Article III Bill of Rights Compilation

8/12/2019 Article III Bill of Rights Compilation

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Article III BILL OF RIGHTSSignificance.Government is powerful. When limited, itbecomes tyrannical. I t is agua ra nt ee th att he re a re ce r ta in a reas o f pe rson s l i f e ,l i b er t y o r p r ope r t y wh ic h government powermay not touch.

All the powers of the government (police power,

power of eminent domain and power of taxation) arelimited by the Bill of Rights.

Classification of Rights:1.Political Rightsgranted by law to members of a community in

relation to their direct or indirect participation in the

establishment or administration of government.

2.Civil Rightsrights which municipal law will enforce at theinstance of privateindiv iduals for the purposeof securing them the enjoyment of theirmeans of happiness.

3.Social and Economic Rights these are the rights which generallyrequireimplementing legislation. (Article XIII)

Doctrine of Preferred Freedom (Hierarchy ofRights)some rights are preferred

PBM Employees Org. vs. PBM Co., Inc., 51 SCRA 189

While the Bill of Rights also protects property rights,the primacy of human rights o v e r p r o p e r t y i sr e c o g n i z e d . B e c a u s e t h e s ef r e e d o m s a r e d e l i c a t e a n d vulnerable, as well as supremely precious inour society and the threat ofsanctions maydeter their exercise almost as potently as the actualapplication ofsanc t ions , they need

brea th ing space to su rv ive , pe rmi t t inggovernment regulation only with narrow specificity.

Property and property rights can be lost thruprescription; but human rights are imprescriptible.

In the hierarchy of civil liberties, the rights offree expression and of assembly occupy apreferred position as they are essential to thepreservation and vitality of our civil and politicalinstitutions; and such priority gives these libertiesthe sanctity and the sanction not permitting dubious

intrusions.

The superiority of these freedoms over property

and immed ia t e danger o f a substantive evilwhich the State has the right to prevent.

Sec. 1, Art. IIINo person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property withoutdue process of law nor shall any person be denied the equalprotection of the laws.

LIMITATIONS OF SOVEREIGNTY

Inherent in sovereignty, and therefore not evenrequired to be conferred by the Constitution, are thepolice, eminent domain, and taxation powers. TheBill of Rights, notably the due process, equalprotection and non-impairment clauses, is a meansof limiting the exercise of these powers by imposingon the State the obligation to protect individualrights. The Bill of Rights is addressed to the State,notably the government, telling it what it cannot do to theindividual.

A . D U E P R O C E S S O F L A W That which hears before it condemns, whichproceeds upon inquiry and renders judgmentonly after trial.

Applies to all persons, without regard to any difference inrace, color or nationality

Artificial personscovered but only insofar as their propertyis concerned.

Extends to aliens

Includes the means of livelihoodResponsiveness to thesupremacy of reason, obedience to the dictates of

justice.

(Ermita-Malate Hotel & Motel OperatorsAssociation vs. City of Manila, 20 SCRA849)

Lifeincludes the right of an individual to his bodyin its completeness, free from

d ismemberment , and ex tends to the useo f God-g iven facu l t ies wh ich make l i f eenjoyable.

Libertyincludes the right to exist and the right to be freefrom arbitrary personal re st ra int or ser vi t ud e.x x x I t inc ludes the r igh t o f the c i t i zento be f ree t o use h is faculties in all lawful ways.

(Rubi vs. Provincial Board of Mindoro, 39 Phil 660)Property

is anything that come under the right of ownershipand be the subject of contract. It representsmore than the things a person owns; it


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actions of judicial and quasi-judicial agencies of thegovernment.

Requisites:(non-criminal cases)a.An impartial courtor tribunalclothed with

judic ial power to hear anddetermine matter beforeit;

b.Jurisdictionp r o p e r l y a c q u i r e d o v e rp er s o n o f d e f en da n t a n d o ve r propertywhich is the subject matter of the proceeding;

c.Opportunity to be heard; and

d.Judgment r e n d e r e d u p o n l a wf u lh e a r i n g a n d b a s e d o ne v i d e n c e adduced.

Impartial Court or TribunalJudges must not only be impartial but must also

appear to be impartial as an added assurance tothe parties that his decision will be just.In

Anzaldo vs. ClaveJacobo Clave, acting as Chairman of CSC,rendered a decision against petitioner. When petitionerappealed to the Office of the President, the same JacoboClave, but this time acting as Presidential Executive

Assistant, upheld his own earlier decision. The SC heldthat this violates fundamental fairness required bydue process. A public officer who decided the caseshould not be the same person to decide it on appeal

because he cannot be an impartial judge.

People vs. Mendenilla (2001),judges have as much interest as counsel in theorderly and expeditious presentation of evidence,and have the duty to ask questions tha t wou lde l i c i t the fac ts on the issues invo lved ,c lar i f y am b ig uo us rem ar ks b y witnesses andaddress the points overlooked by counsel. Questionswhich merely clear up dubious points and elicitrelevant evidence are within the prerogative of a judge toask.

Sec. 14 (1), Art. IIINo person shall be held to answer for acriminal offense without due process of law.---This is procedural due process in criminal casesRequisites of Criminal Due Process:a.Accused has been heard in a court of competent

jurisdiction;b.Accused is proceeded against under the orderlyprocesses of law;c.Accused is given notice and opportunity t obe heard;

d.Judgment rendered within authority ofconstitutional law

restriction on the governments law and rule-makingpowers; a prohibition of arbitrary laws.

The heart to substantive due process is thereasonableness, or the absence of exerc ise o farbitrary power. These are necessarilyre lati ve concepts which depend on thecircumstances of every case.

As a general rule, when the State acts to interferewith life, liberty, or property, the presumption is thatthe action is valid. In rare cases, as in priorrestraint,there is a presumption of invalidity.

