Asean Nishihara

7/30/2019 Asean Nishihara

1/14

11

Japans Political and Security Relations

with ASEAN

Nish ihar a Masash i

Over th e six decades since the end of World War II, Japan has grad ually

tr ansform ed its political and secur ity ro le from a self-con tro lled, low-

pro file po sture to a willing part icipator y role. At first, the nat ion, whose

m ilitarism was the cause of deep h atred in Asia, was reluctan t to play a

political role in the r egion , and for m any years Tokyo strictly lim ited th e

m ission of its Self-Defense Forces (SDF) to hom eland defense. Only since1991 have these forces been deployed for intern ational peace effor ts.

Japans Changed Secur it y Rol e

In th at landm ark year, by adop ting a flexible in terpretation of its consti-

tut ion, Tokyo dispatched several minesweeping ships of the Mar itime Self-

Defense Force (M SDF) to the Persian Gu lf. Then, in 1992, in Cam bodia,

Japan part icipated for the first tim e in Un ited Nations peacekeeping op-

eration s (PKOs). There was opp osition am on g po licy m akers and critics

to send ing SDF m embers to Asia even u nder U N auspices, largely because

of th e possibility of negative reaction s from Asia. Yet the govern ment went

ahead an d sent some 600 troops to Cam bodia. In 2002, Japan decided to

par ticipate in its fou rth peacekeeping mission in Asia, send ing 700 mem -

bers of SDF to East Timor. Since then, Japans par ticipation in U N peace-

keeping operations has becom e a norm al practice.

Parallel with these developments in the 1990s, Japans outlook on its

defense role had also begun to change significant ly. In 1996, Japan and

"Japan's Political and Security Relations with ASEAN," ASEAN-Japan Cooperation:A Foundation for East Asian Community; (ed. Japan Center for International Exchange), Tokyo:Japan Center for International Exchange, 2003, pp. 154-167.

Copyright 2003, Japan Center for International Exchange
http://www.jcie.or.jp/http://www.jcie.or.jp/books/abstracts/A/asean-japan.html


2/14

155

Japans Polit ical and Security Relations w ith ASEA N

the United States redefined their security roles in Asia Pacific by issuing a

join t declaration . The new law subsequen tly enacted st ipu lated that the

SDF would provide logistical supp or t in non combat areas for U.S. forces

operating in the vicinity of Japan ese territo ry. Th is was a m arked d epar-tu re from th e previous defin ition o f Japan s role, which was lim ited to

defense of its hom eland on ly, and it was followed by passage in 2001 of a

special law allowin g th e cou n tr y to join th e in tern ation al fight against

terrorism. The MSDF was authorized to sail to th e Indian O cean to sup -

ply fuel for the naval forces of eight like-m inded n ations operat ing there

against Al Qaeda forces; as of sum m er 2003, there were ten n ation s that

Japan was servicing in t he r egion .

In July 2003, the Diet p assed an oth er special law, enabling Japan to d is-patch SDF troops to Iraq, provided their activities were of a nonm ilitary

natu re and were condu cted in n oncombat areas within Iraq.

Several factors have influ enced th is tr ansfor m ation . First, Japan ese at

ho m e have chan ged th eir attitud e toward th e SDF, with a growing per-

cent age of the pop ulation now supp orting an expanded ro le for th e SDF

in ord er that Japan m ight par ticipate in intern ational effort s for peace

and security. Second , the United States has encou raged Japan to bear re-

sponsibility com m ensurate to its capability. Third, cur rent developm entsin th e security environ m ent sur rou nding Japan have seen large-scale ter-

ror ism and Nor th Koreas lon g-ran ge missile program and spy ships. Fi-

nally, and m ost imp or tan t, the internation al com m un ity, par ticularly in

Asia, has changed its att itude toward Japans secur ity role.

Sout heast Asias Changed Per cept ions of Japan

For m any years after World War II, m ost Sou theast Asians regarded th e

m otives behind Japanese trade and investm ent in the region with suspi-

cion . There were fears that Japan was inten t on dom inating the region.

