human rightswill all be riskier than in the past. ere may be times when pursuit of suchgoals is warranted, but in general the high costs should be recognized.

Tird, the implications or orce posture are ambiguous and highlycontingent on individual dyads. Clearly, different strategies can rely on differentoffensive weapons. Similarly, though missile de enses hold the potentialunder some narrow circumstancesto reduce the destabilizing dynamics,

even they exacerbate some o the problems listed above. While modest missilede ense is not particularly destabilizing in a mutually assured destructiondyad with large arsenals on both sides (and indeed may encourage stabilityby reducing concerns over unauthorized launches that would lead to totalwar), or states with existential views about deterrence, any missile de ensesystem may be threatening. On the other hand, increased sensor technologyavailable to all players reduces one set o inadvertent dangers (although at acost to some strategies).

Finally, multilateral arms control agreements will not reduce thesethreats in the near term. Potential costs in terms o instability in peace andwar have clearly remained high in the second nuclear age in Asia, but, aspointed out above, the challenges acing traditional arms control haverisen substantially. 69 Without a shared view o the role o nuclear weapons,cooperative steps to reduce their role will appear disproportionate to oneside or the other. O course, it is ofen the case that various parties view

arms control agreements differently or example, the value o the Nuclear

68 Paul J. Bracken, Fire in the East: Te Rise o Asian Military Power and the Second Nuclear Age (NewYork: HarperCollins, 1999).

69 is view is shared by Brad Roberts, All the Kings Men? Refashioning Global Nuclear Order,International Affairs 83, no. 3 (May 2007): 52330.


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Non-Proli eration reaty (NP ) regime when it was initially constructed wasdifferent or the nuclear haves than or the have-nots.70 But there mustbe recognized, overlapping interests and available compromises or all sides.Given the wide range of perspectives about the utility of nuclear weapons,even that understanding is absent.

Furthermore, traditionally U.S.-Soviet arms control was remarkably one-dimensional: quantitative reductions in offensive systems. Because o thediversication o systems with strategic effect in Asia, that approach is simplynot viable. Different states will be threatened by different orces and will ndmaintaining a range o orces to be reassuring or their own de ense. Tescope o offensive strategic nuclear weapons, non-strategic nuclear weapons,

missile defenses, and conventional precision-strike systems each performdifferent roles or different players. Reaching common agreements about theappropriate restrictions for each seems to be an impossible task. at concernhas already arisen in U.S.-Russia negotiations, and the minor nonbindingre erence toward broader issues (such as missile de ense and conventionalstrike capabilities) almost provoked enough opposition to prevent Senateratication o the New S AR reaty in December 2010.

Add to this complication o multidimensionality the issue o

multipolarity, and the challenges traditional arms control aces seem simplyinsurmountable. If two stateswith somewhat similar experience withnuclear weaponsstruggle to come to a common understanding o the roleo other strategic systems, how much harder will it be or countries withdi erent strategic cultures? When states face multiple potential adversaries,will they be willing to negotiate with only one? Chinese experts have alludedto exactly this concern, voicing reservations about restricting their arsenal inany negotiation with the United States and other NP nuclear-weapons stateswhile India remains outside this regime and is free to expand at will. Untilthere is a deeper understanding o the logic o different countries nuclearstrategies and their interaction, such compromises will be hard to come byin Asia. Increased discussions by all parties regarding the role of nuclearweapons and the means by which nuclear weapons serve this role will be acritical positive step.

At the same time, the challenges posed by an increasingly multilateral

and complex Asia are so high that it is imperative or the United States bothto be restrained in its goals in the region and to recognize the paramount

70 Illustrating this haves perspective vividly is Michael Rhle, Enlightenment in the SecondNuclear Age, International Affairs 83, no. 3 (May 2007): 51122. Analysts from the Non-AlignedMovement, or instance, would express quite a different view.


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importance o nonproli eration strategies, whether they come in multilateral orunilateral guises. It is important to note that the proliferation of technologyranging rom nuclear energy to more conventional weapons systemslies atthe heart o this deterioration o stability in the region, both in general andin the nuclear arena. Policymakers should utilize a broad set of tools and givehigh-level attention to what has at times been regarded as mundane regulatorystructures in the sphere o export controls.

e risks from nuclear weapons are simply higher in the world describedin this article. All statecra balances costs and bene ts. Goals that might havebeen achievable a decade ago will not be achievable a decade in the uturebecause of these dynamics. It is important to recognize that shi .

Documents

Asia’s Complex Strategic Environment Nuclear Multipolarity and Other Dangers