Requisites:a. In ter est o f the pub l i c ;b. Means employed are reasonably

necessary for accomplishment ofpurpose and not unduly oppressive.

The legislature may not, under the guise of

protecting the public interest, arbitrarilyinterfere with private business or impose unusualand unnecessary restrictions upon lawful occupations.

Void-for-vagueness Rulea c r im ina l s ta tu te tha t fa i l s to g ive aperson of ordinary intelligence fair noticethat his contemplated conduct is forbiddenby the statute, or is so indefinite that it encourages arbitraryand erratic arrests and convictions is void forvagueness. The constitutional vice in avague or indefinite statute is the injustice to

the accused in placing him on trial for an offense,the nature of which he is given no fair warning .

A law is vague as not to satisfy the due processneed for notice when it lacks comprehensiblestandards that men of common intelligence mustnecessarily guess as to its meaning and differ asto its application or is so indefinite that itencourages arbitrary and erratic arrests andconvictions.It is injustice to the accused in placinghim on trial for an offense, the nature of which he isgiven no fair warning.

It is repugnant to the Constitution in2 aspects1.It violates due process for failure to accordpersons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair noticeof the conduct to avoid; and

2.It leaves law enforcers unbridled discretionin car ry ing out its provis ions and become anarbitrary flexing of the Government muscle. The act mustbe utterly vague on its face, that is to say, it cannotbe clarified by either saving clause or by

construction.

(People vs. Dela Piedra, 350 SCRA


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statutes results in striking them down entirely onthe ground that they might be applied to parties notbefore the Court whose activities areconstitutionally protected. It constitutes adeparture from the case and controversyrequirement of the Constitution and permitsdecisions to be made without concrete factualsettings and in sterile abstract contexts.

Tanada vs. Tuvera, 146 SCRA 446 (1986),Motion for reconsideration. xxx[T]he clause "unless it is otherwise provided"refers to the date of effectivity and not to therequirement of publication itself, w/c cannot in anyevent be omitted. This clause does no t me antha t the leg is la tu re may make the lawef f ec t i ve im me d iat el y u po n approval, or onany other date, w/o its previous publication. Publication isindispensable in every case, but the legislature may in itsdiscretion provide that the usual 15-day period shall beshortened or extended. I t i s not co r r ec t to say

tha t under the d ispu ted c lausepublication may be dispensed w/ altogether.The reason is that such omission would offend dueprocess insofar as it would deny the publicknowledge of the laws that are supposed to governit.Conclusive presumption of knowledge of the law.--The conclusive presumption thatevery personknows the law p resupposes tha t the lawhas be en pu b l i shed i f t he presumption is tohave any legal justification at all. The te rmLaws s h o u l d r e f e r t o a l l l a w s a n d n o t

o n l y t o t h o s e o f g e n e r a l application, forstrictly speaking all laws relate to the people ingeneral albeit there are some that do not apply tothem directly. An example is a law grantingcitizenship to a p a r t i c u l a r i n d i v i d u a l ,l i k e a r e l a t i v e o f P r e s . M a r c o s w h ow a s d e c r e e d i n s t a n t naturalization.

RULE:All statutes, including those of local application andprivate laws, shall be published as a condition fortheir effectivity, w/c shall begin 15 days after

publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed by thelegislature.

Coverage:Covered by this rule are PDs and EOs promulgatedby the Pres. In the exercise of legislative powers.

Administrative rules and regulations must also bepublished if their purpose is to enforce orimplement existing law pursuant to a validdelegation.

Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature,

i.e., regulating only the personnel of the administrativeagency and not the public, need not be published.Ne i the r is pub l ica t ion requ i red o f the

Publication of laws is part of substantive dueprocess. It is imperative to the validity of laws, PDs,EOs, Administrative rules and regulationsexceptinterpretative legislations.(Taada vs. Tuvera, No. L-63915, December 29, 1986)

Notes

: In the original caseTanada vs. Tuvera, 136 SCRA 27 (1985), the SC ruled that as a matter of substantive dueprocess, any law must be published before thepeople can be expected to observe them. But,according to a split decision, publication need notbe made in the Official Gazette. It is enough that it bepublished in a newspaper of general circulation. After theEDSA revolution, upon the reconstitution of the SC,the original judgment was reconsidered, and theSC now ruled that publication must be made in theOfficial Gazette, pursuant to CA 638 and the Civil

Code, unless a law "provides otherwise" that is, adifferent mode of publication. What must be publishedare (1) all laws of general application, and eventhose not of general application like (2) private lawsaffecting only particular individuals, e.g., legislativegrant of citizenship, (3) laws of localapplication, and (4) rules and regulations ofasubstantive character. This means not only the title but theentire law. When?Forthwith, that is,immediately

. Where?Only in the Official Gazette

Secretary of Justice vs. Lantion (2000),an extraditee is not entitled to notice andhearing during the evaluation stage of theextradition process. PD 1069 affords anextraditee sufficient opportunity to meet theevidence against him once the petition is filed incourt. During the evaluation stage, right to know iswithheld to accommodate the more compellinginterest of the Stateto prevent escape of potentia

extradite which may be precipitated by prematureinformation on the basis of the request for extradition.

Roxas vs. Vasquez (2001),lack of notice to, participation ofcomplainants at the REINVESTIGATION doesnot render the resolution of the Ombudsman nulland void.(But in preliminary investigation, their participationis needed.)

Exceptions to Notice and Hearing RequirementsPhi lcomsat vs . Alcuaz (1989)

wi thou t conduc t ing any hear ing , NTCordered PHILCOMSAT to reduce its rates by


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the Court upheld the temporary rates grantedby the NTC asserting that the law allows the NTCto approve temporary rate requested by publicservice agency provided hearings are heldwithin 30 days thereafter.

As a general rule, notice and hearing, as thefundamental requirements of procedural dueprocess, are essential only when an

administrative body exercises its QUASI-JUDICIAL function.