From the 1950s th rou gh the 1980s, they viewed Japans defense capab ility

as a sign of th e resur gence of m ilitarism. The p revailing sent iment was

that Japan would invade the region with m ilitary power, following its eco-

nom ic invasion. Tokyos failure to apo logize for wart ime atrocities, which

included the exploitation of com for t wom en, was furth er ind ication ofits lack of sincerity.

The peak of Southeast Asian cr iticism against Japan , which condem ned

its econom ic overpresence, came in th e early 1970s. When Pr ime Minister


3/14

Nishihar a Masash i

156

Tanaka Kakuei visited Bangkok and Jakarta in 1974, there were violent

student demon strations.

Sou theast Asians tod ay have a m ore realistic view of Japanese political

and m ilitary power, du e in p art to greater confidence in their own eco-nom ic and m ilitary stren gth. Since th e early 1990s, criticism against Ja-

pan has been on the decline. In May 1998, du ring huge antigovern m ent

demonstrations in Jakarta, Japan sent Air Self-Defense Force (ASDF)

planes to Singapore in th e event Japan ese nation als needed to be evacu-

ated. This caused no stir in the region.

In 2001, Japan sent some 700 troops to East Timor to serve in UN peace-

keeping operat ions. As was the case with Japanese SDF in Cam bodia, this

received no criticism from the region. Prim e Minister Koizum i Junichirosannual visits to Yasuku ni Shr ine after 2001 received little reaction from

Sou theast Asia as well, althou gh Ch ina an d Sou th Korea voiced str on g

objections. Between China and Sou theast Asian n ation s, the attitud e to-

ward Japans security role is very differen t.

In the afterm ath of th e terror ist attacks in New York and Washington

in September 2001, Japan ese destroyers sailed t hrou gh th e Strait o f Mal-

acca to the Ind ian O cean to supp ly oil for friendly naval ships involved in

the camp aign there. This operat ion received p ractically no criticism frommember count ries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) .

ASEAN cou ntr ies as a who le now appear to endorse Japans non com -

bat con tribu tions for in ternation al secur ity. Philippine President Gloria

Arroyo, in a Januar y 2002 sum m it meeting with Koizum i, stated that she

expected Japan to p lay an extensive role in the area of internation al secu-

r ity, referr ing specifically to po stwar Afghan istan .

Japans Rat ional e for Pol it ical and Secur it yCooper at ion wit h ASEAN

Parallel chan ges in Japans secur ity ou tlook an d Sou th east Asias view of

an expan ded secur ity role for Japan h ave reinforced the basis for coopera-

tion b etween Japan and Sou theast Asian cou nt ries. In th e new in tern a-

tional and regional security environment, Japan should redefine its

rat ionale for p olitical and secur ity cooperation with ASEAN coun tr ies.

Historically, Japan has always con sidered Sou th east Asia str ategically

impor tan t. Geopolitically, first of all, the region , which con nects the Pacific

Ocean an d the Ind ian O cean, is vital as it cont rols Japan s sea lanes of


4/14

157


comm un ications with Europe and th e Middle East. About 85 percent of

Japan ese oil import s from the Midd le East passes throu gh South east Asian

waters, m ainly the Strait of Malacca and t he Lom bok Strait. In add ition,

Japan obtains about 13 percent o f its comm odity im por ts from EuropeanUnion nations.

Second, Southeast Asia has a pop ulation of over five hu nd red fifty mil-

lion , abou t five tim es Japans. Its m arket, po tent ial and real, for Japan ese

expor ts of industrial goods is highly attract ive. So are the regions natu ral

resou rces, such as Indon esias oil. Sou theast Asian countr ies in tu rn have

good reason to cooperate with Japan as it represents a large tr ading mar-

ket and a source of official development assistance. Friendly, economi-

cally viable ASEAN countr ies are in Japans economic interest. In his speechin Singapore in Janu ary 2002, Koizum i prop osed an Initiative for Japan -

ASEAN Com prehensive Econ om ic Partn ership, the in tent of which is to

strengthen economic ties.

