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Luke Roy

Ms. Johnson

English 102

October 2, 2014

Article Review

I am considering researching the harmful effects of anthropocentrism upon the

environment and the feasibility of adopting an ecocentric or biocentric ethic to reorient how

humans view the environment and to repair human inflicted damage upon the environment. In

Rethinking Cosmopolitan Ethics, author Hugh P. McDonald addresses the problems of

anthropocentric or humanist ethics and the effect of said ethic on the environment, in an effort to

establish an ecocentric cosmopolitan ethic that would include the environment in our ethical

system. Moving away from anthropocentrism, as proposed by McDonald, is of the utmost

importance because it could prevent further environmental damage and resituate humanity in its

rightful place in the environment. Unfortunately, McDonald’s analysis of anthropocentrism and

recommendation of an ecocentric cosmopolitan ethic, while insightful, is ultimately useless in

the context of my research because of flaws in McDonald's reasoning.

Hugh P. McDonald is overly qualified to write on the subject of environmental ethics.

McDonald has a Ph.D. in philosophy from New School University and currently teaches at the

New York City College of Technology (“New York City College of Technology”). Additionally,

McDonald is an expert on environmental ethics; he has written numerous articles on how to

properly address environmental problems such as "Pragmatism and the Problem of the Intrinsic

Value of the Environment” and “John Dewey and Environmental Philosophy.” McDonald also

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edited “Pragmatism and Environmentalism.” As shown by his accolades and by the vast works

that he has completed within the academy, McDonald’s possesses a vast knowledge of

environmental ethics and rightly deserves the title of expert in his field (“Hugh McDonald”).

In Rethinking Cosmopolitan Ethics, McDonald argues that anthropocentrism is a

misguided and almost “tribal” ethical system. Anthropocentrism or the belief that humans are the

most valuable species on the planet is inherently exclusionary and violent, similar to how native

tribes excluded and exterminated one another (McDonald 54). When humans adopt an

anthropocentric ethic, they otherize the nonhuman. According to McDonald, this is a

fundamental injustice because it overlooks other species that have the same intrinsic value as

humans. Additionally, this ethic is unjust because it justifies the exploitation of natural resources,

overconsumption, and destruction of natural resources in order to further human progress; for in

a world where humans are of the utmost importance, any atrocity against nature can be justified

for the sake of the human (McDonald 58). McDonald shows humans to be on the same level as

nature by attempting to disprove the existence of the elements of human nature, specifically

uniquely human reason and morality, which are commonly used to distinguish humanity from

the natural world. McDonald “disproves” the existence of human reason by asserting that not

every human can reason with the same proficiency and therefore reason alone does not act as a

qualification for worth because humans who lack certain logistic capabilities still hold value in

our society (McDonald 59). McDonald then explains that morality can also not be used as a

qualification for worth because morality is not intrinsic to humanity. He uses examples of

genocide and racism to show that not all humans have the capability to act ethically (McDonald

59, 60, 61). Additionally he posits that nonhumans have means of evaluation that cannot be

accessed by humans, such as the size of an elephant or the root structure of a tree for example

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(McDonald 59). McDonald then moves on to explain how humans could transcend an

anthropocentric ethic. His solution to the problems of anthropocentrism would be to adopt an

ecocentric cosmopolitan ethic. Ecocentric cosmopolitanism puts the environment as most

valuable and makes humanity along with nonhuman parts of the environment equally responsible

for the environment because they are all cosmopolitan citizens. McDonald also postulates that

this ethic has a melioristic demand in which human action is key not only to save the

environment but also assign value to the nonhuman to repair the damage that has been done over

the course of the Anthropocene (McDonald 71). In theory, if everyone accepted ecocentric

cosmopolitanism, an action would only considered moral if it upheld the environment.

McDonald’s argument appears to be very effective; he takes into account the usual

responses to a rejection of anthropocentrism and provides a feasible ethical model for ecocentric

cosmopolitanism. Unfortunately, McDonald makes logical errors on his criticism of

anthropocentrism that decrease the validity of his points on nonhumans as being a valued part of

the ethical community. When McDonald says that humans are on the same level as nonhumans

because differences in reason exist between both, he fails to present any evidence that

nonhumans have the ability to reason. His argument is predicated off of the fact that because

humans have differing level of reason yet are all morally valuable; reason, therefore, cannot be

used as a justification for moral worth because of the existing differences in ability (McDonald

59). This misses the fact that all humans have at least the base ability for some form of reason

and are thus valuable. When he does not show that nonhumans can reason, he inadvertently

creates a scenario for which they are less than human. For while differences in reason exist, at

some base level all humans have the ability to reason which intern sets them apart from the

nonhuman. Additionally, McDonald’s refutation of humanity as a moral creature is very

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lackluster. He only presents examples in which humanity acted immorally; unfortunately, this

does not disprove humanity’s ability to take moral action. His example’s only show that

humanity retains the capability to willingly become amoral (McDonald 59, 60, 61). Also,

McDonald’s refutation of uniquely human morality is just as fallacious as his refutation of

uniquely human reason. McDonald fails to show that nonhumans can act morally which creates

another reason to separate humans from nonhumans, for if nonhumans, as is currently viewed

from an anthropocentric standpoint, are incapable of acting morally, they do not belong in any

ethical system. McDonald repeatedly tries to reduce humans to that of nonhuman instead of

explaining equal footing, this is inadequate to prove a place for the nonhuman as it just devalues

the human and does not show that the nonhuman belongs in the system. Additionally,

McDonald perpetuates anthropocentrism when he purposes that human adoption of ecocentric

cosmopolitanism is key to prevent the woes of anthropocentrism (McDonald 71). This

melioristic stance on ecocentric cosmopolitanism shows the inevitability of anthropocentrism,

for according to McDonald, the only way for ecocentric cosmopolitanism is if humans get

involved. This reflects a subtle anthropocentric bias in McDonald’s thought for he views humans

as being the necessary catalyst for social change.

In conclusion, I have found that although McDonald makes a few good points on the

injustice of anthropocentrism and the possible workability of ecocentric cosmopolitanism, his

logical flaws discredit his conclusions as a whole. I would not use his article in my research

because it fails to adequately address the problems of anthropocentrism. However, I would use

his article in conjunction with another to show the possibility of ecocentric cosmopolitanism as a

starting point to develop an ethical system that would include the environment. McDonald’s

argument has increased my interest in environmental ethics by showing the effect of a

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cosmopolitan standpoint on human interactions with the nonhuman. By researching McDonald’s

work on ecocentric cosmopolitanism I have been able to find the works of Peter Singer and Aldo

Leopold which I believe will lead me to find a more holistic approach to adequately addressing

the problems of anthropocentrism. I hope that this analysis of McDonald’s work along with my

research on anthropocentrism will allow me to compose a response to anthropocentric ethics

with a pragmatic alternative.

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Works Cited"Hugh McDonald." HF UNI Koeln. Universität Zu Köln, n.d. Web. 30 Sept. 2014.

McDonald, Hugh P. "Rethinking Cosmopolitan Ethics." Value Inquiry Book Series 273.(2014): 51-83. Academic Search Complete. Web. 30 Sept. 2014

"New York City College of Technology - Social Sciences - Faculty - Hugh P. McDonald." New York City College of Technology - Social Sciences - Faculty - Hugh P. McDonald. N.p., n.d. Web. 30 Sept. 2014.