In the exercise of its EXECUTIVE or LEGISLATIVEfunctions, such as issuing rules and regulations, anadministrative body need not comply withthe requirements of notice and hearing.

Suntay vs. People (1957)the passport of a person sought for the commissionof a crime may be cancelled without notice and hearing.

Equitable Banking Corp. vs. Calderon, G.R. No. 156168,December 14, 2004,the Sc ruled that no malice or bad faith attended the Banksdishonor of Calderons credit card,in asmuch as thedishonor was justified under its Credit Card Agreementwhich provided that the cardholder agreed not toexceed his approved credit limit, otherwise the cardprivilege would be automatically suspended without notice tothe cardholder.

Appeal and due processAppeal is not a natural right nor is it a part of due

process; generally, it may be allowed or denied bythe legislature in its discretion. But where theConstitution gives a person the right to appeal,denial of the right to appeal constitutes aviolation of due process. Where there is statutory grantof the right to appeal, denial of that remedy also constitutes adenial of due process.

Preliminary Investigation and due processP re l im ina ry inves t iga t ion is no t acons t i tu t iona l r igh t , bu t i s mere ly ar ig ht conferred by statute

(Serapio vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No.148468, January 28,2003).It may be waived expressly or by failure toinvoke it

(Benedicto vs. CA, G.R.No. 125359, September 4,2001).The right may be forfeited by inaction, and cannot beinvoked for the first time on appeal

(People vs. Lagao, G.R. No. 118457, April

8,1997).G o v s . C A, 2 0 6 S C R A 1 38 ,w h e n t h e r e i s s t a t u t o r y g r a n t o f t h er i g h t t o preliminary investigation, denial of

publicity. Petitioners cannot just rely on thesubliminal effects of publicitybecause these arebasically unbeknown and beyond knowing.(Webb vs. De Leon,1995)

Does the due process clause encompass the rightto be assisted by counsel during an administrativeinquiry?No. The right to counsel, which cannot be waived

unless the waiver is in writing and in the presenceof counsel, is a right afforded a suspect or anaccused during custodial invest igat ion. It is notan absolute right and may, thus, be invokedor rejected in a criminal proceeding and, with morereason, in an administrative inquiry. While investigationsconducted by an administrative body may at times be akin toa c r i m i n a l p r o c e e d i n g , t h e f a c tr e m a i n s t h a t u n d e r e x i s t i n g l a w s , ap a r t y i n a n administrative inquiry may or maynot be assisted by counsel, irrespective of thenature of charges and of the respondents capacity

to represent himself, and no duty rests on suchbody to furnish the person being investigated withcounsel. In an administrative proceeding, arespondent has the option of engaging theservices of counsel or not. Thus, the right tocounsel is not imperative in administrativeinvestigations because such inquiries areconducted merely to determine whetherthere are facts that merit disciplinary measuresagainst erring public officers and employees, withthe purpose of maintain the dignity of governmentservice. The right to counsel is not indispensable to

due process unless required by theConstitution or law.

(Lumiqued vs. Exevea, 282 SCRA 125)Is an extraditee entitled to notice and hearingbefore the issuance of a warrant of arrest once thepetition for extradition is filed in court?Both on statutory and constitutional grounds, theanswer is no.

Government of USA vs. Hon. Puruganan, G.R. No.148571, September 24, 2002:1.On the basis of Extradition Law Sec. 6 of PD

1069Extradition Law, uses the word immediateto qualify thearrest of the accused. Thisqualification would be rendered nugatory bysettingfor hearing the issuance of the arrestwarrant. Hearing entails sending notices totheopposing parties, receiving facts and argumentsfrom them, and giving themtime to prepare andpresent such facts and arguments. Arrestsubsequent to ahe ar in g ca n no lo ng er b econs ide red immed ia te . The law cou ldno t have in tended the wor d as a meresuper f lu i t y bu t , on the who le , as a

me an s of impairing a sense of urgency andswiftness in the determination of whether awarrant orarrestshouldbe issued.By using the phrase


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arrest.To determine probable cause for the issuance ofarrest war rants, the Constitution itself requires onlyexamination--under oath or affirmationofcomplainants and the witnesses they may produce.There is no requirement to notify and hear theaccused before the issuance of warrant of arrest.

B.EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSEThe equal protection of the law is embraced

in the concept of due process, as everyunfair discrimination offends therequirements of justice and fair play. It hasnonetheless been embodied in a separate clause in Section1 of Article III to provide for a more specific guaran tyagainst any form of undue favoritism orhostility from the government. Arbitrariness in generalmay be challenged on the basis of the due processc lause . Bu t i f t he pa r t i cu la r ac tassa i led pa r takes o f an unwarran tedpar t i a l i t y or prejudice, the sharper weapon to cut itdown is the equal protection clause. It simply requires

that all persons or things, similarly situated shouldbe treated alike, both as to rights conferred andresponsibilities imposed. Similar subjects, inother words, should not be treated differently, so asto give undue favor to some and unjustlydiscriminateagainst others.It does not require the universalapplication of the laws on all persons orthingswithout distinction. This might in factsometimes result in unequal protection, aswhere,for example, a law prohibiting maturebooks to all persons, regardless of age,wouldbenefit the morals of the youth but violate

the liberty of adults. What the clause requiresi se q u a l i t y a m o n g e q u a l s a sd e t e r m i n e d a c c o r d i n g t o a v a l i dc l a s s i f i c a t i o n . B y classification is meant thegrouping of persons or things similar to each otherin certainparticulars and different from all others inthese same particulars.

(Philippine Judges Association vs. Prado, 227 SCRA703)Who are protectedall persons or things similarly situated

should be treated alike,both as to rightsconferred and responsibilities imposed. Natural and

juridical personsare enti tled to th is guarantee;but with respect to artificial persons, theyenjoy theprotection only insofar as their property isconcerned.