Third, a po litically stab le and econ om ically viable Sou th east Asia can ,

for Japan, serve as a balance to China. Historically, China has regarded

Sou theast Asia as within its sphere of influ encea view acknowledged by

the United States as well as som e Southeast Asian countr ies, and evidenced

by Chin as offering assistan ce to Nor th Vietn am in its southward p ushdu ring the Vietnam War. That sphere of influence no twithstanding, when

Chin a was reinforcing its m ilitary installations on disputed island s in the

Sou th China Sea du ring the 1990s, ASEAN dem and edand Japan sup-

por ted the dem andth at China act in accordance with established stan-

dards of con duct.

Now, in th e early years of the twenty-first century, there are new factors

suggesting a need for Japan to m od ify its trad itional ration ale of po litical

and security coop eration . One factor is Chin a. With r elation s between

ASEAN coun tr ies and Ch ina m uch imp roved in th e last few years, per-

ception s of the Chinese th reat am on g Sou theast Asians are largely gone,

at least on the sur face. China has offered a free trade agreem ent to ASEAN

coun tr ies. The leaders of the ten countr ies of ASEAN n ow meet with t he

leaders of Ch ina, Japan , and Sou th Korea an nu ally. And wh en Koizum i

spoke in Singapore of bu ilding an East Asian Com m un ity, he said he ex-

pected China would be a core mem ber.

Anoth er new factor is the emergence of non traditional security issues.

These are issues relating to human securityillegal migrants, refugees,

illicit d ru g trade, heavily arm ed pirates, illegal flow o f small arm s, envi-

ronm ental degradation, and non state terror ism an d the nature of these


5/14

Nishihar a Masash i

158

issues requires that they be add ressed with coop erative effort. Japan and

ASEAN coun tr ies need to share inform ation regardin g these issues and

take joint action. In the p rocess, a stron g, add ition al base for cooperation

between Japan and ASEAN coun tr ies will be created.

The Cur r ent St at e of Pol it ical and Secur it yCooper at ion

It is in Japans in terest t ha t th ere be a p olitically stab le Sou th east Asia.

One threat to that stability is the illegal flow of small arms. Japan has

taken th e initiative on th is issue, having served as chair of th e UN Grou pof Governm ental Experts on Sm all Arm s in the p ast. In May 2000, Japan ,

together with th e Indon esian governm ent an d the U N Regional Center

for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific, cosponsored the Jakarta

semin ar on Illicit Trafficking in Sm all Arm s and Light Weapon s. All ten

ASEAN coun tr ies attended ; China, Pakistan , and South Korea sat as ob-

servers. The seminar rep resented t he first time that regional coop eration

on th e issue was discussed. In th e next m on th , Japan ho sted the Asian

Regional Workshop on Sm all Arm s.Parts of Southeast Asia continue to suffer from ethnic and religious

strife and from social and political tur m oil caused by povert y and bu -

reaucrat ic cor ru ption . Japan feels com for table with a political role that

prom otes regional stability th rou gh m ediation and econom ic assistance.

In th e postWorld War II period , Japan has stayed away from m ilitary

intervention, and it has refrained from sales of m ilitary hardware and

technology to Asian countr ies.

In ear ly December 2002, Japan , together with the Un ited States, the Eu-

rop ean Union , and the World Bank, hosted a p reparator y con ference in

Tokyo on peace and reconstru ction in Aceh, demonstrating the support of

the international community for peaceful resolution. A week later, repre-

sentatives of the Indonesian government and the Aceh Independence Move-

ment (GAM) group signed an agreement to cease hostilities. When fighting

between the two sides broke ou t again, Japan , un der the auspices of a pr i-

vate found ation, offered a site in Tokyo for negotiations between th e Indo-

nesian governm ent an d th e GAM grou p. The m eeting failed to produ ce a

peaceful resolution , bu t Japan has continu ed its effor ts toward that en d.

In th e sou thern Philipp ines, Mindan ao has been a hotbed of instabil-

ity. It is the stron ghold of the Moro Islam ic Liberation Fron t (MILF) an d


6/14

159

Japans Political and Security Relations w ith ASEA N

the Abu Sayyaf forces, bo th of which have staged ter ror ist att acks on gov-

ernment buildings and foreign tourists. Japan has expressed its willing-

ness to assist Manila in th e area of hum anitarian an d basic hu m an n eeds.