Scope:Political, Economic and SocialEqualityArt. XIII, Secs. 1&2 (social justice)political & economicSect ion 1 T h e C o n g r e s s s h a l l g i v e h i g h e s t

p r i o r i t y t o t h e e n a c t m e n t o f measuresthat protect and enhance the right of all the peopleto human dignity, reducesocial, economic, and

FILIPINO FIRST POLICYTheCongress shall, upon recommendation of the economicand planning agency, when thenational interestdictates, reserve to citizens of thePhilippines or to corporations or associations atleast sixty per centum (60%) of whose capital is owned bysuch citizens,or such higher percentage as Congressmay prescribe, certain areas of investments.TheCongress shall enact measures that will encourage

the formation and operation of enterprises whosecapital is wholly owned by Filipinos.In the grant of rights,privileges, and concessions covering the nationaleconomy and patrimony, the State shall give preference toqualified Filipinos.The State shall regulate andexercise authority over foreign investments withinitsnational jurisdiction and in accordance with its national goalsand priorities.

Art. XII, Sec. 2(2) (reservation of marine resources)economicThe State shall protect the nations marine wealth

in its archipelagic waters, territorial sea, andexclusive economic zone, and reserve its use andenjoyment exclusively toFilipino citizens.

Art. III, Sec. 11 (free access to the courts)political & economicFree access to the courts and quasi-judicial bodies andadequate legal assistance shallnot be denied to any person by reason of poverty.

Art . V I I I , Sec . 5 (5 ) ( lega l a id to thepoor )

xxx Promulgate rules concerning the protectionand enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice,and procedure inall courts, the admission to thepractice of law, the IBP, and legalassistance to theunderprivileged. Such rules shallprovide a simplified and inexpensive procedure forthespeedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform forall courts of the same grade, and shall notdiminish, increase, or modify substantiverights. Rules of procedure of special courtsand quasi-judicial bodies shall remaineffect ive unless disapproved by t heSupreme

Court.

Art. IX-C, Sec. 10 (protection of candidates)politicalBona fide candidates for any public office shall befree from any form of harassment and discrimination.

A r t . I I , S e c . 2 6 ( p u b l i c s e r v i c e ) T h e S t a t e s h a l l g u a r a n t e e e q u a la c c e s s t o opportunities for public service, andprohibit political dynasties as may be definedby law.

Art . I I , Sec . 14 (equa l i ty of womenand men)


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pro te c t ion o f t he law ca n be observed by thenational interest.

But there are areas where aliens cannot be kept away forthe simple reason thatthey cannot be deprived of acommon means of livelihood, especially when theyareadmitted to the country as immigrants.

Valid Classification:

Persons or things ostensibly similarlysituated may, nonetheless, be treateddifferentlyif there is a basis for valid classification. The requisitesare:1.Classi f icat ion must be based onsubs tan t ia l d is t inc t ions wh ich make fo rr ea ldifferences;

2.The distinction must be germane to the purposeof the lawthe distinctions whichare the bases for theclassification should have a reasonable relation tothe purpose of the law

;3.Not limited to existi ng conditions only;and4.It must apply to all members of thesame class.Philippine Judges Association vs. Prado, 227 SCRA 703,

The withdrawal of frankingpr i v i l ege s f ormer l yg ran ted to the jud ic ia ry bu t rema inedwith the executive andlegislativedepartments, was declared unconstitutional,because the three branches of government aresimilarly situated.

Villegas vs. Hui Chiong,the ordinance imposing a work permit fee of P50.00upon alla l i e n s d e s i r o u s o f o b t a i n i n ge m p l o y m e n t i n t h e C i t y o f M a n i l awas declaredunconst i tut ional, becausethe fee imposed was unreasonable andexcess ive, and it failed to consider validsubstantial differences in situation among individualaliens whowere required to pay it.

Sexual Discrimination

Phil. Association of Service Exporters vs.Drilon, 163 SCRA 386,female domesticworking abroad were in a classby themselves because of the special risksto whichtheir class was exposed.

Administration of JusticeChavez vs. PCGG, G.R. No. 130716, December 9, 1988,

Special grant of exemption inf avor o f t heMarcoses as con ta ined in theagreement en te red in to by PCGG

wi th Marcos Family to compromise the ill-gottenwealth cases (exempt from all taxes) filedby t hefo rmer aga ins t the la t te r is a CLASS

Public PolicyCeniza vs. COMELEC, 95 SCRA 763,The law excluding residents of Mandaue Cityfromvoting for provincial candidates was justified as amatter of legislative discretionand that equalprotection would be violated only if group within thecity were allowed tovote while others were not.

Olivares vs. Sandiganbayan, 248 SCRA 700,when the mayor issued permit in favor ofunidentified vendors while imposing numerousrequirements upon Baclaran Credit Cooperatives,he violated the equal protection clause when failedto show that the two were not similarly situated.

Tiu vs. CA, G.R. No. 127410, January 20, 1999,the executive order granting tax and du t yincen t ives on ly to bus iness andres iden ts w i th in the secured a rea o fSu bic Special Economic Zone and denying them to

those who live within the zone but outsidesuch fenced interritory is VALID.The Constitution does not require absoluteequality among residents. It is enoughthat all personsunder like circumstances or conditions are giventhe same privilegesand required to follow the sameobligations.Classif icat ion based on val id andreasonable standards does not violatetheequal protection clause.