Wh en Arroyo visited Tokyo in D ecemb er 2002, Japan offered aid to sup-port the peace and stability of Mind anao.

As Sou th east Asia grew m ore receptive to Japans po litical role in the

region , so Japan began to work m ore actively for region al security coop-

eration . In 1992, Foreign M inister Nakayam a Taro proposed at the ASEAN

Post-M inisterial Conference that p olitical and secur ity dialogue be add ed

to th e agend a of the senior o fficials m eeting. Th is was at a tim e when,

after p eace had been ach ieved in Cam bodia, ASEAN was searching for a

new ob jective to keep ASEAN int act. Nakayamas prop osal is viewed ashaving contr ibuted to the establishm ent in 1994 of the ASEAN Region al

Forum (ARF). Japan was also instru m ental in th e form ation of the Coun-

cil on Secur ity Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP), a track two o r-

ganization in supp or t of ARF. Japan shared th e first cochair of CSCAP

with Indon esia.

Japan continu es to be an active m ember o f ARF as well as ASEAN + 3

(Ch ina, Japan , and Sou th Korea) an d APEC (Asia-Pacific Econom ic Co-

operation), amon g other regional institutions. Civilian o fficials of the Ja-pan Defense Agency are engaged in regular exchange of securi ty

intelligence with th eir cou nterpart s in m ajor ASEAN coun tries.

Anti-Piracy and Ant iterrorism Cooperation

Piracy at sea in East Asia has becom e so comm on that it is now a significant

problem . Incidents of p iracy in th e region have increased from 80 in 1995

to 257 in 2000; inciden ts involving Japanese ships have gon e from five in

1995 to twenty-two in 2000. There are report s of piracy arou nd Ho ng

Kon g, which, along with Singapore, is one of the busiest por ts in the world.

Pirates tod ay are heavily arm ed an d capable of hijacking large ships. As

half the worlds oil shipm ents pass th rou gh th e Strait o f Malacca, piracy

has becom e a m atter of serious intern ational concern. There is as well

growing fear that p irates and terror ists may join forces.

At th e ASEAN sum mit in November 1999, Prime Minister O buchi Keizo

proposed an international conference devoted to anti-piracy measures.

In April the n ext year, Japan was host to such a con ference, which con-

clud ed with t he adoption by the sixteen coun tr ies present, includ ing all


7/14

Nishihar a Masash i

160

ten ASEAN countr ies, of Asia Anti-Piracy Ch allenges 2000. By this docu-

m ent, count ries agreed to share inform ation abou t piracy incidents expe-

ditiou sly, to strength en cou n term easu res, to assist victim ized sh ips, to

coordinate coast guard activities, to im prove techn ical capabilities in pre-vent ing piracy, and to train app ropriate personn el. The sixteen cou ntr ies

agreed that the same arr angements be applied to surveillance of smu ggled

drugs and small arm s.

In h is Singapor e speech in Januar y 2002, Koizum i followed up o n th is

them e by pro posing that coop eration b etween the coast guard of Japan

and its ASEAN coun terparts be fur thered.

In Jun e 2003, ARF m et in Phn om Penh and adop ted resolution s on

ant i-piracy and ant iterrorism . It endorsed the initiative of the United Statesto strengthen inspection p rocedures of con tainer ships at m ajor p ort s as a

safeguard against terrorist att acks.

Sou theast Asia takes terror ism seriou sly, having suffered from bom b-

ings allegedly m asterm ind ed by Al Qaeda, Jem aah Islam iyah, and Abu

Sayyaf forces. Bom bings in Man ila, Bali, and Jakar ta h ave taken a ter rible

toll, par t of which h as been loss of foreign investment in the region .

Japan has sup ported r eform and up grading of Ind on esias police and

judiciary. To assist in the iden tificat ion of terrorists, it has sen t fingerprin tspecialists to Jakarta.