International School Alliance ofEducators vs. Quisumbing, G.R. No.128845,June 1, 2000,

there were no reasonable distinctions between theservices rendered byforeign-hires and local-hiresas to justify the disparity in salarie spaid to those teachers.Relative Constitutionality:Central Bank Employees Association vs.BSP, G.R. No. 148208, December 15, 2004,the constitutionality of a statute cannot, in everyinstance, be determined by ame re compar isono f i t s p rov is ions o f the Cons t i tu t ionsi nc e th e st at ut e ma y be constitutionallyvalid as applied to one set of facts and invalid in

application to another.A statute valid at onet ime may become vo id a t ano ther t imebecause o f a l te redc i rcumstances . Thus ,i f a s ta tu te in i t s p rac t ica l opera t ionbec ome s a rb i t r ar y o r confiscatory, itsvalidity, even though affirmed by a formerad jud icat ion , is open toinquiry and investigation inthe light of changed conditions.In

Dumlao v. Comelec, 95 SCRA 392 (1980),the SC upheld the validity of sec. 4 of BatasBlg. 52 disqualifying retired elective local officials

who have received retirement benefits and wouldhave been 65 years old at the start of the term. Itdoes not violate equal protection, for it gives younger


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Sec. 2, Article IIISearches and SeizuresThe right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,papers, and effectsagainst unreasonable searches andseizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall beinviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrestshall issue except upon probable cause to be determinedpersonally by the judge after examination under oath oraffirmation of the complainant and the witnesses hemayproduce, and particularly describing the place to be searched

and the persons or things to be seized.

Scope:The protection is available to all persons, includingaliens, whether accused of crime or not. Artificialpersons are also entitled to the guarantee, althoughthey may berequired to open their books ofaccounts for examination by the State in theexercise of police and taxing powers.T h e r i g h t i sp e r s o n a l ; i t m a y b e i n v o k e d o n l y b yt h e p e r s o n e n t i t l e d t o i t

(Stonehill vs. Diokno, 20 SCRA 383) .As such, t he r i gh t ma y be wa ive dei th er expressly or impliedly, but the waivermust be made by the person whose rightisinvaded, not by one who is not dulyauthorized to effect such waiver.

(People vs.Damaso, 212 SCRA 457)SEARCH WARRANTmay be said to particularly describe thethings to be seized when the description thereinis as specific as the circumstances will ordinarily

allow; or when the description expresses aconclusion of fact, not of law, by which the warrantofficer may be guided in making the search andseizure; or when the things described are limi tedto those which bear direct relation to theoffense for which the warrant isbeing issued.

WARRANT OFARRESTsa id to pa r t i cu la r ly descr ibe the pe rsonto be se i zed i f i t contains the name of the person tobe arrested.

Requisites of a valid warrant:1.I t m u s t b e b a s e d u p o nprobable causesuch fac ts and c i rcumstancesvantecedent to the issuance of the warrantthat in themselves are suff icient to induce acautious man to rely on them and act in pursuance thereof.Itconsists of a reasonable ground of suspicionsupported by circumstancessufficiently strongin themselves to warrant a cautious man inbelieving accused to becommitting the offense or to beguilty of the offense.

For a search warrant such fac ts and c i rcumstances wh ich

(Webb vs. De Leon, G.R. No. 121234, August23,1995)InStonehill v. Diokno, 20 SCRA 385 (1967),42 search warrants were issuedfor alleged violation ofCentral Bank Laws, the Tariff and Customs Code, the NIRCandthe Revised Penal Code. The SCvo ided the war ran ts on the g ro und tha ti t was impossible for the judge to have found

probable cause in view of the number oflawsal l eged t o have been v io l a ted b ythe pe t i t ioner . How cou ld he even knowwha tparticular provision of each law had beenviolated? If he did not know this, how could itbedetermined if the person against whom the warrantwas issued was probably guiltythereof? In truth, thiswas a fishing expedition, which violated the sanctityof domicileand privacy of communications. Toestablish the requirement of probable cause, theruleis: One crime, one warrant.

2.The probable cause must be determined personally by the

judge.The judge shall:a . P e r s o n a l l ye v a l u a t e t h e r e p o r t a n d t h es u p p o r t i n g d o c u m e n t s submitted by thepublic prosecutor regarding the existence ofprobablecause and on the basis thereof, issue a warrant ofarrest; or

b.If the basis thereof he finds no probable cause, hemay disregard theprosecutors report and require

the submission of supporting affidavitsof witnesses toaid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the existenceof probable cause.Under the 1987 Constitution, only a

judge can issue a warrant; the offensive andmuchabused phrase "and other responsible officer as may beauthorized by law" in the1973 Constitution has beenremoved.

The judge must personally examinedi n t h ef o r m o f s e a r c h i n g Q & A s , i n writingand under oath, the complainantand any witnesses hemay produce onfacts personally known to them.

The determination of probable caused e p e n d st o a l a r g e e x t e n t u p o n t h e f i n d i n g o ro p i n i o n o f t h e j u d g e w h o vI t i s n o tn e c e s s a r y t ha t t h e j u d g e s h o u l dp e r s o n a l l y e x a m i n e t h ecomp la inan t and h is w i tnesses ;the judge would simply personally reviewt h e i n i t i a l d e t e r m i n a t i o no f t h e prosecutor to see i f i t i s supportedbysubstantial evidence.

Judge determines the probability, notthe certainty,of the guilt of the accused conducted the required


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Bache and Co. (Phil) v. Ruiz, 37 SCRA 823 (1971).In this case, when the BIR agent and his witnessesarrived in court in the middle of ahearing, the judgesuspended the hearing and directed the branch clerk toexamine andtake the testimony of thewitnesses in his chambers. After he wasthrough with thehearing, he went back to hischambers and finding that the examination wasfinished,asked the BIR agent and his witnesses if

they affirmed what they what they testified to,afterwhich he issued the search warrant in question.