Obviou sly, effective sur veillance of the flow of goo ds an d p assengers

thro ugh sea and air rou tes between South east Asia and Japan m ust be

maintained.

Military Contacts and Confidence-Building Program s

Today Japan and ASEAN countries have increasing levels of military-to-

m ilitary (MM) contact aim ed at building mu tual tru st.

Since 1994, Japan has sponsored t he an nu al Asia-Pacific Security Semi-

nar, to which officers of the rank of lieutenan t colonel from eighteen n a-

tion s are invited. In 1996, it instituted th e ann ual For um for D efense

Author ities of the Asia-Pacific Region, in which director-generals in charge

of defense policy in the ministry of defense from some twenty nations

par ticipate. Most of th e ASEAN coun tries are included in these meetings.

One of the activities of ARF is the annual m eeting of the head s of de-

fense colleges of m em ber nations. In 2002, Japans defense college, the

Nation al Institute for Defense Studies un der the Defense Agency, hosted


8/14

161


this meeting in Tokyo. The m ajority of personn el who attend these meet-

ings are high-ran king military officers.

Th ere are also regular exchanges of visits at th e defense m inister level.

Since 1997, Japan has been ho lding MM talks with In donesia, Singapore,Thailand, Malaysia, and Vietn am . At M M talks military officers exchange

views on the region al and intern ational security environm ent. These meet-

ings are no t intended to produ ce join t actions, bu t they do p rovide excel-

len t opp or tun ities for officers to int eract.

Cadets and m idshipm en from Indon esia, the Philippines, Singapore,

Th ailand, and Vietnam stud y at th e Nation al Defense Academ y, located

ou tside of Tokyo. In its twen ty-sixyear h istor y of cont acts with t hese

coun tr ies, the academ y has adm itted abou t 190 Sou theast Asian cadets(11 from Ind on esia, 4 from Malaysia, 3 from th e Philipp ines, 36 from

Singapore, 125 from Thailand, and 8 from Vietn am ). The academy also

spon sors an annu al int ernational con ference of cadets, inviting person -

nel from Ind on esia, Malaysia, the Philipp ines, Singapo re, and Thailand .

Officers of the ran k of colon el from several Sou th east Asian cou n tr ies

enro ll in a nine-m on th cou rse at the National Institute for Defense Stud-

ies; Japanese officers similarly study at defense colleges in a few Sou theast

Asian coun tr ies.Join t exercises are new for con fidence building an d region al security

cooperation. In June 2001, Singapore hosted the first western Pacific mine-

sweeping exercise; the naval forces of sixteen nations par ticipated, includ-

ing Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand , and Vietnam . In April 2002,

the MSDF ho sted for th e first time a m ultination al exercise for subm a-

rin e search an d rescue. Five nat ions par ticipated, includin g Singapore;

Ind on esia was an observer.

In 2001 and 2002, high-ran king Japan ese officers were observers at the

ann ual U.S.-Thai joint exercise known as Cobra Gold; Singapore was in -

vited to par ticipate in a par tial phase. While the o riginal pu rpose of Co-

bra Gold was counterinsurgency operations against comm un ist guerr illas,

it has now shifted to UN -sanction ed peace enforcem ent operations.

As these var ious developm ent s suggest, the p erception ASEAN coun-

tr ies have of Japan has un dergone significant change. Today few in South-

east Asia criticize Japans growing political and security role as the

resurgence of Japanese m ilitar ism .


9/14

Nishihar a Masash i

162

Chal l enges t o ASEAN-Japan Cooper at ion

Wh ile there is broad convergence of interests between Japan and ASEAN

coun tr ies, the road toward closer d iplomat ic secur ity coop eration for Ja-pan is no t withou t ob stacles.

Diversity amon g ASEAN Cou ntr ies

The ten coun tries that com prise ASEAN often do no t speak in one voice.

Understan dably, then , there will be occasions when ASEAN does not h ave

a consensus on secur ity issues. So in o rder to m aintain a cohesiveness, theassociation will have to leave con sensus deliberately bro ad or even am -

biguous. Koizum i, in h is 2002 Singapore speech, acknowledged th is di-

versity and stressed that Japan wou ld respect it. It is this sam e diversity,

however, that often m akes cooperation with ASEAN an un certain propo-

sition for Japan .