The determination of the reasonableness of thejudicial warrant must be basedon the affidavit ofone who has personal knowledge of the facts towhich he testifies.The testimony cannot be basedon mere belief. Neither can it be based on areport.Otherwise, the warrant is void. Thus , inBurgos v . Ch ie f o f S ta f f,(1984),

re it er at in g th e 19 37 ca se of Rodriguez v.Villamiel, the testimony based on a military reportthat the newspaper WeForum was used forsubversive were held to be not a personalknowledge and so wasinadmissible. Likewise, inCorro v. Lising, 137 SCRA 541 (1985),the testimony based oninvestigation reports thatcertain items in the Philippine Times weresubversive wereheld to be not personal knowledge, andthus the search warrant issued was not valid.4.It must particularly describe the place to be

searched and the persons or thingsto be seized.S e a r c hw a r r a n tW a r r a n to fa r r e s t

The descr ip t ion o f the p roper ty tobe seized need not be technicallyaccuratenor necessarily precise, and its naturewillnecessarily vary according to whethertheidentity of the property or its character is

am a t t e r o f c o n c e r n ; t h ed e s c r i p t i o n i s

General warrantsare proscribed andunconstitutional.However, aJ o h n D o e Warrant(a warrant for the apprehensionof a personwhose true name is unknown)satisfies theconstitutional requireme3nt of particularity ift he re is some

descriptioP a g e 7 1 7 / 1 2 / 2 0 0 8 s

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, the description which read "subversivedocuments,leaflets, papers to promote the objectiveof the Movement for a Free Philippines, theL igh ta F i re Movement , and the Apr i l 6Movement " were he ld no t to bepar t i cu la r descriptions, thus making the warrant ageneral warrant. InCorro v. Lising, the search and seizure of "printed copies

and dummies of Philippine Times, subversivedocuments, articles, printed matters, handbills,leaflets,banners, and typewriters, tape recorders,etc." was again invalidated for the descriptionwasnot at all particular or specific, thus making the warrantsgeneral warrants. When it comes to printed matters, theoffensive material need not be set out infull. It is enough ifit specifies the issues and the title of the articles.The instruction tosei ze "s ub ve r si vemate r ia ls " i s no t va l id because thede te rmina t ion o f whe ther amate r ia l i ssubvers ive o r no t i s no t fo r the po l i ce

officer to decide; no unfettereddiscretionmust be granted to him.The matter is di fferent ifgoods were searched and seized because oftheir intrinsic quality (as when they are stolen orsmuggled), than if the goods were searchedfor the ideasthey contain (as when a "subversive newspaper issought). In the latter case, a more detailed description ofthe physical features of the item is required toavoiddelegating the appreciation of ideas, and thus threatenfree expression.Properties subject to Seizure:1.Propertysubject of the offense;2.Property stolen orembezzled and other proceeds or fruits of the

offense; and3.Property used or intended to be usedas the means of committing an offense.Permissible

Area of SearchInPeople vs. Hindoy, G.R. No. 132662, May 10,2002,the warrantless search andseizure as anincident to a lawful arrest may extendbeyond the person of the onearrested to includethe premises or surroundings under his immediatecontrol.Admissibility of Illegally Seized EvidenceAr t i c lesi l lega l l y se ized a re no t admiss ib le asevidence. The rule has beenconstitutionally

affirmed in Section 3(2), Article III, which providesthat such evidenceshallbe inadmissible for any purpose in any

proceeding.Such evidence is thefruit of the poisonous tree.However, it is submitted that it may nonetheless beused in the judicial or administrative action that maybe filed against the officer responsible for itsillegalseizure.It has also been held that wherethe accused d id no t ra ise the issue o fth eadmissibility of the evidence against him on the

ground that it had been illegally seized,suchomission constitutes a waiver of theprotection granted by Section 3, and


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When the person to be arrested is an escapee or adetention prisoner.(Section5, Rule 113, Rules of CriminalProcedure)The Rule requires that the accused perform someovert act that would indicatethat he has committed,is actually committing, or is attempting to commit anoffense.The offi cer arresting a person whohas just committed, is committing, or is

about tocommit an offense must have personalknowledge of the fact. The offense must also becommittedin his presence or within his view.(People vs. Tudtud & Bolong, G.R. No.144037,September 26, 2003)WARRANTLESS SEARCHES AND SEIZURES(a)When search is made of moving vehiclesThe reason is the person may escape easily if awarrant has to be applied for the mean time. Inthe Tariff and Customs Code, customsagents are specificallyauthorized to search and

seize vehicles even without a warrant. Checkpo i n t sa re va l id in some ins tances depend ingon the purpose (e.g.apprehend a suspectedcriminal) and the circumstances (e.g. probablecause that thecriminal is inside the car). There is noquestion that when a child has beenreportedkidnapped in a community, the police can stop allcars and check if the detained child isin any one of them.(b)When search is an incident to a valid arrest.Rule 126 , Sec . 12 . Search incident to lawful arrest

--A person lawful ly arrested may be searched fordangerous weapons or anything which may beused as proof of the commission of an offense, without asearch warrant.

A person arrested may be searched for dangerousweapons or anything thatproves the commissionof the offense. It follows that the search canonly be madewithin the area of control of the arrestedperson, and within the time of the arrest. InNolasco v. Cruz Pano, 139 SCRA 152 (1985),Milagros Roque and CynthiaNolasco were arrested

at the intersection of Mayon and Margal Streets inQC at 11:30a. m. , ha vi ng be en wa nt ed ash igh o f f i ce rs o f the CPP. A t 12 :00noo n, Roqu e ' s apartment located 2 blocks away, wassearched and some documents seized. The SCat firstheld that the search was valid even if the warrantissued was void for failing todescribe withparticularity the things to be seized, because it wasan incident of a validarrest.But after the EDSArevolution, the reconstituted SC granted themotion for reconsideration and held that justbecause there was a valid arrest did not mean

thatthe search was likewise valid. To be valid, the searchmust be "incidental" to the arrest,i.e., not separated bytime or place from the arrest. If the basis for

apar tmen t were 2 b locks away, these ar ch wo ul d no lo ng er be justif ied sincethere is no way for Roque to go back to theapartment and destroy thedocuments, having beenarrested already.InPeople vs. Chua Ho San, 308 SCRA 432,while a contemporaneous searchof a personarrested may be effected to discoverdangerous weapons or proofs or implements