In recent years, the solidarity of ASEAN has suffered from political set-

back. The association has historically m aintain ed a policy of non interfer-

ence in t he intern al affairs of its mem ber coun tr ies, bu t as the m ilitarygovernm ent of Myanm ar continu es to suppress its democratic opposition

as personified by Aun g San Suu Kyisome fellow ASEAN m ember coun -

tries have grown impatient and begun to advocate intervention. In particular,Indon esia and Malaysia have voiced criticism of the Myanm ar government .

ASEAN also did n ot take a uniform stance on the U.S. war against Iraq.

The Philipp ines was po inted ly in support of the U.S. position , while In-

donesia and Malaysia opp osed it.

In b oth these instances, Japan has not been able to determ ine where

ASEAN as a group h as stood.

ASEANs Posture on Preventive Diplom acy

In theory, ASEAN coun tr ies recognize preventive dip lomacy as a secon d

step following th e first ph ase of d ialogue in the evolution ary pr ocess of

ARF activities. In practice, however, ASEAN countries oppose interven-

tion by ARF into its members intern al affairs.

ASEAN coun tr ies also feel that ter ritor ial disput es do not b elon g on

the ARF agend a. In th is, Japan stand s apart from ASEAN, believing that


10/14

163


the ARF pro cess sho uld p rogress from the dialogue stage to th e phase of

pr event ive dip lom acy. Yet, for Japan to reach agreem ent with ASEAN

m embers on ways to strengthen ARF is not a sim ple, straightforward task.

The Ch ina Factor

H istor ically, Sou theast Asians have perceived the sheer size of Ch ina and

its massive pop ulation as a th reat to their national and econom ic secur ity.

The dom inan t presence in the region of what used to be called overseas

Chinese has also r aised th e fear of Chinese dom ination of Southeast Asia.

H owever, to the extent t hat m ajor ASEAN coun tr ies have become m oreeconom ically confid ent , this fear h as declined. And with Ch inas entr y

into the World Trade O rganization, the Chinese market has opened up

furth er. ASEAN coun tr ies can n ow find m ore bu siness opportu nities in

China than before.

An increasing Chinese econ om ic influence is noted in Laos, Cambod ia,

Myanm ar, an d Th ailand . Econ om ic ties between Yun n an p rovince in

south ern Ch ina and the coun tries that share the Mekon g River have been

strengthen ed with Ch inas large-scale investm ent to improve river tr affic.Chin ese econ om ic presence is also a d istinctive feature of t he n or thern

half of Myanm ar.

The fact is, ASEAN cou ntr ies app ear to be buildin g close econ om ic re-

lation s with China. China h as proposed a free trad e agreemen t with

ASEAN. On ce the agreement comes into effect, ASEAN coun tr ies will find

it easier to enter th e Chinese market than the Japan ese m arket, because

their comm odities are more comp etitive in China.

Thro ugh deepened econom ic ties between Ch ina and ASEAN coun -

tr ies, China can be expected to have more political influence in Sou theast

Asia. In October 2003, China, together with Ind ia, joined ASEANs Treaty

of Am ity and Coop eration , while Japan has declined to do so. This cou ld

m ake futur e secur ity cooperat ion between Japan and ASEAN less close

than that between Ch ina and ASEAN.

Japan also sees anoth er side of Chin a, nam ely, its military expan sion .

Altho ugh imp roved Sino -Japan ese relations make the ASEAN + 3 pro -

cess optim istic, subm erged tension s are likely to persist. This may in t urn

complicate Japanese-ASEAN relations.


11/14

Nishihar a Masash i

164

The Fut ur e of Japan-ASEAN Secur it y Cooper at ion

To suggest directions for Japan-ASEAN political and security coopera-

tion in the future is a challenge. The political and econom ic environ m entof both Japan and Southeast Asia will change as tim e passes; the sam e for

the national power th ey por tr ay. These chan ges will un dou btedly affect

the nature of the relationship between the two. Are we likely to see a stron-

ger Japan or a weaker Japan? And are we likely to see a stron ger ASEAN or

a weaker ASEAN? Even if ASEAN as an institution does not becom e stron -

ger, it is clear that som e ASEAN countr ies will.

The falling bir th rate in Japan s aging society is likely to lead to a de-

cline in Japanese national power u nless ways are found to m ake up for theshor tage of labor with m ore sophisticated capital- and kn owledge-in ten-

sive industries and th e im port o f foreign wor kers. Sou theast Asian societ-

i es , on the o ther hand , wi l l have no shor tage of young people ,

proportion ately and in actual num bers. Here is the basis for an increasing

interdepen dency between Japan and ASEAN coun tries and between Ja-

pan and ASEAN as a grou p.

As ASEAN coun tr ies with auth oritarian govern m ents grow econ om i-

cally richer, they are likely to becom e m ore po litically open by virtu e ofpopu lar dem and . Should all m embers of ASEAN becom e democratic, the

international position of ASEAN will be strengthened. A m ore dem ocrat ic

ASEAN wou ld also p rovide a stron ger and easier basis for po litical

and security cooperation with Japan . The cultivation of close econom ic

relations between Japan and ASEAN cou n tr ies now will encour age the

pace of democratization.

This will, furthermore, bring a degree of maturity to Japan-ASEAN

po litical cooper ation . ASEAN will be m ore po sitively disposed to n ew

po litical and secur ity relations with Japan , as both sides grow to app reci-

ate the imp or tance of each other in m aintainin g their po litical system s

and preserving their n ation al and regional security. This will at the same

tim e enable both sides to work together toward global secur ity by their

shared po sitions on such issues as the proliferation of weapon s of mass

destruction an d reform of the UN Secur ity Coun cil.


12/14

165


Bilateral and Regional Coop eration

With the goal of p eace and secur ity, Japan and ASEAN shou ld work to-

gether on th ree levels: bilateral, region al, and global.Bilateral coop eration h as been th e trad itional and familiar form of co-

operation between Japan and ASEAN coun tr ies. Japan has for m any years

extended official developm ent aid t o ASEAN cou n tr ies with t he belief

that to h elp fight povert y and accelerate the pace of developm ent con -

tr ibutes to the po litical stability of Sou th east Asia. Com preh ensive na-

tion al security, the con cept develop ed or iginally by Prim e Minister Oh ira

Masayoshi in the early 1970s, is now widely accepted in the region. Japan

should work with ASEAN count ries to im prove hum an securitypro-viding assistan ce to refugees as well as con trolling drug traffic, illegal m i-

gration , smu ggling of sm all arm s, piracy, and terro rism.

But Japan -ASEAN secur ity coop eration cann ot b e adequately discussed

simply in a bilateral context. Both sides belong to regional institutions:

th e ASEAN Post-Minister ial Con ference, ARF, ASEAN + 3, Asia-Europ e

Meeting (ASEM), and APEC, among others. Main taining a strong work-

ing relationship in the con text o f such large institut ions can b e difficult

because of th eir expan sive m emb ership, bu t as th e ASEAN Post-Ministe-rial Conference and ASEAN + 3 have been organized with ASEAN as their

core, there remains oppo rtu nity for m utu al cooperation as regards the

bro ader region of East Asia.

North Korea is a case in p oin t. Refugees fleeing Nor th Korea th rou gh

China an d tu rn ing up in Bangkok are an East Asian secur ity issue, not

just a Northeast Asian concer n . Similarly with North Koreas nuclear de-

velopm ent an d sales of n uclear weapons to oth er coun tries. Japan and

ASEAN, bo th of wh ich have their security at stake, sho uld join tly con -

dem n Nor th Koreas nu clear program s. Tensions between China and Tai-

wan an d terr itorial disputes in the Sou th Ch ina Sea have the po tential of

far-reaching repercussions as well, and it behooves Japan and ASEAN to

m ake their stand on these issues clearly and jointly.