used in the commission of the crime and whichsearch may extend to thearea within hisimmediate control where he might gainpossess ion of a weapon or evidence he candestroy, a valid arrest must precede the search.The process cannotbe reversed.In a searchincidental to a lawful arrest, as the precedent arrestdetermines thevalidity of the incidental search, the legalityof the arrest is questioned in a large majorityof thesecases, e.g., whether an arrest was merely used asa pretext for conducting a search. In thisinstance, the law requires that there be first

a lawful arrest before asearch can be madetheprocess cannot be reversed.In the case ofPeople vs. Go, 354 SCRA 338 (2001),the police saw the guntucked in appellantswaist when he stood up. The gun was plainlyvisible. No searchwas conducted as none wasnecessary. Accused-appellant could not show anylicensefor the fir earm, whe ther at the time ofhis arrest or thereafter. Thus, he was ineffectcommitting a crime in the presence ofthe police officers. No warrant of arrestwasnecessary in such a situation, it being

one of the recognized exceptions undertheRules.As a consequence of appe llantsvalid warrantless arrest, he may belawfullys e a r c h e d f o r d a n g e r o u sw e a p o n s o r a n y t h i n g w h i c h m a yu s e d a s p r o o f o f t h e commission of anoffense, without a search warrant, as provided inRule 126, Section12. This is a valid searchincidental to a lawful arrest. The subsequentdiscovery in hiscar of drug paraphernalia and thecrystalline substance, which, was later identifiedasshabu, though in a distant place from

where the illegal possession of firearmswascommitted, cannot be said to have beenmade during an illegal. As such, theseizeditems do not fall within the exclusionary clause.Hence, not being fruits of the poisonoustree, the objectsfound at the scene of the crime, such as the firearm, theshabu and thedrug paraphernalia, can be used asevidenced against appellant. Besides, it hasbeenheld that drugs discovered as a result of a consentedsearch is admissible in evidence.InPeople vs. Molina, 352 SCRA 174 (2001),to constitute a valid

in flagrantedelitoarrest, two (2) requisites must concur: 1) the personto be arrested must executean o ver t ac t


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evidence in the trial of the case.Thesearch , however , mus t becon temporaneous to the a r res t andma de w i th in a permissible area ofsearch.Requ isit e: t he apprehending off icermust have been spurred by probable causeineffecting the arrest which could be considered asone in cadence with the instances of permissiblearrest enumerated in Section 5(a), Rule 113 of the Rules of

Court.P a g e 7 5 7 / 1 2 / 2 0 0 8 s

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2008 Political Law and Public InternationalLawPersonal Review Notes (taken from various

sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas,Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-Rreviewmaterials,www.pinoylaw.net

, etc.)Ma. Luisa Angeles RamosIn the case ofPeople vs. Montilla, G.R. No. 123872, January 30,1998,theofficer could reasonably assumesincethe informant was by their side and hadsoin fo rmed them and po in ted ou t th ecu lp r i t t ha t the d rugs were in the

appe l lan t s luggage, and it would have beenirresponsible, if not downright absurd, forthem toadopt a wait-and-see attitude at the risk ofeventually losing their quarry.(c)When things seized are within plain view of a searchingpartyPeople vs. Hedishi Suzuki, G.R. No. 120670,October 23, 2003,whenever the rightagainst unreasonablesearch and seizure is challenged, anindividual may choosebetween invoking theconstitutional protection or waiving his right by

giving consent tothe search and seizure. Areasonable search is not to be determinedby any fixedformula but is to be resolved according tothe facts of the case.Plain View Doctrinefinds application only when the incriminating nature of theobjectis in the plain view of the police officer.The lawenforcement officer must lawfully make an intrusionor properly be in aposition from which he canparticularly view the area. In the course ofsuch lawful intrusion, he came inadvertentlyacross a piece of evidence incriminating the

accused.The object must be open to eye and hand and itsdiscovery inadvertent.It is clear that an object is inplain view if the object itself is plainly

crime, contraband or otherwise subject toseizure.(People vs. Doria, 301 SCRA668)Requisites:1 .Va l id in t rus ion based on a va l idwar ran t less a r res t in wh ich the po l i ceare legally present in the pursuit of their officialduties;2.The evidence was inadver tentlydiscovered by the police who have the rightto

be where they are;3.The ev idence must beimmediately apparent; and4.Plain view justifiedmere seizure of evidence without further search.(d)Stop-and-FriskIt is defined as the vernacular designation of theright of a police officer to stop a

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2008 Political Law and Public InternationalLawPersonal Review Notes (taken from varioussources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas,Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-Rreviewmaterials,www.pinoylaw.net

, etc.)Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramoscitizen on the street, interrogate him, and pat him

for weapons where a police officer observes anunusual conduct which leads him reasonablyto conclude in light of hisexperience thatcriminal activity may be afoot and that thepersons with whom he isdealing may be armedand presently dangerous, where in the course ofinvestigatingthis behavior he identified himself as apoliceman and make reasonable inquiries,andwhere nothing in the initial stages of theencounter serves to dispel his reasonable fear forhis own or others safety, he is entitled for theprotection of himself or others in thearea to conduct

a carefully limited search of the outer clothing ofsuch persons in anattempt to discover weapons whichmight be used to assault him.The interest of effectivecrime prevention and detection allows a policeofficer toap pr oac h a pe rs on , inappropr ia te c i rcumstances and manner ,f o r pur poses o f investigating possible criminalbehavior even though there is insufficient probable causetomake an actual arrest.Requisites for Stop-and-Frisk1.Thepolice officer should properly introduce himself andmake the initial inquiries,approach and restrain aperson who manifests unusual and suspicious

conduct,in order to check the latters outer clothing forpossibly concealed weapons.2.The apprehendingofficer must have a genuine reason to
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t h e authorities. The waiver must be expressly made. It mustbe given by the person whoseright is violated.InPeople vs. Bongcarawan, G.R. No. 143944, July 11, 2002,the shabu in thebaggage of the accused wasfound by (private) security officers of theinterislandpassenger vessel who thenreported the matter to the Philippine CoastGuard. Thesearch and seizure of thesuitcase and contraband items were carried

out withoutgovernment intervention. Accordingly, theexclusionary rule may not be invoked.(f)Searches of vessel and aircraft for violation of fishery,immigration and customs law(g)Searches o f au tomob i les a t bo rders o rcons t ruc t ive bo rders fo r v io la t ionof immigration and smuggling laws