They shou ld work together toward t ran sform ing the ASEAN Regional

Foru m , th e ASEAN Post-Min isterial Con ference, and ASEAN + 3 into

m ore effective institu tions. On e way that this m ight be achieved is by en-

hancing the tran sparency of military activities of mem ber n ations throu gh

more exchan ges of military personnel, ship visits, and defense inform ation.

ARF, since its incept ion , has tend ed to b e a talk shop . It m ade t he

mistake of stating that after d ialogue there should be preventive diplom acy,


13/14

Nishihar a Masash i

166

and this position scared o ff several ASEAN m embers. Japan and ASEAN

have the op portu nity to invent m iddle grou nd here: between the stages of

dialogue and of prevent ive diplom acy, an in term ediate stage, which m ight

be termed diplomacy for m ediation , could be introdu ced.

Global Cooperation : Toward Multi-Tier Approaches

As Japan and ASEAN coun tr ies develop m ore m ature po litical and secu-

rity relations, they should n atur ally expan d th eir cooperat ion in to global

secur ity. In doing so, both sides should develop relations with the United

States as their im por tant com m on p artn er.Both sides already have m any levels of con tact with the United States.

As regards po litical and security issues, however, ASEAN often disagrees

with Washin gton; Japan does not. In form al foru m s, ASEAN cou n tr ies

tend to advocate m ultilateral approaches, such as ARF, and to criticize the

dom ineering position of the U.S. power. Yet, ASEAN coun tr ies m aintain

bilateral secur ity ties with the United States th rou gh joint m ilitary exer-

cises and th e education an d tr aining of their military officers at U.S. m ili-

tary institutions.In cont rast, Japan is un wavering in its pron ou ncemen ts of the imp or-

tan ce of its bilateral alliance with th e United States. By suppo rt ing U.S.

troo ps an d bases on its terr itory, Japan m aintains close relations with

Washin gton . The alliance, which h as mad e the U.S. presence in th e west-

ern Pacific possible, has cont ribu ted to the secur ity and, therefore, politi-

cal stab ility of Sou th east Asia. Man y of the joint m ilitar y exercises th at

Southeast Asian cou nt ries part icipate in with t he United States are orga-

nized by U.S. forces station ed in Japan .

ASEAN an d its mem ber coun tr ies need to accept m ore openly the role

that the Japan -U.S. Secur ity Treaty plays in the region. Today ASEAN coun-

tries can benefit from a stronger p resence of the Un ited States in th e re-

gion not U.S. militar y hardware bu t U.S. organizational capabilities in

the fight against global terror ism . The Philipp ines, Singapor e, and Thai-

land have close working relationships with th e United States in their ef-

forts to com bat Al Qaed a, Jem aah Islamiyah, and Abu Sayyaf forces.

Singapore has a bilateral arran gem ent with the United States to reinforce

inspections of container ships.

With th e United States as th eir cru cial comm on par tn er, Japan and

ASEAN countries could make a better contribution to global security.


14/14

167


Heavily arm ed p iracy in Asian waters could b e hand led m ore effectively,

as cou ld m ovemen t of weapon s of m ass destru ction an d sensitive m ili-

tar y techn ologies that m ay pass th rou gh Asian cou n tr ies. In M ay 2003,

the United States proposed a Proliferation Secur ity In itiative to preventweapon s of mass destru ction from being smuggled into th e hands of hos-

tile forces or terror ists. The in itiative has the suppor t o f eleven coun tries,

which includ e Japan but no ASEAN coun tr y. This would seem to be an-

oth er effort th at ASEAN m ight find valuable to join.

The United Nations continu es to be an impor tant instrum ent for peace

and secur ity, which b oth Japan and ASEAN shou ld supp or t. Yet in t his

case as well, th e position s the Un ited States takes are cr itical. Th us, th e

developm ent of better working relationships with the United States shouldbe in their in terest.

In these ways, Japan and ASEAN shou ld m ove gradually toward com-

m on m ulti-tier approaches, creating a mix of bilateral, region al, and glo-

bal coop eration .

Documents

Asean Nishihara