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, etc.)Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos(h) Inspection of buildings and other premises for the

enforcement of fire, sanitary and building regulations(i)Conduct of areal target zoning andsaturation drive in the exercise ofmilitary powers of the President(j)Visual search at checkpointsConstitutionality of checkpoints and "arealtarget zonings"; doctrine ofexigentcircumstancesThe cons t i tu t iona l r igh t aga ins tun reasonab le searches and se izu res is

apersonal right and can be invoked only by thosewhose rights have been infringed, or threatened to beinfringed.Not all searches and seizures areprohibited. Those which are reasonable arenotforbidden. Those which are warranted by theexigencies of public order a nd areconductedin a way least intrusive to motorists areallowed. For, admittedly, routinecheckpointsdo intrude, to a certain extent, on motorists right tofree passage withoutinterruption, but it cannot bedenied that, as a rule, it involves only a briefdetention of travellers during which the vehicles

occupants are required to answer a brief questionortwo. For as long as the vehicle is neither searchednor its occupants subjected to abody search and

to be able to easily perpetrate theirmal ic iousdesigns.There is no need forc h e c k p o i n t s t o b e a n n o u n c e d . N o to n l y i t w o u l d b e impractical, it would also forewarnthose who intend to violate the ban. Even so, badgesofleg i t imacy o f checkpo in ts may s t i l l bein fe r red f rom the i r f i xed loca t ion andth eregularized manner in which they are operated.(People vs. Usana, 323 SCRA 754)

Knock and Announce Principle

General Rule: Police officers are obliged togive notice, show their authority anddemandthat they be allowed entry. They may only breakopen any outer or inner door or window of a houseto execute the search warrant if, after such noticeand demand,such officers are refused entry to the place ofdirected search.Exceptions: Unannounced intrusion into thepremises is permissible when:

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, etc.)Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos

1.A party whose premises or is entitled t othe possession thereof refuses, upondemand,to open it;2.When such person alreadyknew of the identity of the officers and ofthei r author it y andpersons;3.When the officersare justified in the honest belief that there is animminent peril to life or limb;4.W hen th ose i nthe p remises , aware o f the p resence o fsomeone ou ts ide , a re thenengaged inan ac t iv i t y wh ich jus t i f ies the o f f i ce rsto believe that an escape or thedestructionof evidence is being attempted.

(People vs. Huang Zhen Hua and Lee,G.R. No. 139301,September 29, 2004)InP e o p l e v s . M a r t i , 1 9 3 S C R A 5 7 ,the constitutional protectionagainstunreaso nable sear ches andse izu res re fe rs to the immun i ty o f one sperson f rom interference by government and itcannotbe extended to acts committed byprivateindividuals so as to bring it within the ambit ofalleged unlawful intrusion.

Do the ordinary right against unreasonablesearches and seizures apply to searchesconducted
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Such recognition is implicit in airport securityprocedures. With increasedconcern overairplane hijacking and terrorism has comeincreased security at thena tions airports.Passengers attempting to board an aircraftroutinely pass throughmetal detectors; theircarry-on baggage as well as checkedluggage, are rout ine lysubjected to x-ray scans.Should these procedures suggest the presence of

suspiciousobjects, physical searches areconducted to determine what the objects are. Thereislittle question that such searches are reasonable,given their minimal intrusiveness, thegravity of thesafety interests involved, and the reduced privacyexpectations associatedwi th ai rline trave l. Indeed ,travelers are often notified through airportpublic addresssystems, signs, and notices intheir airline tickets that they are subject to searchand, if any proh ibited materials or substancesare found, such would be subject toseizure .Thes e an nounce ments p lac e

passengers on no t ice tha t o rd ina rycons t i t u t i ona l protection against warrantlesssearches and seizuresdo not apply to routine airport procedures.People vs. Susan Canton, G.R. No. 148825,December 27, 2002,a search madepu rsu ant to a r out inea i rpo r t secur i t y p rocedure is a l lowedun d er RA 62 35 , wh ich provides that everyairline ticket shall contain a condition that hand-carried luggage,etc ., sh al l be su bj ec t to

search , and th is cond i t ion sha l l fo rmpart of the contractbetween the passengerand the air carrier. To limit the action of theairport securitypersonnel to simply refusing thepassenger entry into the aircraft and sending her home(assuggested by the appellant), and thereby deprivingthe security personnel of abilityand facility to actaccordingly, including to further search without warrant, inlight of suchcircumstances, would be sanctioned impotenceand ineffectiveness in law enforcement,

P a g e 7 9 7 / 1 2 / 2 0 0 8 sa y

, etc.)Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramosto the detriment of the society. The strip search inthe ladies room was justified underthecircumstances.Procedure for Seizure of PornographicMaterials:To justify a warrantless search as anincident to a lawful arrest, the arrest mustbe onaccount of a crime having been committed;1 .Ther emust be a c r im ina l charge aga ins t theperson fo r pu rvey ing theporno materials;2.Application for search warrantmust be obtained from the judge;3.Materials must

be brought to court in the prosecution of theaccused for the crimecharged;4.Determinationwhether the items confiscated are pornographic


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Article III Bill of Rights Compilation